Voidable Marriage

(b) On remarriage, FC Art.
40
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (n).
(c) On rights & obligations between the former spouses, 198

Art. 198. During the proceedings for legal separation or for annulment of marriage, and for declaration of nullity of
marriage, the spouses and their children shall be supported from the properties of the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership. After the final judgment granting the petition, the obligation of mutual support between the
spouses ceases. H owever, in case of legal separation, the court may order that the guilty spouse shall give support to the
innocent one, specifying the terms of such order. (292a)
(d) On the property regime of the marriage
FC 50, FC 43(2) cf. FC 102(4), 129, 138

FC 50. The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3),(4) and (5) of Article 43 and by Article 44 shall also apply in the
proper cases to marriages which are declared ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45.
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of third presumptive legitimes, unless such
matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be notified of the
proceedings for liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance with the
provisions of Articles 102 and 129.
FC 43(2). The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the ff. effects:
The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated,
but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property or
conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the
guilty spouse by a previous marriage or in default of children, the innocent spouse;
FC 102(4). Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following procedure shall apply:
The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall constitute its net assets, which shall be divided
equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements,
or unless there has been a voluntary waiver of such share provided in this Code. For purpose of computing the net profits
subject to forfeiture in accordance with Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2), the said profits shall be the increase in value
between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at
the time of its dissolution.
FC 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the following procedure shall apply:
1. An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the conjugal partnership and the
exclusive properties of each spouse.
2. Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in payment of personal debts and obligations of either spouse
shall be credited to the conjugal partnership as an asset thereof.
Voidable Marriages Remainder | Block 5 | 1 of 29

3. Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his or her exclusive funds in the acquisition of property or for
the value of his or her exclusive property, the ownership of which has been vested by law in the conjugal
partnership.
4. The debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership shall be paid out of the conjugal assets. In case of
insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate
properties, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (2) of Article 121.
5. Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to each of them.
6. Unless the owner had been indemnified from whatever source, the loss or deterioration of movables used for
the benefit of the family, belonging to either spouse, even due to a fortuitous event, shall be paid to said
spouse from the conjugal funds, if any.
7. The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall constitute the profits, which shall be divided
equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage
settlements or unless there has been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code.
8. The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon the partition in accordance with
Article 51.
9. In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall, unless
otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the common
children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother,
unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into
consideration the best interests of said children. (181a, 182a, 183a, 184a, 185a)
FC 138. After dissolution of the absolute community or of the conjugal partnership, the provisions on complete
separation of property shall apply. (191a)
1. Buenaventura v CA, G.R. No. 127358. March 31, 2005 (Alejaga)

Facts: Noel Buenaventura filed a position for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that both he and his wife
were psychologically incapacitated. The RTC in its decision, declared the marriage entered into between petitioner and
respondent null and void and ordered the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property; ordered petitioner a
regular support in favor of his son in the amount of 15,000 monthly, subject to modification as the necessity arises, and
awarded the care and custody of the minor to his mother.
Noel appealed before the CA. Likewise, the CA decided in favor of Isabel. Thus, the present petition filed by Noel
assailing the partition of properties ordered by the lower courts.
Issue: Whether the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties owned in common by the parties herein should
be on the basis of co-ownership, and not of the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.
Ruling: Yes. Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage, the provisions of Article 50
in relation to Articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the dissolution of the absolute community or
conjugal partnership of gains, as the case may be, do not apply. Rather, the general rule applies, which is that in case a
marriage is declared void ab initio, the property regime applicable and to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that
of equal co-ownership. In Valdes vs RTC-Quezon, the Court has stated: “…The rules set up to govern the liquidation of
either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable
marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists
between common-law spouses.

The first paragraph of Article 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43, relates only,
by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40 of the Code, i.e., the
declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is
judicially declared void. The latter is a special rule that somehow recognizes the philosophy and an old doctrine that void
marriages are inexistent from the very beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to establish their nullity.”
Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found, both by the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, to have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be covered by the co-ownership. No fruits
of a separate property of one of the parties appear to have been included or involved in said distribution. The liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties owned in common by the parties herein as ordered by the court a quo should,
therefore, be sustained, but on the basis of co-ownership and not of the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.
2. Quiao v Quiao, G. R. No. 183622, July 4, 2012 (Tan)

FACTS: Rita and Brigido Quiao got married in 1977. But in 2000, Rita filed a complaint for legal separation against
petitioner Brigido before the RTC of Butuan City. The Court rendered a decision granting separation thereby awarding the
custody of their 3 minor children in favor of Rita and all remaining properties shall be divided equally between the
spouses subject to the respective legitimes of the children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities. Brigido’s
share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children because
Brigido is the offending spouse.

Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period 270 days later or after more than nine months
from the promulgation of the Decision. However, the petitioner filed before the RTC, a Motion for Clarification, asking
the RTC to define the term “Net Profits Earned.”
It held that the phrase “NET PROFIT EARNED” denotes “the remainder of the properties of the parties after
deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts.” It further held that after determining the
remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the common children because the offending spouse does not
have any right to any share of the net profits earned, pursuant to Arts 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code.
The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129 of the Family Code, instead of Article 102.
He argues that Article 102 applies because there is no other provision under the Family Code which defines net profits
earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation.
ISSUES:
1. Should Art. 102 on dissolution of absolute community, instead of Art. 129 on dissolution of conjugal partnership of
gains, be applicable in this case?
2. Whether the offending spouse acquired vested rights over ½ of the properties in the conjugal partnership?
3. Is the computation of “net profits” earned in the conjugal partnership of gains the same with the computation of “net
profits” earned in the absolute community?
RATIO:
1. YES, Art. 129 should govern. First, since the spouses were married prior to the promulgation of the Family Code, the
default rule is- in the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property relations between husband and wife.
Article 119 of the Civil Code provides: The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative community of property, or
upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of
relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property relations between husband and wife.
Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the spouses’ marriage the operative law is already the Family Code, the
same applies in the instant case and the applicable law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and
liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code.
2. NO. The petitioner is saying that since the property relations between the spouses is governed by the regime of
Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, the petitioner acquired vested rights over half of the properties of the
Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code, which provides: “All property of the conjugal
partnership of gains is owned in common by the husband and wife.”
While one may not be deprived of his “vested right,” he may lose the same if there is due process and such deprivation is
founded in law and jurisprudence.
In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process. First, he was well-aware that the respondent
prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugal properties be awarded to her. In fact, in his Answer, the petitioner prayed
that the trial court divide the community assets between the petitioner and the respondent as circumstances and evidence
warrant after the accounting and inventory of all the community properties of the parties. Second, when the decision for
legal separation was promulgated, the petitioner never questioned the trial court’s ruling forfeiting what the trial court
termed as “net profits,” pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being deprived of
his right to due process.

3. NO. When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife become joint owners of all
the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the marriage, and those acquired during the
marriage (except those under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common mass of the couple’s properties. And when
the couple’s marriage or community is dissolved, that common mass is divided between the spouses, or their respective
heirs, equally or in the proportion the parties established, irrespective of the value they originally owned.
In this case, assuming arguendo that Art 102 is applicable, since it has been established by the trial court found that the
couple has no separate properties when they married, what will be divided equally between them is simply the “net
profits.” And since the legal separation ½ share decision of Brigido states that the in the net profits shall be awarded to the
children, Brigido will still be left with nothing.
On the other hand, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of gains under Article 142 of the Civil
Code, “the husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their separate property and income from their work or
industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained
indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.” From the foregoing provision, each of the couple has his and her
own property and debts. The law does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of those debts or properties between the
spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete separation of capitals.
In the instant case, since it was already established by the trial court that the spouses have no separate properties, there is
nothing to return to any of them. The listed properties above are considered part of the conjugal partnership. Thus,
ordinarily, what remains in the above-listed properties should be divided equally between the spouses and/or their
respective heirs. However, since the trial court found the petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the
conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. Again,
lest we be confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing will be returned to the guilty party in the conjugal
partnership regime, because there is no separate property which may be accounted for in the guilty party’s favor.
(e) On ‘presumptive legitimes/hereditary rights
FC 50-53, 43 (2), FC 51 in rel to NCC 886, 888;

FC 50. The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and by Article 44 shall also apply
in the proper cases to marriages which are declared ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and
45.
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of third presumptive legitimes, unless
such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be notified of
the proceedings for liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance with
the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.
FC 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children, computed as of the date
of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound securities, unless the parties,
by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided for such matters.
The children or their guardian or the trustee of their property may ask for the enforcement of the judgment.

The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein shall in no way prejudice the ultimate successional rights of the
children accruing upon the death of either of both of the parents; but the value of the properties already received
under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as advances on their legitime
FC 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses and the delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the
appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect third persons. (n)
FC 53. Either of the former spouses may marry again after compliance with the requirements of the immediately
preceding Article; otherwise, the subsequent marriage shall be null and void.
FC 43(2). The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the
following effects:
The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and
liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the
community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if
none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or in default of children, the innocent spouse;
NCC 886. Legitime is that part of the testator's property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved
it for certain heirs who are, therefore, called compulsory heirs. (806)
NCC 888. The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the
father and of the mother.
The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half, subject to the rights of illegitimate children and of the
surviving spouse as hereinafter provided. (808a)
FC 176
FC 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and
shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname of
their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in
the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the
father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation
during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate
child. (287a) (as amended by RA No 9255)
NCC 908, 1061

NCC 908. To determine the legitime, the value of the property left at the death of the testator shall be considered,
deducting all debts and charges, which shall not include those imposed in the will.
To the net value of the hereditary estate, shall be added the value of all donations by the testator that are subject to
collation, at the time he made them. (818a)
NCC 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the
estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by
way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime
of each heir, and in the account of the partition. (1035a)

FC 102 (5) and (6), 129 (8) and (9)
Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following procedure shall apply:
(5) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon partition, in accordance with
Article 51.
(6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the
lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the common children
choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court
has decided otherwise. In case there in no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the best
interests of said children. (n)
Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the following procedure shall apply:
(8) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon the partition in accordance with
Article 51.
(9) In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall, unless
otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the common
children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless
the court has decided otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration
the best interests of said children.
Yu v Reyes-Carpio, GR 189207, June 15, 2011 (Repeated)
(f) On the status and custody of children, FC 54, 213

Art. 54. Children conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the marriage under Article
36 has become final and executory shall be considered legitimate. Children conceived or born of the subsequent marriage
under Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate.
Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court.
The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age,
unless the parent chosen is unfit. (n )
(g) On use of surnames, NCC Art. 371, 364, 369 (All Repealed)
Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume her maiden name and
surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name and surname. However, she may choose to
continue employing her former husband's surname, unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or
(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.
Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.
Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable marriage shall principally use the surname of the
father.
Yasin vs Shari'a, G.R. No.94986 February 23, 1995 (Repeated)

I. Marriage when one spouse is absent
FC 41-44, compare with NCC 83, 85(2) and 87(2) cf. RPC 349
FC 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is
danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only
two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a
summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice
to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (83a)
FC 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by the recording of
the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring
it void ab initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the residence of
the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person, with due notice to the spouses of the
subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case it is disputed.
FC 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the ff effects:
1. The children of the subsequent marriage conceived prior to its termination shall be considered legitimate;
2. The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and
liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the
community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if
none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or in default of children, the innocent spouse;
3. Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee contracted the marriage in bad faith,
such donations made to said donee are revoked by operation of law;
4. The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted in bad faith as beneficiary in any
insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and
5. The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit from the innocent
spouse by testate and intestate succession. (n)
FC 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and all
donations by reason of marriage and testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the other are revoked by operation
of law. (n)
NCC 83. Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such
person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse
present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is
generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent
marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid
in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court. (Repealed)

NCC 85(2). Art. 85. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
(2) In a subsequent marriage under Article 83, Number 2, that the former husband or wife believed to be dead was in fact
living and the marriage with such former husband or wife was then in force; (Repealed)
NCC 87(2). Art. 87. The action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by the parties and within the periods as
follows:
(2) For causes mentioned in Number 2 of Article 85, by the spouse who has been absent, during his or her lifetime; or by
either spouse of the subsequent marriage during the lifetime of the other; (Repealed)
RPC 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
SSS vs. De Bailon, G.R. No. 165545, March 24, 2006 (Cerrero)
DOCTRINE: Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being voidable,48 it is terminated by final judgment of
annulment in a case instituted by the absent spouse who reappears or by either of the spouses in the subsequent marriage.
Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to annul a subsequent marriage is necessary. Thus Art. 42 provides:
Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by the recording of
the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring
it void ab initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the residence of
the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person, with due notice to the spouses of the
subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case it is disputed.
FACTS: In 1955 Clemente Bailon and Alice Diaz married in Barcelona, Sorsogon. 15+ years later, Clemente filed an
action to declare the presumptive death of Alice she being an absentee. The petition was granted in 1970. In 1983,
Clemente married Jarque. The two live together untile Clemente’s death in 1998. Jarque then sought to claim her
husband’s SSS benefits and the same were granted her. On the other hand, a certain Cecilia Baion-Yap who claimed that
she is the daughter of Bailon to a certain Elisa Jayona petitioned before the SSS that they be given the reimbursement for
the funeral spending for it was actually them who shouldered the burial expenses of Clemente.
They further claim that Clemente contracted three marriages; one with Alice, another with Elisa and the other with Jarque.
Cecilia also averred that Alice is alive and kicking and Alice subsequently emerged; Cecilia claimed that Clemente
obtained the declaration of Alice’s presumptive death in bad faith for he was aware of the whereabouts of Alice or if not
he could have easily located her in her parent’s place. She was in Sorsogon all along in her parents’ place. She went there
upon learning that Clemente had been having extra-marital affairs. SSS then ruled that Jarque should reimburse what had
been granted her and to return the same to Cecilia since she shouldered the burial expenses and that the benefits should go
to Alice because her reappearance had terminated Clemente’s marriage with Harque. Further, SSS ruled that the RTC’s
decision in declaring Alice to be presumptively death is erroneous. Teresita appealed the decision before the Social
Security Comission and the SSC affirmed SSS. The CA however ruled the contrary.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subsequent marriage of Clemente Bailon and respondent Teresita Jarque may terminate by
mere reappearance of the absent spouse of Bailon? NO

HELD: The second marriage contracted by a person with an absent spouse endures until annulled. It is only the
competent court that can nullify the second marriage pursuant to Article 87 of the Civil Code and upon the reappearance
of the missing spouse, which action for annulment may be filed.
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity on August 3, 1988 of the Family Code,
the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was in effect during their celebration.
Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being voidable, it is terminated by final judgment of annulment in a case
instituted by the absent spouse who reappears or by either of the spouses in the subsequent marriage.
Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to annul a subsequent marriage is necessary. Thus Article 42 thereof
provides the subsequent marriage shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the
absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.
If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either by affidavit or by court action,
such absentee‘s mere reappearance, even if made known to the spouses in the subsequent marriage, will not terminate
such marriage. Since the second marriage has been contracted because of a presumption that the former spouse is dead,
such presumption continues inspite of the spouse‘s physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still be
regarded as legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by law.
SSS is correct in ruling that it is inutile for Alice to pursue the recording of her reappearance before the local civil registrar
through an affidavit or a court action. But it is not correct for the SSS to rule upon the declaration made by the RTC. The
SSC or the SSS has no judicial power to review the decision of the RTC. SSS is indeed empowered to determine as to
who should be the rightful beneficiary of the benefits obtained by a deceased member in case of disputes but such power
does not include the appellate power to review a court decision or declaration.
In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify, in accordance with law, Bailon‘s and Teresita‘s marriage prior to the
former‘s death in 1998, Teresita is rightfully the dependent spouse-beneficiary of Bailon.
Alice reappeared only after Clemente’s death and in this case she can no longer file such an affidavit; in this case the bad
faith [or good faith] of Clemente can no longer be raised – the marriage herein is considered voidable and must be
attacked directly not collaterally – it is however impossible for a direct attack since there is no longer a marriage to be
attacked for the same has been terminated upon Clemente’s death.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No costs.
Valdez v Republic, G.R. No. 180863, September 8, 2009 (Dimen)

FACTS: Angelita Valdez (petitioner) married Sofio Polborosa on January 11, 1971 in Pateros, Rizal. On December 13,
1971, petitioner gave birth to the spouses' only child, Nancy. According to Valdez, she and Sofio argued constantly
because the latter was unemployed and did not bring home any money. In March 1972, Sofio left their conjugal dwelling.
Valdez and their child waited for him to return but, in May 1972, Valdez decided to go back to her parents' home in
Bancay 1st, Camiling, Tarlac. Three years passed without any word from Sofio.
In 1975, Sofio showed up at Bancay 1st, Camiling, Tarlac. He and Valdez talked for several hours and they agreed to
separate, they even executed a document to that effect. And that was the last time Valdez saw him. After that, Valdez
didn't hear any news of Sofio, his whereabouts or even if he was alive or not.
Believing that Sofio was already dead, Valdez married Virgilio Reyes on June 20, 1985. Subsequently, however,
Virgilio's application for naturalization filed with the United States Department of Homeland Security was denied because
petitioner's marriage to Sofio was still subsisting. Hence, on March 29, 2007, Valdez filed a Petition before the RTC of
Camiling, Tarlac seeking the declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.

RTC Ruling: RTC dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The RTC held that Angelita Valdez "was not able to prove the
well-grounded belief that her husband Sofio Polborosa was already dead." It said that under Article 41 of the Family
Code, the present spouse is burdened to prove that her spouse has been absent and that she has a well-founded belief that
the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. This belief, the RTC said,
must be the result of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent
spouse.
The RTC found that, by petitioner's own admission, she did not try to find her husband anymore in light of their mutual
agreement to live separately. Likewise, their daughter testified that her mother prevented her from looking for her father.
The RTC also said there is a strong possibility that Sofio is still alive, considering that he would have been only 61 years
old by then, and people who have reached their 60s have not become increasingly low in health and spirits, and, even
assuming as true petitioner's testimony that Sofio was a chain smoker and a drunkard, there is no evidence that he
continues to drink and smoke until now.
Valdez filed a motion for reconsideration. She argued that it is the Civil Code that applies in this case and not the Family
Code since her marriage to Sofio was celebrated on January 11, 1971, long before the Family Code took effect. Valdez
further argued that she had acquired a vested right under the provisions of the Civil Code and the stricter provisions of the
Family Code should not be applied against her because Title XIV of the Civil Code, where Articles 384 and 390 on
declaration of absence and presumption of death, respectively, can be found, was not expressly repealed by the Family
Code. To apply the stricter provisions of the Family Code will impair the rights she had acquired under the Civil Code.
The RTC denied the said Motion for Reconsideration. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Valdez with Virgilio Reyes is valid despite the lack of declaration of presumptive
death of Sofio.
HELD: Yes, the marriage of Angelita Valdez with Virgilio Reyes is valid. The RTC erred in applying the provisions of
the Family Code and holding that petitioner needed to prove a "well-founded belief" that Sofio was already dead. The
RTC applied Article 41 of the Family Code, to wit:
"Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger under the circumstances
set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient."
For the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a
to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
However, in this case, it is readily apparent that the marriages of Valdez to Sofio and Virgilio on January 11, 1971 and
June 20, 1985, respectively, were both celebrated under the auspices of the Civil Code.
The pertinent provision of the Civil Code is Article 83:

"Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person
other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having
news of the absentee being alive, of if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as
dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed
dead according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void
by a competent court."
Article 390 of the Civil Code states:

"Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all
purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared
after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened."

The Court, on several occasions, had interpreted the above-quoted provision in this wise:
For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee. The
declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the
necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only
requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present
does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so
believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Further, the Court explained that presumption of death cannot be the subject of
court proceedings independent of the settlement of the absentee's estate.
Thus, it can be gleaned that, under the Civil Code, the presumption of death is established by law and no court declaration
is needed for the presumption to arise. Since death is presumed to have taken place by the seventh year of absence, Sofio
is to be presumed dead starting October 1982.
Consequently, at the time of petitioner's marriage to Virgilio, there existed no impediment to petitioner's capacity to
marry, and the marriage is valid under paragraph 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code. Further, considering that it is the Civil
Code that applies, proof of "well-founded belief" is not required. Valdez could not have been expected to comply with this
requirement since the Family Code was not yet in effect at the time of her marriage to Virgilio. The enactment of the
Family Code in 1988 does not change this conclusion. The Family Code itself states:
"Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance
with the Civil Code or other laws."
To retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code requiring petitioner to exhibit "well-founded belief" will,
ultimately, result in the invalidation of her second marriage, which was valid at the time it was celebrated. Such a situation
would be untenable and would go against the objectives that the Family Code wishes to achieve.
In sum, the petition must be dismissed since no decree on the presumption of Sofio's death can be granted under the Civil
Code, the same presumption having arisen by operation of law. Valdez was capacitated to marry Virgilio at the time their
marriage was celebrated in 1985 and, therefore, the said marriage is legal and valid.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is DENIED.
J. Marriages dissolved by a foreign judgment

NCC 15, 17(3)
NCC 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a)
NCC 17(3). Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their
object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. (11a)
FC 26(2)
FC 26(2). Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce
is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have the capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by EO 227)
Salud Arca and Alfredo Javier, Jr. vs Alfredo Javier, July 31, 1954 (Dacua)
TOPIC: Marriage dissolved by foreign judgement
DOCTRINE: An essential condition for the validity of a decree of divorce is the following:
1) The Court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and;
2) In order that this may be acquired, plaintiff must be domiciled in good faith in the State in which it is granted.

FACTS: 1937, Arca and Javier got married in Manila. Prior to getting married they had a son, Junior.
1938, Javier left for the United States having joined the US Navy prior to his marriage to Arca. Because of this, Arca
chose with his parents in Naic, Cavite. But eventually she left the said home with her son, and again stated to live in her
original abode due to conflicts with husband’s parents. Since then their relationship had become strained.
1940, Javier brought an action for divorce with the Circuit Court of Mobile County, State of Alabama, USA. His
contention was that her leaving his parent’s home resulted to desertion on her part.
Having received a copy of the complaint, Arca filed an answer contending the following:
- That Javier was not a resident of Mobile County, being a resident of Naic. Cavite.
- That she did not desert him, rather their distance was cause by him leaving for active duty in the US Navy.
- That he was her and their child’s means of support
- That the US Court did not have jurisdiction to try the said case
With this, she prayed for the dismissal of the complaint for divorce. Nevertheless, the said court still rendered judgement
in favor of the husband, granting such a divorce decree.
1941, after securing such divorce Javier married Thelma Francis, an American citizen. He then bought a house in New
York City where they resided until the American wife obtained a divorce with Javier (1949).
1950, having retired from the Navy, Javier went back to the Philippines. That same year, armed with 2 divorce decrees
Javier then married Maria Odvina, where they lived in his hometown Naic, Cavite.
With this, the city fiscal of Manila filed a bigamy case against Javier, to which Javier was acquitted. The CFI ruled in
favor of Javier in the said criminal case stating that there was good faith on Javier’s part in contracting the marriage with
Maria. And that he had an honest belief that his marriage with Arca had been legally dissolved by the said divorce decree.
ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce decree obtained in the US validly and automatically dissolves marriage ties contracted
by filipinos? NO.
HELD: The Supreme Court stated that there have already been several jurisprudence that passed upon similar questions,
all of which denied the validity of the said decree. In essence, it was held that one of the essential conditions for the
validity of a decree of divorce is that the court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and in order that this
may be acquired, plaintiff must be domiciled in good faith in the State in which it is granted.
The Court further stated that it is not the citizenship of the plaintiff for divorce which confers jurisdiction upon a court, but
his legal residence within the State. the court of a country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and to which one or
both of them may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce has no jurisdiction to determine their matrimonial
status; and a divorce granted by such a court is not entitled to recognition elsewhere.
In this case, it cannot therefore be said that the Mobile County Court of Alabama had acquired jurisdiction over the case
for the simple reason that at the time it was filed, appellant's legal residence was then in the Philippines. He could not
have acquired legal residence or domicile at Mobile County when he moved to that place in 1938 because at that time he
was still in the service of the U.S. Navy and merely rented a room where he used to stay during his occasional shore
leave for shift duty. That he never intended to live there permanently is shown by the fact that after his marriage to
Thelma Francis in 1941, he moved to New York where he bought a house and a lot.

After his divorce from Thelma in 1949 and his retirement from the U.S. Navy, he returned to the Philippines and married
Maria Odvina of Naic, Cavite, where he lived ever since. It may therefore be said that appellant went to Mobile County,
not with intention of permanently residing there, or of considering that place as his permanent abode, but for the sole
purpose of obtaining divorce from his wife. Such residence is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court.
Aside from this it is also a principle under the of Private International Law, that foreign judgements, or laws affecting the
same, shall not be extended, if it is contrary to the law or fundamental policy of the State of the forum. That in keeping
with the moral values of the country, which looks upon marriage as an inviolable social institution, the said decree
allowing the divorce for reasons of desertion, cannot prosper.
Tenchavez v. Escaño, 15 SCRA 355 (Repeated)
Van Dorn v. Romillo, 139 SCRA 139 (Evangelista)

Facts: Alice Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while Richard Upton is a citizen of the US. They were married in
Hong Kong in 1972 and subsequently lived in the Philippines. They had two children together however they divorced in
Nevada, US in 1982. Alice re-married Theodore Van Dorn also in Nevada.
Richard filed a suit against Alice in the RTC of Pasay City on the ground that the business of Alice (the Galleon Shop) in
Manila is conjugal property and thus he is entitled to an accounting of that business with the right to manage the conjugal
property. Alice moved to dismiss because this cause of action is barred by their divorce proceedings in Nevada Court
wherein Richard acknowledged that during their marriage, they had “no community property”. The RTC denied the
Motion to Dismiss, ruling that because the said property is located in the Philippines, the Divorce Decree has no bearing
in this case.
Alice contends that Richard is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property because: (1) the representation
he made in the divorce proceedings in American Court stated that they had no community property thus his claim is
barred and (2) the Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal funds.
Richard on the other hand, asserts that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive
laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially
if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
Issue: Does foreign divorce affect the alleged conjugal property in the Philippines? YES
Ruling: There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The
decree is binding on Richard as an American citizen. For instance, Richard cannot sue Alice, as her husband, in any State
of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same
being contrary to local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public police and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they
are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released Richard from the marriage from
the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, Richard is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the
case below as Alice’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own
country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped
by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as Richard does, that, under our laws, Alice has to be considered still married to Richard and still subject to a
wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Alice should not be obliged to live together
with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to Richard. The Richard should not continue to be one of her heirs
with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice
are to be served.
Pilapil v. Hon. Somera (Escudero)

Doctrine: For an offended spouse to institute a criminal action, it necessarily follows that such spouse must have the
status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. After a divorce has been
decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings against the offenders where the statute
provides that the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery.
Facts: On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich
Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married in Germany. The couple lived together with one daughter and after
about three and a half years of marriage, Geiling initiated a divorce proceeding against Imelda in Germany in January,
1983. He claimed that there was a failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April, 1982.
On January 15, 1986 a divorce decree was promulgated on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody
of the child was granted to Imelda.
On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two complaints for
adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said him, Imelda "had an affair with a certain
William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983".
City Fiscal Ibay-Somera, approved a resolution directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against Imelda.
On March 14, 1987, Imelda filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the aforesaid resolution of Fiscal
Somera be set aside and the cases against her be dismissed. A similar petition was filed by James Chua, Imelda’s
co-accused.
A motion to quash was filed by Imelda in the same case which was denied by Fiscal Somera. Pilapil filed this special civil
action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a TRO, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court
denying her motion to quash. As cogently argued by Imelda, Article 344 of the RPC thus presupposes that the marital
relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery.
Issue: Did Geiling have legal capacity at the time of the filing of the complaint for adultery, considering that it was done
after obtaining a divorce decree?
Ruling: NO. Under Article 344 of the RPC, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written
complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance
with this rule is jurisdictional, and not merely a formal requirement.

Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such
initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This
is a logical consequence since the raison d’etre of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended
party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case.
Stated differently, the inquiry would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that
the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the
action by the former against the latter.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of
Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent
is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons Under the same
considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to
commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and another one
entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87- 52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary restraining
order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent.
Quita vs CA, 300 SCRA 406 (Garcia)

Doctrine: The citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. that aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national
law. However, the the trial court, in finding that the divorce was invalid, simply relied on the fact that petitioner
and Arturo were "Filipino citizens and were married in the Philippines." We conclude that the finding on their
citizenship pertained solely to the time of their marriage as the trial court was not supplied with a basis to determine
petitioner's citizenship at the time of their divorce. The doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen
when their divorce was decreed. The trial court must have overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Once proved
that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn w ould become applicable and petitioner
could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo.
Facts:
1. Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines in 1941. They were not blessed
with children. Eventually, their relationship soured and Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco, California,
U.S.A. She submitted in the divorce proceedings a private writing dated July 19, 1950 evidencing their agreement
to live separately from each other and a settlement of their conjugal properties.
2. In July 1954 she obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz in
the USA but their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the USA., she married for the third time, to a
certain Wernimont.
3. In 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with the RTC for issuance of letters of
administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company.
4. Blandina Padlan, claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel,
Zenaida and Yolanda, as surviving children of Arturo Padlan, opposed the petition and prayed for the appointment
instead of Atty. Leonardo Cabasal, which was resolved in favor of the latter. Atty. Cabasal was later replaced by
Higino Castillon.

5. In 1973 the oppositors (spouse Blandina and the Padlan children) submitted certified photocopies of the July 19,
1950 private writing and the final judgment of divorce between Fe D. Quita and Arturo.
6. Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the deceased Arturo, intervened.
TC: Invoking Tenchavez vs. Escaño which held that "a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens was not entitled to
recognition as valid in this jurisdiction”, disregarded the divorce between Fe D. Quit and Arturo. Consequently, it
held that their marriage subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972. Neither did it consider valid their extrajudicial
settlement of conjugal properties due to lack of judicial approval. On the other hand, it opined that there was no
showing that marriage existed between Blandina and Arturo, much less was it shown that the alleged Padlan
children had been acknowledged by the deceased as his children with her. As regards Ruperto, it found that he was a
brother of Arturo. Hence, only Fe D. Quita and Ruperto were declared the intestate heirs of Arturo and the equal
adjudication of the net hereditary estate was ordered in favor of the two of them. Upon presentation of proofs of the
recognition of the children by the deceased, partial reconsideration was granted declaring the Padlan children, with the
exception of Alexis, entitled to one-half of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and Fe D. Quita to the other half.
In their appeal to the CA, Blandina and her children assigned as one of the errors allegedly committed by the trial court
the circumstance that the case was decided without a hearing, in violation of the Rules of Court, which provides that if
there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares
to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
CA: Found this ground sufficient to sustain appeal; hence, it declared null and void the decision of the trial court, and
directed the remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings. Hence, the present petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether the case should be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. - Yes.
Ruling: Yes, hearing is necessary to determine who is the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo. Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the
Rules of Court is clear: If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or
as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as
in ordinary cases. No dispute exists either as to the right of the six (6) Padlan children to inherit from the decedent
because there are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even recognizes
them as heirs of Arturo Padlan; nor as to their respective hereditary shares. Arturo was a Filipino and as such
remained legally married to her in spite of the divorce they obtained. The implication is that petitioner was no longer
a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from Arturo. This should have prompted the trial court to conduct a
hearing to establish her citizenship. The purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the aid
of documentary and testimonial evidence as well as the arguments of the parties either supporting or opposing the
evidence.
The citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. that aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.
However, the the trial court, in finding that the divorce was invalid, simply relied on the fact that petitioner and
Arturo were "Filipino citizens and were married in the Philippines." We conclude that the finding on their citizenship
pertained solely to the time of their marriage as the trial court was not supplied with a basis to determine petitioner's
citizenship at the time of their divorce. The doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their
divorce was decreed. The trial court must have overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Once proved that she was
ould become applicable and petitioner could very well
no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn w
lose her right to inherit from Arturo.

When asked whether she was an American citizen petitioner answered that she was since 1954. Significantly, the decree
of divorce of petitioner and Arturo was obtained in the same year. Petitioner however did not bother to file a reply
memorandum to erase the uncertainty about her citizenship at the time of their divorce, a factual issue requiring hearings
to be conducted by the trial court. Consequently, respondent appellate court did not err in ordering the case returned
to the trial court for further proceedings.
We emphasize however that the question to be determined by the trial court should be limited only to the right of
petitioner Fe D. Quita's to inherit from Arturo as his surviving spouse. Private respondent Blandina Padlan's claim to
heirship was already resolved by the trial court. Blandina Padlan and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while
the prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage considered
void from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can
inherit from him as this status presupposes a legitimate relationship.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the case to the
court of origin for further proceedings and declaring null and void its decision holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto T.
Padlan as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED. The order of the appellate court modifying its previous decision by granting one-half (1/2)
of the net hereditary estate to the Padlan children, namely, Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, with the exception of
Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead of Arturo's brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise AFFIRMED. The Court however emphasizes that
the reception of evidence by the trial court should be limited to the hereditary rights of petitioner as the surviving spouse of Arturo
Padlan.
Llorente vs CA, Llorente, 345 SCRA 592 (Hechanova)
Facts: After his marriage with Paula (1st wife), Lorenzo (deceased) left for the United States as he was a US Navy
serviceman. Subsequently, he also got naturalized there. Upon his return to the Philippines, he discovered that his 1st wife
was pregnant and was having an affair with his brother. After giving birth, a certificate was issued leaving the father’s
name blank and stating that the child was illegitimate. A written agreement was drawn up by Lorenzo and his 1st wife
stating that:
1. All the family allowances allotted by the US Navy for the 1st wife’s maintenance and support would be suspended
2. They would dissolve their marriage under judicial proceedings
3. They would make a separate agreement regarding their conjugal property
4. Lorenzo would not sue her for the affair since she voluntarily admitted her fault and agreed to separate peacefully
Lorenzo then married Alicia (2nd wife) in the Philippines after having obtained a divorce decree in California.
Apparently, his 2nd wife did not know of his 1st marriage even if they resided in the same town as his 1st wife, who did
not oppose the marriage. After having been married for 25 years, he executed a last will and testament stating that he
bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their children. He also filed with the RTC a petition for probate and allowance of
said will and moved that his 2nd wife be appointed as special administratrix. RTC admitted his will to probate but denied
his motion on the ground that he was still alive. However, Lorenzo died before said proceedings could be terminated.
His 1st wife then filed a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzo’s estate. The 1st wife contended that:
1. She was the surviving spouse
2. Various properties under said will were acquired during their marriage
3. Lorenzo disposed all his property in favor of the 2nd marriage thereby encroaching on her legitime and ½ share in the
conjugal property

RTC then ruled in favor of the 1st wife and appointed her as legal administrator (entitling her to ½ of conjugal properties;
⅓ of estate; ⅓ of the estate to the illegitimate children). RTC also declared that the 2nd wife is not entitled to receive any
share of the estate on the ground that the divorce decree obtained by Lorenzo was void and inapplicable in the Philippines
thereby rendering the 2nd marriage also void. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC but modified it insofar as the 2nd wife
be declared as co-owner of the properties she and Lorenzo may have acquired during their 25-year cohabitation. The 2nd
wife filed a MR but was denied. Hence, the instant petition.
Issues:
1. WON intestate and testamentary succession is governed by the national law of the person whose succession is
consideration. - YES
2. WON the foreign divorce decree obtained was valid - YES
3. WON the will is intrinsically valid and WON the 2nd wife is entitled to inherit from her deceased spouse. - CASE
REMANDED TO RTC
Ruling:
WON intestate and testamentary succession is governed by the national law of the person whose succession is consideration. - YES
The applicable law - foreign law or national law of Lorenzo (NCC 16)
The court ruled that Lorenzo’s naturalization before and at the time of his (1) divorce from his 1st wife, (2) 2nd marriage,
(3) execution of will, and (4) death is undisputed. NCC 16 provides that intestate and testamentary succession shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country where said property may be found. Thus, as a rule, issues arising from said
incidents are governed by foreign law.
Although PH courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of foreign laws, they must be alleged and proved like any
other fact. While the lower courts did not admit of the foreign law and instead ruled by virtue of the renvoi doctrine
(where the case is referred back to the law of the decedent’s domicile, in this case, PH law), the lower courts were not able
to sufficiently prove that American law follows said doctrine or that the PH law will be applied in determining the validity
of the will. The court raises 2 points:
1. There is no such thing as one American law. Each state has its own law applicable to its citizen and in force only
within the state. Therefore, the “national law” in NCC 16 refers to the law of the state of which the deceased was a
resident.
2. There is no evidence that the New York State law requires that application of the renvoi doctrine.
WON the foreign divorce decree obtained was valid - YES
Validity of foreign divorce - YES (NCC 15)

The court reversed the decision of the lower courts and sustained the validity of the foreign divorce decree obtained by the
deceased from his 1st wife thereby upholding the validity of the 2nd marriage. The court cited the ff jurisprudence:
1. Van Dorn v Romillo Jr.

● Aliens may obtain divorces abroad provided they are valid according to their national law.
● Only PH national are covered by the policy against absolute divorces under the nationality principle found in
NCC 15.

2. Quita v CA. As applied to this case, Van Dorn ruling applies when it is proven that Lorenzo was no longer a Filipino
citizen (or was a naturalized American) when he obtained the divorce decree. In effect, the 1st wife could lose her
right to inherit from him.
3. Pilapil v Ibay-Somera. As applied to this case, divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the PH insofar as
Lorenzo (deceased) is concerned in view of the nationality principle under NCC 15.
WON the will is intrinsically valid and WON the 2nd wife is entitled to inherit from her deceased spouse. - REMANDED TO RTC
Validity of the will - CASE REMANDED TO RTC

The court ruled that since the deceased was a foreigner, then he is not covered by PH laws on family (1) rights and duties,
(2) status, (3) condition and legal capacity. The will executed by the deceased clearly shows his intent to bequeath his
properties to the 2nd marriage.
The court held that (1) the intrinsic validity of the will, and (2) the parties entitled to inherit from Lorenzo are best proved
by a foreign law, which must first be proven as a fact. These are what are lacking for the court to rule upon the legal
effectivity of the will as well as the determination of successional rights. On the other hand, whether the will was executed
in accordance with the formalities required is answered by referring to PH law. In fact, the will was duly probated (The
court process by which a will is proved valid or invalid).
Once remanded to RTC, it should note that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of
legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. Instead, it left the amount of
successional rights to the deceased’s national law.
Garcia vs. Recio, 366 SCRA 437 (Repeated)
Diego vs Castillo, 436 SCRA 67 (Jimenea)

Facts: On January 9, 1965, Lucena Escoto (accused) contracted marriage with Jorge de Perio, Jr. solemnized before the
mayor of Dagupan City (Liberato Reyna). In their marriage contract, they were both Filipinos and Lucena adopted the
name Crescencia with a civil status of single.
By February 15, 1978, a Decree of Divorce was issued to Crescencia (aka Lucena) and Jorge by the Family District Court
of Harris County Texas (247th Judicial District).
Then, on June 4, 1987, Crescencia (aka Lucena) contracted marriage with Manuel Diego (complainant’s brother)
solemnized before Rev. Fr. Clemente Godoy, parish priest of Dagupan City. In their marriage contract, she then used
Lucena (aka Crescencia) with a civil status of single.
After the trial of the criminal case of bigamy, respondent Judge Castillo acquitted Lucena (aka Crescencia) Escoto for the
reason of good faith. He gave credence to the defense of Lucena (aka Crescencia) that she acted without malicious intent
and that she believed that the divorce decree given in Texas validly dissolved her marriage with Jorge de Perio Jr, thus she
was legally free to contract her second marriage with Manuel. Furthermore, the respondent judge also reasoned that,
“while it is true that in our jurisdiction, the matrimonial bond between Jorge de Perio and Lucena (aka Crescencia) Escoto
are not yet annulled, it remains undisputed that the cessation of the same was decreed in the Family District Court of
Harris County, Texas (247th Judicial District), effective February 15, 1978.
Complainant, Eduardo Diego contends that the decision rendered by respondent judge is manifestly against the law and
contrary to the evidence presented in court. Thus, Diego urges this Court to impose sanctions upon respondent Judge as
these acts amount to knowingly rendering an unjust judgement and/or gross ignorance of the law.

Issue: Whether or not respondent Judge Castillo should be held administratively liable for knowingly rendering an unjust
judgement and/or gross ignorance of the law? = YES, for gross ignorance of the law and not unjust judgement
Ruling: Knowingly rendering an unjust judgement is a criminal offense defined and penalized under Article 204 of the
RPC. For a judge to be held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgement, it must be shown that the judgement is
unjust as it is contrary to law or is not supported by the evidence, and that the same was made with conscious and
deliberate intent to do an injustice. The law requires that (a) the offender is a judge, (b) he renders a judgement in a case
submitted to him for decision, (c) the judgement is unjust, (d) he knew that said judgement is unjust. In Alforte v. Santos,
malice or bad faith on the part of the judge in rendering an unjust decision must still be proved and failure on the part of
the complainant to prove the same warrants the dismissal of the administrative complaint. Since Diego was unable to
prove the unjust judgement, there is no basis for the charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgement.
In Manozca v. Domagas, Guillermo v. Reyes, Jr., and Wingarts v. Mejia, the error must be gross or patent, malicious,
deliberate or in evident bad faith. It is only in this latter instance, when the judge acts fraudulently or with gross ignorance,
that administrative sanctions are called for as an imperative duty of this Court. Applying these precedents to the present
case, the error committed by respondent Judge for being gross and patent constituted ignorance of the law of a nature
sufficient to warrant a disciplinary action. Thus, respondent Judge Castillo be fined P10,000.00 and be reprimanded with a
stern warning of a more severe penalty in the future.
RP vs. Orbecido, G.R.No. 154380, Oct. 5, 2005 (Repeated)
San Luis vs. San Luis, G.R. 133743, Feb. 2, 2007 (Labrador)
Note: The sentences in bold letters in the “Facts” portion are the relevant facts in the topic of this case. No need to recite those not in
bold unless ma’am asks.
Doctrine: In Garcia v. Recio, the Court held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufcient and that proof of
its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may
be proven as a public or ofcial record of a foreign country by either (1) an ofcial publication or (2) a copy thereof
attested by the ofcer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be
(a) accompanied by a certicate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular ofcer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his ofce.
Facts: The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former
governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages.
His rst marriage was with Virginia Sulit (had 6 children). Five years later, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with
whom he had a son, Tobias. However, Merry Lee (an American citizen) led a Complaint for Divorce before the Family
Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America, which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce
and Awarding Child Custody.
Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of
the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. He had no children with respondent but
lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death.
Thereafter, respondent Felicidad sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of
Felicisimo’s estate. She led a petition for letters of administration before the RTC of Makati City.

Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the decedent was residing at New
Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive. Respondent
prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of administration be issued to her.
Petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his rst marriage, led a motion to dismiss on the
grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of
administration should have been led in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to
his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to le the petition because she was only a
mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
Respondent led her opposition. She submitted documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised the
powers of his public ofce in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in New Alabang Village, Alabang. Further,
she presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to
prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo
had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid
down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.
After numerous court proceedings, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration of respondent
Felicidad. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of
Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been led in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that
respondent was without legal capacity to le the petition for letters of administration because her marriage with
Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s
marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It
also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair the
vested rights of Felicisimo’s legitimate children. Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set
aside the orders of the trial court.
Issue: Whether respondent has legal capacity to le the subject petition for letters of administration. YES.
Ruling: We must rst resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly
remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or
before the Family Code took effect (August 3, 1988). In resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the
provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufcient jurisprudential basis
allowing us to rule in the afrmative.
The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested
Felicidad with the legal personality to le the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records
show that there is insufcient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage
of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A.
In Garcia v. Recio, the Court held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufcient and that proof of its
authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be
proven as a public or ofcial record of a foreign country by either (1) an ofcial publication or (2) a copy thereof attested
by the ofcer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certicate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular ofcer in the Philippine foreign service stationed
in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his ofce.

With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies
of the Marriage Certicate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that their
marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained
by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we nd that the latter has
the legal personality to le the subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of
Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
*Court’s ruling on improper venue [additional]: We nd that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for
purposes of xing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration
was validly led in the Regional Trial Court which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject
petition was led on December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the
Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then
seated 51 in Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. Thus, the subject petition was validly led
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Amor-Catalan vs. Ca, G.R. No. 167109, February 6, 2007 (Repeated)
Corpuz v Sto Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010 (Maligat)
Doctrine: The alien spouse can claim no right to petition a court of Philippine jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign
divorce decree under the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code because the substantive right it establishes is in
favor of the Filipino spouse.
Facts: Petitioner Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization. On
January 18, 2005, petitioner Corpuz married respondent Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. Due to work and other
professional commitments, petitioner Corpuz left for Canada soon after the wedding. Upon his return to the Philippines,
he was shocked to discover that his wife, respondent Sto. Tomas, was having an affair with another man. Hurt and
disappointed, petitioner Corpuz returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice,
Windsor, Ontario, Canada, granted petitioner Corpuz’s petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took
effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.
Two years after the divorce, petitioner Corpuz fell in love with another Filipina, who he desired to marry in the
Philippines. He went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree he obtained for
his previous marriage with respondent Sto. Tomas. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, the NSO informed
petitioner Corpuz that his previous marriage still subsists under Philippine law, and to be enforceable, the foreign divorce
decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of
1982.
Accordingly, petitioner Corpuz filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as
dissolved with the RTC. Respondent Sto. Tomas, although summoned, did not file any responsive pleading but submitted
instead a notarized letter/manifestation; she offered no opposition to petitioner Corpuz’s petition, and in fact, alleged her
desire to file a similar case herself but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She thus requested that she
be considered a party-in-interest.

RTC: Denied petitioner Corpuz’s petition, saying that he was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial
recognition as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen, and that according to Art. 26 of the Family Code, only the Filipino
spouse can avail of the remedy, in order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law. This is consistent with
the legislative intent behind the enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by the
Court in Republic v. Orbecido III; the provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino”
Issue: Does Art. 26 of the Family Code extend to aliens the right to petition a court of Philippine jurisdiction for the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree? NO.
Held: NO, the Court held that the alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family
Code because the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse.
Art. 26 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be
valid in this country, except those prohibited under Arts 35(1),(4),(5),(6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and
a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.
The Court, in resolving the petition, looked into the legislative history and intent behind the second paragraph of Art. 26.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages, namely, void and voidable marriages. In both cases,
the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the
marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the marriage.
Philippine laws do not recognize absolute divorce.
Corazon Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution, enacted EO 227, amending
Art. 26 of the Family Code to its present wording, cited above.
As correctly stated by the RTC, Art. 26 was included in the law to “avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse”. The
legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created
by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a
substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to
remarry. Without the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of
divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be
of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond;
Art. 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments
promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Art. 26 of the Family Code provides the direct
exception to this rule and serves as a basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and
his or her alien spouse.
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other
words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can
claim no right under this provision.

However, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip
petitioner Corpuz of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign
divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national law have been duly proven according to
our rules and evidence, serves as presumptive evidence of right in favor of petitioner Corpuz. The Court emphasizes that
in a divorce situation, the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided that the
divorce is valid according to his or her national law.
Llave v Republic, G.R. No. 169766, March 30, 2011 (Repeated)
Catalan v Catalan-Lee, G. R. No. 183622, February 8, 2012 (Maravillas)
Facts: Orlando B. Catalan, a naturalized American citizen, allegedly obtained a divorce in the United States from his first
wife, Felicitas Amor. He then contracted a second marriage with petitioner.
When Orlando died intestate in the Philippines, petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition for the issuance of letters of
administration for her appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate. While the case was pending, respondent
Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one of the children of Orlando from his first marriage, filed a similar petition with the RTC. The
two cases were consolidated.
Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition filed by the respondent on the ground of litis pendentia. Respondent
alleged that petitioner was not considered an interested person qualified to file the petition. Respondent further alleged
that a criminal case for bigamy was filed against petitioner by Felicitas Amor contending that petitioner contracted a
second marriage to Orlando despite having been married to one Eusebio Bristol.
However, the RTC acquitted petitioner of bigamy and ruled that since the deceased was a divorced American citizen, and
that divorce was not recognized under Philippine jurisdiction, the marriage between him and petitioner was not valid. The
RTC took note of the action for declaration of nullity then pending filed by Felicitas Amor against the deceased and
petitioner. It considered the pending action to be a prejudicial question in determining the guilt of petition-er for the crime
of bigamy. The RTC also found that petitioner had never been married to Bristol.
The RTC subsequently dismissed the Petition for the issuance of letters of administration filed by petitioner and granted
that of private respondent. Contrary to its findings in Crim. Case No. 2699-A, the RTC held that the marriage between
petitioner and Eusebio Bristol was valid and subsisting when she married Orlando. The RTC held that petitioner was not
an interested party who may file said petition. The CA affirmed the decision of the lower court.
Issue: Whether the divorce obtained abroad by Orlando may be recognized under Philippine jurisdiction.
Ruling: Yes. Under the principles of comity, Philippine jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of
for-eign nationality. Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are
valid according to their national law. Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be proven by the divorce decree itself.
The best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may
be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof
attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

Moreover, the burden of proof lies with the “party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution
or defense of an action.” In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint
when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer
when they introduce new matters. It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved.
It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity of Orlando’s divorce under the laws of the
United States and the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. Thus, there is a need to remand the proceedings to the
trial court for further reception of evidence to establish the fact of divorce.
K. Marriages giving rise to criminal liability

Art. 4, Art. 16, Art. 41
FC 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in
Article 35 (2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible
for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. (n)
FC 16. In the cases where parental consent or parental advice is needed, the party or parties concerned shall, in addition to
the requirements of the preceding articles, attach a certificate issued by a priest, imam or minister authorized to solemnize
marriage under Article 7 of this Code or a marriage counsellor duly accredited by the proper government agency to the
effect that the contracting parties have undergone marriage counselling. Failure to attach said certificates of marriage
counselling shall suspend the issuance of the marriage license for a period of three months from the completion of the
publication of the application. Issuance of the marriage license within the prohibited period shall subject the issuing
officer to administrative sanctions but shall not affect the validity of the marriage.
Should only one of the contracting parties need parental consent or parental advice, the other party must be present at the
counselling referred to in the preceding paragraph. (n)
FC 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is
danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only
two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a
to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (83a)
NCC 84, RPC 351-352, FC 167-169

NCC 84. No marriage license shall be issued to a widow till after three hundred days following the death of her husband,
unless in the meantime she has given birth to a child. (Repealed)
RPC 351
Art. 351. Premature marriages. — Any widow who shall marry within three hundred and one day from the date of the
death of her husband, or before having delivered if she shall have been pregnant at the time of his death, shall be punished
by arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos.
The same penalties shall be imposed upon any woman whose marriage shall have been annulled or dissolved, if she shall
marry before her delivery or before the expiration of the period of 300 and 1 day after the legal separation.

RPC 352
Art. 352. Performance of illegal marriage ceremony. — Priests or ministers of any religious denomination or sect, or civil
authorities who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall be punished in accordance with the
provisions of the Marriage Law.chanrobles virtual law library
People v De Guzman, GR 185843, March 3, 2010 (Navas)

Doctrine: The subsequent valid marriage between the offender and the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action
or the penalty imposed.
In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the subsequent forgiveness by the wife as the offended party shall
extinguish the criminal action or the penalty: Provided, That the crime shall not be extinguished or the penalty shall not be
abated if the marriage be void ab initio. (RPC 266)
Facts: De Guzman was indicted in RTC Pasig for two counts of Rape alleged to be committed against the private
complainant.
The RTC and CA both found him guilty and denied his motions for reconsideration due to lack of sufficient showing of
reversible error committed by the courts.
On appeal to the SC, De Guzman alleged that he already MARRIED the private complainant on August 19, 2009,
solemnized by Reverend Lucas R. Dangatan of Jeruel Christ-Centered Ministries, Inc. at the Amazing Grace Christian
Ministries, Inc., Bldg. XI-A, Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City.
He presented pertinent Certificate of Marriage1 and a joint sworn statement ("Magkasamang Sinumpaang Salaysay")2
executed by appellant and private complainant, attesting to the existence of a valid and legal marriage between them.
De Guzman prays for his he be absolved of his conviction for the two counts of rape and be released from imprisonment,
pursuant to Article 266-C3 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
Issue: Does the subsequent marriage of the offender and the offended party absolves him from the crime of rape?
Ruling: YES. With the OSG finding that the said marriage has been conducted in good faith as evidenced by the legal
documents and wedding photos that proved the marriage between appellant and private complainant to have been
contracted validly, legally, and in good faith, as an expression of their mutual love for each other and their desire to
establish a family of their own., RPC 266 in relation to RPC 89 and 344 is therefore applicable:
ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. – Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
Par 7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in Article 344 of this code.
ART. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape, and acts of lasciviousness. – x
x x In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness, and rape, the marriage of the offender with the offended
party shall extinguish the criminal action or remit the penalty already imposed upon him. x x x.
Hence, De Guzman was absolved of criminal liability on the two counts of rape committed against his present wife.

R.A. 6955, “An Act Declaring Unlawful the of Matching Filipino Women for Marriage to Foreign Nationals”
Republic Act 6955 of the Philippines, commonly known as the Anti Mail-Order-Bride Law, prohibits the business of
organizing or facilitating marriages between Filipinas and foreign men, or Mail-Order Brides. The Philippine congress
enacted in 1990 as a result of stories in the local media about Filipinas being abused by their foreign husbands. Because of
this, Filipinas often use "reverse publications" – publications in which men advertise themselves – to contact foreign men
for marriage to Filipina women.
In practice, the law is readily circumvented by basing matchmaking agencies outside the Philippines as no law prohibits
their operation in destination countries such as Japan, the United States of America or South Korea. In 2009, the
Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO) had just three active cases open against marriage brokers; there were no cases
between 2003 and 2007. It has been used occasionally to combat forced marriage and human trafficking; while its
penalties are weaker than those of Republic Act 9208 (the 2003 Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act), cases under it may be
easier to prove in the slow and inefficient Philippine judicial system.
In April 2009, Philippine Ambassador to South Korea Luis Cruz estimated 6,000 Filipinas had met South Korean spouses
through matchmaking agencies. Some of these brides have complained of domestic violence or false information
regarding their partner’s background. Philippine embassies have issued warnings regarding interracial matchmaking
agencies that violate local laws in their own country and use deceptive advertising.
In August 2013, a bill was introduced in the House of Representatives to extend the law to internet services. Rep.
Cinchona Gonzales (CIBAC), who filed the bill, said "A new era of professional prostitution or high-end pornography
through the web was born which downgrades the integrity not only of Filipino women, but of the country as a whole."
R.A. 9208, Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003, as amended by RA 10364

This law was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on May 23, 2006. Consonant with the state’s
obligation to protect the dignity of the individual, this law criminalizes the act of trafficking in persons especially of
women and children for prostitution, sexual exploitation and slavery, among others.
WHAT IS TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS?

The law defines Trafficking in Persons as the recruitment, transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipt of persons
with or without the victim’s consent or knowledge, within or across national borders by means of threat or use of force, or
other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability
of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over
another person for the purpose of exploitation which includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others
or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.” The
recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall also be considered
as “trafficking in persons”.
WHY DOES TRAFFICKING HAPPEN?

A study done in 2001 by Coalition Against Trafficking in Women in Asia and the Pacific (CATW-AP) revealed the
following as the most common reasons for trafficking:
1. poverty
2. low educational attainment and the lack of information on the recruitment process
3. sexual abuse
4. familial pressure
5. the need to earn
6. influenced by good tales and earning huge sums of money overseas

HOW IS TRAFFICKING ACCOMPLISHED?
Trafficking is accomplished through bride trade, illegal recruitment and/or sex tourism. This is often a clandestine activity
which makes it difficult for authorities to find out the perpetrators. This may happen in and out of the country.
● Bride trade occurs when foreigners marry the victims that they find or get acquainted to via regular mail,
magazines and the Internet.
● Illegal recruitment is the manner in which workers were illegally sent abroad to work. Oftentimes, they
end up being prostituted.
● Sex tourism happens when foreign tourists are encouraged to visit a country so that they may enjoy
the sexual services offered by sex workers.
WHAT ARE THE PENALTIES IMPOSED UPON VIOLATORS?

Any person found guilty of qualified trafficking shall be meted with life imprisonment and a fine of up to P5 million if:
● victim is a child
● victim died or incurred Human Immunodeficiency Syndrome (HIV-AIDS)
● the offender was related to the victim or any of the law enforcement units of the government
The law also penalizes any person who patronizes, use, buy, or engage the services of the trafficked person with six (6)
months of community service and a fine of P50, 000 for the first offense and a fine of P100, 000 on the second and
succeeding offenses.
WHO MAY FILE A COMPLAINT?

1. the trafficked person or the offended party
2. spouse
3. parents or legal guardians
4. siblings
5. children
6. Any person who has personal knowledge of the offense
Complainants might seek the assistance of the Inter Agency Council against Trafficking (IACAT) in the filing of the
complaint. The IACAT is chaired by the DOJ Secretary and co-chaired by the DSWD Secretary. The Council also
includes DFA, DOLE, POEA, Bureau of Immigration, PNP, NCRFW and sectoral representatives of women, overseas
workers and children. Trafficked persons are considered victims of the act or acts of trafficking; hence they shall not be
penalized for crimes related to acts of trafficking.
WHAT SERVICES ARE AVAILABLE FOR TRAFFICKED PERSONS?

1. emergency shelter or appropriate housing
2. counseling and referral services
3. free legal services
4. medical and psychological services
5. livelihood and skills training; and
6. educational assistance (if the victim is a trafficked child)
WHAT TO DO TO AVOID TRAFFICKING?

● Ensure that the recruiter is legally registered at the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA).
● Make sure that all documents necessary for working abroad are legal. These documents include the passport, visa,
overseas contract and the salary.
● Secure relevant information from non-government organizations (NGOs) about the country of destination.
● Inform one’s relatives, friends and NGOs about the country of destination and the recruiter’s contact details like
address and telephone numbers to monitor one’s situation abroad. Know your rights and stand up for them.

Voidable Marriage

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(b) On remarriage, FC Art.

(c) On rights & obligations between the former spouses, 198

(d) On the property regime of the marriage

FC 50, FC 43(2) cf. FC 102(4), 129, 138

Voidable Marriages Remainder | Block 5 | 1 of 29

1. Buenaventura v CA, G.R. No. 127358. March 31, 2005 (Alejaga)

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2. Quiao v Quiao, G. R. No. 183622, ​July 4, 2012 (Tan)

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(e) On ‘presumptive legitimes/hereditary rights

FC 50-53, 43 (2), FC 51 in rel to NCC 886, 888;

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NCC 908, 1061

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Yu v Reyes-Carpio, GR 189207, June 15, 2011 (Repeated)

(f) On the status and custody of children, FC 54, 213

Yasin vs Shari'a, G.R. No.94986 February 23, 1995 (Repeated)

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Valdez v Republic, G.R. No. 180863, September 8, 2009 (Dimen)

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The pertinent provision of the Civil Code is Article 83:

Article 390 of the Civil Code states:

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J. Marriages dissolved by a foreign judgment

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Tenchavez v. Escaño, 15 SCRA 355 (Repeated)

Van Dorn v. Romillo, 139 SCRA 139 (Evangelista)

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Pilapil v. Hon. Somera (Escudero)

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Quita vs CA, 300 SCRA 406 (Garcia)

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Llorente vs CA, Llorente, 345 SCRA 592 (Hechanova)

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WON the foreign divorce decree obtained was valid - YES

Validity of foreign divorce - YES (NCC 15)

1. Van Dorn v Romillo Jr.

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Validity of the will - CASE REMANDED TO RTC

Garcia vs. Recio, 366 SCRA 437 (Repeated)

Diego vs Castillo, 436 SCRA 67 (Jimenea)

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RP vs. Orbecido, G.R.No. 154380, Oct. 5, 2005 (Repeated)

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Amor-Catalan vs. Ca, G.R. No. 167109, February 6, 2007 (Repeated)

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Llave v Republic, G.R. No. 169766, March 30, 2011 (Repeated)

Catalan v Catalan-Lee, G. R. No. 183622, February 8, 2012 (Maravillas)

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K. Marriages giving rise to criminal liability

NCC 84, RPC 351-352, FC 167-169

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People v De Guzman, GR 185843, March 3, 2010 (Navas)

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R.A. 9208, Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003, as amended by RA 10364

WHAT IS TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS?

WHY DOES TRAFFICKING HAPPEN?

2. Quiao v Quiao, G. R. No. 183622, July 4, 2012 (Tan)