Persons Criminally Liable

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 133527-28. December 13, 1999.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , plaintiff-appellee, vs . JEANETTE

(GINETTE) YANSON-DUMANCAS, POL. COL. NICOLAS TORRES, POL.
INSP. ADONIS ABETO, POL. OFFICER MARIO LAMIS Y FERNANDEZ,
DOMINADOR GEROCHE Y MAHUSAY, JAIME GARGALLANO,
ROLANDO R. FERNANDEZ, EDWIN DIVINAGRACIA, TEODY DELGADO,
CESAR PECHA, CHARLES DUMANCAS (Acquitted), POL. OFFICER
JOSE PAHAYUPAN (Acquitted), VICENTE CANUDAY, JR. (Acquitted),
accused,
JEANETTE (GINETTE) YANSON-DUMANCAS, POL. COL. NICOLAS

TORRES, POL. INSP. ADONIS ABETO, POL. OFFICER MARIO LAMIS Y
FERNANDEZ, DOMINADOR GEROCHE Y MAHUSAY, JAIME
GARGALLANO, ROLANDO R. FERNANDEZ, EDWIN DIVINAGRACIA,
TEODY DELGADO, CESAR PECHA , accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Archie S. Baribar for accused for Dominador Geroche.
Rolando M. Antiquiera and Roem J. Arbolado for accused Adonis C. Abeto.
Estelito P. Mendoza, Amado A. Parreno, Jr. and Reynaldo Remitio for accused
Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas.
Poblador Bautista & Reyes and Luis V. Sison for accused Nicolas Torres.
Emmanuel G. Vinco for accused Cesar Pecha.
Rosslyn T. Morana for accused PO3 Mario Lamis, Jaime Gargallano, Rolando
Fernandez, Edwin Divinagracia and Teody Delgado.
SYNOPSIS
Of the 13 accused charged with Kidnapping for Ransom with Murder of one Ru no
Gargar, Jr., 3 accused were acquitted, 9 were convicted as principals and 1 accused was
convicted as accessory.
On appeal, the Supreme Court acquitted 3 more accused, ruling: (1) the remark of
accused Jeanette to "take care of the two" did not constitute the words of command
which may be considered su cient basis to convict her as principal by inducement; (2)
accused Police Inspector Abeto's presence at the scene of the crime in order to serve the
search warrant and to interrogate the two victims did not by itself establish conspiracy to
commit the crime. The Court considered accused Abeto's constitutional right to the
presumption of innocence coupled with the presumption of regularity in the performance
of o cial functions; (3) accused Col. Torres passed away during the pendency of this
appeal. His death extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability solely based
thereon.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
The Supreme Court a rmed the trial court's conviction of the other accused,
applying the well settled rule that factual ndings of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses command great respect.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; CRIMINAL LIABILITY; PRINCIPALS; WAYS OF DIRECTLY

FORCING ANOTHER TO COMMIT A CRIME; CASE AT BAR. — There are 2 ways of directly
forcing another to commit a crime, namely: (i) by using irresistible force, or (ii) by causing
uncontrollable fear. Upon review of the testimony of all the witnesses of the prosecution,
we nd nothing to conclude that Jeanette used irresistible force or caused uncontrollable
fear upon the other accused-appellants. From the factual ndings of the trial court, it is
patent that the plan to abduct and liquidate the victims was hatched on August 5, 1992
without Jeanette's involvement or participation whatsoever. The record is entirely bereft of
any evidence to show that Jeanette directly forced the participants of the said meeting to
come up with such plan, by either using irresistible force or causing uncontrollable fear.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DIRECTLY INDUCING ANOTHER TO COMMIT A CRIME; WAYS;
CASE AT BAR. — Likewise, there are 2 ways of directly inducing another to commit a crime,
namely: (i) by giving a price, or offering reward or promise, and (ii) by using words of
command. The Court nds no evidence, as did the trial court, to show that Jeanette
offered any price, reward, or promise to the rest of accused-appellants should they abduct
and later kill the victims in this case. If at all, the prosecution witness mentioned the name
of Ricardo Yanson as having lent money to accused-appellant Col. Torres to be used for
paying the latter's debts or obligations. But de nitely, no money ever came from Jeanette
herself. The trial court's surmise that the money delivered by Ricardo Yanson to the group
was with the knowledge and approval of Jeanette is completely baseless.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRINCIPAL BY INDUCEMENT; REQUISITES FOR CONVICTION. — In
order that a person may be convicted as principal by inducement, the following must be
present: (1) the inducement be made with the intention of procuring the commission of the
crime, and (2) such inducement be the determining cause of the commission by the
material executor (U.S. vs. Indanan, 24 Phil. 203 [1913]). To constitute inducement, there
must exist on the part of the inducer the most positive resolution and the most persistent
effort to secure the commission of the crime, together with the presentation to the person
induced of the very strongest kind of temptation to commit the crime.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; REMARK OF APPELLANT TO "TAKE CARE OF THE TWO" DOES
NOT CONSTITUTE INDUCEMENT. — By the foregoing standards, the remark of Jeanette to
"take care of the two" does not constitute the command required by law to justify a nding
that she is guilty as a principal by inducement. As we held in U.S. vs. Indanan, supra, "a
chance word spoken without re ection, a wrong appreciation of a situation, an ironical
phrase, a thoughtless act, may give birth to a thought of, or even a resolution to crime in
the mind of one for some independent reason predisposed thereto without the one who
spoke the word or performed the act having any expectation that his suggestion would be
followed or any real intention that it produce the result. In such case, while the expression
was imprudent and the results of it grave in the extreme, he (the one who spoke the word
or performed the act) would not be guilty of the crime committed."
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; INDUCEMENT MUST PRECEDE COMMISSION OF CRIME. — The
utterance which was supposedly the act of inducement, should precede the commission
of the crime itself (People vs. Castillo, 17 SCRA 721). In the case at bar, the abduction,
which is an essential element of the crime charged (kidnapping for ransom with murder)
has already taken place when Jeanette allegedly told accused-appellant Geroche to "take
care of the two." Said utterance could, therefore, not have been the inducement to commit
the crime charged in this case.
6. ID.; ID.; EXTINGUISHED BY DEATH. — The death of accused-appellant Torres
extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability solely based thereon. Accordingly, the
appeal of accused-appellant Torres is forthwith dismissed, such dismissal having the
force and effect of an acquittal.
7. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; FINDINGS OF FACT
OF TRIAL COURT GENERALLY ACCORDED GREAT WEIGHT. — We nd no cogent reason to
depart from the well settled rule that when it comes to the issue of credibility of witnesses,
the factual findings of the trial court is generally accorded great weight (People vs. Tañedo
(266 SCRA 34 [1997]) unless the trial judge plainly overlooked certain facts of substance
and value which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, his assessment on
credibility must be respected (People vs. Ramirez, 266 SCRA 335 [1997]). HESCcA
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN

STATEMENTS OF AFFIANT IN AFFIDAVIT AND THOSE MADE ON WITNESS STAND. —
Discrepancies between the statements of the a ant in his a davit and those made by
him on the witness stand do not necessarily discredit him since ex-parte a davits are
generally incomplete a davits are generally subordinated in importance to open court
declarations (People vs. Padao, 267 SCRA 64 [1997]). A contradiction between a witness'
a davit and his testimony in open court may almost be explained by the fact that, being
taken ex parte, an a davit is often incomplete and inaccurate, sometimes from partial
suggestions, and sometimes from the want of suggestions and inquiries (Sumalpong vs.
Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 764 [1997]).
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; TESTIMONY OF WITNESS MAY BE DISREGARDED IN PART. — In
his brief, accused-appellant Geroche cites Grandeza's failure to identify one of their co-
accused, Charles Dumancas, in open court, and the variance on the alleged instructions
given by Jeanette, and the failure by Grandeza to mention the supposed meetings in his
previous a davits, as grounds to totally disregard Grandeza's entire testimony for being
unworthy of credence. Indirectly, accused-appellant Geroche wants this Court to apply the
maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus. In this regard, we held in People vs. Pacis (130
SCRA 540 [1984]): The maxim of "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus," however, is not a
positive rule of law. Neither is it an in exible one of universal application. If a part of a
witness' testimony is found true, it cannot be disregarded entirely. The testimony of a
witness may be believed in part and disbelieved in part.
10. ID.; ID.; ID; ALIBI; CANNOT PREVAIL OVER POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION. —
Alibi cannot prevail over positive identi cation ( People vs. Garma, 271 SCRA 517 [1997]).
Being easy to fabricate and di cult to disprove, alibi cannot prevail over and is worthless
in the face of the positive identi cation of the accused-appellant ( People vs. Datun, 272
SCRA 380 [1997]).
11. CRIMINAL LAW; CRIMINAL LIABILITY; ACCESSORY; BURYING CORPSES OF
VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE. — As to accused-appellant Cesar Pecha's case, the Court nds it
di cult to believe that he had no knowledge that the 2 victims he was burying were
victims of violence. The deceased were surely bloodied from their gunshot wounds and
were in fact still handcuffed when exhumed from their shallow grave. It becomes almost
impossible for accused-appellant Pecha not to at least, entertain doubts as to the absence
of foul play in this case. He is thus guilty as an accessory to the crime committed under
Paragraph 2, Article 19, of the Revised Penal Code.
12. ID.; KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM; PENALTY. — Under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code, when the crime of kidnapping is committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the victims, the penalty is death. However, since the crime was
committed before the re-imposition of the death penalty, only reclusion perpetua is
imposable upon all the accused-appellant found guilty of the crime as principals. Accused-
appellant Pecha's penalty, as accessory is 2 degrees lower, which is prision mayor.
Applying the indeterminate sentence law, the penalty to be imposed is 6 months and 1 day
(the minimum of prision correccional), as minimum, up to 8 years (within the minimum
period of prision mayor), as the maximum.
13. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; AMOUNTS RECOVERABLE BY HEIRS OF VICTIMS OF
VIOLENCE. — On the civil liabilities, accused-appellants who are herein convicted of the
crime as principals are held solidarily liable for the amount of P50,000.00 to the heirs of
each of the victims, as indemnity for their death. The amount of P50,000.00, each, by way
of moral damages and P25,000.00, each, as exemplary damages are already deemed
su cient. Accused-appellant Cesar Pecha is held liable for one-tenth of the above
amounts. The appealed judgment is silent as to any justi cation for the other damages
awarded and can therefore not be sustained on appeal.
DECISION
MELO , J : p
Accused-appellants were charged with Kidnapping for Ransom with Murder under
two Informations which pertinently read:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 94-15562
The undersigned hereby accuses JEANETTE YANSON-DUMANCAS,
CHARLES DUMANCAS, (BOTH AS PRINCIPALS BY INDUCTION), POLICE COL.
NICOLAS M. TORRES (AS PRINCIPAL BY INDUCTION AND BY DIRECT AND/OR
INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION), POLICE INSPECTOR ADONIS C. ABETO,
POLICE OFFICERS MARIO LAMIS Y FERNANDEZ, JOSE PAHAYUPAN, VICENTE
CANUDAY, JR., DOMINADOR GEROCHE Y MAHUSAY, JAIME GARGALLANO,
ROLANDO R. FERNANDEZ, EDWIN DIVINAGRACIA, TEODY DELGADO, ALL AS
PRINCIPALS BY PARTICIPATION, CESAR PECHA, and EDGAR HILADO, BOTH AS
ACCESSORIES, of the crime of KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM WITH MURDER,
committed as follows:
That during the period beginning in the late morning of August 6, 1992 and
ending the late evening of the following day in Sitio Pedrosa, Barangay Alijes,
Bacolod City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and concurring in a common
criminal intent and execution thereof with one another, save for the accessories,
for the purpose of extracting or extorting the sum of P353,000.00, did, then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, to wit:
prcd
Acting upon the inducement of spouses Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas and

Charles Dumancas, under the direction cooperation and undue in uence, exerted
by P/Col. Nicolas M. Torres, taking advantage of his position as the Station
Commander of the Philippine National Police, Bacolod City Station, with the direct
participation and cooperation of Police Inspector Adonis C. Abeto, other police
o cers Vicente Canuday, Jr., Jose Pahayupan, Mario Lamis, civilian (police)
agents Rolando R. Fernandez, Edwin Divinagracia, Teody Delgado, Jaime
Gargallano, also taking advantage of their respective positions, and Dominador
Geroche, concurring and a rming in the said criminal design, with the use of
motor vehicle abduct, kidnap and detain one RUFINO GARGAR, JR. and shortly
thereafter at around 11 o'clock in the evening of August 7, 1993 (1992), failing in
their aforesaid common purpose to extort money and in furtherance of said
conspiracy, with evident premeditation and treachery nocturnity and the use of
motor vehicle, did then and there shot and kill the said victim, while being
handcuffed and blindfolded; that accused Cesar Pecha and Edgar Hilado, with
knowledge that said Gargar was victim of violence, did then and there secretly
bury the corpse in a makeshift shallow grave or the purpose of concealing the
crime of murder in order to prevent its discovery for a fee of P500.00 each;
aforesaid act or acts has caused damage and prejudice to the heirs of said victim,
to wit:
P50,000.00 — as indemnity for death;

50,000.00 — actual damages;
300,000.00 — compensatory damages (lost income);

100,000.00 — moral damages;
50,000.00 — exemplary damages. LibLex
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(pp. 1-3, Record Vol. I)

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 94-15563
The undersigned hereby accused JEANETTE YANSON-DUMANCAS,
CHARLES DUMANCAS (BOTH AS PRINCIPALS BY INDUCTION), POLICE COL.
NICOLAS M. TORRES (AS PRINCIPAL BY INDUCTION AND BY DIRECTION
AND/OR INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION), POLICE INSPECTOR ADONIS C.
ABETO, POLICE OFFICERS MARIO LAMIS Y FERNANDEZ, JOSE PAHAYUPAN,
VICENTE CANUDAY, JR., DOMINADOR GEROCHE Y MAHUSAY, JAIME
GARGALLANO, ROLANDO B. FERNANDEZ, EDWIN DIVINAGRACIA, TEODY
DELGADO, ALL AS PRINCIPALS BY PARTICIPATION, CESAR PECHA and EDGAR
HILADO, BOTH AS ACCESSORIES, of the crime of KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM
WITH MURDER, committed as follows:
That during the period beginning in the late morning of August 6, 1992 and
ending the late evening of the following day in Sitio Pedrosa, Barangay Alijes,
Bacolod City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and concurring in a common
criminal intent and execution thereof with one another, save for the accessories,
for the purpose of extracting or extorting the sum of P353,000.00, did, then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, to wit:
Acting upon the inducement of spouse Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas and

Charles Dumancas, under the direction, cooperation and undue in uence, exerted
by P/Col. Nicolas M. Torres, taking advantage of his position as the Station
Commander of the Philippine National Police, Bacolod City Station, with the direct
participation and cooperation of Police Inspector Adonis C. Abeto, other police
o cers Vicente Canuday, Jr., Jose Pahayupan, Mario Lamis, civilian (police)
agents Rolando R. Fernandez, Edwin Divinagracia, Teody Delgado, Jaime
Gargallano, also taking advantage of their respective positions, and Dominador
Geroche, concurring and a rming in the said criminal design, with the use of
motor vehicle abduct, kidnap and detain one DANILO LUMANGYAO and shortly
thereafter at around 11 o'clock in the evening of August 7, 1993 (1992), failing in
their aforesaid common purpose to extort money and in furtherance of said
conspiracy, with evident premeditation and treachery nocturnity and the use of
motor vehicle, did then and there shot and kill the said victim, while being
handcuffed and blindfolded, that accused CESAR PECHA and EDGAR HILADO,
with knowledge that said Lumangyao was victim of violence, did then and there
secretly bury the corpse in a makeshift shallow grave for the purpose of
concealing the crime of murder in order to prevent its discovery for a fee of
P500.00 each; aforesaid act or acts has caused damage and prejudice to the
heirs of said victim, to wit:
P50,000.00 — as indemnity for death; cdasia
50,000.00 — actual damages;

300,000.00 — compensatory damages (lost income);
100,000.00 — moral damages;

P50,000.00 — exemplary damages.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(pp. 1-3, Record Vol. I-A)
All thirteen accused (excluding Edgar Hilado, who was then still at large) entered
pleas of NOT GUILTY upon arraignment conducted on February 14, 1994 (per Certi cates
of Arraignment, Records Vol. I-A, pp. 372-384). After a joint trial (excluding accused Edgar
Hilado, who upon arraignment on April 11, 1994, pleaded NOT GUILTY [Record, Vol. II, p.
866], was tried separately), judgment was rendered acquitting Charles Dumancas, Police
O cers Jose Pahayupan and Vicente Canuday, Jr., but convicting the rest of the accused
for the crime charged, to wit:
Wherefore, finding the first nine (9) Accused herein —
1. JEANNETTE (GINNETTE) YANSON-DUMANCAS

2. POL. COL. NICOLAS TORRES LLjur
3. POL. INSP. ADONIS ABETO

4. POL. OFFICER MARIO LAMIS Y FERNANDEZ
5. DOMINADOR GEROCHE Y MAHUSAY
6. JAIME GARGALLANO
7. ROLANDO R. FERNANDEZ
8. EDWIN DIVINAGRACIA
9. TEODY DELGADO and
10. CESAR PECHA

GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AS PRINCIPALS and CESAR
PECHA as accessory in the two (2) informations led in these cases, JUDGMENT
is hereby rendered against them, as follows:
1. In CRIMINAL CASE NO. 94-15562, each of the Accused charged as
principal is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with
all the accessories of the law; to indemnify, jointly and severally, the Heirs of
Rufino Gargar Jr. in the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity for death; P25,000.00
as actual damages; P300,000.00 for compensatory damages (lost income);
P100,000.00 in moral damages and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; and to
pay the cost. Accused CESAR PECHA who is charged as an accessory is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years four (4) months
and one (1) day of Prision Correccional as minimum to eight years and one day
of Prision Mayor as maximum and to pay one-tenth of the cost; cdtai
2. In CRIMINAL CASE NO. 94-15563, each of the Accused charged as

principal is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, with all
the accessories of the law, indemnify jointly and severally, the Heirs of DANILO
LUMANGYAO in the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity for death; P25,000.00 as
actual damages; P100,000.00 as compensatory damages (lost income);
P100,000.00 as moral damages; P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; and to pay
the cost. Accused CESAR PECHA who is charged as an accessory is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years four (4) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1)
day of Prision Mayor as maximum and to pay one-tenth of the cost.
Accused CHARLES DUMANCAS, Police O cers JOSE PAHAYUPAN and
VICENTE CANUDAY JR. are hereby Acquitted of the crime charged for failure of
the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, with cost de officio.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 272-273, Rollo.) LLpr
All ten accused led their respective notices of appeal, and are now before us on
review. After going through the voluminous record of the case, the Court adopts the
following summary of facts by the court a quo, to wit:
February 20, 1992
Jeanette Yanson Dumancas was swindled in a fake gold bar transaction
losing P352,000 to Danilo Lumangyao and his cohort.
10:30 A.M. August 5, 1992 present in the house of Rolando Fernandez
were:
a) Dominador Geroche
b) Rolando Fernandez
c) Jaime Gargallano
d) Edwin Divinagracia

e) Teody Delgado
f) Mario Lamis and
g) Moises Grandeza LLpr
On this occasion Mario Lamis brought out the plan to abduct Danilo Lumangyao and
Rufino Gargar, Jr. because they swindled the Dumancas family.
4:30 P.M. August 5, 1992

The group of:
b) Mario Lamis
c) Rolando Fernandez
d) Jaime Gargallano
e) Edwin Divinagracia
f) Teody Delgado
g) Moises Grandeza
went to the o ce of Col. Nicolas Torres at PNP Headquarters where they
met the colonel who told them that if you nd these two people (referring to
Lumangyao and Gargar) to bring and hide them at Dragon Lodge Motel.
8:30 A.M., August 6, 1992

State witness Moises Grandeza went to the house of Helen Tortocion to
invite Danilo Lumangyao and Ru no Gargar Jr. to "Tinolahan Eatery" at Shopping
Center Terminal but found only Gargar Jr. as Lumangyao went to the house of a
certain Bardot at BBB Avenue, this City.
Moises Grandeza together with Gargar Jr. proceeded to the house of
Bardot where they found Lumangyao and thereafter the three of them went to
"Tinolahan Eatery". prcd
9:00-10:00 A.M. August 6, 1992

The three arrived at "Tinulahan Eatery". Waiting for them were:
b) Jaime Gargallano
c) Edwin Divinagracia
d) Rolando Fernandez
e) Teody Delgado; and
f) Mario Lamis
Then a) Fernandez b) Geroche and c) Lamis entered "Tinulahan" and

handcuffed Lumangyao and Gargar.
Waiting in the red Toyota Land Cruiser (Plate No. 689) were:
a) Gargallano
b) Divinagracia; and
c) Delgado cdll
10:30 A.M. August 6, 1992

Lumangyao and Gargar were brought to the O ce of Jeanette at Ceres
Compound on board red toyota land cruiser by:
a) Moises Grandeza
b) Gargallano
c) Lamis
d) Geroche
e) Divinagracia
f) Delgado, and
g) Fernandez
It was there that a) Divinagracia and b) Fernandez manhandled
Lumangyao and Gargar. Jeanette then investigated the two victims on the
whereabouts of the money that they swindled from her and the two answered that
it was already spent. cdtai
It was then that Jeanette ordered Doming (Geroche) to take care of the two
(Lumangyao and Gargar).
3:00 P.M. August 6, 1992
From Ceres Compound and while the group, together with the two victims,
were already at Dragon Lodge Motel, thereafter,
a) Abeto
b) Pahayupan, and
c) Canuday
arrived and investigated the two victims regarding the whereabouts of the
gold bar and the two replied that it was with Helen Tortocion.
4:00 P.M. August 6, 1992

a) Moises Grandeza
b) Fernandez, and
c) Geroche cdasia
went to the o ce of Col. Torres to inform him that Lumangyao and Gargar
were already captured. So Col. Torres ordered them to keep the two victims so
that nobody would see them. After receiving this instructions they went back to
Dragon Lodge. Meanwhile, Geroche again interrogated the victims on where the
money was — if there was still any let and Geroche received the same negative
reply.
Past 6:00 p.m. August 6, 1992

The group, with the two captives transferred to D' Hacienda Motel.
9:00 P.M. August 6, 1992
At D' Hacienda Motel, Jeanette and Charles Dumancas, together with Rose
Ines arrived. Jeanette and Rose Ines investigated the victims where they kept the
money that they swindled and the two gave the same reply that it was already
gone. Jeanette then reiterated her order to Geroche to take care of the two.
9:30 P.M. August 6, 1992
The group transferred to Moonlight Inn Motel.
3:00 A.M. August 7, 1992
The group transferred again to Casamel Lodge Motel.
10:00 A.M. August 7, 1992

The group returned to D' Hacienda Motel and it was there that the plan was
pursued to liquidate the two victims at 12:00 midnight.
The persons who conceived of this plan were:
a) Geroche, and Cdpr
b) Fernandez
4:30 P.M. August 7, 1992
1) Canuday
2) Abeto
3) Dudero
4) Lesaca, and
5) Arollado
searched the residence of Helen Tortocion for the gold dust and simulated
gold bar per search warrant 014-92 (Exh. "D") but the search was fruitless.
7:30 P.M. August 7, 1992

The group, including the victims, partook of supper which was charged to
Roy Yanson.
Then
a) Abeto
b) Canuday, and
c) Pahayupan
entered the room and asked Fernandez what they are going to do with the
two victims to which Fernandez, replied that he will be responsible for the two. llcd
11:00 P.M. August 7, 1992

a) Geroche
b) Lamis
c) Fernandez, and
d) Moises Grandeza
rode on the red Toyota Land Cruiser to conduct Geroche to his house. The
victims were left behind.
From his house Geroche took an armalite ri e and the group then went
back to D' Hacienda Motel.
12:00 P.M. August 7, 1992
a) Fernandez, and
b) Lamis
blindfolded and handcuffed Lumangyao and Gargar (Exh. "A" and "A-1")
and have them board a vehicle, with
a) Gargallano the driver

b) Geroche sitting in front, and with
c) Moises Grandeza also seated inside.

From D' Hacienda Motel, the group rode on the red toyota land cruiser.
They proceeded to Hda. Pedrosa in Brgy. Alijis. When they arrived there the two
victims were ordered to alight and sit by the side of the road. Geroche then asked
Moises Grandeza to hold the hands of Lumangyao and then Gargar behind their
backs. After that —
a) Gargallano was the rst to shoot. He shot Gargar at the back of his
head (Exh. K) using a baby armalite. Then
b) Geroche followed suit by shooting Lumangyao with a .45 cal. Pistol

at his right lower jaw (Exh. L). cdasia
Thereafter, the two dead bodies were loaded on board the land cruiser and
brought to Hda. Siason where Pecha and Hilado buried them in the shallow grave
they dug.
August 8, 1992
In Sitio Cabalagnan were recovered
a) Three (3) empty shells of armalite ri e and one .45 cal. Empty shell
(Exh. "G", "G-2")
In Hda. Siason were recovered
a) the dead bodies of Rufino Gargar, Jr. and Danilo Lumangyao
b) Both of the two victims hands were handcuffed (Exh. "A" and "A-1").
August 9, 1992
The same group again went to see Col. Torres in his o ce and reported
the extermination of the two and Col. Torres promptly gave the instruction that
"you who are here inside, nobody knows what you have done but you have to hide
because the NBI are after you. llcd
August 10, 1992
a) Lamis
b) Geroche
c) Fernandez
d) Divinagracia
e) Gargallano
f) Delgado, and
g) Moises Grandeza
went back to the o ce of Col. Torres and this time he told the group "to hide because the
NBI are now investigating".
4:00 P.M. August 12, 1992
The same group that liquidated Lumangyao and Gargar again went back
to the o ce of Col. Torres where they were asked by Col. Torres to escort him to
Ceres Compound because he would like to borrow money from Ricardo Yanson
as Col. Torres said that he has huge debts to pay. Col. Torres was able on this
occasion, to meet Ricardo Yanson. cdrep
On this same day,
a) Moises Grandeza
b) Lamis, and
c) Geroche
were picked up in a land cruiser by the driver of the Yansons' to go to the
house of Fernandez where Geroche will give the money to the group. Each
member of the group, after the check, which was drawn by Yanson, was encashed
were given the amount of P1,700.00 each.
August 13, 1992

Nenita Bello went to the o ce of Col. Torres to plead for his help in regard
to the death of her relatives Lumangyao and Gargar but was promptly turned
down by Colonel Torres with the curt remark that her case was very di cult
because it involves the "military" and some "big times".
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Bacolod City also passed, on this day,
Resolution No. 328, series of 1992 urging the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) to conduct an investigation on the death of "salvage victims" Danilo
Lumangyao and Rufino Gargar, Jr. as soon as possible (Exh. "I").
September 24, 1992

The bodies of Ru no Gargar Jr. and Danilo Lumangyao were exhumed at
Brgy. Buenavista Cemetery, Balintawak, Escalante, Negros Occidental and
autopsies were conducted (Exhs. "M" and "N") by Dr. Ricardo Jaboneta, Medico
Legal Officer of the NBI. LexLib
a) Found on the body of Ru no Gargar, Jr. (per examination report,

Exh. "M") among others, were ligature marks, wrist joint, right side (Exh. "M-2"),
and
b) Gunshot wound (Exh. "M-1")
As to Danilo Lumangyao, the exhumation report (Exh. "N") disclose

a) Ligature marks, right wrist (Exh. "N-2") and among others, and
b) Gunshot wound (Exh. "N-1")
After the National Bureau of Investigation, Bacolod O ce, conducted its

investigation, the State Prosecutors of the Department of Justice took over and
the result were the ling of these two criminal cases of Kidnapping with Murder
against the above-named accused.
(pp. 73-85, Decision; pp. 202-214, Rollo.)
After a thorough review of the factual ndings of the trial court vis-à-vis the evidence
on record, we nd ourselves unable to agree with the conclusions arrived at by the trial
court convicting all 10 accused-appellants; rather, we concur in the suggestion of the
Solicitor General, that accused-appellants Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas and Police
Inspector Adonis Abeto should be acquitted. Too, by reason of his supervening death,
accused-appellant Police Col. Nicolas Torres is acquitted. The judgment of conviction of
the rest of the accused-appellants is to be affirmed. prcd
A. Jeanette (Ginette) Yanson-Dumancas

On the case of accused-appellant Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas (Jeanette, for short),
the information charged her of the crime of kidnapping for ransom with murder as
principal by induction together with her husband, Charles, who was found by the trial court
not guilty of the crime.
Article 17, Revised Penal Code, provides:
Art. 17. Principals. — The following are considered principals:
1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act;
2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it.
3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another

act without which it would not have been accomplished. LexLib
What the Court now has to examine is whether or not su cient evidence was
adduced by the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Jeanette indeed
performed any of the following acts: (a) directly forcing the killers to commit the crime, or
(b) directly inducing them to commit the crime.
There are 2 ways of directly forcing another to commit a crime, namely: (i) by using
irresistible force, or (ii) by causing uncontrollable fear. Upon review of the testimony of all
the witnesses of the prosecution, we nd nothing to conclude that Jeanette used
irresistible force or caused uncontrollable fear upon the other accused-appellants. From
the factual ndings of the trial court, it is patent that the plan to abduct and liquidate the
victims was hatched on August 5, 1992 (10:30 A.M.) without Jeanette's involvement or
participation whatsoever (p. 202, Rollo). The record is entirely bereft of any evidence to
show that Jeanette directly forced the participants of the said meeting to come up with
such plan, by either using irresistible force or causing uncontrollable fear. The only basis
relied upon by the trial court in arriving at its conclusion that Jeanette is guilty of the crime
as principal by inducement, is the supposed "commands" or order given by her to accused-
appellant Dominador Geroche on two occasions (one inside the Ceres Compound: p. 205,
Rollo, and the other in D' Hacienda Motel: p. 207, Rollo). By no stretch of the imagination
may these so-called "commands", standing alone, be considered as constituting
irresistible force or causing uncontrollable fear. LLjur
Likewise, there are 2 ways of directly inducing another to commit a crime, namely: (i)
by giving a price, or offering reward or promise, and (ii) by using words of command. The
Court nds no evidence, as did the trial court, to show that Jeanette offered any price,
reward, or promise to the rest of accused-appellants should they abduct and later kill the
victims in this case. If at all, the prosecution witness mentioned the name of Ricardo
Yanson as having lent money to accused-appellant Col. Torres to be used for paying the
latter's debts or obligations. But de nitely, no money ever came from Jeanette herself. The
trial court's surmise that the money delivered by Ricardo Yanson to the group was with the
knowledge and approval of Jeanette is completely baseless.
The only matter left for consideration is whether the order supposedly given by
Jeanette to accused-appellant Geroche "to take care of the two" constitutes words of
command which may be considered su cient basis to convict Jeanette as principal by
inducement. prLL
In order that a person may be convicted as principal by inducement, the following

must be present: (1) the inducement be made with the intention of procuring the
commission of the crime, and (2) such inducement be the determining cause of the
commission by the material executor (U.S. vs. Indanan, 24 Phil. 203 [1913]). To constitute
inducement, there must exist on the part of the inducer the most positive resolution and
the most persistent effort to secure the commission of the crime, together with the
presentation to the person induced of the very strongest kind of temptation to commit the
crime.
By the foregoing standards, the remark of Jeanette to "take care of the two" does
not constitute the command required by law to justify a nding that she is guilty as a
principal by inducement. As we held in U.S. vs. Indanan, supra, "a chance word spoken
without reflection, a wrong appreciation of a situation, an ironical phrase, a thoughtless act,
may give birth to a thought of, or even a resolution to crime in the mind of one for some
independent reason predisposed thereto without the one who spoke the word or
performed the act having any expectation that his suggestion would be followed or any
real intention that it produce the result. In such case, while the expression was imprudent
and the results of it grave in the extreme, he (the one who spoke the word or performed
the act) would not be guilty of the crime committed" (p. 219). LLjur
Furthermore, the utterance which was supposedly the act of inducement, should
precede the commission of the crime itself (People vs. Castillo, July 26, [1966]). In the
case at bar, the abduction, which is an essential element of the crime charged (kidnapping
for ransom with murder) has already taken place when Jeanette allegedly told accused-
appellant Geroche to "take care of the two." Said utterance could, therefore, not have been
the inducement to commit the crime charged in this case.
Most importantly, it was duly proven by no less than the prosecution witness
himself, Moises Grandeza, that the intention of Jeanette was but to allow the law to its
course, when in his cross-examination, the following transpired:
ATTY. PARREÑO:
Q And according to your testimony this morning, Jeanette Dumancas said,
what more can we do that swindling transpired four months ago, de nitely
that money could nowhere be around. Would you con rm that you testi ed
that this morning before this Court? Is that correct?
A Yes, sir
Q Mr. Witness, this is very important. Please make a vivid recall. When Danilo
Lumangyao made that answer that the money was not around and
Jeanette Dumancas said what's the use, the money is now nowhere to be
found as four months have already transpired, did not Jeanette Dumancas
tell Doming: "Doming, bring these two to the PC or police and I will call
Atty. Geocadin so that proper cases could be led against them? " Kindly
make a recall on that. LibLex
A. Yes, sir.
(pp. 54-55, tsn Feb. 14, 1994)
Thus, even the veracity of the allegation that Jeanette uttered the words: "take care
of the two" is put to some reasonable doubt by the prosecution witness himself. The
remark, if made at all, cannot by any stretch of the imagination, be basis for the conviction
of Jeanette.
People vs. Manambit (271 SCRA 344 [1997]) finds apt application, to wit:
In criminal law, the quantum of evidence for conviction is that which
produces moral certainty in an unprejudiced mind that the accused is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. But, if the evidence is susceptible of two
interpretations, one consistent with the innocence of the accused and
the other consistent with his guilt, the accused must be acquitted .
(p. 385)
B. Police Inspector Adonis Abeto

With respect to accused-appellant Abeto, we quote with approval the observations
of the Solicitor General as follows:
Police Inspector Adonis C. Abeto's appeal is meritorious. Be it remembered
that Abeto's only participation was to serve the search warrant on Helen
Tortocion's residence and the subsequent interrogation of the two victims at the
Hacienda Motel. He was never part of the conspiracy to abduct and liquidate the
two victims. He is similarly situated as that of Canuday and Pahayupan. prcd
The trial court, in acquitting Canuday and Pahayupan had this to say:
The evidence against O cer CANUDAY, JR. shows that in the
afternoon of August 6, 1992, together with O cers ABETO and
PAHAYUPAN, they went to Dragon Lodge Motel to investigate
LUMANGYAO and GARGAR, JR. as to the whereabouts of the gold (fake)
bar used in swindling JEANETTE. The two captives answered that it is with
HELEN TORTOCION. A subsequent search of Tortocion's house led by
O cer ABETO yielded no fake gold bar. Meanwhile, in the evening of
August 7, 1992, O cers ABETO, CANUDAY, JR., and PAHAYUPAN showed
up at D' Hacienda Motel to inquire from FERNANDEZ what he is going to
do with the two.
Like O cer Pahayupan, his being in the company of O cers Abeto,
on the two occasions can not give rise, to without proof of previous
agreement, a conspiracy. Thus, being present at the scene of the crime is
not by itself su cient to establish conspiracy, as already averted to
previously. So does mere companionship.
(p. 1720-1721, Rollo.)
After due consideration of accused-appellant Abeto's constitutional right to the

presumption of innocence, coupled with the presumption of regularity in the performance
of his o cial functions having simply followed the order of his superior o cers, much is
left to be desired before the Court can sustain the trial court's conviction of accused-
appellant Abeto. The two presumptions negate the inadequate proof adduced against
accused-appellant Abeto, who must perforce be acquitted, in much the same manner that
accused Canuday, Jr. and Pahayupan, who being similarly situated, were cleared and
absolved.
C. Police Col. Nicolas M. Torres
As for accused-appellant Col. Torres, who passed away during the pendency of this
appeal, the following rule laid down by this Court in People vs. Bayotas (236 SCRA 239
[1994]) applies:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes
his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by
Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to nal judgment
terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and
based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso
strictiore." LibLex
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the

death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation
other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of
obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or
omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) ...
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an

action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of ling a separate
civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against
the executor/administrator of the estate of the accused, depending on the source
of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above. llcd
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his
right to le a separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the
prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended
party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of
limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the
criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that
should thereby avoid any apprehension on possible privation of right by
prescription.
(pp. 255-256)
With the application of the above set of rules to accused-appellant Torres, we hold
that his death extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability solely based thereon.
Accordingly, the appeal of accused-appellant Torres is forthwith dismissed, such
dismissal having the force and effect of an acquittal.
D. Pol. O cer Mario Lamis y Fernandez, Dominador Geroche y Mahusay, Jaime
Gargallano, Rolando R. Fernandez, Edwin Divinagracia, Teody Delgado, and Cesar
Pecha
Now, in regard to the other accused-appellants, after a careful review of the
evidence, we find the same sufficient to affirm their conviction.
These accused-appellants assail the credence given by the trial court to the
eyewitness account of Moises Grandeza. Even after a thorough perusal of their main
appellant's brief (pp. 327-498, Rollo), plus the separate briefs of accused-appellants
Geroche (pp. 1453-1627) and Pecha (pp. 828-1009, Rollo), we nd no cogent reason to
depart from the well settled rule that when it comes to the issue of credibility of witnesses,
the factual ndings of the trial court is generally accorded great weight. In People vs.
Tañedo (266 SCRA 34 [1997]) the Court had occasion to reiterate the ruling that ndings
of fact of the trial court pertaining to the credibility of witnesses command great respect
since it had the opportunity to observe their demeanor while they testi ed in court. The
briefs of accused-appellants Lamis, et al. are replete with generalities and legal principles
relating to the issue, but are utterly wanting in relevant particulars which may be the basis
to rule that indeed, the trial court erred in lending full credence to the testimony of witness
Grandeza on the matter. As held in People vs. Ramirez 266 SCRA 335 [1997]), unless the
trial judge plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value which, if considered,
might affect the result of the case, his assessment on credibility must be respected. cdrep
In an attempt to buttress the contention that witness Grandeza's testimony should

not have been given credence by the court a quo, accused-appellants referred to supposed
inconsistencies between Grandeza's sworn statements before investigators vis-à-vis his
testimony in court (pp. 349-359, Rollo; and 1465-1468, Rollo). The Court, however, is not
impressed. This will not be the first occasion for us to hold that discrepancies between the
statements of the a ant in his a davit and those made by him on the witness stand do
not necessarily discredit him since ex-parte a davits are generally incomplete — a davits
are generally subordinated in importance to open court declarations (People vs. Padao,
267 SCRA 64 [1997]). A contradiction between a witness' a davit and his testimony in
open court may almost be explained by the fact that, being taken ex parte, an a davit is
often incomplete and inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestions, and sometimes
from the want of suggestions and inquiries (Sumalpong vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA
764 [1997]). Grandeza's perceived failure to mention anything in his 3 a davits pertaining
to the supposed meetings where the criminal plot was hatched, does not necessarily
render his testimony in court unworthy of credit.
In his brief, accused-appellant Geroche cites Grandeza's failure to identify one of
their co-accused, Charles Dumancas, in open court, and the variance on the alleged
instructions given by Jeanette, and the failure by Grandeza to mention the supposed
meetings in his previous a davits, as grounds to totally disregard Grandeza's entire
testimony for being unworthy of credence (pp. 1461-1469, Rollo). Indirectly, accused-
appellant Geroche wants this Court to apply the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus. In
this regard, we held in People vs. Pacis (130 SCRA 540 [1984]):
The maxim of "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus," however, is not a positive
rule of law. Neither is it an in exible one of universal application. If a part of a
witness' testimony is found true, it cannot be disregarded entirely. The testimony
of a witness may be believed in part and disbelieved in part. prcd
(p. 546)
Also in People vs. Li Bun Juan (17 SCRA 934 [1966]) we ruled:
. . . In this connection it must be borne in mind that the principle falsus in uno falsus in
omnibus is not an absolute one, and that it is perfectly reasonable to believe the testimony of a
witness with respect to some facts and disbelieve it with respect to other facts. In People vs.
Keller, 46 O.G. No. 7, pp. 3222-3223, the following was quoted with approval by the Court of
Appeals from 1 Moore on Facts, p. 23:
"18. Testimony may be partly credited and partly rejected . —

Trier of facts are not bound to believe all that any witness has said; they
may accept some portions of his testimony and reject other portions,
according to what seems to them, upon other facts and circumstances to
be the truth . . . Even when witnesses are found to have deliberately
falsi ed in some material particulars, the jury are not required to reject the
whole of their uncorroborated testimony, but may credit such portions as
they deem worthy of belief.
(p. 945)
The grounds relied upon by accused-appellant Geroche do not, therefore, constitute

cogent reasons to discredit the testimony of eyewitness Grandeza in its entirety.
As regards accused-appellant Geroche's defense of alibi, it is settled that alibi
cannot prevail over positive identi cation ( People vs. Garma, 271 SCRA 517 [1997]). Being
easy to fabricate and di cult to disprove, alibi cannot prevail over and is worthless in the
face of the positive identi cation of the accused-appellant ( People vs. Datun, 272 SCRA
380 [1997]). Besides, the record is bereft of strong and convincing evidence that accused
appellant could not have been at the scene of the crime because the certi cation proffered
in support thereof stated that he was in Mt. Calandog only after the commission of the
crime. And, as aptly stated by the Solicitor General in the People's brief, "the trial court
expressed puzzlement why this supposed fact was not mentioned in his July 3, 1993
a davit . . . The rst impulse of an innocent man when accused of a wrongdoing is to
express his innocence at the rst opportune time. The People can only conclude that
Geroche's defense of alibi is but an afterthought" (p. 1723, Rollo). LibLex

As to accused-appellant Cesar Pecha's case, the Court nds it di cult to believe
that he had no knowledge that the 2 victims he was burying were victims of violence. The
deceased were surely bloodied from their gunshot wounds and were in fact still
handcuffed when exhumed from their shallow grave. It becomes almost impossible for
accused-appellant Pecha not to at least, entertain doubts as to the absence of foul play in
this case. He is thus guilty as an accessory to the crime committed under Paragraph 2,
Article 19, of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
ART. 19. Accessories. — Accessories are those who, having knowledge
of the commission of the crime, and without having participated therein, either as
principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission in any of the
following manners:
1. By pro ting themselves or assisting the offender to pro t by the

effects of the crime;
2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime or the effects or

instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery;
3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principal

of the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public
functions or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of treason,
parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief
Executive, or is known to habitually guilty of some other crime.
prcd
All told, there are only reasons to a rm, and none to reverse, the trial court's
conviction of accused-appellants Pol. O cer Mario Lamis y Fernandez, Dominador
Geroche y Mahusay, Jaime Gargallano, Rolando R. Fernandez, Edwin Divinagracia, and
Teody Delgado as principals by direct participation of the crime of kidnapping for ransom
with murder, and that of Cesar Pecha as accessory thereto.
Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, when the crime of kidnapping is
committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victims, the penalty is death.
However, since the crime was committed before the re-imposition of the death penalty,
only reclusion perpetua is imposable upon all the accused-appellant found guilty of the
crime as principals. Accused-appellant Pecha's penalty, as accessory is 2 degrees lower,
which is prision mayor. Applying the indeterminate sentence law, the penalty to be
imposed is 6 months and 1 day (the minimum of prision correccional), as minimum, up to
8 years (within the minimum period of prision mayor), as the maximum.
On the civil liabilities, accused-appellants who are herein convicted of the crime as
principals are held solidarily liable for the amount of P50,000.00 to the heirs of each of the
victims, as indemnity for their death. The amount of P50,000.00, each, by way moral
damages and P25,000.00, each, as exemplary damages are already deemed su cient.
Accused-appellant Cesar Pecha is held liable for one-tenth of the above amounts. The
appealed judgment is silent as to any justi cation for the other damages awarded and can
therefore not be sustained on appeal. cda
WHEREFORE, accused-appellants JEANETTE YANSON-DUMANCAS and ADONIS

ABETO are hereby ACQUITTED and forthwith ordered released from detention unless there
may be reason for their further detention on other criminal cases. The case and appeal of
NICOLAS TORRES is DISMISSED by reason of his death. The convictions of all the other
accused-appellants for each case led are AFFIRMED except for the modi cation that
accused-appellant CESAR PECHA is sentenced for each case to an indeterminate prison
term of six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum up to eight (8)
years of prision mayor, as maximum. Joint and several civil liability for the accused-
appellants found guilty as principals, is reduced to P50,000.00 for each case, as indemnity
for the death of each victim, P50,000.00 for each case, by way moral damages, and
P25,000.00 for each case, by way of exemplary damages. The civil liability of accused-
appellant Cesar Pecha is maintained at one-tenth of the above amount
No special pronouncement is made as to costs. cdrep
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Panganiban, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 115351. March 27, 1998.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , plaintiff-appellee, vs . DANIEL

MALUENDA alias "DONGKOY"; GIL BUENO; RAUL MONDAGA alias
"BOBONG"; and RODRIGO LEGARTO, accused, DANIEL MALUENDA
and RODRIGO LEGARTO , accused-appellants.

Public Attorney's Office for D. Malunda.
Misa Law Office for R. Legarto.
SYNOPSIS
In an information dated November 20, 1992, herein appellants, together with a

certain Gil Bueno, were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Lianga, Surigao Del Sur
for conspiring and mutually helping one another in kidnapping one Engr. Miguel Rasus for
the purposes of extorting money from the said victim. After trial in due course, the lower
court nds the three appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the
crime of kidnapping for ransom and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. In view of the penalty imposed, Legarto, Maluenda and Mondaga interposed an
appeal directly to the Supreme Court. However, before the promulgation of the instant
case, Mondaga withdrew his appeal. Hence, the Court will only pass upon the criminal
liability of Legarto and Maluenda.
The Supreme Court nds the appeal partially meritorious as regards Legarto who, in
the light of the evidence presented, should be held liable only as an accessory. Clearly,
Legarto cannot be convicted as a principal by indispensable cooperation because the
prosecution failed to allege, much less prove, any overt act on his part showing direct
participation in the kidnapping itself, his participation in the incident being limited to acts
committed after the abduction was already consummated. Moreover, the testimony of the
victim clearly shows that he did not actually see Legarto transport Mondaga's companion.
From the foregoing, it is clear that Legarto's alleged direct participation in the kidnapping
is without factual basis and is nothing more than an inference drawn from a presumption.
The Court, however, cannot completely free him from criminal liability because although he
had no direct hand in the kidnapping, he is still criminally liable as an accessory to the
crime of kidnapping for ransom considering that he has knowledge of the kidnapping for
ransom and took part in the crime subsequent to its commission by pro ting from its
effects. Thus, he is an accessory to the crime charged. In contrast, Maluenda's conviction
deserves a rmation, as his culpability in the kidnapping was clearly proven by the
prosecution through the credible testimonies of the witnesses, including the victim
himself. In view thereof, the decision is a rmed as regards Maluenda's conviction, but
modified as regards Legarto, for the Court just found him guilty as an accessory only. acCTSE
SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; KIDNAPPING WITH RANSOM; APPELLANT CANNOT BE
CONVICTED AS PRINCIPAL BY INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION, FOR HIS PARTICIPATION
IN THE INCIDENT IS LIMITED AFTER THE ABDUCTION WAS ALREADY CONSUMMATED;
CASE AT BAR. — Legarto cannot be convicted as principal by indispensable cooperation
because the prosecution failed to allege, much less prove, any overt act on his part
showing direct participation in the kidnapping itself, his participation in the incident being
limited to acts committed after the abduction was already consummated. He was not with
kidnappers (1) when they forcibly solicited money and medicine from the Resus couple, (2)
when they brought the kidnap victim to Alegria, and (3) when Mondaga demanded ransom
for the victim's release. Together with the Resus housemaid, he accompanied Mondaga to
the hideout in Alegria only upon Dr. Resus' request. In short, the prosecution failed to piece
together a clear story as to how Legarto figured in the kidnapping caper.
2. ID.; DEGREE OF PARTICIPATION; ACCESSORIES; FOR HAVING KNOWLEDGE
OF THE CRIME AND TAKING PART SUBSEQUENT TO ITS COMMISSION BY PROFITING
FROM THE EFFECTS, MAKES ONE AN ACCESSORY TO THE CRIME CHARGED; CASE AT
BAR. — Legarto may not have had a direct hand in the kidnapping, but he received part of
the ransom and used it to pay off his arrears in his motorcycle loan. Thus, having
knowledge of the kidnapping for ransom and without having directly participated therein,
he took part in the crime subsequent to its commission by pro ting from its effects. He
may not be the devil with the face of an angel that the trial court described, but he is
de nitely not a saint. He is criminally liable as an accessory to the crime of kidnapping for
ransom. Under Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code, accessories are de ned as those who
(1) have knowledge of the commission of the crime, (2) did not take part in its
commission as principal or accomplice, but (3) took part in its subsequent to its
commission by any of the three modes enumerated in this article, one of which is by
pro ting or by assisting the offender to pro t from the effects of the crime. These
elements are all present and proven in Legarto's case. SaIACT
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROPER PENALTY THEREOF; CASE AT BAR. — As an

accessory to the consummated crime of kidnapping, the penalty imposable upon Legarto
is two degrees lower than that prescribed by law under Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code. Since no modifying circumstance is appreciated for or against him, the imposable
penalty should be in the medium period of the indeterminate sentence applicable under RA
4103, as amended.
4. ID.; CONSPIRACY; NOT DULY ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR. — In Legarto's
case, conspiracy was not at all established by the prosecution. The familiarity between
Legarto and Mondaga is insu cient proof, as conspiracy transcends companionship."
Moreover, Mondaga's act of meeting Legarto on the road to Andanan does not show
conspiracy, because a merely casual or unintended meeting, like passive presence, is not
proof of conspiracy. Similarly insu cient as circumstantial evidence to prove conspiracy
were Mondaga's demand for the use of Legarto's motorcycle, Legarto's collecting the
ransom money and delivering part of it, and Legarto's failure to testify against Mondaga
due to either refusal or neglect. We stress that conspiracy must be founded on facts, not
mere inferences and conjectures. Without an allegation of any overt act showing
community with the kidnappers, inferences do not adequately establish participation in a
criminal conspiracy.
5. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; ELEMENTS
THEREOF; NOT SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR. — A conviction based on
circumstantial evidence requires the concurrence of the following elements: (a) there is
more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances produces a conviction to
withstand judicial scrutiny, the prosecution must further show that all the circumstances
are inconsistent with the hypothesis except that of his guilt. In this case, the totality of the
pieces of circumstantial evidence being imputed to Legarto does not foreclose the
possibility that he took no part in the criminal enterprise and does not, therefore, overcome
his constitutional right to be presumed innocent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN , J : p
Conspiracy and/or direct participation in a crime may be proven by circumstantial

evidence. However, the comprising circumstances must be duly proven, consistent with
each other and lead with moral certainty to only one conclusion: that the accused is guilty.
If the totality of such circumstances eliminates beyond reasonable doubt the possibility of
innocence, conviction is proper; otherwise, the accused must be acquitted. If said accused,
however, took advantage of the effects of the crime and pro ted thereby, he can be held
criminally liable as an accessory. LLphil
The Case
This is an appeal from the March 18, 1994 Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of
Lianga, Surigao del Sur, Branch 28, in Criminal Case No. L-1174, convicting Raul Mondaga,
Rodrigo Legarto and Daniel Maluenda of kidnapping and sentencing them to reclusión
perpetua.
In an Information dated November 20, 1992, Mondaga, Maluenda and Legarto,
together with a certain Gil Bueno, were charged by Prosecutor II Florito G. Cuartero with
kidnapping, committed as follows: 2
"That on the 19th day of August 1992, at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening,
more or less, at [B]arangay Diatagon, [M]unicipality of Lianga, [P]rovince of
Surigao del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap Engr.
Miguel Resus for the purpose of extorting money from Engr. & Mrs. Resus, and
detaining said Engr. Miguel Resus for a period of four (4) days, to the damage
and prejudice of the victim in the amount of P200,000.00, Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (In violation of Article 267 of the Revised Penal

Code)."
Warrants of arrest for the four accused were issued by the trial court, but Bueno
eluded the authorities and remained at large. 3 At their arraignment and with the
assistance of counsel, Legarto, Maluenda and Mondaga pleaded not guilty. 4
After trial in due course, the lower court found the three accused guilty as charged
and disposed as follows: 5
"WHEREFORE, consistent with all the foregoing findings, this Court finds all
the accused [sic], namely, Raul Mondaga, alias Bobong Gonzaga, 21 years old,
single, driver by occupation, as alleged, and resident of Tagongon, Tagbina,
Surigao del Sur; Rodrigo Legarto alias Rudy, 37 years old, married to Magdalena
C. Legarto, gas man of the bankrupt Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. and a resident
of New Highway, Purok III, Diatagon, Lianga, Surigao del Sur and Daniel
Maluenda, Alias Commander Dongkoy, 22 years old, single, and a farmer and
goldminer, and resident of Purok 1, Barobo, Surigao del Sur, all guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as co-principals of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom,
de ned and penalized under the last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code as charged in the Information, and are hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties provided by law,
and to restitute to the private complainants, Engr. Miguel E. Resus and Dra.
Bernardita R. Resus, jointly and severally, the amount of P200,000.00
corresponding to the aggregate of the money in cash and medicines extorted as
per the demand of the accused [sic] and given by the kidnap victim's wife,
including the subject motorcycle which has been paid for by the victim's ransom
money; (Exh. 'E') with the down payment as per agreement advanced by the
couple Resus for a total cost price of P46,895.00 (Exh. 'F') and to pay the costs.
Immediately after promulgation of this decision, so as not to render the
sentence imposed ineffectual with respect to accused Rodrigo Legarto, alias
Rudy, the bail bond posted for his provisional release is hereby cancelled and said
accused ordered committed to the custody of the Provincial Warden of Surigao
del Sur at Tandag, Surigao del Sur, preparatory to the service of his sentence.
In the service of this sentence, all the accused are ordered immediately
turned over to the custody of the Director, Bureau of Corrections, at Muntinlupa,
Metro Manila, pursuant to the mandate of Supreme Court Circular No. 4-92- A
dated April 20, 1992.
Finally, let [an] alias warrant of arrest issue against accused Gil Bueno for
distribution to the different investigative and law-enforcement agencies of the
Government for their possible execution and return, and hereby consigning this
case, with respect to said GIL BUENO, to the ARCHIVES to be reinstated to the
active files of criminal cases upon his arrest."
In view of the penalty imposed, Legarto, Maluenda and Mondaga interposed this
appeal directly before this Court. 6 However, on March 30, 1995, Mondaga withdrew his
appeal. 7 Hence, this Court will now pass upon the criminal liability of Legarto and
Maluenda only.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
In the Appellee's Brief, the solicitor general presents the following narration of the
kidnapping: 8
"On August 19, 1992 at around 9:45 in the evening, Engr. Miguel E. Resus
('Engr. Resus') and his wife, Dr. Bernardita B. Resus ('Dr. Resus'), arrived at their
residence/clinic at Diatagon, Lianga, Surigao del Sur, from a novena they
attended. Waiting for the Resus spouses at the clinic which adjoins the Resus
spouses' residence were three men who identi ed themselves as Commander
Bobong Gonzaga (who is actually Raul Mondaga), Commander Bongkoy (who is
actually Maluenda) and alias 'Alex'. Upon the arrival of the Resus spouses,
Mondaga declared that they came upon orders of a certain Father Simon, an
alleged NPA Commander, with his directive to solicit money and medicines
needed for the victims of the recent military-NPA encounter at Melale, Agusan del
Sur. The trio demanded from the couple medicines and money in the amount of
P20,000.00, but when the couple told them that they did not have such an
amount, they lowered their demand to P10,000.00, and reduced it still to
P5,000.00 when the couple still could not produce the said amount. Finally, the
demand was lowered to any amount the Resus couple could provide. The latter
gave the amount of P500.00 plus assorted medicines worth P800.00. After they
were given the money and medicines, the trio demanded that they be driven by
Engr. Resus in his Volkswagen car to San Roque, Barobo, Surigao del Sur, but the
couple begged off reasoning that their car [did] have any su cient gasoline and
that the car was not in good running condition to travel that night. Mondaga then
demanded that very early in the morning, the couple should prepare the vehicle so
Engr. Resus [could] drive them to San Roque, Barobo, Surigao del Sur. They left
the clinic with [a] threat not to tell anybody about their coming, otherwise they
[would] kill all the members of their family and blow-up the clinic.
The next day or on August 20, 1992 at around 5:00 o'clock in the morning,
Mondaga arrived at the residence of the Resus couple. Mondaga hurried up Engr.
Resus as he [would] meet his companions who were ferried by Legarto. Engr.
Resus then drove Mondaga to Andanan. As the two passed along Andanan, they
met Legarto, who was on his way back to Diatogon after his passengers, i.e.,
Maluenda and Alex, alighted from his motorcycle and [waited] for Mondaga and
Engr. Resus at Andanan. Maluenda and Alex then rode with Mondaga and Engr.
Resus to Barobo. Upon reaching Barobo, Mondaga told Engr. Resus that they
[would] go to San Francisco instead of going to San Roque. They, however, did
not reach San Francisco, and instead they stopped at Alegria. Upon reaching
Alegria, Mondaga ordered Engr. Resus that he had to go with them. Against his
will, Engr. Resus went with the three. They went to the mountain hiking for almost
two (2) hours between the boundary of Cardon and Alegria. Upon reaching a hut,
Mondaga told him that he had forgotten something and had to go back and that
Engr. Resus had to stay there. So Engr. Resus, Maluenda, Alex and Gil Bueno
passed the night in the farmhut.
Meanwhile at the house of the Resus couple, Dr. Resus was informed by
the midwife that Mondaga came at around 4:00 p.m. when Dr. Resus was out.
Mondaga told the midwife that he [would] come back. Mondaga arrived at the
Resus clinic at around 7:00 in the evening. Mondaga demanded from Dr. Resus
the amount of P300,000.00 for the release of Engr. Resus. Dr. Resus told
Mondaga that she [could] only produce P10,000.00. Mondaga told Dr. Resus to
reserve the amount for he [would] get it the following morning. He also instructed
Dr. Resus to look for the rearm of her husband. Dr. Resus then searched for the
gun (Exh. H) of her husband and after nding it in the cabinet in their room, gave
the same to Mondaga. After [the gun was given to him], Mondaga demanded for
the use of Engr. Resus' motorcycle, but Dr. Resus told him that the motorcycle
[was] out of order. So Mondaga instructed Dr. Resus to get the motorcycle of
Legarto, which Dr. Resus did.
On August 21, 1992, at around 4:45 a.m. Mondaga arrived at Dr. Resus'
clinic. Shortly thereafter, Legarto also arrived in his motorcycle. Mondaga
demanded that Dr. Resus go with them but the latter made excuses particularly
her health. Dr. Resus asked that her helper Maria Abne go instead to which
Mondaga agreed. At exactly 5:00 a.m., Mondaga, Legarto and Maria Abne left Dr.
Resus' clinic, bringing with them the P10,000.00 Dr. Resus gave and the Magnum
22 of Engr. Resus. The three arrived at Alegria, San Francisco, Agusan del Sur at
around 7:00 a.m. Legarto then safely kept his motorcycle after which they walked
to the forest for about 2 hours until they reached a carabao crossing where
Mondaga left Legarto and Maria Abne for 30 minutes. Mondaga went to the hut
where he left Engr. Resus with a note from Dr. Resus which state[d], 'Daddy, I have
committed only P10,000.00'. He gave the note to Engr. Resus but told Engr. Resus
that 'you can afford P300,000.00'. Engr. Resus pleaded with Mondaga that they
[did] not have such amount so Mondaga lowered his demand to P200,000.00.
Engr. Resus then signed the note stating, 'Mommy, it is up to you to produce this
amount.' With the note, Mondaga and Legarto went back to Alegria, while Abne
was left with Engr. Resus. Legarto who was driving Engr. Resus' car, went to the
house of Nora Gubantes where Dr. Resus was at that time and informed her that
Mondaga [was] waiting [for] her at SSIFA, St. Christine. Dr. Resus went with
Legarto at SSIFA, St. Christine where they met Mondaga, who joined them at the
car after which the three proceeded to a deserted place. Mondaga then handed to
Dr. Resus the note written by Engr. Resus where it was written the P200,000.00
ransom. [sic] Dr. Resus told Mondaga that she [could] only produce P100,000.00
Mondaga agreed to the P100,000.00 on the additional condition that he [would]
no longer return the motorcycle of Legarto and instead to give to Legarto the
amount of P50,000.00 as payment for the motorcycle. Mondaga also instructed
Legarto to deliver the amount of P100,000.00 and the original license of the
motorcycle. Dr. Resus and Legarto then went back to the clinic leaving Mondaga
behind.
At around 1:30 p.m. of August 21, 1992, Dr. Resus, together with Nora
Gubantes, went to Lianga to secure money from the relatives of Dr. Resus. Since
Dr. Resus' cousins were out of town, the two proceeded to San Francisco, Agusan
del Sur to see Dr. Presentacion Manatad, the mayor of San Francisco. Dr. Resus
informed Mayor Manatad about the incident and asked the mayor to give her an
amount of P150,000.00 in return for a PNB Check Dr. Resus [would] issue. Mayor
Manatad gave her the amount after Dr. Resus issued PNB Check No. 621330-AJ
in the amount of P150,000.00 (Exh. B). Dr. Resus gave the money to Nora
Gubantes with the instruction to give the same to Legarto. Upon reaching
Diatogon, Nora Gubantes gave the money to her husband with the instruction to
give the money to Legarto. Legarto acknowledged receiving the money from Mr.
Gubantes on August 22, 1992.
On August 22, 1992, Mondaga arrived at the hut where Engr. Resus was
and told that [sic] the latter that he would be released but that he [would] come
back to get the balance of the P300,000.00 in three months. In the afternoon of
August 22, 1992, Engr. Resus and Maria Abne were released. The two were driven
by Legarto in Engr. Resus['] car.
Mondaga, Maluenda and Legarto were later arrested by the police."
Version of the Defense

Appellant Legarto, the Resus couple's former part-time driver, denies any criminal
involvement in the kidnapping. He avows that he participated only in the delivery of the
ransom money at the insistence of Dr. Resus herself. In Legarto's Supplemental Brief, his
counsel submits the following counter-statement of facts: 9
"On August 19, 1992, at 9:45 in the evening, Engr. Miguel E. Resus and wife
Dr. Bernardita B. Resus, arrived at their clinic near their residence at Diatagon,
Lianga, Surigao del Sur after attending a novena. (TSN, March 16, 1993, p. 3).
There were three (3) men who were waiting for them at the clinic, later identi ed
as Commander Bobong Gonzaga (Raul Mondaga), Commander Bongkoy (Daniel
Maluenda), and a certain 'Alex' (ibid. p. 5). Mondaga, upon arrival of the spouses,
solicited money and medicines from them, upon orders of a certain Father Simon,
an NPA Commander (ibid. p. 7). These money and medicines were needed for the
victims of the recent military-NPA encounter at Melale, Agusan del Sur. (ibid.). At
rst, the three asked for P20,000.00 (ibid. p. 8) but lowered it to P10,000.00, and
still reduced it to P5,000.00. Finally, the Resus spouses could only give P500.00
together with P800.00 worth of medicines. (TSN, March 17, 1993 p. 42)
After the money and medicines were handed to them, the three people
demanded that they be driven by Engr. Resus in his Volkswagen car to San
Roque, Barobo, Surigao del Sur, but Engr. Resus declined saying that he could not
drive them at 12:00 midnight because he [did] not have enough gasoline and that
his service car [was] not in good condition to travel in the evening. (TSN, March
16, 1993, p. 8). But one person, Mondaga, insisted that the next morning, a vehicle
should be prepared for a trip to San Roque, Barobo, Surigao del Sur. (TSN, March
17, 1993, p. 43)
At about 4:45 in the morning of August 20, 1992, Mondaga knocked at the
door of the clinic. Engr. Resus was just busy preparing the vehicle, securing
gasoline. (ibid, p. 44.) Mondaga rode in the vehicle of Engr. Resus and met his
two companions at Andanan. (ibid.) LLphil
Instead of San Roque, the vehicle stopped at Alegria (TSN, March 16, 1993,
p. 11). The three (Mondaga, Maluenda and Alex) asked Engr. Resus to go with
them. (ibid.) They went to the mountains and hiked for almost two (2) hours
between the boundary of Gordon and Alegria. (ibid.) When they reached the area,
Mondaga went back to Alegria, leaving behind the three who passed the night in
the area. (ibid, p. 12)
Mondaga arrived at around 4:00 in the afternoon at the clinic of Dr. Resus.
(TSN, March 17, 1993, p. 47) Dr. Resus was out, but when Mondaga later came
back at 7:00 in the evening and saw Dr. Resus (ibid, p. 48), he demanded the
amount of P300,000.00. But since Dr. Resus had only P10,000.00, Mondaga told
her to reserve it and he [would] get it the next morning. (ibid., pp. 48-49) After
asking for the rearm of Engr. Resus, (ibid, p. 51) Mondaga demanded to use the
motorcycle of Engr. Resus. (ibid.) Dr. Resus said that it was out of order. (ibid.)
Mondaga ordered her to secure a motorcycle. (ibid) Dr. Resus, together with her
maid, Maria Abne, went to the house of their driver, Rudy Legarto. (TSN,
November 23, 1993, p. 22) Dr. Resus requested Rudy Legarto to drive for Maria
Abne and Mondaga in his motorcycle to Alegria and on his return, to drive for his
Manong Mike. (ibid) Legarto refused because of his work. (ibid) But when Dr.
Resus insisted and when told that it was very important to conduct Maria Abne
and Mondaga, and because she was his boss, he agreed. (ibid.) He was asked to
le a leave of absence from his job. (ibid.) It is important to note that it was [Dr.]
Resus who got Legarto involved in this drama.
At around 5:00 in the morning of August 21, 1992, Legarto drove for Maria
Abne and Mondaga to Alegria at the behest of Dr. Resus. (ibid, p. 23) At Alegria,
the three proceeded of [sic] Dr. Resus (ibid, p. 23) to a hilly side. (ibid.) Legarto
and Maria Abne were left behind and Mondaga told them that he [would] inform
his commander to release Engr. Resus. (ibid.) They were also warned not to
escape because they were guarded. (ibid.)
At about 9:00 in the evening, Engr. Resus, together with Mondaga, arrived.
Legarto was told by Engr. Resus not to worry as he was treated well. (ibid.) Engr.
Resus told Mondaga that Legarto was his driver and Maria Abne was his helper.
(ibid.) [O]n the way back, Legarto and Abne walked ve (5) meters ahead while
Mondaga and Engr. Resus walked side by side. Legarto and Abne heard their
conversations (ibid, pp. 23-24) and Mondaga was demanding P300,000.00. Engr.
Resus pleaded that he [did not] have that amount. (ibid) Mondaga them ordered
Engr. Resus to make a note to his wife, Dr. Resus stating that P300,000.00 be
given. (ibid) After the note was signed, Mondaga got the keys of the Volkswagen
car and the motorcycle while Legarto was brought along to Alegria. (ibid, p. 25)
Engr. Resus and Maria Abne were left behind. (ibid) When they arrived at Alegria,
Mondaga ordered him to drive the Volkswagen in going back to Diatagon while
Mondaga drove the motorcycle of Legarto. (ibid.)
However, at Diatagon, Mondaga stopped Legarto near the School of
Fisheries. (ibid.) He was ordered to fetch Dr. Resus and bring her to Mondaga for
nal negotiation. (ibid.) There was a threat not to disseminate the information
because if he [did], then Legarto's family [would] be killed, including himself.
(ibid.)
He was able to nd Dr. Resus at the house of a certain Nora Gubantes and
told her he was ordered to fetch her. Legarto asked Dr. Resus what [was] this
incident about and Legarto was told immediately to shut up. (ibid, p. 26) Legarto
asked her of her decision but was told to shut up again. (ibid.)
Dr. Resus rode with him in the Volkswagen car towards the area near the
Fisheries School at St. Catherine, Lianga, Surigao del Sur. (ibid.) At some point
Mondaga joined them in the car. Dr. Resus allowed Mondaga to sit at the back
while she sat in front seat beside Legarto. They talked about the money, and Dr.
Resus pleaded that she [could] only produce P100,000.00. (ibid, p. 27) Mondaga
agreed, provided the motorcycle of Legarto be included. (ibid.) Legarto, at this
point, intervened and told Dr. Resus not to include in the negotiation his
motorcycle because the installment was not yet fully paid. (ibid.) Dr. Resus then
told him to "just give his motorcycle." (ibid.) Then, Mondaga told Dr. Resus that
Legarto would be the one who [would] bring the money to Alegria. He agreed
again because Dr. Resus was his boss. (ibid.)
On August 22, 1992, at 4:00 in the afternoon, Eslao Gubantes and his son
delivered P136,000.00 to Legarto plus P200.00 for gasoline (ibid, p. 28). The
P36,000.00 [was] to be paid as partial payment for his motorcycle. (ibid)
When he led his leave of his [sic] absence, he talked to his Superintendent
Virgilio Fernandez and others who told him he should have led his leave of
absence ahead because nobody was detailed at the depot, (ibid, p. 29) but he told
them that, there was an emergency because Engr. Resus was held hostage and he
[would] deliver the money. (ibid.)
On his way to Alegria, he met Dr. Resus together with her nephew riding a
police car (ibid). He was asked by Dra. Resus where the money [was] but he
answered, he brought along with him P100,000.00. (ibid.) Dr. Resus told him to
bring also the P36,000.00 and another P14,000.00 which was about to be given
by Dr. Resus. (ibid.) However, he advised Dr. Resus that he would bring only
P100,000.00 because that was what they [had] agreed upon. (ibid) If Mondaga
objects [sic] he [would] just come back. (ibid.) This was con rmed by Dr. Resus'
nephew (ibid.)
Legarto proceeded to Alegria and subsequently delivered the money to
Mondaga, which resulted [in] the release of Engr. Resus, together with Maria Abne.
(ibid, p. 30) Engr. Resus and Maria Abne were brought back to Lianga, where they
met Dr. Resus. Mayor Layno of Lianga commented that if not for your driver and
Maria Abne, Engr. Resus [would] not be rescued. (ibid.) Engr. Resus and Dr. Resus
remained at Lianga, while he and Maria Abne proceeded to Diatagon. (ibid.)
On September 18, 1992, Legarto and Maria Abne were brought to the
municipal building to act as witnesses for Engr. and Dr. Resus. (ibid, p. 31)
However, after executing his a davit before the Municipal Judge, he was
arrested just when he went out from the o ce (ibid, p. 31). He was brought to
Patin-ay, Agusan del Sur, where he was detained. (ibid, p. 32) While there, he wrote
a letter to Engr. and Dr. Resus for help. (ibid.) The letter expressed his sentiment
and dismay that in spite of his help, he was included in the case. (ibid, p. 33) He
denied having driven Mondaga alias Bobong Gonzaga at any other time."
Similarly, Maluenda denies knowledge of Mondaga's plan to commit the said crime.
He accompanied the latter to Mahilom only to mine for gold and not to plan, much less
commit, any crime. He alleges that he guarded the victim at the hut only because Mondaga
threatened to kill him and his family. Through counsel, Maluenda presents his own version
of the facts, as follows: 1 0
"Daniel Maluenda testified that on August 20, 1992 at around 10:00 o'clock
in the evening, he was in his house at Barobo when Raul Mondaga came over.
Mondaga told him that he [had] a tunnel in Mahilom and offered Maluenda a
fty- fty proposition to gold mine the tunnel. Maluenda, who [was] a farmer and
at the same time a gold miner, agreed to the proposition.
On August 21, 1992 at around 7:00 o'clock in the morning, Maluenda
together with Mondaga proceeded to Sitio Mahilom. Upon reaching Garden,
Tambis, Surigao del Sur, Mondaga tried to give Maluenda a pistol and grenade
but Maluenda questioned Mondaga's purpose for bringing the same since they
were just looking for gold inside the tunnel. Mondaga in turn told Maluenda to
just follow what he [ordered] so that nothing will happen to him, and that
Mondaga [would] not hesitate to kill a person, so Maluenda merely followed
Mondaga as he was afraid.
Arriving at Mahilom, Mondaga and Maluenda proceeded to a hut where the
latter saw Engr. Resus and some other persons. Mondaga ordered Maluenda to
stay in the hut and feed these persons. Maluenda in turn retorted that their
agreement was to mine for gold, but Mondaga told him 'to just follow my order so
that nothing will happen to you, or else I will blast your head and kill your family.'
Inside the hut, Maluenda and Engr. Resus talked and planned to escape.
The next day at around 2:00 in the afternoon, Maluenda, together with
Engr. Resus, left but when they reached Alegria, they met Mondaga. Mondaga
approached Engr. Resus, held his hand and said, do not be afraid because you
can go home. Mondaga also told Maluenda not to report the matter to the
authorities otherwise, they [would] all be killed.
Maluenda denied that he was at the clinic of Dra. Resus on August 19,
1992. Furthermore, he denied having received any money from Mondaga. (TSN,
November 24, 1993, pp. 50-59)"
Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court convicted Legarto, Maluenda and Mondaga, holding that they
successfully perpetrated a clear case of kidnapping. It gave complete credence to the
testimony of the prosecution witnesses whom it deemed unquestionably reliable, sincere
and candid. The lower court held that Mondaga was the mastermind of the kidnapping.
While Appellant Legarto portrayed himself as a good Samaritan to the Resus couple, the
trial court stated that he was a wolf in sheep's clothing and described his testimony as
evasive, false and shallow. LLphil
The court a quo held: "[A]s to how accused Raul Mondaga came to know that the
Resus couple could pay ransom, the nger of suspicion points to Legarto as source." 11
Legarto failed to satisfactorily explain why he did not testify against Mondaga in the
criminal case for carnapping involving his motorcycle. His actuations from the outset until
the time he delivered the ransom money betrayed his active participation as a co-principal
by indispensable cooperation in the crime. Of the P136,000 handed to him for delivery to
the kidnappers, Legarto kept P36,000 for himself. Legarto con dently refused to accept
P14,000 more from Dr. Resus, saying that what he had was already su cient. He further
failed to report the incident to the police when he had the opportunity to do so.
The trial court also noted the following pieces of evidence which proved
Legarto's participation in the crime:
1. Witness Sanchez testi ed that she saw Mondaga frequenting
Legarto's house in Diatagon, and she even saw him and Mondaga
riding on his motorcycle.
2. On August 20, 1992, Engineer Resus saw him convey Maluenda and
"Alex" to Andanan, where Maluenda and "Alex" boarded Engineer
Resus' car.
3. He drove the victim's car back to Diatagon from Alegria.
4. He delivered Mondaga's ransom notes to Dr. Resus.
5. He also delivered the ransom money to the kidnappers.
6. He used P36,000 of the ransom money to pay the balance of the
purchase price of his motorcycle.
All these allegedly show Legarto's participation as a co-principal by indispensable
cooperation in the crime.
Through the same witnesses for the prosecution, Maluenda, who introduced himself
as Commander Dongkoy, was positively identi ed as one of the men who went to Dr.
Resus' clinic on August 19, 1992. The kidnap victim also identi ed him as the guard at the
hideout in Alegria. Hence, the trial court convicted him as a co-principal.
Assignment of Errors
Legarto assigns the following errors allegedly committed by the trial court: 12
"I The lower court erred in nding that, 'as to how accused Raul Mondaga
came to know that the Resus couple could pay ransom, the nger of
suspicion points to Legarto, as source'.
II The lower court erred in giving credence to the testimony of Norma

Sanchez.

III The lower court erred in nding that, 'with respect to accused Rodrigo
Legarto, there were several instances noted by the court which lead [sic] it
to conclude that this particular accused was part of the criminal scheme to
commits [sic] said kidnapping.'
IV The lower court erred in holding, 'that he has all the opportunity to report
such criminal scheme to the police or military authorities, if he wanted to
and his failure to do so plainly indicated his part in the criminal plan; and
his actuations from the outset in a criminal plan was put to an [sic] effect,
up to his rule [sic] in hand carrying the ransom money which he turned over
to Mondaga at the mountain hideout which he know [sic] inevitably, shows
his active participation as a co-principal by [indispensable] cooperation.
V The lower court erred in not giving credence to the testimony of Rodrigo
Legarto.
VI The lower court erred in convicting the accused-appellant as co-principal of

the crime of kidnapping for ransom de ned and penalized under the last
par. of Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code as charged in the information
and [in sentencing him] to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all
the accessory penalties provided by law.
VII The lower court erred in ordering the con scation of appellant's
motorcycle."
In the Supplemental Brief, Legarto's other counsel adds the following issues: 1 3
"I. The participation of Legarto was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
II. Legarto was convicted on mere suspicion of one prosecution witness.
III. Legarto [had] no motive in kidnapping Engr. Resus.
IV. Lower court erred in holding that Legarto [was] a co-principal by

indispensable cooperation.
V. The lower court erred in ordering the con scation of the motorcycle of
Legarto."
For his part, Maluenda submits the following as his lone assignment of error: 1 4
"The trial court erred in nding the accused guilty of the crime charged
despite the fact that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt."
For clarity and order, the Court will separately discuss the participation of the
appellants and the probative value of the evidence presented against each of them.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is partially meritorious as regards Legarto who, in the light of the
evidence presented, should be held liable only as an accessory. In contrast, Maluenda's
conviction deserves affirmation, as his culpability in the kidnapping was clearly proven.
Legarto's Culpability
Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence
The solicitor general argues for the a rmation of Legarto's conviction on the
ground that the trial court's assessment of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses is
generally accorded great respect on appeal. However, the Court believes that the
resolution of this appeal transcends the issue of the credibility of the witnesses. There is
need to evaluate the su ciency of the circumstantial evidence presented to sustain
Legarto's conviction.
The trial court found Legarto guilty as a principal by indispensable cooperation on
the basis of several pieces of circumstantial evidence, which the solicitor general depicts
as clearly demonstrating his participation. On the other hand, Legarto asserts that the
same set of evidence is frail and inconclusive.
Legarto's contention merits consideration. A principal by indispensable cooperation
is defined by Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code thus:
"ART. 17 Principals. — The following are considered principals:
xxx xxx xxx
3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another

act without which it would not have been accomplished."
Legarto cannot be convicted under this de nition because the prosecution failed to
allege, much less prove, any overt act on his part showing direct participation in the
kidnapping itself, his participation in the incident being limited to acts committed after the
abduction was already consummated. He was not with the kidnappers (1) when they
forcibly solicited money and medicine from the Resus couple, (2) when they brought the
kidnap victim to Alegria, and (3) when Mondaga demanded ransom for the victim's
release. Together with the Resus housemaid, he accompanied Mondaga to the hideout in
Alegria only upon Dr. Resus' request. In short, the prosecution failed to piece together a
clear story as to how Legarto figured in the kidnapping caper.
Admittedly, circumstantial evidence may be su cient to convict an accused as a
principal by indispensable cooperation in accordance with Sec. 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of
Court. 1 5 It may also show conspiracy. Thus, this Court meticulously examined the
pleadings, the records and the assailed Decision in order to evaluate the su ciency of
Legarto's conviction. The pieces of circumstantial evidence used by the prosecution and
accepted by the trial court are enumerated and evaluated seriatim.
Acquaintance Is Inconclusive
Proof of Participation
That Mondaga frequented the house of Legarto in Diatagon proves that he knew the
latter. Witness Sanchez testi ed that she even saw them riding Legarto's motorcycle
during the town esta on June 24, 1992. However, this event occurred about two months
before the kidnapping on August 19 to 22, 1992. Considering that the prosecution did not
present any evidence to show that the plan to kidnap Engineer Resus was hatched as early
as June 24, 1992, the fact that Legarto and Mondaga were together during the town esta
should not be considered as proof of Legarto's direct participation in the crime. Likewise,
that Legarto was acquainted with Mondaga does not prove that the former had a hand in
the kidnapping.
Conveying Maluenda and Bueno
Does Not Conclusively
Prove Participation
The solicitor general harps on the fact that, on August 20, 1992, Legarto was seen
transporting Maluenda and "Alex" to Andanan on his motorcycle. He claims that this is
strong proof of Legarto's complicity, as it shows that Legarto had knowledge of the plan
to kidnap Engineer Resus. The trial court, for its part, said that this fact "points to the clear
perception that . . . he was part of the dubious criminal plan." The "fact" relied upon by the
solicitor general and the trial court, however, is a mere speculation. This is clear from
Engineer Resus' testimony, the pertinent portion of which is reproduced below:" 16
"Q On the following day, August 20, 1992, where were you?
A I was at my residence, sir.
Q While you were in your residence, what transpired, if there was any?
A I got ready of [sic] my car, at the same time Raul Mondaga came in, sir.
Q What time did Raul Mondaga enter your residence?
A At about 5:00 o'clock early in the morning, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Where was the accused Maluenda at that time?
A At that time Maluenda was not around, sir.
Q Now, while you were preparing your car, what happened next?
A I parked my car infront [sic] of the clinic, sir.
Q Then what happened next after parking your car infront [sic] of your clinic?
aisadc
A Raul Mondaga hurried me up to go with his companion who was ferried by

Rudy Legarto, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q When you arrived at Andanan, what happened?
A As we passed along Andanan, I met Rudy Legarto on the way going back to
Diatagon, with his two (2) passengers already alighted from his motorcycle
and waiting for us at Andanan and then took a ride with us on our way to
Barobo, sir." (Emphasis supplied.)
Engineer Resus merely said that he saw Legarto heading back to Diatagon. He did
not witness Maluenda and "Alex" on board Legarto's motorcycle or alighting therefrom; he
only saw the two at Andanan waiting for Mondaga and him. In fact, Engineer Resus did not
actually see Legarto transport Mondaga's companions. Hence, the statement that Legarto
did so is a conclusion unsupported by Resus' testimony, a mere speculation of the event
that might have preceded what Engineer Resus saw. Its true nature as a conjecture is
evident from the averment of the trial court that ". . . they were conveyed there by Rodrigo
Legarto with the use of his motorcycle, as he was even encountered on the road on his
return back to Diatagon that morning by Engr. Resus."
From the foregoing, it is clear that Legarto's alleged direct participation in the
kidnapping is without factual basis; it is nothing more than an inference drawn from a
presumption. And because circumstantial evidence not adequately established cannot
become the basis of conviction, such inference cannot be given evidentiary weight to
support Legarto's conviction as a principal by indispensable cooperation. 1 7
No Specific Demand for Legarto's Motorcycle
The solicitor general avers that Mondaga's instruction to Dr. Resus to requisition
Legarto's motorcycle proves Legarto's complicity in the felonious scheme. The averment
is inaccurate because Mondaga, in accordance with Dr. Resus' testimony, had originally
requisitioned the victim's motorcycle, but the latter told him that it was out of order. 18 So,
Mondaga asked for Legarto's motorcycle instead.
That Mondaga chose Legarto's motorcycle when he could have demanded any other
two-wheel vehicle can be explained by the fact that, several times prior to the kidnapping,
he had taken a ride on the said motorcycle. Note that Legarto used the motorcycle as a
vehicle for hire in the area.
Delivering the Ransom Money
and Keeping Part of It
Do Not Prove Conspiracy
The solicitor general avers that the complete trust of Mondaga in Legarto, whom the
former designated as collector of the ransom money, proves the latter's participation. The
trial court, on the same point, said: 19
". . . His subsequent direct involvement in the negotiations with Dra. Resus
when he was made to drive the Volkswagen car to Diatagon, contact Dra. Resus
in the nal negotiations, and delivery of the ransom money agreed upon [sic] to
Raul Mondaga, admitting having withheld at his house a part of the ransom
money amounting to P36,000.00(?) and paying off the balance of the motorcycle
with it, as evidenced by the receipt of payment, demonstrates very strongly and
beyond doubt to [sic] his participation in that criminal act, as now charged. . . ."
These averments, however, are su ciently rebutted by Legarto's allegation that, out
of loyalty to his former boss, he participated in the release of the kidnap victim, not in his
detention. The testimony of Engineer Resus — that Legarto was at Alegria in order to fetch
the former — is cited by the defense as follows: 20
"Q Do you con rm . . . the statements in these a davits which you
subscribed and sworn [sic] to before Judge Ricardo L. Mosquerra III on
September 18, 1992 and September 23, 1992?
A Yes, Sir.
Q In your a davit on September 16, 1992 subscribed before Judge

Mosquerra, you never mentioned Rudy Legarto as one of the kidnappers,
am I correct?
A Yes, Sir.
Q In fact, you will agree [with] me that the presence of Maria Abne and Rudy
Legarto was for them to fetch you. Am I correct?

A Yes, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx."
Regarding the P36,000 which he kept, Legarto alleges that this was payment for his
motorcycle which was taken by Mondaga. He claims that he had initially refused to give his
motorcycle to Mondaga, but was prevailed upon by Dr. Resus who told him that she would
replace it. 21 Con rming this, Dr. Resus testi ed that she told Mrs. Gubantes that the
money was payment for Legarto's motorcycle, 22 not his share in the ransom. Thus, such
payment could not rationally constitute evidence of direct participation or of conspiracy in
the kidnapping.
Non-appearance at the Hearings
of the Carnapping Case
The solicitor general and the trial court posit that direct participation was
established by the failure of Legarto to testify against Mondaga in the criminal case for the
carnapping of Legarto's motorcycle. The excuses of Legarto for his inability to attend the
hearings — that he did not have transportation and that he had stomach ache — were
branded by the solicitor general as " imsy and incredible." After all, Legarto was able to
appear sans such problems when the trial court ordered the release of the motorcycle.
The contention is untenable. Legarto's lack of interest in pursuing the criminal case
against Mondaga may be less than laudable, but it does not necessarily show direct
participation in the kidnapping. Dismissal of cases due to failure to prosecute is a
common legal experience. Legarto's excuses for failing to prosecute may be dubious, but
they cannot become the basis for his conviction as a principal by indispensable
cooperation in this case.
"Finger of Accusation"
Was Baseless
In the assailed Decision, the trial court states, "As to how accused Raul Mondaga
came to know that the Resus couple could pay [the] ransom, the nger of suspicion points
to Legarto as [the] source." 23 However, an examination of the transcripts of stenographic
notes reveals no testimony that Legarto provided the kidnappers with information
regarding the spouses' nances. This was pure speculation or suspicion — nothing more,
nothing less.
Elements Required to Convict
By Circumstantial Evidence
A conviction based on circumstantial evidence requires the concurrence of the
following elements: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances
produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 24 For such a conviction to withstand
judicial scrutiny, the prosecution must further show that all the circumstances are
inconsistent with the hypothesis that the accused is innocent or with any other rational
hypothesis except that of his guilt. 25
In this case, the totality of the pieces of circumstantial evidence being imputed to
Legarto does not foreclose the possibility that he took no part in the criminal enterprise
and does not, therefore, overcome his constitutional right to be presumed innocent. 2 6
The presumption of innocence is founded upon substantive law and basic principles
of justice. It serves to balance the scales of justice in what would otherwise be an uneven
contest between a single individual accused of a crime and the prosecution which has all
the resources of the government at its command. Thus, this presumption cannot be
overcome by mere suspicion or conjecture that the defendant probably committed the
crime or that he had the opportunity to do so. The prosecution is required to prove the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Otherwise, the accused must be set free in
accordance with the rule that con icts in and insu ciency of evidence must be resolved in
favor of the theory of innocence rather than the theory of guilt. 2 7
Same Circumstances Do Not
Conclusively Show Conspiracy
Although the trial court did not pass upon conspiracy as a source of Legarto's
culpability, we deem it proper to do so, since it was alleged in the Information. In theory,
conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. 28 Once established, the act of one
becomes the act of all. Further, conspiracy must be shown to exist as clearly as the
commission of the offense itself, although direct proof is not essential. 29 Prior agreement
or assent to the crime is usually inferred from the acts of the accused showing concerted
action, common design and objective, actual cooperation, concurrence of sentiments, or
community of interest. 30 In most cases, like the one at bar, proof of conspiracy is
frequently made by evidence of a chain of circumstances only. 31 But such proof must
always be established by evidence that satis es the requirement of proof beyond
reasonable doubt. 32
In Legarto's case, conspiracy was not at all established by the prosecution. The
familiarity between Legarto and Mondaga is insu cient proof, as conspiracy transcends
companionship. 3 3 Moreover, Mondaga's act of meeting Legarto on the road to Andanan
does not show conspiracy, because a merely casual or unintended meeting, like passive
presence, is not proof of conspiracy. 3 4 Similarly insu cient as circumstantial evidence to
prove conspiracy were Mondaga's demand for the use of Legarto's motorcycle, Legarto's
collecting the ransom money and delivering part of it, and Legarto's failure to testify
against Mondaga due to either refusal or neglect. We stress that conspiracy must be
founded on facts, not on mere inferences and conjectures. 3 5 Without an allegation of any
overt act showing community with the kidnappers, inferences do not adequately establish
participation in a criminal conspiracy. 3 6
Legarto's Criminal Liability
Despite its belief that Legarto was not a co-principal or a co- conspirator, this Court
cannot completely free him from criminal liability. Established by the prosecution are the
following: (1) he reported the "loss" of the motorcycle to the police authorities despite the
fact that it had been given to Mondaga as part of the ransom; (2) he had received P36,000
for it; (3) he paid the balance of the purchase price of the motorcycle with the said money;
and (4) he claimed, regained and retained its possession.
Legarto may not have had a direct hand in the kidnapping, but he received part of the
ransom and used it to pay off his arrears in his motorcycle loan. Thus, having knowledge of
the kidnapping for ransom and without having directly participated therein, he took part in
the crime subsequent to its commission by profiting from its effects. 37 He may not be the
devil with the face of an angel that the trial court described, but he is de nitely not a saint.
He is criminally liable as an accessory to the crime of kidnapping for ransom.
Under Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code, accessories are de ned as those who
(1) have knowledge of the commission of the crime, (2) did not take part in its
commission as principal or accomplice, but (3) took part in it subsequent to its
commission by any of the three modes enumerated in this article, 3 8 one of which is by
pro ting or by assisting the offender to pro t from the effects of the crime. 3 9 These
elements are all present and proven in Legarto's case.
As an accessory to the consummated crime of kidnapping, the penalty imposable
upon Legarto is two degrees lower than that prescribed by law under Article 267 of the
said Code. 4 0 Since no modifying circumstance is appreciated for or against him, the
imposable penalty should be in the medium period of the indeterminate sentence
applicable under RA 4103, as amended. 4 1
Affirmation of Maluenda's Conviction
Acquittal is sought by Maluenda on the ground that only Mondaga executed the acts
constituting kidnapping with ransom; i.e., demanding and receiving money, medicine and
ransom from the Resus couple and detaining Engineer Resus. He avers that his presence
at the hideout in Alegria was involuntary because Mondaga had threatened his life and the
lives of the members of his family.
Such contention is patently bereft of merit. Maluenda's conviction deserves
a rmation based on the precept that actions speak louder than words. Established by the
prosecution beyond cavil was his direct participation in the criminal conspiracy to kidnap
Engineer Resus, who testi ed that Maluenda was one of the men who had, on the night of
August 19, 1992, extorted money and medicine from him and his wife who corroborated
this story. 4 2 Engineer Resus testified: 4 3
"Q: So what time did you arrive at your residence? aisadc
A: About 9:45 in the evening, more or less, sir.
xxx xxx xxx

ATTY ALVIZO:
Q: When you arrived [at] your residence, what happened, if any?

WITNESS:
A: When I arrived at our house, the midwife on duty told us that we [had]
visitors, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Who were your visitors?
A: Alias Bobong Gonzaga but his true name, after interrogation by the police
which I happened to know later, is Raul Mondaga, sir. And the other one is
Dongkoy but after interrogation by the police, they told me that the true
name is Daniel Maluenda; then alias 'Alex' whose identity is still unknown
because he is not yet arrested. These were the three (3) people in my
residence at that time, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What happened, after introducing themselves to you?
xxx xxx xxx
A: This Raul Mondaga drew his revolver and also his grenade ready to be
blown-up and introduced himself to us that NPA Commander Father Simon
[had] instructed them to solicit funds for the victims in the recent Melali,
Agusan del Sur, military-NPA encounter, sir."
The kidnap victim also testi ed that he conducted Maluenda and his companions to
Alegria in his car the following day: 4 4
"Q: When you arrived [at] Andanan, what happened?
WITNESS:
A: As we passed along Andana, I met Rudy Legarto on the way going back to
Diatagon [sic], with his two (2) passengers already alighted from his
motorcycle and waiting for us at Andanan and then took a ride with us on
our way to Barobo, sir.
Q: Who were your passengers then when you reached Barobo?
A: Raul Mondaga, Maluenda and alias Alex, sir."
Maluenda also guarded the victim at the farm hut in Alegria. 45

"Q: (PROS. CALVIZO)
Where did you go?
A: (ENGR. RESUS)
We went to the mountain and hiked for almost two (2) hours between the
boundary of Garden and Alegria, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: While you were there, what happened next, if any?
A: Raul Mondaga told me that he [had] forgotten something, he [had] to go

back and I [had] to stay there because the camp of the NPA still further
away and that we [had] to pass the night in that NPA hut, sir.
Q: Who were your companions in that place?
A: Daniel Maluenda and Alex plus another reinforcement, Gil Bueno, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: In the following morning, August 21, 1992, what happened next?

xxx xxx xxx
A: When Raul Mondaga arrived with a note from my wife and that was the
time when they started to grind me, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. ALVIZO:
Q: After the accused Raul Mondaga took the note from you, what happened
next?
xxx xxx xxx
WITNESS:
A: I waited at the farmhut where I was guarded by the three (3) persons, sir.
Q: Who were guarding you at that time?
A: Daniel Maluenda, Alex and Gil Bueno were guarding me at that time, sir."
Engineer Resus' testimony that Maluenda guarded the kidnappers' hideout was
corroborated by Abne, the housemaid, as follows: 46
"Q: Where were you bound for with your companions, Rudy Legarto and
Bobong Gonzaga?
A: To the forest where Engr. Resus was kept or held, sir.

xxx xxx xxx
Q: Did you see Engr. Resus?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: And what happened, after that?
A: Bobong Gonzaga and Rudy Legarto went back to Alegria, sir.

xxx xxx xxx
Q: What about you, where were you?
A: I and Engr. Resus were left in theforest [sic] with the guards, Alias Dongkoy
and Alex, sir.
Q: And where did you spend your night on August 21, 1992?
A: In the forest, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: And who was one of the guards?
A: Alias Dongkoy, Alias Alex and Alias Gil, sir."
Although only Mondaga verbally extorted money and demanded ransom from the
Resus couple, it is evident that the kidnapping was committed with Maluenda's
participation. Beyond reasonable doubt, Maluenda's actions exhibited a community of
interest and a concurrence of sentiment with Mondaga. Consequently inevitable as they
relate to Maluenda are the following holdings of the trial court: 47

". . . Simply stated, the witnesses for the prosecution, in contrast to that [of]
the defense, are, in the Court's assessment, unquestionably reliable, sincere and
candor [sic] in their testimonies which [were] very logical and credible.
xxx xxx xxx

and, as between the a rmative testimony of the prosecution witnesses
and that of the negative versions of the defense, the former [was] more stronger
[sic]. The accused [sic] resorted to unfounded denials.
xxx xxx xxx

To summarize, the Court nds that a clear case of kidnapping for ransom
[had] been successfully committed by all the accuseds [sic] charged in the
information, who are all private individuals; that the victim of that heinous crime
[was] Engr. Miguel E. Resus; that ransom money was actually paid in
consideration of his release on the third day that he was forcibly deprived of his
liberty; . . .
Accused Raul Mondaga, alias Bobong Gonzaga, and Accused Daniel
Maluenda, alias Commander Dongkoy have both been positively identi ed as
among the active perpetrators. . ."
Insofar as Maluenda is concerned, we nd applicable the well- entrenched rule that

the factual ndings of the trial court are binding on the appellate court. 4 8 In this light, our
earlier holding negating the trial court's assessment of the circumstantial evidence
pertains only to Appellant Legarto, not to Appellant Maluenda.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is partially granted. The assailed Decision is hereby
AFFIRMED as regards Maluenda, but MODIFIED as regards Legarto. Legarto is hereby
found GUILTY as an ACCESSORY only and is ORDERED to serve the indeterminate
sentence of two (2) years, four (4) months and one day of prisión correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one day of prisión mayor, as maximum. He is further
ordered to RETURN to Engineer and Dr. Miguel E. Resus the amount of thirty-six thousand
pesos (P36,000) corresponding to the amount he used to pay his loan arrears. The amount
which the trial court ordered to be restituted by Mondaga and Maluenda is accordingly
reduced by said amount.
SO ORDERED. aisadc
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ ., concurs.
Footnotes
1.Penned by Judge Bernardo V. Saludares; Rollo, pp. 14-37.

2.Rollo, p. 6.
3.Records, p. 74.
4.Records, pp. 116-117.

5.Rollo, pp. 36-37.
6.Rollo, pp. 38-39.

7.Rollo, pp. 123-124. This case was deemed submitted for decision on October 29, 1996 upon
the submission of the Appellee's Brief. The filing of a reply brief was deemed waived.
8.Rollo, pp. 136-147. References to the TSNs were omitted.
9.Supplemental Brief for Appellant Legarto prepared by the Misa Law Office, as represented by
Attys. Claudine O. Montenegro and Joaquin L. Misa, pp. 3-10; Rollo, pp. 166-173. Atty.
Romeo C. Buenaflor filed the main Appellant's Brief for Legarto.
10.Rollo, pp. 226g-226h. Appellant Maluenda's Brief was signed by Attys. Exaltacion L. Carlos,
Arceli Adan-Rubin, Amelia C. Garchitorena and Jerry F. Ibay of the Public Attorney's
Office.
11.Rollo, p. 21.
12.Rollo, pp. 53-54.
13.Rollo, p. 175.
14.Rollo, p. 226-b.
15."SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for

conviction if:
(a)There is more than one circumstance;
(b)The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c)The combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond

reasonable doubt." People vs. Ragon, G.R. No. 100593, November 18, 1997, pp.
8-9; People vs. Verano, 264 SCRA 546, 554, November 21, 1996; and People vs.
Malimit, 264 SCRA 167, 178, November 14, 1996.
16.TSN, March 16, 1993, pp. 9-11.
17.People vs. Parel, 261 SCRA 720, 736, September 16, 1996, per Bellosillo, J .
18.TSN, March 17, 1993, p. 51.
19.Rollo, p. 31.
20.TSN, March 16, 1993, pp. 24-25.
21.TSN, March 17, 1993, pp. 56-57; and TSN, November 23, 1993, p. 27.
22.Ibid, pp. 62 & 87.
23.Rollo, p. 21.
24.People vs. Ragon, G.R. No. 100593, November 18, 1997, p. 8-9; People vs. Verano, 264 SCRA
546, 554, November 21, 1996; and People vs. Malimit, 2643 SCRA 167, 178, November
14, 1996.
25.People vs. Casingal, 243 SCRA 37, 44, March 29, 1995, p. 44; and People vs. Abitona, 240
SCRA 335, 340, January 20, 1995.
26.People vs. Verano, supra, p. 554; People vs. Dulatre, Jr., 248 SCRA 107, 120-121, September
7, 1995.
27.People vs. Godoy , 250 SCRA 676, 727-728, December 6, 1995.
28.People vs. Abarri, 242 SCRA 39, 45, March 1, 1995; People vs. Cayanan, 245 SCRA 66, 77,
June 16, 1995.
29.People vs. Salodaga, 247 SCRA 98, 106, August 7, 1995; People vs. Dulatre, Jr., supra, p.
119.
30.People vs. Miranday , 242 SCRA 620, 627, March 23, 1995; People vs. Torres, 247 SCRA 212,
217-218, August 11, 1995; People vs. Asoy , 251 SCRA 682, 689, December 29, 1995;
People vs. Tami, 244 SCRA 1, 22, May 2, 1995; People vs. Compil, 244 SCRA 135, 145,
May 15, 1995; People vs. De Leon, 245 SCRA 538, 546-547, July 3, 1995.
31.People vs. Miranday , supra.

32.People vs. Orehuela, 232 SCRA 82, 93, April 29, 1994; People vs. Villagonzalo, 238 SCRA
215, 230-231, November 18, 1994; Fonacier vs. Sandiganbayan, 238 SCRA 655, 695,
December 5, 1994.
33.People vs. Padrones, 189 SCRA 496, 506-507, September 13, 1990, per Sarmiento, J .
34.People vs. Vda. de Quijano, 220 SCRA 66, 71, March 17, 1993; People vs. Buntan, Sr. 221
SCRA 421, 430, April 12, 1993; People vs. Garcia, 215 SCRA 349, 361, November 4, 1992.
35.People vs. Halili, 245 SCRA 340, 352, June 27, 1995; Sabiniano vs. Court of Appeals, 249
SCRA 24, 29, October 6, 1995; People vs. Argawanon, 231 SCRA 614, 618, March 30,
1994.
36.People vs. Orehuela, supra, p. 94.
37.Art. 18, Revised Penal Code.
38.People vs. Lojo, 122 SCRA 753, 757-758, June 24, 1983.
39.Art. 19(1); People vs. Cordova, 224 SCRA 319, 338, July 5, 1993; People vs. Verzola, 80 SCRA
600, 608, December 21, 1977; and People vs. Amajul, 1 SCRA 682, 689-690, February 28,
1961.
40.Art. 53, Revised Penal Code.
41.Art. 64(1), Revised Penal Code.
42.TSN, March 17, 1993, pp. 40-47.

43.TSN, March 16, 1993, pp. 4-7.
44.Ibid., pp 10-11.
45.Ibid., pp. 11-15.
46.TSN, June 2, 1993, pp. 3-8.

47.Rollo, pp. 31-34.
48.People vs. Ramos, 240 SCRA 191, 201, January 18, 1995; People vs. Dolar, et al., 231 SCRA
414, 422-423, March 24, 1994; People vs. De Guzman, 216 SCRA 754, 759-760,
December 21, 1992.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 67948. May 31, 1988.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , plaintiff-appellee, vs. NAPOLEON

MONTEALEGRE , defendant-appellant.

Citizens Legal Assistance Office for defendant-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; PRINCIPLE BY INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION;

LIABILITY. — The accused-appellant was correctly considered a co-principal for having
collaborated-with Capalad in the killing of the police o cer. The two acted in concert,
with Capalad actually stabbing Camantigue seven times and the accused-appellant
holding on to the victim's hands to prevent him from drawing his pistol and defending
himself. While it is true that the accused-appellant did not himself commit the act of
stabbing, he was nonetheless equally guilty thereof for having prevented Camantigue
from resisting the attack against him. The accused-appellant was a principal by
indispensable cooperation under Article 17, par. 3, of the Revised Penal Code.
2. ID.; ID.; REQUISITES. — As correctly interpreted, the requisites of this
provision are: "(1) participating in the criminal resolution, that is, there is either anterior
conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and intention immediately before the
commission of the crime charged; and (2) cooperation in the commission of the
offense by performing another act without which it would not have been
accomplished."
3. ID.; CONSPIRACY; MANIFEST BY CONCERTED ACTION OF THE TWO
ACCUSED. — The prosecution contends that although there was no evidence of a prior
agreement between Capalad and Montealegre, their subsequent acts should prove the
presence of such conspiracy. The Court sustains this view, which conforms to our
consistent holding on this matter: "Conspiracy need not be established by direct proof
as it can be inferred from the acts of the appellants. It is enough that, at the time the
offense was committed, participants had the same purpose and were united in its
execution; as may be inferred from the attendant circumstances."
4. ID.; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE; TREACHERY; CONSIDERED WHERE THE
ACCUSED ADOPTED MEANS TO WEAKEN THE DEFENSE OF THE VICTIM. — The Court
has held that treachery was presented. Thus: — "There can be no question that
appellant's act in holding the victim from behind when the latter was stabbed by his
cousin, Victor Buduan, was a positive act towards the realization of a common criminal
intent, although the intent can be classi ed as instantaneous. It can be safely assumed
that had not appellant held both arms of the victim from behind, the latter could have
parried the thrust or even run away from his assailant. By immobilizing the two hands of
the victim from behind, and although there was no anterior conspiracy, the two cousins
showed unity of criminal purpose and intent immediately before the actual stabbing."
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2019 cdasiaonline.com

DECISION
CRUZ , J : p
It is a settled rule in thus jurisdiction that the conviction of the accused, who is
constitutionally presumed innocent, depends upon the strength of the prosecution and
not the weakness of the defense. Unfortunately for the accused in this case, his
prosecution for murder with assault upon a person in authority, undoubtedly already
strong, was made even stronger by the defense itself.
As the trial court * which convicted him saw it, the crime imputed to Napoleon
Montealegre was committed as follows:
At about 11:30 in the evening of March 11, 1983, while Edmundo Abadilla was
eating at the Meding's Restaurant in Cavite City, he detected the smell of marijuana
smoke coming from a nearby table. Intending to call a policeman, he quietly went
outside and saw Pfc. Renato Camantigue in his car whom he hailed to report the
matter. After parking his vehicle, Camantigue joined Abadilla in the restaurant and soon
there after the two smelled marijuana smoke from the table occupied by Vicente
Capalad and the accused-appellant. Camantigue then approached the two and collared
both of them, saying "Nagmamarijuana kayo, ano?" Forcing them up, he asked the
waitress if she knew them but the waitress said she did not. 1
Then the mayhem began.
While Camantigue was holding the two, Montealegre with this right hand and
Capalad with his left hand, Capalad suddenly and surreptitiously pulled out a knife from
a scabbard tucked in the right side of his waist and started stabbing Camantigue in the
b ack. 2 Camantigue let loose Montealegre to draw the gun from his holster but
Montealegre, thus released, restrained Camantigue's hand to prevent the latter from
defending himself. Montealegre used both his hands for this purpose, 3 as Capalad
continued stabbing the victim. 4 While they were thus grappling, the three fell to the
oor and Capalad, freed from Camantigue's grip, rose and scampered toward the door.
Camantigue red and, continuing the pursuit outside, red again. 5 Capalad ed into a
dark alley. Camantigue abandoned the chase and asked to be brought to a hospital.
Capalad was later found slumped in the alley with a bullet wound in his chest. Neither
Camantigue nor Capalad survived, both expiring the following day. 6
The accused-appellant, for his part, escaped during the confusion. 7 Having been
informed of the incident, Capt. Cipriano Gilera of the Cavite police immediately
organized a team that went to look for him that very night. 8 They did not nd him in his
house then but he was apprehended in the morning of March 12, 1983, on board a
vehicle bound for Baclaran. He gave his name as Alegre but later admitted he was the
fugitive being sought. 9
Dr. Regalado Sosa, reporting on the autopsy of the Camantigue's body, testi ed
that death was caused by severe shock due to massive internal hemorrhage caused by
seven stab wounds affecting the heart, lungs, liver, stomach, pancreas, and diaphragm.
1 0 The weapon used was 6" in length and about 2 to 2.5 cm. in width and the blood
found on it was analyzed as human. 1 1 The stabbing incident was narrated in detail at
the trial by Abadilla, 1 2 who was corroborated by Generoso San Juan. 1 3
On direct examination, Abadilla testi ed that Montealegre prevented Camantigue
from drawing his pistol while he was being stabbed by Capalad, demonstrating with the
aid of court personnel the relative positions of the three during the incident. 1 4
On cross-examination, he reiterated his previous declaration even more
emphatically, thus:
Q. When accused Montealegre held the hand of Pfc. Camantigue upon
drawing his gun, what happened to Camantigue?
A. He could not move, sir. He could not make any defense because he
was being held by Montealegre and he was being stabbed at the
back. 1 5
He replied as follows to questions on re-direct to stress the participation of the

accused-appellant:
Q. When accused Capalad started stabbing Pfc. Camantigue at the
back, accused Montealegre was being held by Pfc. Camantigue at
that time?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And in fact Montealegre was very close to the right of Camantigue at

that time?
A. Yes sir.
Q. And Montealegre was aware that Capalad was stabbing Pfc.
Camantigue?
A. Yes, sir, he knew. 1 6
In answer to clarificatory questions from the court, he declared:

Q. And when Montealegre saw that Camantigue was about to draw his
gun, Montealegre grabbed the hand of Camantigue?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. With what hand?

A. Both hands, sir.
Q. And was Camantigue able to pull out from his waist the gun?
A. No, sir.
Q. Why?
A. Because Montealegre was holding his hand, Your Honor.
Q. With both hands?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Montealegre was holding with both hands the right hand of
Camantigue?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And at this moment when Montealegre was holding with both hands
the hand of Camantigue, what was Capalad doing?
A. Capalad was still stabbing Camantigue, Your Honor. 1 7
San Juan was equally categorical in his testimony, saying on direct examination.
Q. When Camantigue was being stabbed, where was Montealegre?
A. He was on the right side.
Q. What was he doing at that time?

A. While Camantigue was being stabbed, he tried to pull his gun but
Montealegre held his hand.
Q. Was Camantigue able to draw his gun?
A. No, sir.
Q. What happened when Camantigue failed to draw his gun?

A. They slammed down on the floor and when they were already on the
floor, I ran away because I was already frightened. 1 8
The cause of the defense did not improve when on cross-examination, he

insisted:
A. When Camantigue was about to draw his gun, Montealegre suddenly
held the hand of Camantigue.
Q. And when Montealegre suddenly held the hand of Camantigue, what
happened to Camantigue?
A. He could not draw his gun because while Montealegre was holding
his hand, Capalad was stabbing him at the back. 1 9
And to the court, the witness maintained his testimony as follows:

Q. So Camantigue was hit many times by Capalad while Montealegre
was holding the right hand of the policeman to prevent him from
drawing his gun?
A. Yes, sir. 2 0
The accused-appellant, testifying on his behalf, only succeeded in con rming his
own guilt. He claimed he ran away before the stabbing but his testimony, consisting of
denials, evasions, contradictions, claims of ignorance and forgetfulness and
protestations of innocence, does not have the ring of truth. The following excerpts are
re ective of the kind of defense he offered to exculpate himself from the charge
established against him by the prosecution:
Q. Now, while Pfc. Camantigue was arresting Vicente Capalad, what
happened if any?
A. Camantigue pulled his gun.
Q. What happened after that?
A. Nothing, I did not see anymore what happened. 2 1

xxx xxx xxx

A. I cannot say anything about that. I did not see what really happened.
Q Did you see Capalad stabbing Pfc. Camantigue?
A. I did not see. 2 2
xxx xxx xxx

Q. From whom did you come to know that Pfc. Camantigue shot and
killed Vicente Capalad?
A. From the witness Abadilla. I have heard from him that Camantigue
killed Capalad. 2 3
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Mr. Montealegre, did you notice while Pfc. Camantigue was holding
both of you, did you notice that Vicente Capalad stabbed Pfc.
Camantigue?
A. I did not see anything. 2 4
Q. And you were standing on the right side of Pfc. Camantigue while
Capalad was on the left side?
A. I am not sure whether I was standing at the right or at the left.
Q. But the fact is that you were standing on the right side of
Camantigue?
A. I am not sure if that is the right side.

Q. But you were standing on the side where his gun and holster were
placed?
A. I cannot remember. 2 5
It is simply unbelievable that the accused-appellant did not know what was
happening on that evening of March 11, 1983. As one of the principal gures of the
stabbing incident, he could not have not known, nor could he later not remember, that
startling event that even mere onlookers could not forget. The evidence has established
that the accused-appellant was directly and personally involved and was in fact one of
the two persons held by the victim when he was stabbed. Yet Montealegre would now
insist, quite incredibly, that he was unaware of what had transpired that night.
If it is true, as he says, that he ran away before the stabbing, there would have
been less likelihood of Capalad's attack as Camantigue's attention would have been
fully concentrated on his lone captive. Moreover, there would have been nothing to
restrain the policeman from drawing his pistol and defending himself against Capalad if
the accused-appellant had, by his own account, already escaped before the stabbing.
It is also worth noting that, instead of reporting to the authorities, what the
accused-appellant did was attempt to hide, only to be found the following morning on
board a bus bound for outside Cavite City. When apprehended, he rst gave a false
name before he nally admitted his identity, thus beginning the mesh of contradictions,
admissions and denials, in which he would ensnare himself.
The Court accepts the evidence established by the prosecution that at the time
of the stabbing, the victim was in uniform and, therefore, could easily be recognized as
a person in authority. Several witnesses testi ed as to his attire when he was killed. 2 6
And even assuming that the victim was in civilian clothes on that tragic night, the record
shows that no less than the accused-appellant himself, replying to questions put to him
by the prosecution, declared twice that he knew the victim to be a policeman. 2 7
The accused-appellant was correctly considered a co-principal for having
collaborated with Capalad in the killing of the police o cer. The two acted in concert,
with Capalad actually stabbing Camantigue seven times and the accused-appellant
holding on to the victim's hands to prevent him from drawing his pistol and defending
himself. While it is true that the accused-appellant did not himself commit the act of
stabbing, he was nonetheless equally guilty thereof for having prevented Camantigue
from resisting the attack against him. The accused-appellant was a principal by
indispensable cooperation under Article 17, par. 3, of the Revised Penal Code.
As correctly interpreted, the requisites of this provision are: "(1) participating in
the criminal resolution, that is, there is either anterior conspiracy or unity of criminal
purpose and intention immediately before the commission of the crime charged; and
(2) cooperation in the commission of the offense by performing another act without
which it would not have been accomplished." 2 8
The prosecution contends that although there was no evidence of a prior
agreement between Capalad and Montealegre, their subsequent acts should prove the
presence of such conspiracy. The Court sustains this view, which conforms to our
consistent holding on this matter: LibLex
"Conspiracy need not be established by direct proof as it can be inferred

from the acts of the appellants. It is enough that, at the time the offense was
committed, participants had the same purpose and were united in its execution;
as may be inferred from the attendant circumstances." 2 9
xxx xxx xxx
"We agree that there is no evidence to show a previous plan to kill Regino
Bautista. The whole incident happened because the accused came upon Bautista
and Mallabo shing within or near the shpond enclosure of Carlo Aquino which
was under the care of Vicente Cercano.
"But for a collective responsibility among the herein accused to be
established, it is not necessary or essential that there be a previous plan or
agreement to commit the assault; it is su cient that at the time of the aggression
all the accused by their acts manifested a common intent or desire to attack
Bautista and Mallabo, so that the act of one accused became the act of all." 3 0
xxx xxx xxx

"If it be proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards
accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their acts,
though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative,
indicating a closeness of personal association and concurrence of sentiment, a
conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting among them to concert is
proven. A conspiracy may be entered into after the commencement of overt acts
leading to the consummation of the crime." 3 1
As for the second requirement, the Court has held that:

"There can be no question that appellant's act in holding the victim from
behind when the latter was stabbed by his cousin, Victor Buduan, was a positive
act towards the realization of a common criminal intent, although the intent can
be classi ed as instantaneous. It can be safely assumed that had not appellant
held both arms of the victim from behind, the latter could have parried the thrust
or even run away from his assailant. By immobilizing the two hands of the victim
from behind, and although there was no anterior conspiracy, the two cousins
showed unity of criminal purpose and intent immediately before the actual
stabbing." 3 2
xxx xxx xxx
"It has been su ciently established that appellant Cabiles seized the
running decedent in such a manner that the latter could not even move or turn
around. This enabled the pursuing Labis, who was armed with a drawn bolo and
was barely ve meters away from the decedent, to nally overtake him and stab
him at the back with hardly any risk at all. Cabiles therefore performed another
act — holding the decedent — without which the crime would not have been
accomplished. This makes him a principal by indispensable cooperation. 3 3
The above requisites having been established, the accused-appellant was

correctly convicted of the complex crime of murder, as quali ed by treachery, with
assault upon a person in authority. Accordingly, he must suffer the penalty imposed
upon him, to wit, reclusion perpetua, there being no aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, plus the civil indemnity, which is hereby increased to P30,000.00, and
the actual, medical and funeral expenses in the sum of P37,380.00 as proved at the
trial. prcd
Pfc. Renato Camantigue was only 34 years old when he died in line of duty while
enforcing the law against the abuse of dangerous drugs. He was struck down with no
less than seven vicious stabs by a man who, by his own admission, was at the time of
the incident "burned" on marijuana. The killer also eventually succumbed, and that made
the second life needlessly lost to the wickedness of drug addiction. There was another
life also ruined, this time of the 28 year-old accused-appellant himself, although,
fortunately for him, his loss is not irretrievable nor is his future forever foreclosed. In the
somber shadows of the prison bars, as he ponders the wrong he has done, he may yet
find his ultimate redemption in rehabilitation and remorse.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED as above modi ed, without
any pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
Narvasa, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
* Decision penned by Judge Rolando D. Diaz, RTC, Cavite City, Branch XVII.
1. Decision (Rollo, p. 12).
2. Ibid.
3. TSN, May 9, 1983, p. 34.
4. Ibid., pp. 29-30.
5. Id., pp. 35-40.
6. Id., p. 44; Id., Sept. 20, 1983, p. 165.
7. Id., p. 36.
8. Rollo, p. 13.
9. TSN, Oct. 17, 1983, pp. 172-173.
10. Ibid., July 12, 1983, p. 151.
11. Ibid.; Id., June 1, 1983, p. 70.
12. Id., May 9, 1983, pp. 25-30.
13. Id., June 27, 1983, pp. 123-124.
14. May 9, 1983, pp. 21, 31-34.
15. Id., June 27, 1983, p. 99.
16. Id., pp. 105-106.
17. Id., pp. 111-112.
18. Id., pp. 123-124.
19. Id., pp. 137-138.
20. Id., pp. 142-143.
21. Id., Feb. 28, 1984, p. 187.
22.
23. Id., p. 188.
24. Id., pp. 193-194.
25. Id., pp. 203-204.
26. Id., June 27, 1983, p. 143; Id., July 29, 1983, p. 158; Id., March 5, 1984, pp. 231-234.
27. Id., Feb. 28, 1984, pp. 210-211, 219-220.
28. Luis B. Reyes, Criminal Law, 1977 ed., p. 506.
29. People v. Laganson, 129 SCRA 333, 350.
30. People v. Cercano, 87 SCRA 1, 11-12.
31. People v. Garcia y Cabarse, 94 SCRA 14, 26.
32. Dacanay v. People, 94 SCRA 383, 389.
33. People v. Labis, 21 SCRA 875, 885.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 67803-04. July 30, 1990.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , plaintiff-appellee, vs. PAT. RICARTE

MADALI and ANNIE MORTEL MADALI , defendants-appellants.

Juan B. Soliven for defendants-appellants.
DECISION
FERNAN , C.J : p
Husband and wife Patrolman Ricarte Madali and Annie Mortel Madali appeal from a
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Romblon, Branch LXXXI 1 finding them guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of killing father and son Cipriano and Felix Gasang, and seriously
wounding Agustin Reloj and Cipriano's daughter, Merlinda. The dispositive portion of the
decision states:
"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the guilt of accused Ricarte Madali and
Annie Mortel Madali beyond reasonable doubt of the following offenses and
sentences each of them as follows:
"(1) For the frustrated murder of Agustin Reloj, each accused is meted an
indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional, as minimum to
TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Each
of them is also sentenced to suffer all the accessory penalties provided for by
law, and each is ordered to pay in solidum the offended party, Agustin Reloj, the
sum of P200.00 as reimbursement of medical and hospitalization expenses.
"(2) For the murder of Felix Gasang, each accused is sentenced the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and each of them is likewise sentenced to suffer the accessory
penalties provided for by law, and each is also ordered to pay in solidum to the
heirs of Felix Gasang, the sum of P12,000, as death indemnity.
"(3) For the murder of Cipriano Gasang and the mortal (sic) wounding of
Merlinda Gasang (which has been converted into a complex crime of murder with
frustrated murder) each accused is sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua
together with the accessory penalties provided for by law and to indemnify in
solidum the heirs of Cipriano Gasang the sum of P12,000.00 and each is also
ordered to pay in solidum, Merlinda Gasang the sum of P6,000 for reimbursement
of medical and hospitalization expenses.
"Each of the accused is likewise ordered to pay in solidum the heirs of deceased,
Cipriano Gasang and Felix Gasang, the sum of P50,000.00, which amount
represents the value of the loss (sic) earning capacity of deceased Cipriano and
Felix, both surnamed Gasang, and the sum of P30,000.00 as moral damages, and
the sum of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages.

"The sentences of reclusion perpetua and the indeterminate penalty imposed
upon each accused should be served successively, with proportionate costs.
"IT IS SO ORDERED." 2
According to the prosecution, said crimes stemmed from an altercation between the son
of the Madali spouses, Ramon, and the group of Felix Gasang, who was twenty years old
when he was killed. 3 It appears that on October 26, 1979, Felix figured in a fistfight with
someone who was a friend of Ramon. The latter interceded and mauled Felix with a
"chako". 4 One of Felix's companions then was Agustin Reloj. 5
The following day, the police summoned Felix to the municipal building. Felix's mother,
Desamparada Gasang, went with him. 6 At the police station, Ricarte Madali, a police
officer, angrily scolded Felix and his cousin, Arnaldo Fadriquilan, and told them that
because they were "very brave", he would put them in jail for twelve hours. Madali added
after asking about Felix's age that he would "sow bullets" in the body of Felix. 7 According
to witness policeman Aristeo Fetalino, Madali also uttered, "Kailangan sa imo lubongan
bala" which means, what you need is a bullet embedded in you. 8 Madali's father-in-law,
Agustin Mortel, who arrived at the police station, agreed with Madali that Felix and his
group must be "sown with bullets" to eradicate them. 9 Another group mate of Felix was
detained at the municipal jail but Felix was sent home with his mother. 1 0
At around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of October 31, 1979, Felix and his cousin, Agustin
Reloj, went home together from the town plaza. Their houses were located near each other
in sitio Marawi, barangay Cagbo-aya, San Agustin, Romblon.
Felix and Agustin parted ways at the Marawi bridge. Felix dropped by the store of Coroy
Mangao to buy cigarettes while Agustin proceeded home. Around fifteen meters from the
house of Ricarte Madali, the latter accosted, him, held him by his arm and said, "So you are
here, you devil, now you are finished. I have been waiting for you. I have been watching for
you for three nights already." 1 1 Then Madali dragged Agustin towards the gate of his
(Madali's) house. When Agustin asked Madali why he was dragging him, Madali said that
the reason was because Agustin helped in fighting his son.
As one of Agustin's feet stepped over the knee-high fence at the gate of the Madali
residence, he was clubbed by Annie Madali with a piece of wood. Annie struck him first on
the left shoulder and would have given him another blow had not Agustin freed himself
from Madali's hold. Annie landed that blow on Madali instead. 1 2
Agustin was looking back as he ran away when Madali shot him. He was hit below his right
hip. He fell to the ground and did not get up fearing that Madali might shoot him again.
Agustin was still lying down on the ground with his eyes focused on Madali when Felix
Gasang arrived. He saw Annie beamed her flashlight at Felix and she said, "Here comes
another." 1 3
Agustin saw Felix raising his hands as Annie focused her flashlight on Felix. Felix told
Madali that he would not fight with him but then Madali shot Felix twice. Felix fell to the
ground. Madali was still near the gate of his house when Cipriano Gasang arrived. Annie
beamed her flashlight at Cipriano and she said, "Here comes, here comes another, fire
upon him." 1 4 Madali shot Cipriano who fell to the ground. Merlinda Gasang, who was with
her father Cipriano, clung to the fence nearby and shouted that she was also hit. Then
Desamparada Gasang arrived and shouted for help. One Romeo Manes came and carried
away Merlinda. Agustin slowly stood up and as he walked towards his house, he saw
Roman Galicia (Galicha) and the Madali spouses who were then entering their gate. 1 5
Merlinda Gasang * was at home when she heard an explosion. Her father, Cipriano, was
also at home then but after the second shot, he went out of the house towards the
direction of the source of the gunfire. There was a minute interval between the first and the
second shots but only a second elapsed between the second and the third shots. The
fourth shot came about two minutes later. 1 6
Cipriano was "beyond the gate" of the Madali residence when he was shot by
Madali. Merlinda was around three meters from her father. 1 7 She saw Annie
focused her ashlight at Cipriano and she heard Annie say, "Yara pa, yara pa, barila"
meaning "Here comes another one, here comes another one, shoot." 1 8 That was
when the fourth explosion occurred and Merlinda heard her father exclaim that he
was hit. Merlinda felt that she was also hit. 1 9 She did not fall to the ground
because she was able to take hold of the wooden fence. 2 0 She saw both her
brother Felix and Agustin lying at on the ground with the latter's head turned to
one side. 2 1
Merlinda shouted for help. Romeo Manes came and brought her to the Tablas Island
Emergency Hospital. 2 2 She did not notice anymore where Ricarte Madali was at that time
because she was looking towards the direction of their house. She saw her mother running
to her. 2 3
Desamparada Gasang was washing the dishes after supper when she heard the first shot.
After the fourth shot, she became apprehensive because a policeman was mad at her
family. 2 4 She proceeded to where she heard the gunbursts and she met her daughter
Merlinda who informed her that she was shot by Madali and that she saw Annie focused a
flashlight on her. Then Desamparada saw her husband crawling on the ground. She asked
him to stand up but he could not do so. Cipriano told her, "Ging iwagan ako ni Annie Madali
cag ging baril ako ni Ricarte Madali." (Annie focused a light on me and Ricarte Madali shot
me.) She then went back to her daughter and shouted for help. LexLib
The bodies of Cipriano and Felix Gasang were not removed from the road until around
midnight. They were brought to the Gasang residence for autopsy. 2 5 The rural health
physician who conducted the postmortem examinations on both Cipriano and Felix found
that Cipriano sustained a gunshot wound at the right lower quadrant of the abdomen along
the mammary line. From that point of entry, the bullet followed an obliquely downward
course penetrating the small and large intestines and the urinary bladder, and exited at the
middle of the left buttock. Cipriano's death was caused by hemorrhage due to the gunshot
wound. 2 6
Felix also died of hemorrhage resulting from the gunshot wound at the right second
intercostal space within the midclavicular line of the chest. The bullet veered backwards
towards the left hitting the right lung, its blood vessels and the fourth cervical vertebra.
The second gunshot wound was at the right side of the abdomen at about the level of the
navel and within the right anterior axillary line. The bullet hit the subcutaneous tissues and
exited at the posterior axillary line. 2 7
Merlyn (Merlinda) Gasang sustained a gunshot wound at the anterior upper third portion of
her right leg with no exit wound and which would incapacitate her for ten to fifteen days. 2 8
However, she stayed for treatment at the emergency hospital in San Agustin for 39 days.
Later, she was brought to the hospital in Romblon for extraction of the slug lodged in her
leg. For the treatment of her wound, Merlinda spent P6,200.00. She could not go to school
for three months.2 9

Agustin Reloj suffered a gunshot wound at the glutael region of the right thigh. The bullet
entered the lateral aspect of the upper third of the right thigh and exited at the posterior
aspect of the gluteus maximus muscle. The attending physician certified that Agustin's
injury would incapacitate him for seven to nine days, 3 0 Agustin, who was then a laborer,
stayed one week at the hospital and spent P200 for the treatment of his wound. For his
pain and anxiety, he stated, that he should be compensated in the amount of P500.00. 3 1
Madali voluntarily surrendered to the San Agustin police. 3 2 He handed his .38 caliber
service revolver to the policemen who arrived at the scene of the crime and they noted that
there were only two remaining bullets in the revolver. 3 3 He was placed under technical
arrest by the provincial commander of the Philippine Constabulary. 3 4
After the investigation, on February 1, 1980, two informations were filed against Patrolman
Madali and his wife, Annie Mortel Madali. In Criminal Case No. 981, said spouses were
charged with multiple murder for the killing of Felix and Cipriano Gasang. The information
alleged that they conspired, confederated and mutually helped each other in killing Felix
and Cipriano treacherously, with evident premeditation and with the use of a .38 caliber
revolver. 3 5
In the separate information for multiple frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 982,
conspiracy, treachery and evident premeditation were also alleged as having attended the
felonious assault with the use of a .38 caliber revolver on Merlinda Gasang and Agustin
Reloj which could have resulted in the crime of murder had not timely and able medical
assistance intervened. 3 6
At the trial, both Madali and his wife, who had pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged,
testified in their own defense. According to Madali, at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of
October 31, 1979, he and his family were about to sleep when a stone was hurled at their
house. His wife said that it could have been a stray stone. But then, three other stones
landed on the GI sidings, and the lawanit and bamboo walls of their house. Madali went to
their porch where he noticed a person crouching near their gabi plants. He could not
identify the person because of the fog so he went inside their room and dressed up in his
fatigue trousers and jacket. He went down the house and noticed that there was no one in
the gabi plants anymore.
Madali was behind their kitchen and about to go back to his house when someone hit his
left shoulder. The person struck him again but he was able to catch the club aimed at him
and strike the person with his nightstick. Madali was about to give him another blow with
his nightstick but the person caught it. They tried to get each other's club.
They were in that position when Madali's foot stepped into a low canal, causing him to fall
down flat on his back. The intruder fell with him and landed on Madali's stomach. The
person shouted at someone in the vicinity what the latter was tarrying about. As Madali
tried to get up, he heard his wife call, "Carte, Carte." Just then he kicked the intruder on the
stomach and the latter fell to the ground. LibLex
Madali hurriedly stood up, pulled his gun and fired at the intruder. He noticed two other
persons approaching him. One person had a club and the other had what looked like a
knife. He warned them, "This is a policeman. Do not come near." One of the persons
proceeded to strike him and Madali was hit on his forehead by the man with the club.
Madali in turn dealt him with a blow by swinging back his left forearm. The man with a club
fell down.
When the man with the knife was about to stab him, Madali fired his gun at him. As that
man was still closing in on him, Madali shot him again. The man with the knife retreated to
the gate and fell just outside of it.
After firing two shots, Madali turned sideward and saw the man with the club about to
strike him. So, Madali shot him. The man walked away. Madali later identified the man
crouching amidst their gabi plants as Agustin Reloj. 3 7
Annie Mortel Madali corroborated her husband's testimony from the stoning of their house
until he dressed up, got his gun and nightstick, and went out of the house. When she heard
Madali opening the door to the stairs, Annie got up and went to their balcony to peep. She
saw her husband going around their house in a clockwise direction. When he was near their
kitchen, Annie saw him grappling with someone over the possession of a club. Her
husband and his protagonist fell into a canal, trampling the gabi plants. She heard the man
say, "Hay, naga tanga pa kamo dira!" meaning "What are you still waiting for!"
Annie then saw two persons rushing inside their premises. One person was holding a club
while the other one had something which he appeared to thrust forward. Losing her
composure, Annie warned her husband by calling out his name, "Carte, Carte!" Then she
heard a gunshot and the person holding a club who grappled with her husband ran out of
the premises.
Annie heard her husband say, "Pulis ini, ayaw maglapit" meaning "This is a policeman do not
come near." After that, she heard three more gunshots. The two who came rushing inside
their premises scampered away and out of their fence. She could not recognize the three
intruders. Madali then walked towards her and asked her to call the police. Annie went
inside their sala and told her daughter Agnes to summon the police. 3 8
Policeman Numeriano Galang who heard the gun reports, met Agnes on his way to sitio
Marawi. When he arrived at the Madali residence, he found Madali with his face and jacket
smeared with mud and with a swollen forehead. 3 9 Galang asked Madali what happened
but he did not put his investigation in writing. 4 0 At the yard, he found stones, two slippers
and a nightstick. 4 1 He did not find bloodstains in the yard because it was drizzling. 4 2
Neither did he find bloodstains outside the yard because he inspected only the areas
surrounding the Madali house. 4 3
Policeman Antonio Morales arrived at the scene of the crime with two other policemen. He
found Felix Gasang lying flat on his belly about one foot from the gate. 4 4 To identify him,
they turned Felix's body face up and found that his right hand was holding a knife. 4 5 Later,
that knife was turned over to police investigator Pfc. Ernesto Solano. 4 6 The other victim
(Cipriano) was found about five to six meters from the body of Felix. 4 7 Like Galang,
Morales saw pieces of stones which were different from the stones found in Madali's yard
which were mere corals or "boga", two pairs of slippers and the gabi plants which
appeared to have been trampled upon. 4 8
To prove aggression on the part of his victims, Madali presented a medical certificate
stating that on November 1, 1979, he was examined at the Tablas Island Emergency
Hospital for a vertical contusion (hematoma) on his left forehead and another contusion
on the left deltoid region. 4 9
The lower court gave full faith and credit to the evidence of the prosecution, especially the
testimonies of eyewitnesses-victims Agustin Reloj and Merlinda Gasang. It found that the
concerted acts of Madali and his wife while committing the crimes proved conspiracy
between them thereby making their criminal responsibility collective. While finding that the
prosecution failed to prove evident premeditation, the lower court positively appreciated
treachery to qualify as murder the killing of both Cipriano and Felix Gasang. It noted,
however, that the prosecution erred in charging as the separate crimes of murder and
frustrated murder the killing of Cipriano and the wounding of Merlinda. Observing that only
one bullet hit Cipriano and his daughter, Merlinda, the lower court concluded that the
Madali spouses should have been charged with the complex crime of murder and
frustrated murder. Accordingly, it imposed the penalties set out above for the crimes of
frustrated murder, murder and the complex crime of murder and frustrated murder. prLL
In this appeal, the Madali spouses pray for their acquittal arguing that the lower court erred
in: [a] finding Annie Mortel Madali guilty as principal by direct participation; [b] not finding
that the Gasangs and their kins were motivated by revenge; [c] not finding that Ricarte
Madali acted in self-defense; and [d] in giving credence and/or adopting the theory of the
prosecution instead of that of the defense.
The prosecution of these cases was highlighted by notable developments. Firstly, before
the defense could present its evidence, on September 6, 1980, the capitol building of
Romblon was razed to the ground. All court records were lost. The records of Criminal
Cases Nos. 981 and 982 were, however, reconstituted and the accused arraigned anew. 5 0
Secondly, prosecution eyewitness, Roman Galicia recanted his testimony and appeared for
the defense claiming that he did not see the gunwielder. 5 1 He alleged that he testified for
the prosecution for fear that the special prosecutor would revive the rape case against
him. 5 2 The lower court thereafter disregarded his entire testimony inasmuch as only the
transcript of his cross-examination as prosecution witness could be reproduced. 5 3
Thirdly, only the testimony of Ricarte Madali was heard by the ponente below as the
previous presiding judge was transferred to another sala. 5 4
In view of the disqualification of Roman Galicia as a witness, the issue of the credibility of
the eyewitnesses has gained importance in this case. Significantly, it is the word of the
accused Madali spouses as against that of the surviving victims, Agustin Reloj and
Merlinda Gasang. Both prosecution and defense failed to present corroborative witnesses
to buttress their testimonies.
Matters of credibility are ordinarily addressed to the discretion and discernment of the
trial court which is presumed to have observed the demeanor of the witnesses at the
stand. While the ponente of the decision below was able to hear only the testimony of
accused Ricarte Madali, the Court sees no reason for not giving sufficient weight to his
factual findings considering that he took pains in thoroughly studying the case even to the
extent of conducting an ocular inspection of the scene of the crimes and hearing part of
the cross-examination of Madali thereat. 5 5
The defense is anchored on the justifying circumstance of self-defense. In order that such
plea can prosper, it must be positively shown that there was a previous unlawful and
unprovoked attack that placed the defendant's life in danger and forced him to inflict more
or less severe wounds upon his assailant, employing therefor reasonable means to resist
the said attack. 5 6
The defense miserably failed to pass said test. Its allegation that the Madali residence was
hurled with stones before Madali confronted the Gasang group, was not credibly
established. No one was able to positively identify the stone-throwers. Not even Madali
and his wife, Annie. There is no proof that the stones found in the Madali yard were indeed
the stones thrown at their house. It is interesting to note that even defense witness
Antonio Morales, a fellow policeman of Madali, testified that he did not have personal
knowledge on where the stones were discovered because he was only informed by Galang
(another policeman) "who in turn was only told by Ricarte that the latter was stoned." 5 7
Indeed, the defense story is riddled with contradictions and loopholes which the
appellants failed to rectify. At the trial, Agustin Reloj sketched a map of the neighborhood
and placed Felix Gasang's body on a spot across the road from the Madali gate. 5 8 The
defense tried to discredit Reloj's sketch and his testimony thereon by presenting
policemen Morales and Galang who testified that Felix's body was found close to the gate
of the Madali residence. However, the testimonies of said policemen clashed with each
other. Morales testified that both the two dead bodies were found close to the gate while
Galang swore that while one body was near the gate, the other body was five meters away
from the Madali fence. 5 9 It should be noted that ten days after the alleged commission of
the crime, police investigator Fetalino found blood stains in the middle of the street
indicating that a blood-drenched body had been dragged across the street. 6 0
If it were really true that both Agustin and Cipriano were armed with clubs, at least
Cipriano's club would have been found as he died on the spot. The nightstick found by the
police could not have been the one used by any of the victims. According to defense
witness policeman Galang, the nightstick was similar to that of a policeman. 6 1 Hence, it
could have been the same nightstick which Madali admittedly used in striking one of the
intruders. 6 2
Granting that Agustin Reloj and Felix and Cipriano Gasang were armed with clubs and a
knife, Madali's means of resisting them was unreasonable under the circumstance. Having
known that an interloper was inside his yard, Madali, being a policeman, should have first
fired a warning shot to deter said intruder from executing whatever vicious plans he had.
As it were, he fired directly at his victims and all four shots hit their targets.
Moreover, if Agustin, Felix and Cipriano were the intruders, then they should be credited for
their extraordinary bravery in entering the Madali yard. They were neighbors and they must
have known that as a policeman, Madali possessed a service revolver. The lower court,
which saw for itself the Madali yard considered it "rather inconceivable" for people like the
victims to ever dare go inside the premises armed only with a knife and clubs. 6 3
The lower court is correct in characterizing the felonious assault on Agustin Reloj as
frustrated murder. While Agustin Reloj was hit only below his right hip, Madali's act of
shooting was plainly attended by an intent to kill. This is evidenced by the revealing
statements of Madali while accosting Agustin Reloj some fifteen (15) meters from
Madali's house, thus: "So you are here, you devil, now you are finished. I have been waiting
for you. I have been waiting for you for three nights already." 6 4 The statements "now you
are finished" and "I have been waiting for you for three nights already" sufficiently show
that Madali not only intended to do away with Agustin Reloj but also that the crime had
been premeditated. They satisfactorily prove that Madali had formed a determination to
commit the crime prior to the moment of its execution; that he had clung to his
determination and that there was sufficient interval of time between the determination and
the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. 6 5
Moreover, after uttering those damaging statements, Madali dragged Reloj towards his
gate. Annie then clubbed Reloj who, however, succeeded in freeing himself from Madali's
hold. Reloj was running away when Madali shot him, hitting him below the right hip. 6 6
Indeed, firing at his fleeing victim and subsequently shooting to death two (2) other
persons on the same occasion, to our mind, evince quite clearly the intent to kill being then
entertained by Madali. prcd
There is likewise no doubt that Madali committed murder when he shot Felix Gasang twice
in the body. Treachery qualified the killing to murder punishable under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code. There was treachery because of the suddenness of the attack. Felix
was raising his hands, 6 7 and saying that he would not fight back when Madali feloniously
fired at him twice. Annie Madali's uttering "Here comes another" before Madali shot Felix
may not be considered sufficient warning so as to rule out suddenness of the attack. 6 8
However, no generic aggravating circumstance has been sufficiently proven.
We agree with the trial court that with respect to the killing of Cipriano Gasang and the
wounding of Merlinda Gasang, the crime committed was the complex crime of murder
with frustrated murder inasmuch as a single shot hit them both. 6 9 It is immaterial that
Merlinda Gasang was wounded on the leg and not on a vital part of her body. What is of
primordial consideration is the fact that the criminal act which killed Cipriano also caused
Merlinda's injury. 7 0 As in the killing of Felix, treachery qualified the killing of Cipriano to
murder because of the suddenness of the attack.
Annie Mortel Madali's defense strategy is to deny participation in the commission of the
crimes and to interpose an alibi. She insists that like any other wife, her natural reaction to
situations which involve risk is "to stay away, meditate and to shout and warn her husband
of the intruders rushing towards him." 7 1 She bewails the fact that the prosecution has
pictured her as "a brave, pugnacious and aggressive wife like the heroine of the pre-war
movie 'Annie of the Indies'." 7 2 Indeed, Annie's role in the commission of the crimes may
appear to be straight out of an action picture were it not for the fact that her denials and
uncorroborated alibi cannot stand against the categorical declarations of prosecution
eyewitnesses Agustin Reloj and Merlinda Gasang on her participation therein. 7 3 She
should have presented witnesses to support her story. As she herself admitted, she and
her husband were not alone in their house when they were allegedly stoned. Six of their
children were home then. 7 4 Some of them must have been within the age of discernment
inasmuch as their eldest child was 21 years old and therefore, any one of them could have
corroborated her story.
Nevertheless, the Court finds that proof beyond reasonable doubt has not been
established as to the existence of conspiracy between the Madali spouses. While direct
proof is not essential to prove conspiracy as it may be shown by acts and circumstances
from which may logically be inferred the existence of a common design among the
accused to commit the offense(s) charged, the evidence to prove the same must be
positive and convincing considering that conspiracy is a facile devise by which an accused
may be ensnared and kept within the penal fold. 7 5 With this and the principle that in
criminal prosecution, doubts must be resolved in favor of the accused, as guides, the Court
rules that the liability of Annie Mortel Madali with respect to the crimes committed herein,
is only that of an accomplice.
Annie's participation in the shooting of the victims consisted of beaming her flashlight at
them and warning her husband of the presence of other persons in the vicinity. By beaming
her flashlight at a victim, Annie assisted her husband in taking a good aim. However, such
assistance merely facilitated the commission of the felonious acts of shooting.
Considering that, according to both of the Madali spouses, "it was not so dark nor too
bright" 7 6 that night or that "brightness and darkness were equally of the same intensity."
7 7 Ricarte Madali could have nevertheless accomplished his criminal acts without Annie's
cooperation and assistance.
Neither may Annie's shouts of "here comes, here comes another, shoot" be considered as
having incited Ricarte to fire at the victims to make Annie a principal by inducement. There
is no proof that those inciting words had great dominance and influence over Madali as to
become the determining cause of the crimes. 7 8 The rapidity with which Madali admittedly
fired the shots 7 9 eliminated the necessity of encouraging words such as those uttered by
Annie.
The fact that Annie dealt a blow on Agustin while he was being dragged by Madali to their
yard does not make her a principal by direct participation. Annie's act, being previous to
Madali's act of shooting Agustin, was actually not indispensable to the crime committed
against Agustin. 8 0
Proof of motive is unnecessary where there is a clear identification of the accused. 8 1
More so in this case where the principal accused does not deny having fired the fatal
shots. But the Madali spouses must have harbored a deep resentment against the Gasang
family to put into action Madali's threat of "sowing bullets" on them. What makes Madali's
crimes even more reprehensible is the fact that he claims to have committed them in the
pursuit of his task as a peace officer. He even went to the extent of wearing his fatigue
jacket and trousers to create a facade of performance of an official function. Sadly, he
misused his authority and his wife, harboring an improper sense of connubial cooperation,
did not even try to dissuade him.
Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for a complex crime shall be the
maximum period of the penalty for the most serious crime. The death penalty being the
maximum period of the penalty for murder of reclusion temporal maximum to death under
Article 248 of the same Code, the death penalty should be imposed for the complex crime
of murder with frustrated murder considering that under Article 63, an indivisible penalty
cannot be affected by the presence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance. It
should be noted that under the ruling in People v. Muñoz, L-38968-70, February 9, 1989,
Article III, Section 19(1) of the 1987 Constitution does not change the period of the
penalty for murder except only insofar as it prohibits the imposition of the death penalty
and reduces it to reclusion perpetua. Hence, the lower court correctly imposed the penalty
of reclusion perpetua on Ricarte Madali for said complex crime.
The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender which was proven but not appreciated
in favor of Ricarte Madali by the trial court, should be considered in imposing on him the
penalty for the murder of Felix Gasang. The presence of this mitigating circumstance
without any aggravating circumstance to offset the same justified the imposition of the
minimum period of the penalty for murder pursuant to Article 64(2) of the Revised Penal
Code. Accordingly, the proper penalty should be the indeterminate sentence of not less
than ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum and not more than
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum. 8 2
The same mitigating circumstance should be considered in the imposition of the penalty
on Ricarte Madali for the crime of frustrated murder committed against Agustin Reloj. The
penalty for frustrated murder in accordance with Article 50 in relation to Article 248 is
prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period. Taking
into consideration the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty imposed on Ricarte Madali is four (4) years, two
(2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to 12 years of prision
mayor as maximum.
As an accomplice, Annie Mortel Madali should be imposed the penalty next lower in degree
than that prescribed by law for the consummated felonies. 8 3 For the complex crime of
murder and frustrated murder, like her husband, she shall be imposed the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, 8 4 considering that the penalty prescribed by law for Ricarte Madali is
the death penalty. For the murder of Felix Gasang, the penalty imposable on her is prision
mayor maximum to reclusion temporal medium, 8 5 and there being no aggravating nor
mitigating circumstances, the penalty should be reclusion temporal minimum. 8 6 Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Annie Mortel Madali should therefore be meted the
penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14)
years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as maximum. For the crime of frustrated
murder committed against Agustin Reloj, Annie Mortel Madali shall be sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of from six (6) months and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum
to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision correccional as maximum. LibLex
Ricarte Madali and Annie Mortel Madali shall also be liable to the heirs of Cipriano and Felix
Gasang for indemnity in the total amount of sixty thousand pesos (P60,000) in the
proportion of 2:1 (2 shares for Ricarte Madali as principal and 1 share for Annie Mortel
Madali as accomplice), with each accused-appellant being subsidiarily liable for the other
in case of insolvency. The Court sees no reason to disturb the lower court's findings on the
reimbursement of hospitalization and medical expenses in favor of Merlinda Gasang and
Agustin Reloj as well as the award of damages, except to clarify that payment thereof shall
likewise be in the proportion of 2:1 as above stated and with each accused being
subsidiarily liable for the other in case of insolvency.
WHEREFORE, except as hereinabove modified, the decision of the lower court is hereby
affirmed. Costs against the appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Presided by Judge Wilfredo D. Reyes.

2. Criminal Cases Nos. 981 & 982.
3. Exh. E.
4. TSN, August 21, 1982, p. 14.
5. TSN, March 25, 1980, p. 55.
6. Ibid., p. 65.
7. TSN, August 21, 1982, pp. 8-9.
8. TSN, January 18, 1982, p. 10.
9. TSN, August 21, 1982, p. 10.
10. TSN, January 18, 1982, p. 10.
11. TSN, August 20, 1981, p. 8.
12. Ibid., p. 9.
13. Ibid., p. 10-12.
14. Ibid., p. 13.
15. Ibid., pp. 13-15.
* Merlinda Gasang testified before the fire burned down the capitol building in Romblon
destroying court records including those of Criminal Cases Nos. 981-982. Counsel for the
prosecution and the defense agreed not to present Merlinda and Roman Galicia anymore
(TSN, August 20, 1981). A copy of the complete transcript of stenographic notes of the
testimony of Merlinda was submitted by the private prosecutor to the court (Record, pp.
98-121).
16. TSN, March 25, 1980, pp. 46-47; Record, pp. 100-101.
17. Ibid., p. 57.

18. Ibid., p. 45.
19. Ibid., p. 46.
20. Ibid., P. 52.
21. Ibid., pp. 49-50.
22. Ibid., p. 51.
23. Ibid., pp. 57-58.
24. TSN, August 21, 1981, p. 8.
25. Ibid., p. 12.
26. Exh. C.
27. Exh. D.
28. Exh. F.
29. TSN, March 25, 1980, pp. 51-55.

30. Exh. A.
31. TSN, August 20, 1981, pp. 15-16.

32. Exh. G.
33. TSN, August 8, 1983, pp. 21-22.
34. TSN, January 18, 1982, p. 4.

35. Rollo, p. 6.
36. Rollo, p. 7.
37. TSN, July 21, 1983, pp. 4-13 & 25.
38. TSN, February 8, 1982, pp. 3-11.

39. TSN, January 22, 1982 pp. 4 & 7.
40. Ibid., p. 12.

41. Ibid., p. 6.
42. Ibid., p. 12.
43. bid., p. 13.
44. TSN, January 20, 1982, p. 4.
45. Ibid., p. 5.
46. Ibid., p. 11.
47. Ibid., p. 4.
48. Ibid., pp. 6, 7 & 15.
49. Exh. I.
50. RTC Decision, p. 2; Rollo, p. 9.

51. TSN, January 21, 1982, p. 3.
52. Ibid., p. 5.
53. RTC Decision, p. 3.
54. Ibid.
55. RTC Decision, p. 13; TSN, August 8, 1983, pp. 7-25.
56. People v. Pasco, Jr., L-45716, June 24, 1985, 137 SCRA 137, 143.
57. TSN, January 20, 1982, p. 14.
58. Exh. I.
59. TSN, January 20, 1982, p. 5-6; January 22, 1982, pp. 8-9.
60. TSN, January 18, 1982, p. 4.
61. TSN, January 22, 1982, p. 6.

62. TSN, July 21, 1983, p. 7.
63. RTC Decision, p. 17.

64. TSN, August 20, 1981, p. 8.
65. People v. Corpuz and Serquina, 107 Phil. 44; People v. Custodio, 97 Phil. 698; People v.
Diva, 25 SCRA 468; People v. Ardisa, 55 SCRA 245; People v. Ramolete, 56 SCRA 66;
People v. Cardenas, 56 SCRA 631.
66. TSN, August 20, 1981, p. 9.
67. People v. Catipon, L-49264-66, October 9, 1985, 139 SCRA 192, 204.
68. People v. Rosario, L-46161, February 25, 1985, 134 SCRA 496, 510.
69. People v. Paculba, L-37366-67, August 31, 1983, 124 SCRA 383, 392.
70. Article 48, Revised Penal Code.
71. Brief, p. 24.
72. Ibid., p. 22.

73. People v. Tan, Jr., G.R., No. 53834, November 24, 1986, 145 SCRA 614; People v.
Delavin, G.R. Nos. 73762-63, February 27, 1987, 148 SCRA 257.
74. TSN, February 8, 1982, pp. 2-3.

75. People v. Tingson, L-31228, October 24, 1972, 47 SCRA 243,255.
76. TSN, February 8, 1982, p. 18.
77. TSN, July 21, 1983, pp. 5-6.

78. People v. Canial, L-31042-43, August 18, 1972, 46 SCRA 634, 651.
79. TSN, August 8, 1983, p. 18.
80. People v. Templonuevo, 106 Phil. 1003, 1007.

81. People v. Anquillano, G.R. No. 72318, April 30, 1987, 149 SCRA 442.
82. People v. Aguilar, 88 Phil. 693.

83. Art. 52, Revised Penal Code.
84. Art. 61(1).
85. Arts. 248 & 61 (3).

86. Art. 64 (1).

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 80130. August 19, 1991.]
BENJAMIN ABEJUELA , petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

and COURT OF APPEALS , respondents.
Vicente Y. Bayani for petitioner.
DECISION
FERNAN , C. J : p
In this petition for review by certiorari, petitioner seeks a reversal of the decision of the
Court of Appeals dated September 16, 1987 which affirmed in toto the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch VII of Palo, Leyte, dated January 11, 1984, convicting him as
an accomplice in the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of a commercial document
under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 172
thereof. 1
The facts of this case are uncontroverted.
Petitioner Benjamin Abejuela, a businessman engaged in the manufacture and fabrication
of hand tractors and other agricultural equipment, had a savings deposit with Banco
Filipino, Tacloban Branch. Sometime in April or May 1978, petitioner was befriended by
Glicerio Balo, Jr., an employee of Banco Filipino in the same Tacloban Branch. On several
occasions, petitioner Abejuela and Balo would dine together, go to nightclubs or have
drinking sprees. 2 They became close friends. Balo even became the godfather of
Abejuela's daughter. 3 Moreover, Balo offered Abejuela financial assistance in the latter's
welding business, claiming that he was expecting a large sum of money out of the
insurance policy of his late father.
On August 3, 1978, Balo went to Abejuela's welding shop to borrow the latter's passbook.
Abejuela was surprised and thought that it was not possible for Balo to use his passbook.
Balo showed Abejuela some checks purporting to be the proceeds of his father's
insurance policy. He wanted to deposit the checks in Abejuela's account with Banco
Filipino. Abejuela then suggested that Balo open his own account. However, Balo explained
that he was prohibited from opening an account with Banco Filipino since he was
employed with that bank as a savings bookkeeper. Abejuela advised Balo to open an
account instead with another bank but Balo insisted that he wanted the checks deposited
with Banco Filipino so that he could facilitate their immediate encashment as well as avail
himself of some privileges. Balo assured Abejuela that there was nothing wrong in
allowing him to use his passbook and even reassured Abejuela that he would accompany
him to the bank to make the deposit. cdrep
Accepting Balo's explanations and assurances, Abejuela entrusted his passbook to Balo.
On August 8, 1978, Balo returned Abejuela's passbook where a deposit in the amount of
P20,000.00 was already reflected. Once again, Balo assured Abejuela that there was
nothing wrong with the deposit, and stated that he just deposited one of his checks. On
the same, day Balo requested Abejuela himself to withdraw, in the former's behalf, money
from his account with Banco Filipino. Again with assurances from Balo, Abejuela
reluctantly agreed. He went to Banco Filipino and withdrew the amount of P15,000.00
which he gave to Balo at a restaurant called Felisa's Cafe.
Balo's practice of depositing and withdrawing money using Abejuela's passbook
continued for quite some time. During the month of August 1978, the account of Abejuela
with Banco Filipino reflected a total deposits of P176,145.00 and a total withdrawal of
P175,607.96.
In the meantime, Abejuela borrowed P20,000.00 from Balo, payable within 90 days from
August 9, 1978. But feeling apprehensive over Balo's constant use of his passbook,
Abejuela decided to pay his loan on August 31, 1978 by borrowing P10,000.00 from his
father and taking the other P10,000.00 from his business profits. 4 Abejuela also closed
his account with Banco Filipino by surrendering his passbook and withdrawing the balance
of his deposit.
Thereafter, the bank's accountant and interest bookkeeper discovered a discrepancy
between the interest reconciliation balance and the subsidiary ledger balance. The interest
bookkeeper could not locate the posting reconciliation and the proof reconciliation. He
also noticed that Account No. 6701-0160 in the name of Benjamin Abejuela reflected four
(4) large deposits on various dates from August 3, 1978 to August 23, 1978, totaling
P176,145.25, but the deposits slips thereof could not be located.
After further examination of the bank records, the manager, accountant and interest
bookkeeper were convinced that the irregularities were caused by Balo who was the
savings bookkeeper at that time and who had access to Abejuela savings account ledger.
They concluded that Balo was able to manipulate the ledger, by posting the fictitious
deposits after banking hours when the posting machine was already closed and cleared by
the bank accountant.
The bank officials confronted Balo, who feigned ignorance and initially denied the
accusations, but later admitted having posted the false deposits. Petitioner Abejuela was
also implicated because he was the owner of the passbook used by Balo in accomplishing
his fraudulent scheme. On December 5, 1978, an information was filed against Glicerio
Balo, Jr. and Benjamin Abejuela for the crime of estafa thru falsification of commercial
documents. 5 Separately arraigned, both pleaded "not guilty" to the crime charged. 6 Trial
followed.
On May 29, 1979, acting on an application by Banco Filipino, the trial court issued an order
of preliminary attachment against all the properties of accused Glicerio Balo, Jr. and
Benjamin Abejuela not exceeding P176,145.25 in value, the amount allegedly embezzled or
misappropriated. On September 4, 1979, the Deputy Sheriff of Palo, Leyte, filed a return of
service and submitted an inventory of the goods taken from the two accused and which
goods were placed in the custody of the National Bureau of Investigation. While the
refrigerator and television set taken from the residence of Abejuela would not command a
good price on account of their poor condition, the goods seized from Balo were appraised
at P62,295.00. 7
In the meantime, accused Glicerio Balo, Jr. was reported killed by members of the New
People's Army in the mountains of Mat-i, Balangkayan, Eastern Samar, on suspicion that he
was a PC informer and a collaborator. This information came from a rattan gatherer and
former NPA member whose testimony before the court a quo was never impeached.
Consequently, on February 25, 1981, the trial court dismissed the case against Glicerio
Balo, Jr., pursuant to Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, but without prejudice to a civil
action for recovery of damages arising from the offense which may be instituted by Banco
Filipino and without prejudice also to the reinstatement of the instant criminal action in the
event the accused would turn out to be alive. 8 On September 7, 1981, Banco Filipino filed a
motion praying for the forfeiture in its favor of the goods seized from the accused which
were in the custody of the National Bureau of investigation. On November 5, 1981, the trial
court, thru District Judge Auxencio C. Dacuycuy, granted the motion and ordered the
National Bureau of Investigation to deliver the seized goods to Banco Filipino. In addition,
the bank was authorized to withdraw the savings deposit of Glicerio Balo, Jr. for eventual
reversion to said bank. 9
Thereafter, trial continued with respect to petitioner Abejuela. On January 11, 1984, the
lower court adjudged petitioner Abejuela guilty. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads: cdrep
"WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused Benjamin Abejuela guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as accomplice of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification
of a commercial document under Art. 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code in
relation to Art. 172 thereof and as the amount involved is more than P22,000 he is
hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of not less than fifteen (15) years,
three months and 11 days to not more than sixteen (16) years, eight months and
21 days of reclusion temporal, to indemnify Banco Filipino, Tacloban Branch, in
the sum of One Hundred Seventy Six Thousand One Hundred Forty Five Pesos
and Twenty Five Centavos (P176, 145.25), without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and to pay one half of the costs.
"On May 29, 1979, the court issued a writ of preliminary attachment of the
properties of defendants Glicerio Balo, Jr. and Benjamin Abejuela. This
Attachment is hereby made permanent." 1 0
Abejuela appealed to the Court of Appeals. On September 16, 1987, the Appellate Court
affirmed the decision of the trial court. 1 1 A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner
was denied in a resolution dated October 7, 1987. Hence the instant appeal.
Petitioner Abejuela contends that the Appellate Court erred in not acquitting him for the
following reasons:
"(1) Accused-petitioner has no knowledge of the criminal intent of his co-
accused, Glicerio Balo, Jr., hence, there being no conspiracy, he cannot be
convicted as principal, neither as accomplice, nor did he benefit from the effects
of the crime, hence, he cannot be convicted even as an accessory.
"(2) The lending of the accused-petitioner of his passbook was made in good
faith, and after he was deceived by co-accused Glicerio Balo, Jr. that it is
necessary because as employee of Banco Filipino he cannot deposit in the said
Bank.
"(3) The presumption of innocence and the 'equipoise rule' apply in favor of
accused-petitioner." 1 2
Respondents, in their comment, maintain that petitioner Abejuela had knowledge of the
fraudulent acts of Glicerio Balo, Jr. They asseverate that petitioner is an intelligent
individual who can take care of his concerns, considering that he is a businessman who
finished third (3rd) year college (commerce). 1 3
Respondent also point out that Abejuela should not only have been convicted as an
accomplice but as a principal by indispensable cooperation, because without the
withdrawal slips which he executed allegedly in spite of his many doubts and
apprehensions, Glicerio Balo, Jr. could not have succeeded in his scheme.
Petitioner, on the other hand, claims that he had no knowledge at all of the fraudulent
machinations of Balo, and that his act of lending his passbook was done in good faith. LexLib
After carefully weighing the arguments of both parties as well as taking into consideration
the evidence on record, we are inclined to believe that petitioner Abejuela was completely
unaware of the malevolent scheme of Balo. From Balo's own admissions, it was he who
deceived Abejuela through sweet talk, assurances, drinking sprees and parties and cajoled
him into giving in to his requests. Furthermore, during that time, nobody would have
questioned Balo's source of money and since he had a perfect alibi, i.e. the insurance
proceeds of his later father. When Balo showed Abejuela some checks purporting to be his
father's insurance proceeds, Abejuela was hoodwinked into believing that Balo indeed had
money. Balo's request to borrow Abejuela's passbook in order to facilitate the encashment
of the checks seemed reasonable enough, considering that they were close friends and
"compadres", Abejuela's acquiescence to Balo's overtures is understandable.
Furthermore, the court takes judicial notice of the practice of banks in allowing anybody to
deposit in an account even without the owner's passbook, as long as the account number
is known. Thus, even without Abejuela's passbook, the false deposits could still have been
posted by Balo in the savings account ledger of Abejuela. After all, the ledger is the record
of the bank reflecting the transactions of the depositor, while the passbook is the record
of the depositor. More often than not, it is the ledger which is more accurate and up-to-
date. This is the reason why depositors have their passbooks updated for unrecorded
transactions like interests, checks deposited beyond clearance cut-off time and bank
charges.
In the instant case, the evidence of the prosecution clearly points at Balo as the one who
had posted the bogus deposits in Abejuela's ledger. He was also the one who wisely
manipulated petitioner Abejuela in order that the fictitious deposits could be placed at his
(Balo) disposal. Thus, when Balo requested Abejuela to withdraw the amount he had earlier
placed in the latter's account, Abejuela had no choice but to give in. He actually believed
that the money was really owned by Balo and he did not want Balo to think that he was
interested in it. Thus, the prosecution miserably failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that Abejuela had knowledge of the fraudulent scheme of Balo. The most that could be
attributed to Abejuela was his negligence in lending his passbook and his utter gullibility.
Knowledge of the criminal intent of the principal (in this case, Glicerio Balo, Jr.) is essential
in order that petitioner Abejuela can be convicted as an accomplice in the crime of estafa
thru falsification of commercial document. To be convicted as an accomplice, there must
be cooperation in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts. However,
the cooperation which the law punishes is the assistance rendered knowingly or
intentionally, which assistance cannot be said to exist without the prior cognizance of the
offense intended to be committed.
In a number of cases decided by this Court, it has been held that knowledge of the criminal
intention of the principal is indispensable in order to hold a person liable as an accomplice.
Thus:
"It appearing that the accused who drove the taxicab in which the other accused
rode did not actually take part in the conspiracy to commit the crime of robbery
but only furnished the means through which the robbery could be perpetrated,
with knowledge of the said criminal design, he is not guilty as principal of the
crime of robbery with homicide but is an accomplice therein." 1 4
"There is no evidence that appellant had conspired with the malefactors, nor that
he actually participated in the commission of the crime. He cannot, therefore, be
considered as a principal. But in going with them, knowing their criminal intention
and in staying outside of the house with them while the others went inside the
store to rob and kill, appellant effectively supplied the criminals with material and
moral aid, making him guilty as an accomplice." 1 5
It is axiomatic that in criminal proceedings, proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary

before a judgment of conviction can be rendered. Not an iota of doubt must cloud the
Court's mind. A conviction of a criminal offense must be based on clear and positive
evidence and not on mere assumptions. 1 6
In the light of the facts and the evidence on record, we believe that the guilt of petitioner
Abejuela has not been established beyond a reasonable doubt for which reason he must
be acquitted. The question that must be resolved now is the effect of Abejuela's acquittal
on his civil liability.
The Rules provide: "The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of
the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact
from which the civil might arise did not exist. In other cases, the person entitled to the civil
action may institute it in the jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the
person who may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for the
damage suffered." 1 7
We decree the acquittal of Abejuela because we seriously doubt whether he had
knowledge of the plan of Balo to defraud Banco Filipino by means of posting false
deposits and withdrawing these later. Because of this doubt, however, his exoneration will
not extinguish his civil liability. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where
the same is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required in
civil cases, or where the court has expressly declared that the liability of the accused is not
criminal but only civil in nature. 1 8
In Banal vs. Tadeo, Jr., 1 9 we declared:
"While an act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise
to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage
to another. Viewing things pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise
to the civil liability is really the obligation and moral duty of everyone to repair or
make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission,
done intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be punishable by law."
LLphil
It has been satisfactorily established that Banco Filipino suffered damage in the amount of
P176,145.25 representing the fictitious deposits posted by Glicerio Balo, Jr. and
systematically withdrawn through the passbook of petitioner Abejuela. Although Abejuela,
was unaware of the criminal workings in the mind of Balo, he nevertheless unwittingly
contributed to their eventual consummation by recklessly entrusting his passbook to Balo
and by signing the withdrawal slips. Abejuela failed to exercise prudence and care.
Therefore, he must be held civilly accountable.
WHEREFORE, on reasonable doubt, Benjamin Abejuela is hereby ACQUITTED of the
complex crime of estafa thru falsification of commercial documents. However, the writ of
preliminary attachment issued by the Regional Trial Court of Leyte on May 29, 1979
against petitioner's properties and those of his co-accused Glicerio Balo, Jr. to satisfy their
civil obligation in the amount of P176,145.25 and which was subsequently made
permanent by the said court stands. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr. and Davide, Jr., JJ ., concur.
Bidin, J ., concurs in the result.
Separate Opinions
FELICIANO, J ., concurring and dissenting :
I quite agree with the holding of the Chief Justice's ponencia that Benjamin Abejuela must
be held civilly accountable and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction issued
by the trial court against Abejuela's properties and those of his co-accused Glicerio Balo,
Jr. to satisfy their civil obligation in the amount of P176,145.25.
At the same time, I submit, with respect, that Abejuela should not be completely
exonerated of criminal liability. The facts in this case appear so similar as to be practically
on all fours with the facts in Samson v. Court of Appeals (103 Phil. 277 [1958]). In Samson,
the Court held the accused guilty of "estafa through falsification of commercial documents
by reckless negligence." Two (2) out of ten (10) members of the Court dissented: Reyes,
J.B.L., J. and Concepcion, J. As far as I can determine, however, Samson has not been
overruled, expressly or impliedly. Upon the other hand, the doctrine in Samson was
explicitly followed in People v. Rodis, et al. (105 Phil. 1294 [1959]), where the Court held
that the accused could be held liable for the crime of "malversation of public funds through
falsification of a public document by reckless negligence." Much the same doctrine has
been applied in both earlier and subsequent cases: U.S. v. Malesa, et al. (14 Phil. 468
[1909]) (Falsification of documents through reckless negligence); People v. Blancas (56
Phil. 801 [1931]) (Unpublished) (Falsification of public document through reckless
negligence); People v. Leopando (C.A.) 36 O.G. 2937 (1938) (Falsification of public
document through reckless negligence); Sarep v. Sandiganbayan (177 SCRA 440 [1989])
(Falsification of public document through reckless imprudence). LLjur
Finally, it might be noted that the ponencia explicitly found Abejuela to have acted with
reckless negligence:
". . . although Abejuela was unaware of the criminal workings in the mind of Balo,
he nevertheless unwittingly contributed to their eventual consummation by
recklessly entrusting his passbook to Balo and by signing the withdrawal slips.
Abejuela failed to exercise prudence and care. Therefore, he must be held civilly
accountable." (Emphasis supplied)
Footnotes
1. Criminal Case No. 3272.

2. TSN, p. 7, July 26, 1983.
3. TSN, p. 17, July 26, 1983; p. 5, August 17, 1983.
4. TSN, pp. 3-4, 6 and 24, July 26, 1983.
5. Original Record, pp. 1-10.
6. Ibid, pp. 94 and 106.

11. Rollo, pp. 118-125.
12. Rollo, p. 178.

13. Rollo, p. 134.
14. People vs. Lingad, 51 O.G. p. 6191.
15. People vs. Balili, No. L-14044, August 5, 1966, 17 SCRA 892, 898.
16. Gaerlan vs. Court of Appeals, et al. G.R. No. 57876, November 6, 1989, 179 SCRA 20.
17. Rule 111, Sec. 2(c).

18. Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-39999, May 31, 1984, 129 SCRA 558, citing PNB vs.
Catipon, 98 Phil. 286 and De Guzman vs. Alvia, 96 Phil. 558.
19. G.R. Nos. 78911-25, December 11, 1987, 156 SCRA 325, 330.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-30028. May 31, 1982.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , plaintiff-appellee, vs. CRESENCIO

DOBLE, ET AL. , defendants, CRESENCIO DOBLE, SIMEON DOBLE and
ANTONIO ROMAQUIN , defendants-appellants.

Federico Agrava for defendants-appellants.
SYNOPSIS
At about 11:00 o'clock in the evening, ten men, almost all of them heavily armed,
boarded a banca and proceeded to Navotas where eight of them disembarked and
robbed the Prudential Bank and Trust Company of P10,000.00. killing many persons
and seriously injuring some in the course thereof. Charged with robbery in band with
multiple homicide, multiple frustrated homicide, and assault upon agents in authority,
only ve of ten accused were brought to trial as the others remained at large. Based on
their extrajudicial confessions, the herein appellants were found guilty as co-
conspirators in the crimes charged and were sentenced to death. The records, however,
show that the appellants did not participate in the actual perpetration of the crimes.
Simeon was merely present during the nal conference of the malefactors in his house
which was near the landing place of the banca to be used by the culprits, telling them
that he could not join them because of a foot injury. The participation of Cresencio
consisted in his having been asked by the leader of the malefactors, just a few hours
before the robbery, to look for a banca, and in accompanying him to Antonio whose
banca they used. Cresencio and Antonio remained in the banca during the actual
robbery and shooting. Later. only Antonio was given money in the amount of P441.00
by the conspirators. On automatic review, appellants claimed that their extrajudicial
confessions, taken in 1966, were not voluntary and were obtained in violation of their
constitutional rights to counsel and against self-incrimination.
The Supreme Court held, that Simeon's mere presence in his house where the
conspirators met without taking active part in their conversation did not make him a co-
conspirator; that the right to counsel during custodial interrogation did not exist prior
to the 1973 Constitution; and, that appellants' extrajudicial statements which were
shown to be voluntary by su cient proof and the positive denial by the named police
investigator of the alleged maltreatment, may not be a basis for the invocation of the
right against self-incrimination. The Court acquitted Simeon and found Antonio and
Cresencio liable only as accomplices and only for the crime of robbery in band since
their cooperation was not indispensable and there was failure to establish their
complicity by a previous conspiracy with the real malefactors.
Judgment modified.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE; CONSPIRATORS; MERE

PRESENCE OF APPELLANT DURING MEETING OF MALEFACTORS IN HIS HOUSE DOES
NOT MAKE HIM A CO-CONSPIRATOR. — Appellant Simeon has no culpable
participation in the commission of the crime and is acquitted. His mere presence in his
house where the conspirators met and telling them that he could not join them because
of a foot injury and will just wait for them, evidently as mere gesture of politeness in not
being able to join them in their criminal purpose, for he could not be of any help in the
attainment thereof, and also to avoid being suspected that he was against their vicious
plan for which they may harm him, do not make him a co-conspirator, not having even
taken active part in the talks among the malefactors in his house.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSIONS;
VOLUNTARINESS SUFFICIENTLY SHOWN IN CASE AT BAR. — In the case at bar,
appellants contend that their extrajudicial statements upon which their convictions
were principally made to rest were inadmissible in evidence for having been allegedly
obtained by force and intimidation. The records however reveal that aside from the
appellants having virtually con rmed their extrajudicial statements when they testi ed
in court, and the positive denial of Sgt. Lacson, the only one named among the alleged
torturers, that any violence was practiced by the investigators, speci cally. the alleged
delivery of st blows on Cresencio, the following proofs are persuasive enough to show
the voluntariness of the custodial statements: (1) The statement of one of the
appellants in his extrajudicial confession which attempts to exculpate himself is
generally taken as an indication of lack of undue pressure exerted on one white giving
his statement on custodial investigation; (2) Neither one of the appellants presented a
medical certi cate to attest to the injuries allegedly in icted; (3) One of the accused
made no admission of his participation in the bold bank robbery in his extrajudicial
statement and in his testimony in court he admitted that no violence was applied to him
when he gave his statement, which is evidence enough that the appellants could not
have been dealt with differently; and, (4) The identity of ve of those charged in this
case has remained only as "John Does," an indication of non-employment of any
coercive means with which to force them into revealing the names of their companions
in the robbery.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHT; RIGHT TO COUNSEL DURING
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION; GRANTED ONLY BY NEW 1973 CONSTITUTION. — At the
time of appellants' custodial interrogation in 1966, the requisite of assistance of
counsel was not yet made a matter of constitutional right, as it has been granted only
by the new 1973 Constitution. There is no merit in the contention of counsel de o cio,
invoking a ruling in an American case, Miranda vs. Arizona, 16 L. Ed. 2nd. 694, that
appellants' custodial statements are inadmissible for having been unaided by counsel,
nor informed of their right thereto during the interrogation.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; EXTRAJUDICIAL STATEMENTS;
VOLUNTARINESS DETERMINES ADMISSIBILITY; RIGHT AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION MAY NOT BE INVOKED. — The right against self-incrimination, as
invoked by appellants, can neither be appreciated to impair the admissibility of their
extrajudicial statements. It is the voluntariness of an admission or confession that
determines its admissibility, for no principle of law or constitutional precept should
stand on the way of allowing voluntary admission of one's guilt, the only requisite justly
demanded being that ample safeguards be taken against involuntary confessions.
Once the element of voluntariness is convincingly established, which, incidentally, is
even presumed, the admissibility of an extrajudicial confession, admission or statement
becomes unquestionable.

5. CRIMINAL LAW; CRIMINAL LIABILITY; ACCOMPLICE; DEFINED. — An
accomplice is one who, not being principal as de ned in Article 17 of the Revised Penal
Code, cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts (Art.
18, Revised Penal Code). There must be a community of unlawful purpose between the
principal and accomplice and assistance knowingly and intentionally given (U.S. vs.
Belco, II Phil. 526), to supply material and moral aid in the consummation of the offense
and in as efficacious way (People vs. Tamayo, 44 Phil. 38).
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; CIRCUMSTANCES SHOWING WHY APPELLANTS NOT LIABLE
AS CO-PRINCIPALS. — The liability of appellants is less than that of a co-principal by
conspiracy or by actual participation. The commission of the crimes perpetrated
needed planning and men to execute the plan with full mutual con dence of each other,
but this was not shown with respect to appellants by the way they were asked to look
and provide for a banca just a few hours before the actual robbery. Romaquin, for his
part, appears not to be even known to the principal malefactors still at large, to join
actively in the conspiracy. The amount received by Romaquin who alone was given
money by the malefactors in the sum of P441.00, indicates that the latter did not
consider appellant as their confederate in the same character as those constituting the
band robbers. The sum given to Romaquin could very well represent only the rental of
his banca, and for the cooperation he extended to the malefactors, which, by no means,
is an indispensable one. At the most, appellants' liability would be that of mere
accomplices. They joined in the criminal design when Cresencio consented to look for a
banca and Romaquin provided it when asked by the gang leader Joe Intsik, and then
brought the malefactors to the scene of the robbery despite knowledge of the evil
purpose for which the banca was used. It was the same banca that carried the
malefactors away from the scene after the robbery to prevent their apprehension.
Appellants thus cooperated but not in an indispensable manner. Even without
appellants providing the banca, the robbery could have been committed specially with
the boldness and determination shown by the robbers in committing the crime.
7. ID.; ID.; COMPLICITY OF APPELLANTS IN CASE AT BAR LIMITED TO
ROBBERY. — It is not established by the evidence that in the nal meeting held in the
house of Simeon Doble where appellants for the rst time were present, the
malefactors had agreed to kill, if necessary to carry out successfully the plan to rob.
What appellants may be said to have joined is the criminal design to rob, which makes
them accomplices. Their complicity must, accordingly be limited to the robbery, not
with the killing. Having been left in the banca, they could not have tried to prevent the
killing, as is required of one seeking relief from liability for assaults committed during
the robbery (Art. 296, Revised Penal Code).
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring and dissenting :
CRIMINAL LAW; CRIMINAL LIABILITY; AWARENESS OF CRIMINAL DESIGN
TO KILL MAKES APPELLANTS IN CASE AT BAR LIABLE FOR ROBBERY WITH
HOMICIDE. — The complicity of appellants Cresencio Doble and Antonio Romaquin
as accomplices must not be limited to the robbery only but should include the
killing. For it must be remembered that the principal malefactors were each fully
armed; the arms consisted of pistols, carbines and Thompson sub-machine guns.
This fact was known to the appellants. In fact the principal malefactors had so
many guns that one was given to Cresencio with which to cover Antonio in case he
tried to escape. This shows that the principal malefactors were prepared to kill
even an accomplice so that they could accomplish their criminal objective. It
cannot be said, therefore, that there was no criminal design to kill but only to rob
among the principal malefactors as suggested in the main opinion. It is
unbelievable that under the circumstances the appellants were unaware of the
criminal design to kill and that they gave their cooperation-albeit not indispensable
— only to the robbery. Appellants should thus be held guilty as accomplices in the
crime of robbery with homicide.
DECISION
DE CASTRO , J : p
This case refers to a bank robbery committed in band, with multiple

homicide, multiple frustrated homicide and assault upon agents of persons in
authority, on June 14, 1966, in Navotas, Rizal. Only ve of ten accused were
brought to trial, the other ve named only as "John Does" in the information having
remained at large. Two of the ve accused who stood trial, Mateo Raga and Celso
Aquino were acquitted, while the trial court, the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
imposed the death penalty on the appellants herein, Cresencio Doble, Simeon
Doble and Antonio Romaquin. The decision of the trial court is now before Us for
review for having imposed the death penalty.
Both the de oficio counsel for appellants and the then Solicitor General, Hon.
Felix Q. Antonio, a retired Justice of this Court, agree that as so narrated in the
appealed decision, and as quoted in appellants' brief, the relevant and material
facts accurately re ect the evidence presented, except only as to the fact that
there were eight malefactors, with respect to which appellants are not in full
conformity (p. 2, Appellants' Brief). Cdpr
As stated in the decision under review, the crime was committed as follows:
"Late in the night of June 13, 1966, ten (10) men, almost all of them
heavily armed with pistols, carbines and thompsons, left the shores of
Manila in a motor banca and proceeded to Navotas, Rizal. Their mission: to
rob the Navotas Branch of the Prudential Bank and Trust Company. Once in
Navotas and taking advantage of the darkness of the night, eight (8) men
disembarked from the banca and proceeded to the beach in the direction of
the branch bank. Within a few minutes, shots were heard throwing the
people around in panic. As confusion reigned, the people ran in different
directions scampering for safety. As time went on, the shots grew in
intensity. As the commotion died down, the eight men returned to their
banca, still fully armed and some of them carrying what looked like
"bayongs". They boarded the waiting motor banca and sped away. As a
result of the shooting, many people got killed and some injured. Among
those who were killed were agents of the law, like Sgt. Alejandro Alcala of
the Philippine Constabulary, Sgt. Eugenio Aguilos and Cpl. Teo lo
Evangelista of the Navotas Police Department. Dominador Estrella, a market
collector, was also killed. Those who were injured were Pat. Armando
Ocampo, Exequiel Manalus, Jose Fabian, Rosalina Fuerten and Pedro de la
Cruz.
"The Prudential Bank and Trust Company branch o ce located at the
North Bay Boulevard, Navotas, Rizal, the object of the bloody mission, has
an unusual banking hours. It opens at midnight and closes at 8:00 in the
morning. The bank has ten employees, more or less, including a security
guard. It has two cages or compartments for tellers. One cage was under the
care of Melvin Domingo and the other one under the care of Alejandro San
Juan. At around 12:30 a.m. of June 14, 1966, Cesar Reyes, assistant cashier
of the bank, was near the cage of Domingo when two men entered the bank
asking that their money be changed. Domingo refused, saying that they had
no small denominations. Suddenly three men armed with long guns barged
in and red at the ceiling and the walls of the bank. They ordered the
employees to lie down, face downward and then demanded the key to the
vault. When Reyes answered that they do not have the key, the armed men
aimed their guns at the vault and red upon it until its doors were opened.
They entered the vault and found that they could not get anything as the
compartments inside the said vault were locked. Not being able to get
anything from the vault, the armed men went to the two teller cages and
took whatever they could lay their hands on. Not long afterwards, the men
left, carrying with them the sum of P10,439.95.
"Just beside the bank was a police outpost. On the night in question,
Pat. Nicolas Antonio was in the outpost, together with Sgt. Aguilos, Pats.
Pangan, Burgos, Rosal, Ocampo and Cpl. Evangelista. They were on duty
watching the sh landing. Suddenly, Antonio said, at around 1:30 a.m., he
heard a burst which he believed came from a thompson. He said he saw a
man pointing a thompson upwards while he was in front of the bank.
Afterwards, Antonio said, he heard another burst coming from the same
direction. Antonio and his companions then went to the middle of the road
and again they heard shots, and this time they were successive, coming
from their left. Antonio could not see who was ring the shots. Suddenly, he
said, he saw one of this companions Cpl. Evangelista topple down. He saw
also Dominador Estrella sitting down folding his stomach. They were both
felled by the shots coming from the left side of the bank. Antonio told
Ocampo to go beside the outpost and held Sgt. Aguilos by the arm. Sgt.
Aguilos, however, collapsed and fell down. He was hit. Later on, Antonio
said, he went to the outpost and told Pat. Ocampo to go too. He said that
from the outpost he heard some more shots. Then he saw Ocampo hit in the
thigh. After the ring ceased, Antonio saw his wounded companions placed
in a vehicle, together with Evangelista and Aguilos who were already dead.
Later on, he said he saw Sgt. Alcala, a member of the PC, lying prostrate in
the ground already dead." (pp. 83-85, Rollo).
It is noteworthy that from the above narration as to how the robbery and the
killing that followed in its wake were actually committed, the three appellants had
no participation. It is not surprising that the Solicitor General has recommended
the acquittal of one of the appellants, Simeon Doble. With this recommendation, it
might be well to take up the case of this appellant ahead of the other two,
appellants Antonio Romaquin and Cresencio Doble.
In recommending Simeon Doble's acquittal, the Solicitor General made the
following observation:
"As to appellant Simeon, the evidence shows only that the
malefactors met in his house to discuss the plan to rob the Prudential Bank.
This circumstance, standing alone, does not conclude his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. The facts do not show that he performed any act tending
to the perpetration of the robbery, nor that he took a direct part therein or
induced other persons to commit, or that he cooperated in its consummation
by some act without which it would not have been committed. It could be
that Simeon was present at the meeting held in his house and entered no
opposition to the nefarious scheme but, aside from this, he did not
cooperate in the commission of the robbery perpetrated by the others. At
most, his act amounted to joining in a conspiracy which is not punishable.
Mere knowledge, acquiescence, or approval of the act, without cooperation
or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one a party to a
conspiracy, but that there must be intentional participation in the transaction
with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose (15 CJS
1062).
"We are, therefore, unable to agree with the nding of the lower court
that Simeon was a principal both by agreement and encouragement, despite
his non-participation in the commission of the crime. Nor was it clearly
proved that Simeon received a part of the looted money as to make him an
accessory. Romaquin's testimony that the day after the robbery he gave
P2.00 to Simeon who had asked for cigarettes (p. 5, t.s.n., May 25, 1967)
could hardly be considered as the latter's share of the loot. It is signi cant
that in his statement he claimed he had not yet received his share." (pp. 10-
11, Appellee's Brief; p. 146, Rollo).
A review of the evidence of record shows the foregoing observation of the
Solicitor General to be with convincing rationality. It is only that portion in which is
cited Simeon's statement made before the Navotas Police Department (Exh. I pp.
28-29, Folder of Exhibits) that "he has not yet received his share" that detracts
from the solidity of the Solicitor General's recommendation, for it gives the
impression that Simeon had given material or moral support or encouragement to
the malefactors (referring to those still at large as the principal culprits) as to
entitle him to a share in the loot. However, a reading of his whole extrajudicial
statement would erase that impression, and reveals the true import of that
statement as intended only to show that Simeon had nothing to do with
commission of the crime and therefore did not receive any share of the fruits
thereof. Thus, to quote pertinent portions of his statement on custodial
investigation: llcd
"3. T Ano ang dahilan at ikaw ay naririto?

S Dahil po sa aking pagkakasangkot sa holdapan dito sa isang
Bangko sa Navotas, Rizal at ako ay hinuli ng mga tauhan ng M.P.D.
"4. T Kailan ka hinuli?
S Noon pong Miyerkoles ng madaling araw, hindi ko alam ang
petsa pero nito pong buwan na ito.
"5. T Mayroon ka bang nalalaman tungkol sa pagkakaholdap ng
isang bangko dito sa Navotas?
S Ang nalalaman ko po ay doon nagpulong sa aming bahay ang
mga taong nangholdap dito sa Navotas.
"6. T Sino sino o ilang tao ang mga nagpulong sa inyong bahay?
S Primero po ay walo (8), pagkatapos ay may dumating na dalawa
pa at ang mga kilala ko lamang po ay sina Tony na may ari ng
bangka, si Joe Rondina, Cresencio Doble at narinig kong may
tinawag pang Erning. Iyon pong iba ay hindi ko alam ang pangalan
pero makikilala ko nag aking nakitang muli.
"7. T Gaano katagal na nagpulong sa inyong bahay ang mga taong
ito?
S Mahigit pong mga isang (1) oras, pero hatinggabi na nong Lunes
ng gabi (June 13, 1966).
"8. T Ano ang mga bagay na pinagpulongan sa inyong bahay?
S Tungkol sa kanilang lakad na pagpunta sa isang bangko sa
Navotas.
"9. T Sino ang nangunguna sa pulong na iyon?
S Iyan po (witness pointing to the picture of Rodolfo Dizon, after
being shown five (5) other pictures).
"10. T Ano-ano ang mga narinig mong pinagpulongan?
S Tungkol po doon sa gagawing pagnanakaw sa isang Bangko sa
Navotas, Rizal.
"11. T Samantalang sila ay nagpupulong, ano ang iyong ginagawa?

S Wala po, hindi ko sila sinasaway at hindi ako kumikibo bastat
ako ay nakikinig lamang.
"12. T Bukod sa narinig mong magnanakaw sa bangko na usapan,
ano pa ang iba mong mga narinig?
S Sinabi nito (witness pointing to the picture of Rodolfo Dizon) at
ni Jose Rondina na "MALAKING KUARTA TO, PERO MASYADONG
MAPANGANIB, AT KAILANGAN AY HANDA TAYO."
"13. T Ano pa ang sumunod?
S Nagbubulong-bulongan ang iba tungkol doon sa gagawing
paglaban.
"14. T Ano pa ang nangyari?
S Maya-maya po ay lumakad na sila, hindi ako sumama.
"15. T Pagkatapos?
S Makaraan po ang mahigit na isang (1) oras ay nagbalik silang
lahat.
"16. T Ano ang nangyari ng magbabalik na sila?
S Matapos po silang bumaba doon sa malapit sa aming babay ay
nagmamadali na silang umalis dahil sa may tama ang isa sa kanila.
At noon pong umaga ng araw na iyon ay nagpunta ako kay Tony
(Antonio Romaquin) at kumuha ng dalawang piso (P2.00) dahil iyong
aking parte ay hindi pa naibibigay sa akin. Pagkatapos po ay umuwi
na ako sa amin.
"17. T Ano pa ang iyong masasabi kaugnay ng pangyayaring ito.
Ikaw ba ay mayroong nais na alisin o dili kaya ay baguhin sa
salaysay mong ito?
S Mayroon pa po akong ibig na sabihin.
"18. T Ano pa ang ibig mong sabihin?
S Bago po tuluyang umalis sila sa aking bahay ay nag-usap-usap
silang lahat at ako ay sumama sa kanilang pag-uusap at
nakapagbigay pa ako ng mungkahi na ako na lamang ang
maghihintay sa kanila dahil sa ako ay may pinsala sa paa at
maaaring hindi ako makatakbo at mahuli lamang.
"19. T Iyan bang pinsala mo sa kaliwang paa ay matagal na?
S Opo, may limang (5) taon na.
"20. T Samantalang nag-uusap sa loob ng bahay mo, nasaan ka?
S Kasama po sa loob ng aking bahay.
"21. T Ano pa ang masasabi mo?
S Wala na po."
The only link between Simeon and the crime is his house having been used
as the meeting place of the malefactors for their nal conference before
proceeding to Navotas to rob the Prudential Bank branch thereat. He did not join
them because of a 5-year old foot injury which would make him only a liability, not
one who can help in the devilish venture. To the malefactors he was most
unwanted to join them. If they met at his house it was only because it was near the
landing place of the banca, and so he invited them to his house while waiting for
the banca to arrive. His mere presence in his house where the conspirators met,
and for merely telling them that he could not join them because of his foot injury,
and will just wait for them; evidently as a mere gesture of politeness in not being
able to join them in their criminal purpose, for he could not be of any help in the
attainment thereof, and also to avoid being suspected that he was against their
vicious plan for which they may harm him, Simeon is by no means a co-conspirator,
not having even taken active part in the talks among the malefactors in his house.
Like the Solicitor General, We, therefore, nd no culpable participation of
Simeon Doble in the commission of the crime, for, indeed, by his physical condition
alone, he could not in any way be of help to the malefactors in the pursuit of their
criminal design, nor could he have been desired by the latter to be one of them.
Taking up next the case of appellants Antonio Romaquin and Cresencio
Doble, their main contention is that their extrajudicial statements upon which their
conviction was principally made to rest, are inadmissible for having been allegedly
obtained by force and intimidation, and in violation of basic constitutional rights to
counsel and against self-incrimination. In support of this contention, appellants
have only their own self-serving testimony to rely upon. LexLib
Thus, Cresencio Doble testi ed that while at the Navotas police department
someone he could not name boxed him on the chest, while one Sgt. Lacson hit him
on the left side with the butt of a gun causing him to lose consciousness; that he
was made to lie on a narrow table and peppery liquid was poured over his face, his
eyesight then becoming dim, and it was then that he was made to sign a piece of
paper which he could not read because of his blurred eyesight.
Romaquin gave a similar story of torture and maltreatment in order to force
him to admit culpable participation in the heist. The inquiry must, accordingly, be
whether the claim of violence and involuntariness of their statements is true as to
render said statements inadmissible in evidence.
Disputing the allegation of maltreatment in the execution of the custodial
statements (Exhibits E, F, F-1, G, H-1), the Solicitor General argues that the same is
negated by how the details as given by both appellants in their respective
statements t into each other, at least as to the part played by each from the time
Cresencio went to Romaquin's place to procure the latter's banca up to their get-
away from the scene of the crime. Thus, while Romaquin claimed in his statement
that although he wanted to escape from the scene after his passengers have
disembarked for their evil mission, he could not do so because Cresencio had a
gun pointed at him to prevent his escape, as was the order given Cresencio by the
rest of the gang. The latter denied this allegation when he testi ed that he returned
the gun given him because he did not know how to use or manipulate it, although in
his extra-judicial statement (Exhibit M, p. 35, Record of Exhibits), he stated that he
accepted the gun.
The statement of Romaquin as just cited in an attempt to exculpate himself
which is generally taken as an indication of lack of undue pressure exerted on one
while giving his statement on custodial interrogation. (People vs. Palencia, 71
SCRA 679).
The Solicitor General also observed, in disputing the claim of violent
maltreatment to which appellant's were subjected to, that neither one of the
appellants presented medical certi cate to attest to the injuries allegedly in icted
(p. 3, Appellee's Brief) which disproves the claim (People vs. Tuazon, 6 SCRA 249;
People vs. Dela Cruz, 88 Phil. 79). He also points to the fact that in his extrajudicial
statement (Exhibit 1, p. 100, Record of Exhibits), Celso Aquino, one of the accused,
made no admission of his participation in the bold bank robbery, and in his
testimony in court, he admitted that no violence was applied to him when he gave
his statement (p. 12, t.s.n., July 12, 1967; p. 4, Appellee's Brief). This is evidence
enough that the appellants could not have been dealt with differently as their co-
accused Aquino who was allowed to give his statement freely without the
employment of force or intimidation upon him. The evidence also disclosed a note
(Exhibit E) of Cresencio addressed to Romaquin asking the latter not to reveal the
names of their companions. This means that the names of the members of the
band led by Joe Intsik must have been known to both appellants. That the identity
of ve of those charged in this case has remained only as "John Does" indicate the
non-employment of any coercive means with which to force them into revealing
the names of their companions in the robbery, again negating the claim of torture
and violence.
It is, likewise, to be noted that appellants Romaquin and Cresencio virtually
con rmed their extra-judicial statements when they testi ed in court. By all the
proofs as cited, persuasive enough to show the voluntariness of their custodial
statements plus the positive denial of Sgt. Lacson, the only one named among the
alleged torturers, that any violence was practiced by the investigators, speci cally,
the alleged delivery of st blows on Cresencio, (pp. 3, 6, 7, 18, t.s.n., October 27,
1967) the alleged involuntariness of the extra-judicial statements is fully
discredited. Cdpr
It is hinted that the killing of suspect Rodolfo Dizon while allegedly

attempting to escape could have instilled fear in the minds of the appellants which
affected their freedom of will in giving their own statements (p. 12, Appellant's
Brief). This is a far-fetched argument to prove involuntariness in the giving of the
statements, the killing having taken place after their interrogation. In his
supplemental statement dated July 5, 1966 (Exhibits F-2, p. 20, Record of
Exhibits), Romaquin pointed to the person of Rodolfo Dizon. His death therefore,
took place long after appellants have given their main statements, all in mid June,
1966. If counsel de o cio had only bothered to check the dates of the main
statements of both appellants which were given not later than just past the middle
of June, 1966, and that of the supplementary statement of Romaquin which is July
5, 1966, he would not have probably come forth with this argument.
Counsel de oficio, invoking a ruling in an American case, Miranda vs. Arizona,
16 L. Ed. 2nd. 694, harps on the inadmissibility of appellants' custodial
statements, for their having been unaided by counsel, nor informed of their right
thereto during the interrogation. There might be merit in this contention were the
right to counsel during custodial interrogation one of constitutional grant as is
provided in our 1973 Constitution, before which the right was given only to an
accused, not to a mere suspect during in-custody police interrogation (Magtoto
vs. Manguera, 63 SCRA 4; People vs. Dumdum, Jr. G. R. No. L-35279, July 30,
1979). At the time of their custodial interrogation in 1966, however, the requisite
of assistance of counsel was not yet made a matter of constitutional right, as it
has been granted only by the new 1973 Constitution.
The right against self-incrimination, as invoked by appellants, can neither be
appreciated to impair the admissibility of their extra-judicial statements. It is the
voluntariness of an admission or confession that determines its admissibility, for
no principle of law or constitutional precept should stand on the way of allowing
voluntary admission of one's guilt, the only requisite justly demanded being that
ample safeguard be taken against involuntary confessions. Once the element of
voluntariness is convincingly established, which, incidentally, is even presumed, the
admissibility of an extra-judicial confession, admission or statement becomes
unquestionable. 1
The extra-judicial statements of appellants, however, when evaluated with

the testimony they gave in court, would convince Us that their liability is less than
that of a co-principal by conspiracy or by actual participation, as was the holding
of the trial court. The most damaging admission made in the extra-judicial
statements of Cresencio is that he was asked by Joe Intsik, the gang leader, at
8:00 o'clock in the evening of June 13, 1966, if he could procure a banca for his
use, and that Joe Intsik, on being asked by Cresencio, allegedly told him that the
banca would be used for robbery. Cresencio gave an a rmative answer to Joe
Intsik's query, having in mind Tony Romaquin who had a banca. Cresencio
accompanied Joe Intsik to Romaquin at 12:00 in the evening. In Romaquin's
statement (Exh. C also Exh. I, Romaquin, p. 15, Record of Exhibits), Cresencio
allegedly asked him to bring his friends in his banca, to board a launch for a trip to
Palawan. The discrepancy between the statements of Cresencio and Romaquin as
to the intended use of the banca is at once apparent, for while according to the
former, it was for the commission of robbery, according to the latter, it was to
bring Cresencio's friends to board a launch for a trip to Palawan. What is
demonstrated thereby is the full freedom with which both appellants were allowed
to give their respective statements while in custodial interrogation.
Cresencio's consenting to look for a banca, however, did not necessarily
make him a co-conspirator. Neither would it appear that Joe Intsik wanted to draft
Cresencio into his band of malefactors that would commit the robbery more than
just asking his help to look for a banca. Joe Intsik had enough men all with arms
and weapons to perpetrate the crime, the commission of which needed planning
and men to execute the plan with full mutual con dence of each other, which is not
shown with respect to appellants by the way they were asked to look and provide
for a banca just a few hours before the actual robbery.
Romaquin, for his part, appears not to be known to the principal malefactors
still at large, to be asked to join actively in the conspiracy. The amount received by
Romaquin who alone was given money by the malefactors in the sum of P441.00,
indicate that the latter did not consider appellant as their confederate in the same
character as those constituting the band of robbers. The sum given to Romaquin
could very well represent only the rental of his banca, and for the cooperation he
extended to the malefactors, which, by no means, is an indispensable one.
Cresencio, on the other hand, was not given any part of the loot. It was only
Romaquin who gave him P41.00, clearly not what should represent his share if he
were a full-fledged ally or confederate. prLL
The apprehension of the malefactors that upon realizing the full impact of
their vicious misdeeds, Romaquin might speed away from the scene in fear of
being implicated, as shown by the measure they had taken to prevent his escape,
is further proof that Romaquin was not considered a co-conspirator, who is one
who should not be looked upon with mistrust. For his part, Cresencio testi ed that
while he was given a gun with which to cover Romaquin who might escape, he
returned the gun because he did not know how to use it, and so one of the
malefactors was left near the beach to prevent appellants eeing from the scene
of the crime with banca. In his statement, however, (Exh. M, p. 35, Record of
Exhibits), he refused to accept the gun, but they gave it just the same, and he
received it.
The circumstances pointed out would not make appellants liable as co-
principals in the crime charged. At the most their liability would be that of mere
accomplices. They joined in the criminal design when Cresencio consented to look
for a banca and Romaquin provided it when asked by the gang leader Joe Intsik,
and then brought the malefactors to the scene of the robbery, despite knowledge
of the evil purpose for which the banca was to be used. It was the banca that
brought the malefactors to the bank to be robbed and carried them away from the
scene after the robbery to prevent their apprehension. Appellants thus cooperated
but not in an indispensable manner. Even without appellants providing the banca,
the robbery could have been committed, specially with the boldness and
determination shown by the robbers in committing the crime.
The complicity of appellant Cresencio is further shown by his note (Exhibit
"H", p. 26, Record of Exhibits) addressed to Romaquin asking him not to reveal to
the police the names of their companions. He went to Romaquin and asked for
money which the latter gave in the sum of P41.00, as if to show that he had helped
in some material way to deserve a share in the loot.
As to Romaquin, while he testi ed that the malefactors gave a gun to
Cresencio with which the latter would prevent Romaquin from eeing away from
the scene, evidently to show that he never joined in the criminal purpose, and that
all his acts were in fear of bodily harm and therefore, not voluntary, the measure
taken by the malefactors to prevent his escape, could have been just an extra
precaution, lest he would be stricken with fear in the course of the commission of
the crime specially if attended by shootings as it was really so. If it is true that he
never voluntarily made the trip with knowledge of the planned robbery, and with
Cresencio saying that he returned the gun given him with which to prevent
Romaquin from speeding away, Romaquin could have tried a getaway, as should
have been his natural impulse had he not joined in the criminal design. His act of
hiding the money he received from the malefactors, and repainting his boat, all
attest to his guilty conscience arising from the act of cooperation he knowingly
extended to the principal culprits to achieve their criminal purpose.
An accomplice is one who, not being principal as de ned in Article 17 of the
Revised Penal Code, cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or
simultaneous acts (Art. 18, Revised Penal Code). There must be a community of
unlawful purpose between the principal and accomplice and assistance knowingly
and intentionally given (U.S. vs. Belco, 11 Phil. 526), to supply material and moral
aid in the consummation of the offense and in as e cacious way (People vs.
Tamayo, 44 Phil. 38). In this case, appellants' cooperation is like that of a driver of
a car used for abduction which makes the driver a mere accomplice, as held in
People vs. Batalan, 45 Phil. 573, citing the case of U.S. vs. Lagmay, G.R. No. L-
15009.
It is however, not established by the evidence that in the meeting held in the
house of Simeon Doble, the malefactors had agreed to kill, if necessary to carry
out successfully the plan to rob. What appellants may be said to have joined is the
criminal design to rob, which makes them accomplices. Their complicity must,
accordingly, be limited to the robbery, not with the killing. Having been left in the
banca, they could not have tried to prevent the killing, as is required of one seeking
relief from liability for assaults committed during the robbery (Art. 296, Revised
Penal Code). 2
The nding that appellants are liable as mere accomplices may appear too
lenient considering the gravity and viciousness of the offense with which they were
charged. The evidence, however, fails to establish then complicity by a previous
conspiracy with the real malefactors who actually robbed the bank and killed and
injured several persons, including peace o cers. The failure to bring to justice the
real and actual culprits of so heinous a crime should not bring the wrath of the
victims not of the outraged public, upon the heads of appellants whose
participation has not been shown to be as abominable as those who had gone into
hiding. The desire to bring extreme punishment to the real culprits should not blind
Us in meting out a penalty to appellants more than what they justly deserve, and as
the evidence warrants.
Accordingly, We nd appellants Cresencio Doble and Antonio Romaquin
guilty beyond reasonable doubt, but only as accomplices for the crime of robbery
in band. 3 As discussed earlier, appellant Simeon Doble is entitled to acquittal as
so recommended by the Solicitor General who nds no su cient evidence, to
which We agree, to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The penalty imposable upon appellants Cresencio Doble and Antonio
Romaquin, as accomplices for the crime of robbery in band is prision mayor
minimum which has a range of 6 years, 1 day to 8 years as provided in Article 295
of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 294, paragraph 5 of the same code.
The commission of the crime was aggravated by nighttime and the use of a
motorized banca. There being no mitigating circumstance, both appellants should
each be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from ve (5) years, four (4)
months, twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional to eight (8) years of prision
mayor as maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of each of the deceased in the sum
of P12,000.00 not P6,000.00 as imposed by the trial court.
WHEREFORE, modi ed as above indicated, the judgment appealed from is
a rmed in all other respects. The immediate release of Simeon Doble who is
hereby acquitted is ordered, unless he should be continued in con nement for
some other legal cause. Proportionate costs against Cresencio Doble and Antonio
Romaquin. LLphil
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, Makasiar, Guerrero, Melencio-Herrera Vasquez and Gutierrez, JJ .,
concur.
Aquino and Escolin, J., took no part.
Concepcion, Jr., J., previously voted to concur with the main opinion.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS , J., concurring and dissenting :
Giving to Cresencio Doble and Antonio Romaquin the bene t of a lenient

attitude, I can agree that they were not principals but merely accomplices as
stated in the main opinion. However, I cannot persuade myself that their complicity
must be limited to the robbery only and should not include the killing. For it must
be remembered that the principal malefactors were each fully armed; the arms
consisted of pistols, carbines and Thompson sub-machine guns. This fact was
known to the appellants. In fact the principal malefactors has so many guns that
one was given to Cresencio with which to cover Antonio in case he tried to escape.
This shows that the principal malefactors were prepared to kill even an
accomplice so that they could accomplish their criminal objective. How then can it
be said that there was no criminal design to kill but only to rob among the principal
malefactors as suggested in the main opinion. And I cannot believe that under the
circumstances the appellants were unaware of the criminal design to kill and that
they gave their cooperation — albeit not indispensable — only — to the robbery.
Accordingly, I believe that the appellants should be held guilty as accomplices in
the crime of robbery with homicide. LLphil
Barredo, Plana and Relova, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. People vs. Molleda, 86 SCRA 667; People vs. Dorado, 30 SCRA 53; People vs.
Narciso, 23 SCRA 844.
2. People vs. Hamiana, 89 Phil. 225.

3. People vs. Palencia, 71 SCRA 679; People vs. Geronimo, 53 SCRA 246; People vs.
Pastores, 40 SCRA 498.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 34386. February 7, 1991.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , plaintiff-appellee, vs. LUDOVICO C.

DOCTOLERO alias "ECOY," CONRADO C. DOCTOLERO alias
"CONDRING," and VIRGILIO C. DOCTOLERO alias "VERGEL, " accused-
appellants.

Hermogenes S. Decano for accused-appellants.
DECISION
REGALADO , J : p
Accused-appellants Ludovico Doctolero and his brothers, Conrado and Virgilio

Doctolero, charged with and convicted in the then Court of First Instance, Branch II,
Pangasinan, of the crime of multiple murder and unspeci ed physical injuries, appealed
from the decision of the court a quo the decretal portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the court nds the accused Ludovico
Doctolero guilty as principal, and his co-accused Conrado Doctolero and Virgilio
Doctolero guilty as accomplices, in committing the crime of Murder, which caused
the death of Epifania Escosio, Lolita de Guzman Oviedo and Marcelo Doctolero,
and in in icting physical injury on the minor child, Jonathan Oviedo. Accordingly,
in the absence of other circumstances to mitigate the penalty, the accused
Ludovico Doctolero is sentenced to suffer the penalty of three (3) LIFE
IMPRISONMENTS (CADENA PERPETUA) for the deaths of Epifania Escosio, Lolita
de Guzman Oviedo and Marcelo Doctolero, and the additional penalty of 4
Months and 1 Day to 6 Months of arresto mayor, for in icting slight physical
injury to (sic) the minor child, Jonathan Oviedo. The accused Conrado Doctolero
and Virgilio Doctolero, as accomplices, are sentenced to suffer the penalty of 10
years and 1 Day of prision mayor to 17 Years and 4 months of reclusion
temporal, for the death of Epifania Escosio; the penalty of 10 Years and 1 Day of
prision mayor to 17 Years and 4 Months of reclusion temporal, for the death of
Lolita de Guzman Oviedo: the penalty of 10 Years and 1 Day of prision mayor to
17 Years and 4 Months of reclusion temporal, for the death of Marcelo Doctolero;
and the additional penalty of 2 Months and 1 Day to 4 Months of arresto mayor
for the slight physical injury suffered by the minor child, Jonathan Oviedo. All
accused Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio all surnamed Doctolero, are ordered to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Epifania Escosio, in the sum of P12,000.00;
the heirs of the deceased Lolita de Guzman Oviedo, in the sum of P12,000.00; and
the heirs of the deceased Marcelo Doctolero, in the sum of P12,000.00; and to pay
three-fourths (3/4) of the costs. The accused Antonio Doctolero is acquitted, with
one-fourth (1/4) cost de oficio." 1
The information filed against appellants alleges that the crime was committed as
follows:
"That on or about the 8th day of November, 1970, in barrio Binday, municipality of
San Fabian, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, armed with bolos, went up the
house of Marcial Sagun and once thereat, conspiring together and mutually
aiding one another, with intent to kill and with evident premeditation and
treachery, with abuse of superior strength and with extreme cruelty, did, then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hack, stab and strike
Lolita de Guzman Oviedo, Epifania Escosio and Jonathan Oviedo and
immediately thereafter, the same accused while already on the road, conspiring
together and mutually aiding one another, with intent to kill and with evident
premeditation and treachery, attack, assault, hack and stab Marcelo Doctolero,
thereby inflicting upon him multiple mortal wounds which caused his death." 2
Upon arraignment, all the appellants pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged. In
its decision, the trial court made the following ndings and a summary of the evidence
for the prosecution thus:
"It is undisputed that on the evening of November 8, 1970, Epifania Escosio and
Lolita de Guzman were killed in the house of Marcia Sagun in Sitio Binday,
municipality of San Fabian, province of Pangasinan, where they were living.
Jonathan Oviedo, 1 1/2 year old child of Lolita de Guzman, was on the same
occasion, slightly injured while being fed on the breast of his mother. On the road,
a few meters from the house of Marcial Sagun, Marcelo Doctolero, 81 years old,
was fatally injured. He was taken to the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital but he
died on the way . . .
"The evidence for the prosecution tend to show that the three (3) accused,
Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio, all surnamed Doctolero, were responsible for the
death(s) of Epifania Escosio and Lolita de Guzman, and in in icting physical
injuries to (sic) Jonathan Oviedo. And immediately thereafter, with their father
and co-accused, Antonio Doctolero, they hacked Marcelo Doctolero, with their
bolos which caused the death of the latter.prLL
The principal witnesses for the prosecution are: Marcial Sagun, his wife Maria
Sagun, and Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy. According to Marcial Sagun, at about 6:30
in the evening on November 8, 1970, he and his wife, Maria Oviado-Sagun and
Lolita de Guzman-Oviedo (sister-in-law of Maria Oviedo-Sagun) were on their way
home to Barrio Binday. They came from the eld where they bundled their
harvests. Upon reaching a crossing of the road in Bo. Binday they met the
accused Ludovico Doctolero who, without warning and without cause or reason,
held the left shoulder of Marcial Sagun with his left hand and struck Marcial
Sagun with a bolo. The latter evaded that blow and wrestled with Ludovico
Doctolero for possession of the bolo of the latter. Lolita de Guzman-Oviedo
became frightened when Ludovico Doctolero and Marcial Sagun were wrestling
for the possession of the bolo of the former, so she ran away in the direction of
the house in Sitio Binday.
"Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy (sister of Marcial Sagun) testi ed that while she was
cleaning palay in the yard of her uncle, the deceased Marcelo Doctolero, she saw
the accused, Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio (all surnamed Doctolero) throw
stones at the house of Marcial Sagun. While throwing stones, Ludovico allegedly
shouted for the man in the house to come out. Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy went
towards the house of Marcial Sagun and saw the three accused, Ludovico,
Conrado and Virgilio, coming down from the house going towards her. She told
them: 'Why can't you be patient and forget?' But she was asked not to interfere. At
about that time, Marcelo Doctolero, half-brother of Antonio Doctolero, and uncle
of the three accused was going towards the house of Marcial Sagun, when he
met the three accused, Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio. Marcelo Doctolero told
them why they can't be patient and forget, but the three accused replied 'Vulva of
your mother, we will also kill you.' Than they struck Marcelo Doctolero several
times with their bolos. And when their father Antonio Doctolero arrived, he also
struck Marcelo Doctolero with a bolo on the head. Marcelo Doctolero fell and then
all the accused ran away.
"The testimony of Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy is sought to be corroborated by the

testimony of Maria Oviedo-Sagun (wife of Marcial Sagun) who declared that
while she was in the house of Marcelo Doctolero, to whom she reported the
incident between Ludovico Doctolero and Marcial Sagun, she saw the three
accused Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio throwing stones at their house and called
to all the men in the house to come out. She was about to go to their house to get
her children but she saw the three accused Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio going
up. So she hid behind the palm tree, a few meters away from their house. While
there, she heard Epifania Escosio (her adopted mother) shouting at her, saying
'Enieng, your children.' Then she saw the three accused coming down from the
house, going towards the road where they met Marcelo Doctolero whom they also
boloed several times until he felt. When Antonio Doctolero arrived, he also struck
Marcelo Doctolero with a bolo. Then they all left." 3
On the other hand, appellants present the following version:

"On November 8, 1970, at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening, Ludovico Doctolero
met at the crossing of Bo. Banana and Binday road, San Fabian, Pangasinan.
Marcial Sagun, who was with his wife, Maria Oviedo, Antonio Oviedo and the
latter's wife, Lolita de Guzman. Antonio Oviedo is the brother-in-law of Marcial
Sagun, he being the brother of Maria Oviedo. (tsn, p. 7 hearing, February 17, 1971-
Somera). Marcial Sagun and company were on their way home. (p. 8, Ibid). LibLex
"Ludovico greeted Marcial Sagun: 'Where have you been cousin.' (p. 8, ibid) He
noticed, however, Antonio Oviedo holding his bolo on his waist. So, he asked his
cousin Marcial Sagun why Antonio Oviedo was like that. The latter unsheathed
his bolo and boloed Ludovico with a downward swing. He parried the bolo with
his left hand (p. 9, ibid), but he was hurt in the process (p. 10, ibid).
"At that juncture, Marcial Sagun unsheathed his bolo and Ludovico Doctolero also
unsheathed his bolo. They watched each other's step (p. 10, ibid) with the two
women, Lolita de Guzman and Maria Oviedo, hitting the back of Ludovico with a
wood (sic). The latter ignored them, as his eyes were towards Marcial Sagun and
his brother-in-law, Antonio Oviedo (p. 11, ibid).
"Realizing that he could not afford to ght both Marcial Sagun and Antonio
Oviedo, Ludovico tried to escape by boloing Maria Oviedo, whom he hit at the
back. He retreated and then run (sic) away, with Marcial Sagun and Antonio
Oviedo throwing stones at him. (p. 12, ibid).
"Ludovico went to the house of his father, Antonio Doctolero. The latter was
eating his meal, together with his small children upstairs, while accused-appellant,
Conrado Doctolero was in the kitchen downstairs also eating his meal, when
Ludovico arrived (p. 13, ibid; p. 4, hearing June 8, 1971-Salazar).
"He told his father that he was wounded and asked him to look after his children
as he might meet something bad that night. He did not enter the house anymore:
he was only until the door. Then he ran away. His father asked him what
happened, but he did not answer anymore. (p. 14, ibid, p. 4, Salazar).
"He ran towards his house, taking a short cut by passing through the house of his
cousins, Juanito and Cresencia Doctolero. As he came near his house, he saw the
house of Marcial Sagun, who was also his immediate neighbor. His blood boiled.
He went to Marcial's house calling him to get down. When Marcial did not get
down, he peeped and noticed that Marcial Sagun was not there. So he went
upstairs to ask Epifania Escosio, who told him that Marcial Sagun went towards
the South. He was about to leave when the old woman hit him at the back of his
neck, causing him to see darkness and (he) boloed her several times (p. 13-19,
tsn, hearing, February 17, 1971).
"Ludovico went downstairs to look for Marcial Sagun. He stayed a while at the
trunk of the buri tree, thinking that he might be ambushed. Here, he did not notice
anyone coming from the south or the east. So he tried to move, but as he did so,
he noticed someone approaching him coming from the yard of Marcelo
Doctolero. As it was dark he did not recognize the man and thinking that it was
Marcial Sagun, he met him. It turned out however, that the man was Marcelo
Doctolero. So he returned the bolo he was holding in its scabbard. He asked
Marcelo Doctolero where Marcial Sagun was, but Marcelo Doctolero answered
him, 'because of your foolishness' and hit him on the shoulder, but in the process
of evading the blow, Ludovico Doctolero was hit at the back. As Marcelo
Doctolero tried to hit him for a second time he took a side step and took hold of
the stick and pulled it away, causing Marcelo Doctolero to fall on his knees. He
was able to get the club, but Marcelo Doctolero unsheathed his bolo. When the
latter insisted on unsheathing his bolo, Ludovico Doctolero boloed him many
times. (pp. 19-26, ibid). 4
The police were then informed of the brutal murders as well as the injury caused
to the child. A doctor and a photographer went to the scene of the crime and pictures
were then taken. 5
Quoting from the ndings of the Rural Health O cer of San Fabian, the court
below established that —
". . . nine (9) wounds were inflicted on the body of Marcelo Doctolero, namely:
xxx xxx xxx
'(1) Incised wound, 5 inches from the upper border of the left ear to
the side of the forehead. There is fracture of the underlying skull.
llcd
'(2) Incised wound 6 inches in length 1 1/2 inches above the 1st
wound with fracture of the underlying skull.
'(3) Incised wound 4 inches in length 1/2 inch above the 2nd wound
with fracture of the underlying skull.
'(4) Incised wound 6 inches in length from the upper border of the
left eyebrow to the right eyebrow. There is also fracture of the underlying
skull.
'(5) Incised wound — 3 1/2 inches in length 1 1/2 from the angle of
the mouth towards the lower border of the right ear. The lower lobe of the
ear is detached.

'(6) The lower third of the left small finger is almost cut off.
'(7) Incised wound at the median portion of the left hand. There is a
severance from the level of the middle finger.
'(8) Incised wound — 1 1/2 inches long at the median portion and
distal 3rd of the forearm, left.
'(9) Incised wound 1 1/2 inches long above the 8th wound.
xxx xxx xxx
"One wound was in icted on the body of Lolita de Guzman, namely, 'stab wound
around 3 cms. long and 4 inches in depth at the 2nd intercostal space just at the
left border of the sternal bone.' (Exh. C). And nine (9) wounds were in icted on the
body of Epifania, namely:
xxx xxx xxx
'(1) Stab wound around 4 cms. in length and around 5 inches deep
penetrating the sternal bone at the level of the 2nd intercostal space.
'(2) Incised wound 3 inches in length just skin deep at the level of
the right clavicular region.
'(3) Incised wound 2 inches in length also skin deep one inch below
the second wound.
'(4) Chopping wound 3 inches in circumference with fracture of the
underlying skull at the right frontal portion of the head.
'(5) Incised wound around one inch length at the left frontal portion
of the head.
'(6) Incised wound 3 inches long just at the level of the shoulder
joint, exposing the bony portion, left.
'(7) Incised wound one inch long 1/2 inch below the sixth wound.
'(8) Incised wound one inch long 4 inches below the seventh wound.
'(9) Incised wound around 3 inches in length at the base and lateral
portion of the hand right. There was fracture of some of the underlying
bones.'" 6
Regarding the wounds in icted upon Jonathan Oviedo, the resident physician at
the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital, Dr. Rodolfo Ramirez, explained the same as follows:
"Stab wound, thru and thru, about 1 1/2 inches on the lateral aspect of the dischartered
forearm, right. Then, there was another about 1 inch of the middle aspect of the right
forearm. There was also an incised wound, about 1/2 inch, temporal right." He further
testi ed that the child was admitted to the hospital on November 8, 1970 and was
discharged completely healed fifteen (15) days later. 7
During the pendency of the present petition and on motion of appellant Ludovico
Doctolero, on May 17, 1976 the Court resolved to grant the withdrawal of his appeal 8
and entry of judgment with regard to said accused was made on the same day. 1 0
Hence, this review is only with respect to the liability of appellant Conrado Doctolero. LexLib
The trial court correctly found that appellant Conrado Doctolero participated as
an accomplice in the commission of the crimes charged. In his defense, appellant
denies having participated in the commission thereof and raises the effete defense of
alibi, contending that he was not at the place where the crimes were committed.
Appellant's pretension, however, was not corroborated by any evidence other than the
testimony of the other erstwhile appellants. While the testimony of a co-conspirator or
an accomplice is admissible, such testimony comes from a polluted source and must
be scrutinized with great caution as it is subject to grave suspicion. 11 This
uncorroborated denial of his participation cannot overthrow the positive and
categorical testimony of the principal witnesses of the prosecution, and between the
positive declarations of the prosecution witness and the negative statements of the
accused, the former deserves more credence. 1 2
There is no showing that the witnesses had any motive to testify falsely against
appellants. The only imputed grudge that Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy may have had
against appellants occurred years ago and she was, at the time she testi ed, on good
terms with appellants as shown by the following testimony of Ludovico Doctolero
himself:
"Q And even before Paciencia Sagun Diamoy testi ed as one of the prosecution
witness (sic) your relationship with her was harmonious and rather very
closed (sic) being your cousin?
A Yes, sir.
Q As a matter of fact, whenever she goes to San Fabian to visit her relatives she
did not fail to see you in your house?
A Yes, sir sometimes she slept in my house." 1 3
As to Maria Sagun, we agree with the court a quo when it held that "Maria Sagun
(wife of Marcial Sagun) pointed to the three accused. Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio, all
surnamed Doctolero, as the persons who went up her house that night of November 8,
1970. While Maria Sagun may have a grudge against the accused Ludovico Doctolero
by reason of that previous incident at the crossing yet, no reason or motive is shown
why Maria Sagun should also implicate Conrado and Virgilio Doctolero in the
commission of the crime." 1 4
When there is nothing in the records which would show a motive or reason on the
part of the witnesses to falsely implicate the accused, identi cation should be given full
credit. 15 And when there is no evidence and nothing to indicate that the principal
witness for the prosecution was moved by improper motives, the presumption is that
he was not so moved, and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. 1 6
In an attempt to disprove the ndings of the trial court, appellant points to
certain inconsistencies that allegedly render the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses incredible. These inconsistencies, however, are not so substantial as to
destroy their credibility. As correctly explained by the People, the seeming
contradictions and minor inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witness
pointed out by the appellants in their brief are mere inconsequential variations on the
part of each observer in relating his own observation of the same incident.
Contradictions and inconsistencies of witnesses in regard to the details of an incident
far from demonstrating falsehood constitute evidence of good faith. Not all persons
who witness an incident are impressed by it in the same manner and it is but natural
that said eyewitnesses should disagree on minor details. 1 7
In fact, inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimony of the prosecution
witnesses which refer to minor details cannot destroy the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses. 18 And where the prosecution witnesses were able to positively identify the
appellants as the authors of the crime and the testimonies were, on the whole,
consistent on material points, the contradictions become insignificant. 1 9
Nor can appellant successfully assail the testimony of Sgt. Del n Ronquillo who
conducted the investigation himself and personally examined the scenes of the multiple
killings. Credence is accorded to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who are law
enforcers for it is presumed that they have regularly performed their duties in the
absence of convincing proof to the contrary. Appellants have not shown that this
prosecution witness was motivated by an improper motive other than that of
accomplishing his mission. 2 0
Sgt. Ronquillo established that the reports which were received at the police
department of San Fabian, Pangasinan shortly after the crimes were committed were to
the effect that the Doctoleros were involved. He further testi ed that when he
immediately proceeded to the scene of the crime and investigated Paciencia Sagun-
Diamoy she told him that the accused Doctoleros came with bolos from the house of
Marcial Sagun. 21 In ne, Sgt. Ronquillo merely testi ed objectively on the results of his
investigation and the weight to be accorded to his ndings was properly addressed to
the trial court. Cdpr
The lower court held that Conrado Doctolero and his brother, Virgilio,
participated as accomplices in the slaying of the women and the in iction of injuries on
the child. We agree with its ndings and the ratiocination of the Solicitor General with
its evidentiary substantiation:
"Now, there is no question that while the three appellants were still stoning and
hurling challenges at the house of Marcial Sagun, they must have already heard
the two women thereat protesting what they were doing and shouting back at
them (pp. 39-41, 97, 119, tsn. Jan. 13, 1971: pp. 144-146, tsn., Jan. 14, 1971),
after which all the three appellants went up the house. Under these facts, it is
impossible that both appellants Virgilio Doctolero and Conrado Doctolero did not
know or were not aware when their brother Ludovico was brutally killing the two
women Lolita de Guzman-Oviedo and Epifania Escosio and wounding the child
Jonathan Oviedo inside the room of said house. Furthermore, from the nature,
number, and locations of the many wounds sustained by the two women and
child (Exhs. A, C, D, and D-1), it could not have been possible for Ludovico's two
brothers Virgilio and Conrado (assuming that they did not go inside the house)
not to hear either the screams of pain of their brother's victims or the contact
between the blade of his bolo and their bodies when their brother Ludovico was
ruthlessly hacking them several times . . . Under these circumstances, it is obvious
that appellants Conrado Doctolero and Virgilio themselves knew what was going
on inside the room of the house at the time, but they just stood by and did nothing
to stop their brother Ludovico Doctolero from brutally hacking his women victims
to death. It is, therefore, reasonable to believe that the two appellants, Conrado
and Virgilio, merely stood by as their brother Ludovico Doctolero was murdering
the two deceased women, ready to lend assistance. Indeed, there is no question
that the presence of these two appellants upstairs in the house of Marcial Sagun
gave their brother Ludovico Doctolero the encouragement and reliance to proceed
as he did proceed, in committing the heinous crimes against two defenseless
women and a child." 2 2

We have held that where one goes with the principals, and in staying outside of
the house while the others went inside to rob and kill the victim, the former effectively
supplied the criminals with material and moral aid, making him guilty as an accomplice.
23
Appellants contend that the murders occurred as a consequence of a sudden

thought or impulse, thus negating a common criminal design in their minds. This
pretension must be rejected since one can be an accomplice even if he did not know of
the actual crime intended by the principal provided he was aware that it was an illicit
act. 24 This is a doctrine that dates back to the ruling in U.S. vs. De Jesus 2 5 that where
the accomplices therein consented to help in the commission of forcible abduction,
they were responsible for the resulting homicide even if the purpose of the principal to
commit homicide was unknown to the accomplices.
Whatever doubt the court a quo entertained on the criminal responsibility of
appellants Conrado and Virgilio Doctolero did not refer to whether or not they were
liable but only with regard to the extent of their participation. There being ample
evidence of their criminal participation, but a doubt exists on the nature of their liability,
the courts should favor the milder form of liability or responsibility which is that of
being mere accomplices, 26 no evidence of conspiracy among the appellants having
been shown.
The court below, however, erred in the penalty imposed for the physical injuries
in icted on Jonathan Oviedo. The child required medical attention for fteen (15) days,
hence the liability of appellants therefor is for less serious physical injuries punished
wit h arresto mayor under Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code. There being no
modifying circumstances, a penalty of twenty (20) days of arresto menor should be
imposed for said offense on appellant Conrado Doctolero as an accomplice.
The death of appellant Virgilio Doctolero during the pendency of this appeal
terminated only his criminal liability but not his civil liability. 2 7 Also, while the death
indemnity has been increased to P50,000.00 under current case law, the same should
not apply to Ludovico Doctolero, he having heretofore withdrawn his appeal and the
judgment rendered by the trial court having long since become nal and executory with
respect to him. Cdpr
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is MODIFIED and judgment is hereby
rendered IMPOSING on appellant Conrado Doctolero three (3) indeterminate sentences
of ten (10) years of prision mayor to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of
reclusion temporal each for the death of Epifania Escosio, Lolita de Guzman Oviedo and
Marcelo Doctolero, and a penalty of twenty (20) days of arresto menor for the less
serious physical injuries in icted on Jonathan Oviedo. Appellant Conrado Doctolero and
the estate of Virgilio Doctolero are ORDERED to indemnify, in the sum of P50,000.00 for
each set or group of heirs, the respective heirs of Epifania Escosio, Lolita de Guzman
Oviedo and Marcelo Doctolero, and to pay one-half (1/2) of the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Original Record, 239-240.

2. Ibid., 50.
3. Ibid., 215-218.
4. Brief for the Accused-Appellants, 3-6; Rollo; 110.

7. TSN, January 12, 1971, 5-7.
8. Rollo, 149.
9. Ibid., 150.
10. Ibid., 171.
11. People vs. Aquino, 57 SCRA 43 (1974).

12. People vs. Macabenta, 170 SCRA 203 (1989).
13. TSN, February 18, 1971, 58.
14. Original Record, 228.
15. People vs. Samson, 176 SCRA 710 (1989).

16. People vs. Perez, 175 SCRA 203 (1989).
17. Brief for the Appellee, 39; Rollo, 135.
18. People vs. Lamosa, 173 SCRA 518 (1989).
19. People vs. Baysa, et al., 172 SCRA 706 (1989).
20. People vs. Mahumanding, 174 SCRA 237 (1989).

22. Brief for the Appellee, 42-44; Rollo, 135.
23. People vs. Balili, et al., 17 SCRA 892 (1966).
24. People vs. Largo, et al., 99 Phil. 1061 (1956).
25. 2 Phil. 514 (1903).

26. People vs. Torejar, 43 SCRA 158 (1972); People vs. Irenea, 164 SCRA 481 (1988).
27. People vs. Garachico, et al., 113 SCRA 131 (1982); People vs. Pamintuan, et al., 126 SCRA 5
(1983); People vs. Salig, et al., 133 SCRA 59 (1984).

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 128966. August 18, 1999.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , plaintiff-appellee, vs . EDWIN DE VERA y

GARCIA, RODERICK GARCIA y GALAMGAM, KENNETH FLORENDO
and ELMER CASTRO , accused,
EDWIN DE VERA y GARCIA , appellant.

Vicente D. Millora for accused-appellant.
SYNOPSIS
Appellant, together with Roderick Garcia, Kenneth Florendo and Elmer Castro, was
charged with Murder before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in connection with the
killing of one Frederick Capulong. Appellant and co-accused Garcia pleaded not guilty
during arraignment. The other two accused were at large. During the trial, the prosecution
presented as witness Bernardino Cacao who testi ed that he saw appellant in the car,
where an altercation later occurred. Thereafter, he saw accused Florendo drag out of the
vehicle an apparently disabled Capulong and shot him in the head moments later. Aside
from Cacao's testimony, the prosecution also presented appellant De Vera's extrajudicial
statement which established that appellant knew that Florendo intended to kill the victim
and that the three co-accused were carrying weapons and that he acted as a lookout to
watch for passersby. Thereafter, the trial court convicted appellant co-accused Garcia of
the crime charged and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim. The trial court found that it was indeed
accused Kenneth Florendo who actually shot the victim. However, it convicted appellant as
a principal because the scienti c and forensic ndings on the criminal incident directly and
substantially con rmed the existence of conspiracy among the four accused. Hence, this
appeal. aATESD
The testimony of the prosecution eyewitness contained nothing that could inculpate
appellant. Aside from the fact that he was inside the car, no other act was imputed to him.
Mere presence does not amount to conspiracy. Indeed, the trial court based its nding of
conspiracy on mere presumptions, and not on solid facts indubitably indicating a common
design to commit murder. Such suppositions do not constitute proof beyond reasonable
doubt. The fact that appellant was at the locus criminis in order to aid and abet the
commission of the crime did not make him a conspirator; at most, he was only an
accomplice. Moreover, the prosecution evidence has not established that appellant was
part of the conspiracy to kill the victim. Appellant's participation, as culled from his own
statement, was made after the decision to kill was already a fait accompli.
When an extrajudicial statement satis es the requirements of the Constitution, it
constitutes evidence of a high order. The defense has the burden of proving that it was
extracted by means of force, duress or promise of reward. Appellant failed to overcome
the overwhelming prosecution evidence to the contrary. Consequently, the Supreme Court
convicted appellant as an accomplice, not as a principal, in the crime of murder and
sentenced him accordingly. The Court likewise modified the damages awarded to the heirs
of the victim.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; CONSPIRACY, MUST BE FOUNDED ON FACTS, NOT ON MERE

SURMISES OR CONJECTURES. — It is axiomatic that the prosecution must establish
conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt. In the present case, the bare testimony of Cacao
fails to do so. Cacao testi ed that he saw Appellant De Vera in the car, where an
altercation later occurred. Thereafter, he saw Florendo drag out of the vehicle an
apparently disabled Capulong and shoot the victim in the head moments later. Cacao's
testimony contains nothing that could inculpate appellant. Aside from the fact that he was
inside the car, no other act was imputed to him. Mere presence does not amount to
conspiracy. Indeed, the trial court based its nding of conspiracy on mere presumptions,
and not on solid facts indubitably indicating a common design to commit murder. Such
suppositions do not constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. As the Court has
repeatedly stated, criminal conspiracy must be founded on facts, not on mere surmises or
conjectures. Clearly, Cacao's testimony does not establish appellant's culpability.
2. ID.; PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE; CONSPIRACY; DISTINGUISHED FROM
ACCOMPLICE. — The Revised Penal Code provides that a conspiracy exists when "two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide
to commit it." To prove conspiracy, the prosecution must establish the following three
requisites: "(1) that two or more persons came to an agreement, (2) that the agreement
concerned the commission of a crime, and (3) that the execution of the felony [was]
decided upon." Except in the case of the mastermind of a crime, it must also be shown that
the accused performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. The Court has held
that in most instances, direct proof of previous agreement need not be established, for
conspiracy may be deduced from the acts of the accused pointing to a joint purpose,
concerted action and community of interest. On the other hand, the Revised Penal Code
de nes accomplices as "those persons who, not being included in Article 17, cooperate in
the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts. The Court has held that an
accomplice is "one who knows the criminal design of the principal and cooperates
knowingly or intentionally therewith by an act which, even if not rendered, the crime would
be committed just the same." To hold a person liable as an accomplice, two elements
must be present: (1) the "community of criminal design; that is, knowing the criminal
design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose;"
and (2) the performance of previous or simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the
commission of the crime. The distinction between the two concepts needs to be
underscored, in view of its effect on appellant's penalty. The act of one of them is deemed
the act of all. In the case of an accomplice, the liability is one degree lower than that of a
principal.
3. ID.; ID.; CONSPIRATORS DISTINGUISHED FROM ACCOMPLICES. —
Conspirators and accomplices have one thing in common: they know and agree with the
criminal design. Conspirators, however, know the criminal intention because they
themselves have decided upon such course of action. Accomplices come to know about it
after the principals have reached the decision, and only then do they agree to cooperate in
its execution. Conspirators decide that a crime should be committed; accomplices merely
concur in it. Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be committed; they
merely assent to the plan and cooperate in its accomplishment. Conspirators are the
authors of a crime; accomplices are merely their instruments who perform acts not
essential to the perpetration of the offense.
4. ID.; CONSPIRACY; PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — Appellant De Vera knew that
Kenneth Florendo had intended to kill Capulong at the time, and he cooperated with the
latter. But he himself did not participate in the decision to kill Capulong; that decision was
made by Florendo and the others. He joined them that afternoon after the decision to kill
had already been agreed upon; he was there because "nagkahiyaan na." Signi cantly, the
plan to kill could have been accomplished without him. It should be noted further that he
alone was unarmed that afternoon. Florendo and Garcia had guns, and Castro had a
baseball bat. In any event, the prosecution evidence has not established that appellant was
part of the conspiracy to kill the victim. His participation, as culled from his own
Statement, was made after the decision to kill was already a fait accompli. aTEHCc
5. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION; REQUISITES TO

BE ADMISSIBLE. — Extrajudicial confessions must conform to constitutional
requirements. Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, provides: '(1) Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his
right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. . . . (3)
Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.' If the confession meets these requirements, "it is
subsequently tested for voluntariness, i.e., if it was given freely — without coercion,
intimidation, inducement, or false promises; and credibility, i.e., if it was consistent with the
normal experience of mankind."
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; BURDEN OF PROVING THAT THE SAME WAS EXTRACTED BY
MEANS OF FORCE, DURESS OR PROMISES OF REWARD RESTS ON THE DEFENSE. — The
right to counsel is enshrined in the Constitution in order to address, among others, the use
of duress and undue in uence in the execution of extrajudicial confessions. In the present
case, the Court is satis ed that Atty. Sansano su ciently ful lled the objective of this
constitutional mandate. Moreover, appellant's allegations of torture must be disregarded
for being unsubstantiated. To hold otherwise is to facilitate the retraction of solemnly
made statements at the mere allegation of torture, without any proof whatsoever. When an
extrajudicial statement satis es the requirements of the Constitution, it constitutes
evidence of a high order, because of the strong presumption that no person of normal
mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and
conscience. The defense has the burden of proving that it was extracted by means of
force, duress or promise of reward. Appellant failed to overcome the overwhelming
prosecution evidence to the contrary.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; TO BE SUFFICIENT FOR CONVICTION, THERE MUST BE OTHER
EVIDENCE TENDING TO SHOW THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME APART THEREFROM. —
Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, provides that "[a]n extrajudicial confession made
by an accused shall not be su cient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by
evidence of corpus delicti." In the present case, the prosecution presented other evidence
to prove the two elements of corpus delicti: (a) a certain result has been proven — for
example, a man has died; and (b) some person is criminally responsible. It is indubitable
that a crime has been committed, and that the other pieces of prosecution evidence clearly
show that appellant had conspired with the other accused to commit the crime. He himself
does not deny that he was at the crime scene. In fact, he was seen by the prosecution
eyewitness in the company of the gunman. Furthermore, Atty. Sansano and the police
o cers testi ed to the voluntariness of his confession. It must be stressed that the
aforementioned rule merely requires that there should be some other evidence "tending to
show the commission of the crime apart from the confession."
8. CRIMINAL LAW; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES; TREACHERY; ABSORBS
ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH IN CASE AT BAR. — We disagree with the court a quo in
appreciating two generic aggravating circumstances, because treachery absorbs abuse of
superior strength. Hence, there is only one generic aggravating circumstance, not two.
Notwithstanding the presence of a generic aggravating circumstance, we cannot impose
the death penalty, because the crime was committed before the effectivity of the Death
Penalty Law.
9. ID.; PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE; APPELLANT WHO HAD ACTED AS A
LOOKOUT CONSIDERED A MERE ACCOMPLICE IN CASE AT BAR. — Appellant's presence
was not innocuous. Knowing that Florendo intended to kill the victim and that the three co-
accused were carrying weapons, he had acted as a lookout to watch for passersby. He
was not an innocent spectator; he was at the locus criminis in order to aid and abet the
commission of the crime. These facts, however, did not make him a conspirator; at most,
he was only an accomplice.
10. ID.; ID.; ACCOMPLICE; PENALTY; ONE DEGREE LOWER THAN THAT OF
PRINCIPAL. — In the present case, the penalty of appellant as an accomplice is one degree
lower than that of a principal, which in murder cases is reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to death. He is also entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
11. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; CIVIL INDEMNITY; AWARDED WITHOUT NEED OF
PROOF OTHER THAN COMMISSION OF CRIME. — We sustain the trial court's grant of
P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto, which may be awarded without need of proof other than
the commission of the crime.
12. ID.; ID.; MORAL DAMAGES; AWARD THEREOF, REDUCED IN CASE AT BAR. —
Based on the evidence presented, moral damages is also warranted, but only in the
amount of P50,000, not P500,000 as fixed by the trial court.
13. ID.; ID.; ACTUAL DAMAGES; NO FACTUAL BASIS TO GRANT INDEMNITY FOR
LOST EARNINGS IN CASE AT BAR. — The grant of P600,000 for loss of earning capacity
lacks factual basis. Such indemni cation partakes of the nature of actual damages, which
must be duly proven. In this case, the trial court merely presumed the amount of
Capulong's earnings. Since the prosecution did not present evidence of the current income
of the deceased, the indemnity for lost earnings must be rejected.
VITUG, J., separate opinion:
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CONSPIRACY; DISTINGUISHED FROM
ACCOMPLICE. — There is conspiracy under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code when two
or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it. Conspiracy, of course, by itself is legally inconsequential unless the
criminal plot is, in fact, carried out. Once the offense is perpetrated, the responsibility of
the conspirators is collective, not individual, that render all of them equally liable
regardless of the extent of their respective participations, the act of one being deemed to
be the act of the other or the others, in the commission of the felony. An accomplice, under
Article 18 of the same Code, is one who, not being a principal who (a) takes a direct part in
the execution of the act, (b) directly forces or induces others to commit it, or (c)
cooperates in the commission of the offense by another act without which the offense
would not have been accomplished (per Article 17 of the Code), collaborates in the
execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; APPELLANT DEEMED A CONSPIRATOR IN CASE AT BAR. — I
cannot bring myself to accept any material variance between the terms "to decide," on the
one hand, and "to concur" or "to assent," on the other hand, in de ning, i.e., whether as a
conspirator or as an accomplice, the speci c criminal liability of the criminal offender.
Where there is concurrence or assent by one to a plan, even when previously hatched by
another or others, to commit a felony which concurrence or assent is made prior to the
actual perpetration of the offense, and he then actually participates in its commission,
regardless of the extent of such participation, his liability should be deemed, in my view,
that of a conspirator rather than that of an accomplice. I would equate the liability of an
accomplice to one who, knowing of the criminal design, but neither concurring nor
assenting to it, cooperates in the execution of the crime short of taking a direct part in, and
short of taking an indispensable act for, the commission of the offense. In the last two
instances (taking a direct part in, or taking an indispensable act for, the commission of the
felony), his participation would be that of a principal under Article 17 of the Revised Penal
Code. cCHETI
DECISION
PANGANIBAN , J : p
When is a lookout deemed an accomplice and when a conspirator? What is the

distinction between the two? cdasia
Statement of the Case

These are the main questions passed upon by the Court in resolving the present
appeal, which assails the March 12, 1997 Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City (Branch 57) in Criminal Case No. Q-92-31323, nding Appellant Edwin De Vera and
Accused Roderick Garcia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and sentencing them
to reclusion perpetua.
In an Information dated June 11, 1992, Assistant City Prosecutor Tirso M. Gavero
charged with murder Appellant Edwin De Vera, together with Roderick Garcia and two
other persons who were subsequently identi ed during the trial as Kenneth Florendo and
Elmer Castro. The crime was allegedly committed as follows:
"That on or about the 8th day of June, 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines,
the said accused, conspiring [and] confederating [with] and helping . . . two (2)
other persons, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to
kill, with evident premeditation, treachery and use of superior strength, attack,
assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one FREDERICK
CAPULONG y DIZON, by then and there shooting him with the use of a .22 cal.
with trade mark 'Paspar Armas' bearing SN-29069 with ve (5) pieces of caliber
22 ammo inside, hitting him between his eyes and striking him with the use of a
baseball bat in the mouth, thereby in icting upon him serious and mortal wounds
which were the direct and immediate cause of his untimely death, to the damage
and prejudice of the heirs of the said Frederick Capulong y Dizon." 2
On July 9, 1992, Assistant City Prosecutor Enrico P. Bringas filed a Motion to Amend
the Information to include the use of a .32 caliber rearm in the killing of Frederick
Capulong. The trial court granted the Motion, and the Amended Information now reads as
follows:
"That on or about the 8th day of June, 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines,
the said accused, conspiring [and] confederating [with] and helping . . . two (2)
other persons, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to
kill, with evident premeditation, treachery and use of superior strength, attack,
assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one FREDERICK
CAPULONG y DIZON, by then and there shooting him with the use of a .22 cal.
with trade mark 'Paspar Armas' bearing SN-29069 with ve (5) pieces of caliber
22 ammo inside and a .32 cal. rearm of still undetermined make , hitting him
between his eyes and striking him with the use of a baseball bat in the mouth,
thereby in icting upon him serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and
immediate cause of his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs
of the said Frederick Capulong y Dizon." 3
On their arraignment, Appellant Edwin De Vera 4 and Roderick Garcia 5 pleaded not
guilty. The other two accused were at large. Trial in due course proceeded only against De
Vera and Garcia. Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered nding the accused EDWIN DE
VERA y GARCIA and RODERICK GARCIA y GALAMGAM guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of MURDER and they are hereby accordingly sentenced to
suffer reclusion perpetua, including all its accessory penalties; to indemnify the
heirs of Frederick Capulong y Dizon, as follows:
a) P50,000.00, as death indemnity;
b) P211,670.00, as compensatory damages;
c) P600,000.00, as indemnification for loss of earning capacity; cdtai
d) P500,000.00, as moral damages;
e) Interest at the legal rate on a) and b), hereof from the ling of the
information until full payment; and,
f) Costs of suit." 6
Only Edwin De Vera filed a Notice of Appeal. 7

The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
In its Brief, 8 the O ce of the Solicitor General presented the following narration of
facts: 9
"As earlier stated, the prosecution presented an eyewitness in the person of
Bernardino Cacao, a resident of Denver Loop Street, Filinvest II, Quezon City
before he moved to No. 58 Elisa Street, Caloocan City. He was residing at Filinvest
II, together with his wife and children, at the time of the incident on June 28, 1992
in the house owned by David Lim. He was then employed at a Kodak branch in
Caloocan City, while his wife served as secretary of the homeowners association.
"About 1:30 in the afternoon of June 8, 1992, while bringing out the
garbage, the witness saw a car passing by, driven by victim Frederick Capulong
together with four (4) other passengers. He knew the victim by name who was a
resident of the subdivision. He recognized and identified two of the passengers as
Kenneth Florendo and Roderick Garcia, both familiar in the subdivision.
"Cacao did not at rst notice anything unusual inside the car while it
passed by him, but then he heard unintelligible voices coming from the car as it
was cruising around Denver Loop Street, a circular road whose entrance and exit
were through the same point (ibid, p. 12). His curiosity taking [the] better part of
him, Cacao walked to the opposite side of the road from where he saw the car
already parked. Moments later, he saw the victim dragged out of the car by
Florendo and brought to a grassy place. Florendo was holding a gun (ibid, p. 13).
Upon reaching the grassy spot, Florendo aimed and red the gun at the victim,
hitting him between the eyes. After the shooting, Florendo and his companions
fled in different directions.
"When he submitted a sworn statement to the investigating prosecutor,
Cacao attached a sketch of the crime scene prepared by police o cers, indicating
therein his relative position at the time of the incident. While testifying in court,
Cacao identi ed Garcia and pointed to appellant as among the companions of
Florendo.
"Ten minutes later, or about 2:40 in the afternoon, the desk o cer of the
Investigation Division, Station 5, Central Police District, Quezon City received a
report about the shooting incident from a security guard of the subdivision. The
o cer immediately dispatched a team to Filinvest II, composed of PO2 Armando
Garcia, PO3 Armando Junio, and PO3 Jovencio Villacorte, to investigate and
gather evidence (TSN, p. 5, September 13, 1993). A security guard guided the
team to the corner of Denver and Doña Justina Streets, site of the shooting, where
they discovered blood stains and damaged grass (ibid, p. 6). The guard informed
them that the victim was rushed to the East Avenue Medical Center by other
security guards. The policemen then found a color red sports car with plate no.
NBZ 869, with engine still running and its doors opened. They recovered inside the
car several class cards and a license belonging to one Ric Capulong, who was
later identified as Frederick Capulong.
"The policemen went around the subdivision to look for possible suspects.
They came upon a person wearing muddied maong pants and white t-shirt
'standing and walking around' near the clubhouse of the subdivision. When asked
his name, the person identi ed himself as Edwin de Vera, herein appellant.
Explaining the mud stains on his pants, appellant declared that he was a victim of
a hold-up. Suspicious [of] his conduct, the policemen brought appellant to Station
5 and turned him over to the desk officer for investigation.
"Another prosecution witness, SPO3 Mario Guspid, a police investigator

since 1989, was assigned to investigate the shooting of Frederick Capulong. He
was assisted by SPO4 Pablito Selvido, SPO2 Armando Rivera, SPO3 Jovencio
Villacorte, SPO3 Rolando Gacute, SPO3 Danilo Castro and other police officers. LLpr
"Upon receiving his assignment, SPO3 Guspid immediately went to the

East Avenue Medical Center where he saw the victim lying inside the intensive
care unit receiving medical treatment. The victim was unconscious. After
conferring with the victim's parents and relatives, SPO3 Guspid returned to
Station 5. On his arrival, the desk o cer referred appellant to him for questioning.
He was told that appellant was picked up near the crime scene acting
suspiciously. When appellant was asked about his participation in the shooting,
he was reluctant at rst to talk, but later relented after SPO3 Guspid told him that
his conscience would bother him less if he would tell the truth.
"Without any hesitation, appellant admitted being [with the] group which
perpetrated the crime, and implicated Roderick Garcia. He was then persuaded to
accompany a group of policemen to the residence of Garcia, which turned out to
be at Doña Justina Street, Filinvest II Subdivision. Finding Garcia at home, SPO3
Guspid informed him that he was implicated by appellant [in] the crime. He was
then invited to the station to shed light [on] the incident. Garcia consented.
"At Station 5, SPO3 Guspid interviewed appellant and Garcia. In the course
of the interview, Garcia revealed the place where he hid a .22 caliber gun, black t-
shirt and black cap. According to Garcia, Florendo asked them to wear black t-
shirts. With the revelation, SPO3 Guspid, SPO2 Rivera, SPO3 Gacute and SPO3
Castro, together with the suspects, went back to the subdivision and proceeded to
a grassy portion near the boundary of Filinvest II and San Mateo, Rizal. The place
was near a creek and about 50 meters away from the residence of Garcia (TSN,
pp. 9-14, September 30, 1993). Truly, the policemen recovered a .22 caliber
revolver, black t-shirt and black cap (TSN, pp. 12-13, August 24, 1993). While
there, SPO3 Guspid and SPO2 Rivera prepared a sketch of the crime scene to
reflect the explanations and answers given by appellant and Garcia in response to
their questions. As identifying marks, SPO3 Gacute placed his initials 'OG'
(acronym for his rst name and family name) between the handle and cylinder of
the gun, and on the neck of the t-shirt, as well as in the inner lining of the black
cap.
"From the crime site, the policemen and the suspects returned to Station 5
where SPO3 Guspid asked them if they were willing to give their written
statements, to which they assented. Consequently, they were brought to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Quezon City Chapter, at Malakas Street, Diliman,
Quezon City. They were then introduced to Atty. Confesor Sansano, the [c]hairman
of the Free Legal Aid of the IBP. Also, present at that time were appellant's
relatives, including his mother and sisters, and other lawyers of the IBP.
"SPO3 Guspid inquired from them if they would agree to be assisted by

Atty. Sansano, 'a competent lawyer.' They replied in the a rmative. Thereafter,
the two conferred with Atty. Sansano.
"Atty. Sansano, a rebuttal witness of the prosecution, testi ed that upon
arrival of the suspects [i]n his o ce, he requested the policemen, as a matter of
policy, to step outside the building in order to assure that no pressure would be
exerted on the suspects even by their mere presence (TSN, p. 6, November 6,
1996). After they left, Atty. Sansano interviewed the suspects for about twenty
minutes, informing them of their rights under the constitution and inquiring from
them if they indeed wanted to give voluntary statements. To the query, the
suspects answered positively. They also a rmed their earlier declaration that
they were willing to be assisted by the IBP (ibid, pp. 8-9). He further advised them
of their right during the investigation to answer or not to answer the questions
which they thought would incriminate them, but they retorted that they fully
understood their right.

"Satis ed that they were not coerced or threatened to give their statements,
Atty. Sansano requested the suspects to show their upper bodies to enable him to
determine any telltale signs of torture or bodily harm. Finding no such signs, he
then summoned the policemen to re-enter the building. The investigators readied
two typewriters and each suspect was assigned to an investigator. He served as
the lawyer of the suspects, cautioning them against answering questions that
they did not understand, and to seek . . . a clarification, if needed.
"According to Atty. Sansano, the interrogation took place in his o ce, a

single separate room from where his ve staff members were visible. He sat
between the two tables used by the investigators for typing the questions and
answers, involving himself from beginning to end of the investigation until the
signing of the statements. He never left the o ce to attend to anything else,
consistent with [the] standing policy of the IBP to properly safeguard the rights of
suspects during investigation. cdasia
"He recalled that the investigators rst typed the headings of the
statements, then informed the suspects before starting the investigation about
their rights under the constitution, speci cally, the right of the suspects to have a
lawyer of their own choice; if not, the police would provide them with one who
would assist them; that they could answer or refuse to answer the questions. The
investigators also asked him if he was willing to serve as counsel of the suspects.
They also asked the suspects if they were willing to accept him as their counsel.
They agreed expressly by saying: 'Oho'.
"SPO3 Guspid investigated Garcia while SPO4 Selvido investigated
appellant. They conducted the question and answer investigation in Pilipino. The
statement of appellant was marked as Exhibit O and that of Garcia was marked
as Exhibit N. The statements were signed by the suspects and Atty. Sansano.
"For his part, SPO4 Selvido declared that SPO3 Guspid requested his help
in taking the statements of the suspects (TSN, p. 4, June 29, 1993). He took the
statement of appellant in the presence of Atty. Sansano. Before proceeding, he
reminded appellant of the constitutional warnings, consisting of four (4)
questions under the heading 'Paunawa,' to which the latter gave positive answers.
The statement was signed by appellant and Atty. Sansano. After taking down the
statement, he turned over appellant to SPO3 Guspid.
"Following the investigation, the policemen brought the suspects to the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for para n testing. The result: 'both
hands of Edwin de Vera y Garcia @ Boy/Bong gave positive results [in] the test for
gunpowder nitrates while both hands of Roderick Garcia y Galamgam @ Deo
gave negative result [in] the test for gunpowder nitrates.'
"After coming from the crime laboratory, SPO3 Guspid contacted the
mother of the victim to get her own statement. Next, he obtained a death
certi cate and prepared a referral to the Quezon City Prosecution O ce which
was signed by Senior Inspector Ernesto Collado, Chief of the Station Investigation
Division. During the inquest, the prosecutor asked the suspects some clari catory
questions.
"Surveillance and follow-up operations were conducted against Florendo
and his other companion, Elmer Castro. However, the two were never arrested and
brought to trial."
Version of the Defense

Appellant claims that he had no part in the killing, and that it was Kenneth Florendo
who had shot the victim. He avers that he merely accompanied to Filinvest the other
accused and Florendo, who was his friend, upon the latter's request. A few hours after the
shooting incident, appellant was picked up by the police, who subsequently tortured and
coerced him into signing his Statement regarding the incident. The trial court summarized
appellant's evidence in this wise: 1 0
"Edwin de Vera admitted that, as of June 8, 1992, he and Kenneth Florendo
were already close friends for about a year, sometimes sleeping in the latter's
house at No. 106 Kamias Road, Quezon City. His own residence at the time was
at No. 7 Bignay Street, Project 2, Quezon City. That was also the address of Elmer
Castro, his and Kenneth's friend.
"Edwin had slept in Kenneth's house on Kamias Road from June 6 to June
8, 1992 and went home at 7:00 am of June 8th. Later at around 10:30 am,
Kenneth passed by Edwin's house to invite him back to [the former's] house that
morning and to bring Elmer along. Kenneth mentioned that he, his girlfriend, and
Deo, who were then with him, would be going somewhere rst. Deo, or Roderick
Garcia, was another friend of Kenneth's."
"Edwin and Elmer later went to and arrived at Kenneth's house at 11:00 am.
Kenneth, his girlfriend, and Deo were already taking lunch, and invited the two to
lunch. After lunch, Kenneth asked Edwin to go with him to Filinvest without telling
why. It was Deo who mentioned to Edwin that Kenneth was going to see a friend.
Edwin was not aware if Kenneth had also asked the others to go with him to
Filinvest, but the four of them — Kenneth, Edwin, Elmer, and Deo — later proceeded
to Filinvest [i]n Kenneth's car. Edwin sat at the back seat. The time was past 12:00
noon.
Kenneth drove his car. Upon reaching Filinvest, Kenneth stopped at a
house and the four of them alighted in front of the house. Edwin did not know
whose house it was. Kenneth and Elmer told Edwin and Deo to wait near the car
because they were going to see a friend. At that point in time, Edwin knew the
person[,] whom Kenneth and Elmer went to see[,] by name, never having met him
personally before then. From his conversation with Deo, Edwin found out that the
house was where Deo stayed.
Then, Edwin heard the voices of Kenneth and his friend and they appeared
to be arguing ('. . . parang nagtatalo sila' ). The voices came from some twenty-
two (22) meters away. Not before long, Edwin also heard a gunshot which came
from where Kenneth and Elmer had gone to. He was shocked because he was not
used to hearing gun re. Frightened, he panicked and ran away from the place. His
singular thought while running was to get out of Filinvest. Deo also ran away.
Edwin denied that either he or Deo carried any firearm on that occasion.
Edwin was arrested by the police at past 2:00 pm when he was already
outside of Filinvest subdivision in front of Batasan. He was brought to Station 5
where four (4) persons in civilian attire tortured him by forcing him to lie down on
a bench, tying his feet together and binding his hands from his back with
handcuffs, and then covering his face with a piece of dirty cloth into which water
was poured little by little into his face and mouth, while one of them sat on his
thighs. This maltreatment lasted for about 20 or 25 minutes, because they
wanted him to admit 'something' and to name 'my companions' but he refused to
admit or to name anyone. They next took him outside to a mango tree where they
repeated his ordeal for 30 minutes. At one point during the torture, a policeman
untied his feet and hands and poked a gun to his temple, telling him to run as it
was his chance to escape, but he did not escape because he could see that they
were merely frightening him. LexLib
None of the policemen told him that he could . . . get a lawyer[;] instead,
one of them, whose name he [did] not know, told him that 'I should listen only to
them and not to anyone else.' He claimed that he saw one [of] his tormentors in
court, and he identi ed him as police o cer Rivera. Guspid did not participate in
his torture, because he merely took down his statement. His tormentors were not
drunk or under the in uence of drugs, but Guspid seemed to be under the
in uence of drugs when he took his statement because of his troubled
appearance.
Edwin was not advised to inform or call any of his relatives. Before his
torture, his request to contact his relatives or lawyer was turned down. His
intimidation continued ('. . . puro pananakot and ginawa nila sa akin' ). After his
torture at the mango tree, he was returned inside and thrown into a cell, where he
remained until the following day (June 9th). During the night, an inmate named
Cesar boxed him once in the upper body upon instruction of a policeman. He was
not given any dinner.
At around noontime of the next day (June 9th), Edwin was taken out of the
cell and brought to the IBP o ce by police o cers Guspid and Selvido. Also with
them were Deo Garcia and two other police o cers. At the IBP o ce, the o cers
talked with one of the lawyers there, whom Edwin came to know to be Atty.
Sansano only after the lawyer was introduced ('present') to him and Deo. That
was the first he met and saw Atty. Sansano.
Atty. Sansano informed both Edwin and Deo that they had the choice
whether to talk or not. Edwin could not make any comment because 'wala po ako
sa sarili ko' . Then, Atty. Sansano warned Edwin substantially that: 'Alam n'yo ba
na ang salaysay na ito ay maaring hindi ninyo sumpaan,' referring to the
statement taken from Edwin by officers Guspid at around past 8 pm until 9 pm on
the day before (June 8, 1992) at the police station. He was not assisted by
counsel, and had no relatives present. Guspid appeared to be 'like drunk or tipsy,'
when he took down Edwin's statement that night.'
At the IBP o ce, Edwin's and Deo's statement were taken separately by
Guspid and Selvido, respectively. At the time, Edwin and Deo were about six (6)
meters from each other, but he could hear what was being asked of Deo. Guspid
asked the questions and typed both the questions and his answers, which were
given in Tagalog. All the while, Atty. Sansano was inside his o ce, which was
about seven (7) meters away from where he and Guspid were situated. The o ce
of Atty. Sansano was separated by a divider, so that he could not see what Atty.
Sansano was doing at the time. After the questioning, he signed a paper which he
was not able to read. He did not see Atty. Sansano sign the paper.
xxx xxx xxx
On July 14, 1992, Edwin executed a so-called salaysay ng pagbabawi ng

sinumpaang salaysay, which he swore to before Prosecutor Tobia of Quezon City,
for the purpose of recanting his statements given at the precinct in the evening of
June 8, 1992 and at the IBP o ce on June 9, 1992 on the ground that they were
given under coercion, intimidation, and in violation of his constitutional rights."
Ruling of the Trial Court
Based on the testimony of Eyewitness Bernardino Cacao, the trial court ruled that it
was indeed Kenneth Florendo who had actually shot the victim, Frederick Capulong. It
convicted appellant as a principal, however, because "the scienti c and forensic ndings
on the criminal incident directly and substantially con rmed the existence of conspiracy
among the four [accused], namely, Kenneth Florendo, Elmer Castro, Edwin de Vera, and
Roderick Garcia." 1 1
The Issues
Appellant submits for the consideration of this Court the following alleged errors:
"I
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT PROSECUTION EYE-WITNESS
BERNARDO CACAO HAD TESTIFIED TO NO CRIMINAL ACT OF APPELLANT;
II
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN FINDING AND CONCLUDING THAT THERE WAS A
CONSPIRACY TO KILL THE VICTIM AND THAT APPELLANT WAS A CO-
CONSPIRATOR;
III
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN ADMITTING EXHIBIT 'O', ALLEGED STATEMENT OF
APPELLANT; AND IN NOT DECLARING THE SAME AS AN INADMISSIBLE
EVIDENCE CONSIDERING THE BARBARIC MANNER UNDER WHICH IT WAS
EXTRACTED/OBTAINED FROM THE APPELLANT WHICH VIOLATED THE
LATTER'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS;
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING AND DECLARING THAT THE
PROSECUTION HAS NOT PROVED THE APPELLANT'S GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT AND IN NOT ACQUITTING THE APPELLANT." 1 2
In the main, the Court will resolve three questions: (1) the su ciency of the
prosecution evidence, (2) the admissibility of appellant's extrajudicial statement, and (3)
the nature of his liability.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious. Appellant should be convicted only as an
accomplice, not as a principal.
First and Third Issues:
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
and Appellant's Liability
Because the rst and the third questions mentioned above are interrelated, they
shall be discussed jointly.
Eyewitness Account
In ruling that there was conspiracy between Florendo, Castro, Garcia and Appellant
De Vera, the trial court relied mainly on the testimony of Eyewitness Cacao. Speci cally, it
based its conclusions on the following facts: appellant was seen with the other accused
inside the victim's car; the victim was clearly struck with a blunt object while inside the car,
and it was unlikely for Florendo to have done it all by himself; moreover, it was impossible
for De Vera and Garcia to have been unaware of Florendo's dark design on Roderick.
We disagree. It is axiomatic that the prosecution must establish conspiracy beyond
reasonable doubt. 13 In the present case, the bare testimony of Cacao fails to do so.
Cacao testi ed that he saw Appellant De Vera in the car, where an altercation later
occurred. Thereafter, he saw Florendo drag out of the vehicle an apparently disabled
Capulong and shoot the victim in the head moments later.
Cacao's testimony contains nothing that could inculpate appellant. Aside from the
fact that he was inside the car, no other act was imputed to him. Mere presence does not
amount to conspiracy. 1 4 Indeed, the trial court based its nding of conspiracy on mere
presumptions, and not on solid facts indubitably indicating a common design to commit
murder. Such suppositions do not constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. As the Court
has repeatedly stated, criminal conspiracy must be founded on facts, not on mere
surmises or conjectures. Clearly, Cacao's testimony does not establish appellant's
culpability.
Appellant's Extrajudicial
Statement
Aside from the testimony of Cacao, the prosecution also presented Appellant De
Vera's extrajudicial statement, which established three points.
First, appellant knew of Kenneth Florendo's malevolent intention.
"T: Ito bang balak ni Kenneth para patayin itong si Frederick ay alam mo ba
ito at pumayag kang maging kasapakat nito?
S: Sinabi po niya ito sa akin. Hindi po ako pumayag. Pero noong araw na
iyon ay nagkahiyaan na lamang at napilitan akong sumama." 15
Second, appellant's companions were armed that day, a fact which revealed the
unmistakable plan of the group.
"T: Ikaw ba ay mayroong dalang armas noong hapon na iyo[n]?
S: Wala po akong dalang armas. Pero itong si Kenneth ay mayroong dalang

dalawang baril[,] sina Deo at Elmer ay wala. Pero noong naroroon na kami
sa lugar ay ibinigay ni Kenneth ang isang baril niya kay Deo at itong si
Elmer ay mayroong nang dalang baseball bat."
Third, he cooperated with the other accused in the commission of the crime by
placing himself at a certain distance from Kenneth and the victim in order to act as a
lookout. This is clear from the following portion of his statement:
"S: Kabarkada ko po si Kenneth at dalawang araw po akong nakitulog sa
kanila at noong araw ng June 08, 1992 ay sinabihan ako ni Kenneth
Gumabao na huwag raw akong uuwi, dahil [mayroon] daw po kaming
lakad. Pagkaraan ng ilang oras ay dumating naman itong si Roderick
Garcia @ Deo at may sinabi sa kanya itong si Kenneth at sinabi naman ito
sa akin ni Deo na kaysa raw maunahan siya ni Frederick Sumulong [sic] ay
uunahan na raw po niya ito. Umalis po itong si Kenneth na kasama ang
kanyang nobya at itong si Deo, para ihatid ang kanyang [sic] sa hospital at
bago sila umalis ay sinabihan ako ni Kenneth na sunduin ko raw itong si
Elmer Castro at magbhihai [magbihis] na rin daw ako at pagdating nila ay .
. . lalakad na raw po kami. Mga ilang oras pa ay sinundo ko na itong si
Elmer Castro at pagdating namin sa bahay nila Kenneth ay naroroon na
itong si Kenneth at Deo. Matapos magpalit ng damit itong si Kenneth ay
sumakay na kami sa kanilang kotse at nagtuloy sa kanilang katabing
bahay at doon ay kumain kami. Pagkatapos noon ay umalis na kami at
nagtuloy sa F[i]l-Invest. P[a]gdating namin sa isang lugar doon sa medyo
malayo-layo sa bahay nila Deo ay bumaba na itong si Deo at Elmer at sila
ay nagpunta doon sa lugar ng pinagbarilan para kunin ang bayad sa
utang ni Fred[er]ick Capulong sa tiyuhin ni Deo. P[a]gkaraan ng ilang
minuto ay sumunod po kami ni Kenn[e]th sa lugar at ako ay naiwan nang
medyo malayo-layo sa lugar upang tignan kung mayroong darating na
tao. Samantalang si Kenneth ay lumapit kina Deo at Frederick at kasunod
noon ay nagkaroon ng sagutan itong si Kenneth at Frederick at nakita
kong inaawat ni Deo itong si Kenneth. Hindi nakapagpigil itong si Kenneth
at nasipa niya s[i] Frederick at kasunod noon ay binunot niya ang kanyang
baril na kalibre .38 at pinaputukan niya ng isang beses itong si Frederick
na noong tamaan ay natumba sa lupa. Lumapit si Elmer kina Kenneth
habang binabatak ni Kenneth itong si Frederick at kasunod po noon ay
lumapit sa akin si Deo at sinabihan ako na tumakbo na kami. Tumakbo na
po kami, pero ako po ay nahuli ng mga security guard ng Subdivision at
itong si Deo ay nahuli naman sa kanilang bahay. Itong sina Kenneth at
Elmer ay hindi pa nahuhuli." 1 6
Appellant an Accomplice,
Not a Conspirator
In other words, appellant's presence was not innocuous. Knowing that Florendo
intended to kill the victim and that the three co-accused were carrying weapons, he had
acted as a lookout to watch for passersby. He was not an innocent spectator; he was at
t he locus criminis in order to aid and abet the commission of the crime. These facts,
however, did not make him a conspirator; at most, he was only an accomplice. LLphil
The Revised Penal Code provides that a conspiracy exists when "two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it." 1 7 To prove conspiracy, the prosecution must establish the following three
requisites: "(1) that two or more persons came to an agreement, (2) that the agreement
concerned the commission of a crime, and (3) that the execution of the felony (was)
decided upon." 1 8 Except in the case of the mastermind of a crime, it must also be shown
that the accused performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. 1 9 The Court has
held that in most instances, direct proof of a previous agreement need not be established,
for conspiracy may be deduced from the acts of the accused pointing to a joint purpose,
concerted action and community of interest. 2 0
On the other hand, the Revised Penal Code de nes accomplices as "those persons
who, not being included in Article 17, 2 1 cooperate in the execution of the offense by
previous or simultaneous acts." 2 2 The Court has held that an accomplice is "one who
knows the criminal design of the principal and cooperates knowingly or intentionally
therewith by an act which, even if not rendered, the crime would be committed just the
same." 2 3 To hold a person liable as an accomplice, two elements must be present: (1) the
"community of criminal design; that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal by
direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose;" and (2) the performance of
previous or simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the commission of the crime.
24
The distinction between the two concepts needs to be underscored, in view of its
effect on appellant's penalty. Once conspiracy is proven, the liability is collective and not
individual. The act of one of them is deemed the act of all. 2 5 In the case of an accomplice,
the liability is one degree lower than that of a principal.
Conspirators and accomplices have one thing in common: they know and agree with
the criminal design. Conspirators, however, know the criminal intention because they
themselves have decided upon such course of action. Accomplices come to know about it
after the principals have reached the decision, and only then do they agree to cooperate in
its execution. Conspirators decide that a crime should be committed; accomplices merely
concur in it. Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be committed; they
merely assent to the plan and cooperate in its accomplishment. Conspirators are the
authors of a crime; accomplices are merely their instruments who perform acts not
essential to the perpetration of the offense.
Thus, in People v. Castro, 2 6 the Court convicted Ru no Cinco, together with two
others, as a principal, although he had acted merely as a lookout. The Court held that "their
concerted action in going armed and together to their victim's house, and there, while one
stayed as a lookout, the other two entered and shot the mayor and his wife, leaving again
together afterwards, admits no other rational explanation but conspiracy." It may be noted
further that Cinco executed a Sworn Statement that the three of them, together with some
others, had planned to kill the victim on the promise of a P5,000 reward.
In People v. Tawat et al., 2 7 the lookout, Nestor Rojo, was convicted as a principal for
conspiring with two others. The Court ruled that the conspiracy was shown by their
conduct before, during and after the commission of the crime. The Court also noted that,
upon their arrest, they disclosed that they had intended to rob the victim's store and that
they did so in accordance with their plan. In that case, it was clear that all three of them,
including the lookout, were the authors of the crime.
I n People v. Loreno, 2 8 the Supreme Court convicted all the accused as principals
because they had acted in band. In acting as a lookout, Jimmy Marantal was armed at the
time like the other conspirators, and he gave his companions effective means and
encouragement to commit the crime of robbery and rape.
Upon the other hand, in People v. Corbes, 2 9 the Court noted that Manuel Vergel
knew of the criminal design to commit a robbery, and that he cooperated with the robbers
by driving the vehicle to and from the crime scene. In convicting him as an accomplice and
not as a conspirator, the Court observed that he was merely approached by one of the
robbers who was tasked to look for a getaway vehicle. He was not with the robbers when
they resolved to commit a robbery. When his services were requested, the decision to
commit the crime had already been made.
I n People v. Tatlonghari, 3 0 the Court was asked to resolve the responsibility of
some appellants who "knowingly aid(ed) the actual killers by casting stones at the victim,
and distracting his attention." The Court ruled that they were accomplices and not co-
conspirators, "(i)n the absence of clear proof that the killing was in fact envisaged by
them."
In People v. Suarez et al., 3 1 Wilfredo Lara merely introduced the gang of Reyes to
Suarez who intended to perpetrate the crime with the help of the said group. In ruling that
he was merely an accomplice, the Court noted that there was no evidence showing that he
"took part in the planning or execution of the crime, or any proof indicating that he pro ted
from the fruits of the crime, or of acts indicative of confederacy on his part."
In People v. Balili, 3 2 the Court convicted appellant as an accomplice, holding that "in
going with them, knowing their criminal intention, and in staying outside of the house with
them while the others went inside the store to rob and kill, (he) effectively supplied the
criminals with material and moral aid, making him guilty as an accomplice." The Court
noted that there was no evidence that he "had conspired with the malefactors, nor that he
actually participated in the commission of the crime."
I n People v. Doble, 3 3 the Court held that Cresencio Doble did not become a
conspirator when he looked for a banca that was eventually used by the robbers. Ruled the
Court: "Neither would it appear that Joe Intsik wanted to draft Crescencio into his band of
malefactors that would commit the robbery more than just asking his help to look for a
banca. Joe Intsik had enough men, all with arms and weapons to perpetrate the crime, the
commission of which needed planning and men to execute the plan with full mutual
con dence of each other, which (was) not shown with respect to appellants by the way
they were asked to look and provide for a banca just a few hours before the actual
robbery."
In the present case, Appellant De Vera knew that Kenneth Florendo had intended to
kill Capulong at the time, and he cooperated with the latter. But he himself did not
participate in the decision to kill Capulong; that decision was made by Florendo and the
others. He joined them that afternoon after the decision to kill had already been agreed
upon; he was there because "nagkahiyaan na." This is clear from his statement, which we
quote again for the sake of clarity:
"T: Ito bang balak ni Kenneth para patayin itong si Frederick ay alam mo ba
ito at pumayag kang maging kasapakat nito?
S: Sinabi po niya ito sa akin. Hindi po ako pumayag. Pero noong araw na
iyon ay nagkahiyaan na lamang at napilitan akong sumama." 34
Signi cantly, the plan to kill could have been accomplished without him. It should be
noted further that he alone was unarmed that afternoon. Florendo and Garcia had guns,
and Castro had a baseball bat.
In any event, the prosecution evidence has not established that appellant was part of
the conspiracy to kill the victim. His participation, as culled from his own Statement, was
made, after the decision to kill was already a fait accompli. Thus, in several cases, the
Court has held:
"[L]ack of complete evidence of conspiracy, that creates the doubt whether
they had acted as principals or accomplices in the perpetration of the offense,
impels this Court to resolve in their favor the question, by holding . . . that they
were guilty of the 'milder form of responsibility,' i.e., guilty as mere accomplices."
35
Second Issue:
Admissibility of Extrajudicial Statement
Extrajudicial confessions must conform to constitutional requirements. Section 12,
Article III of the Constitution, provides:
'(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or

section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.'
If the confession meets these requirements, "it is subsequently tested for

voluntariness, i.e., if it was given freely — without coercion, intimidation, inducement, or
false promises; and credibility, i.e., if it was consistent with the normal experience of
mankind." 3 6
Appellant claims that his extrajudicial statement was inadmissible, because it was
not made in the presence of counsel. Although Atty. Confesor Sansano of the Quezon City
IBP Legal Aid Committee purportedly assisted him and his co-accused in the execution of
their extrajudicial Statements, appellant asserts that the lawyer was in his o ce, not with
them, at the time. Appellant adds that he was tortured.
Appellant's claims must be rejected. Atty. Sansano testi ed that he did not leave
them at any time.
"Q: You were involved in the interrogation from the very start?
A: Yes, from the beginning to the end of the interview until the boys signed
their statements.
Q: Did you recall having at any time left your o ce to attend to some o cial
matters? cdrep
A: I never left the office to attend to anything.
Q: Is that the usual manner by which you assist persons referred to you by the
police insofar as custodial investigation is concerned?
A: It is our policy that when we assist [in] that capacity, we [want] to see to it
that the rights of the accused or suspects are properly [protected] during
the course of the entire interrogation." 37
In fact, Atty. Sansano even checked to see if there were torture marks on Appellant
De Vera, and Garcia and interviewed the two to make sure that they understood what they
were doing.
"Q: What was your purpose in asking the police officers to leave the room?
A: My purpose in asking the police o cers to step out of the building was to
assure myself that no pressure could be exerted on the two boys by the
presence of the police o cers during my personal interview. Before we
allow any police o cers to take the statements of people brought before
us[,] we see to it [that] we interview the persons personally out of hearing
and sight of any police officer.
Q: After the police o cers left the room, completely left the room[,] you were
able to interview the two accused namely Mr. de Vera and Mr. Garcia?
A: Yes, I spent about 15 to 20 minutes interviewing the boys.
Q: What was the nature of your initial interview with these two accused?
A: I asked the boys Roderick and Edwin if it [was] true that they [were] going
to give their own statements to the police?
Q: And what did they say?

A: They said yes, sir.
Q: What was your reaction to that?
A: Routinely[,] I informed them about their rights under the constitution.

xxx xxx xxx
Q: Having obtained their answers, what next transpired?
A: After telling them the statements they may give to the police could be used
against them for a [sic] in any court of the Phil., I was satis ed that nobody
coerced them, that they were never threatened by anybody much less by
the police o cers to give these statements. Casually I asked the two boys
to raise their upper clothes.
xxx xxx xxx

Q: What was your purpose in requiring these persons to show you or remove
their upper clothing?
A: I wanted to assure myself that there were no telltale signs of torture or

bodily harm committed on the[m] prior to their [being brought] to the o ce.
In spite of their [personal] assurances . . ., verbal assurance that they were
never hurt." 38
The right to counsel is enshrined in the Constitution in order to address, among

others, the use of duress and undue in uence in the execution of extrajudicial confessions.
3 9 In the present case, the Court is satis ed that Atty. Sansano su ciently ful lled the
objective of this constitutional mandate. Moreover, appellant's allegations of torture must
be disregarded for being unsubstantiated. To hold otherwise is to facilitate the retraction
of solemnly made statements at the mere allegation of torture, without any proof
whatsoever.
When an extrajudicial statement satis es the requirements of the Constitution, it
constitutes evidence of a high order, because of the strong presumption that no person of
normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by
truth and conscience. 40 The defense has the burden of proving that it was extracted by
means of force, duress or promise of reward. 41 Appellant failed to overcome the
overwhelming prosecution evidence to the contrary.
Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, provides that "[a]n extrajudicial confession
made by an accused shall not be su cient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by
evidence of corpus delicti." In the present case, the prosecution presented other evidence
to prove the two elements of corpus delicti: (a) a certain result has been proven — for
example, a man has died; and (b) some person is criminally responsible. 4 2 It is indubitable
that a crime has been committed, and that the other pieces of prosecution evidence clearly
show that appellant had conspired with the other accused to commit the crime. He himself
does not deny that he was at the crime scene. In fact, he was seen by the prosecution
eyewitness in the company of the gunman. Furthermore, Atty. Sansano and the police
o cers testi ed to the voluntariness of his confession. It must be stressed that the
aforementioned rule merely requires that there should be some other evidence "tending to
show the commission of the crime apart from the confession." 4 3
Criminal and Civil Liability
In ruling that the crime committed was murder, the trial court found that the killing
was attended by treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength. One of
these was enough to qualify the crime as murder; the two others constituted generic
aggravating circumstances. The lower court explained that the evidence established
evident premeditation, for Florendo's group acted with deliberate forethought and
tenacious persistence in the accomplishment of the criminal design. Treachery was also
proven, because the attack was planned and performed in such a way as to guarantee the
execution of the criminal design without risk to the group. There was also abuse of
superior strength, because the attackers took advantage of their superiority in numbers
and weapons.
We disagree with the court a quo in appreciating two generic aggravating
circumstances, because treachery absorbs abuse of superior strength. 4 4 Hence, there is
only one generic aggravating circumstance, not two. Notwithstanding the presence of a
generic aggravating circumstance, we cannot impose the death penalty, because the crime
was committed before the effectivity of the Death Penalty Law.
In the present case, the penalty of appellant as an accomplice is one degree lower
than that of a principal, which in murder cases is reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to death. He is also entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
We sustain the trial court's grant of P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto, which may be
awarded without need of proof other than the commission of the crime. The award of
P211,670 as compensatory damages was duly supported by evidence. Based on the
evidence presented, moral damages is also warranted, but only in the amount of P50,000,
not P500,000 as xed by the trial court. Furthermore, we a rm the payment of interest. 4 5
However, the grant of P600,000 for loss of earning capacity lacks factual basis. Such
indemnification partakes of the nature of actual damages, which must be duly proven. 4 6 In
this case, the trial court merely presumed the amount of Capulong's earnings. Since the
prosecution did not present evidence of the current income of the deceased, the indemnity
for lost earnings must be rejected.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby partially GRANTED. Appellant De Vera is
CONVICTED as an accomplice, not as a principal, in the crime of murder. He is sentenced
to an indeterminate prison term of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum, to 14
years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum. We AFFIRM the awards of:
(a) P50,000 indemnity ex delicto, (b) P211,670 as compensatory damages and (c) interest
of six percent per annum on these two amounts. The award of moral damages is however
REDUCED to P50,000 and the award for the loss of earning capacity is DELETED. No
pronouncement as to costs. prLL
SO ORDERED.

Melo, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ.,concur.
Vitug, J., please see separate opinion.
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J.:
I share the ponencia of my colleagues in its a rmance of the conviction of

appellants except, with all due respect, insofar as it has concluded that appellant De Vera
is guilty merely as an accomplice. LibLex
There is conspiracy under Article 8 of the Revised penal Code when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. Conspiracy, of course, by itself is legally inconsequential unless the criminal plot
is, in fact, carried out. Once the offense is perpetrated, the responsibility of the
conspirators is collective, not individual, that render all of them equally liable regardless of
the extent of their respective participations, the act of one being deemed to be the act of
the other or the others, in the commission of the felony. An accomplice, under Article 18 of
the same Code, is one who, not being a principal who (a) takes a direct part in the
execution of the act, (b) directly forces or induces others to commit it, or (c) cooperates in
the commission of the offense by another act without which the offense would not have
been accomplished (per Article 17 of the Code), collaborates in the execution of the
offense by previous or simultaneous acts.
In the case at bar, De Vera, "knowing that Florendo intended to kill the victim and that
the three co-accused were carrying weapons, he had acted as a lookout to watch for
passersby. He was not an innocent spectator; he was at the locus criminis in order to aid
and abet the commission of the crime" (ponencia).
I cannot bring myself to accept any material variance between the terms "to decide,"
on the one hand, and "to concur" or "to assent," on the other hand, in de ning, i.e., whether
as a conspirator or as an accomplice, the speci c criminal liability of the criminal offender.
Where there is concurrence or assent by one to a plan, even when previously hatched by
another or others, to commit a felony which concurrence or assent is made prior to the
actual perpetration of the offense, and he then actually participates in its commission,
regardless of the extent of such participation, his liability should be deemed, in my view,
that of a conspirator rather than that of an accomplice. I would equate the liability of an
accomplice to one who, knowing of the criminal design, but neither concurring nor
assenting to it, cooperates in the execution of the crime short of taking a direct part in, and
short of taking an indispensable act for, the commission of the offense. In the last two
instances (taking a direct part in, or taking an indispensable act for, the commission of the
felony), his participation would be that of a principal under Article 17 of the Revised Penal
Code. LLpr
When appellant De Vera, aware of the plan to kill the victim, agreed to be the lookout
during the commission of the crime which, in fact, so took place as planned, he rendered
himself liable no less than that incurred by his co-accused.
Footnotes
1. Penned by Judge Lucas P. Bersamin.
2. Information, p. 1; rollo, p. 12.
3. Amended Information, p. 1; records, p. 31.
4. Assisted by Atty. Raymundo de Cadiao.

5. Assisted by Atty. Domingo Floresta.
6. Assailed Decision, p. 35; rollo, p. 84.

7. The case was deemed submitted for resolution on November 27, 1998, upon the receipt
by this Court of the Appellee's Brief. The filing of a reply brief was deemed waived, as
none was submitted within the reglementary period.
8. Signed by Sol. Gen. Ricardo P. Galvez, Asst. Sol. Gen. Carlos N. Ortega and Associate
Sol. Thomas M. Laragan.
9. Appellee's Brief, pp. 3-12; rollo, pp. 195-204.
10. RTC Decision, pp. 10-13; rollo, pp. 59-62.

11. Assailed Decision, p. 18; rollo, p. 157.
12. Appellant's Brief, pp. 3-4; rollo, pp. 98-99. This was signed by Atty. Vicente D. Millora.
13. People v. Magallano, 266 SCRA 305, 314, January 16, 1997; People v. Albao, 287 SCRA
129, March 6, 1998; People v. Obello, 284 SCRA 79, January 14, 1998; People v.
Sumalpong, 284 SCRA 464, January 20, 1998; People v. Timple, 237 SCRA 52,
September 26, 1994; People vs. Orehuela, 232 SCRA 82, 93, April 29, 1994; People v.
Villagonzalo, 238 SCRA 215, 230-231, November 18, 1994; Fonacier v. Sandiganbayan,
238 SCRA 655, 695, December 5, 1994.
14. People v. Campos, 202 SCRA 387, October 3, 1991; People v. Saavedra, 149 SCRA 610;
May 18, 1987; People v. Madera, 57 SCRA 349, May 31, 1974.
15. Sworn Statement of Edwin De Vera, p. 2; records, p. 10.
16. Ibid., pp. 9-10.

17. Article 8. See also People v. Abarri, 242 SCRA 39, 45, March 1, 1995; People v. Cayanan,
245 SCRA 66, 77, June 16, 1995.
18. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, 12th ed., p. 133.

19. People v. De Roxas, 241 SCRA 369, February 15, 1995.
20. People v. Cawaling, 293 SCRA 267, 306, July 28, 1998; People v. Andres, GR No.
122735, September 25, 1998; People v. Sumalpong, 284 SCRA 464, January 20, 1998;
People v. Leangsiri, 252 SCRA 213, January 24, 1996; People v. Salison Jr., 253 SCRA
758, February 20, 1996; People v. Obzunar, 265 SCRA 547, December 16, 1996.
21. Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
"ART. 17 Principals. — The following are considered principals:
1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act;

2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it;
3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it
would not have been accomplished."
22. Article 18, Revised Penal Code.
23. People v. Corbes, 270 SCRA 465, 472, March 26, 1997, per Bellosillo, J.; citing People v.
Lingad, 98 Phil. 5, 12, November 29, 1955; People v. Fronda, 222 SCRA 71, May 14, 1993;
People v. Custodio, 47 SCRA 289, October 30, 1972.
24. Reyes, Revised Penal Code, 12th ed., p. 515. See also Aquino, The Revised Penal Code,
1997 ed., p. 557; Padilla, Criminal Law, 1987 ed., p. 700; People v. Custodio, 47 SCRA
289; People v. Tamayo, 44 Phil 38, November 17, 1922.
25. People v. De Roxas, 241 SCRA 369, February 15, 1995.
26. 11 SCRA 699, August 31, 1964, per curiam.
27. 126 SCRA 362, December 21, 1983. See also People v. Evangelista, 86 Phil. 112, April
12, 1950.
28. 130 SCRA 311, July 9, 1984, per Concepcion, J.

29. Supra.
30. 27 SCRA 726, March 28, 1967, per J. B. L. Reyes, J.
31. 267 SCRA 119, January 28, 1997, per Regalado, J.

32. 17 SCRA 892, August 5, 1966, per Makalintal, J.
33. 114 SCRA 131, May 31, 1982, per De Castro, J.
34. Sworn Statement of Edwin de Vera, p. 2; records, p. 10.

35. People v. Riveral, 10 SCRA 462, March 31, 1964, per Bengzon, CJ; People v. Torejas, 43
SCRA 158, January 31, 1972; People v. Tolentino, 40 SCRA 514, 519, August 31, 1971;
People v. Ablog, 6 SCRA 437, October 31, 1962; People v. Ubina, 97 Phil 515, August 31,
1955; People v. Tatlonghari, 27 SCRA 726; March 28, 1969.
36. People v. Santos, 283 SCRA 443, December 22, 1997, per Panganiban, J. See also
People v. Muleta, GR No. 130189, June 21, 1999.
37. TSN, November 6, 1996, p. 15.
38. TSN, November 6, 1996, pp. 7-11.

39. People v. Lucero, 244 SCRA 425, 434, May 29, 1995; People v. Rous, 242 SCRA 732,
March 27, 1995.
40. People v. Montiero, 246 SCRA 786, July 31, 1995; People v. Alvarez, 201 SCRA 364,
September 5, 1991.
41. People v. Dasig, 221 SCRA 549, April 28, 1993.
42. People v. Lorenzo, 240 SCRA 624, January 26, 1995, per Davide, J. (Now CJ).
43. Ibid.
44. People v. Caritativo, 256 SCRA 1, April 1, 1996; People v. Torrefiel, 265 SCRA 369, April
18, 1996.
45. Article 2211 of the Civil Code provides: "In crimes and quasi-delicts, interest as part of
the damages may, in a proper case, be adjudicated in the discretion of the court."
46. Kierulf v. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 433, March 13, 1997.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 173858. July 17, 2007.]
ERNESTO GARCES , petitioner, vs . PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ,

respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO , J : p
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision 1 dated January 31, 2006
of the Court of Appeals which a rmed with modi cation the Judgment 2 rendered by
Branch 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Bangued, Abra, nding petitioner Ernesto Garces
guilty as an accessory to the crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape. Also assailed is the
Resolution 3 dated July 27, 2006 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
In an Information dated December 10, 1992, Rosendo Pacursa, Senando Garces,
Antonio Pira, Jr., Aurelio Pira, and petitioner Ernesto Garces, were charged with Forcible
Abduction with Rape committed as follows:
That on or about the 2nd day of August, 1992, in the evening, at . . .,
Province of Abra, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, with criminal and carnal intent, with lewd design and by means
of force, accused Rosendo Pacursa, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, after covering her mouth, forcibly abduct, pull and take away one AAA
while walking to the church to the tobacco ue-curing barn and while inside the
barn lie and succeeded in having sexual intercourse and carnal knowledge of the
offended party; that accused Ernesto Garces later on covered the mouth of
AAA and take her out of the barn ; that accused Senando Garces, Antonio Pira,
Jr. and Aurelio Pira stand guard outside the barn while Rosendo Pacursa is raping
AAA; to the damage and prejudice of the offended party.
CONTRARY TO LAW with the aggravating circumstances of: (1)

uninhabited place, and (2) nighttime. 4 (Emphasis supplied)
All the accused, except Senando Garces who is still at large, pleaded not guilty.
The prosecution's version of the incident is as follows:
On August 2, 1992, between 8:00 and 9:00 o'clock in the evening, AAA was on her
way to the chapel when the ve accused suddenly appeared and approached her. Rosendo
Pacursa covered her mouth with his hands and told her not to shout or she will be killed.
He then brought her inside a nearby tobacco barn while his four companions stood guard
outside. 5
Inside the barn, Pacursa started kissing AAA. Private complainant fought back but
to no avail. Thereafter, Pacursa succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her. After a while,
they heard people shouting and calling the name of AAA. At this point, petitioner Ernesto
Garces entered the barn, covered AAA's mouth, then dragged her outside. He also
threatened to kill her if she reports the incident. 6
Upon reaching the house of Florentino Garces, petitioner released AAA. Shortly
afterwards, AAA's relatives found her crying, wearing only one slipper and her hair was
disheveled. They brought her home but when asked what happened, AAA could not answer
because she was in a state of shock. After a while, she was able to recount the incident. 7
Rosendo Pacursa denied that he raped the victim, while his co-accused presented
alibis as their defense.
Pacursa testi ed that he and AAA were sweethearts for almost a year prior to the
incident. On the night of August 2, 1992, he was on his way to the house of Antonio Pira, Jr.
to watch a televised basketball game when he saw AAA. The latter allegedly wanted to
have a talk with him so he led her to the tobacco barn about 15 meters away, so that no
one might see them. They were alone by the door of the barn talking, embracing and
kissing. They only parted ways when he saw the relatives of AAA. He denied having sexual
intercourse with her. After the incident, he received a letter 8 from AAA asking him to elope.
9
On the other hand, petitioner, Antonio Pira, Jr., and Aurelio Pira, testi ed that they
were watching a televised basketball game at the house of Antonio Pira, Jr. at the time the
alleged rape transpired. They denied seeing Pacursa that night. 1 0
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered its decision nding Pacursa guilty of
Forcible Abduction with Rape while petitioner Garces was found guilty as an accessory to
the crime. Antonio Pira, Jr. and Aurelio Pira were acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. 1 1
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, accused ROSENDO PACURSA and
ERNESTO GARCES are hereby found guilty of the crime of Forcible Abduction
With Rape punishable under the Revised Penal Code committed upon the person
of AAA. The other accused ANTONIO PIRA, JR. and AURELIO PIRA are hereby
ACQUITTED as accessory for the crime of Forcible Abduction With Rape.
ROSENDO PACURSA, the principal accused in this case is hereby

sentenced to one degree lower than that prescribed by law for the offense, for
being 16 years old at the time of the commission of the crime pursuant to Art. 68
of the Revised Penal Code. Taking into consideration the aggravating
circumstances of uninhabited place and nighttime, he is hereby sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of 11 years of prision mayor as minimum to 18
years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Ernesto Garces, being an accessory to the commission of the crime is

hereby penalized two degrees lower than that prescribed by law for the offense.
Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 4 years
of prision correccional as minimum to 8 years of prision mayor as maximum.
Both accused are jointly and solidarily liable to pay the victim the amount
of P50,000.00 as and by way of actual and moral damages plus the cost of this
suit.
SO ORDERED. 1 2
Both Pacursa and petitioner appealed the decision with the Court of Appeals.
However, Pacursa subsequently withdrew his appeal.
On January 31, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision a rming with
modification the decision of the trial court, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision convicting
accused ROSENDO PACURSA as principal and accused-appellant ERNESTO
GARCES as accessory of the crime of forcible abduction with rape is
AFFIRMED .
However, accused-appellant Ernesto Garces' sentence is MODIFIED in that

he is to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from FOUR (4)
YEARS of prision correccional , as minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE
(1) DAY of prision mayor , as maximum.
SO ORDERED. 1 3
Petitioner led a motion for reconsideration but same was denied. Hence, the
instant petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner claims that no rape was committed and that there is no evidence to show
that he covered the mouth of the complainant when he brought her out of the barn.
The petition lacks merit.
It has been established that Pacursa forcibly took AAA against her will and by use of
force and intimidation, had carnal knowledge of her. The trial court found complainant's
testimony to be credible, consistent and unwavering even during cross-examination.
Regarding the letter she wrote to Pacursa asking him to elope with her, she
explained that she felt uncertain at that time and was trying to avoid the possible trouble
or scandal the incident might bring upon her, 1 4 which we nd plausible. In pursuing the
case, she had to transfer to another school because of the threats of her assailants and
their persistence in settling the case. Furthermore, no improper motive was shown why
she would accuse and testify against Pacursa who was her boyfriend, and the other
accused, who are her relatives. 1 5
Prosecution witness Grace Liberto likewise corroborated the testimony of
complainant when she testi ed that she saw the latter crying, wearing only one slipper, and
her hair disheveled, 1 6 immediately after the incident. The medico-legal ndings of Dr.
Herminio Venus also showed that there was a laceration in complainant's private parts
possibly caused by sexual contact. 1 7
Pacursa, however, could not be convicted of the crime of forcible abduction with
rape because the crime committed was only simple rape. Forcible abduction is absorbed
in the crime of rape if the real objective of the accused is to rape the victim. 1 8 Based on
the evidence presented, the accused intended to rape the victim when he took her to the
tobacco barn. Hence, forcible abduction is absorbed in the crime of rape. 1 9
We also note that the trial court failed to make any de nitive nding as to the
existence of aggravating circumstances. However, we nd that the aggravating
circumstances of nighttime and uninhabited place did not attend the commission of the
crime.
Nocturnity is aggravating when it is deliberately sought to prevent the accused from
being recognized or to ensure his unmolested escape. 2 0 The mere fact that the rape was
committed at nighttime does not make nocturnity an aggravating circumstance. 2 1 In the
instant case, other than the fact that the crime was committed at night, there is no other
evidence that the peculiar advantage of nighttime was purposely and deliberately sought
by the accused.
The aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place cannot likewise be appreciated
in the absence of evidence that the accused actually sought an isolated place to better
execute their purpose. 2 2 The records do not show that solitude was purposely sought or
taken advantage of to facilitate the commission of the crime.
Although Pacursa has withdrawn his appeal, the Court's ruling that the crime
committed is simple rape and not forcible abduction with rape, shall apply to him. Section
11 (a), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court speci cally provides that an appeal taken by one or
more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the
judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.
As regards petitioner's complicity, his defense of alibi cannot prevail over
complainant's positive identi cation of her assailants. Denial and alibi are inherently weak
defenses and constitute self-serving negative evidence which can not be accorded greater
evidentiary weight than the positive declaration of credible witnesses. 2 3
For alibi to prosper, the accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence (a)
his presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense and (b) the
physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime. 2 4 Petitioner alleged he
was watching television at Aurelio Pira's house, which is about 20 meters away from the
barn at the time of the incident. However, it will only take one minute for him to reach the
barn from the house. 2 5 Thus, it was not physically impossible for him to be at the scene of
the crime at the time of its commission.
Contrary to petitioner's contention, there is proof that petitioner covered AAA's
mouth when he dragged her out of the barn. Complainant executed a sworn statement
recounting her harrowing experience which she identi ed during her direct examination
and offered as Exhibits A, A-1, and A-2 2 6 for the prosecution and admitted by the trial
court. 2 7 In her sworn statement, AAA narrated thus:
Q Will you relate carefully the manner by which Rosendo Pacursa raped you?
A . . . Then someone came inside the barn, shut-off my mouth, then brought
me out and away southward and when we reach the house of Florentino
Garces he released me and as I walked down the path my uncle Bartolome
Florendo was able to light me with his flashlight
xxx xxx xxx

Q Who was that person who later came inside the barn who brought you out
shutting-off your mouth then took you away southward?
A Ernesto Garces also from our place, sir.

Q Why, has Rosendo Pacursa other companions?
A He has, sir. They are Ernesto Garces, Senando Garces, Antonio Pira, Jr. and
Aurelio Pira.
Q What did these companions of Rosendo Pacursa do?

A They stayed outside the barn but it was Ernesto Garces who brought me
out, sir. 2 8
Complainant's failure to testify during her direct examination that her mouth was
covered by petitioner when she was pulled out of the barn does not preclude resort to her
sworn statement to provide the missing details, since said sworn statement forms part of
her testimony. As held in People v. Servano: 2 9
Evidence in criminal cases is not limited to the declarations made in open
court; it includes all documents, a davits or sworn statements of the witnesses,
and other supporting evidence. It comprehends something more than just the
mere testimony of a witness. Thus, when a sworn statement has been formally
offered as evidence, it forms an integral part of the prosecution evidence which
should not be ignored for it complements and completes the testimony on the
witness stand. A sworn statement is a written declaration of facts to which the
declarant has sworn before an o cer authorized to administer oaths. This oath
vests credibility and trustworthiness on the document. The fact that a witness
fails to reiterate, during trial, the contents of his sworn statement should not
affect his credibility and render the sworn statement useless and insigni cant, as
long as it is presented as evidence in open court. This is not to say, however, that
the sworn statement should be given more probative value than the actual
testimony. Rather, the sworn statement and the open court declarations must be
evaluated and examined together in toto so that a full and thorough
determination of the merits of the case may be achieved. Giving weight to a
witness' oral testimony during the trial should not mean being oblivious to the
other pieces of available evidence such as the sworn statement. In like manner,
the court cannot give probative value to the sworn statement to the exclusion of
the oral testimony. In every case, the court should review, assess and weigh the
totality of the evidence presented by the parties. It should not con ne itself to oral
testimony during trial. . . . 3 0
Petitioner also faults the court a quo in nding that he threatened AAA while leading
her out of the barn. He argues that complainant failed to positively identify the person who
issued the threats because she vaguely referred to said person merely as "they".
The contention lacks merit.
The use of the word "they" in referring to the person who threatened complainant is
of no moment. When the threats were issued, both Pacursa and petitioner were inside the
barn; thus, it is logical to conclude that the threats came from both of them.
Petitioner likewise cannot take refuge in the acquittal of Antonio and Aurelio Pira.
Both were acquitted because there was no evidence to show their participation in the
crime. Complainant only testi ed that she heard their voices which the trial court
considered insu cient. However, in the case of petitioner, complainant positively
identi ed him as one of the companions of Pacursa who remained outside the barn and
who eventually entered upon noting the presence of AAA's relatives nearby. He thereafter
covered complainant's mouth and led her out of the barn. All these circumstances
demonstrate petitioner's complicity.
We do not agree, however, that petitioner should be convicted as an accessory to
the crime.
It is a settled rule that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case
open for review and it becomes the duty of the Court to correct any error in the appealed
judgment, whether it is made the subject of an assignment of error or not. Such an appeal
confers upon the appellate court full jurisdiction and renders it competent to examine the
records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty and cite the proper
provision of the penal law. 3 1
In nding petitioner guilty as an accessory, the Court of Appeals found that his
participation was after or subsequent to the rape and that his acts were employed as a
means of concealing the commission of the crime and assisting Rosendo to escape.
We nd otherwise. The facts show that petitioner participated in the commission of
the crime even before complainant was raped. He was present when Pacursa abducted
complainant and when he brought her to the barn. He positioned himself outside the barn
together with the other accused as a lookout. When he heard the shouts of people looking
for complainant, he entered the barn and took complainant away from Pacursa.
Having known of the criminal design and thereafter acting as a lookout, petitioner is
liable as an accomplice, 3 2 there being insu cient evidence to prove conspiracy, 3 3 and not
merely as an accessory. As de ned in the Revised Penal Code, accomplices are those who,
not being included in Article 17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or
simultaneous acts. 3 4 The two elements necessary to hold petitioner liable as an
accomplice are present: (1) community of criminal design, that is, knowing the criminal
design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; and
(2) performance of previous or simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the
commission of the crime. 3 5
The crime committed in the case at bar is simple rape, the penalty for which under
the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua. Since Pacursa was a minor when the crime
was committed, the penalty must be reduced by one degree, to reclusion temporal. 3 6
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and in the absence of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances, the maximum of the penalty shall be within the medium range of
reclusion temporal, or fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen
(17) years and four (4) months. The minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall be within
the range of the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision mayor, ranging from six (6)
years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. 3 7
With respect to petitioner, the penalty imposed upon accomplices in a
consummated crime is the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed for the felony.
3 8 Since simple rape is punishable with reclusion perpetua, the penalty of reclusion
temporal should also be imposed on petitioner in its medium period in the absence of any
aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
imposable penalty should range from prision mayor, as minimum, to reclusion temporal in
its medium period, as maximum.
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. 3 9 If there are two or
more persons civilly liable for a felony, as in this case, the court shall determine the amount
for which each must respond 4 0 to be enforced in accordance with Article 110 of the
Revised Penal Code. Thus, the amount of damages to be awarded must be apportioned
according to the respective responsibilities of the accused to be paid by them solidarily
within their respective class and subsidiarily for the others. 4 1
Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, the complainant in rape cases is entitled to
an award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto and another P50,000.00 as moral
damages. Civil indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon nding of the fact of rape which is
distinct from moral damages awarded upon such nding without need of further proof
because it is assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling the
victim to such award. 4 2
In determining the civil liability of petitioner, a clari cation of the trial court's
decision is necessary. The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision held Pacursa and
petitioner "jointly and solidarily liable to pay the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as and by
way of actual and moral damages plus the cost of suit." For our purposes, we shall treat
the amount of P50,000.00 awarded by the trial court as the civil indemnity ex delicto for
which, as an accomplice, petitioner should be solidarily liable with Pacursa only for one-
half of the said amount, or P25,000.00, and is subsidiarily liable for the other P25,000.00 in
case the principal is found insolvent. 4 3
In addition, complainant must be awarded another P50,000.00 as moral damages.
However, this additional award should not apply to Pacursa who has withdrawn his appeal
as the same is not favorable to him. 4 4 Hence, the additional monetary award can only be
imposed upon petitioner who pursued the present appeal. 4 5
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals nding
Rosendo Pacursa guilty as principal by direct participation, and petitioner Ernesto Garces
as an accessory, to the crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape, is MODIFIED. Accused
Rosendo Pacursa is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE, and
being a minor at the time the crime was committed, is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to 15 years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Petitioner Ernesto Garces is
found guilty as an accomplice to the crime of rape, and is also sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to 15 years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
Rosendo Pacursa and Petitioner Ernesto Garces are ORDERED to pay complainant
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto. Being an accomplice, petitioner is held solidarily
liable with the principal only for half of the amount or P25,000.00 and their subsidiary
liability shall be enforced in accordance with Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioner is likewise ordered to pay complainant P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
Austria-Martinez and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Nachura, J., took no part. Filed pleading as Solicitor General.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 64-75. Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo F. Sundiam and concurred in by
Associate Justices Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and Japar B. Dimaampao.
2. Id. at 28-37. Penned by Judge Charito B. Gonzales.
3. Id. at 93-94.
4. Records, p. 1.
5. Rollo, p. 147.
6. Id. at 147-148.
7. Exhibit "C," records, pp. 14-15.
8. Exhibit "2," records, p. 126; TSN, June 15, 1993, p. 31, Translated to read as follows: "Let
us elope, please answer this to tell me of your decision the one who wrote Bing".
9. TSN, October 20, 1993, pp. 27-38.
10. Id. at 2-15.

11. Rollo, pp. 28-37.
12. Id. at 36-37.
13. Id. at 75.
14. TSN, June 15, 1993, pp. 30, 32.
15. See People v. Domingo, G.R. No. 97921, September 8, 1993, 226 SCRA 156, 174.
16. Exhibit "C," records, pp. 14-15; TSN, July 28, 1993, pp. 13-15.
17. Exhibit "B," not found in the records; TSN, July 28, 1993, pp. 3-10.
18. People v. Almanzor, 433 Phil. 667, 700 (2002).
19. See People v. Lining, 433 Phil. 797 (2002), where accused were convicted for simple
rape. In this case, complainant was dragged towards the ricefield and was forcibly
carried to an unoccupied house where she was subsequently raped.
20. People v. Fortich, 346 Phil. 596, 617 (1997).
21. People v. Lining, supra at 812.
22. People v. Fortich, supra at 618.
23. People v. Candaza, G.R. No. 170474, June 16, 2006, 491 SCRA 280, 297.
24. People v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 141599, June 29, 2004, 433 SCRA 102, 116.
25. TSN, October 20, 1993, pp. 27-38.
26. TSN, June 15, 1993, pp. 5-6.
27. Records, p. 92.

28. Id. at 10-11.
29. People v. Servano, 454 Phil. 256 (2003).
30. Id. at 277-278.
31. People v. Las Piñas, Jr., 427 Phil. 633, 641 (2002).
32. Cf. People v. Corbes, 337 Phil. 190, 197 (1997).
33. See People v. Tulin, 416 Phil. 365 (2001). As a rule, if there is lack of complete evidence
of conspiracy, the liability is that of an accomplice and not as principal since any doubt
as to the participation of an individual in the commission of the crime is always resolved
in favor of lesser responsibility.
34. REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 18.

35. People v. De Vera, 371 Phil. 563, 584 (1999).
36. People v. Clores, Jr., G.R. No. 130488, June 8, 2004, 431 SCRA 210, 222.
37. Reyes, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 424 Phil. 829 (2002).
38. REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 52.
39. Id., Art. 100.
40. Id., Art. 109.
41. People v. Garcia, 424 Phil. 158, 194 (2002).
42. People v. Calongui, G.R. No. 170566, March 3, 2006, 484 SCRA 76, 88.
43. People v. Flores, 389 Phil. 532, 552 (2000).
44. RULES OF COURT, Rule 122, Sections 11-12. See People v. Doctolero, G.R. No. 34386,
February 7, 1991, 193 SCRA 632.
45. People v. Arondain, 418 Phil. 354 (2001).

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-32126. July 6, 1978.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , plaintiff-appellee, vs. NEMESIO

TALINGDAN, MAGELLAN TOBIAS, AUGUSTO BERRAS, PEDRO BIDES
and TERESA DOMOGMA , accused-appellants.
SYNOPSIS
Armed with long guns, the four male accused gunned down Bernardo from below
the "batalan" of his house as he was sitting by the supper table and his twelve-year old
daughter Corazon was watching him nearby. The accused then climbed the stairs and
seeing Bernardo still alive, accused Talingdan and Tobias red at him again. Corazon
tried to call for help but Bides threatened to kill her. The assailants then ed. Corazon
recognized and knew the four as they were residents of their barrio, but her mother,
Teresa, who came out of their "silid" after the shooting, warned Corazon not to tell
anyone that she recognized her father's killers threatening to kill her if she did. When
peace o cers repaired to their house to investigate what happened, Teresa claimed
that she had no suspects in mind.
Teresa was known to have illicit relations with Talingdan and prior to this incident
had been seen by her daughter Corazon meeting with the other accused on two
occasions. The rst time was in a hut near where the child was washing clothes on
which occasion she overheard one of them ask "Can he elude a bullet?" This was after a
violent quarrel between Teresa and the deceased. The second time was on the very
night of the killing when Corazon saw and heard them talking in subdued tones about 3
or 4 meters away from the "batalan" where she was cooking supper.
The trial court found all the accused guilty of murder and sentenced each of them
to life imprisonment. On appeal, they claimed that the lone testimony of Corazon
suffered from vital contradictions and badges of falsehood because of patently
unnatural circumstances alleged by her.
The Supreme Court found Corazon's testimony consistent, sincere, and truthful
considering that she was hardly thirteen years old when she testi ed, an age when "a
child is, as a rule, but little in uenced by the suggestion of others", no cogent
explanation having been offered why she would attribute the assault on her father to
three other men, aside from Talingdan whom she knew had relations with her mother,
where she was merely making-up her account of how he was shot, no motive for her to
do so having been shown.
Judgment a rmed except that the four male appellants were sentenced to
death and appellant Teresa was convicted only as an accessory to the crime.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; PARRICIDE; SUPPOSED WIFE CANNOT BE CHARGED OF

PARRICIDE FOR LACK OF PROOF OF MARRIAGE. — The supposed wife of a murder
victim cannot be charged with parricide where there is no certi cate or any other proof
of their marriage.
2. EVIDENCE; TESTIMONY OF A CHILD; CREDIBILITY. — The consistent
testimony of a child who is thirteen years old relating to the circumstances surrounding
the killing of her father by the four accused whom she recognized and knew as they
were residents of their barrio, is undoubtedly sincere and truthful considering that at
that age, a child is, as a rule, "but little in uenced by the suggestion of others", and no
cogent explanation had been offered why she would attribute the assault on her father
to three other men, aside from the one whom she knew had illicit relations with her
mother, where she was merely making-up her account of how he was shot, no motive
for her to do so having been shown.
MAKASIAR, J., dissenting:
1. CRIMINAL LAW; PARRICIDE; CERTIFICATE OF MARRIAGE NOT
INDISPENSABLE TO ESTABLISH THE FACT OF MARRIAGE. — A marriage certi cate is
not indispensable to establish the fact of marriage in order to charge a wife of parricide
because the presumption that two persons are married subsists by reason of the fact
that they had been living together for about thirteen years as evidenced by the birth of
their eldest child and that they had other children thereafter.
2. ID.; CIRCUMSTANCES SHOWING CONSPIRACY. — The active cooperation
of the wife in the conspiracy against the life of the her husband is clearly demonstrated
in the categorical testimony of her 13-year old daughter who declared that she saw her
mother meeting with her other co-accused in a hut on which occasion she overheard
one of them ask "Could he elude a bullet?"; that when her mother noticed her presence,
she shoved her away saying, "You tell your father that we will kill him"; that in the evening
of her father's death while she was cooking supper she saw her mother go down the
stairs and meet the other accused who were armed with long guns in their yard about 3
to 4 meters away from where she was and that she heard them conversing in subdued
tones; and, that after her father was shot and her mother knew that she recognized and
could identify her father's assailants her mother warned her not to tell anyone
threatening to kill her if she did.
DECISION
PER CURIAM : p
Appeal from the conviction for the crime of murder and the sentence of life
imprisonment, with indemnity to the offended party, the heirs of the deceased Bernardo
Bagabag, in the amount of P12,000, rendered by the Court of First Instance of Abra in
its Criminal Case No. 686, of all the accused therein, namely, Nemesio Talingdan,
Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras, Pedro Bides and Teresa Domogma, the last being the
supposed wife of the deceased, who, because no certi cate nor any other proof of their
marriage could be presented by the prosecution, could not be charged with parricide.
Prior to the violent death of Bernardo Bagabag on the night of June 24, 1967, he
and appellant Teresa Domogma and their children, lived together in their house at
Sobosob, Salapadan, Abra, some 100 meters distant from the municipal building of the
place. For sometime, however, their relationship had been strained and beset with
troubles, for Teresa had deserted their family home a couple of times and each time
Bernardo took time out to look for her. On two (2) different occasions, appellant
Nemesio Talingdan had visited Teresa in their house while Bernardo was out at work,
and during those visits Teresa had made Corazon, their then 12-year old daughter living
with them, go down the house and leave them. Somehow, Bernardo had gotten wind
that illicit relationship was going on between Talingdan and Teresa, and during a quarrel
between him and Teresa, he directly charged the latter that should she get pregnant, the
child would not be his. About a month or so before Bernardo was killed, Teresa had
again left their house and did not come back for a period of more than three (3) weeks,
and Bernardo came to know later that she and Talingdan were seen together in the
town of Tayum, Abra during that time; then on Thursday night, just two (2) days before
he was gunned down, Bernardo and Teresa had a violent quarrel; Bernardo slapped
Teresa several times; the latter went down the house and sought the help of the police,
and shortly thereafter, accused Talingdan came to the vicinity of Bernardo's house and
called him to come down; but Bernardo ignored him, for accused Talingdan was a
policeman at the time and was armed, so the latter left the place, but not without
warning Bernardo that someday he would kill him. Between 10:00 and 11:00 o'clock the
following Friday morning, Bernardo's daughter, Corazon, who was then in a creek to
wash clothes saw her mother, Teresa, meeting with Talingdan and their co-appellants
Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides in a small hut owned by Bernardo,
some 300 to 400 meters away from the latter's house; as she approached them, she
heard one of them say "Could he elude a bullet"; and when accused Teresa Domogma
noticed the presence of her daughter, she shoved her away saying "You tell your father
that we will kill him".
Shortly after the sun had set on the following day, a Saturday, June 24, 1967,
while the same 12-year old daughter of Bernardo was cooking food for supper in the
kitchen of their house, she saw her mother go down the house through the stairs and
go to the yard where she again met with the other appellants. As they were barely 3-4
meters from the place where the child was in the "batalan", she heard them conversing
in subdued tones, although she could not discern what they were saying. She was able
to recognize all of them through the light coming from the lamp in the kitchen through
the open "batalan" and she knows them well for they are all residents of Sobosob and
she used to see them almost everytime. She noted that the appellants had long guns at
the time. Their meeting did not last long; after about two (2) minutes Teresa came up
the house and proceeded to her room, while the other appellants went under an
avocado tree nearby. As supper was then ready, the child called her parents to eat;
Bernardo who was in the room adjoining the kitchen did not heed his daughter's call to
supper but continued working on a plow, while Teresa also excused herself by saying
she would rst put her small baby to sleep. So Corazon ate supper alone, and as soon
as she was through she again called her parents to eat. This time, she informed her
father about the presence of persons downstairs, but Bernardo paid no heed to what
she said. He proceeded to the kitchen and sat himself on the oor near the door.
Corazon stayed nearby watching him. At that moment, he was suddenly red upon from
below the stairs of the "batalan". The four accused then climbed the stairs of the
"batalan" carrying their long guns and seeing that Bernardo was still alive, Talingdan and
Tobias red at him again. Bides and Berras did not re their guns at that precise time,
but when Corazon tried to call for help Bides warned her, saying "You call for help and I
will kill you", so she kept silent. The assailants then ed from the scene, going towards
the east.
The rst to come to the aid of the family was Corazon's male teacher who lived
nearby. Teresa came out of her "silid" later; she pulled Corazon aside and questioned
her, and when Corazon informed her that she recognized the killers of her father to be
her co-appellants herein, she warned her not to reveal the matter to anyone, threatening
to kill her if she ever did so. Still later on, other persons arrived and helped x and dress
the lifeless body of the victim, Bernardo, autopsy on which was performed in his own
house by the Municipal Health O cer of the place on June 26, 1967, about 36 hours
after death; burial took place on the same day. The victim's brother who came from
Manila arrived one day after the burial, followed by their mother who came from La Paz,
Abra where she resides. Corazon, who had not earlier revealed the identities of the
killers of her father because she was afraid of her own mother, was somehow able to
reveal the circumstances surrounding his killing to these immediate relatives of hers,
and the sworn statement she thereafter executed on August 5, 1967 (Exh. B) nally led
to the filing of the information for murder against the herein five (5) appellants.
On the other hand, according to the evidence for the defense: Teresa prior to her
marriage with Bernardo, was a resident of the town of Manabo, Abra. She has a sister in
Manila and two (2) brothers in America who love her dearly, that is why said brothers of
hers had been continuously and regularly sending her monthly $100.00 in checks,
starting from the time she was still single up to the time of her husband's violent death
on June 24, 1967, and thereafter. After their marriage, they moved to and resided in her
husband's place in Sallapadan, Abra, bringing with them three (3) carabaos and two (2)
horses, which Bernardo and she used in tilling a parcel of land in said place, separate
and distinct from the parcel of land worked on by Bernardo's parents and their other
children. She and Bernardo lived in their own house which was about 4-5 meters away
from the house of her parents-in-law. She loved Bernardo dearly, they never quarreled,
and her husband never maltreated her; although sometimes she had to talk to Bernardo
when he quarrels with his own mother who wanted that Bernardo's earnings be given to
her, (the mother) which Bernardo never did, and at those times, Bernardo would
admonish Teresa "You leave me alone". Her in-laws also hated her because her mother-
in-law could not get the earnings of Bernardo for the support of her other son, Juanito,
in his schooling. On his part, Juanito also disliked her because she did not give him any
of the carpentry tools which her brothers in America were sending over to her. She
never left their conjugal home for any long period of time as charged by her mother-in-
law, and if she ever did leave the house to go to other places they were only during
those times when she had to go to Bangued to cash her dollar checks with the PNB
branch there, and even on said trips, she was sometimes accompanied by Bernardo, or
if she had to go alone and leaves Sallapadan in the morning, she rode in a weapons
carrier along with merchants going to Bangued in the morning and always rode back
with them to Sallapadan in the afternoon of the same day because the weapons carrier
is owned by a resident of Sallapadan who waits for them. Teresa came to know
Talingdan only when the latter became a policeman in Sallapadan, as whenever any of
the carabaos and horses they brought from Manabo to Sallapadan got lost, she and
Bernardo would go and report the matter to the Mayor who would then refer the matter
to his policemen, one of whom is Talingdan, so that they may help locate the lost
animals; Teresa knew Talingdan well because they are neighbors, the latter's home
being only about 250-300 meters away from theirs, But illicit relationship had never
existed between them. cdll
Early in the evening of June 24, 1967, Teresa was in the kitchen of their house
cooking their food for supper. Two of the children, Corazon and Judit, were with her.
Her husband, Bernardo, was then in the adjoining room making a plow. He had to make
the plow at that time of the night because at daytime he worked as a carpenter in the
convent. As soon as the food was ready, she and the children moved over to the
adjoining room where Bernardo was to call him for supper, and he then proceeded to
the kitchen to eat. Teresa and the two children were about to follow him to the kitchen
when suddenly they heard more than ve (5) or six (6) successive gun shots coming
from near their "batalan". They were all so terri ed that they immediately cried for help,
albeit she did not know yet at that precise time that her husband was shot, as she and
the children were still in the other room on their way to the kitchen, about three (3)
meters away from Bernardo. But soon Teresa heard her husband crying in pain, and as
soon as she reached him, she took Bernardo into her arms. She did not see the killers of
her husband, as the night was then very dark and it was raining. Bernardo was in her
arms when the rst group of people who responded to their cry for help arrived. Among
them were the chief of police, some members of the municipal council and appellant
Tobias who even advised Teresa not to carry the lifeless body of Bernardo to avoid
abortion as she was then six (6) months pregnant. The chief of police then conducted
an investigation of the surroundings and he found some empty shells and foot prints on
the ground some meters away from the "batalan". He also found some bullet holes on
the southern walls of said "batalan" and on the northern wallings of the kitchen. Later,
Teresa requested some persons to relay the information about the death of her
husband to her relatives in Manabo, Abra, and they in turn passed on the news to
Bernardo's mother and her family in La Paz, Abra, where they were then residing, as they
have left their house in Sallapadan about two (2) months previous after they lost the
land they used to till there in a case with the natives called Tingians. Two (2) PC
soldiers arrived in the afternoon of June 26, 1967, and after Bernardo's remains was
autopsied and he was buried under their house, they conducted an investigation, but
she did not give them any information relative to the identity of the persons who shot
her husband because she did not really see them. Her mother-in-law and a brother-in-
law, Juanito Bagabag, arrived later, the former from the town of La Paz, Abra, and the
latter from Manila, and after the usual nine (9) days mourning was over, they left
Sallapadan, taking Teresa's children under their custody. Teresa suspects that since her
mother-in-law and her brother-in-law have axes to grind against her and they have her
daughter, Corazon, under their custody, they had forced the said child to testify against
her. She further declared that her late husband, Bernardo, had enemies during his
lifetime, as he had quarrels with some people over the land they work on.
Furthermore, the defense presented evidence to the effect that: Talingdan was
not in Sallapadan at the time of the killing of Bernardo on June 24, 1967; being a
policeman of the place at the time, he was one of the two (2) policemen who escorted
and acted as bodyguard of the Mayor, when the latter attended the cursillo in Bangued,
all of them leaving Sallapadan on June 22 and returning thereto four (4) days later on
June 26, hence, he could not have anything to do with the said killing. On the other hand,
Tobias claimed to be in the house of one Mrs. Bayongan in Sallapadan on the date of
said killing, but he was one of the persons who was called upon by the chief of police of
the place to accompany him in answer to the call for help of the wife of the victim. The
other two appellants Bides and Berras also alleged that they were in the same house of
Mrs. Bayongan on that date; they are tillers of the land of said Mrs. Bayongan and had
been staying in her house for a long time. They were sleeping when the chief of police
came that evening and asked Tobias, who was then municipal secretary, to accompany
him to the place of the shooting. They did not join them, but continued sleeping. They
never left the said house of Mrs. Bayongan, which is about 250-300 meters away from
the place of the killing, that evening of June 24, 1967.
After carefully weighing the foregoing con icting evidence of the prosecution
and defense, We have no doubt in Our mind that in that fatal evening of June 24, 1967,
appellants Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides, all
armed with long rearms and acting in-conspiracy with each other gunned down
Bernardo as the latter was sitting by the supper table in their house at Sobosob,
Sallapadan, Abra. They were actually seen committing the offense by the witness
Corazon. She was the one who prepared the food and was watching her father nearby.
They were all known to her, for they were all residents of Sobosob and she used to see
them often before that night. Although only Talingdan and Tobias continued ring at her
father after they had climbed the stairs of the "batalan", it was Bides who threatened her
that he would kill her if she called for help. Berras did not re any shot then. But even
before the four appellants went up the "batalan", they already red shots from
downstairs.
We also fully believe Corazon's testimony that two nights before, or on Thursday,
June 22, 1967, the deceased Bernardo and appellant Teresa had a violent quarrel during
which he slapped her several times, She went to seek the help of the police, and it was
appellant Talingdan, a policeman of their town, who went to the vicinity of their house
and challenged her father to come down, but the latter refused because the former was
a policeman and was armed. And so, Talingdan left after shouting to her father that "If I
will find you someday, I will kill you."
We likewise accept as truthful, Corazon's declaration regarding the amorous
relationship between her mother and appellant Talingdan, as already related earlier
above. So also her testimony that in the morning following the quarrel between her
father and her mother and the threat made by Talingdan to the former, between 10:00
and 11:00 o'clock, she saw all the herein four male accused-appellants meeting with her
mother in a small hut some 300 or 400 meters away from their house, near where she
was then washing clothes, and that on said occasion she overheard one of them ask
"Could (sic) he elude a bullet?", We have our doubts, however, as to whether or not her
mother did say to her in shoving her away upon seeing her approach, "You tell your
father we will kill him," If it were true that there was really such a message, it is to be
wondered why she never relayed the same to her father, specially when she again saw
the said appellants on the very night in question shortly before the shooting talking
together in subdued tones with her mother and holding long arms. Moreover, it is quite
unnatural that such a warning could have been done in such a manner.
Accordingly, it is Our conclusion from the evidence related above and which We
have carefully reviewed that appellants Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias, Augusto
Berras and Pedro Bides are guilty of murder quali ed by treachery, as charged, and that
they committed the said offense in conspiracy with each other, with evident
premeditation and in the dwelling of the offended party. In other words, two
aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the offense, namely, evident
premeditation and that it was committed in the dwelling of the victim. No mitigating
circumstance has been proven.
Appellants insist in their brief that the lone testimony of Corazon suffered from
vital contradictions and inconsistencies and badges of falsehood because of patently
unnatural circumstances alleged by her. We do not agree. As the Solicitor General has
well pointed out, the fact that the witness varied on cross-examination the exact time of
some of the occurrences she witnessed, such as, (1) whether it was before or after
Bernardo had began eating when he was shot; (2) whether it was before or after seeing
her mother's meeting with her co-accused in the morning of Friday, June 23, 1967, that
she went to wash clothes; and (3) whether or not the accused were already upstairs or
still downstairs when they rst red their guns, cannot alter the veracity of her having
seen appellants in the act of mercilessly and coldbloodedly shooting her father to
death.
Contrary to the contention of appellants, there was nothing inherently unnatural in
the circumstances related by her. We agree with the following rebuttal of the Solicitor
General:
"Appellants also attempt to buttress their attack against the credibility of
Corazon Bagabag by pointing out ve supposed unnatural declarations in her
testimony; First, she said that her father appeared unconcerned when she
informed him of the presence of people downstairs. But as correctly observed by
the prosecuting scal the witness does not know then "the mentality of her father"
(p. 62, t.s.n., hearing of March 29, 1968). Second, Corazon also declared that the
accused conversed that Saturday night preceding the day the crime charged was
committed in a lighted place although there was a place which was unlighted in
the same premises. But this only proves that the accused were too engrossed in
their conversation, unmindful of whether the place where they were talking was
lighted or not, and unmindful even of the risk of recognition. Third, witness
declared that Pedro Bides and Augusto Berras did not re their guns. Even if these
accused did withhold their re, however, since they were privies to the same
criminal design, would this alter their culpability? Should the witness Corazon
Bagabag be discredited for merely stating an observation on her part which is not
inherently unnatural? Fourth Corazon also declared that only three bullets from
the guns of the four male accused found their mark on the body of her father. But
would this not merely prove that not all the accused were good shots? And fth,
the witness declared that her father was still able to talk after he was shot, yet Dr.
Jose Dalisan declared that his death was instantaneous. It is respectfully
submitted, however, that the doctor's opinion could yield to the positive testimony
of Corazon Bagabag in this regard without in the least affecting the ndings of
said doctor as regards the cause of the death of the deceased. As thus viewed,
there are no evident badges of falsehood in the whole breadth and length of
Corazon Bagabag's testimony. (Pp. 9-10, People's Brief.)
Why and how Corazon could have concocted her version of the killing of her
father, if it were not basically true, is hardly conceivable, considering she was hardly
thirteen (13) years old when she testi ed, an age when according to Moore, a child "is,
as a rule, but little in uenced by the suggestion of others" because "he has already got
some principles, lying is distasteful to him, because he thinks it is mean, he is no
stranger to the sentiment of self-respect, and he never loses an opportunity of being
right in what he a rms." (II Moore on Facts, pp. 1055-1056.) No cogent explanation
has been offered why she would attribute the assault on her father to three other men,
aside from Talingdan whom she knew had relations with her mother, were she merely
making-up her account of how he was shot, no motive for her to do so having been
shown.
Demolishing the theory of the accused that such testimony was taught to her by
her uncle, His Honor pointed out that said "testimony, both direct and cross, would
show that she was constant, rm and steady in her answers to questions directed to
her." We have Ourselves read said testimony and We are convinced of the sincerity and
truthfulness of the witness. We cannot, therefore, share appellants' apprehension in
their Seventh Assignment of Error that the grave imputation of a mother's in delity and
her suggested participation in the killing of her husband, would if consistently
impressed in the mind of their child, constitute a vicious poison enough to make the
child, right or wrong, a willing instrument in any scheme to get even with her wicked
mother. We feel Corazon was too young to be affected by the in delity of her mother in
the manner the defense suggests. We are convinced from a reading of her whole
testimony that it could not have been a fabrication. On the whole, it is too consistent for
a child of thirteen years to be able to substantially maintain throughout her stay on the
witness stand without any fatal aw, in the face of severe and long cross-
interrogations, if she had not actually witnessed the event she had described. We reject
the possibility of her having been "brainwashed or coached" to testify as she did. cdphil
The second to the sixth assignments of error in the appeal brief do not merit
serious consideration. Anent these alleged errors, su ce it to say that the following
refutations of the Solicitor General are well taken:
"Appellants also decry that the trial court allegedly failed to consider the
testimony of Dr. Dalisan that the distance between the assailants and the
deceased could have been 4 to 5 meters when the shots were red. But the
appellants overlook the testimony of Corazon Bagabag that when the rst shot
was red, the gunman was about 3-1/2 meters from her father (p. 60, t.s.n.,
hearing of March 29, 1968), which disproves the theory of the defense that the
killers fired from a stonepile under an avocado tree some 4 to s meters away from
the deceased's house Appellants also insist that the Court a quo ignored the
testimonies of defense witness Cpl. Bonifacio Hall and Chief of Police Rafael
Berras on their having found bullet marks on the southern walling of the house of
the deceased, as well as empty cal. 30 carbine shells under the aforementioned
avocado tree. The trial court, however, made the following apt observations on the
testimony of defense witness Cpl. Bonifacio Hall:
'This witness stated that we went to the house of the
deceased to investigate the crime after the deceased had already
been buried; that he investigated the widow as well as the
surroundings of the house where the deceased was shot. He
found empty shells of carbine under the avocado tree. He stated
that the 'batalan' of the house of the deceased has a siding of
about 1-1/2 meters high and that he saw bullet holes on the top
portion of the wall directly pointing to the open door of the
'batalan' of the house of the deceased. When the court asked the
witness what could have been the position of the assailant in
shooting the deceased, he stated that the assailant might have
been standing. The assailant could not have made a bullet hole on
the top portion of the sidings of the 'batalan' because the 'batalan'
is only 1-1/2 meters high, and further, when asked as to the level
of the ground in relation to the top sidings of the 'batalan,' he
answered that it is in the same level with the ground. If this is true,
it is impossible for the assailant to make a bullet hole at the top
portion sidings of the 'batalan,' hence, the testimony of this
witness who is a PC corporal is of no consequence and without
merit. The court is puzzled to nd a PC corporal testifying for the
defense in this case, which case was led by another PC sergeant
belonging to the same unit and assigned in the same province of
Abra' (pp. 324-325, rec.).
"As regards the empty shells also found in the vicinity of the shooting,
su ce it to state that no testimony has been presented, expert or otherwise,
linking said shells to the bullets that were red during the shooting incident.
Surmises in this respect surely would not overcome the positive testimony of
Corazon Bagabag that the accused shot her father as they came up the 'batalan'
of their house." (Pp. 11-12, People's Brief.)
At the trial, the four male appellants tried to prove that they were not at the scene
of the crime when it happened. This defense of alibi was duly considered by the trial
court, but it was properly brushed aside as untenable. In their brief, no mention thereof
is made, which goes to show that in the mind of the defense itself, it cannot be
successfully maintained and they do not, therefore, insist on it. Nonetheless, it would do
well for this Court to speci cally a rm the apt pertinent ratiocination of His Honor in
reference thereto thus:
"This defense, therefore, is alibi which, in the opinion of the court, can not
stand rmly in the face of a positive and unwavering testimony of the
prosecution witness who pointed out to the accused as the authors of the crime.
This is so because, rst, according to the three accused — Bides, Tobias and
Berras — they were sleeping at 8:00 o'clock that night in the house of Mrs.
Bayongan which is only 250 meters away from the scene of the crime. Granting,
for the sake of argument, but without admitting, that they were already sleeping at
8:00 o'clock in the house of Mrs. Bayongan, Corazon Bagabag clearly stated that
her father was gunned down at sunset which is approximately between 6:00 and
6:30 in the evening, hence, the accused Tobias, Berras and Bides could have
committed the crime and went home to sleep in the house of Mrs. Bayongan after
the commission of the crime. According to Pedro Bides, the house of Mrs.
Bayongan is only 250 meters away from the house of the victim. Second, the
three accused have failed miserably to present the testimony of Mrs. Bayongan,
the owner of the house where they slept that night to corroborate or bolster their
defense of alibi." (Pp. 27A-28A, Annex of Appellants' Brief.)
xxx xxx xxx
"Nemesio Talingdan, alias Oming, the last of the accused, also in his
defense of alibi, stated that on June 22, 1967, he accompanied Mayor Gregorio
Banawa of Sallapadan to Bangued, together with policeman Cresencio Martinez
for the purpose of attending a cursillo in Bangued. They started in Sallapadan in
the early morning of June 22, 1967 and arrived in Bangued the same day.
According to him, he went to accompany the mayor to the cursillo house near the
Bangued Cathedral and after conducting the mayor to the cursillo house, he went
to board in the house of the cousin of Mayor Banawa near the Filoil Station at
Bangued, Abra. From that time, he never saw the mayor until after they went
home to Sallapadan on June 26th.
"This kind of alibi could not gain much weight because he could have
returned anytime on the evening of June 22 or anytime before the commission of
the offense to Sallapadan and commit the crime on the 24th at sunset, then
returned to Bangued, Abra to fetch the mayor and bring him back to Sallapadan
on the 26th.
"The irony of this defense of alibi is that the mayor who was alleged to
have been accompanied by witness-accused is still living and very much alive. As
a matter of fact, Mayor Gregorio Banawa is still the mayor of Sallapadan, Abra,
and also policeman Cresencio Martinez another policeman who accompanied the
mayor to Bangued, is also still living and still a policeman of Sallapadan. Why
were not the mayor and the policeman presented to corroborate or deny the
testimony of Nemesio Talingdan?
"Conrado B. Venus, Municipal Judge of Penarrubia, Abra, and a member of
the Cursillo Movement, was presented as rebuttal witness for the prosecution. On
the witness stand, he stated that he belongs to Cursillo No. 3 of the Parish of
Bangued, Abra, and said cursillo was held on October 20 to 23, 1966, at the St.
Joseph Seminary in Galicia, Pidigan, Abra, and not on June 23 to 26, 1967. As a
matter of fact, Mayor Banawa of Sallapadan also attended the cursillo held on
October 20 to 23, 1966, as could be seen in his 'Guide Book' where the signature
of Gregorio Banawa appears because they both attended Cursillo No. 3 of the
Parish of Bangued.
"(To) this testimony of the rebuttal witness belies partly, if not in full, the
testimony of accused Nemesio Talingdan." (Pp. 29A-30A, Annex of Appellants'
Brief.)
Coming now to the particular case of appellant Teresa Domogma, as to whom

the Solicitor General has submitted a recommendation of acquittal, We nd that she is
not as wholly innocent in law as she appears to the Counsel of the People. It is
contended that there is no evidence proving that she actually joined in the conspiracy to
kill her husband because there is no showing of "actual cooperation" on her part with
her co-appellants in their culpable acts that led to his death. If at all, what is apparent, it
is claimed, is "mere cognizance, acquiescence or approval" thereof on her part, which it
is argued is than what is required for her conviction as a co-conspirator per People vs.
Mahlon, 99 Phil. 1068. We do not see it exactly that way. LexLib
True it is that the proof of her direct participation in the conspiracy is not beyond
reasonable doubt, for which reason, she cannot have the same liability as her co-
appellants. Indeed, she had no hand at all in the actual shooting of her husband. Neither
is it clear that she helped directly in the planning and preparation thereof, albeit We are
convinced that she knew it was going to be done and did not object. (U.S. vs. Romulo,
15 Phil. 408, 411-414.) It is not de nitely shown that she masterminded it either by
herself alone or together with her co-appellant Talingdan. At best, such conclusion
could be plain surmise, suspicion and conjecture, not really ineludible. After all, she had
been having her own unworthy ways with him for quite a long time, seemingly without
any need of his complete elimination. Why go to so much trouble for something she
was already enjoying, and not even very surreptitiously? In fact, the only remark
Bernardo had occasion to make to Teresa one time was "If you become pregnant, the
one in your womb is not my child." The worst he did to her for all her faults was just to
slap her.
But this is not saying that she is entirely free from criminal liability. There is in the
record morally convincing proof that she is at the very least an accessory to the offense
committed by her co-accused. She was inside the room when her husband was shot.
As she came out after the shooting, she inquired from Corazon if she was able to
recognize the assailants of her father. When Corazon identi ed appellants Talingdan,
Tobias, Berras and Bides as the culprits, Teresa did not only enjoin her daughter not to
reveal what she knew to anyone, she went to the extent of warning her, "Don't tell it to
anyone. I will kill you if you tell this to somebody." Later, when the peace o cers who
repaired to their house to investigate what happened, instead of helping them with the
information given to her by Corazon, she claimed she had no suspects in mind. In other
words, whereas, before the actual shooting of her husband, she was more or less
passive in her attitude regarding her co-appellants' conspiracy, known to her, to do
away with him, after Bernardo was killed, she became active in her cooperation with
them. These subsequent acts of her constitute "concealing or assisting in the escape of
the principal in the crime" which makes her liable as an accessory after the fact under
paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code.
As already indicated earlier, the offense committed by appellants was murder
quali ed by treachery. It being obvious that appellants deliberately chose nighttime to
suddenly and without warning assault their victim, taking advantage of their number
and arms, it is manifest that they employed treachery to insure success in attaining
their malevolent objective. In addition, it is indisputable that appellants acted with
evident premeditation. Talingdan made the threat to kill Bernardo Thursday night, then
he met with his co-accused to work out their conspiracy Friday and again on Saturday
evening just before the actual shooting. In other words, they had motive — Talingdan's
taking up the cudgels for his paramour, Teresa — and enough time to meditate, and
desist, if they were not resolved to proceed with their objective. Finally, they committed
the offense in the dwelling of the offended party.
In these premises, the crime committed by the male appellants being murder,
quali ed by treachery, and attended by the generic aggravating circumstances of
evident premeditation and that the offense was committed in the dwelling of the
offended party, the Court has no alternative under the law but to impose upon them the
capital penalty. However, as to appellant Teresa, she is hereby found guilty only as an
accessory to the same murder.
WHEREFORE, with the above nding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the
appellants Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides of
the crime of murder with two aggravating circumstances, without any mitigating
circumstance to offset them, they are each hereby sentenced to DEATH to be executed
in accordance with law. Guilty beyond reasonable doubt as accessory to the same
murder, appellant Teresa Domogma is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of ve (5) years of prision correccionalas minimum to eight (8) years of prision
mayor as maximum, with the accessory penalties of the law. In all other respects, the
judgment of the trial court is affirmed, with costs against appellants.
Barredo, Muñoz Palma Aquino, Concepcion Jr., Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero,
JJ., concur.
Fernando and Antonio, JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
CASTRO, C.J., concurring:
Concurs, with the observations, however, that the evidence points to the
appellant Teresa Domogma as a co-principal and that she should therefore also be held
guilty of murder and sentenced to death.
TEEHANKEE , J., concurring:
Concurs, but join in the partial dissent of Mr. Justice Makasiar insofar as the
penal liability of the accused Teresa Domogma is concerned.
MAKASIAR, J., dissenting:
I dissent insofar as the liability of the accused Teresa Domogma who should be
convicted, not merely as an accessory, but of parricide as principal and meted the
death penalty, is concerned. A marriage certi cate is not indispensable to establish the
fact of marriage; because the presumption that the deceased and the accused Teresa
were married subsists by reason of the fact that they had been living together for about
thirteen (13) years as evidenced by the birth of the child-witness Corazon, who was 12
years old at the time her father was killed on June 24, 1967 by the accused-appellants,
and who was 13 years of age when she testi ed. They have other children aside from
Corazon. LLjur
That appellant Teresa is a co-conspirator, not merely an accessory after the fact
has been clearly demonstrated by the testimony of her own daughter, Corazon, who
declared categorically that she plotted with her co-appellants the assassination of her
own husband whom she betrayed time and time again by her repeated illicit relations
with her co-accused Nemesio Talingdan, a town policeman and their neighbor. The
record is abundant with evidence that Teresa, without a feeling for shame and
unnaturally lacking any concern for her minor children of tender age, deserted several
times their family home to live with and continue with her immoral relations with
appellant Talingdan with whom at one time she cohabited for more than three (3)
weeks. Her patient husband had to look for her and to beg her to return each time she
left the family abode for the embrace of her lover.
We should believe Corazon's statement that between 10 and 11 o'clock Friday
morning, she saw her mother, appellant Teresa, meeting with her other co-appellants in
a small hut owned by her father some 300 to 400 meters away from the latter's house
near the creek where she was then washing clothes; that she heard one of the
conspirators say "Could he elude a bullet?"; that when her mother noticed her presence,
her mother shoved her away saying, "You tell your father that we will kill him"; that in the
evening of the following day, Saturday, June 24, 1967, while she was cooking supper in
their house, she saw her mother go down the stairs and meet the other appellants in the
yard about 3 to 4 meters from where she was in the "batalan"; that she heard them
conversing in subdued tones; that she was able to recognize all of them by the light
coming from the kitchen lamp through the open "batalan"; that she knows all of them
very well as they are all residents of their barrio and she used to see them almost
everyday; that she noted that appellants were armed with long guns; that their meeting
did not last long; that after about 2 minutes her mother, appellant Teresa, came up the
house and proceed to her room while the other appellants hid under an avocado tree
nearby; that when supper was ready she called her parents to eat; that her father did
not heed her call but continued working on a plow while her mother excused herself by
saying she would rst put her small baby to sleep; that she (Corazon) ate alone after
which she again called her parents to eat; that about this time she informed her father
about the presence of persons downstairs but her father paid no heed to what she said;
that her father proceeded to the kitchen and sat on the oor near the door while
Corazon stayed nearby watching him; that at the that moment her father was shot from
below the stairs of the "batalan"; that the four accused then went up the stairs of the
"batalan" with their long guns and, upon seeing that her father was still alive, appellants
Talingdan and Tobias red at him again; that when she (Corazon) tried to call for help,
appellant Bides warned her saying "You call for help and I will kill you"; and that
thereafter, the assailants fled towards the east.
The foregoing testimony of 13-year old Corazon should be accorded belief in the
same way that credence was given to her statement that, upon her mother's inquiry
immediately after the shooting as to whether she recognized the assailants of her
father, she (Corazon) readily told her mother that she identi ed appellants Talingdan,
Tobias, Berras and Bides as the culprits; for which reason her mother warned her "Don't
tell it to anyone. I will kill you if you tell this to somebody."
On Thursday or two days before Bernardo was shot, he and Teresa had a quarrel
during which Bernardo slapped Teresa several times by reason of which Teresa left the
house and sought the help of the police. Shortly thereafter appellant Talingdan came
and called Bernardo to come down. When Bernardo ignored him because Talingdan
was a policeman and was then armed, appellant Talingdan left after warning Bernardo
that someday he would kill him.
Can there be a clearer demonstration of the active cooperation of Teresa in the
conspiracy against the life of her husband? The majority opinion admits that Teresa
was a paramour of appellant Talingdan; hence, she wanted freedom from her husband,
the victim, so that she could enjoy the company of her lover, appellant Talingdan.
LibLex
From the evidence on record, appellant Teresa had no moral compunction in

deserting her family and her children for the company of her lover. As heretofore stated,
she did this several times and continued to do so until the violent death of her husband
even as she was carrying a six-month old baby in her womb, the paternity of which her
husband denied.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 111426. July 11, 1994.]
NORMA DIZON-PAMINTUAN , petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES , respondent.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR. , J : p
The chief issue presented for our determination in this petition for review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court is the correctness of the decision of 29 March 1993 of the Court
of Appeals in C A-G.R. CR No. 11024 1 which a rmed the decision of Branch 20 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila in Criminal Case No. 88-64954 2 nding the petitioner guilty
of the violation of the Anti-Fencing Law (P.D. No. 1612) but set aside the penalty imposed
and ordered the trial court to receive additional evidence on the "correct valuation" of the
pieces of jewelry involved for the sole purpose of determining the penalty to be imposed. llcd
The information in Criminal Case No. 88-64954 charged the petitioner with the
violation of the Anti-Fencing Law in that
"on or about and during the period from February 12, to February 24, 1988,
inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with intent of gain
for herself or for another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly
buy and keep in her possession and/or sell or dispose of the following jewelries,
to wit: one (1) set of earings, a ring studded with diamond sin a triangular style,
one (1) set of earrings (diamond studded) and one (1) diamond-studded cruci x,
or all valued at P105,000.00, which she knew or should have known to have been
derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery committed by Joselito
Sacdalan Salinas against the owner Teodoro and Luzviminda Encarnacion." 3
On the basis of the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Teodoro Encarnacion (one

of the offended parties), Cp. Ignacio Jao, Jr., and Pfc. Emmanuel Sanchez, both of the
Western Police District, the trial court promulgated on 16 November 1990 its decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads: LLjur
"WHEREFORE, the prosecuting having proved the guilt of the accused for
violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612 beyond reasonable doubt, the accused
Norma Dizon-Pamintuan is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty
of imprisonment from FOURTEEN (14) YEARS of prison mayor to NINETEEN (19)
YEARS of reclusion temporal.
No civil liability in view of the recovery of the items, subject-matter of this

case.
With costs." 4
The evidence of the prosecution is summarized by the trial court as follows:

"Teodoro Encarnacion, Undersecretary, Department of Public Works and
Highways testified that he has just arrived at his residence located at Better Living
Subdivision, Parañaque at around 9:45 p.m. of February 12, 1988 coming from
the Airport and immediately proceeded inside the house, leaving behind his driver
and two housemaids outside to pick-up his personal belongings from his case. It
was at this point that ve unidenti ed masked armed persons appeared from the
grassy portion of the lot beside the house and poked their guns to his driver and
two helpers and dragged them inside his house. That the men pointed a gun at
him and was made to lie face down on the oor. Thereafter, the robbers
ransacked the house and took away jewelries and other personal properties
including cash. After the intruders left the house he reported the matter
immediately to the police. He was then interviewed by the Parañaque police and
was informed that an operation group would be assigned to the case.
He likewise reported the matter to the Western Police District on February
15, 1988. Two days later, a group of WPD operatives came over to his house and
he was asked to prepare a list of items of jewelry and other valuables that were
lost including a sketch of distinctive items. He was later told that some of the lost
items were in Chinatown area as tipped by the informer the police had
dispatched. That an entrapment would be made with their participation, on
February 14, 1988. As such, they went to Camp Crame at around 9:00 a.m. and
arrived at the vicinity of 733 Florentino Torres Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila at about
10:00 a.m.; that he is with his wife posed as a buyer and were able to recognize
items of the jewelry stolen displayed at the stall being tended by Norma Dizon
Pamintuan; the pieces were: 1 earring and ring studded with diamonds worth
P75,000 bought from estimator Nancy Bacud (Exh. "C-2"), 1 set of earring
diamond worth P15,000 (Exh. "C-3") and 1 gold chain with cruci x worth P3,000
(Exh. "C-4").
Corporal Ignacio Jao, Jr. of the WPD testi ed that he was with the spouses
Teodoro Encarnacion, Jr. in the morning of February 24, 1988 and they proceeded
to Florentino Torres Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila at the stall of Norma Dizon-
Pamintuan together with Sgt. Perez. After the spouses Encarnacion recognized
the items subject matter of the robbery at the display window of the stall being
tended by the herein accused, they invited the latter to the precinct and
investigated the same. They likewise brought the said showcase to the WPD
station. He further testi ed that he has no prior knowledge of the stolen jewelries
of the private complainant from one store to another.
Pfc. Emmanuel Sanchez of the WPD testi ed that he reported for duty on
February 24, 1988; that he was with the group who accompanied the spouses
Encarnacion in Sta. Cruz, Manila and was around when the couple saw some of
the lost jewelries in the display stall of the accused. He was likewise present
during the early part of the investigation of the WPD station." 5
The recovery of the pieces of jewelry, on the basis of which the trial court ruled that
no civil liability should be adjudged against the petitioner, took place when, as testi ed to
by Teodoro Encarnacion, the petitioner "admitted that she got the items but she did not
know they were stolen [and that] she surrendered the items and gave them to [his] wife." 6
On the other hand, the version of the defense, as testi ed to by Rosito Dizon-
Pamintuan, is summarized by the trial court thus: cdphil
"The defense presented only the testimony of Rosito Dizon-Pamintuan who

testi ed that he is the brother of Norma Dizon-Pamintuan and that sometime
around 11:00 a.m. of February 24, 1985, he, together with the accused went
infront of the Carinderia along Florentino Torres Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila waiting
for a vacancy therein to eat lunch. Suddenly, three persons arrived and he
overheard that Cpl. Jao told her sister to get the jewelry from inside the display
window but her sister requested to wait for Fredo, the owner of the stall. But ten
minutes later when said Fredo did not show up, the police o cer opened the
display stall was hauled to a passenger jeepney and the same, together with the
accused were taken to the police headquarters. He likewise testi ed that he
accompanied his sister to the station and after investigation was sent home." 7
In convicting the petitioner, the trial court made the following findings:
"The prosecution was able to prove by evidence that the recovered items
were part of the loot and such recovered items belong to the spouses
Encarnacion, the herein private complainants. That such items were recovered by
the Police O cers from the stall being tended by the accused at that time. Of
importance, is that the law provides a disputable presumption of fencing under
Section 5 thereof, to wit:
'Mere possession of any goods, article, item object, or anything of

value which has been the subject of robbery of thievery shall be prima
facie evidence of fencing.'
There is no doubt that the recovered items were found in the possession of
the accused and she was not able to rebut the presumption though the evidence
for the defense alleged that the stall is owned by one Fredo. A distinction should
likewise be made between ownership and possession in relation to the act of
fencing. Moreover, as to the value of the jewelries recovered, the prosecution was
able to show that the same is Ninety Three Thousand Pesos (P93,000.00)." 8
The petitioner then appealed her conviction to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CR No.
11024) where she raised two issues: (1) that the judgment was based on a mere
presumption, and (2) that the prosecution failed to show that the value of the jewelry
recovered is P93,000.00. LexLib
In its challenged decision of 29 March 1993, the Court of Appeals disposed of the
first issue in this wise:
"The guilt of accused-appellant was established beyond reasonable doubt.
All the elements of the crime of fencing in violation of the Anti-Fencing Law of
1979 (P.D. No. 1612), to wit:
1. A crime of robbery of theft has been committed;
2. A person, not a participant in said crime, buys, receives,
possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and
sells; or in any manner deals in any article or item, object or anything
of value;
3. With personal knowledge, or should be known to said
person that said item, object or anything of value has been derived
from the proceeds of the crime of robbery of theft;
4. With intent to gain for himself or for another;
have been established by positive and convincing evidence of the
prosecution . . .
xxx xxx xxx

The fact that a crime of robbery has been committed on February 12, 1988
is established by the testimony of private complainant Teodoro T. Encarnacion
who immediately reported the same to Parañaque Police Station of the Southern
Police District (TSN, Hearings of October 3, 1988, November 9, 1988 and January
11, 1989; Exh. A) and submitted a list and sketches of the jewelries robbed,
among other things, from their residence located at Better Living Subdivision,
Parañaque, Metro Manila (Exh. C, C-1 to C-4 and D).
The second element is likewise established by convincing evidence. On
February 24, 1988, accused-appellant was found selling the jewelries (Exhs. C-2,
C-3 and C-4) which was displayed in a showcase in a stall located at Florentino
Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila [Testimonies of Teodoro Encarnacion ( id. supra); Cpl.
Ignacio Jao (TSN, Hearing of February 13, 1989) and Pfc. Emmanuel Sanchez
(TSN, Hearing of June 4, 1989)].
On the element of knowledge that the items are derived from the proceeds
of the crime of robbery and of intent to gain for herself or for another, the Anti-
Fencing Law provides:
'SECTION 5. Presumption of Fencing. — Mere possession of any
good, article, item, object, or anything of value which has been the subject
of robbery of thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing.'
Knowledge and intent to gain are proven by the fact that these jewelries
were found in possession of appellant and they were displayed for sale in a
showcase being tended by her in a stall along Florentino Street, Sta. Cruz,
Manila." 9
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals was of the opinion that there was not enough
evidence to prove the value of the pieces of jewelry recovered, which is essential to the
imposition of the proper penalty under Section 3 of P.D. No. 1612. It opined that the trial
court erred in concluding that "the value of the recovered jewelries is P93,000.00 based on
the bare testimony of the private complainant and the self-serving list he submitted (Exhs.
C, C-2 and C-4, TSN, Hearing of October 3, 1993)." 1 0
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, nding that the trial court did not commit any reversible
error, its decision dated October 26, 1990 convicting accused appellant is hereby
AFFIRMED with the modi cation that the penalty imposed is SET ASIDE and the
Regional Trial Court (Branch 20) of Manila is ordered to receive evidence with
respect to the correct valuation of the properties involved in this case, marked as
Exhibits "C", "C-2" and "C-4" for the sole purpose of determining the proper penalty
to be meted out against accused under Section 3, P.D. No. 1612. Let the original
records be remanded immediately." 1 1
Hence, this petition wherein the petitioner contends that:

"I
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY ERRED IN

AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT JUDGE CAÑEBA, IN
BLATANT DISREGARD OF APPLICABLE LAW AND WELL-ESTABLISHED
JURISPRUDENCE. LibLex
II

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY ERRED IN
REMANDING THE CASE TO THE COURT A QUO FOR RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE
FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING THE CORRECT PENALTY TO BE
IMPOSED." 1 2
On 23 February 1994, after the public respondents had led their Comment and the
petitioner her Reply to the Comment, this Court gave due course to the petition and
required the parties to submit their respective memoranda, which they subsequently
complied with.
The first assigned error is without merit.
Fencing, as de ned in Section 2 of P.D. No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law), is "the act of
any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess,
keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any
article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to
have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft." LLphil
Before P.D. No. 1612, a fence could only be prosecuted for and held liable as an
accessory, as the term is de ned in Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code. The penalty
applicable to an accessory is obviously light under the rules prescribed in Articles 53, 55,
and 57 of the Revised Penal Code, subject to the quali cation set forth in Article 60
thereof. Noting, however, the reports from law enforcement agencies that "there is
rampant robbery and thievery of government and private properties" and that "such
robbery and thievery have become pro table on the part of the lawless elements because
of the existence of ready buyers, commonly known as fence, of stolen properties," P.D. No.
1612 was enacted to "impose heavy penalties on persons who pro t by the effects of the
crimes of robbery and theft." Evidently, the accessory in the crimes of robbery and theft
could be prosecuted as such under the Revised Penal Code or under P.D. No. 1612.
However, in the latter case, he ceases to be a mere accessory but becomes a principal in
the crime of fencing. Elsewise stated, the crimes of robbery and theft, on the one hand, and
fencing, on the other, are separate and distinct offenses. 1 3 The state may thus choose to
prosecute him either under the Revised Penal Code or P.D. No. 1612, although the
preference for the latter would seem inevitable considering that fencing is a malum
prohibitum, and P.D. No. 1612 creates a presumption of fencing 1 4 and prescribes a higher
penalty based on the value of the property. 1 5
The elements of the crime of fencing are:
1. A crime of robbery of theft has been committed;
2. The accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission
of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps,
acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any
manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which
has been derived from the proceeds of the said crime; LLphil
3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item,
object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the
crime of robbery or theft; and
4. There is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for
another.

In the instant case, there is no doubt that the rst, second, and fourth elements were
duly established. A robbery was committed on 12 February 1988 in the house of the
private complainants who afterwards reported the incident to the Parañaque Police, the
Western Police District, the NBI, and the CIS, and submitted a list of the lost items and
sketches of the jewelry taken from them (Exhibits "C" and "D"). Three of these items stolen,
viz., (a) a pair of earrings and ring studded with diamonds worth P75,000.00 (Exhibit "C-
w"); (b) one set of earrings worth P15,000.00 (Exhibit "C-3"); and (c) a chain with cruci x
worth P3,000.00 (Exhibit "C-4"), were displayed for sale at a stall tended to by the
petitioner in Florentino Torres Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. The public display of the articles for
sale clearly manifested an intent to gain on the part of the petitioner.
The more crucial issue to be resolved is whether the prosecution proved the
existence of the third element: that the accused know or should have known that the items
recovered from here were the proceeds of the crime of robbery of theft.
One is deemed to know a particular fact if he has the cognizance, consciousness or
awareness thereof, of is aware of the existence of something, or has the acquaintance with
facts, or if he has something within the mind's grasp with certitude and clarity. 1 6 When
knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such
knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence unless
he actually believes that it does not exist. 1 7 On the other hand, the words "should know"
denote the fact that a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the
fact in performance of his duty to another or would govern his conduct upon assumption
that such fact exists. 1 8 Knowledge refers to a mental state of awareness about a fact.
Since the court cannot penetrate the mind of an accused and state with certainty what is
contained therein, it must determine such knowledge with care from the overt acts of that
person. And given two equally plausible states of cognition or mental awareness, the court
should choose the one which sustains the constitutional presumption of innocence. 1 9
Since Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612 expressly provides that "[m]ere possession of any
good, article, item, object, or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or
thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing," it follows that the petitioner is presumed
to have knowledge of the fact that the items found in her possession were the proceeds of
robbery or theft. The presumption is reasonable for no other natural or logical inference
can arise from the established fact of her possession of the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft. This presumption does not offend the presumption of innocence
enshrined in the fundamental law. 2 0 In the early case of United States vs. Luling , 2 1 this
Court held: LexLib
"It has been frequently decided, in case of statutory crimes, that no

constitutional provision is violated by a statute providing that proof by the state
of some material fact or facts shall constitute prima facie evidence of guilt, and
that then the burden is shifted to the defendant for the purpose of showing that
such act or acts are innocent and are committed without unlawful intention.
(Commonwealth vs. Minor, 88 Ky., 422.)
In some of the States, as well as in England, there exist what are known as
common law offenses. In the Philippine Islands no act is a crime unless it is
made so by statute. The state having the right to declare what acts are criminal,
within certain well de ned limitations, has a right to specify what act or acts shall
constitute a crime, as well as what act or acts shall constitute a crime, as well as
what proof shall constitute prima facie evidence of guilt, and then to put upon the
defendant the burden of showing that such act or acts are innocent and are not
committed with any criminal intent or intention."
In his book on constitutional law, 2 2 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz said:

"Nevertheless, the constitutional presumption of innocence may be
overcome by contrary presumptions based on the experience of human conduct
[People vs. Labara, April 20, 1954]. Unexplained ight, for example, may lead to
an inference of guilt, as 'the wicked ee when no man pursueth, but the righteous
is as bold as a lion.' Failure on the part of the accused to explain his possession
of stolen property may give rise to the reasonable presumption that it was he
himself who had stolen it [U.S. vs. Espia, 16 Phil. 506]. Under our Revised Penal
Code, the inability of an accountable o cer to produce funds or property
entrusted to him will be considered prima facie evidence that he has appropriate
them to his personal use [Art. 217]. According to Cooley, the constitutional
presumption will not apply as long as there is 'some rational connection between
the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, and the inference of one fact
from proof of another shall not be so unreasonable as to be purely arbitrary
mandate' [1 Cooley, 639]." cdll
The petitioner was unable to rebut the presumption under P.D. No. 1612. She relied
solely on the testimony of her brother which was insu cient to overcome the
presumption, and, on the contrary, even disclosed that the petitioner was engaged in the
purchase and sale of jewelry and that she used to buy from a certain Fredo. 2 3
Fredo was not presented as a witness and it was not established that he was a
licensed dealer or supplier of jewelry. Section 6 of P.D. No. 1612 provides that "all stores,
establishments or entities dealing in the buy and sell of any good, article, item, object or
anything of value obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier thereof, shall before
offering the same for sale to the public, secure the necessary clearance or permit from the
station commander of the Integrated National Police in the town or city where such store,
establishment or entity is located." Under the Rules and Regulations 2 4 promulgated to
carry out the provisions of Section 6, an unlicensed dealer/supplier refers to any person,
partnership, firm, corporation, association or any other entity or establishment not licensed
by the government to engage in the business of dealing in or supplying "used secondhand
articles," which refers to any good, article, item, object or anything of value obtained from
an unlicensed dealer or supplier, regardless of whether the same has actually or in fact
been used.
We do not, however, agree with the Court of Appeals that there is insu cient
evidence to prove the actual value of the recovered articles.
As found by the trial court, the recovered articles had a total value of P93,000.00,
broken down as follows: cdll
"a) one earring and ring studded with diamonds (Exh. "C-2") —
P75,000.00
b) one set of earring (Exh. "C-3") — P15,000.00
c) one gold chain with crucifix (Exh. "C-4") — P3,000.00".
These ndings are based on the testimony of Mr. Encarnacion 2 5 and on Exhibit "C," 2 6 a
list of the items which were taken by the robbers on 12 February 1988, together with
the corresponding valuation thereof. On cross-examination, Mr. Encarnacion re-
a rmed his testimony on direct examination that the value of the pieces of jewelry
described in Exhibit "C-2" is P75,000.00 2 7 and that the value of the items described in
Exhibit "C-3" is P15,000.00, although he admitted that only one earring — and not the
pair — was recovered. 2 8 The cross-examination withheld any question on the gold
chain with cruci x described in Exhibit "C-4." In view, however, of the admission that
only one earring was recovered of the jewelry described in Exhibit "C-3," it would be
reasonable to reduce the value from P15,000.00 to P7,500.00. Accordingly, the total
value of the pieces of jewelry displayed for sale by the petitioner and established to be
part of the proceeds of the robbery on 12 February 1988 would be P87,000.00. LexLib
Section 3(a) of P.D. No. 1612 provides that the penalty of prision mayor shall be
imposed upon the accused if the value of the property involved is more than P12,000.00
but does not exceed P22,000.00, and if the value of such property exceeds the latter sum,
the penalty of prision mayor should be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year
for each additional P10,000.00; the total penalty which may be imposed, however, shall not
exceed twenty years. In such cases, the penalty shall be termed reclusion temporal and the
accessory penalty pertaining thereto provided in the Revised Penal Code shall also be
imposed. The maximum penalty that can be imposed in this case would then be eighteen
(18) years and ve (5) months, which is within the range of reclusion temporal maximum.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law which allows the imposition of an indeterminate
penalty which, with respect to offenses penalized by a special law, shall range from a
minimum which shall not be lower than the minimum prescribed by the special law to a
maximum which should not exceed the maximum provided therein, the petitioner can thus
be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from ten (10) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor maximum as minimum to eighteen (18) years and ve (5) months of
reclusion temporal maximum as maximum, with the accessory penalties corresponding to
the latter.
In the light of the foregoing, the Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the penalty
imposed by the trial court and in remanding the case to the trial court for further reception
of evidence to determine the actual value of the pieces of jewelry recovered from the
petitioner and for the imposition of the appropriate penalty. cdll
We do not agree with the petitioner's contention, though, that a remand for further
reception of evidence would place her in double jeopardy. There is double jeopardy when
the following requisites court: (1) the rst jeopardy must have attached prior to the
second, (2) the rst jeopardy must have validly been terminated, and (3) the second
jeopardy must before the same offense as that in the rst. 2 9 Such a concurrence would
not occur assuming that the case was remanded to the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is party GRANTED by setting aside the challenged
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. Cr No. 11024 insofar as it sets aside the
penalty imposed by Branch 20 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Criminal Case No.
88-64954 and orders the remand of the case for the trial court to receive evidence with
respect to the correct value of the properties involved. The decision of the Regional Trial
Court is AFFIRMED subject to the modi cation of the penalty which is hereby reduced to
an indeterminate penalty ranging from Ten (10) years and One (1) day of Prision Mayor
maximum as minimum to Eighteen (18) years and Five (5) months of Reclusion Temporal
maximum as maximum, with the accessory penalties if the latter. cdll
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Bellosillo, Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1. Rollo, 54-64. Per Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, concurred in by Associate
Justices Nathanael P. De Pano, Jr. and Quirino D. Abad Santos, Jr.
2. Original Records (OR), 130-135; Rollo, 67-72, Per Judge Doroteo N. Caneba.
3. RTC OR, 1.
4. OR, 135; Rollo, 72.

5. OR, 132-133; Rollo, 69-70.
6. TSN, 3 October 1988, 23.
7. OR, 133-134; Rollo, 70-71.
8. OR, 134; Rollo, 71.
9. Rollo, 57-59.
10. Rollo, 61.
11. Id., 63.
12. Id., 20-21.
13. People vs. Hon. de Guzman, G.R. No. 77368, 5 October 1993.
14. Section 5, P.D. No. 1612.
15. Section 3, Id.
16. Webster's Third New World International Dictionary, unabridged, 1971 ed., 1252.
17. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 872-873, (6th ed.), citing Model Penal Code, par. 2.202.
18. Id., 873, taken from Reinstatement of Torts par 12.

19. Dion-an vs. Court of Appeals, 138 SCRA 39 [1985].
20. Section 14(2), Article III, 1987 Constitution.
21. 34 Phil. 725, 728 [1916].
22. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1993 ed., 313.
23. TSN, 2 February 1990, 2-4.

24. It took effect on 15 June 1979.
25. TSN, 3 October 1988, 15-17.
26. OR, 79.
27. TSN, 9 November 1988, 5.

28. Id., 3-4.
29. Gorion vs. RTC of Cebu, 213 SCRA 138 [1991].

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THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 133527-28. December 13, 1999.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , plaintiff-appellee, vs . JEANETTE

JEANETTE (GINETTE) YANSON-DUMANCAS, POL. COL. NICOLAS

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

1. CRIMINAL LAW; CRIMINAL LIABILITY; PRINCIPALS; WAYS OF DIRECTLY

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN

Acting upon the inducement of spouses Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas and

P50,000.00 — as indemnity for death;

300,000.00 — compensatory damages (lost income);

50,000.00 — exemplary damages. LibLex

(pp. 1-3, Record Vol. I)

Acting upon the inducement of spouse Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas and

50,000.00 — actual damages;

100,000.00 — moral damages;

1. JEANNETTE (GINNETTE) YANSON-DUMANCAS

3. POL. INSP. ADONIS ABETO

10. CESAR PECHA

2. In CRIMINAL CASE NO. 94-15563, each of the Accused charged as

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g) Moises Grandeza LLpr

4:30 P.M. August 5, 1992

8:30 A.M., August 6, 1992

9:00-10:00 A.M. August 6, 1992

Then a) Fernandez b) Geroche and c) Lamis entered "Tinulahan" and

10:30 A.M. August 6, 1992

4:00 P.M. August 6, 1992

Past 6:00 p.m. August 6, 1992

10:00 A.M. August 7, 1992

7:30 P.M. August 7, 1992

11:00 P.M. August 7, 1992

a) Gargallano the driver

c) Moises Grandeza also seated inside.

b) Geroche followed suit by shooting Lumangyao with a .45 cal. Pistol

a) the dead bodies of Rufino Gargar, Jr. and Danilo Lumangyao

August 10, 1992

On this same day,

August 13, 1992

September 24, 1992

a) Found on the body of Ru no Gargar, Jr. (per examination report,

b) Gunshot wound (Exh. "M-1")

As to Danilo Lumangyao, the exhumation report (Exh. "N") disclose

b) Gunshot wound (Exh. "N-1")

After the National Bureau of Investigation, Bacolod O ce, conducted its

(pp. 73-85, Decision; pp. 202-214, Rollo.)

A. Jeanette (Ginette) Yanson-Dumancas

3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another

In order that a person may be convicted as principal by inducement, the following

(pp. 54-55, tsn Feb. 14, 1994)

B. Police Inspector Adonis Abeto

After due consideration of accused-appellant Abeto's constitutional right to the

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an

In an attempt to buttress the contention that witness Grandeza's testimony should

"18. Testimony may be partly credited and partly rejected . —

The grounds relied upon by accused-appellant Geroche do not, therefore, constitute

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1. By pro ting themselves or assisting the offender to pro t by the

2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime or the effects or

3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principal

WHEREFORE, accused-appellants JEANETTE YANSON-DUMANCAS and ADONIS

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