CHAPTER IV: POWERS, DUTIES, AND NORMS OF CONDUCT

OFPUBLIC OFFICERS
Source of powers and authority of public office.
 People themselves.
 Public law.

Authority of public officer not presumed.

Authority of public officer and private agents distinguished.

1. Private agents
a. Universal
b. General
c. Special
2. Public agents
a. General
b. Special/ Limited

Ascertainment of authority of public officer.

 Persons contracting with the public officer acting under a public law, must, at their peril, ascertain the scope of the officer's authority, and are chargeable
with notice of the contents of the law conferring that authority.

Scope of power of a public officer.

1. Expressly conferred upon him by the law under which he has been appointed or elected;
2. Expressly annexed to the office by the law which created it or some other law referring to it; or
3. Attached to the office as incidents to it.

Territorial limitation of authority of public officers.

1. Limited to territory where law has effect.
2. Action at a place not authorized by law ordinarily invalid.

Duration of authority.
1. Duration of term as provided by the law.
2. Where officer chosen to act in reference to a particular subject.

Construction of grant of powers.

 Strict interpretation and will be construed as conferring those powers only which are expressly imposed or necessarily implied.

Classification of powers and duties.

From their nature Ministerial. — Official duty is ministerial when it is absolute, certain, and imperative involving merely execution of a
specific duty arising from fixed and designated facts.

Discretionary. — Discretionary or judicial duties are such as necessarily require the exercise of reason in the
adaptation of means to an end, and discretion in determining how or whether the act shall be done or the course
pursued.

From the standpoint of the
obligation of the officer to
perform his powers and
duties
Mandatory. — Powers conferred on public officers are generally construed as mandatory although the language may
be permissive, where they are for the benefit of the public or individuals.
Permissive. — Statutory provisions define the time and mode in which public officers will discharge their duties, and
those which are obviously designed merely to secure order, uniformity, system, and dispatch in public business, are
generally deemed directory.
From the standpoint of the Power of control. — It implies the power of an officer to manage, direct or govern, including the power to alter or
relationship of the officer to modify or set aside what a subordinate had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute his judgment for
his subordinates that of the latter.

Power of supervision. — Supervisory power is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body. It does not include
any restraining authority over such body. He merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay
down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them.

Ministerial and discretionary powers distinguished.

1. Nature of act. — Determined by the facts of the particular case.
2. Exercise of discretion. — Whether the act complained of involves policy making or judgment.

Meaning of discretion.
Discretion - act or the liberty to decide according to the principles of justice and one's ideas of what is right and proper under the circumstances, without willfulness or
favor.

Exercise of discretion limited.

 The exercise of the officer's discretion is still limited, by legal construction, to the evident purposes of the act, and to what is known as a sound and legal
discretion, excluding all arbitrary, capricious, inquisitorial and oppressive proceedings.

Remedy to compel exercise of duty.

 Purely ministerial - the courts will require specific action.
 Purely discretionary - the courts, by mandamus, will require action only.

Delegation of discretionary powers.

 Unless the power to substitute another in his place has been given to him, a public officer cannot delegate his duties to another.

Delegation of ministerial powers.

It can be delegated, except:
 Expressly prohibited.
 Expressly requires the act to be performed by the officer in person.
Time to perform official acts.
1. Where no time stated in statute. — Must be performed within a reasonable time.
2. Where time stated in statute. — The time period expressed is to be construed as directory and not mandatory, unless the nature of the act to be
performed or the language used in the statute evidences an intention to limit the power of the officer.
Ratification of unauthorized acts.
His acts may be ratified, except:
a. When an act which was absolutely void at the time it was done.
b. Not merely voidable.

State is not estopped by the unauthorized or illegal acts of its agents.

Where superior officers have authority to ratify the acts of their inferiors, they are restricted to the ratification of acts and contracts which they themselves are
empowered to make.

Judicial review of official acts.

1. Where act involves exercise of discretionary power. — He is the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those facts.
2. Where act involves performance of purely ministerial duty. — Any person who will sustain personal injury by such refusal may have a mandamus to
compel its performance.
3. Where act reviewed done without jurisdiction. —The courts are not bound by an officer’s interpretation of the law under which he presumes to act.

Norms of conduct of public officials and employees.

1. Public office is a public trust.
2. Standards of personal conduct.
a. Commitment to public interest.
b. Professionalism.
c. Justness and sincerity.
d. Political neutrality.
e. Responsiveness to the public.
f. Nationalism and patriotism.
g. Commitment to democracy.
h. Simple living.
3. Duties of the Civil Service Commission.
a. Promote observance of these standards; and
 b. Continue to research and experiment on measures which provide positive motivation to public officials and employees.

System of incentives and rewards.

1. Criteria.
a. Years of service;
b. Quality and consistency of performance;
c. Obscurity of the position;
d. Level of salary;
e. Unique and exemplary quality of achievement;
f. Risk or temptation inherent in the work; and
g. Any similar circumstances or consideration in favor of the particular awardee.
2. Form of incentives and rewards.
a. Bonuses; or
b. Citations; or
c. Directorship in government-owned or –controlled corporations; or
d. Local and foreign scholarship grants; or
e. Paid vacations; and
f. Automatic promotion to the next higher position suitable to his qualifications and with commensurate salary.
3. Committee on Awards. — Composed of the following:
a. The Ombudsman
b. Chairman of the Civil Service Commission as Co-Chairmen
c. Chairman of the Commission on Audit
d. Two (2) government employees to be appointed by the President as members.

Purpose:
a. Conduct a periodic, continuing review of performance of officials and employees in all departments, offices, and agencies;
b. Establish a system of annual incentives and rewards to the end that due recognition is given to officials and employees of outstanding merit;
c. Determine the form of rewards to be granted;
d. Formulate and adopt its own rules to govern the conduct of its activities.
4. Secretariat. — Provide secretariat services to the Committee.

Duties of public officers as trustees for the public.

1. In General Duties
a. Duty to obey the law.
b. Duty to accept and continue in office.
c. Duty to accept burden of office.
d. Duty as to diligence and care.
e. Duties in choice and supervision of subordinates.
2. Ethical duties.
a. Duty as to outside activities. rights
b. Duty where personal interest is involved.
c. Duty to act with civility.

Duty to make financial disclosure.

 To maintain public confidence in government and in public officials and employees,
 To avoid conflicts of interest from arising, to deter corruption,
 To provide the citizens with information concerning a public officer's financial affairs.

Specific duties of public officials and employees.

1. Act promptly on letters and requests.
2. Submit annual performance reports.
3. Process documents and papers expeditiously.
4. Act immediately on the public's personal transactions.
5. Make documents accessible to the public.

Actions on requests and petitions.

1. General rule - shall do so immediately, without discrimination, and in no case beyond fifteen (15) working days from receipt of the request or petition.
2. In case of written requests - shall act on the same within fifteen (15) working days from receipt thereof.
3. The department, office, or agency must take action within a period of fifteen (15) working days.

Processing of papers and documents.

Within a reasonable time from the preparation thereof, in accordance with the following rules:
1. As prescribed by the law;
2. If law is silent, head of department, office, or agency to determine reasonable time, taking into account the:
a. Nature, simplicity or complexity of the subject matter;
b. Completeness or inadequacy of requirements;
 c. Lack of resources caused by circumstances beyond the control of the department, office, or agency or official or employee concerned;
d. Legal constraints;
e. Fault, failure or negligence of the party concerned which renders decision or action not possible or premature; and
f. Fortuitous events or force majeure.

Signing of any written action or decision.

 Must contain no more than three (3) initials or signatures.

Public disclosure of statements of assets and liabilities.

1. Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Financial Disclosure.
a. Contents.
 real property, its improvements, acquisition costs, assessed value and current fair market value;
 personal property and acquisition cost;
 all other assets such as investments, cash on hand or in banks, stocks, bonds, and the like;
 financial liabilities, both current and long-term;
 all business interests and financial connections,
b. When to file.
 within thirty (30) days after assumption of office, statements of which must be reckoned as of his first day of service;
 on or before April 30, of every year thereafter, statements of which must be reckoned as of the end of the preceding year;
 within thirty (30) days after separation from the service, statements of which must be reckoned as of his last day in office.
c. Where to file.
 President, Vice-President, and Constitutional Officials, with the National Office of the Ombudsman;
 Senators and Congressmen, with the Secretaries of the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively; Justices, with the Clerk of the
Supreme Court; Judges, with the Court of Administrator; and all national executive officials, such as members of the Cabinet, Undersecretaries,
and Assistant Secretaries, including the foreign service and heads of government- owned or -controlled corporations with original charters and
their subsidiaries and state colleges and universities, with the Office of the President;
 Regional and local officials and employees, both appointive and elective, including other officials and employees of government-owned or -
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, with the Deputy Ombudsman in their respective regions;
 Officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, with the Office of the President, and those below said ranks, with the
Deputy Ombudsman in their respective regions; and
 All other public officials and employees, defined in Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, with the Civil Service Commission.
d. Authority in favor of Ombudsman. — Execute, within thirty (30) days from the date of their assumption of office, the necessary authority in favor of
the Ombudsman to obtain from all appropriate government agencies such documents as may show their assets, liabilities, net worth.
2. Identification and disclosure of relatives. — Such relatives shall include those up to the fourth civil degree of relationships, either of consanguinity or
affinity.
3. Accessibility of documents.
a. At reasonable hours.
b. Made available for copying after ten (10) working days from the time they are filed.
c. Available to the public for a period of ten (10) years after receipt of the statement.
4. Prohibited acts.
a. any purpose contrary to morals or public policy; or
b. any commercial purpose other than by news and communications media for dissemination to the general public.

5. Authority/ responsibility of certain officials - Authority to determine whether said statements have been properly accomplished:
a. In the case of Congress, the designated committees of both Houses of Congress subject to approval by the affirmative vote of the majority of the
particular House concerned;
b. In the case of the Executive Department, the heads of departments, offices, and agencies insofar as their respective departments, offices and
agencies are concerned subject to approval of the Secretary of Justice;
c. In the case of the Judicial Department, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court; and
d. In case of the Constitutional Commissions and other Constitutional Offices, the respective Chairman and members thereof; in the case of the Office
of the Ombudsman, the Ombudsman.
6. Review and compliance procedures.
7. Basis in monitoring income and lifestyle of government officials and employees. — Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SSAL).

Transparency of transactions and access to information.

1. Ensure transparency of public transactions.
2. Provide official information, except if:
a. must be kept secret in the interest of national defense or security or the conduct of foreign affairs;
b. would put the life and safety of an individual in imminent danger;
c. falls within the concepts of established privilege or recognized exceptions as may be provided by law;
d. information, record, or document comprises drafts of decisions, orders, rulings, policy-decisions, memoranda, etc.;
e. would disclose information of a personal nature where disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
f. would disclose investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes that will cause partial adjudication; or
g. premature disclosure that will endanger the stability of financial institution.
 3. Establish information systems. — for the purpose of informing the public of such policies, programs, and accomplishments, and not to build the public
image of any official or employee or advance his own personal interest.

Reforms on public administrative systems.

1. Conduct value development programs.
2. Conduct professional, etc. programs.
3. Conduct studies and analyses of work systems.
4. Develop and make available a service guide.
5. Consult the public for feedbacks and suggestions.
6. Conduct research and experimentation.
7. Designate a resident Ombudsman.
8. Consult and dialogue with staff.

CHAPTER V: RIGHTS AND PRIVILEDGES OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

A. IN GENERAL
Rights incident to public office

Rights as a citizen

a. Protection from publication commenting on his fitness and the like

b. Engaging in certain political and business activities

B. RIGHT TO COMPENSATION
Power of Congress to fix compensation

a. Power primarily but not exclusively legislative in character

b. Power may be delegated subject to statutory limitations

Compensation, not an element of public office

Forms of compensation defined and distinguished

A. Compensation

means pay for doing all that may be required whether it is in the form of a fixed salary or wages, per diems, fees, commissions, or perquisites of whatever character.

it is distinguished from honorarium, as honorarium is given not as a matter of obligation but in appreciation for services rendered; a voluntary donation in
consideration of services which admit of no compensation in money.

B. Salary

is the personal compensation to be paid to the public officer for his services, it is generally a fixed annual or periodical payment depending on the time and not the
amount of service.

It is distinguished from wages, as wages is given to officers of lesser rank and paid per day or week.

C. Per diem

is merely one forms of compensation granted to public officers which is fixed, not as ordinarily by the year or by the month but by the day.

is a daily allowance given for each day an officer or employee of government is away from her home base. It is intended to cover the cost of lodging and
subsistence of officers and employees when the latter are on duty outside of their permanent station.

Could rightfully be considered a compensation or remuneration attached to an office.

not deemed to be a salary within the Constitutional provision that no change in the compensation of officers shall affect the salary of any officer during his existing
term.

D. Emoluments

refers to the profits arising from the office, and that which is received as compensation for services or which is annexed to the office as salary, fees or perquisites.

Includes fees and compensation as the incumbent of the office is, by law, entitled to receive.
 Allowances are included in the term “emoluments” (i.e., representation and transportation, housing, etc.)

Basis of right to compensation

1. Creation of law
2. Services rendered
3. Compensation fixed by law
4. Legal title to office
5. Amount of compensation
6. Ex oficio position

Recovery of compensation

1. From the government

a. De jure officer cannot recover that which has been paid to a de facto officer unless the government continues to pay even after having received notice of an
adjudication in favor of the de jure.

b. In cases where there is no de jure officer, a de facto officer is legally entitled to the emoluments of the office if he is:

1. In good faith
2. Has possession of the office
3. Has discharge of the duties of said office

2. From the de facto officer

a. After the notice of adjudication in favor of the de jure officer, the de facto officer is not entitled to keep what has been paid for services rendered.
b. Also, where the tenure of the de facto was wrongful, the salary received by such may be recovered.

3. From the intruder or usurper

o An intruder or usurper has no right to the salary or emoluments of the office. He becomes liable to the de jure officer in an action for money he had received.

Salary not subject to garnishment

Garnishment
is a kind of attachment for reaching credits belonging to the judgment debtor owing to him from a stranger to litigation.

o The salary of a public officer may not be subject of garnishment, attachment, or order of execution, nor be seized before being paid to him, and appropriated for the
payment of his debts for the following reasons:

1. While the money is still in the hands of the disbursing officer, it belongs to the Government;

2. Public policy forbids such practice since it would be fatal to the public service;

3. The garnishment or attachment of an officer’s salary is tantamount to a suit against the State in its own court, which is
prohibited except with its consent.

Agreements affecting compensation

a. Compensation is given not only for remuneration of services but also to enable the incumbent to give due attention to his official duties and to perform them
better.

o Any agreement respecting such compensation is invalid as against public policy if it tends to pervert such compensation to purpose other than that for what it was
intended. This rule specifically refers to unperformed services and the salaries attached thereto and to those already performed which the officer can validly disburse
as he may see fit.

b. The following agreements are invalid:

1. Agreement to accept, or acceptance of less or other than legal compensation

2. Sale, assignment, or barter of said compensation
3. Dividing compensation with others if it amounts to an anticipatory agreement

Prohibition against diminution of salary

a. Congress has absolute power to fix or alter the compensation of public officers, except as provided by the Constitution.
b. The Constitution prohibits Congress from reducing the salary of the following constitutional officers during their term or tenure in order to secure their
independence:

1. President and Vice-President

2. Chief Justice, Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and judges of lower courts
3. Chairmen and members of the Constitutional Commissions
4. Ombudsman and his Deputies

Prohibition against receiving additional, double, or indirect compensation

“No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept
without the consent of the Congress, any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind from any foreign government.

Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect compensation.” (Constitution, Article IX-B, Section 8)

The prohibition does not apply in the following cases:

1. The law, in certain instances, specifically authorizes payment where it appears just and necessary
2. Additional compensation is received not from government or any of its entities
3. In case of double appointments where there are 2 distinct offices, the public officer may draw the salary attached to the 2nd position only when law specifically
authorizes him.
Free voluntary service to the government

Free voluntary service

refers to services rendered by persons who are in government without pay or compensation.

1. Requirements for free voluntary service

a. Issuance of an appointment document

b. Fitness and suitability for the duties and responsibilities of the particular position
c. Compliance with the rule on nepotism

2. Functions or services that volunteers can perform:

a. Advisory
b. Consultancy or counseling
c. Recommendatory
d. Professional services
e. Staff work such as planning or research
f. Humanitarian

3. Applicable laws and rules

o The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (Republic Act no. 6713) and the Implementing Rules on:

a. Rewards and incentives

b. Norms of conduct and ethical standards
c. Duties and obligations of public officers and employees
d. Prohibitions and sanctions
enumerated in the Implementing Rules
e. Civil and criminal liability

4. Exemptions

o Those who render free voluntary service are exempted from the following:

a. Filing of statements of assets and liabilities and net worth, and financial disclosures
b. Requirement of divestment
c. Eligibility requirements
d. Security of tenure

5. Prohibitions

o Unless otherwise provided in the terms of their designations, volunteers are prohibited from:
a. Exercising supervisory functions over personnel
b. Exercising functions of positions involving national security
c. Having access to confidential or classified information unless authorized by proper authorities
d. Occupying regular plantilla positions
e. Having such services credited as government service and availing themselves of retirement benefits
f. Using facilities and resources of the office for partisan political purposes
g. Receiving any pecuniary benefit such as honoraria, allowances, and other perquisites of office.

C. OTHER RIGHTS
1. Rights under the Constitution

a. Right to self-organization
b. The right to protection of temporary employees
c. Freedom of members of Congress from arrest and from being questioned
d. The right not to be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law

2. Participation in prohibited activity or mass action

“Prohibited concerted activity or mass action”

refers to any collective activity undertaken by government employees either by themselves or through their employees’ organizations, with the intent of effecting
work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize their demands or force concessions, economic or otherwise, from their respective agencies or the government.

3. Rights under the Civil Service Decree and the new Administrative Code

a. The right to preference in promotion

b. The right to present complaints and grievances
c. The right not to be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law and after due process
d. Right to organize

NEXT-IN-RANK RULE

4. Personnel actions

refers to any action denoting movement or progress of personnel in the civil service which must be in accordance with the rules or standards promulgated by the
Civil Service .

o Personnel actions include the following:

1. Appointment through certification

2. Promotion
It is the advancement from one position to another with an increase in duties and responsibilities as authorized by law and usually accompanied by an increase in
pay.

3. Transfer
It is the movement from one position to another of equivalent rank, level, or salary without break in service involving issuance of appointment.

4. Reinstatement

It means restoration to a state or condition from which one has been removed or separated.

5. Reemployment

6. Detail

It is the movement of an employee from one department or agency to another without the issuance of appointment and shall be allowed only for a limited period in
case of employees occupying professional, technical, and scientific positions.

7. Reassignment

8. Demotion

It is the movement from one position to another involving the issuance of an appointment with diminution in duties, responsibilities, status, grade or rank which may
or may not involve reduction in salary.

5. Rights under the Revised Government Service Insurance Act

o Covered employees are entitled to the following benefits:

1. Retirement benefits
2. Separation benefits
3. Unemployment or involuntary separation benefits
4. Disability benefits
5. Survivorship benefits
6. Funeral benefits
7. Life insurance benefits

6. Pension

are regular allowances paid to an individual or group of individuals by the government in consideration of services rendered, or in recognition of merit, civil or military

Pension and gratuity distinguished

o Gratuity is a donation and act of pure liberality on the part of the State.

7. Retirement

as a withdrawal from office public station, business, occupation, or public duty.

8. Right to reimbursement and indemnity

9. Right to reinstatement and back salary

o Reinstatement

Is the restoration to a state or condition from which one had been removed or separated.
o Back Salary

Is a form of relief that restores the income that was lost by reason of unlawful dismissal.

10. Rights to property, devices and inventions

11. Right to recover reward for performance of duty

*SCOPE OF POWER AND AUTHORITY

ARTICLE XI

ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives.

Section 17. A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be required by
law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the President, the Vice-
President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions and other
constitutional offices, and officers of the armed forces with general or flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to the
public in the manner provided by law.

Section 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance at all times and any public
officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during
his tenure shall be dealt with by law
*NORMS OF CONDUCT
*SPECIFIC DUTIES

*Liabilities in general

Republic Act No. 6713 February 20, 1989

AN ACT ESTABLISHING A CODE OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES, TO
UPHOLD THE TIME-HONORED PRINCIPLE OF PUBLIC OFFICE BEING A PUBLIC TRUST, GRANTING INCENTIVES AND
REWARDS FOR EXEMPLARY SERVICE, ENUMERATING PROHIBITED ACTS AND TRANSACTIONS AND PROVIDING PENALTIES
FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

Section 1. Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees."

Section 2. Declaration of Policies. - It is the policy of the State to promote a high standard of ethics in public service.
Public officials and employees shall at all times be accountable to the people and shall discharge their duties with
utmost responsibility, integrity, competence, and loyalty, act with patriotism and justice, lead modest lives, and uphold
public interest over personal interest.

Section 3. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act, the term:

(a) "Government" includes the National Government, the local governments, and all other instrumentalities, agencies or
branches of the Republic of the Philippines including government-owned or controlled corporations, and their
subsidiaries.lawphi1.net

(b) "Public Officials" includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the
career or non-career service, including military and police personnel, whether or not they receive compensation,
regardless of amount.

(c) "Gift" refers to a thing or a right to dispose of gratuitously, or any act or liberality, in favor of another who accepts it,
and shall include a simulated sale or an ostensibly onerous disposition thereof. It shall not include an unsolicited gift of
nominal or insignificant value not given in anticipation of, or in exchange for, a favor from a public official or employee.

(d) "Receiving any gift" includes the act of accepting directly or indirectly, a gift from a person other than a member of
his family or relative as defined in this Act, even on the occasion of a family celebration or national festivity like
Christmas, if the value of the gift is neither nominal nor insignificant, or the gift is given in anticipation of, or in exchange
for, a favor.

(e) "Loan" covers both simple loan and commodatum as well as guarantees, financing arrangements or accommodations
intended to ensure its approval.
(f) "Substantial stockholder" means any person who owns, directly or indirectly, shares of stock sufficient to elect a
director of a corporation. This term shall also apply to the parties to a voting trust.

(g) "Family of public officials or employees" means their spouses and unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of
age.

(h) "Person" includes natural and juridical persons unless the context indicates otherwise.

(i) "Conflict of interest" arises when a public official or employee is a member of a board, an officer, or a substantial
stockholder of a private corporation or owner or has a substantial interest in a business, and the interest of such
corporation or business, or his rights or duties therein, may be opposed to or affected by the faithful performance of
official duty.

(j) "Divestment" is the transfer of title or disposal of interest in property by voluntarily, completely and actually
depriving or dispossessing oneself of his right or title to it in favor of a person or persons other than his spouse and
relatives as defined in this Act.

(k) "Relatives" refers to any and all persons related to a public official or employee within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity, including bilas, inso and balae.

Section 4. Norms of Conduct of Public Officials and Employees. - (A) Every public official and employee shall observe the
following as standards of personal conduct in the discharge and execution of official duties:

(a) Commitment to public interest. - Public officials and employees shall always uphold the public interest over and
above personal interest. All government resources and powers of their respective offices must be employed and used
efficiently, effectively, honestly and economically, particularly to avoid wastage in public funds and revenues.

(b) Professionalism. - Public officials and employees shall perform and discharge their duties with the highest degree of
excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill. They shall enter public service with utmost devotion and dedication to
duty. They shall endeavor to discourage wrong perceptions of their roles as dispensers or peddlers of undue patronage.

(c) Justness and sincerity. - Public officials and employees shall remain true to the people at all times. They must act with
justness and sincerity and shall not discriminate against anyone, especially the poor and the underprivileged. They shall
at all times respect the rights of others, and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs,
public policy, public order, public safety and public interest. They shall not dispense or extend undue favors on account
of their office to their relatives whether by consanguinity or affinity except with respect to appointments of such
relatives to positions considered strictly confidential or as members of their personal staff whose terms are coterminous
with theirs.

(d) Political neutrality. - Public officials and employees shall provide service to everyone without unfair discrimination
and regardless of party affiliation or preference.

(e) Responsiveness to the public. - Public officials and employees shall extend prompt, courteous, and adequate service
to the public. Unless otherwise provided by law or when required by the public interest, public officials and employees
shall provide information of their policies and procedures in clear and understandable language, ensure openness of
information, public consultations and hearings whenever appropriate, encourage suggestions, simplify and systematize
policy, rules and procedures, avoid red tape and develop an understanding and appreciation of the socio-economic
conditions prevailing in the country, especially in the depressed rural and urban areas.

(f) Nationalism and patriotism. - Public officials and employees shall at all times be loyal to the Republic and to the
Filipino people, promote the use of locally produced goods, resources and technology and encourage appreciation and
pride of country and people. They shall endeavor to maintain and defend Philippine sovereignty against foreign
intrusion.

(g) Commitment to democracy. - Public officials and employees shall commit themselves to the democratic way of life
and values, maintain the principle of public accountability, and manifest by deeds the supremacy of civilian authority
over the military. They shall at all times uphold the Constitution and put loyalty to country above loyalty to persons or
party.

(h) Simple living. - Public officials and employees and their families shall lead modest lives appropriate to their positions
and income. They shall not indulge in extravagant or ostentatious display of wealth in any form.

(B) The Civil Service Commission shall adopt positive measures to promote (1) observance of these standards including
the dissemination of information programs and workshops authorizing merit increases beyond regular progression
steps, to a limited number of employees recognized by their office colleagues to be outstanding in their observance of
ethical standards; and (2) continuing research and experimentation on measures which provide positive motivation to
public officials and employees in raising the general level of observance of these standards.

Section 5. Duties of Public Officials and Employees. - In the performance of their duties, all public officials and employees
are under obligation to:

(a) Act promptly on letters and requests. - All public officials and employees shall, within fifteen (15) working days from
receipt thereof, respond to letters, telegrams or other means of communications sent by the public. The reply must
contain the action taken on the request.

(b) Submit annual performance reports. - All heads or other responsible officers of offices and agencies of the
government and of government-owned or controlled corporations shall, within forty-five (45) working days from the end
of the year, render a performance report of the agency or office or corporation concerned. Such report shall be open
and available to the public within regular office hours.

(c) Process documents and papers expeditiously. - All official papers and documents must be processed and completed
within a reasonable time from the preparation thereof and must contain, as far as practicable, not more than three (3)
signatories therein. In the absence of duly authorized signatories, the official next-in-rank or officer in charge shall sign
for and in their behalf.

(d) Act immediately on the public's personal transactions. - All public officials and employees must attend to anyone
who wants to avail himself of the services of their offices and must, at all times, act promptly and expeditiously.
(e) Make documents accessible to the public. - All public documents must be made accessible to, and readily available
for inspection by, the public within reasonable working hours.

Section 6. System of Incentives and Rewards. - A system of annual incentives and rewards is hereby established in order
to motivate and inspire public servants to uphold the highest standards of ethics. For this purpose, a Committee on
Awards to Outstanding Public Officials and Employees is hereby created composed of the following: the Ombudsman
and Chairman of the Civil Service Commission as Co-Chairmen, and the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and two
government employees to be appointed by the President, as members.

It shall be the task of this Committee to conduct a periodic, continuing review of the performance of public officials and
employees, in all the branches and agencies of Government and establish a system of annual incentives and rewards to
the end that due recognition is given to public officials and employees of outstanding merit on the basis of the standards
set forth in this Act.

The conferment of awards shall take into account, among other things, the following: the years of service and the
quality and consistency of performance, the obscurity of the position, the level of salary, the unique and exemplary
quality of a certain achievement, and the risks or temptations inherent in the work. Incentives and rewards to
government officials and employees of the year to be announced in public ceremonies honoring them may take the
form of bonuses, citations, directorships in government-owned or controlled corporations, local and foreign scholarship
grants, paid vacations and the like. They shall likewise be automatically promoted to the next higher position with the
commensurate salary suitable to their qualifications. In case there is no next higher position or it is not vacant, said
position shall be included in the budget of the office in the next General Appropriations Act. The Committee on Awards
shall adopt its own rules to govern the conduct of its activities.

Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees now
prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any
public official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

(a) Financial and material interest. - Public officials and employees shall not, directly or indirectly, have any financial or
material interest in any transaction requiring the approval of their office.

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public officials and employees during their incumbency
shall not:

(1) Own, control, manage or accept employment as officer, employee, consultant, counsel, broker, agent, trustee or
nominee in any private enterprise regulated, supervised or licensed by their office unless expressly allowed by law;

(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such
practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; or

(3) Recommend any person to any position in a private enterprise which has a regular or pending official transaction
with their office.
These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after resignation, retirement, or separation from
public office, except in the case of subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the professional concerned cannot practice his
profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with, in which case the one-year prohibition
shall likewise apply.

(c) Disclosure and/or misuse of confidential information. - Public officials and employees shall not use or divulge,
confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason of their office and not made available to the
public, either:

(1) To further their private interests, or give undue advantage to anyone; or

(2) To prejudice the public interest.

(d) Solicitation or acceptance of gifts. - Public officials and employees shall not solicit or accept, directly or indirectly, any
gift, gratuity, favor, entertainment, loan or anything of monetary value from any person in the course of their official
duties or in connection with any operation being regulated by, or any transaction which may be affected by the
functions of their office.

As to gifts or grants from foreign governments, the Congress consents to:

(i) The acceptance and retention by a public official or employee of a gift of nominal value tendered and received as a
souvenir or mark of courtesy;

(ii) The acceptance by a public official or employee of a gift in the nature of a scholarship or fellowship grant or medical
treatment; or

(iii) The acceptance by a public official or employee of travel grants or expenses for travel taking place entirely outside
the Philippine (such as allowances, transportation, food, and lodging) of more than nominal value if such acceptance is
appropriate or consistent with the interests of the Philippines, and permitted by the head of office, branch or agency to
which he belongs.

The Ombudsman shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purpose of this subsection,
including pertinent reporting and disclosure requirements.

Nothing in this Act shall be construed to restrict or prohibit any educational, scientific or cultural exchange programs
subject to national security requirements.

Section 8. Statements and Disclosure. - Public officials and employees have an obligation to accomplish and submit
declarations under oath of, and the public has the right to know, their assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and
business interests including those of their spouses and of unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age living in
their households.

(A) Statements of Assets and Liabilities and Financial Disclosure. - All public officials and employees, except those who
serve in an honorary capacity, laborers and casual or temporary workers, shall file under oath their Statement of Assets,
Liabilities and Net Worth and a Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections and those of their spouses and
unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age living in their households.

The two documents shall contain information on the following:

(a) real property, its improvements, acquisition costs, assessed value and current fair market value;

(b) personal property and acquisition cost;

(c) all other assets such as investments, cash on hand or in banks, stocks, bonds, and the like;

(d) liabilities, and;

(e) all business interests and financial connections.

The documents must be filed:

(a) within thirty (30) days after assumption of office;

(b) on or before April 30, of every year thereafter; and

(c) within thirty (30) days after separation from the service.

All public officials and employees required under this section to file the aforestated documents shall also execute, within
thirty (30) days from the date of their assumption of office, the necessary authority in favor of the Ombudsman to
obtain from all appropriate government agencies, including the Bureau of Internal Revenue, such documents as may
show their assets, liabilities, net worth, and also their business interests and financial connections in previous years,
including, if possible, the year when they first assumed any office in the Government.

Husband and wife who are both public officials or employees may file the required statements jointly or separately.

The Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth and the Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections
shall be filed by:

(1) Constitutional and national elective officials, with the national office of the Ombudsman;

(2) Senators and Congressmen, with the Secretaries of the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively;
Justices, with the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court; Judges, with the Court Administrator; and all national executive
officials with the Office of the President.

(3) Regional and local officials and employees, with the Deputy Ombudsman in their respective regions;

(4) Officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, with the Office of the President, and those
below said ranks, with the Deputy Ombudsman in their respective regions; and
(5) All other public officials and employees, defined in Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, with the Civil Service
Commission.

(B) Identification and disclosure of relatives. - It shall be the duty of every public official or employee to identify and
disclose, to the best of his knowledge and information, his relatives in the Government in the form, manner and
frequency prescribed by the Civil Service Commission.

(C) Accessibility of documents. - (1) Any and all statements filed under this Act, shall be made available for inspection at
reasonable hours.

(2) Such statements shall be made available for copying or reproduction after ten (10) working days from the time they
are filed as required by law.

(3) Any person requesting a copy of a statement shall be required to pay a reasonable fee to cover the cost of
reproduction and mailing of such statement, as well as the cost of certification.

(4) Any statement filed under this Act shall be available to the public for a period of ten (10) years after receipt of the
statement. After such period, the statement may be destroyed unless needed in an ongoing investigation.

(D) Prohibited acts. - It shall be unlawful for any person to obtain or use any statement filed under this Act for:

(a) any purpose contrary to morals or public policy; or

(b) any commercial purpose other than by news and communications media for dissemination to the general public.

Section 9. Divestment. - A public official or employee shall avoid conflicts of interest at all times. When a conflict of
interest arises, he shall resign from his position in any private business enterprise within thirty (30) days from his
assumption of office and/or divest himself of his shareholdings or interest within sixty (60) days from such assumption.

The same rule shall apply where the public official or employee is a partner in a partnership.

The requirement of divestment shall not apply to those who serve the Government in an honorary capacity nor to
laborers and casual or temporary workers.

Section 10. Review and Compliance Procedure. - (a) The designated Committees of both Houses of the Congress shall
establish procedures for the review of statements to determine whether said statements which have been submitted on
time, are complete, and are in proper form. In the event a determination is made that a statement is not so filed, the
appropriate Committee shall so inform the reporting individual and direct him to take the necessary corrective action.

(b) In order to carry out their responsibilities under this Act, the designated Committees of both Houses of Congress
shall have the power within their respective jurisdictions, to render any opinion interpreting this Act, in writing, to
persons covered by this Act, subject in each instance to the approval by affirmative vote of the majority of the particular
House concerned.
The individual to whom an opinion is rendered, and any other individual involved in a similar factual situation, and who,
after issuance of the opinion acts in good faith in accordance with it shall not be subject to any sanction provided in this
Act.

(c) The heads of other offices shall perform the duties stated in subsections (a) and (b) hereof insofar as their respective
offices are concerned, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice, in the case of the Executive Department and
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, in the case of the Judicial Department.

Section 11. Penalties. - (a) Any public official or employee, regardless of whether or not he holds office or employment in
a casual, temporary, holdover, permanent or regular capacity, committing any violation of this Act shall be punished
with a fine not exceeding the equivalent of six (6) months' salary or suspension not exceeding one (1) year, or removal
depending on the gravity of the offense after due notice and hearing by the appropriate body or agency. If the violation
is punishable by a heavier penalty under another law, he shall be prosecuted under the latter statute. Violations of
Sections 7, 8 or 9 of this Act shall be punishable with imprisonment not exceeding five (5) years, or a fine not exceeding
five thousand pesos (P5,000), or both, and, in the discretion of the court of competent jurisdiction, disqualification to
hold public office.

(b) Any violation hereof proven in a proper administrative proceeding shall be sufficient cause for removal or dismissal
of a public official or employee, even if no criminal prosecution is instituted against him.

(c) Private individuals who participate in conspiracy as co-principals, accomplices or accessories, with public officials or
employees, in violation of this Act, shall be subject to the same penal liabilities as the public officials or employees and
shall be tried jointly with them.

(d) The official or employee concerned may bring an action against any person who obtains or uses a report for any
purpose prohibited by Section 8 (D) of this Act. The Court in which such action is brought may assess against such person
a penalty in any amount not to exceed twenty-five thousand pesos (P25,000). If another sanction hereunder or under
any other law is heavier, the latter shall apply.

Section 12. Promulgation of Rules and Regulations, Administration and Enforcement of this Act. - The Civil Service
Commission shall have the primary responsibility for the administration and enforcement of this Act. It shall transmit all
cases for prosecution arising from violations of this Act to the proper authorities for appropriate action: Provided,
however, That it may institute such administrative actions and disciplinary measures as may be warranted in accordance
with law. Nothing in this provision shall be construed as a deprivation of the right of each House of Congress to discipline
its Members for disorderly behavior.

The Civil Service Commission is hereby authorized to promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out the
provisions of this Act, including guidelines for individuals who render free voluntary service to the Government. The
Ombudsman shall likewise take steps to protect citizens who denounce acts or omissions of public officials and
employees which are in violation of this Act.
Section 13. Provisions for More Stringent Standards. - Nothing in this Act shall be construed to derogate from any law, or
any regulation prescribed by any body or agency, which provides for more stringent standards for its official and
employees.

Section 14. Appropriations. - The sum necessary for the effective implementation of this Act shall be taken from the
appropriations of the Civil Service Commission. Thereafter, such sum as may be needed for its continued
implementation shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.

Section 15. Separability Clause. - If any provision of this Act or the application of such provision to any person or
circumstance is declared invalid, the remainder of the Act or the application of such provision to other persons or
circumstances shall not be affected by such declaration.

Section 16. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees and orders or parts thereof inconsistent herewith, are deemed repealed
or modified accordingly, unless the same provide for a heavier penalty.

Section 17. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect after thirty (30) days following the completion of its publication in the
Official Gazette or in two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.

Approved, February 20, 1989.

*SECURITY OF TENURE

Republic Act No. 6656 June 10, 1988

AN ACT TO PROTECT THE SECURITY OF TENURE OF CIVIL SERVICE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

Section 1. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to protect the security of tenure of civil service officers and
employees in the reorganization of the various agencies of the National Government and of local governments, state
colleges and universities expressly authorized by law, including government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters, without sacrificing the need to promote morale, efficiency in the civil service pursuant to Article IX, B,
Section 3 of the Constitution.

Section 2. No officer or employee in the career service shall be removed except for a valid cause and after due notice
and hearing. A valid cause for removal exists when, pursuant to a bona fide reorganization, a position has been
abolished or rendered redundant or there is a need to merge, divide, or consolidate positions in order to meet the
exigencies of the service, or other lawful causes allowed by the Civil Service Law. The existence of any or some of the
following circumstances may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removals made as a result of reorganization,
giving rise to a claim for reinstatement or reappointment by an aggrieved party:

(a) Where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the department or
agency concerned;

(b) Where an office is abolished and other performing substantially the same functions is created;
(c) Where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance and merit;

(d) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the department or agency concerned and the reclassified offices
perform substantially the same function as the original offices;

(e) Where the removal violates the order of separation provided in Section 3 hereof.

Section 3. In the separation of personnel pursuant to reorganization, the following order of removal shall be followed:

(a) Casual employees with less than five (5) years of government service;

(b) Casual employees with five (5) years or more of government service;

(c) Employees holding temporary appointments; and

(d) Employees holding permanent appointments: provided, that those in the same category as enumerated above, who
are least qualified in terms of performance and merit shall be laid first, length of service notwithstanding.

Section 4. Officers and employees holding permanent appointments shall be given preference for appointment to the
new positions in the approved staffing pattern comparable to their former position or in case there are not enough
comparable positions, to positions next lower in rank.

No new employees shall be taken in until all permanent officers and employees have been appointed, including
temporary and casual employees who possess the necessary qualification requirements, among which is the appropriate
civil service eligibility, for permanent appointment to positions in the approved staffing pattern, in case there are still
positions to be filled, unless such positions are policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature.

Section 5. Officers and employees holding permanent appointments shall be given preference for appointment in other
agencies if they meet the qualification requirements of the positions therein.

Section 6. In order that the best qualified and most deserving persons shall be appointed in any reorganization, there
shall be created a Placement Committee in each appointments shall be given preference for appointment in the
judicious selection and placement of personnel. The Committee shall consist of two (2) members appointed by the head
of the department or agency, a representative of the appointing authority, and two (2) members duly elected by the
employees holding positions in the first and second levels of the career service: provided, that if there is a registered
employee association with a majority of the employees as members, that employee association shall also have a
representative in the Committee: provided, further that immediately upon approval of the staffing pattern of the
department or agency concerned, such staffing pattern shall be made known to all officers and employees of the agency
who shall be invited to apply for any of the positions authorized therein. Said application shall be considered by the
Committee in the placement and selection of personnel.

Section 7. A list of the personnel appointed to the authorized positions in the approved staffing pattern shall be made
known to all the officers and employees of the department or agency. Any of such officers and employees aggrieved by
the appointments made may file an appeal with the appointing authority who shall make a decision within thirty (30)
days from the filling thereof.
Section 8. An officer or employee who is still not satisfied with the decision of the appointing authority may further
appeal within ten (10) days from the receipt thereof to the Civil Services Commission which shall render a decision
thereon within thirty (30) days and whose decision shall be final and executory.

Section 9. All officers and employees who are found by the Civil Service Commission to have been separated in violation
of the provisions of this Act, shall be ordered reinstated or reappointed as the case may be without loss of seniority and
shall be entitled to full pay for the period of separation. Unless also separated for cause, all officers and employees, who
have been separated pursuant to reorganization shall, if entitled thereto, be paid the appropriate separation pay and
retirement and other benefits under existing laws within ninety (90) days from the date of the effectivity of their
separation or from the date of the receipt of the resolution of their appeals as the case may be: provided, that
application for clearance has been filed and no action thereon has been made by the corresponding department or
agency. Those who are not entitled to said benefits shall be paid a separation gratuity in the amount equivalent to one
(1) month salary for every year of service. Such separation pay and retirement benefits shall have priority of payment
out of the savings of the department or agency concerned.

Section 10. All heads of department, commissions, bureaus, agencies or offices who after the effectivity of this Act
willfully violate any provision thereof, including failure to abide by the rules promulgated by the Civil Service
Commission or to implement a Civil Service Commission reinstatement order, shall upon conviction be punished by a
fine not, exceeding ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) or by imprisonment of not less than three (3) nor more than five (5)
years or both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the Court, and suffer permanent disqualification to hold
public office.

Section 11. The executive branch of the government shall implement reorganization schemes within a specified period
of time authorized by law.

In the case of the 1987 reorganization of the executive branch, all departments and agencies which are authorized by
executive orders promulgated by the President to reorganize shall have ninety (90) days from the approval of this Act
within which to implement their respective reorganization plans in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

Section 12. The Civil Service Commission shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to implement the
provisions of this Act.

CC

Article 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without
just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against the latter, without
prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.

Article 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates
or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the
latter for damages:

(1) Freedom of religion;

(2) Freedom of speech;

(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;

(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;

(5) Freedom of suffrage;

(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;

(7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;

(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;

(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures;

(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;

(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;

(12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law;

(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the Government for redress of grievances;

(14) The right to be a free from involuntary servitude in any form;

(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;

(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witness in his behalf;

(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or from
being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such confession, except when the person confessing
becomes a State witness;

(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is imposed or inflicted in
accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional; and

(19) Freedom of access to the courts.

In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or omission constitutes a criminal
offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for
other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and
may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.

The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of
the Penal Code or other penal statute.

Article 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render aid or protection to any person in
case of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages, and the city or municipality
shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action herein recognized shall be independent of any criminal
proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such action.

ADMIN CODE
Section 38. Liability of Superior Officers. - (1) A public officer shall not be civilly liable for acts done in the performance of
his official duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence.
(2) Any public officer who, without just cause, neglects to perform a duty within a period fixed by law or regulation, or
within a reasonable period if none is fixed, shall be liable for damages to the private party concerned without prejudice
to such other liability as may be prescribed by law.
(3) A head of a department or a superior officer shall not be civilly liable for the wrongful acts, omissions of duty,
negligence, or misfeasance of his subordinates, unless he has actually authorized by written order the specific act or
misconduct complained of.

Section 39. Liability of Subordinate Officers. -No subordinate officer or employee shall be civilly liable for acts done by
him in good faith in the performance of his duties. However, he shall be liable for willful or negligent acts done by him
which are contrary to law, morals, public policy and good customs even if he acted under orders or instructions of his
superiors.

Title Seven
CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS
Chapter One
PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS

Art. 203. Who are public officers. — For the purpose of applying the provisions of this and the preceding titles of this
book, any person who, by direct provision of the law, popular election or appointment by competent authority, shall
take part in the performance of public functions in the Government of the Philippine Islands, of shall perform in said
Government or in any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent or subordinate official, of any rank or class,
shall be deemed to be a public officer.
Chapter Two
MALFEASANCE AND MISFEASANCE IN OFFICE
Section One. — Dereliction of duty

Art. 204. Knowingly rendering unjust judgment. — Any judge who shall knowingly render an unjust judgment in any case
submitted to him for decision, shall be punished by prision mayor and perpetual absolute disqualification.
Art. 205. Judgment rendered through negligence. — Any judge who, by reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance
shall render a manifestly unjust judgment in any case submitted to him for decision shall be punished by arresto mayor
and temporary special disqualification.
Art. 206. Unjust interlocutory order. — Any judge who shall knowingly render an unjust interlocutory order or decree
shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period and suspension; but if he shall have acted by reason of
inexcusable negligence or ignorance and the interlocutory order or decree be manifestly unjust, the penalty shall be
suspension.

Art. 207. Malicious delay in the administration of justice. — The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period
shall be imposed upon any judge guilty of malicious delay in the administration of justice.

Art. 208. Prosecution of offenses; negligence and tolerance. — The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period
and suspension shall be imposed upon any public officer, or officer of the law, who, in dereliction of the duties of his
office, shall maliciously refrain from instituting prosecution for the punishment of violators of the law, or shall tolerate
the commission of offenses.

Art. 209. Betrayal of trust by an attorney or solicitor. — Revelation of secrets. — In addition to the proper administrative
action, the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period, or a fine ranging from 200 to 1,000 pesos, or both,
shall be imposed upon any attorney-at-law or solicitor ( procurador judicial) who, by any malicious breach of
professional duty or of inexcusable negligence or ignorance, shall prejudice his client, or reveal any of the secrets of the
latter learned by him in his professional capacity.

The same penalty shall be imposed upon an attorney-at-law or solicitor

(procurador judicial) who, having undertaken the defense of a client or having received confidential information from
said client in a case, shall undertake the defense of the opposing party in the same case, without the consent of his first
client.
Section Two. — Bribery

Art. 210. Direct bribery. — Any public officer who shall agree to perform an act constituting a crime, in connection with
the performance of this official duties, in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present received by such officer,
personally or through the mediation of another, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium and maximum
periods and a fine [of not less than the value of the gift and] not less than three times the value of the gift in addition to
the penalty corresponding to the crime agreed upon, if the same shall have been committed.
If the gift was accepted by the officer in consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute a crime, and
the officer executed said act, he shall suffer the same penalty provided in the preceding paragraph; and if said act shall
not have been accomplished, the officer shall suffer the penalties of prision correccional, in its medium period and a fine
of not less than twice the value of such gift.

If the object for which the gift was received or promised was to make the public officer refrain from doing something
which it was his official duty to do, he shall suffer the penalties of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine
[of not less than the value of the gift and] not less than three times the value of such gift.

In addition to the penalties provided in the preceding paragraphs, the culprit shall suffer the penalty of special
temporary disqualification.
The provisions contained in the preceding paragraphs shall be made applicable to assessors, arbitrators, appraisal and
claim commissioners, experts or any other persons performing public duties. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 872,
June 10, 1985).

Art. 211. Indirect bribery. — The penalties of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, and public
censure shall be imposed upon any public officer who shall accept gifts offered to him by reason of his office. (As
amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 872, June 10, 1985).

Art. 212. Corruption of public officials. — The same penalties imposed upon the officer corrupted, except those of
disqualification and suspension, shall be imposed upon any person who shall have made the offers or promises or given
the gifts or presents as described in the preceding articles.
Chapter Three
FRAUDS AND ILLEGAL EXACTIONS AND TRANSACTIONS
Art. 213. Frauds against the public treasury and similar offenses. — The penalty of prision correccional in its medium
period to prision mayor in its minimum period, or a fine ranging from 200 to 10,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed
upon any public officer who:
1. In his official capacity, in dealing with any person with regard to furnishing supplies, the making of contracts, or the
adjustment or settlement of accounts relating to public property or funds, shall enter into an agreement with any
interested party or speculator or make use of any other scheme, to defraud the Government;
2. Being entrusted with the collection of taxes, licenses, fees and other imposts, shall be guilty or any of the following
acts or omissions:

(a) Demanding, directly, or indirectly, the payment of sums different from or larger than those authorized by law.
(b) Failing voluntarily to issue a receipt, as provided by law, for any sum of money collected by him officially.

(c) Collecting or receiving, directly or indirectly, by way of payment or otherwise things or objects of a nature different
from that provided by law.

When the culprit is an officer or employee of the Bureau of Internal Revenue or the Bureau of Customs, the provisions of
the Administrative Code shall be applied.
Art. 214. Other frauds. — In addition to the penalties prescribed in the provisions of Chapter Six, Title Ten, Book Two, of
this Code, the penalty of temporary special disqualification in its maximum period to perpetual special disqualification
shall be imposed upon any public officer who, taking advantage of his official position, shall commit any of the frauds or
deceits enumerated in said provisions.

Art. 215. Prohibited transactions. — The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period or a fine ranging from 200
to 1,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any appointive public officer who, during his incumbency, shall directly
or indirectly become interested in any transaction of exchange or speculation within the territory subject to his
jurisdiction.

Art. 216. Possession of prohibited interest by a public officer. — The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period to
prision correccional in its minimum period, or a fine ranging from 200 to 1,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon a
public officer who directly or indirectly, shall become interested in any contract or business in which it is his official duty
to intervene.

This provisions is applicable to experts, arbitrators and private accountants who, in like manner, shall take part in any
contract or transaction connected with the estate or property in appraisal, distribution or adjudication of which they
shall have acted, and to the guardians and executors with respect to the property belonging to their wards or estate.
Chapter Four
MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS OR PROPERTY

Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation. — Any public officer who, by reason of
the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same or shall take or
misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public
funds, or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds
or property, shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved in the
misappropriation or malversation does not exceed two hundred pesos.
2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount involved is more than two hundred
pesos but does not exceed six thousand pesos.

3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period, if the amount
involved is more than six thousand pesos but is less than twelve thousand pesos.

4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved is more than twelve
thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two thousand pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.

In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a fine
equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon
demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to
personal use. (As amended by RA 1060).

Art. 218. Failure of accountable officer to render accounts. — Any public officer, whether in the service or separated
therefrom by resignation or any other cause, who is required by law or regulation to render account to the Insular
Auditor, or to a provincial auditor and who fails to do so for a period of two months after such accounts should be
rendered, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum period, or by a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos,
or both.

Art. 219. Failure of a responsible public officer to render accounts before leaving the country. — Any public officer who
unlawfully leaves or attempts to leave the Philippine Islands without securing a certificate from the Insular Auditor
showing that his accounts have been finally settled, shall be punished by arresto mayor, or a fine ranging from 200 to
1,000 pesos or both.
Art. 220. Illegal use of public funds or property. — Any public officer who shall apply any public fund or property under
his administration to any public use other than for which such fund or property were appropriated by law or ordinance
shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from one-half to the total of the
sum misapplied, if by reason of such misapplication, any damages or embarrassment shall have resulted to the public
service. In either case, the offender shall also suffer the penalty of temporary special disqualification.

If no damage or embarrassment to the public service has resulted, the penalty shall be a fine from 5 to 50 per cent of
the sum misapplied.

Art. 221. Failure to make delivery of public funds or property. — Any public officer under obligation to make payment
from Government funds in his possession, who shall fail to make such payment, shall be punished by arresto mayor and
a fine from 5 to 25 per cent of the sum which he failed to pay.

This provision shall apply to any public officer who, being ordered by competent authority to deliver any property in his
custody or under his administration, shall refuse to make such delivery.

The fine shall be graduated in such case by the value of the thing, provided that it shall not less than 50 pesos.

Art. 222. Officers included in the preceding provisions. — The provisions of this chapter shall apply to private individuals
who in any capacity whatever, have charge of any insular, provincial or municipal funds, revenues, or property and to
any administrator or depository of funds or property attached, seized or deposited by public authority, even if such
property belongs to a private individual.
Chapter Five
INFIDELITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
Section One. — Infidelity in the custody of prisoners

Art. 223. Conniving with or consenting to evasion. — Any public officer who shall consent to the escape of a prisoner in
his custody or charge, shall be punished:
1. By prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and temporary special disqualification in its maximum
period to perpetual special disqualification, if the fugitive shall have been sentenced by final judgment to any penalty.
2. By prision correccional in its minimum period and temporary special disqualification, in case the fugitive shall not have
been finally convicted but only held as a detention prisoner for any crime or violation of law or municipal ordinance.

Art. 224. Evasion through negligence. — If the evasion of the prisoner shall have taken place through the negligence of
the officer charged with the conveyance or custody of the escaping prisoner, said officer shall suffer the penalties of
arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period and temporary special
disqualification.
Art. 225. Escape of prisoner under the custody of a person not a public officer. — Any private person to whom the
conveyance or custody or a prisoner or person under arrest shall have been confided, who shall commit any of the
offenses mentioned in the two preceding articles, shall suffer the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed for
the public officer.
Section Two. — Infidelity in the custody of document
Art. 226. Removal, concealment or destruction of documents. — Any public officer who shall remove, destroy or conceal
documents or papers officially entrusted to him, shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos, whenever serious damage shall have been caused
thereby to a third party or to the public interest.
2. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium period and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos,
whenever the damage to a third party or to the public interest shall not have been serious.

In either case, the additional penalty of temporary special disqualification in its maximum period to perpetual
disqualification shall be imposed.
Art. 227. Officer breaking seal. — Any public officer charged with the custody of papers or property sealed by proper
authority, who shall break the seals or permit them to be broken, shall suffer the penalties of prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods, temporary special disqualification and a fine not exceeding 2,000 pesos.

Art. 228. Opening of closed documents. — Any public officer not included in the provisions of the next preceding article
who, without proper authority, shall open or shall permit to be opened any closed papers, documents or objects
entrusted to his custody, shall suffer the penalties or arresto mayor, temporary special disqualification and a fine of not
exceeding 2,000 pesos.
Section Three. — Revelation of secrets

Art. 229. Revelation of secrets by an officer. — Any public officer who shall reveal any secret known to him by reason of
his official capacity, or shall wrongfully deliver papers or copies of papers of which he may have charge and which should
not be published, shall suffer the penalties of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, perpetual special
disqualification and a fine not exceeding 2,000 pesos if the revelation of such secrets or the delivery of such papers shall
have caused serious damage to the public interest; otherwise, the penalties of prision correccional in its minimum
period, temporary special disqualification and a fine not exceeding 50 pesos shall be imposed.
Art. 230. Public officer revealing secrets of private individual. — Any public officer to whom the secrets of any private
individual shall become known by reason of his office who shall reveal such secrets, shall suffer the penalties of arresto
mayor and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos. chan robles virtual law library
Chapter Six
OTHER OFFENSES OR IRREGULARITIES BY PUBLIC OFFICERS

Art. 231. Open disobedience. — Any judicial or executive officer who shall openly refuse to execute the judgment,
decision or order of any superior authority made within the scope of the jurisdiction of the latter and issued with all the
legal formalities, shall suffer the penalties of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum
period, temporary special disqualification in its maximum period and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos.
Art. 232. Disobedience to order of superior officers, when said order was suspended by inferior officer. — Any public
officer who, having for any reason suspended the execution of the orders of his superiors, shall disobey such superiors
after the latter have disapproved the suspension, shall suffer the penalties of prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods and perpetual special disqualification.

Art. 233. Refusal of assistance. — The penalties of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its
minimum period, perpetual special disqualification and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos, shall be imposed upon a public
officer who, upon demand from competent authority, shall fail to lend his cooperation towards the administration of
justice or other public service, if such failure shall result in serious damage to the public interest, or to a third party;
otherwise, arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed.

Art. 234. Refusal to discharge elective office. — The penalty of arresto mayor or a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos, or
both, shall be imposed upon any person who, having been elected by popular election to a public office, shall refuse
without legal motive to be sworn in or to discharge the duties of said office.

Art. 235. Maltreatment of prisoners. — The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its
minimum period, in addition to his liability for the physical injuries or damage caused, shall be imposed upon any public
officer or employee who shall overdo himself in the correction or handling of a prisoner or detention prisoner under his
charge, by the imposition of punishment not authorized by the regulations, or by inflicting such punishment in a cruel
and humiliating manner.

If the purpose of the maltreatment is to extort a confession, or to obtain some information from the prisoner, the
offender shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum period, temporary special disqualification and a fine
not exceeding 500 pesos, in addition to his liability for the physical injuries or damage caused.
Section Two. — Anticipation, prolongation
and abandonment of the duties and powers of public office.

Art. 236. Anticipation of duties of a public office. — Any person who shall assume the performance of the duties and
powers of any public officer or employment without first being sworn in or having given the bond required by law, shall
be suspended from such office or employment until he shall have complied with the respective formalities and shall be
fined from 200 to 500 pesos.
Art. 237. Prolonging performance of duties and powers. — Any public officer shall continue to exercise the duties and
powers of his office, employment or commission, beyond the period provided by law, regulation or special provisions
applicable to the case, shall suffer the penalties of prision correccional in its minimum period, special temporary
disqualification in its minimum period and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos.

Art. 238. Abandonment of office or position. — Any public officer who, before the acceptance of his resignation, shall
abandon his office to the detriment of the public service shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor.

If such office shall have been abandoned in order to evade the discharge of the duties of preventing, prosecuting or
punishing any of the crime falling within Title One, and Chapter One of Title Three of Book Two of this Code, the
offender shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, and by arresto mayor if the
purpose of such abandonment is to evade the duty of preventing, prosecuting or punishing any other crime.
Section Three. — Usurpation of powers and unlawful appointments

Art. 239. Usurpation of legislative powers. — The penalties of prision correccional in its minimum period, temporary
special disqualification and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos, shall be imposed upon any public officer who shall
encroach upon the powers of the legislative branch of the Government, either by making general rules or regulations
beyond the scope of his authority, or by attempting to repeal a law or suspending the execution thereof.
Art. 240. Usurpation of executive functions. — Any judge who shall assume any power pertaining to the executive
authorities, or shall obstruct the latter in the lawful exercise of their powers, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in
its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period.
Art. 241. Usurpation of judicial functions. — The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in
its minimum period and shall be imposed upon any officer of the executive branch of the Government who shall assume
judicial powers or shall obstruct the execution of any order or decision rendered by any judge within its jurisdiction.

Art. 242. Disobeying request for disqualification. — Any public officer who, before the question of jurisdiction is decided,
shall continue any proceeding after having been lawfully required to refrain from so doing, shall be punished by arresto
mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos.

Art. 243. Orders or requests by executive officers to any judicial authority. — Any executive officer who shall address any
order or suggestion to any judicial authority with respect to any case or business coming within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the courts of justice shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos.

Art. 244. Unlawful appointments. — Any public officer who shall knowingly nominate or appoint to any public office any
person lacking the legal qualifications therefor, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 1,000
pesos.
Section Four. — Abuses against Chastity

Art. 245. Abuses against chastity; Penalties. — The penalties of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods
and temporary special disqualification shall be imposed:
1. Upon any public officer who shall solicit or make immoral or indecent advances to a woman interested in matters
pending before such officer for decision, or with respect to which he is required to submit a report to or consult with a
superior officer;
2. Any warden or other public officer directly charged with the care and custody of prisoners or persons under arrest
who shall solicit or make immoral or indecent advances to a woman under his custody.

If the person solicited be the wife, daughter, sister of relative within the same degree by affinity of any person in the
custody of such warden or officer, the penalties shall be prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods and
temporary special disqualification.

REPUBLIC ACT No. 3019

ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT

Section 1. Statement of policy. It is the policy of the Philippine Government, in line with the principle that a public office
is a public trust, to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which constitute graft or corrupt
practices or which may lead thereto.

Section 2. Definition of terms. As used in this Act, that term

(a) "Government" includes the national government, the local governments, the government-owned and government-
controlled corporations, and all other instrumentalities or agencies of the Republic of the Philippines and their branches.
(b) "Public officer" includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the
classified or unclassified or exempt service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government as defined in
the preceding subparagraph.

(c) "Receiving any gift" includes the act of accepting directly or indirectly a gift from a person other than a member of
the public officer's immediate family, in behalf of himself or of any member of his family or relative within the fourth
civil degree, either by consanguinity or affinity, even on the occasion of a family celebration or national festivity like
Christmas, if the value of the gift is under the circumstances manifestly excessive.

(d) "Person" includes natural and juridical persons, unless the context indicates otherwise.

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by
existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

(a) Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules and
regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, or
allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit such violation or offense.

(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any
other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the Government and any other part, wherein the
public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law.

(c) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present or other pecuniary or material benefit, for himself or for
another, from any person for whom the public officer, in any manner or capacity, has secured or obtained, or will secure
or obtain, any Government permit or license, in consideration for the help given or to be given, without prejudice to
Section thirteen of this Act.

(d) Accepting or having any member of his family accept employment in a private enterprise which has pending official
business with him during the pendency thereof or within one year after its termination.

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

(f) Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time
on any matter pending before him for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the
matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage, or for the purpose of favoring his own interest or giving undue
advantage in favor of or discriminating against any other interested party.

(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to
the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.
(h) Director or indirectly having financing or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection
with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any
law from having any interest.

(i) Directly or indirectly becoming interested, for personal gain, or having a material interest in any transaction or act
requiring the approval of a board, panel or group of which he is a member, and which exercises discretion in such
approval, even if he votes against the same or does not participate in the action of the board, committee, panel or
group.

Interest for personal gain shall be presumed against those public officers responsible for the approval of manifestly
unlawful, inequitable, or irregular transaction or acts by the board, panel or group to which they belong.

(j) Knowingly approving or granting any license, permit, privilege or benefit in favor of any person not qualified for or not
legally entitled to such license, permit, privilege or advantage, or of a mere representative or dummy of one who is not
so qualified or entitled.

(k) Divulging valuable information of a confidential character, acquired by his office or by him on account of his official
position to unauthorized persons, or releasing such information in advance of its authorized release date.

The person giving the gift, present, share, percentage or benefit referred to in subparagraphs (b) and (c); or offering or
giving to the public officer the employment mentioned in subparagraph (d); or urging the divulging or untimely release
of the confidential information referred to in subparagraph (k) of this section shall, together with the offending public
officer, be punished under Section nine of this Act and shall be permanently or temporarily disqualified in the discretion
of the Court, from transacting business in any form with the Government.

Section 4. Prohibition on private individuals. (a) It shall be unlawful for any person having family or close personal
relation with any public official to capitalize or exploit or take advantage of such family or close personal relation by
directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any present, gift or material or pecuniary advantage from any other person
having some business, transaction, application, request or contract with the government, in which such public official
has to intervene. Family relation shall include the spouse or relatives by consanguinity or affinity in the third civil degree.
The word "close personal relation" shall include close personal friendship, social and fraternal connections, and
professional employment all giving rise to intimacy which assures free access to such public officer.

(b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or cause any public official to commit any of the offenses
defined in Section 3 hereof.

Section 5. Prohibition on certain relatives. It shall be unlawful for the spouse or for any relative, by consanguinity or
affinity, within the third civil degree, of the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President of the Philippines, the
President of the Senate, or the Speaker of the House of Representatives, to intervene, directly or indirectly, in any
business, transaction, contract or application with the Government: Provided, That this section shall not apply to any
person who, prior to the assumption of office of any of the above officials to whom he is related, has been already
dealing with the Government along the same line of business, nor to any transaction, contract or application already
existing or pending at the time of such assumption of public office, nor to any application filed by him the approval of
which is not discretionary on the part of the official or officials concerned but depends upon compliance with requisites
provided by law, or rules or regulations issued pursuant to law, nor to any act lawfully performed in an official capacity
or in the exercise of a profession.

Section 6. Prohibition on Members of Congress. It shall be unlawful hereafter for any Member of the Congress during
the term for which he has been elected, to acquire or receive any personal pecuniary interest in any specific business
enterprise which will be directly and particularly favored or benefited by any law or resolution authored by him
previously approved or adopted by the Congress during the same term.

The provision of this section shall apply to any other public officer who recommended the initiation in Congress of the
enactment or adoption of any law or resolution, and acquires or receives any such interest during his incumbency.

It shall likewise be unlawful for such member of Congress or other public officer, who, having such interest prior to the
approval of such law or resolution authored or recommended by him, continues for thirty days after such approval to
retain such interest.

Section 7. Statement of assets and liabilities. Every public officer, within thirty days after the approval of this Act or after
assuming office, and within the month of January of every other year thereafter, as well as upon the expiration of his
term of office, or upon his resignation or separation from office, shall prepare and file with the office of the
corresponding Department Head, or in the case of a Head of Department or chief of an independent office, with the
Office of the President, or in the case of members of the Congress and the officials and employees thereof, with the
Office of the Secretary of the corresponding House, a true detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities,
including a statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and
the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year: Provided, That public officers assuming office less
than two months before the end of the calendar year, may file their statements in the following months of January.

Section 8. Dismissal due to unexplained wealth. If in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act Numbered One
thousand three hundred seventy-nine, a public official has been found to have acquired during his incumbency, whether
in his name or in the name of other persons, an amount of property and/or money manifestly out of proportion to his
salary and to his other lawful income, that fact shall be a ground for dismissal or removal. Properties in the name of the
spouse and unmarried children of such public official may be taken into consideration, when their acquisition through
legitimate means cannot be satisfactorily shown. Bank deposits shall be taken into consideration in the enforcement of
this section, notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary.

Section 9. Penalties for violations. (a) Any public officer or private person committing any of the unlawful acts or
omissions enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment for not less than one
year nor more than ten years, perpetual disqualification from public office, and confiscation or forfeiture in favor of the
Government of any prohibited interest and unexplained wealth manifestly out of proportion to his salary and other
lawful income.

Any complaining party at whose complaint the criminal prosecution was initiated shall, in case of conviction of the
accused, be entitled to recover in the criminal action with priority over the forfeiture in favor of the Government, the
amount of money or the thing he may have given to the accused, or the value of such thing.
(b) Any public officer violation any of the provisions of Section 7 of this Act shall be punished by a fine of not less than
one hundred pesos nor more than one thousand pesos, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both such
fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the Court.

The violation of said section proven in a proper administrative proceeding shall be sufficient cause for removal or
dismissal of a public officer, even if no criminal prosecution is instituted against him.

Section 10. Competent court. Until otherwise provided by law, all prosecutions under this Act shall be within the original
jurisdiction of the proper Court of First Instance.

Section 11. Prescription of offenses. All offenses punishable under this Act shall prescribe in ten years.

Section 12. Termination of office. No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation, criminal
or administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under this Act or under the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code on bribery.

Section 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid
information under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, shall be
suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under
any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to
receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.

Section 14. Exception. Unsolicited gifts or presents of small or insignificant value offered or given as a mere ordinary
token of gratitude or friendship according to local customs or usage, shall be excepted from the provisions of this Act.

Nothing in this Act shall be interpreted to prejudice or prohibit the practice of any profession, lawful trade or occupation
by any private person or by any public officer who under the law may legitimately practice his profession, trade or
occupation, during his incumbency, except where the practice of such profession, trade or occupation involves
conspiracy with any other person or public official to commit any of the violations penalized in this Act.

Section 15. Separability clause. If any provision of this Act or the application of such provision to any person or
circumstances is declared invalid, the remainder of the Act or the application of such provision to other persons or
circumstances shall not be affected by such declaration.

Section 16. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect on its approval, but for the purpose of determining unexplained wealth,
all property acquired by a public officer since he assumed office shall be taken into consideration.

Approved: August 17, 1960

REPUBLIC ACT No. 1379

AN ACT DECLARING FORFEITURE IN FAVOR OF THE STATE ANY PROPERTY FOUND TO HAVE BEEN UNLAWFULLY
ACQUIRED BY ANY PUBLIC OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE AND PROVIDING FOR THE PROCEEDINGS THEREFOR.
Section 1. Definitions. (a) For the purposes of this Act, a "public officer or employee" means any person holding any
public office or employment by virtue of an appointment, election or contract, and any person holding any office or
employment, by appointment or contract, in any State owned or controlled corporation or enterprise.

(b) "Other legitimately acquired property" means any real or personal property, money or securities which the
respondent has at any time acquired by inheritance and the income thereof, or by gift inter vivos before his becoming a
public officer or employee, or any property (or income thereof) already pertaining to him when he qualified for public
office or employment, or the fruits and income of the exclusive property of the respondent's spouse. It shall not include:

1. Property unlawfully acquired by the respondent, but its ownership is concealed by its being recorded in the name of,
or held by, the respondent's spouse, ascendants, descendants, relatives, or any other person.

2. Property unlawfully acquired by the respondent, but transferred by him to another person or persons on or after the
effectivity of this Act.

3. Property donated to the respondent during his incumbency, unless he can prove to the satisfaction of the court that
the donation is lawful.

Section 2. Filing of petition. Whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount of
property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful
income and the income from legitimately acquired property, said property shall be presumed prima facie to have been
unlawfully acquired. The Solicitor General, upon complaint by any taxpayer to the city or provincial fiscal who shall
conduct a previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in criminal cases and shall certify to the Solicitor General
that there is reasonable ground to believe that there has been committed a violation of this Act and the respondent is
probably guilty thereof, shall file, in the name and on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, in the Court of First
Instance of the city or province where said public officer or employee resides or holds office, a petition for a writ
commanding said officer or employee to show cause why the property aforesaid, or any part thereof, should not be
declared property of the State: Provided, That no such petition shall be filed within one year before any general election
or within three months before any special election.

The resignation, dismissal or separation of the officer or employee from his office or employment in the Government or
in the Government-owned or controlled corporation shall not be a bar to the filing of the petition: Provided, however,
That the right to file such petition shall prescribe after four years from the date of the resignation, dismissal or
separation or expiration of the term of the office or employee concerned, except as to those who have ceased to hold
office within ten years prior to the approval of this Act, in which case the proceedings shall prescribe after four years
from the approval hereof.

Section 3. The petition. The petition shall contain the following information:

(a) The name and address of the respondent.

(b) The public officer or employment he holds and such other public offices or employment which he has previously
held.
(c) The approximate amount of property he has acquired during his incumbency in his past and present offices and
employments.

(d) A description of said property, or such thereof as has been identified by the Solicitor General.

(e) The total amount of his government salary and other proper earnings and incomes from legitimately acquired
property, and

(f) Such other information as may enable the court to determine whether or not the respondent has unlawfully acquired
property during his incumbency.

Section 4. Period for the answer. The respondent shall have a period of fifteen days within which to present his answer.

Section 5. Hearing. The Court shall set a date for a hearing, which may be open to the public, and during which the
respondent shall be given ample opportunity to explain, to the satisfaction of the court, how he has acquired the
property in question.

Section 6. Judgment. If the respondent is unable to show to the satisfaction of the court that he has lawfully acquired
the property in question, then the court shall declare such property, forfeited in favor of the State, and by virtue of such
judgment the property aforesaid shall become property of the State: Provided, That no judgment shall be rendered
within six months before any general election or within three months before any special election. The Court may, in
addition, refer this case to the corresponding Executive Department for administrative or criminal action, or both.

Section 7. Appeal. The parties may appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance as provided in the Rules of
Court for appeals in civil cases.

Section 8. Protection against self-incrimination. Neither the respondent nor any other person shall be excused from
attending and testifying or from producing books, papers, correspondence, memoranda and other records on the
ground that the testimony or evidence, documentary or otherwise, required of him may tend to incriminate him or
subject him to prosecution; but no individual shall be prosecuted criminally for or on account of any transaction, matter
or thing concerning which he is compelled, after having claimed his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or
produce evidence, documentary or otherwise, except that such individual so testifying shall not be exempt from
prosecution and conviction for perjury or false testimony committed in so testifying or from administrative proceedings.

Section 9. Immunity. The Solicitor General may grant immunity from criminal prosecution to any person who testifies to
the unlawful manner in which the respondent has acquired any of the property in question in cases where such
testimony is necessary to prove violations of this Act.

Section 10. Effect of record of title. The fact that any real property has been recorded in the Registry of Property or
office of the Register of Deeds in the name of the respondent or of any person mentioned in paragraphs (1) and (2) of
subsection (b) of section one hereof shall not prevent the rendering of the judgment referred to in section six of this Act.
Section 11. Laws on prescription. The laws concerning acquisitive prescription and limitation of actions cannot be
invoked by, nor shall they benefit the respondent, in respect of any property unlawfully acquired by him.

Section 12. Penalties. Any public officer or employee who shall, after the effective date of this Act, transfer or convey
any unlawfully acquired property shall be repressed with imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, or a fine not
exceeding ten thousand pesos, or both such imprisonment and fine. The same repression shall be imposed upon any
person who shall knowingly accept such transfer or conveyance.

Section 13. Separability of provisions. If any provision of this Act or the application thereof to any person or
circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of the Act and the application of such provision to other persons or
circumstances shall not be affected thereby.

Section 14. Effective date. This Act shall take effect on its approval, and shall apply not only to property thereafter
unlawfully acquired but also to property unlawfully acquired before the effective date of this Act.

Approved: June 18, 1955

82. Torres vs Ribo 81 Phil 44

FACTS:
The protestant, Bernardo Torres, and the defendants, Mamerto S. Ribo and Alejandro Balderian, were opposing
candidates for provincial governor of Leyte in the general elections held on November 11, 1947. As Mamerto S. Ribo, who
was provincial governor, and two members of the provincial board were candidates, they are disqualified to form parts of
the provincial board of canvassers of which they were to be members under section 158 of the Revised Election Code.
Consequently, and in pursuance of Section 159, the Commission on Elections, in a telegram to the provincial treasurer
dated November 20 and received on November 21 in Tacloban, Leyte, appointed the division superintendent of schools,
the district engineer and the district health officer to replace the disqualified members, with advice that they might assume
office upon receipt of their appointments. It so happened that the division superintendent of schools and the district
engineer were on that date on the west coast of the province and did not return to Tacloban until the 24th. In the
meantime, on November 22, F. Martinez, provincial treasurer, as chairman, Gregorio Abogado, provincial fiscal, Vicente
Tizon, assistant civil engineer in the district engineer's office, Evaristo Pascual, chief clerk in the office of the division
superintendent of schools, and W. Enage, acting district health officer, canvassed the votes for provincial governor and
other officers and proclaimed "Mamerto S. Ribo as Governor-elect." Vicente Tizon and Evaristo Pascual sat as members
"representing the district engineer and the division superintendent of schools respectively.
On November 24, 1947, the provincial board of canvassers again met, the meeting this time being attended by the
provincial treasurer, the provincial fiscal, the district health officer, the division superintendent of schools, the district
engineer and the provincial auditor. In that meeting the board made a new canvass of the votes and proclaimed Mamerto
S. Ribo elected to the office of provincial governor.
ISSUE:
1. WON assistant civil engineer Vicente Tizon and chief clerk Evaristo Pascual lawful members of the provincial board of
canvassers?
2. WON Tizon and Pascual can be considered as de facto officers?
HELD:
1. NO. It does not appear, and there is no pretense on the part of the protestee, that the division superintendent
of schools and the district engineer delegated their authority to Pascual and Tizon. Upon whose instance or
suggestion these two presumed to act in representation of their chiefs is nor shown.
Section 158 of the Revised Election Code designates the officers who are to comprise the provincial board of canvassers,
and section 159 enumerates the officers to be appointed substitute members by the Commission on Elections in case of
the absence or incapacity of any of the members named in the next preceding section. They are the division
superintendent of schools, the district health officer, the register of deeds, the clerk of the Court of First
Instance, and the justice of the peace of the provincial capital.
This express enumeration excludes other officers. Expresio unius est exclusio alterius. Not even the Commission on
Elections may lawfully appoint any of the person or officer outside of those mentioned. Much less may anyone other than
this officers act as the member of the provincial board of canvasser by delegation by a substitute members, by the
indication of other members of the board, or of his own volition. The appointment of a substitute member is personal
and restricted and his powers must be performed directly and in person by the appointee. To hold otherwise
would be to authorize the appointment, say, by the provincial treasurer, the provincial auditor, or the provincial
fiscal of another person to act in his stead and thus take away from the hands of the Commission on Elections
the authority to appoint under section 159.

An officer to whom a discretion is entrusted cannot delegate it to another. The powers of the board of canvassers are
not purely ministerial, as the court below erroneously holds. The board excercise quasi judicial functions, such as the
function and duty to determine whether the papers transmitted to them are genuine election returns signed by the proper
officers. Thus, where what purports to be two or more returns from the same municipality are received, the canvassing
board must necessarily determine from the face of the papers which one shall be regarded as the true and genuine return.
(20 C. J., 201-202.).

2. NO. An officer de facto is one who has the reputation of being the officer he assumes to be, and yet is not a good
officer in point of law. He must have 1) acted as an officer for such a length of time, 2) under color of title and 3)
under such circumstances of reputation or acquiescence by the public and public authorities, as to afford a
presumption of appointment or election, and induce people, without injury, and relying on the supposition that he is the
officer he assumes to be, to submit to or invoke his action. (46 C. J., 1053.)

Tizon and Pascual did not possess any of these conditions. They acted without any appointment, commission or
any color of title to the office. There was no acquiescence, public or private, in their discharge of the position. In
fact the very person most greatly affected by their assumption of the office, Bernardo Torres, was not notified
and was not unaware of it.

CASE DIGEST: FILIPINA SAMSON v. JULIA A. RESTRIVERA. (G.R. No. 178454; March 28, 2011)

FACTS: Petitioner, a government officer from the Population Commission, agreed to help her friend, respondent Julia A.
Restrivera, to have the latter’s land located in Carmona, Cavite, registered under the Torrens System. Petitioner said that
the expenses would reach P150,000 and accepted P50,000 from respondent to cover the initial expenses for the titling
of respondents land. However, petitioner failed to accomplish her task because it was found out that the land is
government property. When petitioner failed to return theP50,000, respondent sued her for estafa. Respondent also
filed an administrative complaint for grave misconduct or conduct unbecoming a public officer against petitioner before
the Office of the Ombudsman.

The Ombudsman found petitioner guilty of violating Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 and suspended her from office for six
months without pay. It was reduced to three months suspension without pay. According to the Ombudsman, petitioners
acceptance of respondents payment created a perception that petitioner is a fixer. Her act fell short of the standard of
personal conduct required by Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 that public officials shall endeavor to discourage wrong
perceptions of their roles as dispensers or peddlers of undue patronage. The CA affirmed, and added that contrary to
petitioners contentions, the Ombudsman has jurisdiction even if the act complained of is a private matter.

ISSUES: Has the Ombudsman jurisdiction even if the act was private? Has the proper offense been identified?

HELD: Section 13(1), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution states that the Ombudsman can investigate on its own or on
complaint by any person any act or omission of any public official. Under Section 16of R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known
as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance,
and nonfeasance committed by any public officer or employee during his/her tenure. Section 19 of R.A. No. 6770 also
states that the Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not limited, to acts or omissions which are unfair or
irregular. Thus, even if the complaint concerns an act of the public official or employee which is not service-
connected, the case is within the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. The law does not qualify.

Both the Ombudsman and CA interpreted Section 4(A) of R.A. No. 6713 as broad enough to apply even to private
transactions that have no connection to the duties of one’s office. However, that petitioner may not be penalized for
violation of Section 4 (A)(b) of R.A. No. 6713. In Domingo v. Office of the Ombudsman, this Court had ruled that failure
to abide by the norms of conduct under Section 4(A)(b) of R.A. No. 6713, in relation to its implementing rules, is not a
ground for disciplinary action. Nevertheless, for reneging on her promise to return aforesaid amount, petitioner is
guilty of conduct unbecoming a public officer. In Assistant Special Prosecutor III Rohermia J. Jamsani-Rodriguez v.
Justices Gregory S. Ong, et al., unbecoming conduct means improper performance and applies to a broader range of
transgressions of rules not only of social behavior but of ethical practice or logical procedure or prescribed method.

Respondent is found GUILTY of conduct unbecoming a public officer, and is FINED P15,000.00 to be paid at the Office of
the Ombudsman.

BAYBAY WATER DISTRICT, ET AL. v. COA, G.R. No. 147248-49, January 23, 2002 (Water districts are GOCCs subject to
the jurisdiction of the COA; As a rule, per diem is the compensation of members of board of directors of water district)
 “In Davao City Water District v. CSC, that water districts are government-owned and controlled corporations subject to the
jurisdiction of the COA.”
 “It is obvious that the Salary Standardization Law does not apply to petitioners because directors of water districts are
in fact limited to policy-making and are prohibited from the management of the districts. P.D. No. 198, Section 18
described the functions of members of board of directors of water districts as follows: xxx.”
 “Under Section 13 of this Decree (P.D. 198), per diem is precisely intended to be the compensation of members of board of
directors of water districts. Indeed, words and phrases in a statute must be given their natural, ordinary and commonly-
accepted meaning, due regard being given to the context in which the words and phrases are used. By specifying the
compensation which a director is entitled to receive and by limiting the amount he/she is allowed to receive in a month, and,
in the same paragraph, providing “No director shall receive other compensation” than the amount provided for per diems, the
law quite clearly indicates that directors of water districts are authorized to receive only the per diem authorized by law and
no other compensation or allowance in whatever form.”
 “Unlike P.D. No. 198, Section 13, the Charter of NAPOCOR expressly granted members of its board of directors the right to
receive allowance in addition to their per diems, subject only to the approval of the Secretary of Energy.
 “The erroneous application and enforcement of the law by public officers does not estop the Government from making a
subsequent correction of such errors. xxx. Practice without more, no matter how long continued, cannot give rise to any
vested right if it is contrary to law.”
 “It is well-settled that findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies, such as the COA, are generally accorded respect and even
finality by this Court, if supported by substantial evidence, in recognition of their expertise on the specific matters under their
jurisdiction.”
GSIS v. CSC
G.R. No. 98395 & 102449 June 19, 1995 Kapunan Enad
petitioners GSIS
respondents CSC and (1) Dr. Manuel Baradero, (2) Matilde Belo
summary Respondents paid on a per diem basis. CSC ruled that such periods should be considered
creditable for computing their length of service for retirement purposes. GSIS and SC: not
creditable, per Sec. 1(c), RA 1573. Held: Reconsidered. The “per diem” paid to them was
actual compensation for their service; nature of remuneration, not label, is controlling.
facts of the case (resolution)

Belo – Vice-Gov of Capiz from 5 Jan 1972 – 1 Feb 1988.

+ From 31 Dec 1979 to 1 Feb 1988: held the position in a holdover capacity broken
down into 2 periods1—

(1) 31 Dec 1976 to 31 Dec 1979, where she was paid on a per diem basis reckoned
on the attendance in Board Meetings;

(2) 1 Jan 1980 to 1 Feb 1988, paid a fixed salary.

+ During holdover: served on a full time basis and was on call 24 hrs. a day.

+ CSC Resolution: services rendered for the 1st holdover period was creditable for
purposes of retirement.

Baradero – Sangguniang Bayan member of the Municipality of La Castellana,

Negros Occidental between 1 Jan 1976 – 10 Oct 1978, paid on a per diem basis.

+ Former army member and served as a medical officer of the Philippine Medicare
Commission.

+ Rendered full services to the government.

+ CSC Resolution: (Based on Belo) recognized the period served as SB mem as

creditable for retirement purposes instead of allowing him his petition for extension of
service in order to complete the 15-yr period of service required for the purpose of
qualifying for retirement benefits.

GSIS: per diems are not compensation within the meaning of Sec. 1(c), RA 15732.

SC Decision: Certiorari granted. Government service rendered on a per diem basis is

not creditable in computing the length of service for retirement purposes.

issue

WoN the GSIS is the proper government agency to determine what service is creditable for retirement
purposes. YES. But issue raised and discussed only in dissent.

WoN regular service in government on a per diem basis, without any other form of
compensation or emolument, is compensation within the contemplation of the term
‘service with compensation’ under the Government Service Insurance Act of 1987. YES.

ratio

+ Even if what they received were denominated as “per diem”, the amounts received
were actually in the nature of a compensation or pay.

+ Test: Nature of the remuneration, not the label.

+ (Belo) The “per diem” she received was actually paid for in the performance of her
duties as VG of Capiz in a hold over capacity not as the per diem referred to in Sec. 1(c).

+ Legislative intent: Make a clear distinction between salary, pay or compensation

vs. other incidental allowances, including per diems.

1 Nalabuan din ako, sabi sa case 1979 onwards yung hold over tapos yung pagbreakdown ng periods from
1976. Ewan ko haha.
2 (c) Salary, pay or compensation shall be construed as to exclude all bonuses, per diems, allowances and

overtime pay, or salary, pay or compensation given to the base pay of the position or rank as fixed by law or
regulations.
 + GR: An allowance for expenses incident to the discharge of an office is not a salary
of office.

Thus, if remuneration received by a public official in the performance of his duties

does not constitute a mere “allowance for expenses” but appears to be his actually
base pay, then no amount of categorizing the salary as “per diem” would take the
allowances from the term service with compensation for the purpose of computing the
number of years of service in government.

+ “Per diem” as used in the GSI Act: a daily allowance given for each day an officer
or employee of government is away from his home base.

- A reimbursement for extra expenses incurred by the public official in the

performance of his duties.
- Intended to cover the cost of lodging and subsistence of officers and
employees when they are on duty outside of their permanent station.
- BUT, in general, it could also be considered as compensation or
remuneration attached to an office.
- applies to Belo and Baradero.

+ Fact missed in the SC decision: Belo was subsequently paid a fixed salary, which
apparently rectified an otherwise anomalous situation.

+ Retirement benefits are in effect rewards for the government employees for
giving the best years of their lives to the service of the country. Basis for provision of
retirement benefits = service to government. While a government insurance system is
partly dependent on contributions made by the members, the fact that these
contributions are minimal when compared to the amount of retirement benefits actually
received shows that such contributions, while necessary, are not absolutely
determinative in drawing up criteria for those who would qualify as recipients of the
retirement benefit system.

+ Argument: They cannot avail themselves of the benefits of the policy because no
deductions were made from their salaries during the disputed periods.

SC: (Belo) She was not duly informed that the short period was not to be
credited in computing the length of her service for retirement purposes. She assumed
all in good faith that she continued to be covered by the GSIS insurance benefits
considering that the deductions are virtually mandatorily made from all government
employees on an essentially involuntary basis.

(Baradero) If he had been informed of the need to pay the required deductions,
he would have willingly paid the required sums.

-The contract between the GSIS and the government employee is done on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis = a virtual contract of adhesion which gives the
employee no choice but to involuntarily accede to the deductions made from
their oftentimes meager salaries.
+ Source of GSIS benefits not in essence merely contractual, but also a social
legislation clearly indicated in the whereas clauses of PD 11463.

3 WHEREAS, provisions of existing laws that have prejudiced, rather than benefited, the government employee;
restricted, rather than broadened, his benefits, prolonged, rather than facilitated the payment of benefits, must now
yield to his paramount welfare;
WHEREAS, the social security and insurance benefits of government employees must be continuously re-examined and
improved to assure comprehensive and integrated social security and insurance programs that will provide benefits
responsive to their needs and those of their dependents in the event of sickness, disability, death, retirement, and other
contingencies; and to serve as a fitting reward for dedicated public service;
WHEREAS, in the light existing economic conditions affecting the welfare of government employees there is a need to
expand and improve the social security and insurance programs administered by the Government Service Insurance
Systems, specifically, among others, by increasing pension benefits, expanding disability benefits, introducing
survivorship benefits, introducing sickness income benefits, and eventually extending the compulsory coverage of
these programs to all government employees regardless of employment status.
 + Situation can be rectified by deducting a reasonable amount corresponding to the
contributions which should have been deducted from the retirement benefits.

- Grossly inequitable to permanently penalize them by ignoring the fact of

actual period of service to government with compensation, and deny them
the retirement privileges that they justly deserve.

QUIASON DISSENT

+ Raised a third issue: WoN respondents may avail of retirement benefits

notwithstanding his failure make contributions to the GSIS for the duration he was
receiving per diem as compensation.

+ First issue: GSIS has the power to determine what service is creditable, as PD 1146
vests such power to it.

+ Second issue: The nomenclature given to the basic salary paid a government
employee is not controlling in determining the service that is creditable for retirement
purposes; what is important is that the pay is given for full time work.

+ Third issue: The obligation to pay premiums is equally essential as the period
of services rendered.

- Prior to LGC, LGUs were not compulsorily covered by the GSI Act (RA 186).
However, RA 1573, amending RA 186, allowed the optional coverage under the
government insurance system, subject to certain requirements4.

- Belo never became a GSIS member during her term as VG, nor did she
contribute to the System. She had an option of continuing her membership by
complying with the requirements in Sec. 4(b), but she failed to do so.

+ GSIS only obligated to grant retirement benefits to its members. Obligation exists
where there is a contract of life or retirement insurance between GSIS and the
government employee, as evidenced by a GSIS policy.

+ Premiums payable by the members are the lifeblood of the retirement scheme.

- Unjust for Belo to compel GSIS to grant her the benefits when she never
remitted the employer’s and her share of contributions for the disputed period.

- Would result in an inequitable situation where GSIS is exposed to a risk

without the benefit of receiving any contribution or premium.

- Only fair that GSIS be entitled to payment of premiums as soon as it is exposed

to the risk ensured against, whether it be life or annuity insurance.

+Most liberal application of ruling: Limit it to cases where the retiree has paid the
corresponding retirement premiums during said period.

4(1) the employee notifies the System in writing; (2) the employee complies with the requirements of the System
and that he is in government service when the insurance takes effect; and (3) after his admission, the
employee shall be eligible to either life or retirement insurance benefits, or to both, for which the rates of the
premiums or contributions shall be paid by him, including the share otherwise payable by his employer (Sec.
4[b]).
FUNA VS. VILLAR

MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ

DENNIS A. B. FUNA, PETITIONER, VS. THE CHAIRMAN, COA, REYNALDO A.

VILLAR

G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012

FACTS: Funa challenges the constitutionality of the appointment of Reynaldo A. Villar

as Chairman of the COA.

Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 and during the fourth year of
Villar as COA Commissioner, Villar was designated as Acting Chairman of COA from
February 4, 2008 to April 14, 2008. Subsequently, on April 18, 2008, Villar was
nominated and appointed as Chairman of the COA. Shortly thereafter, on June 11, 2008,
the Commission on Appointments confirmed his appointment. He was to serve as
Chairman of COA, as expressly indicated in the appointment papers, until the
expiration of the original term of his office as COA Commissioner or on February 2,
2011. Challenged in this recourse, Villar, in an obvious bid to lend color of title to his
hold on the chairmanship, insists that his appointment as COA Chairman accorded him
a fresh term of 7 years which is yet to lapse. He would argue, in fine, that his term of
office, as such chairman, is up to February 2, 2015, or 7 years reckoned from February 2,
2008 when he was appointed to that position.

Before the Court could resolve this petition, Villar, via a letter dated February 22, 2011
addressed to President Benigno S. Aquino III, signified his intention to step down from
office upon the appointment of his replacement. True to his word, Villar vacated his
position when President Benigno Simeon Aquino III named Ma. Gracia Pulido-Tan
(Chairman Tan) COA Chairman. This development has rendered this petition and the
main issue tendered therein moot and academic.

Although deemed moot due to the intervening appointment of Chairman Tan and the
resignation of Villar, We consider the instant case as falling within the requirements for
review of a moot and academic case, since it asserts at least four exceptions to the
mootness rule discussed in David vs Macapagal Arroyo namely:

a. There is a grave violation of the Constitution;

b. The case involves a situation of exceptional character and is of paramount public

interest;

c. The constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of controlling principles to

guide the bench, the bar and the public;

d. The case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

The procedural aspect comes down to the question of whether or not the following
requisites for the exercise of judicial review of an executive act obtain in this petition,
viz:

a. There must be an actual case or justiciable controversy before the court

b. The question before it must be ripe for adjudication;

c. The person challenging the act must be a proper party; and

d. The issue of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity and must be
the very litis mota of the case
ISSUES:

a. WON the petitioner has Locus Standi to bring the case to court

b. WON Villar’s appointment as COA Chairman, while sitting in that body and after
having served for four (4) years of his seven (7) year term as COA commissioner, is valid
in light of the term limitations imposed under, and the circumscribing concepts tucked
in, Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution

HELD:

Issue of Locus Standi: This case before us is of transcendental importance, since it

obviously has “far-reaching implications,” and there is a need to promulgate rules that
will guide the bench, bar, and the public in future analogous cases. We, thus, assume a
liberal stance and allow petitioner to institute the instant petition.

In David vs Macapagal Arroyo, the Court laid out the bare minimum norm before the
so-called “non-traditional suitors” may be extended standing to sue, thusly:

a. For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the
tax measure is unconstitutional;

b. For voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election
law in question

c. For concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of
transcendental importance which must be settled early; and

d. For legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes
their prerogatives as legislators.

On the substantive issue:

Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution provides that:

(2) The Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall be appointed by the President
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years,
one commissioner for five years, and the other commissioner for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of
the term of the predecessor. In no case shall any member be appointed or designated in
a temporary or acting capacity.

Petitioner now asseverates the view that Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the 1987 Constitution
proscribes reappointment of any kind within the commission, the point being that a
second appointment, be it for the same position (commissioner to another position of
commissioner) or upgraded position (commissioner to chairperson) is a prohibited
reappointment and is a nullity ab initio.

The Court finds petitioner’s position bereft of merit. The flaw lies in regarding the word
“reappointment” as, in context, embracing any and all species of appointment. The rule
is that if a statute or constitutional provision is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it
must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.

The first sentence is unequivocal enough. The COA Chairman shall be appointed by the
President for a term of seven years, and if he has served the full term, then he can no
longer be reappointed or extended another appointment. In the same vein, a
Commissioner who was appointed for a term of seven years who likewise served the
full term is barred from being reappointed. In short, once the Chairman or
Commissioner shall have served the full term of seven years, then he can no longer be
reappointed to either the position of Chairman or Commissioner. The obvious intent of
the framers is to prevent the president from “dominating” the Commission by allowing
him to appoint an additional or two more commissioners.

On the other hand, the provision, on its face, does not prohibit a promotional
appointment from commissioner to chairman as long as the commissioner has not
served the full term of seven years, further qualified by the third sentence of Sec. 1(2),
Article IX (D) that “the appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired
portion of the term of the predecessor.” In addition, such promotional appointment to
the position of Chairman must conform to the rotational plan or the staggering of terms
in the commission membership such that the aggregate of the service of the
Commissioner in said position and the term to which he will be appointed to the
position of Chairman must not exceed seven years so as not to disrupt the rotational
system in the commission prescribed by Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).

In conclusion, there is nothing in Sec. 1(2), Article IX(D) that explicitly precludes a
promotional appointment from Commissioner to Chairman, provided it is made under
the aforestated circumstances or conditions.

The Court is likewise unable to sustain Villar’s proposition that his promotional
appointment as COA Chairman gave him a completely fresh 7- year term––from
February 2008 to February 2015––given his four (4)-year tenure as COA commissioner
devalues all the past pronouncements made by this Court. While there had been
divergence of opinion as to the import of the word “reappointment,” there has been
unanimity on the dictum that in no case can one be a COA member, either as
chairman or commissioner, or a mix of both positions, for an aggregate term of more
than 7 years. A contrary view would allow a circumvention of the aggregate 7-year
service limitation and would be constitutionally offensive as it would wreak havoc to
the spirit of the rotational system of succession.

In net effect, then President Macapagal-Arroyo could not have had, under any
circumstance, validly appointed Villar as COA Chairman, for a full 7- year appointment,
as the Constitution decrees, was not legally feasible in light of the 7-year aggregate rule.
Villar had already served 4 years of his 7-year term as COA Commissioner. A shorter
term, however, to comply with said rule would also be invalid as the corresponding
appointment would effectively breach the clear purpose of the Constitution of giving to
every appointee so appointed subsequent to the first set of commissioners, a fixed term
of office of 7 years. To recapitulate, a COA commissioner like respondent Villar who
serves for a period less than seven (7) years cannot be appointed as chairman when such
position became vacant as a result of the expiration of the 7-year term of the predecessor
(Carague). Such appointment to a full term is not valid and constitutional, as the
appointee will be allowed to serve more than seven (7) years under the constitutional
ban.

To sum up, the Court restates its ruling on Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution, viz:

1. The appointment of members of any of the three constitutional commissions, after the
expiration of the uneven terms of office of the first set of commissioners, shall always be
for a fixed term of seven (7) years; an appointment for a lesser period is void and
unconstitutional. The appointing authority cannot validly shorten the full term of seven
(7) years in case of the expiration of the term as this will result in the distortion of the
rotational system prescribed by the Constitution.
2. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death, resignation, disability
or impeachment) shall only be for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor,
but such appointments cannot be less than the unexpired portion as this will likewise
disrupt the staggering of terms laid down under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).

3. Members of the Commission, e.g. COA, COMELEC or CSC, who were appointed for a
full term of seven years and who served the entire period, are barred from
reappointment to any position in the Commission. Corollarily, the first appointees in the
Commission under the Constitution are also covered by the prohibition against
reappointment.

4. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven
years is eligible for an appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired
portion of the term of the departing chairman. Such appointment is not covered by
the ban on reappointment, provided that the aggregate period of the length of service
as commissioner and the unexpired period of the term of the predecessor will not
exceed seven (7) years and provided further that the vacancy in the position of
Chairman resulted from death, resignation, disability or removal by impeachment.
The Court clarifies that “reappointment” found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a
movement to one and the same office (Commissioner to Commissioner or Chairman
to Chairman). On the other hand, an appointment involving a movement to a
different position or office (Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute a new
appointment and, hence, not, in the strict legal sense, a reappointment barred under
the Constitution.

4. Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or designated in a

temporary or acting capacity.

Cuevas et al. v. Bacal, [G.R. No. 139382. December 6, 2000]

14 OCT

FACTS

This case involves the appointment and transfer of career executive service officers
(CESOs). More specifically, it concerns the “appointment” of respondent Josefina G.
Bacal, who holds the rank of CESO III, to the position of Chief Public Attorney in the
Public Attorney’s Office, which has a CES Rank Level I, and her subsequent transfer,
made without her consent, to the Office of the Regional Director of the PAO because of
the appointment of Atty. Carina Demaisip to the position of Chief Public Defender
(formerly Chief Public Attorney). Atty. Bacal filed a petition for quo warranto ruled in
her favor by the Court of Appeals. Hence this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUES

Whether:

(1) Bacal is entitled of security of tenure considering that she belongs to Career Service;

(2) security of tenure in the Career Executive Service is acquired with respect to the
position or to the rank the officer is holding;

(3) CESOs may be shifted from one position to another without violating their security
of tenure;

(4) Bacal’s unconsented transfer from Acting Chief Public Attorney to Regional Director
constitutes a demotion;

RULING
(1) No. The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not
automatically confer security of tenure on its occupant even if he does not possess the
required qualifications. Such right will have to depend on the nature of his
appointment, which in turn depends on his eligibility or lack of it. A person who
does not have the requisite qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in
the first place or, only as an exception to the rule, may be appointed to it merely in an
acting capacity in the absence of appropriate eligibles. Here, Atty. Bacal has a rank of
CESO III “appointed” to a position of CESO I. The appointment extended to him
cannot be regarded as permanent even if it may be so designated.

(2) Security of tenure in the career executive service is acquired with respect to rank and
not to position. The guarantee of security of tenure to members of the CES does not
extend to the particular positions to which they may be appointed a concept which is
applicable only to first and second-level employees in the civil service but to the rank to
which they are appointed by the President. Here, respondent did not acquire security
of tenure by the mere fact that she was appointed to the higher position of Chief
Public Attorney since she was not subsequently appointed to the rank of CESO I
based on her performance in that position as required by the rules of the CES Board.

(3) Yes. Members of the Career Executive Service may be reassigned or transferred from
one position to another and from one department, bureau or office to another; provided
that such reassignment or transfer is made in the interest of public service and involves
no reduction in rank or salary; provided, further, that no member shall be reassigned or
transferred oftener than every two years. If a CESO is assigned to a CES position with
a higher salary grade than that of his CES rank, he is allowed to receive the salary of
the CES position. Should he be assigned or made to occupy a CES position with a
lower salary grade, he shall continue to be paid the salary attached to his CES rank.
Here, there is a valid transfer of Atty. Bacal to the Regional Office as it was made in
the interest of public service and she is still compensated according to her CES rank.

(4) No. Respondent’s appointment to the position of Chief Public Attorney was
merely temporary and that, consequently, her subsequent transfer to the position of
Regional Director of the same office, which corresponds to her CESO rank, cannot be
considered a demotion, much less a violation of the security of tenure guarantee of
the Constitution. The rule that outlaws unconsented transfers as anathema to security
of tenure applies only to an officer who is appointed – not merely assigned – to a
particular station. Such a rule does not proscribe a transfer carried out under a specific
statute that empowers the head of an agency to periodically reassign the employees and
officers in order to improve the service of the agency.

G.R. No. 178021 : January 25, 2012

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,

Petitioner,v.MINERVA M.P. PACHEO, Respondent.

MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:

Pacheo was a Revenue Attorney IV, Assistant Chief of the Legal Division of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue (BIR) in Revenue Region No. 7 (RR7), Quezon City. The BIR issued
Revenue Travel Assignment Order (RTAO)No. 25-2002, ordering the reassignment of
Pacheo as Assistant Chief, Legal Division from RR7 in Quezon City to RR4 in San
Fernando, Pampanga.
Pacheo questioned the reassignment through her Letter addressed to Rene G. Banez,
then Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR). She considered her transfer from Quezon
City to Pampanga as amounting to a constructive dismissal.

Due to the then inaction of the BIR, Pacheo filed a complaint before the CSC- National
Capital Region (CSC-NCR), praying for the nullification of RTAO No. 25-2002. The BIR,
through its Deputy Commissioner for Legal and Inspection Group, Edmundo P.
Guevara (Guevara), denied Pacheos protest for lack of merit. It contended that her
reassignment could not be considered constructive dismissal as she maintained her
position as Revenue Attorney IV and was designated as Assistant Chief of Legal
Division.

Pacheo appealed to the CSC where the latter granted the same. However, the CSC held
that rules and so holds that the withholding by the BIR of her salaries is justified as she
is not entitled thereto since she is deemed not to have performed any actual work in the
government on the principle of no work no pay. Still not satisfied, Pacheo moved for
reconsideration. She argued that the CSC erred in not finding that she was
constructively dismissed and, therefore, entitled to back salary. However, the motion
was dismissed.

Undaunted, Pacheo sought recourse before the CA via a petition for review. The CA
reversed the CSC decision, stating that Pacheo was constructively dismissed. Hence,
this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that Pacheo was constructively dismissed
and entitled to backwages

HELD: No.

Political Law- transfer or assignment of personnel cannot be done when the same is a
preliminary step toward his removal or a scheme to lure him away from his
permanent position.

While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible even without the

employee's prior consent, it cannot be done when the transfer is a preliminary step
toward his removal, or a scheme to lure him away from his permanent position, or when
it is designed to indirectly terminate his service, or force his resignation. Such a transfer
would in effect circumvent the provision which safeguards the tenure of office of those
who are in the Civil Service.

Significantly, Section 6, Rule III of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, series of 1998,
defines constructive dismissal as a situation when an employee quits his work
because of the agency heads unreasonable, humiliating, or demeaning actuations
which render continued work impossible. Hence, the employee is deemed to have
been illegally dismissed. This may occur although there is no diminution or reduction
of salary of the employee. It may be a transfer from one position of dignity to a more
servile or menial job.

The CSC, through the OSG, contends that the deliberate refusal of Pacheo to report for
work either in her original station in Quezon City or her new place of assignment in San
Fernando, Pampanga negates her claim of constructive dismissal.
It is clear, however, from E.O. 292, Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A, Chapter 5, Section 26 (7)
that there is no such duty to first report to the new place of assignment prior to
questioning an alleged invalid reassignment imposed upon an employee. Pacheo was
well within her right not to report immediately to RR4, San Fernando, Pampanga, and to
question her reassignment.

Reassignments involving a reduction in rank, status or salary violate an employees

security of tenure, which is assured by the Constitution, the Administrative Code of
1987, and the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations. Security of tenure covers
not only employees removed without cause, but also cases of unconsented transfers and
reassignments, which are tantamount to illegal/constructive removal.

Having ruled that Pacheo was constructively dismissed, is she entitled to reinstatement
and back wages? The Court agrees with the CA that she is entitled to reinstatement,
but finds Itself unable to sustain the ruling that she is entitled to full back wages and
benefits. It is a settled jurisprudence that an illegally dismissed civil service employee is
entitled to back salaries but limited only to a maximum period of five (5) years, and not
full back salaries from his illegal dismissal up to his reinstatement.

Petition Denied

Pastor vs City of Pasig, G.R. No. 146873, May 9, 2002

Doctrine: Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, 26(7) of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987, provides:

Reassignment. An employee may be reassigned from one organizational unit to another in the
same agency: Provided, That such reassignment shall not involve a reduction in rank, status, or
salary.

It has been held that a reassignment that is indefinite and results in a reduction in rank, status,
and salary is in effect a constructive removal from the service

Facts: Petitioner Remedios Pastor is Budget Officer of the Municipality (now City) of Pasig. In
1992, she was reassigned to the Office of the Municipal Administrator pending investigation of
reports against her concerning the issuance of Advice of Allotments by her. In 1995, after three
years with no case filed against her, she asked for reinstatement to her former position. But she
was instead reassigned to another unit of the now city government. Upon her complaint, the
Civil Service Commission ordered her reinstatement as Budget Officer of the City of Pasig.
However, on appeal of the city government, the Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the
Civil Service Commission (CSC).

Issue: Whether or not the reassignment of the petitioner is valid?

Held: No.It has been held that a reassignment that is indefinite and results in a reduction in rank,
status, and salary is in effect a constructive removal from the service.[21] In this case, contrary to
the ruling of the Court of Appeals, petitioners reassignment to different offices in the local
government of Pasig City is indefinite. Petitioner has been on virtual floating assignments which
cannot but amount to a diminution of her rank, hence impermissible under the law.[22] As already
noted, her reassignment began in 1992 with her detail to the Office of the (now) City
Administrator pending investigation of reports that she had issued Advice of Allotments without
sufficient cash collections. However, no investigation appears to have ever been conducted on
the said charge. To justify her continuing reassignment, respondent City Mayor claimed that the
same was due to petitioners long years of experience in finance which especially fitted her for
studies regarding the citys revenues.

For the same reason, petitioners reassignment to various offices should be considered
more than merely a temporary one. For all intents and purposes, her reassignment, lasting
nearly ten years now, is a removal without cause as Budget Officer of the City of Pasig.

In contrast, as head of the Pasig City Hall Annex, petitioners budget proposals for the
same will be subject to review by the City Budget Officer. Moreover, the position of City
Budget Officer is created by statute, while that of the head of the Pasig City Hall Annex is created
by mere ordinance.
We agree with the CSC that petitioner should now be returned to her original position for her
indefinite detail to other positions would amount to her removal without cause from the position to
which she has been permanently appointed. As we said in Cruz v. Navarro:[26]

There is no question that we recognize the validity and indispensable necessity of the well
established rule that for the good of public service and whenever public interest demands, [a]
public official may be temporarily assigned or detailed to other duties even over his objection
without necessarily violating his fundamental and legal rights to security of tenure in the civil
service. But as we have already stated, such cannot be undertaken when the transfer of the
employee is with a view to his removal and if the transfer is resorted to as a scheme to lure the
employee away from his permanent position because such attitude is improper as it would in
effect result in a circumvention of the prohibition which safeguards the tenure of office of those
who are in the civil service.

GSIS v VELASCO NO DIGEST

G.R. No. 170132 December 6, 2006

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) and WINSTON F. GARCIA, in his capacity as
GSIS President & General Manager, petitioners,
vs.
KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA GSIS, respondents.

FACTS: Forming a huge part of the October 4 to October 7, 2004 mass action participants were
GSIS personnel, among them members of the herein respondent Kapisanan Ng Mga
Manggagawa sa GSIS (“KMG” or the “Union”), a public sector union of GSIS rank-and-file
employees.

On or about October 10, 2004, the manager of the GSIS Investigating Unit issued a
memorandum directing 131 union and non-union members to show cause why they should not
be charged administratively for their participation in said rally. In reaction, KMG’s counsel, Atty.
Manuel Molina, sought reconsideration of said directive on the ground, among others, that
the subject employees resumed work on October 8, 2004 in obedience to the return-to-work
order thus issued. The plea for reconsideration was, however, effectively denied by the filing,
on October 25, 2004, of administrative charges against some 110 KMG members for grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

KMG filed a petition for prohibition with the CA against these charges. The CA granted the
petition and enjoined the GSIS from implementing the issued formal charges and from issuing
other formal charges arising from the same facts and events.

CA equated the right to form associations with the right to engage in strike and similar activities
available to workers in the private sector. In the concrete, the appellate court concluded that
inasmuch as GSIS employees are not barred from forming, joining or assisting employees’
organization, petitioner Garcia could not validly initiate charges against GSIS employees waging
or joining rallies and demonstrations notwithstanding the service-disruptive effect of such mass
action.

ISSUE: WON the strike conducted by the GSIS employees were valid

HELD: NO

The 1987 Constitution expressly guaranteeing, for the first time, the right of government
personnel to self-organization to complement the provision according workers the right to
engage in “peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law.”.
It was against the backdrop of the aforesaid provisions of the 1987 Constitution that the Court
resolved Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals. In it, we held, citing MPSTA v. Laguio, Jr., that
employees in the public service may not engage in strikes or in concerted and unauthorized
stoppage of work; that the right of government employees to organize is limited to the
formation of unions or associations, without including the right to strike.

Specifically, the right of civil servants to organize themselves was positively recognized in
Association of Court of Appeals Employees vs. Ferrer-Caleja. But, as in the exercise of the rights
of free expression and of assembly, there are standards for allowable limitations such as the
legitimacy of the purpose of the association, [and] the overriding considerations of national
security.

As regards the right to strike, the Constitution itself qualifies its exercise with the provision “in
accordance with law.” This is a clear manifestation that the state may, by law, regulate the use
of this right, or even deny certain sectors such right. Executive Order 180 which provides
guidelines for the exercise of the right of government workers to organize, for instance,
implicitly endorsed an earlier CSC circular which “enjoins under pain of administrative
sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass
leaves, walkouts and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or
disruption of public service” by stating that the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted
activities and strikes in government service shall be observed.

Public employees going on disruptive unauthorized absences to join concerted mass actions
may be held liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

With the view we take of the events that transpired on October 4-7, 2004, what respondent’s
members launched or participated in during that time partoo k of a strike or, what contextually
amounts to the same thing, a prohibited concerted activity. The phrase “prohibited concerted
activity” refers to any collective activity undertaken by government employees, by themselves
or through their employees’ organization, with the intent of effecting work stoppage or service
disruption in order to realize their demands or force concessions, economic or otherwise; it
includes mass leaves, walkouts, pickets and acts of similar nature. Indeed, for four straight days,
participating KMG members and other GSIS employees staged a walk out and waged or
participated in a mass protest or demonstration right at the very doorstep of the GSIS main
office building. The record of attendance for the period material shows that, on the first day of
the protest, 851 employees, or forty eight per cent (48%) of the total number of employees in
the main office (1,756) took to the streets during office hours, from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m.,leaving the
other employees to fend for themselves in an office where a host of transactions take place
every business day. On the second day, 707 employees left their respective work stations, while
538 participated in the mass action on the third day. A smaller number, i.e., 306 employees, but
by no means an insignificant few, joined the fourth day activity.

In whatever name respondent desires to call the four-day mass action in October 2004, the
stubborn fact remains that the erring employees, instead of exploring non-crippling activities
during their free time, had taken a disruptive approach to attain whatever it was they were
specifically after. As events evolved, they assembled in front of the GSIS main office building
during office hours and staged rallies and protests, and even tried to convince others to join
their cause, thus provoking work stoppage and service-delivery disruption, the very evil sought
to be forestalled by the prohibition against strikes by government personnel.

To petitioner Garcia, as President and General Manager of GSIS, rests the authority and
responsibility, under Section 45 of Republic Act No. 8291, the GSIS Act of 1997, to remove,
suspend or otherwise discipline GSIS personnel for cause. At bottom then, petitioner Garcia, by
filing or causing the filing of administrative charges against the absenting participants of the
October 4-7, 2004 mass action, merely performed a duty expected of him and enjoined by law.
Regardless of the mood petitioner Garcia was in when he signed the charge sheet, his act can
easily be sustained as legally correct and doubtless within his jurisdiction.
 GSIS v. COA, G.R. No. 138381, Nov. 10, 2004

Facts:

On account of the consolidated cases of the parties involved, the Court promulgated a
decision, on the one hand, ordering the refund of amounts representing fringe benefits
granted to GSIS employees; and on the other, affirming the disallowance in excess of that
approved by the COA which was later on deducted by GSIS from the employees’
retirement benefits.

The GSIS retirees then filed a motion for amendatory and clarificatory judgment
(“amendatory motion”) asking the court whether the GSIS may lawfully deduct any
amount from their retirement benefits in light of Section 39 of Republic Act No. 8291.
The court then ruled that the said provision provides the Exemption of Retirement
benefits from Tax, Legal Process and Lien. As settled in several cases, retirement pay
accruing to a public officer may not be withheld and applied to his indebtedness to the
government. Hence, the GSIS employees retained their retirement benefits including
those which were properly disallowed by the COA.

Issues:

1. Whether the GSIS employees have the obligation to return the benefits which were
justifiably disallowed by the COA and erroneously granted to and received by them.

2. Whether GSIS can seek restoration of the amounts erroneously granted to and received
by the employees.

Held:

1. Yes. The GSIS employees resultantly retained benefits to which they were not legally
entitled which, in turn, gave rise to an obligation on their part to return the amounts
under the principle of solutio indebiti. Under Article 2154 of the Civil Code, if something
is received and unduly delivered through mistake when there is no right to demand it, the
obligation to return the thing arises.

2. Yes. While GSIS cannot directly proceed against its employees’ retirement
benefits, it can nonetheless seek restoration of the amounts by means of a proper
court action for its recovery. There is no prohibition against enforcing a final
monetary judgment against its employees’ other assets and properties. This is only
fair and consistent with basic principles of due process.

G.R. No. 128055, April 18, 2001

o Power of Sandiganbayan to suspend members of Congress vis-a-vis Congress'

prerogative to discipline its own members: the former is not punitive, the latter is

FACTS:

A group of employees of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) filed a

complaint for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against then CID
Commissioner Miriam Defensor-Santiago. It was alleged that petitioner, with evident
bad faith and manifest partiality in the exercise of her official functions, approved the
application for legalization of the stay of several disqualified aliens. The Sandiganbayan
then issued an order for her suspension effective for 90 days.

Facts: "That on or about October 17, 1988, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, a public
officer, being then the Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation, with evident bad
 faith and manifest partiality in the exercise of her official functions, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and criminally approve the application for legalization for the stay of the aliens in violation of
Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988 which prohibits the legalization of said disqualified
aliens knowing fully well that said aliens are disqualified thereby giving unwarranted benefits to said
aliens whose stay in the Philippines was unlawfully legalized by said accused."

ISSUE:

o Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has authority to decree a 90-day preventive suspension
against a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines

RULING:

The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent

public official charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both
legal and jurisprudential support. xxx

It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of

suspension upon determination of the validity of the information filed before it. Once the
information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to issue an
order of suspension as a matter of course, and there seems to be “no ifs and buts about
it.” Explaining the nature of the preventive suspension, the Court in the case of Bayot vs.
Sandiganbayan observed:

“x x x It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In

fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the
salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension.”

In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to

the clear an unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the
Court has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayan’s authority to decree the suspension
of public officials and employees indicted before it.

Power of Sandiganbayan to Decree Preventive Suspension vis-à-vis Congress’

Prerogative to Discipline its Members

The pronouncement, upholding the validity of the information filed against petitioner,
behooved Sandiganbayan to discharge its mandated duty to forthwith issue the order of
preventive suspension.

The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power
of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution which provides that each-
“x x x house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for
disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend
or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty
days.”

The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure

that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the house of Representatives, as
the case may be, upon an erring member.

xxx
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of
Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the
assailed preventive suspension order.

BAYBAY WATER DISTRICT, represented by ERNESTO D. FERNANDEZ, General Manager; ERLINDA MENDEZ, SAMUEL O. CANETE, NILO
RAMADA, DOMINGO COTIAMCO, BWD Board of Directors, and other similarly situated Officers and Board Members of BWD,
Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondent.

MENDOZA, J.:
This is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 64 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court for annulment of the decision, dated
September 21, 2000, of the Commission on Audit1 and its resolution, dated January 30, 2001, affirming the disallowance by the
Director, COA Regional Office No. VIII, of the payment of various benefits to members of the board of directors and officers of
petitioner Baybay Water District (BWD) in Baybay, Leyte.

The facts are as follows:

In 1996, the Resident Auditor of the BWD conducted an audit of its 1994 accounts. In the course of the audit, the auditor disallowed
payments of per diems in excess of those authorized by the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) and P. D. No. 198, RATA
(representation and transportation allowance) and rice allowances granted to the members of the board of directors of the BWD, as
well as duplication of claims for cash gifts as part of the Christmas bonus of the general manager and traveling allowance of the
officers of the BWD. The members of the board, namely, petitioners Domingo V. Cotiamco, Apolonio G. Medina, Nilo T. Ramada,
Virginia P. Espinosa, Ernesto L. Gorre, Antonio R. C. Palencia, Love Joy A. Fernandez, and Frank Bula, Administrative Division Chief
Erlinda A. Mendez, and then General Manager Francis H. P. Militante, the officers who had approved the release of these benefits,
were served with notices of disallowance. Ma. Josette B. Astorga, to whom rice allowances had been given, and the other
petitioners in this case were also served with similar notices.

On May 30, 1997, petitioners asked for a reconsideration, but the Resident Auditor denied their request on the ground that the
disallowance had become final and executory. Instead, she advised them to make their appeal to the Commission on Audit. The
BWD at first appealed to the COA Regional Office No. VIII at Tacloban City, which affirmed the findings of the Resident Auditor of
Baybay, Leyte, and then to the Commission on Audit. On September 21, 2000, the Commission rendered a decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is regretted that the instant appeal cannot be given due course for lack of merit. Accordingly,
the decision of the Director COA Regional Office No. VIII is hereby affirmed and the following persons cited in the various Notices of
Disallowances, namely:

Erlinda A. Mendez,

for approving the questioned

payment and at the same time

being payee;

Francis H. P. Militante

- do -

Domingo V. Cotiamco

as payee

Apolonio G. Medina - do - Nilo T. Ramada - do - Virginia P. Espinosa - do - Ernesto L. Gorre - do - Antonio R. C. Palencia - do - Ma.
Josette B. Astorga - do - Love Joy A. Fernandez - do -
Frank Bula- do - are held liable.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. As their motion was denied by the Commission on January 30, 2001, they filed the
present petition, alleging that the Commission erred in:

I. NOT HOLDING THAT THE GRANT OF THE SUBJECT BENEFITS TO THE DIRECTORS, OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF BWD, HAS LEGAL
BASIS, AND IS GUARANTEED BY THE CONSTITUTION.

II. HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO RECEIVE OTHER BENEFITS PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OF PD 198, AS
AMENDED.

III. NOT HOLDING THAT SECTION 13 OF P. D. 198, AS AMENDED, WAS ALREADY REPEALED AND/OR SUPERSEDED BY REPUBLIC ACT
6758, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE SALARY STANDARDIZATION LAW, WHICH TOOK EFFECT IN JULY, 1989.

IV. HOLDING THAT THE CONTINUED DISALLOWANCE OF THESE BENEFITS WOULD NOT VIOLATE THE POLICY OR RULE ON NON-
DIMINUTION OF BENEFITS AND THE EQUITY RULE.

V. NOT HOLDING THAT THE BENEFITS GRANTED TO BWD OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES IS A MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVE WHICH ACT
OR PRIVILEGE SHOULD ENJOY THE PRESUMPTION OF LEGALITY UNTIL OTHERWISE DECLARED BY THE COURTS AND THAT THE GRANT
OF THESE BENEFITS NOT ONLY APPLIES TO THE PERMANENT EMPLOYEES BUT ALSO TO THE OFFICERS AND MEMBERS OF THE
BOARD OF BWD.3

The issues raised in this case are as follows: (1) whether members of the board of directors of water districts are entitled to receive
benefits in addition to those authorized to be paid pursuant to their charter and the guidelines of the LWUA after the effectivity of R.
A. No. 6758; (2) whether the disallowance of duplication of claims of transportation allowance of various BWD employees, as well as
the grant of RATA, rice allowance, and excessive per diems to members of the board of directors of BWD, would impair vested
rights, violate any rule against diminution of benefits, and undermine the management prerogative of water districts; and (3)
whether the BWD officers and employees are entitled to receive benefits in excess of that authorized by law.
For the reasons hereafter given, we hold that petitioners are not entitled to receive benefits and allowances in excess of those
allowed by P.D. No. 198, the guidelines of the LWUA, and other applicable laws.

First. As far as the directors of the BWD are concerned, P. D. No. 198, 13, as amended by P. D. No. 768 and P. D. No. 1479, reads:

Compensation. - Each director shall receive a per diem, to be determined by the board, for each meeting of the board actually
attended by him, but no director shall receive per diems in any given month in excess of the equivalent of the total per diems of four
meetings in any given month. No director shall receive other compensation for services to the district.

Any per diem in excess of P50 shall be subject to approval of the Administration. (emphasis added)

Petitioners argue that the term "compensation" in the above provision does not include the allowances and per diems which had
been disallowed in this case. They cite P. D. No. 1146,4 2(i), as amended by R.A. No. 8291, which provides that "compensation"
means "the basic pay or salary by an employee, pursuant to his employment/appointment, excluding per diems, bonuses, overtime
pay, allowances and any other emoluments received in addition to the basic pay which are not integrated into the basic pay under
existing laws."

The contention is untenable. The statutory provision invoked refers to the basis for the computation of employer and employee
contributions to the GSIS as well as the benefits to which such employees are entitled. In the same manner, under 32 of the National
Internal Revenue Code, "compensation" includes fees, salaries, wages, commissions, and similar items for purposes of recognizing
taxable income. The definitions of the term "compensation" in these statutes are for limited purposes only and cannot be deemed
to comprehend such other purposes not specifically included in the provisions thereof.

Petitioners, also invoke the rulings of this Court in Kneebone v. NLRC,5 Vengco v. Trajano,6 and Philippine Duplicators, Inc. v. NLRC,7
to support their contention that the prohibition against the payment of compensation other than per diems does not include the
payment of allowances and other benefits.

These cases do not apply to this case. They refer to the exclusion made by this Court of allowances and other benefits from the
salaries of employees in the private sector, not to the compensation of members of the board of directors of water districts, whose
rights to compensation, as already stated, are governed by P. D. No. 198. Under 13 of this Decree, per diem is precisely intended to
be the compensation of members of board of directors of water districts. Indeed, words and phrases in a statute must be given their
natural, ordinary, and commonly-accepted meaning,8 due regard being given to the context in which the words and phrases are
used.9 By specifying the compensation which a director is entitled to receive and by limiting the amount he/she is allowed to receive
in a month, and, in the same paragraph, providing "No director shall receive other compensation" than the amount provided for per
diems, the law quite clearly indicates that directors of water districts are authorized to receive only the per diem authorized by law
and no other compensation or allowance in whatever form.

Second. Petitioners contend that the prohibition in P.D. No. 198, 13 against the grant of additional compensation to board members
must be deemed repealed by virtue of 2210 of R. A. No. 6758, otherwise known as the Salary Standardization Law, which took effect
on July 1, 1989. They contend that 13 of P.D. No. 198 is inconsistent with the following provisions of the Salary Standardization Law:

Sec. 12. Consolidation of Allowances and Compensation.-All allowances, except for representation and transportation allowances;
clothing and laundry allowances; subsistence allowance of marine officers and crew on board government vessels and hospital
personnel; hazard pay; allowances of foreign service personnel stationed abroad; and such other additional compensation not
otherwise specified herein as may be determined by the DBM, shall be deemed included in the standardized salary rates herein
prescribed. Such other additional compensation, whether in cash or in kind, being received by incumbents only as of July 1, 1989 not
integrated into the standardized salary rates shall continue to be authorized.

....

Sec. 17. Salaries of Incumbents.-Incumbents of positions presently receiving salaries and additional compensation/fringe benefits
including those absorbed from local government units and other emoluments, the aggregate of which exceeds the standardized
salary rate as herein prescribed, shall continue to receive such excess compensation, which shall be referred to as transition
allowance. The transition allowance shall be reduced by the amount of salary adjustment that the incumbent shall receive in the
future.

We do not agree. R. A. No. 6758, 4 specifically provides that the Salary Standardization Law applies to "positions, appointive or
elective, on full or part-time basis, now existing or hereafter created in the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations and government financial institutions." These positions, with their corresponding functions, are described as follows:

Sec. 5. Position Classification System. - The Position Classification System shall consist of classes of positions grouped into four main
categories, namely: professional supervisory, professional non-supervisory, sub-professional supervisory, and sub-professional non-
supervisory, and the rules and regulations for its implementation.

Categorization of these classes of positions shall be guided by the following considerations:

(a) Professional Supervisory Category. - This category includes responsible positions of a managerial character involving the exercise
of management functions such as planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling and overseeing within delegated
authority the activities of an organization, a unit thereof or of a group, requiring some degree of professional, technical or scientific
knowledge and experience, application of managerial or supervisory skills required to carry out their basic duties and responsibilities
involving functional guidance and control, leadership, as well as line supervision. These positions require intensive and thorough
knowledge of a specialized field usually acquired from completion of a bachelor's degree or higher degree courses.

The positions in this category are assigned Salary Grade 9 to Salary Grade 33.
(b) Professional Non-Supervisory Category. - This category includes positions performing tasks which usually require the exercise of a
particular profession or application of knowledge acquired through formal training in a particular field or just the exercise of a
natural, creative and artistic ability or talent in literature, drama, music and other branches of arts and letters. Also included are
positions involved in research and application of professional knowledge and methods to a variety of technological, economic,
social, industrial and governmental functions; the performance of technical tasks auxiliary to scientific research and development;
and in the performance of religious, educational, legal, artistic or literary functions. These positions require thorough knowledge in
the field of arts and sciences or learning acquired through completion of at least four (4) years of college studies.

The positions in this category are assigned Salary Grade 8 to Salary Grade 30.

(c) Sub-Professional Supervisory Category. - This category includes positions performing supervisory functions over a group of
employees engaged in responsible work along technical, manual or clerical lines of work which are short of professional work,
requiring training and moderate experience or lower training but considerable experience and knowledge of a limited subject matter
or skills in arts, crafts or trades.

These positions require knowledge acquired from secondary or vocational education or completion of up to two (2) years of college
education.

The positions in this category are assigned Salary Grade 4 to Salary Grade 18.

(d) Sub-Professional Non-Supervisory Category. - This category includes positions involved in structured work in support of office or
fiscal operations or those engaged in crafts, trades or manual work. These positions usually require skills acquired through training
and experience or completion of elementary education, secondary or vocational education or completion of up to two (2) years of
college education.

The positions in this category are assigned Salary Grade 1 to Salary Grade 10.

It is obvious that the Salary Standardization Law does not apply to petitioners because directors of water districts are in fact limited
to policy-making and are prohibited from the management of the districts. P.D. No. 198, 18 described the functions of members of
boards of directors of water districts as follows:

Sec. 18. Functions Limited to Policy-Making. - The function of the board shall be to establish policy. The Board shall not engage in the
detailed management of the district.

Furthermore, the fact that 12 and 17 of the Salary Standardization Law speak of allowances as "benefits" paid in addition to the
salaries incumbents are presently receiving makes it clear that the law does not refer to the compensation of board of directors of
water districts as these directors do not receive salaries but per diems for their compensation.

It is noteworthy that even the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), in Resolution No. 313, s. 1995, entitled "Policy Guidelines
on Compensation and Other Benefits to WD Board of Directors," on which petitioners rely for authority to grant themselves
additional benefits, acknowledges that directors of water districts are not organic personnel and, as such, are deemed excluded
from the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law. Memorandum Circular No. 94-002 of the DBM-CSC-LWUA-PAWD Oversight
Committee states in pertinent part:

As the WD Board of Directors' function is limited to policy-making under Sec. 18 of Presidential Decree 198, as amended, it is the
position of the Oversight Committee that said WD Directors are not to be treated as organic personnel, and as such are deemed
excluded from the coverage of RA 6758, and that their powers, rights and privileges are governed by the pertinent provisions of PD
198, as amended, not by RA 6758 or Executive Order No. 164, s. 1994.

There is, therefore, no basis for petitioners' contention that the provisions of P.D. No. 198 on the compensation of members of the
board of directors of water districts are inconsistent with the provisions of the Salary Standardization Law.

Third. Petitioners contend that even before this Court declared in Davao City Water District v. Civil Service Commission11 that water
districts are government-owned and controlled corporations subject to the jurisdiction of the COA, water districts had already been
granting additional benefits to members of the board of directors, with the approval of the Local Water Utilities Administration
(LWUA), and to their officers and employees and that they continued doing so after the promulgation of the decision in that case.
Petitioners contend they have thus acquired a vested right to these benefits of which they cannot now be deprived without violating
their property rights and the rule on non-diminution of benefits.

This contention too has no merit. The erroneous application and enforcement of the law by public officers does not estop the
Government from making a subsequent correction of such errors.12 More specifically, where there is an express provision of law
prohibiting the grant of certain benefits, the law must be enforced even if it prejudices certain parties due to an error committed by
public officials in granting the benefit.13 As already stated, P.D. No. 198 expressly prohibits the grant of compensation other than
the payment of per diems, as determined by the LWUA pursuant to P. D. No. 198, to directors of water districts. Practice, without
more, no matter how long continued, cannot give rise to any vested right if it is contrary to law.14

The same rule applies to the officers and employees of the BWD. R.A. No. 6686, which then applied, provides that all government
personnel are entitled to a Christmas bonus of one (1) month basic salary and additional cash gift of P1,000.00.15 The cash gift
granted to Francis H. P. Militante, BWD Manager, for the year 1994 amounted to P1,500.00. The Resident Auditor, therefore,
properly disallowed the P500.00 thereof as this amount was in excess of that authorized by law. On the other hand, findings
regarding the duplication of claims for the transportation allowance granted to various employees of the BWD are findings of fact by
the Resident Auditor. The question is whether such claims were properly accounted for and not whether this disallowance will
impair vested rights. It is well-settled that findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies, such as the COA, are generally accorded respect
and even finality by this Court, if supported by substantial evidence, in recognition of their expertise on the specific matters under
their jurisdiction.16 In the present case, the findings of the Resident Auditor were not only supported by the evidence, but they
remained unrebutted by petitioners who simply relied on claims based on impairment of vested rights and diminution of benefits.

Petitioners' reliance on De Jesus v. Commission on Audit,17 Philippine Ports Authority v. Commission on Audit,18 and Manila
International Airport Authority v. Commission on Audit19 is likewise erroneous. In De Jesus, it was held that the circular issued by
the Department of Budget and Management to implement the Salary Standardization Law, which discontinued the payment of
allowances and fringe benefits previously granted on top of basic salary, was ineffective for lack of publication in the Official Gazette
or in a newspaper of general circulation, as required by law. On the other hand, in Philippine Ports Authority and Manila
International Airport Authority, the issue resolved was the right of employees to receive RATA over and above the standardized
salary after the effectivity of R. A. No. 6758. These cases are not in point as the issues in the present case are, to repeat, (1) whether
members of the board of directors of water districts are entitled to receive even after the effectivity of the Salary Standardization
Law benefits other than their authorized per diems, contrary to the provisions of their charter and the resolution of the LWUA; (2)
whether the disallowance of duplication of claims of transportation allowance to BWD employees, as well as the grant of RATA, rice
allowance, and excessive per diems to members of the board of directors of BWD, would impair vested rights and violate any rule
against diminution of benefits and undermine the management prerogative of the BWD; and (3) whether the BWD officers and
employees are entitled to receive benefits in excess of that authorized by law.

Fourth. Petitioners invoke management prerogative to justify the grant of allowances and other benefits to both the board of
directors of BWD and its officers and employees.

With respect to the board of directors, there is no basis for such contention. To begin with, management prerogative refers to the
right of an employer to regulate all aspects of employment, such as the freedom to prescribe work assignments, working methods,
processes to be followed, regulation regarding transfer of employees, supervision of their work, lay-off and discipline, and dismissal
and recall of work.20 Clearly, the existence of such right presupposes the existence of an employer-employee relationship. In the
present case, the BWD board of directors are not employees of BWD. As already noted, their function, as defined by P. D. No. 198, is
limited to policy-making,21 implying that their relationship to the water district is more fiduciary than that of employer-employee.
Moreover, as also noted before, the right of directors of water districts to the payment of compensation is expressly provided for in
P.D. No. 198, thus pre-empting the exercise of any discretion by the water districts.

With respect to the officers and employees of BWD, it has been held that the terms and conditions of employment of government
employees are governed by law.22 Thus, the exercise of management prerogative by government corporations are limited by the
provisions of the laws applicable to them. The cash gift granted to the general manager as part of his Christmas bonus was in excess
of that authorized by R. A. No. 6686. It cannot be justified by the exercise of management prerogative as it is contrary to law.

Finally, the disallowance of the duplication of claims for transportation allowance does not fall under management prerogative as
this does not pertain to the power of management to determine the terms and conditions of employment but pertains to whether
or not the claims are properly accounted for.

Fifth. Petitioners finally cite the grant of similar benefits to the directors of the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) to support
their claim that board of directors are entitled to receive allowances and other benefits in addition to per diems. The comparison
drawn by petitioner between the BWD and NAPOCOR has no basis. The grant of other allowances to NAPOCOR board members in
COA Decision No. 99-020 is based on the Revised NAPOCOR Charter (R. A. No. 6395, as amended by P. D. No. 1360), which states:

Sec. 6 . . . . The members of said Board shall receive a per diem of not to exceed Five Hundred Pesos for each regular or special
meeting of the Board actually attended by them, and upon approval of the Secretary of Energy, shall receive such other allowances
as the Board may prescribe, any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding.

As the Commission pointed out in its decision COA Case No. 90-020:

The entitlement to per diems and other allowances by members of the board was originally derived from the revised NPC Charter.
All allowances enjoyed by the board members were approved by the Ministry of Energy to conform with the imposition of an
additional condition under the NPC Charter that the receipt of the allowances other than per diems should carry the approval of the
MOE.

The entitlement to these allowances cannot be removed by R.A. 6758 or any subsequent law, consistent with the policy of non-
diminution of pay embodied under R. A. 6758 since these allowances were already being received and the board's right to these
allowances was already established before the enactment of R. A. 6758.

Since the allowances were fixed at a time when the authority of the board to grant the same was still valid and effective, the
allowances are also valid and should remain part of the compensation of the members of the board.

Unlike P.D. No. 198, 13, the Charter of NAPOCOR expressly granted members of its board of directors the right to receive allowances
in addition to their per diems, subject only to the approval of the Secretary of Energy. Petitioners cannot thus claim similar
treatment as the board of directors of NAPOCOR. The BWD board of directors' right to compensation, it bears emphasis, is limited to
per diems.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DENIED and the decision of the Commission on Audit, dated September 21, 2000, as well
as its resolution, dated January 30, 2001, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

[ G.R. No. 196564, August 07, 2017 ]

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), PETITIONER, VS. ALBERT M. VELASCO, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

A government employer must exercise its management prerogatives and its authority to discipline employees in good faith and in
accordance with the principles of fair play as expected of all employers.

Shortly after having been perpetually restrained by the Court of Appeals[1] from hearing and investigating the pending
administrative cases against union president Albert M. Velasco (Velasco) and his colleague Mario I. Molina (Molina), then
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) President and General Manager Winston F. Garcia (PGM Garcia) dropped respondent
Velasco from the roll of employees anyway following a new set of formal charges: the first charging him for Gross Discourtesy for
doing his duty as president of the employee's union of asserting a contractual right under the Collective Negotiation Agreement
(CNA), and second for Insubordination for seeking clarification with regard to two conflicting memoranda: one declaring him
ineligible to remain as GSIS Attorney during his term as union president and another reassigning him as GSIS Attorney to the GSIS
Zamboanga, Iligan and Cotabato field offices (where he clearly cannot perform his duties as union president). Velasco was dropped
from the roll of employees neither for the charge of Gross Discourtesy nor the charge of Insubordination but for a different basis
altogether, i.e., being supposedly absent without approved leave for more than thirty (30) days despite his reporting for work in the
Head Office instead of the Zamboanga, Iligan and Cotabato field offices.

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari, petitioner GSIS assails the Court of Appeals Decision[2] in CA-G.R. SP No. 86365 dated
November 30, 2010. The Court of Appeals, acting on a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (with Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction) filed by herein respondent Velasco against the officers of petitioner GSIS, declared the
following void:

1) GSIS OSVP Office Order No. 04-04 dated July 1, 2004 reassigning Velasco from the head office of the GSIS in Pasay City to its field
offices in Zamboanga, Iligan and Cotabato;

2) The Formal Charge docketed as Adm. Case No. 04-010 against Velasco for Insubordination;

3) The Formal Charge docketed as Adm. Case No. 04-009 against Velasco for Gross Discourtesy in the Course of Official Duty; and

4) The dropping of Velasco from the GSIS roll of employees.

The Court of Appeals also directed the GSIS to effect the reinstatement of Velasco to his former position or, if it is no longer feasible,
to another position of equivalent rank and compensation. The GSIS was likewise ordered to pay Velasco his back salaries pertaining
to the period during which he was unlawfully dropped from the roll of employees.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL ANTECEDENTS

(1) Our Ruling in G.R. Nos. 157383 and

174137 mentioned by the Court of Appeals
in its Decision

PGM Garcia filed administrative charges against Velasco and Molina, who both held the position of Attorney V in the GSIS. Velasco
and Molina allegedly committed grave misconduct for helping disgruntled employees to conduct concerted protest actions against
PGM Garcia and the GSIS management. PGM Garcia ordered the immediate preventive suspension of Velasco and Molina for a
period of ninety (90) days without pay. A committee was constituted to investigate the charges against Velasco and Molina.

Velasco and Molina filed with the Civil Service Commission (CSC) a "Petition to Transfer Investigation to [the] Commission, with an
Urgent Motion to Lift Preventive Suspension Order."

The CSC failed to resolve Velasco and Molina's Urgent Motion, leading them to file with the Court of Appeals on October 10, 2002 a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). The Petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
73170, sought to set aside the order of PGM Garcia directing them to submit to the jurisdiction of the committee created to
investigate the administrative cases filed against them.

On January 2, 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision granting Velasco and Molina's petition. The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads:

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Public respondents are hereby PERPETUALLY RESTRAINED from hearing and
investigating the administrative case against petitioners, without prejudice to pursuing the same with the Civil Service Commission
or any other agency of government as may be allowed x x x by law.[3]

PGM Garcia filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals. The Petition was
docketed as G.R. No. 157383.

Finally, acting on Velasco and Molina's Petition to Transfer Investigation to the Commission, the CSC issued its Resolution No. 03-
0278 on February 27, 2003, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby rules that:

The Urgent Petition to Lift the Order of Preventive Suspension is hereby DENIED for having become moot and academic.
The Petition to Transfer Investigation to the Commission is likewise DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, GSIS President and
General Manager Winston F. Garcia is directed to continue the conduct of the formal investigation of the charges against
respondents-petitioners Albert Velasco and Mario I. Molina.[4]

The CSC ruled that since the period of the preventive suspension has lapsed, the issue has become moot. The Petition to Transfer
Investigation to the Commission was denied on the ground that the fact that the GSIS acted as complainant, prosecutor, and judge in
the administrative cases does not necessarily mean that it will not be impartial.

Velasco and Molina assailed the CSC Resolution in a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 75973. On December 7, 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision reversing the CSC Resolution, and holding that the lack
of the requisite preliminary investigation rendered the formal charges against Velasco and Molina void. The Court of Appeals
likewise ruled that the propriety of the preventive suspension has not become moot. Since the preventive suspension emanated
from void formal charges, Velasco and Molina are entitled to back salaries. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The formal charges filed by the President and General Manager of the GSIS
against petitioners, and necessarily, the order of preventive suspension emanating therefrom, are declared NULL AND VOID. The
GSIS is hereby directed to pay petitioners' back salaries pertaining to the period during which they were unlawfully suspended. x x
x.[5]

PGM Garcia filed a Petition for Certiorari with this Court assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 75973. The
petition was docketed as G.R. No. 174137, which was consolidated with G.R. No. 157383.

This Court rendered its Decision on the consolidated petitions on August 10, 2010. The dispositive portion of this Court's Decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition in G.R. No. 157383 is DENIED while the petition in G.R. No. 174137 is DISMISSED, for
lack of merit.[6]

This Court held that although the President and General Manager of the GSIS is vested with authority and responsibility to remove,
suspend or otherwise discipline GSIS personnel for cause, such power is not without limitations and must be exercised in accordance
with Civil Service Rules, which PGM Garcia neglected to do. This Court explained:

Indeed, the CSC Rules does not specifically provide that a formal charge without the requisite preliminary investigation is null and
void. However, as clearly outlined above, upon receipt of a complaint which is sufficient in form and substance, the disciplining
authority shall require the person complained of to submit a Counter-Affidavit/Comment under oath within three days from receipt.
The use of the word "shall" quite obviously indicates that it is mandatory for the disciplining authority to conduct a preliminary
investigation or at least respondent should be given the opportunity to comment and explain his side. As can be gleaned from the
procedure set forth above, this is done prior to the issuance of the formal charge and the comment required therein is different
from the answer that may later be filed by respondents. Contrary to petitioner's claim, no exception is provided for in the CSC Rules.
Not even an indictment in flagrante as claimed by petitioner.

This is true even if the complainant is the disciplining authority himself, as in the present case. To comply with such requirement, he
could have issued a memorandum requiring respondents to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against them instead
of immediately issuing formal charges. With respondents' comments, petitioner would have properly evaluated both sides of the
controversy before making a conclusion that there was a prima facie case against respondents, leading to the issuance of the
questioned formal charges. It is noteworthy that the very acts subject of the administrative cases stemmed from an event that took
place the day before the formal charges were issued. It appears, therefore, that the formal charges were issued after the sole
determination by the petitioner as the disciplining authority that there was a prima facie case against respondents.

To condone this would give the disciplining authority an unrestricted power to judge by himself the nature of the act complained of
as well as the gravity of the charges. We, therefore, conclude that respondents were denied due process of law. Not even the fact
that the charges against them are serious and evidence of their guilt is — in the opinion of their superior — strong can compensate
for the procedural shortcut undertaken by petitioner which is evident in the record of this case. The filing by petitioner of formal
charges against the respondents without complying with the mandated preliminary investigation or at least give the respondents
the opportunity to comment violated the latter's right to due process. Hence, the formal charges are void ab initio and may be
assailed directly or indirectly at anytime.[7] (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)

On PGM Garcia's argument that Velasco and Molina waived their right to a preliminary investigation for failure to raise the matter
before the GSIS, this Court ruled that a decision held without due process is void ab initio and may be attacked anytime directly or
collaterally by means of a separate action, or by resisting such decision in any action or proceeding where it is invoked. Moreover,
Velasco and Molina questioned the validity of their preventive suspension in the CSC on the ground of lack of preliminary
investigation.

This Court concluded that since Velasco and Molina were preventively suspended in the same formal charges that were declared
void, their preventive suspension is likewise invalid.

(2) Two Conflicting Memoranda

In the meantime, after the January 2, 2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 73170 perpetually restraining PGM
Garcia and the GSIS from hearing and investigating the administrative cases against Velasco and Molina, but before said restraining
order was affirmed by this Court on August 10, 2010, the GSIS issued two conflicting Memoranda to Velasco:
(a) On June 29, 2004, GSIS Senior Vice-President-Administration Group Concepcion L. Madarang issued a Memorandum informing
Velasco (who was elected President of the Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS or KMG in May 2004) that he could no longer
hold the position of GSIS Attorney because of conflict of interest and he should either seek a transfer to another position or go on
extended leave of absence for the duration of his term as union president; and

(b) A mere two days later or on July 1, 2004, the GSIS Chief Legal Counsel issued OSVP Office Order No. 04-04, which provided:

Upon request by the SVP, FOG, as required by the exigencies of the service, and in view of the technical supervision and control of
the Chief Legal Counsel over Field Operations Attorneys and Lawyers of the System, ATTY. ALBERT M. VELASCO, considering his legal
expertise on the System's operations, is temporarily assigned for a period of ninety (90) days to the Zamboanga, Iligan and Cotabato
FODs to augment the legal officers in the said FODs due to the surmounting number of legal cases therein and shall conduct legal
due diligence of cases pertaining to the System's operating concerns specifically involving housing loan defaults, collection of
arrearages, foreclosure proceedings, and other matters requiring legal attention.

He shall submit written reports, with proper recommendation/s, if needed, to the Field Office Manager concerned to whom he shall
report directly and who shall sign his Daily Attendance Record (DAR).

Atty. Velasco is allowed cash advances, as needed, subject to reimbursement in accordance with existing auditing and office rules
and regulations.

This Order shall take effect immediately and shall remain effective until further notice.[8] (Emphases supplied.)

This second Memorandum did not state that the transfer was because of conflict of interest. On the contrary, it specified Velasco's
legal expertise as the reason for the transfer. The Memorandum likewise stated that "(t)his Order shall take effect immediately and
shall remain effective until further notice" which contradicts the statement in the very same memorandum that the reassignment is
for a fixed period of ninety (90) days.[9] In other words, the duration of the reassignment cannot be said to be definite.

Velasco wrote the GSIS informing the latter of the unmistakable conflict between the two memoranda he received: unless the
Memorandum disqualifying him as GSIS Legal Counsel is withdrawn, he cannot assume the Mindanao posting as GSIS Legal Counsel.

In response to Velasco's request for clarification, Lutgardo B. Barbo[10] issued a Memorandum[11] to him on July 9, 2004 stating
that "Your reply appears to stonewall or countermand [OSVP Office Order No. 04-04]. It may also show in no uncertain terms your
defiance, refusal and deliberate failure to comply with an otherwise lawful order." The Memorandum required Velasco to explain
why he should not be administratively dealt with for Insubordination, Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service and/or Refusal to Perform Official Duty. Without clarifying the commencement and the term of Velasco's reassignment other
than the vague statement in the July 1, 2004 Order that it "shall take effect immediately and shall remain effective until further
notice," the GSIS immediately treated the letter as a defiance warranting an administrative charge.

Notably, the reassignment order was issued despite the fact that the GSIS chief legal counsel had earlier issued a Memorandum[12]
dated June 7, 2004 urgently requesting PGM Garcia for the appointment of litigation lawyers in the Legal Services Group (LSG) since
three lawyers at the Head Office had either resigned or were promoted. To quote from said Memorandum which was issued less
than a month prior to Velasco's reassignment:

We respectfully refer to your kind attention the above-captioned request for the appointment of litigation lawyers for the Legal
Services Group (LSG). As you are of course aware, the Litigation Department of the LSG had been operating shorthanded since the
resignation of two (2) lawyers handling a substantial amount of litigation work. These are Attys. Michael Miranda, of the Litigation
Department, and Gabriel Silvera, of the Corporate Business Department, who resigned at different times last year.

Since the resignation of the said lawyers, the remaining lawyers of [the] Litigation Department have had to bear all the work of these
resigned lawyers on top of their already overburdened workload. Please allow me to say sir that the remaining litigation lawyers
superbly performed their work, despite their being overworked, without rancor or reproach.

However, with the impending transfer of one of the lawyers of the Litigation Department, Atty. Douglas Marigomen, to the
Tagbilaran Branch where he has been appointed as Branch Manager, the Litigation Department will be unable to function to the
point of being crippled. The remaining litigation lawyers will, to be sure, be unable to cope with the workload of Atty. Marigomen,
which will be apportioned among them. Moreover, there has been an influx of new cases filed against GSIS which require immediate
and urgent attention.

In view of the foregoing, we respectfully entreat you to accede to our request for the immediate appointment of two (2) lawyers for
the Litigation Department to fill up the slot or item of Atty. Miranda and that to be vacated by Atty. Marigomen. We sincerely hope
for your kind attention on this matter. (Emphases supplied.)

Even further highlighting the fact that Velasco's July 1, 2004 reassignment to the Mindanao field offices was effected despite a
continued shortage of lawyers in the GSIS main office is OSVP Order No. 05-04[13] issued on July 5, 2004 by the chief legal counsel
detailing one of the field lawyers to the main office. The pertinent portion of said Order reads:

In the exigency of the service arising from the extreme lack of manpower in the LSG due to the resignation of Attys. Michael Miranda
and Gabriel Silvera, as well as the promotion of Attys. Douglas Marigomen and Lourdes Dorado as Branch Managers of the
Tagbilaran and Batangas Branches, respectively, and the impending retirement of Atty. Julita Aningat, ATTY. PEACHY ANNE V.
TIONGSON-DUMLAO, is hereby temporarily detailed at the Litigation Department in order to perform the duties and responsibilities
appurtenant to the position of the abovementioned lawyers.
The Order shall take effect immediately and shall remain effective until the permanent litigation lawyers are duly appointed by the
President and General Manager. (Underscoring supplied.)

(3) Velasco's allegedly Grossly Discourteous Memorandum

Velasco, acting as president of the KMG, issued a memorandum dated June 28, 2004 to GSIS SVP Leticia P. Sagcal with reference to
her memorandum prohibiting employees from participating in any "UNION ACTIVITIES during office hours." Citing the Collective
Negotiation Agreement between the GSIS and the KMG which provides that "(t)he GSIS Management agrees and hereby authorizes
the duly elected executive and legislative assembly officers of the KMG, including the chairpersons of KMG standing committees to
perform the functions related to KMG activities on official time," Velasco demanded the recall of the Memorandum of SVP Sagcal.

In response, the GSIS issued a memorandum requiring Velasco to "submit your Counter-Affidavit/Comment under Oath within three
(3) days from receipt hereof explaining why you should not be administratively dealt with for misconduct, discourtesy,
insubordination and/or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service."[14] Velasco issued his reply stressing that he wrote
the letter as a duly elected union representative asserting a contractual right.

(4) RTC Case / Formal Charges / Removal from the Rolls

In connection with the two conflicting memoranda disqualifying Velasco as GSIS Legal Counsel and assigning him as GSIS Legal
Counsel in Mindanao, Velasco filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking to
prohibit the GSIS from enforcing the following: (1) OSVP Order No. 04-04 dated July 1, 2004 assigning him to the Zamboanga, Iligan,
Cotabato field offices; (2) July 7, 2004 Memorandum directing him to explain his letter-reply to SVP Sagcal; and (3) July 9, 2004
Memorandum directing him to explain his failure to comply with the Reassignment Order.

The RTC of Manila initially issued a 72-hour TRO which was later extended to twenty days. However, the Petition was eventually
dismissed by the RTC of Manila on the ground of improper venue, said court ratiocinating that the case should be filed with the RTC
of Pasay City where the principal office of the GSIS is located. During the pendency of said case, the GSIS nonetheless initiated the
two assailed Formal Charges against Velasco:

(1) The Formal Charge dated August 10, 2004 signed by PGM Garcia, docketed as ADM. Case No. 04-009 for Gross Discourtesy in the
Course of Official Duty in connection with Velasco's letter to SVP Sagcal;[15] and

(2) The Formal Charge dated August 13, 2004 signed by PGM Garcia, docketed as ADM. Case No. 04-010 for Refusal to Perform
Official Duty; Insubordination; Misconduct; Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service in connection with the two
conflicting Memoranda.[16]

During the pendency of Velasco's Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC Resolution dismissing the Petition for improper venue, and
while Velasco continued to report to his post in the Head Office, the GSIS issued the assailed September 1, 2004 letter[17] to Velasco
dropping him from the rolls of the GSIS on the claim that allegedly he has been continuously absent without leave (AWOL) for thirty
(30) days.

(5) Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals

On September 13, 2004, Velasco withdrew his Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC of Manila which favorably acted on said
withdrawal in an Order[18] dated September 14, 2004. On September 15, 2004, Velasco thereafter filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the Court of Appeals, assailing
GSIS OSVP Office Order No. 04-04 reassigning him to Zamboanga City; the Formal Charge docketed as Adm. Case No. 04-010 for
Insubordination; the Formal Charge docketed as Adm. Case No. 04-009 for Gross Discourtesy in the Course of Official Duty; and the
letter dated September 1, 2004 dropping Velasco from the GSIS roll of employees.

On September 17, 2004, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution[19] granting Velasco's prayer for a 60-day TRO enjoining the GSIS
from further implementing the assailed acts. Petitioner GSIS however refused to implement the TRO and asserted that, with
Velasco's dropping from the rolls, injunction was improper to restrain acts that had become fait accompli.

On November 30, 2010, the Court of Appeals issued the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which read:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Order issued reassigning petitioner to Zamboanga; the
administrative charges filed against petitioner docketed as Adm. Case No. 04-010 for Refusal to Perform Official Duty, etc. and Adm.
Case No. 04-009 for Gross Discourtesy in the Course of Official Duty; and the dropping of petitioner from the GSIS roll of employees
are hereby declared void. Accordingly, the GSIS is hereby directed to effect the reinstatement of petitioner to his former position or,
if it is no longer feasible, to another position of equivalent rank and compensation. It is likewise ordered to pay petitioner his back
salaries pertaining to the period during which he was unlawfully dropped from employees' roll.[20]

The GSIS filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated April 1, 2011.

The GSIS then filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari, raising the following grounds for the allowance of the same: (a)
that Velasco is guilty of forum shopping; (b) that the non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is fatal to Velasco's Petition for
Certiorari before the Court of Appeals; and (c) that petitioner is allegedly justified in its actions against Velasco since GSIS lawyers
are precluded from joining the employees' organization or union according to a ruling issued by the Public Sector Labor-
Management Council (PSL-MC).[21]

THIS COURT'S RULING

Forum Shopping

Petitioner alleged that Velasco is guilty of forum shopping for filing a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals (a) while his
motion for reconsideration in Civil Case No. 04110451 was still pending before the RTC of Manila, Branch 22; and (b) during the
pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 86130 with another division of the appellate court.

According to jurisprudence, forum shopping is the act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one
forum, of seeking another (and possibly favorable) opinion in another forum other than by appeal or special civil action of certiorari,
or the institution of two (2) or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other
court might look with favor upon the party. Where the elements of litis pendentia are not present or where a final judgment in one
case will not amount to res judicata in the other, there is no forum shopping.[22]

Based on the facts on record, we see no reason to disturb the Court of Appeals' ruling that respondent Velasco was not guilty of
forum shopping as succinctly explained in its November 30, 2010 Decision:

In the case at bar, although petitioner filed a petition for prohibition before the RTC and, thereafter, filed substantially the same
petition before this Court, the fact remains that before filing the instant petition, he first filed a notice of withdrawal of his Motion
for Reconsideration with the RTC which was granted. It is also worthy to note that while both petitions filed by petitioner before the
RTC and this Court assail his reassignment Order to Zamboanga, the petition before US differs because petitioner is, in addition,
assailing the formal charges against him as well as his severance from employment. Hence, petitioner could not be said to have
resorted to two different courts for the purpose of obtaining the same relief.

To further bolster their allegation that petitioner is guilty of forum shopping, respondents aver that a similar case was also filed by
[Velasco] against respondent Garcia in this Court docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 86130 which was already dismissed on September 17,
2004.

WE perused the September 17, 2004 Resolution of this Court in CA-G.R. SP No. 86130 and found that the cause of action and relief
prayed for by herein petitioner in that case were not the same as in this petition. In this case, petitioner prays to declare OSVP Order
No. 04-04 transferring petitioner to Zamboanga; the formal charges against petitioner dated August 10, 2004 and August 13, 2004;
and the letter informing petitioner that he is already dropped from GSIS roll of employment as void and illegal. On the other hand,
the objective of the action in CA-G.R. SP No. 86130 was to declare as illegal and void respondent Garcia's Office Order dated June 25,
2004 by which the respondent allegedly usurped the petitioner's power under the law and the collective negotiation agreement to
choose a representative to the GSIS Personnel Selection and Promotion Board and to prohibit the respondent from convening said
Boards from transacting business without the legitimate union representative.[23] (Emphases supplied.)

We have held that what is truly important to consider in determining whether forum shopping exists or not is the vexation caused
the courts and parties-litigants by a party who asks different courts and/or administrative agencies to rule on the same or related
causes and/or grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being
rendered by different fora upon the same issues.[24] In this instance, there was no danger that two different fora might render
conflicting decisions as the petition before the Court of Appeals was the only case pending which involved the specific issues raised
therein.

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

and the Alleged Illegality of Velasco's
Union Involvement

We discuss the second and third issues raised by petitioner jointly as the resolution of the procedural issue of exhaustion of
administrative remedies hinges on the substantive issue of whether or not petitioner's actions and issuances involving respondent
Velasco were patently illegal and/or tainted with bad faith.

Petitioner claims that Velasco violated the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies by filing a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with the Court of Appeals instead of assailing his dismissal with the CSC. The Court of Appeals ruled that the assailed GSIS
issuances were patently illegal and, hence, the case falls within at least one of several exceptions to the doctrine on exhaustion of
administrative remedies. The exceptions, according to Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. Court of Appeals,[25] are: (1) when there
is a violation of due process; (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question; (3) when the administrative action is patently
illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned; (5)
when there is irreparable injury; (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the President,
bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter; (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be
unreasonable; (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim; (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case
proceedings; (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (11) when there are circumstances
indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, and unreasonable delay would greatly prejudice the complainant; (12) when no
administrative review is provided by law; (13) where the rule of qualified political agency applies; and (14) when the issue of non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot.

After a judicious examination of the records, we uphold the Court of Appeals' ruling that the present case falls within the recognized
exceptions to the rule regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies. Before going into the merits of the case, we dispel the
procedural concerns raised in the dissent.

The Dissenting Opinion submits, citing Merida Water District v. Bacarro,[26] that the test to determine whether or not there is
patent illegality is "whether there exists a factual issue to be resolved to arrive at the conclusion of illegality."[27] Accordingly, the
notion of patent illegality in the case at bar is negated by the presumption of good faith on the part of the GSIS officers involved, and
the presumption of regularity of official acts. Determination of bad faith and irregularity are questions of fact, which should allegedly
bar direct recourse before the courts in a special civil action.
The Court's decision in Republic of the Philippines v. Lacap[28] explained the rationale behind the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies in this wise:

The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should first avail of all the means afforded him by
administrative processes. The issues which administrative agencies are authorized to decide should not be summarily taken from
them and submitted to a court without first giving such administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of the same after due
deliberation.

Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; that is, courts cannot or will
not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution
of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion
requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters
of fact. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted.)

In Merida, the factual question involved was the determination of the current water rate from which the allowable 60% increase can
be computed in accordance with existing rules and regulations. Obviously, that was a highly technical matter that required the
special knowledge and expertise of the proper administrative agency to resolve. The issue of whether petitioner GSIS's memoranda
and issuances against respondent Velasco were attended by bad faith is hardly the kind of "technical and intricate" factual matter
that requires prior resolution by an administrative body with special expertise or knowledge. To be sure, in Department of Finance v.
Dela Cruz, Jr.,[29] we held that a case that assails the mass detail and reassignment of DOF employees as "patently illegal, arbitrary,
and oppressive" falls among the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and thus, we upheld said
employees' direct recourse to the courts as there was no need to resort to remedies with the CSC. In another example of bitterly
contested litigation between the parties in the case at bar, The Board of Trustees of the Government Service Insurance System v.
Velasco,[30] we held that the RTC, not the CSC, had jurisdiction over a petition for prohibition with prayer for writ of preliminary
injunction even if it involved a civil service matter. Verily, the principle that all personnel actions must first be referred to the CSC is
not an iron-clad rule.

The dissent's reliance on Corsiga v. Defensor[31] is misplaced as no court therein issued a judgment on the merits. What was
appealed to the Court was a preliminary order denying a motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds. Even more importantly, the
Court in Corsiga expressly stated that the employee failed to present evidence of the invalidity of his reassignment and for that
reason the reassignment was presumed regular. In the present case, the Court of Appeals found, after due proceedings, that
respondent duly proved his factual allegations while petitioner failed to refute the evidence presented against it. There is no cause
for the dissent to assert that petitioner was denied due process for it had every opportunity before the Court of Appeals to submit
its countervailing evidence but petitioner chose to present purely technical objections to respondent's petition and pinned its
defense on the presumptions of good faith and of regularity in the performance of official duty which are both rebuttable by proof.

This Court cannot accept the proposition that a mere allegation of good faith by the issuers of the assailed official acts automatically
takes the disputed action out of its being patently illegal and thereby necessitates the application of the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. Bad faith and irregularities can be evident from the assailed acts themselves, in which case the courts
should not simply tum a blind eye on the ground that it is the administrative agencies which must take the first look. It is precisely in
cases when the bad faith and irregularity are so blatant that immediate recourse to the courts is necessary in order to nullify a
capricious and whimsical exercise of authority.

This Court finds no reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals in making a finding of illegality and bad faith in the GSIS's
actions against Velasco based on the undisputed facts on record.

Petitioner alleged that "the Court of Appeals failed to consider that in all the cases filed by respondent, his basic allegation stemmed
from just one single act, i.e., his illegal activities as union president of the KMG which led to the GSIS's taking of necessary measures
to protect its interest."[32]

Interestingly, in the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 73170, which was affirmed by this Court in the consolidated
cases, G.R. Nos. 157383 and 174137, the GSIS's officers were perpetually restrained from hearing and investigating the
administrative case against Velasco and Molina for acts allegedly in betrayal of the confidential nature of their positions and in
defiance of the Rules and Regulations on Public Sector Unionism, without prejudice to pursuing the same with the CSC or any other
agency of the government as may be allowed by law. Even then the appellate court recognized that the investigation should not be
done by the GSIS but by the CSC or any other impartial and disinterested tribunal. Yet, the GSIS undertook to investigate Velasco on
new formal charges in this case, springing from essentially similar grounds of breach of confidentiality of position and union
activities. We now examine these new formal charges.

On the issue of the validity of the reassignment order, upon which the charge of Insubordination depends, we sustain the Court of
Appeals' factual finding that the GSIS never denied, much less refuted, the various memoranda presented by Velasco proving that
there was a dire shortage of lawyers in the Manila Head Office at the time of his reassignment to the Mindanao field offices. There is
nothing in the records to show that other lawyers from the Head Office were also sent out to augment the legal staff in the field
offices. On the contrary, Velasco demonstrated that due to the extreme lack of manpower in the Head Office a lawyer from the one
of the field offices was temporarily detailed in the Head Office until the vacancies therein were filled. Although the first paragraph of
the reassignment order stated that it was for a period of ninety (90) days, the last paragraph states that the order shall take effect
immediately and shall remain effective until further notice. What is indubitable from the records was that Velasco was being singled
out for indefinite reassignment due to his election as union president. In all, this Court concurs with the appellate court that there
was "no valid cause for the reassignment" and "the reassignment order was issued to prevent [Velasco] from actually and
aggressively leading the union['s] activities and in the process weaken unionism in [the] GSIS main office."[33] As Velasco's
reassignment is invalid, there was no cause to charge him with Insubordination.
As for the second formal charge, the difficulty of finding an actionable case of gross discourtesy from the following letter can be
considered by the courts in determining whether there is gross abuse of authority on the part of petitioner:

1 July 2004

SVP LETICIA P. SAGCAL

GSIS Social Insurance Group

Re: Memorandum dated 28 June 2004.

Dear SVP Sagcal,

In behalf of the Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS (KMG), we bring to your attention the above subject memorandum which
prohibits employees from "participation in any UNION ACTIVITIES".

Please be reminded that under Section 3 of the GSIS-KMG Collective Negotiation Agreement for 2002-2005 it is provided as follows:
Section 3. Authorized KMG Activities on Official Time. The GSIS Management agrees and hereby authorizes the duly elected
executive and legislative assembly officers of the KMG, including the chairpersons of KMG standing committees to perform the
functions related to KMG activities on official time, subject to the following conditions:
Only those authorized in writing from time to time by the KMG President or his duly authorized representatives shall enjoy the
privilege; and

The GSIS Management likewise agrees that attendance by duly authorized union representatives to workers' education, seminars,
meetings, conventions, conferences shall be allowed on Official Time, subject also to the said two (2) conditions. x x x

Additionally, our CNA likewise states, and we quote the pertinent part:

ARTICLE V
NO STRIKE NO LOCKOUT

GSIS Management shall also respect the rights of the employees to air out their sentiments through peaceful concerted activities
during allowable hours, subject to reasonable office rules and regulations on the use of office premises.

Clearly, your memorandum absolutely prohibiting participation of union members, including duly elected executive, legislative
officers, and chairpersons of standing committees, from participating in union activities is a gross and patent violation of our CNA.
Peaceful concerted activities is also [permissible], subject only to reasonable office rules and regulations, and is not absolutely
prohibited by law, and neither can you prohibit the same.

We demand that your (sic) recall within two (2) days your unlawful memorandum dated 28 June 2004. Your failure to do so will
compel us to file the corresponding administrative and criminal complaints against you before the appropriate body.[34]

Even without the presentation of evidence before an administrative body, the existence of bad faith and the arbitrary and despotic
abuse of power can easily be gleaned from an administrative case of gross discourtesy ensuing from the mere issuance of the above
letter by a union president. The exercise of even a statutorily enshrined power when done in a whimsical and capricious manner
amounting to lack of jurisdiction is properly assailed in a special civil action under Rule 65 before the courts.

In any event, the merits of the formal charges of Insubordination and Gross Discourtesy against Velasco need not even be
scrutinized by the Court. Despite initiating administrative investigations in relation to the Formal Charge docketed as Adm. Case No.
04-010 (for Insubordination, etc.) and the Formal Charge docketed as 04-009 (for Gross Discourtesy), the GSIS never issued a
decision or ruling in these administrative cases. In the end, Velasco was dropped from the rolls for his purported 30 days continuous
absence without authorized leave, a separate and distinct matter, not included in the charges stated in the two formal charges
pending investigation.

The Court cannot fault respondent for claiming that his separation from the service was without valid ground and done without due
process. Furthermore, this Court fully agrees with the Court of Appeals that Velasco's dropping from the rolls was unwarranted
when he did not abandon his post.

Petitioner GSIS did not dispute the fact that Velasco continued to report at the Head Office while he was seeking clarification from
the GSIS regarding its conflicting memoranda and while various contentious issues between the parties were pending before the
courts and the PSL-MC. The records bear out that correspondence and memoranda were personally served on Velasco by the GSIS,
including the notice of his dropping from the rolls, since he could be readily found at his work station in the Head Office. On the
other hand, the records are bereft of proof that the GSIS in good faith gave notice to Velasco that he would be considered absent
without authorized leave for his failure to report for duty in the Mindanao field offices. Significantly, the GSIS itself narrated in the
petition that Velasco was able to secure from the RTC a 72-hour TRO on July 20, 2004 that was extended for another 20 days, giving
him additional justification to defer taking up his Mindanao posting while his standing disputes with management were pending
litigation.

In Batangas State University v. Bonifacio,[35] a teacher was dropped from the rolls by the petitioner state university for failure to
immediately report to his new detail at the office of the university president and instead he continued to fulfill his duties as a
teacher and coach of the basketball team. We held that where there is no abandonment or clear proof of the intention to sever the
employer-employee relationship, an employee cannot be dropped from the rolls. Furthermore, despite the proviso in Section 63,
Rule XVI of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations that an employee continuously absent without approved leave for at
least thirty (30) days may be dropped from the rolls without prior notice, we ruled that there was bad faith on the part of the
employer and a violation of an employee's rights to security of tenure and due process when the employer ignored the employee's
presence in the school, did not give him the opportunity to explain his purported absences and thereafter peremptorily dropped him
from the rolls.

Certainly, the gross violation of Velasco's due process rights in the matter of his dropping from the rolls not only contribute to the
patent illegality of his separation from the service but is in itself a recognized exception to the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies.[36]

The Dissenting Opinion rejects the applicability of Batangas State University, and argued, echoing the words of petitioner, that while
there was good faith on the part of the employee in BSU to report to his new detail, Velasco showed bad faith when he "wrote a
letter conveying his resistance to the assignment order." The Court should not adopt petitioner's arrogant stance of treating a mere
clarificatory letter as an act of defiance and gross discourtesy. The despotic notion that an employee may not even ask for
clarification of inconsistent orders precisely manifests the grave abuse of discretion on the part of petitioner. It shows very clearly
that petitioner is bent on dismissing Velasco for whatever imagined wrong it can throw at him, and force. him to file a case for each
new accusation.

Be that as it may, the Dissenting Opinion misreads the significance of BSU, which is cited to emphasize that an employee who
reports for work cannot be summarily dropped from the rolls for being "continuously absent without approved leave for at least 30
calendar days." BSU held that ignoring said employee instead of summoning him to explain his alleged absences does not only show
bad faith, but is itself a violation of the constitutional guarantees of security of tenure and due process. Violation of due process is
the first and foremost exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies in settled jurisprudence other than BSU,
making it entirely irrelevant that there was prior resort to the CSC in BSU.

The dissent asserts that bad faith is never presumed; it is a conclusion to be drawn from the facts.[37] However, intent, being a state
of mind, is rarely susceptible of direct proof, but must ordinarily be inferred from the facts.[38] Consequently, when the facts –
namely the acts from which bad faith can be inferred – already appears on record and are uncontroverted, the legal consequence of
such acts becomes a question of law which falls under the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies as well. A
question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of
facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of
facts being admitted.[39]

Petitioner's improper motive in its actions and issuances against respondent is plainly apparent even in its submissions to this Court.
In the petition, the GSIS averred it "lost all faith and confidence in respondent when he ran for and was elected KMG President"[40]
and that it was Velasco's purported "illegal activities as union president of the KMG which led to the GSIS's taking of necessary
measures to protect its interest."[41] Indeed, this history of antagonism between Velasco and the GSIS's previous leadership is a
matter of record not only in this case but also in G.R. Nos. 157383 and 174137, which arose from the charges of misconduct against
Velasco for participating and/or leading protests against management and former GSIS President Winston F. Garcia for alleged
corruption.

As the GSIS admits in the petition, it was Velasco himself who submitted the issue of his eligibility to hold the position of union
president for resolution by the PSL-MC to settle his dispute with management.[42] However, the GSIS pre-empted the ruling of the
PSL-MC and issued the reassignment order, the formal charges of Insubordination and Gross Discourtesy and the order dropping
Velasco from the rolls long before the PSL-MC could dispose of the matter in its Resolution No. 02, s. 2005 dated May 4, 2005, now
being cited by the GSIS as its main basis for the legality of its actions against Velasco. It is the height of injustice and absurdity to
allow the GSIS to now rely on this issuance when it did not even exist in 2004 when the GSIS issued the assailed memoranda and
orders that are the subject matter of this case.

It bears repeating as well that the PSL-MC merely ruled that lawyers of the GSIS Legal Services Group are ineligible to join and hold
elective positions in the union.[43] There was no statement in PSL-MC Resolution No. 02, s. 2005 that the holding of a position in the
union was a ground to discipline or dismiss Velasco. Even in the GSIS's Memorandum dated June 29, 2004 advising Velasco of his
inelibility to hold the position of GSIS Attorney while serving as union president on the ground of conflict of interest, there was no
mention of any disciplinary action to be taken but only that Velasco was given the options to either (a) seek a transfer to another
position not covered by the prohibition or (b) go on extended leave of absence for the term of his office, subject to existing office
rules and regulations. Yet, despite the fact that the GSIS did not see fit to discipline or sanction Velasco for his union activities in the
June 29, 2004 Memorandum, it nonetheless engaged in a series of actions to harass Velasco, to keep him away from the Head Office
(by inducing him to seek a transfer or to take a leave and, failing in that, reassigning him) and to eventually cause Velasco's
separation from the service on whatever ground and by whatever means it could conceive.

Petitioner's assertion that the new formal charges against Velasco and his dismissal from the service are measures to protect the
interests of the GSIS from Velasco's purportedly illegal activities as union president likewise violate Velasco's right to due process as
he is being indirectly charged for something not mentioned in the Formal Charges. To reiterate, Velasco was never administratively
charged for what the GSIS termed as his "illegal" service as union president and therefore, Velasco could not have been validly
dismissed from the service on that ground. Moreover, the GSIS could not have possibly relied on the aforementioned PSL-MC
Resolution to justify Velasco's dismissal or separation from the service as the same was issued more than eight (8) months after
Velasco had already been dropped from the rolls.

Prior to the resolution by the PSL-MC of the question of Velasco's eligibility to join the union and serve as union president, the GSIS
had no basis to act against Velasco on that ground other than the opinion of its own chief legal counsel. For this reason, the GSIS was
bound to respect in good faith Velasco's election as union president of the KMG until the PSL-MC could issue its opinion on the
grievance raised by Velasco. As the Court of Appeals correctly emphasized, "[t]he right to unionize or to form organizations is now
explicitly recognized and granted to employees in both the governmental and private sectors"[44] and that the Bill of Rights itself
demands that such right shall not be abridged.[45]

In the private sector, the Court has held that the reassignment of an employee is illegal if it is used as a subterfuge by the employer
to rid himself of an undesirable worker or when the real reason is to penalize an employee for his union activities and when there is
no genuine business urgency that necessitated the transfer.[46] Neither does the Court condone a reassignment done by a private
employer on the pretext of eventually removing an employee with whom the employer felt "uncomfortable" because it doubted the
employee's loyalty.[47] This Court will not be induced into setting a precedent that a government employer can hide behind the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty in spite of evidence of illegal, discriminatory and oppressive acts
against labor extant in the records.

In closing, it is worth recalling that the non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is a procedural matter that, time and again, this
Court has held should be set aside in the interest of substantial justice.[48] This is particularly true in this case when the application
of said doctrine would in effect deny respondent reliefs despite his meritorious claim. The insistence in the Dissenting Opinion that
the Court of Appeals should have ignored petitioner's manifest display of arrogance and disregard of court orders on the ground that
bad faith is a factual issue misses the basic principle that the Court of Appeals, unlike this Court, is mandated to rule on questions of
fact.[49] The Dissenting Opinion's proposed reversal of the factual findings and the judgment on the merits of the Court of Appeals
on the ground of a supposed procedural misstep is unjust and unduly burdens a party already aggrieved by a whimsical, capricious,
and despotic abuse of power with a circuitous and ineffectual remedy. Accordingly, this Court holds that the Court of Appeals
properly decided the substantive issues when the evidence it needed to resolve the same was already before it.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated November 30, 2010 and
Resolution dated April 1, 2011 in CA-G.R. SP No. 86365 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.