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COMPLETION OF THE IMMIGRANT CASE IN THE JORDAN

THROUGH DIPLOMATION, INFORMATION, MILITARY, AND


ECONOMIC STRATEGIES

COUNTRY PROFILE

The Kingdom of Hashemite Jordan is a small country with few natural resources, but has
played an important role in the seizure of power in the Middle East, more precisely because of its
strategic location at the crossroads crossed by Christians, Jews and Muslims from the continents
of Asia, Africa and Europe. This kingdom emerged after the First World War in the Middle East
after colonialism by Britain and France. Countries with international borders to Jordan are Iraq,
Israel, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and parts of Palestine (West Bank), and bordering the sea.1

Figure 1Map of Jordan.2

This almost landless country borders the Gulf of Aqaba (Red Sea) at a small outlet in the
south. This country has a lake edge in the Dead Sea, the lowest altitude of the earth on land at
430.5 m below sea level. Most of Jordan is covered by the Arabian Desert. This country covers

1
“Jordan.” Nations Online. Accessed April 16, 2019. https://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/jordan.htm
2
"Black September, The Jordanian-PLO Civil War of 1970." Accessed April 16, 2019.
http://mideastcartoonhistory.com/1965to1976/1970.html

1
an area of 89,342 km², making Jordan a little smaller than Portugal (from a large area), or also
slightly smaller than the state of Indiana in the United States.3

Figure 2Jordan flag.

Figure 3Jordanian state emblem.

The Jordanian flag consists of three horizontal fields with black, white, and green that are
connected by a red triangle on the left, with a seven-pointed star in the triangle. The three colors
symbolize the three figures that became an example for Jordan, namely the Abbasid Caliph,
Umayyad, and Fatima. While the red triangle symbolizes the Hashemite Dynasty and the Arab
Rebellion. Seven-pointed star is the only feature that distinguishes Jordanian flags from
Palestine. This star has two meanings, namely the seven sides represent seven verses of the first
Surah of the Qur'an, and some believe the star refers to the seven hills of Amman or the capital
of Jordan that have been built.4

3
“Jordan.” Nations Online. Accessed April 16, 2019. https://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/jordan.htm
4
"Jelang Asian Games 2018: Pahami dan HargaiBendera Nasional Negara
PesertaSupayaTidakMempermalukanBangsaSendiri."Nusantara Tv. Published August 16, 2018. Accessed April 17,
2019. https://www.nusantaratv.com/index.php?/kamutau/read/10112964/Jelang-Asian-Games-Pahami-dan-
Hargai-Bendera-Nasional-Negara-Peserta-Supaya-Tidak-Mempermalukan-Bangsa-Sendiri

2
While the Jordanian state symbol was designed by Jordanian architect, FawwazMuhanna,
at the request of King Abdullah I bin al-Hussein in 1921, which was then declared the official
logo and symbol of the Kingdom of Jordanian Hashemite by the Council of Ministers on August
25, 1934 under Administrative Order No. 558. On February 21, 1982, where the Council of
Ministers issued an official statement No. 6, with additional specifications on it.

Jordan, with the official name of Al Mamlakah al Urduniyah al Hashimiyah, has a


population of 9.9 million (in 2017, including Syrian Civil War refugees). The capital and largest
city of Jordan is Amman, with a total population of around 4 million, which is almost half of the
country's population. The spoken language is Arabic, as the official language, and Jordan itself is
a country with a majority Muslim population, of which about 92% of Jordan are followers of
Sunni Islam, the dominant religion in the country. Cities in southern Jordan have the highest
percentage of Muslim population, with a life expectancy of 72 years for male and 75 years for
their female people.5

Since 1999, Jordan has been led by King Abdullah II, who has full power in making
policies, approving laws, and can dissolve parliament. Over the past few years, the government
has faced demands for political reform, especially after 2011 with a popular uprising in Tunisia
which caused political turmoil in many Arab countries. King Abdullah dissolved his government
at the time and appointed a series of prime ministers to oversee political change, but worries
about the cost of living and reforming income taxes have caused protests perpetually carried out
on the streets throughout the year.6

With the Jordanian state system of government still in the kingdom and the highest
decision under the hands of the King, the Jordanian media has traditionally been under strict state
control. In this case, the media must be careful not to cross the red line of editorials and
journalists must also be supervised by intelligence services. With the tight security, the
government will be able to easily sue and sometimes imprison journalists when there is news that
attacks the government. In addition, although around 3.5 million Jordanian citizens have access
to the internet in mid-2016, there are laws that give officials the power to block and censor
certain websites that are considered to endanger the government. Every site owner must be
5
“Jordan.” Nations Online. Accessed April 16, 2019. https://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/jordan.htm
6
"Jordan country profile." BBC News. Accessed April 17, 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-
14631981

3
responsible for every comment posted and the news website must also have a government
license.7

HISTORY OF JORDAN

1922 - The League of Nations Council recognizes Transjordan as a country under British
supervision.

1946 - The United Nations recognizes Jordan as an independent sovereign kingdom.

1948 - The State of Israel is made in Palestine based on a mandate from England. So that
thousands of displaced Palestinians continue to flee Arab-Israeli battles to the West Bank and
Jordan.

1950 - Jordan succeeds in annexing and taking over the West Bank.

1951 - King Abdullah is killed by Palestinian gunmen angry at the collusion seen with
Israel in the Palestinian division.

1952 - Hussein declares the king after his father, Talal, but is declared mentally unfit to
rule Jordan.

1957 - British forces complete their withdrawal from Jordan.

1967 - Israel takes control of Jerusalem and the West Bank during the Six-Day War,
which then causes the first wave of refugees to Jordan.

1970-71 - Jordan expels armed camps of the Palestine Liberation Organization from the
country and a September Black conflict ensues.

1972 - Attempts at military coup fail.

1986 - Hussein breaks political ties between Jordan and the PLO and orders his main
office to close.

7
"Jordan country profile." BBC News. Accessed April 17, 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-
14631981

4
1989 - Riots in several cities in Jordan occur by civil society mainly due to instability and
price increases.

1989 - The first general election has been held since 1967, but only contested by
independent candidates because of the previous government's 1963 ban on political parties.

The peace agreement between Jordan and Israel was signed

1994 - The Jordanian government signs a peace treaty with Israel, which means officially
ending the war after 46 years of riots.

1996 - Food price riots after subsidies are abolished by the government based on
economic plans supervised by the International Monetary Fund.

King Hussein died

1999 - King Hussein dies, so the government is replaced by his eldest son, Crown Prince
Abdullah.

2000 September - Military court sentences six people to death for planning attacks on
Israeli and US targets.

2001 March - King Abdullah Together with president Bashar al-Assad from Syria and
Hosni Mubarak from Egypt inaugurate a $ 300 million power line that connects the grid of the
three countries.

2002 January - Riots erupt in the southern city of Maan, Jordan, causing the worst public
disturbances in more than three years, after the death of a young man in detention.

2002 September - Both countries, Jordan and Israel, jointly agree to a plan to channel
water from the Red Sea to the Dead Sea which has begun to shrink. This project, for $ 800
million, is a project carried out by the country's second largest joint venture to date.

2002 October - Senior US diplomat Laurence Foley is shot dead outside his house in
Amman, shot by al-Qaeda fighters, in the first murder of a Western diplomat in Jordan. Dozens
of political activists after this incident began to be arrested.

2003 June - First parliamentary election under King Abdullah II, but independent
candidates loyal to the king still win two-thirds of the seats.
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2004 February - King Abdullah and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad launch the Wahdah
Dam project at a ceremony on the Yarmuk River.

Terror from al-Qaeda to Jordan

2004 April - Authorities confiscate a car full of explosives and arrest several suspects
said to be linked to the al-Qaeda terrorist group and plan a chemical bomb attack on intelligence
headquarters in HQ in Amman.

2005 March - Jordan returns its ambassador to Israel after four years of absence. Amman
recalled their envoy in 2000 after the outbreak of the Palestinian uprising.

2005 April - A new cabinet is inaugurated, chaired by Prime Minister Adnan Badran,
after the government has previously resigned amid reports of unhappiness by the king over
reform measures.

2005 August - Al-Qaeda manages to fire three missiles from inside Jordan, two of which
nearly lose US naval vessels at the port of Aqaba while the third is near Eilat airport in Israel. A
Jordanian soldier dies killed.

2005 November - Sixty people die in suicide bombings at three international hotels in
Amman. Al-Qaeda in Iraq claimed responsibility for this incident. Most of the victims were
Jordanian. Even the day of mourning was announced by the government.

2006 June - Iraqi Prime Minister announces that Jordanian-born Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,
al-Qaeda leader in Iraq, has been killed in an air strike.

2007 July - First local elections have been held since 1999, in which the main opposition
party, the Islamist Action Front, withdrew after accusing the government of cheating on the
election.

2007 November - Parliamentary elections strengthen the position of tribal leaders and
other pro-government candidates. The fate of the opposition Islamic Action Front in this case
declined. Moderate politics Nader Dahabi immediately appointed the prime minister.

2008 August - King Abdullah visits Iraq, which, he is the first Arab leader to visit the
country since the invasion of the United States in 2003.

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Reforms and protests from Jordanian civil society

2009 November - Raja Abdulla dissolves parliament halfway through a four-year term.

2009 December - King Abdullah appoints a new prime minister through economic
reforms announced by the government, due to requests from the public.

2010 May - New electoral law has been introduced to the public and pro-reform
campaigners say it doesn't make the system more representational.

2010 October - Leader of Islamic militant group jailed for planning an attack on pro-
government militants.

2010 November - Parliamentary elections, boycotted by opposition parties, the Islamic


Action Front. The riots broke out after it was announced that pro-government candidates had
won a big victory in the umpteenth election.

2011 January - Tunisian street protests by civil society with the aim of overthrowing the
president encourage similar demonstrations in other countries, including Jordan.

2011 February - Against a backdrop of large-scale street protests, King Abdullah


appointed a new prime minister, former army general MaroufBakhit, and accused him of
political reform.

2011 October - Protests continue throughout the summer, although on a smaller scale,
encourage King Abdullah to replace Prime Minister Bakhit with Awn al-Khasawneh, a judge at
the International Court.

2012 April - Prime Minister Awn al-Khasawneh resigns abruptly, unable to meet
demands for reform or fears of establishing the opposition of the Islamic opposition. King
Abdullah appointed former prime minister Fayez al-Tarawneh to replace him.

2012 October - King Abdullah calls for early parliamentary elections for January. The
Muslim Brotherhood's political wing, the Islamic Action Front, decided to continue to boycott
them in protest at the size of the unequal constituency and the lack of real parliamentary power.
The king appointed Abdullah Ensour, a former minister and vocal supporter of democratic
reform, as prime minister.

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2012 November - Clashes occur between protesters and king supporters following mass
demonstrations in Amman against the lifting of fuel subsidies, where calls for an end to the
monarchy are heard. In this incident, three people were killed.

2013 January - Pro-government candidates win back in parliamentary elections boycotted


by the main opposition Islamic Action Front.

2013 March - The new government is installed, with the incumbent Abdullah Ensour
being reinstalled as prime minister after unprecedented consultation between the king and
parliament.

2014 June - Radical Muslim pastor Abu Qatada, deported from Britain after a lengthy
legal battle, was found not guilty of terrorism violations by a court in Jordan on suspicion of a
plot in 1998.

Fighting the Islamic State

2014 September - Jordan is one of four Arab countries participating, along with the
United States, in air strikes against Islamic State militants in Syria.

2014 November - Jordanian authorities arrest deputy head of the country's Muslim
Brotherhood organization, in the first arrest of a major opposition figure in Jordan for several
years.

2015 February - Islamic State publishes a video intended to show Jordanian pilots
arrested, MuathKasasbeh burned alive. Jordan responded by increasing the anti-Islam-State air
campaign and executing prisoners. The European Union said it was providing a loan of 100
million euros ($ 113 million) to Jordan to help it overcome the effects of the crisis in Syria and
Iraq.

2015 March - Jordan takes part in Saudi-led airstrikes on Houthi rebels in Yemen.

2016 September - First parliamentary elections under proportional representation since


1989.

2016 December - Ten people, including a tourist, are killed in an attack claimed by the
Islamic State group in a Crusader castle in the city of Karak.

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2017 August - Jordan and Iraq reopen their main border for the first time in two years
after Islamic State militants were driven from the main highway to Baghdad.

2018 June - Street protests against tax increases and other measures introduced as part of
austerity programs lead to the fall of Prime Minister Hani Mulki and his successor with the
education minister and economist, Omar al-Razzaz.8

THE POWER OF THE JORDAN COUNTRY FROM DIPLOMATION,


INFORMATION, MILITARY, AND ECONOMIC CONDITION

Jordan is one of the biggest contributors to the refugee crisis which has been a cause of
concern internationally since the beginning of the Syrian and Palestinian civil war. Which then
has triggered a mass exodus that no one is ready to handle the impact. On the other hand, the
condition is, Jordan, being one of the neighboring countries that cannot avoid the arrival of
refugees from Syria and Palestine, but Jordan has limitations in terms of natural resources so that
if it does not cooperate with the country rich in natural resources others, Jordan certainly will not
be able to prosper the people, especially the population that increases every year.

As explained in The Telegraph in 2015, Jordan has limited water resources and national
consumption has increased by around 20 percent nationally, and by 40 percent in the northern
governor close to the Syrian border since the entry of refugees. Possibly since 2015 this
percentage will continue to increase. Up to 90 percent of Jordanian energy obtained from imports
and hence absorbing large populations proved to be costly. Conventionally, it is understandable
that the local population pays, through their tax dinar for the costs of meeting these shared needs,
which then has created some hatred by the community towards the government, at various
levels.9

Geopolitically, Jordan's position in terms of security and the military is surrounded by


volatility in neighboring countries such as Israel, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. From a
military point of view, Jordan has received assistance from the United States, as stated by the US

8
"Jordan country profile." BBC News. Accessed April 17, 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-
14631981
9
Sayegh, Nadine."Soft power and domestic affairs: Lessons from Jordan." TRT World. Last modified August 23,
2017. Accessed April 17, 2019.https://www.trtworld.com/opinion/international-9839

9
State Department, saying that $ 750 million has been allocated annually to Jordan in the form of
economic support funds and $ 350 million to support Jordanian military funds. During a joint
press conference in Amman, Tillerson also said that the increase would support Jordan's security
role in fighting terrorism and conflict in the countries around them, one of which was Syria.10

Jordan's human strength is at 94th position out of 137 registered countries. With a total of
200,000 military personnel, with 100,000 as active personnel and the remaining 100,000 as
reserves. For the total aircraft strength, Jordan is ranked 36 out of 137 countries, with a total of
290 military aircraft.11

Total population 10.458.413


Available labor 3.346.692
Total military personnel 200.000
Active personnel 100.000
Backup personnel 100.000
The total strength of military 290 (36 dari 137)
aircraft
Total helicopter power 149 (30 dari 137)
Battle tank 1.313 (19 dari 137)
Armored combat vehicle 2.847 (24 dari 137)
Rocket projector 88 (37 dari 137)
Total naval assets 37
Patrol boat 27
Table 1. Jordanian military conditions.

From an economic standpoint, Jordan's real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is in its third
year with a growth of 2 percent annually. On the supply side, services are expected to continue to
sustain the economy, as tourism maintains a strong recovery, namely with tourist receipts which
have increased by 14.9 percent during the first half of 2018. However, the decline in construction
permit issuance is a bad sign for private investment and expected weak consumption, namely

10
Younes, Ali."Jordan's economic crisis threatens political stability." Al Jazeera. Published February 15, 2018.
Accessed April 17, 2019.https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/02/jordan-economic-crisis-threatens-political-
stability-180214112245542.html
11
“Jordan Military Strength.” Global Fire Power. Accessed April 17, 2019.
https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=jordan

10
public consumption burdened by ongoing fiscal consolidation, and private consumption
burdened by sluggish job growth is a risk of immediate decline.12

The prospect of Jordan's economic growth is tense by the precarious regional situation,
including such an ongoing transaction deficit, and a lack of fiscal space in the government.
Economic recovery depends on reducing the level of debt and implementing structural reforms
on the one hand and identifying sources for expanding investment oriented on the other hand,
while taking advantage of international assistance and the potential for regional recovery.
Therefore, we only expect moderate growth in the medium term, with GDP rising from 2.0
percent in 2017 to 2.1 percent in 2018, 2.3 percent in 2019, and 2.4 percent in 2020.13

Jordanian debt has now reached $ 40 billion and the debt to domestic product ratio has
reached a record 95 percent, up from 71 percent in 2011. The economic crisis that is pressing
Jordan will be very acute in 2018, after allies of the Jordan Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC),
namely Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait, have not renewed the five-year financial assistance
program with Amman which was previously valued at $ 3.6 billion and ended in 2017. Thus,
Jordan in terms of the economy depends on western countries as mentioned earlier, namely one
of them is the United States, because they are one of the donors who have committed to support
Jordan. On Wednesday, US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson signed a $ 6.375 billion ($ 1.275
billion a year) five-year agreement with Foreign Minister Ayman al-Safadi.14

The rest of the developing economy is supported by the reopening of border crossings
with Iraq and Syria, and stronger tourism activities. Turning to 2019, in March, the government
has also authorized the restoration of the Jordan-Syria free trade area and announced that work is
being carried out to build a Jordanian-Iraqi industrial zone; both of these developments will help
Jordan's sluggish industrial sector, which shrank annually for 14 consecutive months in January.

12
"Jordan's Economic Outlook - October 2018." The World Bank. Published by October 3, 2018. Accessed April 17,
2019. https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/jordan/publication/economic-outlook-october-2018
13
Ibid.
14
Younes, Ali."Jordan's economic crisis threatens political stability." Al Jazeera. Published February 15, 2018.
Accessed April 17, 2019.https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/02/jordan-economic-crisis-threatens-political-
stability-180214112245542.html

11
In the political sphere, lawmakers demanded in March that the state-run National Electric
Power Company cancel a 15-year agreement to supply natural gas from Israel even though it is
expected to save a cash-strapped government of USD 1 billion.15

Apart from the United States, Jordan also has good economic relations with the European
Union (EU). Which in this case is a donor country for immigrant reservoirs, one of them is from
Syria. In Brussels this year, an article in the Jordan Times explained that before the Ministry of
Planning and International Cooperation, additional funding would be promised. The high-level
meeting in the Belgian capital gathered around 40 billion dollars to accommodate people in the
MENA region. In this regard, critics argue that throwing money into a crisis serves as a way for
Western powers to keep the refugee population under control and protected. By locking them up
in a region far from their borders, this bypasses their responsibility as signatories to the Refugee
State Convention.16Jordan is not a signatory to the 1951 Convention on Refugee Countries but is
arguably more committed to helping those in need than their Western counterparts, because the
Kingdom has a Memorandum of Understanding with UNHCR to protect those who are
legitimate refugees and agree to the legal framework in this matter, even though they not bound
in the same way as signed by signatories to the Convention.

In addition, economic growth is likely to increase in 2019 thanks to increased trade


relations with Iraq and Syria; greater gas supply from neighboring countries, especially Egypt,
which should reduce electricity costs; and strong tourism activities. However, fiscal
consolidation and the possibility of tighter monetary policies pose a risk of decreasing growth.
Our panelists estimate GDP growth of 2.4% in 2019, which is unchanged from last month's
forecast, and 2.6% in 2020.17

15
"Jordan Economic Outlook." Focus Economics. Published April 2, 2019. Accessed April 17,
2019.https://www.focus-economics.com/countries/jordan
16
Sayegh, Nadine."Soft power and domestic affairs: Lessons from Jordan." TRT World. Last modified August 23,
2017. Accessed April 17, 2019.https://www.trtworld.com/opinion/international-9839
17
"Jordan Economic Outlook." Focus Economics. Published April 2, 2019. Accessed April 17,
2019.https://www.focus-economics.com/countries/jordan

12
CASE OF IMMIGRANTS IN JORDAN

Jordan is the host of the largest number of Palestinian refugees in one country in the
world. These refugees are under the mandate of the United Nations Assistance and Employment
Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), a special UN agency that has been
operating since 1950 to provide assistance and work for 900,000 Palestinians who were moved
to the regions. neighboring regions by the creation of the State of Israel in 1948. During the first
Arab-Israeli war, Jordan received a large wave of refugees and then annexed the West Bank of
the Jordan River - part of pre-1948 Palestine. In two years, Jordan's population increased from
500,000 to 1.5 million, one third of them were refugees.18

During the second June-1967 Arab-Israeli war, Israel occupied the West Bank, sending to
the Jordanian East Bank 400,000 other Palestinians who were not considered refugees but more
as internally displaced people, because they had not crossed the internationally recognized
border. About 175,000 of them were also refugees from the 1948 war. In June 2010, Palestinian
refugees and their descendants were registered and UNRWA clients numbered more than 1.9
million of Jordan's total population of 6 million. To make statistical problems and more complex
categories, tens of thousands of Palestinians have voluntarily settled in the East Bank since 1948.
It is generally recognized that about half of Jordan's population comes from Palestine.19

Since the outbreak of the Syrian conflict in 2011, nearly five million refugees have
settled in neighboring countries. This massive refugee movement followed others, such as the
forced exile of Palestinians after the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, Lebanese
citizens from 1975 to 1990 or Iraqis since the early 1980s.20The refugee movement is one of the
main consequences of the political crisis in the Middle East in recent decades. As a result,
Jordan's territory is one of the largest refugee populations in the world, because most host
countries (except Turkey and Israel) are not signatories to the Geneva Convention in 1951.21

18
Chatelard, Geraldine."Jordan: A Refugee Haven." Migration Policy Institute. Published August 31, 2010. Accessed
April 17, 2019.https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/jordan-refugee-haven
19
Ibid.
20
Chatty, Dawn. Displacement and Dispossession in the Modern Middle East(Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press: 2010).
21
Dorai, Kamel."Conflict and Migration in the Middle East: Syrian Refugees in Jordan and Lebanon." E-International
Relations. Published September 4, 2018. Accessed April 17, 2019.https://www.e-ir.info/2018/09/04/conflict-and-
migration-in-the-middle-east-syrian-refugees-in-jordan-and-lebanon/

13
The Jordan region is also characterized by strong and ancient human mobility as a result
of regional economic disparities and transnational social ties. 22The Syrian crisis has caused
changes in Jordanian settlement policy. Until 2012, when the Zaatari camp was opened in North
Jordan, the reluctance of the host country's authorities to open new camps was based on fear of a
permanent settlement of refugees in their area, as happened to Palestinians.23

The high concentration of Syrian refugees in the Middle East can be partially explained
by historical and previous migration relations between countries in the region. There are bilateral
agreements to facilitate circulation and employment - with restrictions - people. When national
borders were created in the early twentieth century, this circular migration turned into a
transnational network. The Syrian refugee settlement was also the result of an open door policy
during the first two years of the conflict.24

The recent agreement between Turkey and the European Union aims to stabilize Syrian
refugees outside the European Union.25Several new agreements are being carried out in
neighboring countries. For example, since April 2016, Jordan has adopted new regulations to
give Syrian workers access to the labor market, but it still involves a small number of refugees
(according to the Jordanian Ministry of Labor, 37,000 Syrian workers have obtained work
permits by the end of 2016).

Before 2011, the circulation of migration from Syria to Lebanon or Jordan had a different
purpose: family visits, marriages or commercial activities. If the presence of Syria is well
documented in Lebanon,26the current Syrian crisis has explained the growth of Syria's presence
in Jordan.27Historical relations existed between Southern Syria and Northern Jordan - especially
tribal and family relations, and there was also a group of Syrians who found asylum in Jordan in

22
Marfleet, Philip. 2007. “Refugees and History. Why We Must Address the Past?” Refugee Survey Quarterly 26,
no. 3: 136–148.
23
Dorai, Kamel."Conflict and Migration in the Middle East: Syrian Refugees in Jordan and Lebanon." E-International
Relations. Published September 4, 2018. Accessed April 17, 2019.https://www.e-ir.info/2018/09/04/conflict-and-
migration-in-the-middle-east-syrian-refugees-in-jordan-and-lebanon/
24
“Europe: Syrian Asylum Applications From Apr. 2011 to Oct. 2016.”United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR).http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/asylum.php.
25
Krumm, Thomas. 2015. “The EU-Turkey Refugee Agreement of Autumn 2015 as a Two-Level Game.” Alternatives:
Turkish Journal of International Relations 14, no. 4: 20–36.
26
Chalcraft, John. 2009. The Invisible Cage, Syrian Migrant Workers in Lebanon. Stanford, California: Stanford
University Press.
27
AlKhouri, Riad. 2004. “Arab Migration Patterns: The Mashreq.” Arab Migration in a Globalized World. Genève:
IOM.

14
1982 after the Hama massacre. Some of them settled permanently in Jordan and opened
businesses. They are well integrated in Jordanian society and actively participate in the private
sector.28

However, after 2011, the migration policies of neighboring countries have changed
dramatically. Syrians are no longer free in cross-border mobility towards Lebanon and Jordan.
They also have access - with some limitations in both countries - to the labor market. The two
countries have signed an agreement with the Syrian government to facilitate the circulation of
migrant workers. In this case, Jordan gradually implemented a policy of restricting entry for
Syrians.29The opening of the Zaatari refugee camp in July 2012 could be considered the first
turning point to regulate the entry of Syrian refugees. Then more restrictions were imposed
because refugees who were still arriving in mass in the country were trying to find work. Today,
even if the border is still officially opened, very few Syrian refugees are allowed to enter. The
main consequence was that the Rukban camp in the eastern part of the border changed from a
transit to a camp. Now it holds more than 85,000 Syrian refugees in no man's land between the
two countries with very limited access to humanitarian assistance.30

An important element to consider is that there are no clear differences between migration
policies and asylum policies in Lebanon and Jordan. Like other countries in the region, they are
not signatories to the 1951 Geneva Convention on refugees.31Thus, both countries do not have a
national asylum system. It was UNHCR that established the asylum procedure in collaboration
with the host government. Lebanon and Jordan have signed a Memorandum of Understanding
with UNHCR that establishes the mandate of international organizations,32from where
Palestinians (covered by other international organizations, UNRWA) are issued.

28
Dorai, Kamel."Conflict and Migration in the Middle East: Syrian Refugees in Jordan and Lebanon." E-International
Relations. Published September 4, 2018. Accessed April 17, 2019.https://www.e-ir.info/2018/09/04/conflict-and-
migration-in-the-middle-east-syrian-refugees-in-jordan-and-lebanon/
29
Ababsa, Myriam. 2015. “De la crisehumanitaire à la crisesécuritaire. Les dispositifs de contrôle des
réfugiéssyriensenJordanie (2011–2015).” Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales 31, nos. 3 and 4: 73–
101.
30
UNHCR. 2017. “Jordan UNHCR Operational Update, January 2017.” reliefweb, 24 January 2017.
http://reliefweb.int/report/jordan/jordan-unhcr-operational-update-january-2017
31
Zaiotti, Ruben. 2006. “Dealing with Non-Palestinian Refugees in the Middle East: Policies and Practices in an
Uncertain Environment.” International Journal of Refugee Law 18, no. 2: 333–53.
32
Kagan, Michael. 2011. “We live in a country of UNHCR.” The UN Surrogate State and Refugee Policy in the Middle
East.” UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),

15
Massive forced migration of Syrians should not hide the fact that other groups of refugees
living in Syria were also forced to flee war and violence. UNRWA estimates that the total
number of displaced Palestinians in Syria is only around 250,000 (half of the total registered in
Syria), most of them from the Yarmouk camp in Damascus. More than 70,000 of them were
forced to seek asylum in neighboring countries mainly to Lebanon (50,000), Jordan (6,000) and
Egypt (9,000).33

Palestinian refugees tend to be transformed into asylum seekers because of conflict.


Jordan quickly decided to close its doors to this category of refugees, drastically limiting their
possibility to avoid violence from Syria. As written by Jalal Al Husseini (2015),

"After a relatively tolerant phase in which around 10,000 Palestinian refugees have been
able to enter the country, Jordan has tightened its entry policy since late 2012 in the
name of the need to counter Israel's vision of Jordan as a replacement Palestinian
homeland."
Thus, it can be said that Syria's neighboring countries, Jordan, are currently reluctant to
give them asylum. Not part of the 1951 Geneva Convention, they did not want to be considered a
resettlement state. Jordan and Lebanon consider themselves only as temporary host countries and
develop policies that incite refugees to immigrate to third countries to settle permanently and
access new citizenship.34

At present, in Jordan, the Azraq camp, built to accommodate 130,000 people when the
number of refugee arrivals is very high, is now mostly empty. UNHCR registered almost 55,000
refugees in August 2016, half of Azraq's capacity. Most Syrian refugees, when they have the
possibility, prefer to settle in urban areas where the opportunity to get a job is higher and where
rebuilding a 'normal' life is easier.35

In Jordan, the physiognomy of northern villages and cities has been greatly altered by
refugee settlements. Coexistence between Jordan and Syria is facilitated by historical ties that
bind southern Syria and the north of the Kingdom. In some border areas, such as in northwest
Jordan or in the Beqaa valley in Lebanon, the effects of the protracted settlement of large

33
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). n.d. “Syria Crisis.”
https://www.unrwa.org/syria-crisis
34
Chatelard, Géraldine and Kamel Doraï. 2009. “The Iraqi Presence in Syria and Jordan: Social and Spatial
Dynamics, And Management Practices by Host Countries.” Maghreb-Mashreq 199: 43–60.
35
Ibid.

16
numbers of refugees have a profound effect on local residents. The poorest and most
marginalized populations suffer from pressure on the rental market. In northern cities, such as
Irbid, Mafraq or Ramtha, rent has increased significantly and is not accessible to the poorest
households. Some services, such as schools or the medical sector, are also affected. For example,
according to the United National Development Program (UNDP),

"With the arrival of Syrians, many school classrooms are crowded. Many schools have
adopted a dual schedule, which requires shortening the class to 35 minutes from 45, and
means that the teacher is now working overtime so they do not get compensation."36
In addition to Syrian refugees, Jordan also hosts forced migrants from other countries in
the Middle East, such as Lebanon during the 1975-1991 civil war, and Iraq since the 1991 Gulf
War and after Saddam Hussein's 2003 ouster after Anglo-American military intervention .
Because even though the problem of migration continues to pose challenges for the Jordanian
regime. At the same time, it has become an asset for the country's economic development. So
that, since mid-2012, three official refugee camps have been opened in North Jordan (Zaatari,
Azraq and Mrajeeb Al Fhood) which accommodate around 140,000 refugees (22% of the total
population registered with UNHCR). The Zaatari camp in Northern Jordan, which currently has
nearly 80,000 residents, is the most famous for Syrian refugee settlements, and today is an
emergency city where prefabricated construction and several tents are juxtaposed. This region
focuses on all the paradoxes of the presence of Syria in Jordan. Humanitarian organizations
(such as UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, Save the Children, MSF, etc.) are everywhere, symbolizing
the vulnerability of exiled populations who have lost resources. Unlike Iraqi refugees who
arrived in Jordan after the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, most of the urban middle class, and
who have settled in the Jordanian capital, most Syrian refugees currently come from rural areas
and are therefore more vulnerable. They have limited access to the labor market, despite
measures to facilitate obtaining work permits before the summer of 2016.37

At present it is quite difficult to characterize Syrian refugee camps, because their


demographic development has been rapid due to the mass arrival of refugees in a short time.

36
UNDP. 2014. Municipal Needs Assessment Report. Mitigating the Impact of the Syrian Refugee Crisis on
Jordanian Vulnerable Host Communities, United Nations Development Programme.
http://www.jo.undp.org/content/dam/jordan/docs/Poverty/UNDPreportmunicipality.pdf
37
Dorai, Kamel."Conflict and Migration in the Middle East: Syrian Refugees in Jordan and Lebanon." E-International
Relations. Published September 4, 2018. Accessed April 17, 2019.https://www.e-ir.info/2018/09/04/conflict-and-
migration-in-the-middle-east-syrian-refugees-in-jordan-and-lebanon/

17
Most refugees arrived between mid-2012 when 50,000 were registered, and mid-2013 with more
than 500,000 registered. The morphology of the camp has changed substantially, from densely
populated areas where prefabricated tents and housing are located adjacent to each other to urban
areas where refugees have built small yards or small gardens among prefabricated housing
structures growing vegetables. Initially, the Zaatari camp was a residential area for Syrian
refugees. Until 2013, they had the possibility to go back and forth without special control.
Displacement expanded, and the number of refugees increased significantly, the Jordanian
authorities gradually began to control the entrance and exit of the camp. Today is a closed room,
and refugees who want to go must get a temporary permit that allows them to go to a medical
agreement at the embassy or meet relatives. Similarly, foreigners who wish to enter the camp
must obtain prior authorization from the Jordanian authorities.

SETTLEMENT OF THE IMMIGRANT CASE THROUGH


DIPLOMATION, INFORMATION, MILITARY, AND ECONOMY
STRATEGIES OF JORDAN

Similar to the involvement of countries in each other in the fields of war and peace, trade,
economics, culture, environment and human rights, migration in this case is also increasingly
becoming an important area of the country's bilateral and multilateral diplomatic relations. Such
as through intergovernmental agreements that aim to encourage or limit migration flows;
extension of preferential treatment for certain foreign citizens; creation of guest workers or other
temporary labor migration schemes; expulsion or threat of expulsion of foreign nationals; etc.38

There are three main scope conditions that apply to defining migration diplomacy,
namely, first, migration diplomacy refers to state actions in investigating how population
mobility across borders is related to the country's diplomatic goals. Thus, migration diplomacy
does not investigate the internal work of international organizations, the media, or social actors,
such as non-governmental organizations. Which in fact, indeed, countries that are often involved
in migration diplomacy will be in conflict with international organizations. For example,
Tanzania has submitted a public appeal to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees as a way to

38
Fiona B Adamson and GerasimosTsourapas. 2018. "Migration Diplomacy in World Politics." International Studies
Perspectives, eky015.

18
secure their resources.39Then Kenya has used threats to close Dadaab camps as a type of
diplomatic bargaining chip, and countries such as Denmark are involved in direct public
diplomacy as a way to block unwanted migration.40Territorial logic says that they mean having
an interest in maintaining and controlling their national borders as aspects of domestic
sovereignty, Westphalia, and interdependence.41

Second, the migration diplomacy of a country is not identical to the migration policy as a
whole and is only relevant when the state includes it as part of their foreign relations and
diplomacy, where migration policies can range from fully limiting to allowing free
migration.42Diplomacy is often about negotiations, and migration diplomacy centers on how
countries use cross-border population mobility management in their international relations, or
how they use diplomatic means to get goals related to migration.

Third, migration diplomacy highlights the issue of political issues, so it does not have a
direct impact on relations between countries, but will be more visible in internal movements,
regulation of immigrant citizenship status or access to rights, tariff rules that can be transported
goods and services, diaspora politics because on interactions between countries.43

At the same time, a country can be involved in emigration diplomacy in one context and
immigration diplomacy or transit in another. Jordan is one of the countries involved in this
complicated practice. Jordan has developed an emigration diplomacy framework in bilateral
work with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, by giving special attention to the
welfare of its citizens abroad. On the other hand, at the same time, Jordan was involved in transit
migration diplomacy with Egypt during the 1970s and 1980s when thousands of Egyptian
workers needed to cross through Jordan to pursue work in the GCC countries. This bilateral
negotiation focuses on strengthening security, but also enhances infrastructure and transportation
relations between the two countries to facilitate transit flows. Finally, Jordan has been the

39
Whitaker Beth Elise. 2002. “Refugees in Western Tanzania: The Distribution of Burdens and Benefits Among Local
Hosts.” Journal of Refugee Studies15: 339–58.
40
Fiona B Adamson and GerasimosTsourapas. 2018. "Migration Diplomacy in World Politics." International Studies
Perspectives, eky015.
41
Krasner Stephen D. 1999. Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy . Princeton: Princeton University Press.
42
Messina Anthony M., Lahav Gallya. 2006. The Migration Reader: Exploring Politics and Policies . London: Lynne
Rienner Publishers.
43
Fiona B Adamson and GerasimosTsourapas. 2018. "Migration Diplomacy in World Politics." International Studies
Perspectives, eky015.

19
destination of Palestinian refugees who settled in the country after the big wave in 1948, 1967,
and later, gave Jordan the opportunity to engage in negotiations with Israel from the perspective
of immigration diplomacy.44

Recently, when Syria fled to Jordan since 2011, the Amman strategy has blurred the line
between transit migration and immigration diplomacy when the country agreed to accommodate
Syrian refugees in exchange for significant international assistance. Negotiations culminated in
Jordan Compact, an agreement prepared in the context of the London Pledging Summit and
agreed in February 2016.45The main objective is to create 200,000 job opportunities for Syrians
in Jordan over a period of three to five years. Jordan also agreed to lift regulatory barriers to
allow refugees to work in the country and to reduce the cost of work permits from 700 Jordanian
dinars to 10 Jordanian dinars for those looking for low-skilled jobs. In return, a $ 700 million
grant was raised in hopes of additional promises of $ 700 million in 2017 and 2018. At the same
time, the World Bank adopted the Concession Financing Facility, which according to Jordan's
Minister of Planning and International Cooperation, provided $ 116.4 million in funding for
Jordan during 2016-2017, thereby increasing around $ 670 million concessional financing for
development projects in various sectors.46

So, in other words, countries can use this migration diplomacy equally to achieve
economic goals. Similarly, the 2016 EU-Turkey agreement and Jordan Compact are both related
to the economic interests of Turkey and Jordan, respectively, with the latter providing Jordanian
economic benefits such as foreign direct investment (FDI) to special economic zones (SEZs) and
tariffs - and quota-free access to a single EU market for goods produced in SEZs by workers who
are at least 15 percent Syrian.47In addition to Jordan and Europe, Singapore, which also houses
the largest migrants in Southeast Asia, has developed a migration diplomacy policy that allows

44
Lukacs Yehuda. 1999. Israel, Jordan, and the Peace Process . Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
45
MellingerHillary, van Berlo Patrick. 2016. “The Jordan Compact: Turning the Syrian Refugee Crisis Into a
Development Opportunity.” Leiden Law Blog , September 24. Accessed April 17, 2019.
http://leidenlawblog.nl/articles/the-jordan-compact-turning-the-syrian-refugee-crisis.
46
WORLD BANK. 2017. “2016–2017 Global Concessional Financing Facility Annual Report.” Washington, DC: World
Bank. Accessed April 17, 2019. https://globalcff.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/GCFF-
Annual%20Report_FINAL_DIGITAL.pdf.
47
MellingerHillary, van Berlo Patrick. 2016. “The Jordan Compact: Turning the Syrian Refugee Crisis Into a
Development Opportunity.” Leiden Law Blog , September 24. Accessed April 17, 2019.
http://leidenlawblog.nl/articles/the-jordan-compact-turning-the-syrian-refugee-crisis.

20
the recruitment of foreign workers and foreign workers from abroad, in accordance with the
requirements of skilled and unskilled migrant workers.48

Then, the migration to, from and across Jordan since the Palestinian exodus in 1948 has
played an important role in the country's politics, economy and society. These movements have
several underlying patterns and interact. The main ones are connected with regional geopolitics,
fluctuations in the oil economy in the Persian Gulf, and efforts by the royal Hashemite kingdom
to ensure its own stability.49

In particular, it has enabled Jordan to receive a large amount of development assistance


from the international community to help resettle and integrate refugees. Remittances from
Palestinians who go looking for work in the Gulf also play a major role in developing Jordan's
public and private sectors. The Jordanian government welcomes resettlement projects carried out
by international organizations or US development agencies within the broader development
framework. These projects generally encourage the entire Jordanian economy.50

UNRWA continues to provide health and education services to its clients - currently only
341,500 live in camps, and the majority settle on their own. Grants and loans from oil-producing
Arab countries also allow job creation for refugees. On the Jordanian labor market which has
become highly segmented along ethnic and gender lines, men employed in agribusiness or
construction come from more populated or less affluent Arab countries such as Egypt and Sudan,
and female domestic workers come from Southeast Asia. Especially after the peace agreement
with Israel in 1994, the Jordanian-Israeli joint industrial business (called the Qualified Industrial
Zone) has imported male and female labor from India, Bangladesh and other Southeast Asian
countries.51On the other hand, there is no domestic labor supply to meet this demand due to the
very young age structure of the Jordanian population and the relative marginalization of women
from the workforce. This imbalance creates a very high dependence on migrant workers to
Jordan. In the late 1970s, the government introduced policies that supported professional
immigration without expertise and semi-skilled. Jordan is thus a recipient of labor while

48
Hui Weng-Tat. 1997. “Regionalization, Economic Restructuring, and Labour Migration in Singapore.” International
Migration 35: 109–30.
49
Chatelard, Geraldine."Jordan: A Refugee Haven." Migration Policy Institute. Published August 31, 2010. Accessed
April 17, 2019.https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/jordan-refugee-haven
50
Ibid.
51
Ibid.

21
continuing to export skilled workers. Immigrants are mostly men from Egypt and Syria, with
stable growth of Asian female workers. In 1984, 80 percent of the 153,519 registered foreign
workers came from Egypt, and 13 percent from Southeast Asia.52

The Jordanian government does not attempt to attach incentives to the migration of
highly educated professional professionals, who are not considered brain drain. In contrast, in the
1970s, the government established a national development goal for public education for exports,
thus expanding and systematizing training efforts. In the mid-1980s, a drastic decline in workers'
remittances and a decline in the level of aid to Jordan by oil-producing countries, both of which
were linked to falling oil prices, caused an increase in Jordanian foreign debt. Thus, continuing
to use cheap foreign labor, without social costs, save the country from the need to continue
investing in social infrastructure such as care centers for small children or the elderly, cared for
by low-paid Asian housemaids at home. In addition, it allows the Jordanian elite, the main
employer of foreign workers, to maintain a standard of living equivalent to the previous
prosperous period.53

From the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, an average of 42 percent of Jordanian labor was
foreigners, and the domestic unemployment rate, which had peaked at 12 percent in the 1960s,
dropped to 2 percent in 1986. In 1987, 350,000 Jordanian people, mostly men, work abroad,
more than 50 percent in Saudi Arabia alone. More than 30 percent are university graduates, and
40 percent are in professional positions.54

In addition to reducing unemployment, emigration allows the country of Jordan to take


advantage of expatriate remittances to the point of securing a sustainable source of financial
income. Jordan is described as the only oil economy in the world without oil, that is, a country
that relies heavily on foreign aid from oil-producing countries and on remittances from its
citizens working in these countries. Fluctuations in Jordan's economic development have
followed the ups and downs of the oil market. Worldwide, between 1974 and 1991, Jordan was
the fourth country that was most dependent on migrant income. In 1984, for example,
remittances reached US $ 1.2 billion, or one quarter of GDP.

52
Chatelard, Geraldine."Jordan: A Refugee Haven." Migration Policy Institute. Published August 31, 2010. Accessed
April 17, 2019.https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/jordan-refugee-haven
53
Ibid.
54
Ibid.

22
In addition to economics, migration diplomacy has also been used by immigration
countries for security purposes when migration flows are seen as a channel for terrorism or as an
reinforcer of organized crime. For example, bilateral extradition agreements are used as a means
of transferring individuals from a country's territory to alleged crime or terrorist activities.55

Politically, Jordan has played a regional role in transit migration. Palestinian refugees, for
example, created a collection of cheap labor that emerged, through Jordan, when labor flowed in
the Gulf. Among those who were expelled in 1991, most of them used Jordan as an entry point to
the West Bank. In the other direction, Western Bankers have been transiting in Jordan in
significant numbers since the second Palestinian uprising began in 2000. Apart from
Palestinians, forced migrants from the Lebanese civil war in 1970 found their way through the
kingdom to settle in the United States, and Iraq using Jordan as a base since the 1991 Gulf War
to seek asylum in Europe and elsewhere.56

Palestinian political integration in Jordan was made very dependent on their loyalty to the
ruling monarchy which first sought to protect its own stability in the Arab-Israeli conflict rather
than engage militarily with Israel. During the 1960s, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
succeeded in making Jordan a political and military base against Israel.57

55
Fiona B Adamson and GerasimosTsourapas. 2018. "Migration Diplomacy in World Politics." International Studies
Perspectives, eky015.
56
Chatelard, Geraldine."Jordan: A Refugee Haven." Migration Policy Institute. Published August 31, 2010. Accessed
April 17, 2019.https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/jordan-refugee-haven
57
Ibid.

23
CONCLUSION

Jordan is a very small country with limited natural resources and history characterized by
sudden reconfiguration of regions and populations. The economy is related to neighboring
countries, both Palestine or oil-producing countries such as Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The
Jordanian economy is therefore vulnerable to political conflicts that affect these countries. Direct
and indirect policy interventions for managing migration by state actors and international
organizations have been carried out in this unstable socio-economic or sociopolitical social and
economic context.

In addition, both labor migration and refugee acceptance policies have been largely
determined by political and economic considerations related to state development projects and
economic growth in the ideological context of Arab nationalism. The minimum institutional
framework that has been established to manage this migration trend or to provide assistance and
protection for refugees is largely left to international organizations, such as UNRWA for
Palestine and the UNHCR for Iraq.

The Jordanian government, although recently introduced entry regulations from the West
Bank and Iraq, the number of forced migrants from neighboring countries is still considered
high. Jordan currently does not want to absorb these migrants either as migrant workers or as
refugees. In particular, the government continues to reject pressure by UNHCR to become a state
of asylum for non-Palestinian refugees, arguing that they want to see the Palestinian problem
resolved first.

Migrants often continue their journey through irregular channels with the result that
Europe, the main purpose of this migration, put pressure on Jordan as early as the 1990s,
accompanied by financial incentives, to control this flow. Jordan is now more closely monitoring
its borders at the exit, either at the Amman airport or on the border with Syria (a step on an
irregular migration route by land across Turkey or via the Mediterranean).

However, there is a limited direct prospect for a large number of Palestinians or Iraqis to
return from Jordan. This creates a deadlock: Jordan cannot absorb new migrants without
endangering its social balance; migrants do not want to return home and only a limited number
can continue through regular or irregular channels. One way to meet this challenge is to open

24
resettlement options for Iraqi refugees in Western countries. More options for secondary
migration and international development assistance may be needed to help Jordan overcome
what appears to be voluntary migrant flows.

Diplomacy √
Information √
Military
Economy √

25
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28

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