SECTION 2 3.

MICROSOFT CORPORATION AND LOTUS

DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS.
MAXICORP, INC. (G.R. No. 140946 September 13,
2004)
1. RICARDO C. VALMONTE V. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA
(GR.No. 83988; May 24, 1990)
Facts:
This case involves a complaint against respondent for
Facts: Checkpoints in various areas of Valenzuela were installed
copyright infringement under Section 29 of Presidential
by the the NCRDC. Petitioners then filed a petition for prohibition
Decree No. 49 and for unfair competition under Article
seeking the declaration of the checkpoints as unconstitutional. The
189 of the RPC. On July 25, 1996, NBI agents conducted
Court in its decision dated 29 September 1989, dismissed their
search of Maxicorp’s premises and seized property fitting
petition. Petitioners have filed the instant motion and supplemental
the description stated in the search warrants issued by
motion for reconsideration of said decision.
Judge Bayhon. On 2 September 1996, Maxicorp filed a
motion to quash the search warrants alleging that there
Issue: Whether or not checkpoints are unconstitutional.
was no probable cause for their issuance and that the
warrants are in the form of "general warrants." But the
Held: No, the Court declared that checkpoints are not illegal per
RTC found probable cause to issue the search warrants
se. Under exceptional circumstances, as where the survival of
after examining the witnesses thereof. However, the CA
organized government is on the balance or where the lives and safety
reversed the decision of the RTC and held that NBI Agent
of the people are in grave peril. Checkpoints may be allowed and
Samiano failed to present conclusive evidence that
installed by the government.
Maxicorp produced or sold the counterfeit products and
pointed out that the sales receipt NBI Agent Samiano
The Court’s decision on checkpoints does not, in any way,
presented as evidence that he bought the products from
validate nor condone abuses committed by the military manning the
Maxicorp was in the name of a certain "Joel Diaz."
checkpoints. Soldiers, including those who man checkpoints, who
Hence, this petition.
abuse their authority to act beyond the scopes of their authority and
are, therefore, liable criminally and civilly for their abusive acts.
Issue: Whether or not there was probable cause to issue
the search warrants.
2. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JULIAN DEEN
Ruling: Yes, there was probable cause in the issuance of
ESCANO, VIRGILIO TOME USANA AND JERRY
the search warrants. Probable cause means "such reasons,
CASABAAN LOPEZ
supported by facts and circumstances as will warrant a
cautious man in the belief that his action and the means
Facts: During the COMELEC gun ban, the police officers stopped
taken in prosecuting it are legally just and proper."19
the car owned and driven by Escano. During the visual search,
Thus, probable cause for a search warrant requires such
police officer Suba saw a long firearm on the lap of Usana. So, they
facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably
ordered the three accused to get out from the car for further search.
prudent man to believe that an offense has been
They found another arm tucked on the waist of Escano. The firearm
committed and the objects sought in connection with that
owned by Escano was unlicensed while for Usana, it was licensed.
offense are in the place to be searched. The offense
They were brought to the police station and they requested Escano
charged against Maxicorp is copyright infringement
to open the trunk whereby Escano readily consented to the request.
under Section 29 of PD 49 and unfair competition under
The other two accused were not present during the opening of the
Article 189 of the RPC. To support these charges,
trunk. The police officers found out hashish inside the bag located
petitioners presented the testimonies of NBI Agent
inside the trunk. With this, the police officers charged the three
Samiano, computer technician Pante, and Sacriz, a
accused on the ground of the illegal possession of firearms and
civilian. The offenses that petitioners charged Maxicorp
marijuana, although the other two accused were asking Escano to
contemplate several overt acts. The sale of counterfeit
tell the police officers that Escano owns the bag with hashish and
products is but one of these acts. Both NBI Agent
the unlicensed firearms and they do not have anything about the
Samiano and Sacriz related to the RTC how they
same. The trial court convicted the three accused. Escano withdrawn
personally saw Maxicorp commit acts of infringement
his appeal while the other two accused continued their appealed.
and unfair competition. The determination of probable
cause does not call for the application of rules and
Issue: Whether or not the conviction was correct.
standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires
after trial on the merits. As implied by the words
Ruling: The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the trial court.
themselves, "probable cause" is concerned with
It said that there was an unreasonable search and seizure against the
probability, not absolute or even moral certainty. The
two accused , Usana and Lopez, because when the trunk was opened
prosecution need not present at this stage proof beyond
by Escano as requested by the officer, the two accused were not
reasonable doubt. The standards of judgment are those of
present at the time of the opening of the trunk.
a reasonably prudent man, not the exacting calibrations
The following facts militate against a finding of conviction:
of a judge after a full-blown trial.
1. The car belongs to Escano.
2. The trunk of the car was not opened soon after it was
No law or rule states that probable cause requires a
stopped and after the accused were searched for firearms
specific kind of evidence. No formula or fixed rule for its
3. The car was driven by a policeman from place where is was
Hence, there is probable cause on the issuance of the warrants.
4. SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT INC. PHILS., ET AL. V.
HON. JUDGE DOLORES L. ESPAÑOL, ET AL.
G.R. No. 156804 March 14, 2005
Doctrine: A core requisite before a warrant shall validly issue is the
existence of a probable cause, meaning "the existence of such facts
and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that
the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place to
be searched". And when the law speaks of facts, the reference is to
facts, data or information personally known to the applicant and the
witnesses he may present. Absent the element of personal
knowledge by the applicant or his witnesses of the facts upon which
the issuance of a search warrant may be justified, the warrant is
deemed not based on probable cause and is a nullity, its issuance
being, in legal contemplation, arbitrary, as held by us in Columbia
Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.
Facts: In 2000, the Videogram Regulatory Board (VRB) filed with
the Department of Justice (DOJ) a criminal complainet against
private respondets Uy, Chung, Lim, and other officers of Solid
Laguna Corporation (SLC) for engaging in the replication,
reproduction, and distribution of videograms without license and
authority from VRB. Based on this and petitioner Sony Music’s
complaint of copy right infringement, the National Bureau of
Investigation, through Agent Lavin, applied for the issuance of
search warrants against SLC and its production facility in Binan,
Laguna.
Judge Espanol issued two warrants. Search Warrant No. 220-008 for
probable violation of Section 6 of PD 1987 (Registration under the
Videogram Regulatory Board), and Search Warrant No. 219-007 for
probable violation of RA 8293 (copy right infringement under the
Intellectual Property Code). The search warrants were subsequently
enforced and items were seized from SLC.
DOJ dismissed VRB’s complaint after SLC presented a certification
that they were in fact authorized by VRB. SLC then moved to quash
the search warrants and return the items seized. SLC also requested
to examine the items seized.
Judge Espanol quashed Search Warrant No. 220-008, and later on
Search Warrant No. 219-007 on the ground that the integrity of the
seized items as evidence had been compromised, commingled as
they were with other articles.
Petitioners deplore the quashal which they tag as predicated on a
ground immaterial to the search warrants.
Issue: Was its issuance of Search Warrant No. 219-007 proper in
the first place?
Held: No. The issuance of Search Warrant No. 219-007 was not
proper. A core requisite before a warrant shall validly issue is the
existence of a probable cause, meaning "the existence of such facts
and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that
the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place to
be searched". And when the law speaks of facts, the reference is to
facts, data or information personally known to the applicant and the
on the information of unnamed sources and on
certifications made by persons who were never presented
as witnesses. The information thus is mere hearsay and
cannot prove the existence of probable cause.
Thus, the issuance of the search warrant was invalid.
NOTES:
“To prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual
depreciation of the right to privacy, a liberal construction
in search and seizure cases is given in favor of the
individual. Consistent with this postulate, the
presumption of regularity is unavailing in aid of the
search process when an officer undertakes to justify it.
For, the presumption juris tantum of regularity cannot,
by itself, prevail against the constitutionally protected
rights of an individual because zeal in the pursuit of
criminals cannot ennoble the use of arbitrary methods
that the Constitution itself detests.”
“The proceedings for the issuance/quashal of a search
warrant before a court on the one hand, and the
preliminary investigation before an authorized officer on
the other, are proceedings entirely independent of each
other. One is not bound by the other’s finding as regards
the existence of a crime. The first is to determine whether
a warrant should issue or be quashed, and the second,
whether an information should be filed in court.”
“Initial hearsay information or tips from confidential
informants could very well serve as basis for the issuance
of a search warrant, if followed up personally by the
recipient and validated, as what transpired in Columbia.
Unfortunately, the records show that such is not the case
before us.”
“Summing up, the issuance of Search Warrant No. 219-
00 was, at bottom, predicated on the sworn testimonies of
persons without personal knowledge of facts they were
testifying on and who relied on a false certification issued
by VRB. Based as it were on hearsay and false
information, its issuance was without probable cause
and, therefore, invalid.
5. STONEHILL VS. DIOKNO (G.R. No. L-19550)
Facts: Petitioners herein assails the validity of 42 search
warrants issued against them by Respondents-Judges and
Prosecutors due to their alleged violation of Central Bank
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and the Revised Penal Code. Petitioners alleged
that the said warrants are null and void as the words used
are by nature, makes it a general warrant. They do not
describe with particularity the documents, books and
things to be seized and that the searches and seizures were
made in an illegal manner. Respondents contend that the
warrants in question are issued in accordance with the law
and if it is not, the petitioners have already waived their
right when they consented during the search and seizure.
Acting upon the original petition, the court granted a
partial injunction on the documents and other materials
seized resulting in the division of the seized materials into

Ruling: On the first group of documents and other materials, the SC
ruled on its validity as the petitioners have no cause of action to
assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures
because corporations have their respective personalities, separate
and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners. It is well
settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the
party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the
objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and
cannot be availed of by third parties.
On the documents seized from the petitioners' residences, SC
stressed on this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant
shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge
in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant
shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
To which the SC found no compliance by the respondents on the
questioned search warrants. In other words, no specific offense had
been alleged in said applications. SC believed that it was impossible
for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence
of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of
competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has
performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions,
violating a given provision of our criminal laws.
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe
out completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our
Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the
privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the
whims caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil
sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted
— to outlaw the so-called general warrants.
Thus, the search warrants were declared illegal. Consequently, the
documents, papers and other materials seized must be inadmissible
evidence in courts in accordance with the exclusionary rule.
6. QUA CHEE GAN, et. al. vs. THE DEPORTATION BOARD
(GR No. L-10280, September 30, 1963)
FACTS:
The Court of First Instance denied the petition for writs of habeas
corpus, mandamus and certiorari by the petitioners.
On May 12, 1952, Special Prosecutor Emilio L. Galang charged
petitioner before the Deportation Board. The crimes:
6. Purchasing $130,000 with license from Central Bank and
remitted it to Hong Kong
7. Attempted bribery of Phil and US officials.
In effect, Deportation Board issued a warrant of arrest for petitioner
(E.O. No 398, series of 1951). Upon fixing of bonds, petitioner was
temporarily set free.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the President has authority to deport aliens.
2. Whether or not the Deportation Board also has authority to file
warrants of arrest.
HELD:
1. YES. Section 69 of Act NO. 2711 of the Revised Administrative
Code – Deportation of subject to foreign power. — A subject of a
foreign power residing in the Philippines shall not be deported,
expelled, or excluded from said Islands or repatriated to his own
* In effect, the President (Quezon, May 29, 1936) created
the Deportation Board to conduct investigations.
2. Yes but only after investigation has resulted to the
actual order of deportation.
Arrest would have been necessary for deportation to take
effect. However, in the case at bar, investigations were
still ongoing and no order for deportation was yet made.
Decision: E.O. No 398, series of 1951: declared illegal
Deportation may be effected in 2 ways:
1. by order of President, after due investigation,
pursuant to Section 69 of the RAC
2. by Commissioner of Immigration, upon
recommendation by the Board of
Commissioners under Section 37 of
Commonwealth Act No. 613
Crime was an act profiteering, hoarding or black-
marketing of US dollars.
7. SOLIVEN VS. JUDGE MAKASIAR (G.R. No.
82585, November 14, 1988)
Facts: This is consolidation of three cases where the
Secretary of Justice denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the
Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City Fiscal's
finding of a prima facie case against petitioners. A second
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was
denied by the Secretary of Justice. On appeal, the
President, through the Executive Secretary, affirmed the
resolution of the Secretary of Justice. The motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary
on . With these developments, petitioners' contention that
they have been denied the administrative remedies
available under the law has lost factual support.
Issue: Whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran
were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a
warrant for his arrest without personally examining the
complaint and the witnesses, if any, to determine
probable cause.
Held: Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and
personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy
himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying
himself of the existence of probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required
to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.
Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall:
(1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting
documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be
unduly laden with the preliminary examination and investigation of
criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and
deciding cases filed before their courts.
8. VICENTE LIM , SR. AND MAYOR SUSANA LIM, VS.
HON. NEMESIO S. FELIX AND HON. ANTONIO ALFANE
G.R. Nos. 94054-57 February 19, 1991
Facts: Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his security escorts,
were attacked and killed by a lone assassin at the vicinity of the
airport road of the Masbate Domestic Airport. Dante Siblante
another security escort of Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived the
assassination plot, although, he himself suffered a gunshot wound.
After an investigation of the incident, for the purpose of preliminary
investigation, the designated investigator, Harry O. Tantiado, filed
an amended complaint against the petitioners. After the preliminary
investigation, the court issued an order that a probable cause has
been established for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of the accused
and recommended the amount of P200, 000.00 as bail for the
provisional liberty of each of the accused.
Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed a verified petition
for change of venue to which the court issued an en banc Resolution
authorizing the change of venue from the Regional Trial Court of
Masbate to the Regional Trial Court of Makati to avoid a
miscarriage of justice.
The cases were raffled to Branch 56 presided by respondent Judge
Nemesio S. Felix.
Petitioners Vicente, and Susana Lim filed with the respondent court
several motions and manifestations that an order be issued requiring
the transmittal of the initial records of the preliminary inquiry or
investigation conducted by the Municipal Judge Barsaga of Masbate
for the best enlightenment of the existence of a probable cause or
prima facie evidence as well as its determination of the existence of
guilt.
In another manifestation, the Lims reiterated that the court conduct
a hearing to determine if there really exists a prima facie case against
them in the light of documents which are recantations of some
witnesses in the preliminary investigation in which the respondent
court issued an order denying for lack of merit the motions and
manifestations and issued warrants of arrest against the accused
including the petitioners.
Issue: Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without
bail by simply relying on the prosecution's certification and
recommendation that a probable cause exists.
Ruling: No, the Judge cannot ignore the clear words of the 1987
Constitution which requires ". . . probable cause to be personally
determined by the judge . . .” not by any other officer or person.
The records of the preliminary investigation conducted
by the Municipal Court of Masbate and reviewed by the
respondent Fiscal were still in Masbate when the
respondent Fiscal issued the warrants of arrest against the
petitioners. There was no basis for the respondent Judge
to make his own personal determination regarding the
existence of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant
of arrest as mandated by the Constitution. He could not
possibly have known what transpired in Masbate as he
had nothing but a certification. Significantly, the
respondent Judge denied the petitioners' motion for the
transmittal of the records on the ground that the mere
certification and recommendation of the respondent
Fiscal that a probable cause exists is sufficient for him to
issue a warrant of arrest.
Hence, the respondent Judge committed a grave error
when he relied solely on the Prosecutor's certification and
issued the questioned Order without having before him
any other basis for his personal determination of the
existence of a probable cause.
9. TEODORO C. BORLONGAN, JR. vs.
MAGDALENO M. PEÑA (G.R. No. 143591, November
23, 2007)
Facts: Respondent Magdaleno Peña instituted a civil case
for recovery of agent’s compensation against Urban Bank
and the petitioners, for when he allegedly entered into an
agreement with the petitioners wherein Peña undertook to
perform acts necessary to prevent any intruders or
squatters from unlawfully occupying Urban Bank’s
property.
Petitioners presented documents (letters and
memorandums) in an attempt to show that the respondent
(Peña) was appointed as agent by ISCI (former owner of
the banks property) and not by Urban Bank or by the
petitioners. While, on the other hand, Peña claimed that
said documents were falsified because the alleged
signatories did not actually affix their signatures, and the
signatories were neither stockholders nor officers and
employees of ISCI.
The City Prosecutor rules in favor of Peña and concluded
that the petitioners were guilty of crime of introducing
falsified documents, subsequently, information were filed
with the MTCC of Bago City, Negros, Occidental. The
Judge subsequently issued warrants for the arrest of the
petitioners.
Petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion to Recall Warrants
of Arrest and insisted that they were denied due process
because they were not afforded the right to submit their
counter-affidavits. And avers that since they were not
afforded to submit their counter-affidavit, the trial judge
merely relied on the complaint-affidavit and attachments
of the respondent in issuing the warrants of arrest, in
contravention of the Rules. Petitioners further prayed that
the prosecutor may either dismiss the complaint if he does not see
sufficient reason to proceed with the case, or file the information if
he finds probable cause. The prosecutor is not mandated to require
the submission of counter-affidavits. Probable cause may then be
determined on the basis alone of the affidavits, without infringing
on the constitutional rights of the petitioners.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal
responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence
of probable cause. But the judge is not required to personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established
doctrine and procedure, he shall (1) personally evaluate the report
and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor
regarding the existence of probable cause, and on the basis thereof,
he may already make a personal determination of the existence of
probable cause; and (2) if he is not satisfied that probable cause
exists, he may disregard the prosecutor’s report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in
arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause
In determining probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of
arrest there is no provision of law or procedural rule which makes
the submission of counter-affidavits mandatory before the judge can
determine whether or not there exists probable cause to issue the
warrant.
10. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs JOSE MA.
VELOSO (GR No. L-23501; October 20, 1925)
Doctrine: Wharton’s Criminal Procedure: Form and Sufficiency of
Warrant
Technical accuracy is not required…
Name and description of the accused should be inserted in the body
of the warrant and where the name is unknown there must be such a
description of the person accused as will enable the officer to
identify him hen found.
Facts: A building in Manila managed by defendant Veloso was
raided. The police officers furnished a search warrant against a
building at No. 124 Calle Arzobizpo, Manila, in possession of
“JOHN DOE,” is allegedly being used in violation of the Gambling
Law. Counsel of Veloso argued that the search warrant was void
because the defendant’s name was not indicated therein.
Issue: Is Veloso’s name required to be in the search warrant?
Ruling: No. The insertion of a fictitious name to the information or
complaint is permitted in lieu of the true name, provided, that he be
sufficiently described. The search warrant contained sufficient
description of the premises to be searched. The description of the
person to be seized is also sufficiently described in the warrant, as
Veloso is the manager of the building, he could be identified as “in
possession” of the said building without difficulty.
11. PANGANDAMAN VS. CASAR (G.R. No. 71782, April
14,1988)
Facts: On July 27, 1985, a shooting incident occurred in Pantao,
Masiu, Lanao del Sur, which left at least five persons dead and two
others wounded.A criminal complaint for multiple murder was filed
before respondent Judge Casar by P.C. Sgt. Jose L. Laru-an, which
was docketed as Case No. 1748.On that same day, the respondent
Issue: Is the arrest warrant valid?
Ruling: Insofar as said warrant is issued against fifty (50)
“John Does” not one of whom the witnesses to the
complaint could or would identify, it is of the nature of
a general warrant, one of a class of writs long proscribed
as unconstitutional and once anathematized as “totally
subversive of the liberty of the subject.” Clearly
violative of the constitutional injunction that warrants
of arrest should particularly describe the person or
persons to be seized, the warrant must, as regards its
unidentified subjects, be voided.
Hence, the warrant complained of is upheld and declared
valid insofar as it orders the arrest of the petitioners. Said
warrant is voided to the extent that it is issued against fifty
(50) “John Does.” The respondent Judge is directed to
forward to the Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Sur the
record of the preliminary investigation of the complaint
in Criminal Case No. 1748 of his court for further
appropriate action.
12. COLUMBIA PICTURES V. FLORES (G.R. No.
78631, June 29, 1993)
Facts: As a consequence of a complaint filed by the
Motion Picture Association of America, Inc., NBI agents
conducted surveillance operations on certain video
establishments, among them respondent FGT Video
Network, Inc. (FGT), for “unauthorized sale, rental,
reproduction and/or disposition of copyrighted film,"
a violation of PD 49 (the old Intellectual Property
Law). After an NBI agent was able to have copyrighted
motion pictures “Cleopatra” (owned by 20th Century
Fox) and “The Ten Commandments” (owned by
Paramount) reproduced in video format in FGT, the NBI
applied for and was able to obtain from the respondent
judge the subject Search Warrant No. 45
In the course of the implementation of the search
warrant in the premises of FGT, the NBI agents found and
seized various video tapes of copyrighted films owned
and exclusively distributed by petitioners. Also seized
were machines and equipment, television sets,
paraphernalia, materials, accessories, rewinders, tape
head cleaners, statements of order, return slips, video
prints, flyers, production orders, and posters.
FGT moved for the release of the seized
television sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders, tape
head cleaners, accessories, equipment and other machines
or paraphernalia seized by virtue of the subject warrant.
It argued that as a licensed video reproducer, it had the
right possess the seized reproduction equipment, which
are not illegal per se, but are rather exclusively used and
intended to be used for reproduction and not in the “sale,
lease, distribution or possession for purposes of sale,
lease distribution, circulation or public exhibition of
pirated video tapes.”
Finding that FGT was a registered and duly
licensed distributor and in certain instances and under
Issue: Did the respondent judge act with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in ordering the immediate return
of some of the items seized by virtue of the search warrant?
Ruling:
NO, the respondent judge DID NOT act with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in ordering the
immediate return of some of the items seized by virtue of the search
warrant.
Search Warrant No. 45 fails to satisfy the test of legality.
This is more so because the Court has previously decided a case
dealing with virtually the same kind of search warrant.
In 20th Century Fox vs. CA, the Court upheld the legality of the
order of the lower court lifting the search warrant issued under
circumstances similar to those obtaining in the case at bar. A striking
similarity between this case and 20th Century Fox is the fact that
Search Warrant No. 45, specifically paragraph (c) thereof describing
the articles to be seized, contains an almost identical description as
the warrant issued in the 20th Century Fox case, to wit:
(c) Television sets, Video Cassettes Recorders, rewinders,
tape head cleaners, accessories, equipments and other machines
used or intended to be used in the unlawful reproduction, sale,
rental/lease, distribution of the above-mentioned video tapes which
she is keeping and concealing in the premises above-described.
On the propriety of the seizure of the articles above-
described, the Court held in 20th Century Fox:
Television sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders and
tape cleaners are articles which can be found in a video tape store
engaged in the legitimate business of lending or renting out betamax
tapes. In short, these articles and appliances are generally connected
with, or related to a legitimate business not necessarily involving
piracy of intellectual property or infringement of copyright laws.
Hence, including these articles without specification and/or
particularity that they were really instruments in violating an Anti-
Piracy law makes the search warrant too general which could result
in the confiscation of all items found in any video store.
The language used in paragraph (c) of Search Warrant No.
45 is thus too all-embracing as to include all the paraphernalia of
FGT in the operation of its business. As the search warrant is in the
nature of a general one, it is constitutionally objectionable.
The Court concluded that the respondent judge did not
gravely abuse his discretion in ordering the immediate release of the
enumerated items, but that he was merely correcting his own
erroneous conclusions in issuing Search Warrant No. 45. This can
be gleaned from his statement that “. . . the machines and equipment
could have been used or intended to be used in the illegal
reproduction of tapes of the copyrighted motion pictures/films, yet,
it cannot be said with moral certainty that the machines or
equipment(s) were used in violating the law by the mere fact that
pirated video tapes of the copyrighted motion pictures/films were
reproduced. As already stated, FGT Video Network, Inc. is a
registered and duly licensed distributor and in certain instances and
under special instructions . . . reproducer of videograms, and as such,
it has the right to keep in its possession, maintain and operate
reproduction equipment(s) and paraphernalia(s).”
1, the residence of Hussein and was immediately
adjacent to the variety store, which resulted to the arrest
of 4 Pakistani nationals and the seizure of their personal
belongings, papers, and effects.
On arraignment, respondents pleaded not guilty and filed
a motion to quash the search warrant and declare
evidence obtained inadmissible. Respondent Judge
Casanova conducted an ocular inspection of the premises
searched and established that while Apartment No. 1 and
Abigail’s Variety Store are adjacent and contiguous, there
are no connecting doors and are therefore distinct and
separate. Thus, the motion was granted.
Issue: Whether or not the search conducted on Apartment
No. 1 was valid.
Ruling: No, the place described in the search warrant is
the only place which may be legitimately searched in
virtue thereof. The constitution requires the search
warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched
as well as the persons or things to be searched. The
particularization of the description of the place to be
searched may properly be done only by the Judge and
only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion
of the police officers conducting the search. In this case,
the address specified was Abigail’s Variety Store but the
search was conducted at Apartment No. 1. There was
therefore an infringement of this constitutional
requirement which necessarily brought into action the
concomitant provision that any evidence obtained thereof
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
14. JOSE BURGOS VS. CHIEF OF STAFF
(G.R. No L-64261, December 26, 1984)
Facts: Two warrants were issued against petitioners for
the search on the premises of “Metropolitan Mail” and
“We Forum” newspapers and the seizure of items alleged
to have been used in subversive activities. Petitioners
prayed that a writ of preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the
seized articles, and that respondents be enjoined from
using the articles thus seized as evidence against
petitioner.
Petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of
probable cause and that the two warrants issued indicated
only one and the same address.
Issue: Whether or not the two warrants were valid to
justify seizure of the items.
Held: The defect in the indication of the same address
in the two warrants was held by the court as a
typographical error and immaterial in view of the correct
determination of the place sought to be searched set forth
in the application. The purpose and intent to search two
distinct premises was evident in the issuance of the two
warrant.
However, the Court declared the two warrants null and
void.
Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet
Furthermore, jurisprudence tells of the prohibition on the issuance
of general warrants. (Stanford vs. State of Texas). The description
and enumeration in the warrant of the items to be searched and
seized did not indicate with specification the subversive nature of
the said items.
15. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ROSA ARUTA Y
MENGUIN (G. R. No. 120915, April 3, 1998)
Doctrine: Search warrants to be valid must particularly describe the
place to be searched and the persons to be seized. The purpose of
this rule is to limit the things to be seized to those and only those,
particularly described in the warrant so as to leave the officers of the
law with no discretion regarding what articles they shall seize to the
end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made.
Facts: P/Lt Abello was tipped off by an informant named Benjie
that the defendant Aruta would be arriving from Baguio City with a
large volume of marijuana the following day. Abello assembled a
team and waited for the defendant.
When Aruta arrived, the team approached her and introduced
themselves as NARCOM agents. Abellow asked Aruta about the
contents of her bag, and the latter handed it over. Upon inspection,
it was confirmed that the bag contained marijuana leaves packedin
a plastic bag. Aruta was brought to the NARCOM office, and the
bag was seized.
Issue: Was Aruta’s arrest valid?
Ruling: No, because her warrantless arrest is not justified. Abello
received the tip one day before Aruta’s arrival, which gave him time
to secure a warrant of arrest particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons and things to be seized. She was also not
in a moving vehicle when she was searched. Instead, she was
crossing the street without even looking suspicious, like a normal
pedestrian. Her act of handing over her bag was not a waiver of her
right either, because in order for a waiver to be valid, it must first
inform the person to be searched of the existing right. Therefore,
Aruta’s arrest was not valid.
16. CYNTHIA D. NOLASCO ET AL. VS. HON. ERNANI
CRUZ PAÑO (G.R. No. L-69803, October 8, 1985)
Facts: Milagros Aguilar-Roque was arrested together with Cynthia
Nolasco by the Constabulary Security Group (CSG). Milagros had
been wanted as a high ranking officer of the CPP. The arrest took
place at 11:30 a.m. on August 6, 1984. At noon of the same day,
her premises were searched and 428 documents, a portable
typewriter and 2 boxes were seized. Earlier that day, Judge Cruz
Paño issued a search warrant to be served at Aguilar-Roque’s
leased residence allegedly an underground house of the CPP/NPA.
On the basis of the documents seized, charges of subversion and
rebellion by the CSG were filed by but the fiscal’s office merely
charged her and Nolasco with illegal possession of subversive
Issue: Whether or not the search warrant was valid?
Ruling: NO. Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution,
guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose. It also specifically provides that no Search
Warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer
as may be authorized by law, after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the things to be seized. It is at once
evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the
seizure of personal properties vaguely described and not
particularized. It is an all- embracing description which
includes everything conceivable regarding the
Communist Party of the Philippines and the National
Democratic Front. It does not specify what the subversive
books and instructions are; what the manuals not
otherwise available to the public contain to make them
subversive or to enable them to be used for the crime of
rebellion. There is absent a definite guideline to the
searching team as to what items might be lawfully seized
thus giving the officers of the law discretion regarding
what articles they should seize as, in fact, taken also were
a portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes.
17. PAPA vs MAGO (G.R. No. L-27360, February 28,
1968)
Doctrine: Except in the case of the search of a dwelling
house, persons exercising police authority under the
customs law may effect search and seizure without a
search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws.
Facts: The Bureau of Customs, upon hearing from a
reliable information that a certain shipment of personal
effects, loaded on two trucks, allegedly misdeclared and
undervalued, would be released from the customs zone of
the port, intercepted and seized the trucks transporting the
goods. Mago, the owner of the goods that were seized,
questioned the validity of the search conducted by the
BOC since it was made without a search warrant.
Issue: Whether or not the search conducted by the BOC
is valid
Ruling: Yes. The officers had the authority to effect the
search and seizure even without a search warrant as
provided under the Tariff and Customs Code. The Code
authorizes persons having police authority to “inspect,
search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk,
package, or envelope or any person on board, or to stop
and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person
suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or
prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary
to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant
in said cases.”
18. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS IDEL
AMINNUDIN
articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI
laboratory for examination.
They were verified as marijuana leaves, thus an information for
violation of the Dangerous drugs Act was filed against him and later
the information was amended to include Farida Hassen, who had
also been arrested with him the same evening. Both were arranged
and pleaded not guilty. The trial was proceeded only against the
accused-appellant, who was eventually convicted.
Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his
bag was his clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs
of pants. He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately
handcuffed. That his bag was confiscated without a search warrant.
That his business was selling watches and sometimes cigarettes, that
he did not even know what marijuana looked like.
Issue: Whether or not the search and arrest was lawful.
Held: No. there was no warrant of arrest or search
warrant issued by a judge after personal determination by him of the
existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averments of the
government , the accused appellant was not caught in flagrante nor
was a crime about to be committed or had just been committed to
justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court.
The evidence of probable cause should be determined by a judge
and not by law-enforcement agent. A search cannot be considered
an incident of a lawful arrest if there is no warrant of arrest and the
warrantless arrest does not come under the exceptions allowed by
Rules of Court.
If the warrantless search was illegal, the evidence obtained is
inadmissible. It is the fruit of the poisonous tree. The constitutional
presumption is that the accused is presumed innocent even if his
defense is weak as long as the prosecution is not strong enough to
convict him.
19. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MIKAEL
MALMSTEDT (G.R. No. 91107, June 19, 1991)
Facts: In an information dated 15 June 1989, Accused-appellant
Mikael Malmstedt (hereinafter referred to as the accused) was
charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad,
Benguet, Branch 10, in Criminal Case No. 89-CR-0663, for
violation of Section 4, Art. II of Republic Act 6425, as amended,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On 11 May 1989 at about 1:30 o’clock in the afternoon, the bus
where accused was riding was stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan
boarded the bus and announced that they were members of the
NARCOM and that they would conduct an inspection. The two (2)
NARCOM officers started their inspection from the front going
towards the rear of the bus.
During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused’s
waist. Suspecting the bulge on accused’s waist to be a gun, the
officer asked for accused’s passport and other identification papers.
When accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring
travelling bags from the luggage carrier. Upon stepping
out of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them.
A teddy bear was found in each bag which later on was
discovered to have hidden hashish inside.
For his defense, the defendant raised the issue of illegal
search of his personal effects. Accused argues that the
search of his personal effects was illegal because it was
made without a search warrant and, therefore, the
prohibited drugs which were discovered during the illegal
search are not admissible as evidence against him.
Issue: Whether or not the search conducted on the
defendant’s person is valid?
Ruling: The court finds for the state. The Constitution
guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures. However, where the search is made
pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a
search warrant. A lawful arrest without a warrant may be
made by a peace officer or a private person under the
following circumstances.
"SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and
he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the
person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall
be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112,
Section 7. (6a, 17a)."
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting
prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was actually being
committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante
delicto. Thus, the search made upon his personal effects
falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing
provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search
incident to a lawful arrest.
While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not
armed with a search warrant when the search was made
over the personal effects of accused, however, under the
circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable
cause for said officers to believe that accused was then
and there committing a crime.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and
Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been
declared by this Court as valid, because of existence of probable
cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag
owned by the accused, or where the accused was acting
suspiciously, and attempted to flee. Additionally, it was held that
when faced with on-the spot information, the police officers had to
act quickly and there was no time to secure a search warrant.
It must be observed that, at first, the NARCOM officers merely
conducted a routine check of the bus (where accused was riding) and
the passengers therein, and no extensive search was initially made.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed judgment of
conviction by the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
the Accused-Appellant.
20. PEOPLE VS TABAR (G.R. No. 101124)
Facts: Respondent-accused was charged, together with her nephew,
for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act in an information which
provided that: That on or about the 8th day of February 1989, at
about 3:00 PM. in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conniving and
confederating together and mutually helping each other, with
deliberate intent, did then and there sell and deliver, without
authority of law, Three (3) sticks of marijuana cigarettes, a (sic)
prohibited drugs, to a person who posted himself as a buyer, in Viol.
of Sec. 4, Art. 11, of RA 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Act of 1972. The accused were then convicted of the
offense charged against them in the trial court.
On appeal, respondent presented her argument that the
lower court erred in admitting the evidence against her when there
wasn’t any search warrant. Therefore, violating the constitutional
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Issue: WON there was a violation against the constitutional
guarantee of individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Ruling: The second assigned error is without merit. The evidence
for the prosecution discloses that the appellant placed the packs of
marijuana sticks under the rolled pair of pants which she was then
carrying at the time she hurriedly left her shanty after noticing the
arrest of Rommel. When she was asked to spread it out, which she
voluntary did, the package containing the packs of marijuana sticks
were thus exposed in plain view to the member of the team. A crime
was thus committed in the presence of the policemen. Pursuant to
Section 5, Rule 113 and Section 12 Rule 126 of the Revised Rules
of Court, she could lawfully be arrested and searched for anything
which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense without
the corresponding arrest and search warrants
Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the seach and seizure were
without a warrant, the appellant had effectively waived her
constitutional right relative thereto by voluntarily submitting to the
seach and seizure. In People vs. Malasugui, 20 this Court ruled:
When one voluntarily submits to a search and consent
to have it made of his person or premises, he is precluded from
later complaining thereof. The right to be secure from
unreasonable seach may, like every right, be waived and such
waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly.
21. VERGARA V. PEOPLE
approximately 23 grams of dried marijuana leaves
wrapped in newspaper and cellophane.
Petitioner denied all allegations saying that it was one of
the tanods that had his bag when he was brought to the
Brgy. Captain’s house. But Petitioner cooperated fully
with the trial and did not question the validity of the
arrest.
The RTC found Petitioner guilty and sentenced him to
suffer indeterminate imprisonment ranging from eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium as
minimum to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal
medium as maximum and ordered him to pay a fine of
₱350,000.00.15. The decision was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals.
Issue: Was the arrest and search proper?
Ruling: No. The manner in which the search that yielded
the drug evidence was not lawful, thus affecting the
lawfulness of the arrest. Even taking the tanods testimony
as truth reveals that the warrantless arrest was not a valid
exercise of such power. By the tanods own admission,
Petitioner did not perform any overt act that he
committed, is actually committing, or about to commit a
crime when they apprehended him.
Even if the Petitioner did attempt to flee, the Court held
in People v Shabaz that “flight alone is not a reliable
indicator of guilt without other circumstances because
flight alone is inherently ambiguous."
The most the tanod may have done in the present
circumstances is a stop and frisk, but limited to
Petitioners outer clothing and grounded on a genuine
reason.
Accordingly, the waiver to question the validity of the
arrest is not a waiver to the inadmissibility of evidence.
Though the Constitutional immunity against illegal
searches may be waived, such waiver must be done with
specific, unequivocal, and intelligently given consent
with no duress or coercion.
22. SPS. VEROY VS. JUDGE LAYAGUE
AND BRID. GEN. DUMLAO (G.R. No. L-95630
June 18, 1992)
Facts: The petitioner-spouses own a house at Skylight
Village in Davao City, but they moved to Quezon City
due to the husband’s promotion. Their house was
entrusted to two caretakers and to Ms. Edna. In 1990,
Capt. Obrero attempted to raid the house because the
residence was being used as a safe house of rebel soldiers.
However, they were only able to enter the yard, but not
the house because they did not have search warrant. Capt.
Obrero called petitioner Luisa through phone and asked
her permission to search the house, Luisa agreed as long
as the raid will be conducted in the presence of Major
Macasaet. The following day, Capt. Obrero and Major
Macasaet conducted the search pursuant to the authority
granted by petitioner Luisa. In their operation, Capt.
petitioners' provisional liberty and set the bail bond at P20,000.00
each.
Petitioners contend that they were not found in actual possession of
the firearm and ammunitions. They were in Quezon City while the
prohibited articles were found in Davao City. Yet they were being
charged under Presidential Decree No. 1866 upon the sole
circumstance that the house wherein the items were found belongs
to them.
Issue: Whether or not Presidential Decree No. 1866 is
unconstitutional for being violative of the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Constitution;
Ruling: The Supreme Court said that Permission was indeed
granted by Ma. Luisa Veroy to enter the house but only to ascertain
the presence of rebel soldiers. Under the circumstances it is
undeniable that the police officers had ample time to procure a
search warrant but did not.
The items taken cannot be used as evidence against the petitioners
in the criminal action against them for illegal possession of firearms.
Besides, assuming that there was indeed a search warrant, still in
mala prohibita, while there is no need of criminal intent, there must
be knowledge that the same existed. Without the knowledge or
voluntariness there is no crime.
The criminal case against the petitioners for illegal possession of
firearms is DISMISSED.
23. PEOPLE vs. DE GRACIA
Doctrine: Where the military operatives had reasonable grounds to
believe that a crime was being committed, and had no opportunity
to apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts, the same
constituted an exception to the prohibition against warrantless
searches.
Facts:
1. Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino
People (RAM-SFP) staged coup d’état in December 1989
against the Government.
2. Efren Soria of Intelligence Division, NCR Defense Command,
together with his team, conducted a surveillance of the Eurocar
Sales Office in EDSA, QC on early morning of December 1,
1989, which surveillance actually started November 30, 1989 at
around 10:00 PM. Such surveillance was conducted pursuant to
an intelligence report that the said establishment was being
occupied by the elements of the RAM-SFP as communication
command post.
3. Near the Eurocar office, there were crowd watching the on-
going bombardment near Camp Aguinaldo when a group of 5
men disengaged themselves and walked towards their
surveillance car. Maj. Soria ordered the driver to start the car
and leave the area. However, as they passed the area, then 5 men
drew their guns and fired at them, which resulted to the
wounding of the driver. Nobody in the surveillance team
retaliated for they were afraid that civilians might be caught in
the crossfire.
4. Thereafter, on the morning of December 5, 1989, a search team
raided the Eurocar Sales Office and confiscated 6 cartons of M-
the Eurocar office, aside from the fact that the courts
were consequently closed.
Issue: Whether there was a valid search and seizure in
this case.
Ruling: YES, there was a valid search and seizure in this
case.
• It is admitted that the raiding team was not armed
with a search warrant at that time. It was
actually precipitated by intelligence reports that said
office was being used as headquarters by the RAM.
Prior to the raid, there was a surveillance
conducted on the premises wherein the surveillance
team was fired at by a group of men coming from the
Eurocar building. When the military operatives
raided the place, the occupants thereof refused to
open the door despite requests for them to do so,
thereby compelling the former to break into the
office.
• The Eurocar Sales Office is obviously not a gun store
and it is definitely not an armory or arsenal which are
the usual depositories for explosives and
ammunition. It is primarily and solely engaged in the
sale of automobiles. The presence of an unusual
quantity of high-powered firearms and explosives
could not be justifiably or even colorably explained.
• In addition, there was general chaos and disorder at
that time because of simultaneous and intense
firing within the vicinity of the office and in the
nearby Camp Aguinaldo which was under attack by
rebel forces. The courts in the surrounding areas were
obviously closed and, for that matter, the building
and houses therein were deserted.
• Under circumstances, SC considered that the instant
case falls under one of the exceptions to the
prohibition against a warrantless search. In the first
place, the military operatives, taking into account the
facts obtaining in this case, had reasonable ground to
believe that a crime was being committed. There was
consequently more than sufficient probable cause to
warrant their action. Furthermore, in the prevailing
situation, the raiding team had no opportunity to
apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts.
The trial judge himself manifested that on December
5, 1989 when the raid was conducted, his court was
closed. Under such urgency and exigency of the
moment, a search warrant could lawfully be
dispensed with.
24. ROMEO POSADAS y ZAMORA, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
Facts: Two policemen where conducting a surveillance,
when they spotted Posadas carrying a “buri” bag and
acting suspiciously. The policemen approached the
Posadas and identified themselves as members of the
INP. They approached the petitioner and identified
themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner attempted
to flee but his attempt to get away was thwarted by the
further investigation. In the course of the same, the petitioner was
asked to show the necessary license or authority to possess firearms
and ammunitions found in his possession but he failed to do so. He
was then taken to the Davao Metrodiscom office and the prohibited
articles recovered from him were indorsed to M/Sgt. Didoy the
officer then on duty.
Issue: Whether or not the search is a valid exercise of police power.
Ruling: Yes. At the time the peace officers identified themselves
and apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to flee, they did not
know that he had committed, or was actually committing the offense
of illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions. They just
suspected that he was hiding something in the buri bag. They did not
know what its contents were. The said circumstances did not justify
an arrest without a warrant.
Nevertheless, the search and seizure may still be justified as akin to
a "stop and frisk" situation. When the petitioner acted suspiciously
and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause
that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the
right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same. To require
the police officers to search the bag only after they had obtained a
search warrant might prove to be useless, futile and much too late
under the circumstances. In such a situation, it was reasonable for a
police officer to stop a suspicious individual briefly in order to
determine his identity or to maintain the status quo while obtaining
more information, rather than to simply shrug his shoulders and
allow a crime to occur.
The Court reproduces with approval the following disquisition of
the Solicitor General:
The assailed search and seizure may still be justified as
akin to a "stop and frisk" situation whose object is either
to determine the identity of a suspicious individual or to
maintain the status quo momentarily while the police
officer seeks to obtain more information. This is
illustrated in the case of Terry vs. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968). In this case, two men repeatedly walked past a
store window and returned to a spot where they
apparently conferred with a third man. This aroused the
suspicion of a police officer. To the experienced officer,
the behaviour of the men indicated that they were sizing
up the store for an armed robbery. When the police
officer approached the men and asked them for their
names, they mumbled a reply. Whereupon, the officer
grabbed one of them, spun him around and frisked him.
Finding a concealed weapon in one, he did the same to
the other two and found another weapon. In the
prosecution for the offense of carrying a concealed
weapon, the defense of illegal search and seizure was put
up. The United States Supreme Court held that "a police
officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner approach a person for the purpose of
investigating possible criminal behaviour even though
there is no probable cause to make an arrest." In such a
situation, it is reasonable for an officer rather than simply
to shrug his shoulder and allow a crime to occur, to stop
a suspicious individual briefly in order to determine his
identity or maintain the status quo while obtaining more
information.
25. PEOPLE vs MENGOTE (GR NO. 87059, JUNE 22,
1992)
Doctrine: Rule 113, Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant, when
lawful. — A peace officer or private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person;
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and
he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
Facts: Respondent herein was standing in a sidewalk,
looking from side-to-side and holding his abdomen. The
police received a call that three persons were standing in
a sidewalk, including respondent herein, looking all
suspicious. The police then approached the three,
whereupon respondent tried to run but was eventually
caught. He was then searched and an unlicensed revolver
was found to be in his possession. Respondent was then
arrested and turned over to police headquarters for
investigation.
Issue: W/N the warrantless arrest was lawful.
Ruling: NO. The warrantless arrest was not in
accordance with Rule 113.
At the time of the arrest in question, Mengote was merely
looking from side to side and holding his abdomen. No
offense had been committed or is being committed or at
least attempting to be committed by Mengote. (par [a])
Moreover, there was no showing that an offense had just
been committed during the arrest and that the arresting
officers had personal knowledge that such offense was
committed by Mengote. (par [b])
26. PEOPLE vs. RUBEN BURGOS (G.R No. L-68955
September 4,1986)
Facts: Cesar Masamlok voluntarily surrendered himself
to the authorities-Philippine Constabulary, alleging that
the accused Ruben Burgos and his companions forcibly
recruited him to be part of the NPA, he alleged that
Burgos threatened to kill him through his homemade
revolver calibre.38, and his family if he refuse to join.
After receipt of the information, a joint team of a PC-IIVP
was dispatched to arrest the accused, who was then
plowing his field. One of the officers asked Burgos about
the alleged firearm. Burgos denied having possession of
such, however, his wife pointed to a palace below their
house where the gun was buried. After recovery of the
firearm, Burgos pointed to a stock pile of cogon, where
the officers recover alleged subversive documents.
Burgos, however denied being involved in any subversive
Ruling: NO. Records disclose that the police went to Burgos’ house
to arrest him upon receipt of the information given by Masamlok,
they had neither search warrant not arrest warrant. Since Burgos’
arrest does not fall within the exceptions laid down in Rule 113
Section 6 of Rules of Court the warrantless search conducted to such
arrest is so illegal.
27. PEOPLE vs DELA CRUZ
Doctrine: As a general rule, a police officer must secure a warrant
of arrest or a search warrant before he can search a person. Without
such warrant, any evidence that will be seized shall be deemed as
inadmissible evidence by the Court.
Facts: Dela Cruz and Beltran were convicted for possessing 3
cigarette foil wrapper containing marijuana which was obtained
through a buy bust operation. The defendants contend that there is
an illegal seizure of their possessions as the police officers were
raided without any search warrant. They claim that such action
results to corruption of police officers by planting evidence for their
extortion.
Issue: Is there an illegal seizure?
Ruling: No, the said seizure is lawful and does not result to
corruption of officers. It is a general rule that a police officer must
secure a search warrant before any evidence that will be seized be
considered as an admissible evidence. However, in this case, is an
exception to such rule as the seizure was committed during an
entrapment operation by the police offers. Thus, a police officer
may, without warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed an offense. There being no
violation of the constitutional right against unreasonable search and
seizure, the confiscated articles are admissible in evidence.
28. PEOPLE VS. DORIA (G.R. No. 125299, January 22, 1999)
Facts: Accused-appellants assail the legality of their warrantless
arrest through a buy-bust operation. They are allegedly caught
violating the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Issue: Whether or not the warrantless arrest of accused-appellants
through a buy-bust operation valid.
Ruling: The SC ruled in favor of the validity of the said warrantless
arrest and defined buy-bust operation as a form of entrapment
employed by peace officers as an effective way of apprehending a
criminal in the act of the commission of an offense. Entrapment has
received judicial sanction when undertaken with due regard to
constitutional and legal safeguards.
It consists of two (2) elements: (a) acts of persuasion, trickery, or
fraud carried out by law enforcement officers or the agents to induce
a defendant to commit a crime; and (b) the origin of the criminal
design in the minds of the government officials rather than that of
the innocent defendant, such that the crime is the product of the
creative activity of the law enforcement officer.
It is recognized that in every arrest, there is a certain amount of
entrapment used to outwit the persons violating or about to violate
public officials furnished the accused an opportunity for
commission of the offense, or that the accused is aided in
the commission of the crime in order to secure the
evidence necessary to prosecute him, there is no
entrapment and the accused must be convicted. The law
tolerates the use of decoys and other artifices to catch a
criminal.
29. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR
HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL, et al. vs.
FIDEL V. RAMOS (G.R. No. 81567 July 9, 1990)
Facts: The Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital
Command received confidential information about a
member of the NPA Sparrow Unit being treated for a
gunshot wound at the St. Agnes Hospital, QC. Upon
verification, it was found that the wounded person, is
actually Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA liquidation
squad, who was positively identified as one who is
responsible for the killing of two (2) soldiers. Dural was
transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the
CAPCOM, for security reasons. As a consequence of this
positive identification, Rolando Dural was referred to the
Caloocan City Fiscal who conducted an inquest and
thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
City an information charging Rolando Dural alias Ronnie
Javelon with the crime of "Double Murder with Assault
Upon Agents of Persons in Authority." A petition
for habeas corpus was filed with the Court on behalf
of Roberto Umil, Rolando Dural, and Renato Villanueva,
which was subsequently approved by the former.
However, Roberto Umil and Renato Villanueva posted
bail before the RTC of Pasay City where charges for
violation of the Anti-Subversion Act had been filed
against them, and they were accordingly released. The
petition for habeas corpus, insofar as Umil and
Villanueva are concerned, is now moot and academic and
is accordingly dismissed.
Petitioner: Asserts that his detention is unlawful as their
arrests were made without warrant and, that no
preliminary investigation was first conducted, so that the
information filed against them are null and void. It clearly
appears that he was not arrested while in the act of
shooting the two soldiers nor was he arrested just after the
commission of the said offense Seemingly, his arrest
without warrant is unjustified.
Issue: Whether or not the arrest, detention, and denial
of petition to habeas corpus of the petitioner amounts to
deprivation of his constitutional right to liberty, and
hence null and void.
Ruling: No. An arrest without a warrant under Section 5
paragraphs (a) and (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court,
as amended, is justified when the person arrested is
caught in flagranti delicto (“in the act of committing an
offense”) or when an offense has just been committed and
the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of
the facts indicating that the person arrested has committed
it.
Further, dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA, an
outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing
offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without warrant is justified as it
can be said that he was committing an offense when arrested. The
crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit
such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance
thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against
the State and are in the nature of continuing crimes.
The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the
prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a judge
of the existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial
warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable.
Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment
to arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence
against government forces, or any other milder acts but equally in
pursuance of the rebellious movement.
30. ROLITO GO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et. al. (G.R. No.
101837 February 11, 1992)
Facts: On July 2, 1991, Eldon Maguan was driving his car along
Wilson St., San Juan, Metro Manila, heading towards P. Guevarra
St. Petitioner entered Wilson St., where it is a one-way street and
started travelling in the opposite or "wrong" direction. At the corner
of Wilson and J. Abad Santos Sts., petitioner's and Maguan's cars
nearly bumped each other. Petitioner alighted from his car, walked
over and shot Maguan inside his car. Petitioner then boarded his car
and left the scene.
After six days of the incident, petitioner, accompanied by two
lawyers, presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to
verify news reports that he was being hunted by the police. An
eyewitness positively identified petitioner as the gunman. So, the
police promptly filed a complaint for frustrated homicide against
petitioner with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal
which was later on changed to murder by the prosecutor upon filing
of Information before the RTC after the death of Maguan.
On July 11, 1991, counsel for petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an
omnibus motion for immediate release and proper preliminary
investigation, alleging that the warrantless arrest of petitioner was
unlawful and that no preliminary investigation had been conducted
before the information was filed.
Trial for the criminal case commenced in Sept. 1991. On 4 October
1991, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari was filed. On 14
October 1991, the Court issued a Resolution directing respondent
Judge to hold in abeyance the hearing of the criminal case below
until further orders from this Court.
The Solicitor General argues that under the facts of the case,
petitioner had been validly arrested without warrant. Since
petitioner's identity as the gunman who had shot Eldon Maguan on
2 July 1991 had been sufficiently established by police work,
petitioner was validly arrested six (6) days later at the San Juan
Police Station invoking the case of Umil v. Ramos.
Issue: Whether there is a valid warrantless arrest in this case.
Ruling: No, the warrantless arrest was unlawful. The SC ruled that
the reliance of both petitioner and the Solicitor General upon Umil
v. Ramos is, in the circumstances of this case, misplaced. In Umil v.
Ramos, by an eight-to-six vote, the Court sustained the legality of
Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which
provides as follows:
Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when
lawful. — A peace officer or a private
person may, without warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to
be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days after
the shooting of Maguan. The "arresting" officers
obviously were not present, within the meaning
of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had
allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the
"arrest" effected six (6) days after the shooting
be reasonably regarded as effected "when [the
shooting had] in fact just been committed"
within the meaning of Section 5(b). Moreover,
none of the "arresting" officers had any
"personal knowledge" of facts indicating that
petitioner was the gunman who had shot
Maguan. The information upon which the police
acted had been derived from statements made by
alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting — one
stated that petitioner was the gunman; another
was able to take down the alleged gunman's car's
plate number which turned out to be registered in
petitioner's wife's name. That information did
not, however, constitute "personal knowledge."
It is thus clear to the Court that there was no
lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner within the
meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113. It is clear too
that Section 7 of Rule 112 is also not applicable.
Hence, the warrantless arrest by the police officers were
invalid.
SECTION 3
1. TERESITA SALCEDO-ORTANEZ VS. COURT
OF APPEALS
Facts: Rafael Ortanez and Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez were
married. Sometime in May 1990, Rafael Ortanez, private
respondent, on the grounds of lack of marriage license
for certiorari on the ground of the admission of the evidence
particularly the three cassette tapes.
Issue: Whether or not the three cassette tapes are inadmissible
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioner, Teresita
Salcedo-Ortanez. The three cassette tapes that were offered as
evidence were inadmissible in court because according to Sec 1 of
R.A. NO. 4200, “It shall be unlawful for any person, not being
authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken
word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other devise…..”
The private respondent here, requested his friend who is a member
of the Arm Forces to tap the conversations of his wife and
unidentified persons. According to the Supreme Court, it is
inadmissible because the conversations were unauthorized by the
parties, his wife and the alleged unidentified persons. Meaning to
say if the conversations are authorized by the parties in the
conversations, it is lawful and if presented as evidence, will become
admissible in the court.
2. JOSE JESUS M. DISINI ET AL. VS THE SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE (G.R. No. 203335, February 11, 2014)
Facts: The consolidated petitions seek to declare several provisions
of Republic Act 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012,
unconstitutional and void. The cybercrime law aims to regulate
access to and use of cyberspace but petitioners claim that the means
adapted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable
cyberspace activities violate certain of their constitutional rights.
The government asserts that the law merely seeks to reasonably put
order into cyberspace activities, punish wrongdoings, and prevent
hurtful attacks on the system. Petitioners claim that the Section 4
(b)(3) violates the rights to due process and to privacy and
correspondence and transgresses the freedom of the press.
Issue: Whether or not the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012
Section 4(b)(3) violates the constitutional right to privacy and
correspondence.
Ruling: No, Section 4 (b)(3) did not violate the constitutional right
to privacy and correspondence. Section 4 (b)(3) punishes those who
acquire or use such identifying information without right, implicity
to cause damage and petitioners failed to show how it violated the
right to privacy and correspondence.
3. NAVARRO vs. COURT OF APPEALS (G.R No. 121087;
August 26, 1999)
Facts: Navarro being a member of the Lucena Integrated National
Police, assaulted Ike Lingan inside the police headquarter by boxing
Lingan in the head with a butt of a gun and thereafter when the said
victim fell, by banging his head against the concrete pavement.
Lingan suffered cerebral concussion and shock which directly
caused his death. Unknown to the petitioner Navarro, Jalbuena who
is a colleague of Lingan who is also with him at the police
headquarters was able to record on tape the heated exchange
between petitioner and Lingan. In giving credence to the evidence
of the prosecution, the trial court find Navarro criminally liable.
Issue: Whether or not the voice recording of Jalbuena is an
admissible evidence in view of R.A No. 4200, which prohibits wire
tapping.
in the Court was the one recorded; 3) that the voices on
the tape are those of the persons such are claimed to
belong. A sufficient foundation was thus laid for the
authentication of the tape presented by the prosecution.
4. CECILIA ZULUETA V. COURT OF APPEALS
(GR No. 107383, Feb 20, 1996)
Doctrine: The constitutional injunction declaring “the
privacy of communication and correspondence to be
inviolable is no less applicable simply because it is the
wife who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s
infidelity, who is the party against whom the
constitutional provision is to be enforced.
The only exception to the prohibition in the
Constitution is if there is a lawful order from a court or
when public safety or order requires otherwise, as
prescribed by law. Any violation of this provision renders
the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. The intimacies between husband and wife do
not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and
cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any
telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by
contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or
his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional
protection is ever available to him or to her.
Facts: Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private
respondent Dr. Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1962,
petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, and in the
presence of her mother, a driver and Dr. Martin’s
secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet and
took 157 documents consisting of private
correspondences between Dr. Martin and his alleged
paramours, greeting cards, cancelled check, diaries,
passport, and photographs. The documents and papers
were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal
separation and for disqualification from the practice of
medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.
Dr. Martin brought the action for recovery of the
documents and papers and for damages against Zulueta,
with the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The RTC
rendered judgment in favor of Martin, declaring him the
capital/exclusive owner of the properties. The RTC also
ordered Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to
immediately return the properties, and were enjoined
from submitting the properties as evidence. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. Zulueta filed
the petition for review with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Are the papers and documents admissible in
evidence against Dr. Martin?
Held: No. The papers and documents are
inadmissible. The constitutional injunction declaring the
privacy of communication and correspondence to be
inviolable is no less applicable simply because it is the
wife who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s
infidelity, who is the party against whom the
constitutional provision is to be enforced.
of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not
shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
Hence, the papers and documents are inadmissible in evidence.
NOTES:
“The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the
spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may
testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected
spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined
without the consent of the other as to any communication received
in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for
specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication;
quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows
with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity
that each owes to the other.”
5. PEOPLE vs. ANDRE MARTI (G.R. No. 81561, January 18,
1991)
Facts: On August 14, 1987, the appellant and his common-law wife,
Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the Manila Packing and Export
Forwarders, carrying with them four (4) gift wrapped packages. The
appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to
a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Anita Reyes then asked the appellant
if she could examine and inspect the packages. Appellant, however,
refused, assuring her that the packages simply contained books,
cigars, and gloves.
Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or
Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) following standard
operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. When he
opened appellant's box, a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. His
curiousity aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles allegedly
containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside.
Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the
NBI and requesting a laboratory examination of the samples he
extracted from the cellophane wrapper. He brought the letter and a
sample of appellant's shipment to the Narcotics Section of the NBI.
Job Reyes informed them that the rest of the shipment was still in
his office. NBI agents went to the Reyes' office at Ermita, Manila
The package which allegedly contained books was likewise opened
by Job Reyes. He discovered that the package contained bricks or
cake-like dried marijuana leaves. The package which allegedly
contained tabacalera cigars was also opened. It turned out that dried
marijuana leaves were neatly stocked underneath the cigars.
Thereafter, an Information was filed against appellant for violation
of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
After trial, the court a quo rendered the assailed decision. Appellant
appealed and contends that the evidence subject of the imputed
offense had been obtained in violation of his constitutional rights
against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of
communication and therefore argues that the same should be held
inadmissible in evidence.
Issue: May an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of
appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked against the State?
seizure clauses are restraints upon the government and its
agents, not upon private individuals.
Records of the case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job
Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding agency, who
made search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection
was reasonable and a standard operating procedure as a
precautionary measure before delivery of packages to the
Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts. The
contraband in the case at bar having come into possession
of the Government without the latter transgressing
appellant's rights against unreasonable search and
seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why the same
should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of
the offense charged.
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches
and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only
against the government and its agencies tasked with the
enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked
against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary
and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
6. POLLO vs. DAVID (GR No. 181881, October 18,
2011)
Facts: Petitioner is a former Supervising Personnel
Specialist of the CSC Regional Office No. IV and also the
Officer-in-Charge of the Public Assistance and Liaison
Division (PALD) under the “Mamamayan Muna Hindi
Mamaya Na” program of the CSC.
On January 3. 2007, CSC Chairperson Karina
Constantino-David received an unsigned complaint letter
which was marked “Confidential” and was sent through
a courier service (LBC) from certain Allan San Pascual
of Bagong Silang, Caloocan City. The letter contain
allegations that the petitioner have been helping many
who have pending cases in the CSC and the letter sender
pleas that the CSC should investigate this anomaly to
maintain the clean and good behaviour of their office.
Chairperson David immediately formed a team of four
personnel with background in information technology
(IT), and issued a memo directing them to conduct an
investigation and specifically “to back up all the files in
the computers found in the Mamamayan Muna (PALD)
and Legal divisions.”
After some briefing, the team proceeded at once to the
CSC-ROIV office at Panay Avenue, Quezon City. The
backing-up of all files in the hard disk of computers at the
PALD and Legal Services Division (LSD) was witnessed
by several employees, together with Directors Castillo
and Unite who closely monitored said activity. At around
6:00 p.m., Director Unite sent text messages to petitioner
and the head of LSD, who were both out of the office at
the time, informing them of the ongoing copying of
computer files in their divisions upon orders of the CSC
Chair.
Issue: Legality of the search conducted in the petitioner’s
standard of reasonableness will neither unduly burden the efforts of
government employers to ensure the efficient and proper operation
of the workplace, nor authorize arbitrary intrusions upon the privacy
of public employees. We hold, therefore, that public employer
intrusions on the constitutionally protected privacy interests of
government employees for noninvestigatory, work-related
purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related misconduct,
should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the
circumstances. Under this reasonableness standard, both the
inception and the scope of the intrusion must be reasonable:
“Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a twofold
inquiry: first, one must consider ‘whether the…action was justified
at its inception,’ x x x ; second, one must determine whether the
search as actually conducted ‘was reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place,’” x
xx
Ordinarily, a search of an employee’s office by a supervisor will be
“justified at its inception” when there are reasonable grounds for
suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the employee is
guilty of work-related misconduct, or that the search is necessary for
a noninvestigatory work-related purpose such as to retrieve a needed
file. x x x The search will be permissible in its scope when “the
measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the
search and not excessively intrusive in light of …the nature of the
[misconduct].” x x x39 (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
Under the facts obtaining, the search conducted on petitioner’s
computer was justified at its inception and scope. We quote with
approval the CSC’s discussion on the reasonableness of its actions,
consistent as it were with the guidelines established by O’Connor:
Even conceding for a moment that there is no such administrative
policy, there is no doubt in the mind of the Commission that the
search of Pollo’s computer has successfully passed the test of
reasonableness for warrantless searches in the workplace as
enunciated in the above-discussed American authorities. It bears
emphasis that the Commission pursued the search in its capacity as
a government employer and that it was undertaken in connection
with an investigation involving a work-related misconduct, one of
the circumstances exempted from the warrant requirement. At the
inception of the search, a complaint was received recounting that a
certain division chief in the CSCRO No. IV was “lawyering” for
parties having pending cases with the said regional office or in the
Commission. The nature of the imputation was serious, as it was
grievously disturbing. If, indeed, a CSC employee was found to be
furtively engaged in the practice of “lawyering” for parties with
pending cases before the Commission would be a highly repugnant
scenario, then such a case would have shattering repercussions. It
would undeniably cast clouds of doubt upon the institutional
integrity of the Commission as a quasi-judicial agency, and in the
process, render it less effective in fulfilling its mandate as an
impartial and objective dispenser of administrative justice. It is
settled that a court or an administrative tribunal must not only be
actually impartial but must be seen to be so, otherwise the general
public would not have any trust and confidence in it.
Considering the damaging nature of the accusation, the Commission
had to act fast, if only to arrest or limit any possible adverse
consequence or fall-out. Thus, on the same date that the complaint
was received, a search was forthwith conducted involving the
computer resources in the concerned regional office. That it was the
computers that were subjected to the search was justified since these
Worthy to mention, too, is the fact that the Commission
effected the warrantless search in an open and transparent
manner. Officials and some employees of the regional
office, who happened to be in the vicinity, were on hand
to observe the process until its completion. In addition,
the respondent himself was duly notified, through text
messaging, of the search and the concomitant retrieval of
files from his computer.
All in all, the Commission is convinced that the
warrantless search done on computer assigned to Pollo
was not, in any way, vitiated with unconstitutionality. It
was a reasonable exercise of the managerial prerogative
of the Commission as an employer aimed at ensuring its
operational effectiveness and efficiency by going after
the work-related misfeasance of its employees.
Consequently, the evidence derived from the questioned
search are deemed admissible.
Petitioner’s claim of violation of his constitutional right
to privacy must necessarily fail. His other argument
invoking the privacy of communication and
correspondence under Section 3(1), Article III of the
1987 Constitution is also untenable considering the
recognition accorded to certain legitimate intrusions into
the privacy of employees in the government workplace
under the aforecited authorities.
7. SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING VS.
ALEXANDER CHOACHUY (G. R. No. 179736; June
26, 2013)
Doctrine: The right to privacy is the right to be let alone.
Facts: Petitioners Hing are owners of a parcel of land in
Mandaue, Cebu. Respondents are the owners of Aldo
Development and Resources, Inc., adjacent to the
property of the petitioners.
Respondents filed a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
against the petitioners for constructing a fence without a
valid permit. The construction would also destroy the
wall of Aldo’s building. In order to collect evidence, the
respondents set up two video surveillance cameras facing
the petitioner’s property. Employees of Aldo were also
ordered to take pictures of the ongoing construction.
Issue: Was the installment of video surveillance
cameras facing the petitioner’s property a violation of
their right to privacy?
Ruling: Yes, because the Reasonableness of Expectation
of Privacy Test was aplied by the Court, and it was
determined that the petitioners were reasonable in their
expectation, as the cameras pry into the privacy of their
business, and it is no different from eavesdropping. The
cameras were covering a significant amount of the
petitioner’s property, without their consent.
8. VIVARES vs ST. THERESA’S COLLEGE (G.R. No. 202666)
Facts: In January 2012, Angela Tan, a high school student at St.
Theresa’s College (STC), uploaded on Facebook several pictures of
her and her classmates (Nenita Daluz and Julienne Suzara) wearing
only their undergarments. Thereafter, some of their classmates
reported said photos to their teacher, Mylene Escudero. Escudero,
through her students, viewed and downloaded said pictures. She
showed the said pictures to STC’s Discipline-in-Charge for
appropriate action. Later, STC found Tan et al to have violated the
student’s handbook and banned them from “marching” in their
graduation ceremonies scheduled in March 2012.
The issue went to court but despite a TRO (temporary
restraining order) granted by the Cebu RTC enjoining the school
from barring the students in the graduation ceremonies, STC still
barred said students.
Subsequently, Rhonda Vivares, mother of Nenita, and the other
mothers filed a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data
against the school. They argued, among others, that:
1. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts
was set at “Friends Only.” They, thus, have a reasonable
2. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be
used and reproduced without their consent. Escudero,
however, violated their rights by saving digital copies of the
photos and by subsequently showing them to STC’s
fficials. Thus, the Facebook accounts of the children were
3. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the
copying of information, data, and digital images happened
They prayed that STC be ordered to surrender and deposit with
the court all soft and printed copies of the subject data and have such
data be declared illegally obtained in violation of the children’s right
to privacy. The Cebu RTC eventually denied the petition. Hence,
this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the petition for writ of habeas data is proper
on the ground that there in an actual or threatened violation of the
right to privacy in the life, liberty, or security of the minors involved
in the case.
Held: YES it is proper but in this case, it will not prosper.
Contrary to the arguments of STC, the Supreme Court ruled that:
7. The petition for writ of habeas data can be availed of even if this
8. The writ of habeas data can be availed of against STC even if it
is not an entity engaged in the business of “gathering, collecting,
or storing data or information regarding the person, family,
home and correspondence of the aggrieved party”.
First, the Rule on Habeas Data does not state that it can be
applied only in cases of extralegal killings or enforced
disappearances. Second, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the
habeas data protection shall be available only against abuses of a
person or entity engaged in the business of gathering, storing, and
collecting of data.
In this case, however, there is no showing that
the students concerned made use of such privacy tools.
Evidence would show that that their post (status) on
Facebook were published as “Public”.
Facebook has the following settings to control as
to who can view a user’s posts on his “wall” (profile
page):
• Public – the default setting; every Facebook user
• Friends of Friends – only the user’s Facebook
friends and their friends can view the photo;
• Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends can
• Custom – the photo is made visible only to
• Only Me – the digital image can be viewed only
The default setting is “Public” and if a user wants to
have some privacy, then he must choose any setting other
than “Public”. If it is true that the students concerned did
set the posts subject of this case so much so that only five
people can see them (as they claim), then how come most
of their classmates were able to view them. This fact was
not refuted by them. In fact, it was their classmates who
informed and showed their teacher, Escudero, of the said
pictures. Therefore, it appears that Tan et al never use the
privacy settings of Facebook hence, they have no
reasonable expectation of privacy on the pictures of them
scantily clad.
STC did not violate the students’ right to privacy.
The manner which the school gathered the pictures
cannot be considered illegal. As it appears, it was the
classmates of the students who showed the picture to their
teacher and the latter, being the recipient of said pictures,
merely delivered them to the proper school authority and
it was for a legal purpose, that is, to discipline their
students according to the standards of the school (to
which the students and their parents agreed to in the first
place because of the fact that they enrolled their children
there).
SECTION 4
1. FRANCISCO CHAVEZ v RAUL M. GONZALES
(GR No. 168338 February 15, 2008)
Doctrine: Freedom of the press is crucial and so
inextricably woven into the right of free speech and free
expression that any attempt to restrict it must be met with
an examination so critical that only a danger that is clear
and present would be allowed to curtail it.
Facts: On June 7, 2005, former counsel of deposed
President Joseph Estrada, Atty. Alan Paguia,
subsequently released an alleged authentic tape recording
of the wiretap. Included in the tapes were purported
be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. He also stated that
persons possessing or airing said tapes were committing a
continuing offense, subject to arrest by anybody who had personal
knowledge if the crime was committed or was being committed in
their presence. NTC also warned the concerned radio and television
companies that their broast/airing of such false information and/or
willful misrepresentation shall be just cause for the suspension,
revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations
issued to the said companies.
Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court against respondents Secretary Gonzales and the
NTC, "praying for the issuance of the writs of certiorari and
prohibition, as extraordinary legal remedies, to annul void
proceedings, and to prevent the unlawful, unconstitutional and
oppressive exercise of authority by the respondents." Petitioner also
prayed for the nullification of acts, issuances, and orders of
respondents committed or made since June 6, 2005 until the present
that curtail the public's rights to freedom of expression and of the
press, and to information on matters of public concern specifically
in relation to information regarding the controversial taped
conversion of President Arroyo and for prohibition of the further
commission of such acts, and making of such issuances, and orders
by respondents.
Issue: Do acts of respondents abridge the freedom of speech and
of the press?
Ruling: Yes. The restrictions imposed by the respondents falls
under the clear and present danger rule which requires a substantial
danger that the speech will likely lead to an evil that the government
has the right to prevent to be valid. The respondents failed to offer
proof to satisfy such rule and there is no showing that the feared
violation of anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers the national
security of the State.
NOTE:
Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression
are evaluated by either or a combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the
dangerous tendency doctrine which permits limitations on speech
once a rational connection has been established between the speech
restrained and the danger contemplated; (b) the balancing of
interests tests, used as a standard when courts need to balance
conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a
conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests
observable in a given situation of type of situation; and (c) the clear
and present danger rule which rests on the premise that speech
may be restrained because there is substantial danger that the speech
will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent. This
rule requires that the evil consequences sought to be prevented must
be substantive, "extremely serious and the degree of imminence
extremely high."
Distinctions on restraint:
1. a content-neutral regulation, i.e., merely concerned
with the incidents of the speech, or one that merely
controls the time, place or manner, and under well
defined standards
2. a content-based restraint or censorship, i.e., the
restriction is based on the subject matter of the
utterance or speech.
2. IGLESIA NI CRISTO vs COURT OF APPEALS
Facts: Petitioner produces a television show that teaches
about their religion and is required to submit taped
episodes of said shows to Private Respondent MTRCB
for review. Private Respondent classified some episodes
as “X” or not for public viewing, saying that the program
attacked other religions which is prohibited by law.
Petitioner filed the current action and gained a favorable
decision from the RTC who ordered Private Respondent
to grant the necessary permits to show the program.
T
he decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals who
said the subject materials constitute an attack against
other religions and found the program “indecent, contrary
to law and good customs.”
Issue:
1) Does the Private Respondent have the power to
review religious TV programs?
2) Does the program constitute an attack on other
religions?
Ruling:
1) Yes. Under Sec. 3 of Private Respondent’s power and
functions, the law gives them the ability to review and
examine all television shows. Petitioners argument that
religious programs should not be included in such
classification is untenable. Justice Isagani Cruz
elaborates on the matter by differentiating the Freedom to
Believe from Freedom to Act on One’s Beliefs. The first
is internal and absolute in its protection, while the second
is external and subject to regulation by the State.
2) No. The Supreme Court said that any act that restrains
speech is immediately hobbled with the presumption with
invalidity. It is the burden of the party petitioning such
censorship to prove a valid cause for censorship. The
respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of
other religions by petitioner but that gives it no excuse to
interdict such criticisms, however, unclean they may be.
3. SALONGA vs PAÑO (GR No. L-20449, January 26,
1968)
Doctrine: Political discussion even among those opposed
to the present administration is within the protective
clause of freedom of speech and expression.
Facts: A series of bombings occurred in Metro Manila.
Victor Lovely was among those victimized by the
bombing. Arrest, Search and Seizure orders (ASSOs)
were issued against those who were implicated by Victor
Lovely. Herein petitioner was implicated by Lovely.
Military elements presented the ASSO to petitioner then
arrested the latter, without however specifying the charge
against him.
Respondent City Fiscal filed a complaint accusing
petitioner of violation Anti-Subversion Act. The counsel
of petitioner was furnished a copy of an amended
 (2) Because petitioner mentioned some kind of violent
struggle in the Philippines being most likely should reforms be not
made immediately by President Marcos.
Issue: Is the second reason established by the respondent Judge
sufficient to convict petitioner for violation of Anti-Subversion Act?
Ruling: No. The alleged opinion of the petitioner about the
likelihood of a violent struggle here in the Philippines if reforms are
not instituted, assuming that he really stated the same, is nothing but
a legitimate exercise of freedom of thought and expression. No man
deserves punishment for his thoughts.
Political discussion even among those opposed to the present
administration is within the protective clause of freedom of speech
and expression. The same cannot be construed as subversive
activities per se or as evidence of membership in a subversive
organization. Under Presidential Decree No. 885, Section 3,
paragraph 6, political discussion will only constitute, prima facie
evidence of membership in a subversive organization if such
discussion amounts to:
xxx
(6) Conferring with officers or other members of such association
or organization in furtherance of any plan or enterprise thereof.
4. NATIONAL PRESS CLUB vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS (G.R. No. 102653, March 5, 1992)
Facts: It is principally argued by petitioners that Section 11 (b) of
Republic Act No. 6646 invades and violates the constitutional
guarantees comprising freedom of expression. Petitioners maintain
that the prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to
censorship, because it selects and singles out for suppression and
repression with criminal sanctions, only publications of a particular
content, namely, media-based election or political propaganda
during the election period of 1992. It is asserted that the prohibition
is in derogation of media's role, function and duty to provide
adequate channels of public information and public opinion relevant
to election issues. Further, petitioners contend that Section 11 (b)
abridges the freedom of speech of candidates, and that the
suppression of media-based campaign or political propaganda
except those appearing in the Comelec space of the newspapers and
on Comelec time of radio and television broadcasts, would bring
about a substantial reduction in the quantity or volume of
information concerning candidates and issues in the election thereby
curtailing and limiting the right of voters to information and opinion.
The statutory text that petitioners ask us to strike down as
unconstitutional is that of Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646,
known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987:
Sec. 11 Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. — In addition to
the forms of election propaganda prohibited under Section 85 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be unlawful;
xxx xxx xxx
b) for any newspapers, radio broadcasting or television station, other
mass media, or any person making use of the mass media to sell or
to give free of charge print space or air time for campaign or other
political purposes except to the Commission as provided under
Sections 90 and 92 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Any mass media
Sec. 90. Comelec space. — The Commission shall
procure space in at least one newspaper of general
circulation in every province or city: Provided, however,
that in the absence of said newspaper, publication shall be
done in any other magazine or periodical in said province
or city, which shall be known as "Comelec Space"
wherein candidates can announce their candidacy. Said
space shall be allocated, free of charge, equally and
impartially by the Commission among all candidates
within the area in which the newspaper is circulated.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 92. Comelec time. — The Commission shall procure
radio and television time to be known as "Comelec Time"
which shall be allocated equally and impartially among
the candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and
television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all
radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby
amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of
charge, during the period of the campaign.
Issue: Whether or not Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No.
6646, known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 is
unconstitutional.
Ruling: The court finds for the constitutionality of
Section 11.
The objective which animates Section 11 (b) is the
equalizing, as far as practicable, the situations of rich and
poor candidates by preventing the former from enjoying
the undue advantage offered by huge campaign "war
chests." Section 11 (b) prohibits the sale or donation of
print space and air time "for campaign or other political
purposes" except to the Commission on Elections
("Comelec"). Upon the other hand, Sections 90 and 92 of
the Omnibus Election Code require the Comelec to
procure "Comelec space" in newspapers of general
circulation in every province or city and "Comelec time"
on radio and television stations. Further, the Comelec is
statutorily commanded to allocate "Comelec space" and
"Comelec time" on a free of charge, equal and impartial
basis among all candidates within the area served by the
newspaper or radio and television station involved.
The Comelec has been expressly authorized by the
Constitution to supervise or regulate the enjoyment or
utilization of the franchises or permits for the operation
of media of communication and information. The
fundamental purpose of such "supervision or regulation"
has been spelled out in the Constitution as the ensuring of
"equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to
reply," as well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges
for the use of such media facilities, in connection with
"public information campaigns and forums among
candidates."
It is difficult to overemphasize the special importance of
the rights of freedom of speech and freedom of the press
in a democratic polity, in particular when they relate to
One of the basic state policies given constitutional rank by Article
II, Section 26 of the Constitution is the egalitarian demand that "the
State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service
and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law."
The essential question is whether or not the assailed legislative or
administrative provisions constitute a permissible exercise of the
power of supervision or regulation of the operations of
communication and information enterprises during an election
period, or whether such act has gone beyond permissible supervision
or regulation of media operations so as to constitute unconstitutional
repression of freedom of speech and freedom of the press. The Court
considers that Section 11 (b) has not gone outside the permissible
bounds of supervision or regulation of media operations during
election periods.
Firstly, Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability
and enforceability. By virtue of the operation of Article IX (C) (4)
of the Constitution, Section 11 (b) is limited in its applicability in
time to election periods. By its Resolution No. 2328 dated 2 January
1992, the Comelec, acting under another specific grant of authority
by the Constitution (Article IX [C] [9]), has defined the period from
12 January 1992 until 10 June 1992 as the relevant election period.
Secondly, and more importantly, Section 11 (b) is limited in its
scope of application. Analysis of Section 11 (b) shows that it
purports to apply only to the purchase and sale, including purchase
and sale disguised as a donation, 4 of print space and air time for
"campaign or other political purposes." Section 11 (b) does not
purport in any way to restrict the reporting by newspapers or radio
or television stations of news or newsworthy events relating to
candidates, their qualifications, political parties and programs of
government. Moreover, Section 11 (b) does not reach commentaries
and expressions of belief or opinion by reporters or broadcasters or
editors or commentators or columnists in respect of candidates, their
qualifications, and programs and so forth, so long at least as such
comments, opinions and beliefs are not in fact advertisements for
particular candidates covertly paid for. In sum, Section 11 (b) is not
to be read as reaching any report or commentary other coverage that,
in responsible media, is not paid for by candidates for political
office. We read Section 11 (b) as designed to cover only paid
political advertisements of particular candidates.
There is a third limitation upon the scope of application of Section
11 (b). Section 11 (b) exempts from its prohibition the purchase by
or donation to the Comelec of print space or air time, which space
and time Comelec is then affirmatively required to allocate on a fair
and equal basis, free of charge, among the individual candidates for
elective public offices in the province or city served by the
newspaper or radio or television station. Some of the petitioners are
apparently apprehensive that Comelec might not allocate "Comelec
time" or "Comelec space" on a fair and equal basis among the
several candidates. Should such apprehensions materialize,
candidates who are in fact prejudiced by unequal or unfair
allocations effected by Comelec will have appropriate judicial
remedies available, so long at least as this Court sits. Until such
time, however, the Comelec is entitled to the benefit of the
presumption that official duty will be or is being regularly carried
out.
5. DIOCESE OF BACOLOD vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 205728,
2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is
the subject of the present case.
This tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience Vote”
and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay”
with a check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an
“X” mark. The electoral candidates were classified
according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act
No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who
voted for the passing of the law were classified by
petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who
voted against it form “Team Buhay”:
During oral arguments, respondents conceded that the
tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any
candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin
contains names of candidates for the 2013 elections, but
not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH
Law but were not candidates for that election.
On February 22, 2013, respondent Atty. Mavil V.
Majarucon, in her capacity as Election Officer of Bacolod
City, issued a Notice to Remove Campaign Materials
addressed to petitioner Most Rev. Bishop Vicente M.
Navarra. The election officer ordered the tarpaulin’s
removal within three (3) days from receipt for being
oversized. COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 provides for
the size requirement of two feet (2’) by three feet (3’).
On February 25, 2013, petitioners replied requesting,
among others, that (1) petitioner Bishop be given a
definite ruling by COMELEC Law Department regarding
the tarpaulin; and (2) pending this opinion and the
availment of legal remedies, the tarpaulin be allowed to
remain.
On February 27, 2013, COMELEC Law Department
issued a letter ordering the immediate removal of the
tarpaulin; otherwise, it will be constrained to file an
election offense against petitioners.
Concerned about the imminent threat of prosecution for
their exercise of free speech, petitioners initiated this case
through this petition for certiorari and prohibition with
application for preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order.
Issue: Whether or not the notice and order issued by the
COMELEC to remove the tarpaulin posted by the
petitioners is a violation of freedom of speech and
expression.
Held: Yes, the issuance of notice and order for the
removal of the said tarpaulins are a violation of freedom
of speech and expression.
Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and
jurisprudence to support their position that they had the
power to regulate the tarpaulin. However, all of these
provisions pertain to candidates and political parties.
Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do they belong to
any political party. COMELEC does not have the
petitioners posted the tarpaulin as part of their advocacy against the
RH Law.
COMELEC’s general role includes a mandate to ensure equal
opportunities and reduce spending among candidates and their
registered political parties. It is not to regulate or limit the speech
of the electorate as it strives to participate in the electoral exercise.
What is involved in this case is the most sacred of speech forms:
expression by the electorate that tends to rouse the public to debate
contemporary issues. This is not speech by candidates or political
parties to entice votes. It is a portion of the electorate telling
candidates the conditions for their election. It is the substantive
content of the right to suffrage.
This is a form of speech hopeful of a quality of democracy that we
should all deserve. It is protected as a fundamental and primordial
right by our Constitution. The expression in the medium chosen by
petitioners deserves our protection.
6. RUBIN, SECRETARY OF TREASURY vs. COORS
BREWING CO.
Facts: Coors Brewing Co. (Coors) applied to the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms for an approval of proposed labels. The
approval was rejected because it violated the Federal Alcohol
Administration Act’s (FAAA) prohibition of disclosing the alcohol
content on beer labels or advertisements. Coors filed a claim arguing
the regulation violated the First Amendment’s protection of
commercial speech. The government argued the regulation was
necessary to prevent “strength wars” among brewers, which in this
case, refers to breweries competing on the basis of the potency of
their alcohol.
The district court found in favor of Coors, but the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the judgment and remanded
the case back to the district court. The district court subsequently
upheld the ban of alcohol content in advertising, but not on labels.
The government appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the
judgment of the lower court by concluding that the label ban did not
prevent strength wars.
Issue: Does the prohibition of displaying alcohol content on beer
labels violate the First Amendment’s protection of commercial
speech?
Ruling: Yes, the Court applied the test developed in the case of
Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. vs. Public Service
Commission, in which for a commercial speech to be within the First
Amendment, it ,must at least concern a.) a lawful activity and not
misleading, b.) whether the asserted governmental interest is
substantial, c.) whether the regulation directly advances the
governmental interest asserted and lastly d.) whether it is not more
extensive than necessary to serve that interest.
In this case, the interest which the government intended to protect
by banning the display of alcohol content on beer labels was to limit
the “strength wars” of competing beer companies, which could lead
to greater alcoholism. However, the Court concluded that this
interest was not substantial enough, since there was no reason to
believe that banning the alcoholic content on beer labels would
prevent such social harms. The regulation also does not directly
advance the suppression of strength wars, especially since other
Facts: Private respondent Francisco Wenceslao was
elected as an Executive Director, who wrote numerous
solicitation letters to the business community for the
support of the First National Conference on Land
Transportation whose objective is to draft an omnibus bill
that would embody a long-term land transportation policy
for presentation to Congress.
Petitioner Borjal published series of articles on different
dates in his column Jaywalker. The articles dealt with the
alleged anomalous activities of an “organizer of a
conference” without naming or identifying private
respondent not the FNCLT.
Private Respondent reacted to the articles insisting that he
was the “organizer” alluded to in the columns. He then
filed a criminal case for libel against the petitioners, but
the Assistant Prosecutor dismissed the case for
insufficiency of evidence. He then filed a civil action for
damages based on libel. The RTC decided in favor of
him. The CA affirmed the decision, since the newspaper
was of general circulation and that the privilege
characters of the articles was lost.
Ruling: Yes. A privileged communication may be either
absolutely privileged or qualifiedly privileged.
Absolutely privileged communication are those which are
not actionable even if the author has acted in bad faith.
Upon the other hand, qualifiedly privileged
communications containing defamatory imputations are
not actionable unless found to have been made without
good intention or justifiable motive.
The enumeration under Article 354 of the RPC is not an
exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged communications
since fair commentaries on matters of public interest are
likewise privileged. Fair commentaries on matters of
public interest are privileged and constitute a valid
defence in an action for libel or slander. The declared
objective of conference, the composition of its members
and participants, and the manner by which it was intended
to be funded no doubt lend to its activities as being
genuinely imbued with public interest.
8. EUGENIO LOPEZ and JUAN T. GATBONTON
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and FIDEL G. CRUZ
(G.R. No. L-26549; July 31, 1970)
Facts: The Manila Chronicle, a newspaper company of
which Eugenio Lopez is the publisher, printed a news
story about a sanitary inspector by the name of Fidel
Cruz, assigned to the Babuyan Islands, who was sending
a distress signal to a passing US Air Force plane which in
turn relayed the message to Manila. The message was that
the people in the place were living in terror due to a series
of killings committed since Christmas of 1955. The
Philippines defense sent a platoon of scout rangers, led by
Major Encarnacion, to the island. Upon arrival, the
soldiers did not find the alleged killers but rather, the
same man, Fidel Cruz, who merely wanted transportation
back to Manila. The incident was referred to as a hoax of
the year.
Fidel G. Cruz, a businessman contractor from Sta. Maria, Bulacan.
It turns out that while rushing to meet the newspaper’s deadline, the
photographs of the two were inadvertently switched. Upon
discovery of the error, petitioners published the two photographs
and proper corrections placed in a conspicuous place with bolder
font face to call the attention of the readers to the amends being
made.
Respondent Fidel G. Cruz sued the petitioners for the recovery of
damages alleging the defamatory character of the publication of his
picture. After trial, he was awarded a total of eleven thousand pesos
in damages, which was affirmed by the CA. The petitioners filed
this present petition, invoking a liberal construction of the
implications of press freedom, owning up to the mistake and
publishing a correction as an act of good faith should make them not
liable to pay for damages.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners, as members of the press, are
liable for libel in favor of private respondent.
Ruling: According to the standard treatise of Newell on Slander and
Libel: "Publication of a person's photograph in connection with an
article libelous of a third person, is a libel on the person whose
picture is published, where the acts set out in the article are imputed
to such person." For liability to arise then without offending press
freedom, there is this test to meet: "The constitutional guarantees
require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from
recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his
official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with
'actual malice' — that is, with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."
A newspaper, it is stressed, "should not be held to account to a point
of suppression for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of
words." Here there was no pressure of a daily deadline to meet no
occasion to act with haste as the picture of respondent was published
in a weekly magazine. Moreover, there is the added requirement of
reasonable care imposed by such decision which from the facts here
found, appeared not to be satisfied. It cannot be concluded then that
the plea of petitioners is sufficiently persuasive. The mandate of
press freedom is not ignored, but here it does not speak
unequivocally. It is not decisive of the basic issue. By itself, it does
not have a controlling significance. So we hold.
Petitioners would make much, likewise, of their correction, which
has all the force of a retraction, as a basis from being absolved from
any pecuniary responsibility. This rectification or clarification does
not wipe out the responsibility arising from the publication of the
first article, although it may and should mitigate it. The correction
promptly made by petitioners would thus call for a reduction in the
damages awarded.
9. IN RE: EMIL P. JURADO (A.M. No. 93-2-037 SC, April 6,
1995)
Facts: Emiliano P. Jurado, a lawyer-journalist wrote an alleged
improprieties and irregularities in the judiciary over several months.
What was particularly given attention by the Supreme Court was his
column entitled, "Who will judge the Justices?" referring to a report
that six justices, their spouses, children and grandchildren spent a
vacation in Hong Kong, and that luxurious hotel accommodations
and all their other expenses were paid by a public utility firm.
Issue: Whether or not Jurado’s right to press freedom and
free speech is violated.
Held: In here, Jurado’s actuations constitute contempt of
court, tending to degrade or abase the administration of
justice and the judges engaged in that function. He also
violated the Journalist’s Code of Ethics, in failing to exert
bona fide efforts to verify the accuracy of his information.
Thus, the Supreme Court said that false reports about a
public official or other person are not shielded from
sanction by the cardinal right to free speech in the
Constitution. Moreover, protection of the right of
individual persons to private reputations is also a matter
of public interest and must be reckoned with as a factor
in identifying and laying down the norms concerning the
exercise of press freedom and free speech.
10. PITA vs COURT OF APPEALS
Doctrine: Freedom of the press is not without restraint,
as the state has the right to protect society from
pornographic literature that is offensive to public morals.
Facts: Mayor Ramon Bagatsing pursued an Anti-Smut
Campaign with the purpose of seizing and confiscating
from dealers, distributors and others along Manila
sidewalks , magazine, publications and other reading
materials which they believe is obscene and indecent.
Upon conducting such campaign, they seized and burned
Pinoy Playboy magazines published by Pita. Pita alleged
that their publication is protected by the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of speech and the press.
Issue: Is the publication of the Pinoy Playboy magazine,
which regarded as obscene by the defendants, protected
by the guaranty of freedom of speech?
Ruling: No, the publication was made for commercial
purpose and not for the sake of satisfying the art taste of
any artist or critic. Thus, it is not included in the guaranty
of freedom of speech as it is obscene and immoral.
However, there is an illegal seizure committed by the
Anti-Smut Campaign as there is no judicial order
allowing such seizure and their failure to prove that there
is a clear and present danger upon the publication of the
said magazine.
11. BAYAN, et. al. vs. EDUARDO ERMITA, et. al.
(GR No. 169838; April 25, 2006)
Facts: The petitioners, Bayan, et al., alleged that they are
citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and that their
right as organizations and individuals were violated when
the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005 was
violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas
Pambansa No. 880.
Petitioners contended that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is
clearly a violation of the Constitution and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
the government. The words “lawful cause,” “opinion,” “protesting
or influencing” suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused
by the government. Also, the phrase “maximum tolerance” shows
that the law applies to assemblies against the government because
they are being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot
pass the strict scrutiny test. This petition and two other petitions
were ordered to be consolidated on February 14, 2006. During the
course of oral arguments, the petitioners, in the interest of a speedy
resolution of the petitions, withdrew the portions of their petitions
raising factual issues, particularly those raising the issue of whether
B.P. No. 880 and/or CPR is void as applied to the rallies of
September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005.

Issue: Whether the Calibrated Pre-emptive response and the Batas

Pambansa No. 880, specifically Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a) and 14(a)
violates Art. III Sec. 4 of the Philippine Constitution as it causes a
disturbing effect on the exercise by the people of the right to
peaceably assemble.

Held: Section 4 of Article III of the Philippine Constitution provides

that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of
expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. The
right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances,
together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, is
a right that enjoys dominance in the sphere of constitutional
protection. For this rights represent the very basis of a functional
democratic polity, without which all the other rights would be
meaningless and unprotected.

However, it must be remembered that the right, while sacrosanct, is

not absolute. It may be regulated that it shall not be injurious to the
equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the
rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the
exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the
sovereign “police power,” which is the power to prescribe
regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good
order or safety, and general welfare of the people.

B.P. No 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a

restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the
assemblies. B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds
of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to
“lawful cause” does not make it content-based because assemblies
really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be
“peaceable” and entitled to protection. Neither the words “opinion,”
“protesting,” and “influencing” in of grievances come from the
wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally,
maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyist
and is independent of the content of the expression in the rally.

Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear

and present danger to public order, public safety, public
convenience, public morals or public health. This is a recognized
exception to the exercise of the rights even under the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and The International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights.