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The general rule is that the vendee of land has no greater right, title, or interest than LABURADA V. LRA
his vendor; that he acquires the right which his vendor had, only. Under that rule the
vendee of the earlier certificate would be the owner as against the vendee of the It is settled that a land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the registration
owner of the later certificate of land already decreed in the name of another in an earlier land registration case. A
second decree for the same land would be null and void, since the principle behind
PINO VS CA the original registration is to register a parcel of land only once.
The rule applicable to this controversy is well-settled. Where the certificate of title is NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
in the name of the vendor when the land is sold, the vendee for value has the right to
rely on what appears on the certificate of title. In the absence of anything to excite or HEIRS OF LOPEZ V. DE CASTRO
arouse suspicion, said vendee is under no obligation to look beyond the certificate
and investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face of said certificate. The basic rule is that after the lapse of one (1) year, a decree of registration is no
CASIMIRO DEVELOPMENT VS MATEO longer open to review or attack although its issuance is attended with actual fraud.
This does not mean however that the aggrieved party is without a remedy at law. If
the property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value, an action for A probate court's jurisdiction is not limited to the determination of who the heirs are
reconveyance is still available. and what shares are due them as regards the estate of a deceased person. Neither is it
confined to the issue of the validity of wills. the main function of a probate court is
to settle and liquidate the estates of deceased persons either summarily or through
CUREG V. IAC the process of administration." Thus, its function necessarily includes the
examination of the properties, rights and credits of the deceased so as to rule on
The increase in the area of the petitioner’s land, being an accretion left by the change whether or not the inventory of the estate properly included them for purposes of
of course or the northward movement of the Cagayan River does not automatically distribution of the net assets of the estate of the deceased to the lawful heirs.
become registered land just because the lot which receives such accretion is covered
by a Torrens title. As such, it must also be placed under the operation of the Torrens It is settled that by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 892 the system of registration
system. under the Spanish Mortgage Law was abolished and all holders of Spanish titles or
grants should cause their lands covered thereby to be registered under the Land
Registration Act within six (6) months from the date of effectivity of the said
53
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. CA, HEIRS OF DEMOCRITO Decree or until August 16, 1976. Otherwise, non-compliance therewith will result
54
indubitable evidence of land ownership. Sec. 1. The system of registration under the
At any rate, registration does not vest title. It is merely evidence of such title. Our land Spanish Mortgage Law is discontinued, and all lands recorded under said system
registration laws do not give the holder any better title than what he actually has. When which are not yet covered by Torrens title shall be considered as unregistered lands.
the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of
law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY V. SPOUSES
certificate of title being issued. The Torrens system was not established as a means TIROL, ET. AL
for the acquisition of title to private land, as it merely confirms, but does not confer
ownership. well-settled is the rule that registration of instruments must be done in the proper
registry in order to effect and bind the land. Prior to the Property Registration Decree
of 1978, Act No. 496 (or the Land Registration Act) governed the recording of
CUENCO V. VDA DE MANGUERRA transactions involving registered land, i.e., land with a Torrens title. On the other hand,
Act No. 3344, as amended, provided for the system of recording of transactions over
Although tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive unregistered real estate without prejudice to a third party with a better right.
evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the
concept of owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property Accordingly, if a parcel of land covered by a Torrens title is sold, but the sale is
that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession." Such realty tax payments registered under Act No. 3344 and not under the Land Registration Act, the sale is not
constitute proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. considered registered and the registration of the deed does not operate as constructive
LEE HONG KOK V. DAVID notice to the whole world.
A holder of a land acquired under a free patent is more favorably situated than INDEFEASIBILITY OF TITLE, PRESCRIPTION,
that of an owner of registered property. Not only does a free patent have a force and PROHIBITION AGAINST COLLATERAL ATTACK
effect of a Torrens Title, but in addition the person to whom it is granted has likewise
in his favor the right to repurchase within a period of five years (Cabacug v. Lao). CARAAN V. CA
Only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands, or the Secretary of “…an action is an attack on a title when the object of the action or proceeding is to
Agriculture and Natural Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void certificate nullify the title, and thus challenge the judgment pursuant to which the title was
of title issued pursuant to a void patent. decreed. The attack is direct when the object of an action or proceeding is to annul or
set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is
indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the
INTESTATE ESTATE OF MARIANO SAN PEDRO V. CA judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof.”
Indefeasibility of Title JAVIER V. CONCEPCION
It should be borne in mind, however, that Section 48, Presidential Decree No. 1529
(P.D. No. 1529), provides that "a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral Under sec 38 of Land Registration Act: the person allegedly deprived of the land by
attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in a decree of registration under fraud should file in the CFI a petition for review w/in
accordance with law." 1 yr. after the entry of the decree, provided no innocent purchaser for value has
acquired an interest.
DE GUZMAN V. AGBAGALA The rule is one cannot acquire title to a registered land by prescription or adverse
possession. There are no intervening rights of 3rd persons w/c may be affected by a
Indeed, a decree of registration or patent and the certificate of title issued pursuant decision directing the return of Lot 12 to Chua et. al. The defense of laches will not
thereto may be attacked on the ground of falsification or fraud within one year from apply in this case.
the date of their issuance. Such an attack must be direct and not by a collateral
proceeding.
MADRID V. SPS. MARTINEZ
However, the principle of indefeasibility does not apply when the patent and the title Registration of land under the Torrens system, aside from perfecting the title and
based thereon are null and void. An action to declare the nullity of a void title does rendering it indefeasible after the lapse of the period allowed by law, also renders
not prescribe and is susceptible to direct, as well as to collateral, attack. the title immune from collateral attack. A collateral attack transpires when, in
another action to obtain a different relief and as an incident of the present action, an
HEIRS OF MAXIMO LABANON V. HEIRS OF CONSTANCIO LABANON attack is made against the judgment granting the title.
Section 32 of PD 1529 merely precludes the reopening of the registration proceedings To permit a collateral attack on respondents-plaintiffs’ title is to water down the
for titles covered by the Torrens System, but does not foreclose other remedies for the integrity and guaranteed legal indefeasibility of a Torrens title.
re-conveyance of the property to its rightful owner. REGALIAN DOCTRINE
Thus, Maximo Labanon maintained the title over theproperty while acknowledging RIGHT OF POSSESSION FROM TITLE
the true ownership of Constancio Labanon over the eastern portion of the land. The ARANDA V. REPUBLIC
existence of an express trust cannotbe doubted nor disputed.In relation to the issue of
prescription, unrepudiated express trusts do not prescribe. As a rule, tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, nevertheless they are good indicia of possession in the concept
of owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not
In the case at bar, Maximo Labanon never repudiated the expresstrust instituted in his actual or constructive possession. Petitioner thus failed to meet the quantum of
between him and Constancio Labanon. And after Maximo Labanon's death, the trust proof required by law and his petition must be denied.
could no longer be renounced; thus, respondent’s right to enforce the trust agreement
can no longer be restricted nor prejudiced by prescription. LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY REGISTRIES OF DEEDS
CARBONILLA V. ABIERA
LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING CO. V. DUMYUNG To set the record straight, while petitioner may have proven his ownership
It is well settled that a certificate of title is void when it covers property of public of the land, as there can be no other piece of evidence more worthy of
domain classified as forest or timber and mineral lands. Any title issued on non- credence than a Torrens certificate of title, he failed to present any evidence
disposable lots even in the hands of alleged innocent purchaser for value. to substantiate his claim of ownership or right to the possession of the
building.
However, the original JVA dated April 25, 1995 covered not only the Under Section 44 of P.D. 1529, every registered owner receiving a certificate
Freedom Islands and the additional 250 hectares still to be reclaimed, it also of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent
granted an option to AMARI to reclaim another 350 hectares. The original purchaser of registered land taking a certificate of title for value and in good
JVA, a negotiated contract, enlarged the reclamation area to 750 hectares. faith, shall hold the same free from all encumbrances except those noted on
The failure of public bidding on December 10, 1991, involving only 407.84 the certificate and any of the encumbrances which may be subsisting, and
hectares, is not a valid justification for a negotiated sale of 750 hectares, enumerated in the law.
almost double the area publicly auctioned.
CAJAYON V. SPOUSES BATUYONG
To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred
to PEA as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional It is doctrinal in land registration law that possession of titled property
ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the adverse to the registered owner is necessarily tainted with bad faith. Thus,
public domain. This scheme can even be applied to alienable agricultural proceeding with the construction works on the disputed lot despite knowledge
lands of the public domain since PEA can "acquire . . . any and all kinds of of respondents’ ownership put petitioners in bad faith.
lands."
In a decided case, this court has already held that the owner of the land in
JOCSON V. SORIANO
whose favor and in whose name said land is registered and inscribed in the
Act 1120 provides that the title remains with the government until full
certificate of title has more preferential right to the possession of
payment of the purchased price. Section 16 provides that in case of death of
the owners’ duplicate than one whose name does not appear in the certificate
purchaser , prior to completion, his widow shall be entitled to receive a deed
and has yet to establish his right to the possession thereto.
of the land stated in the certificate upon showing that she has complied with
the requirements of law for the purchase of the same. . .” The character of the
right of Silvestre was analogous to a homesteader. Act No. 926, provides or
homesteads. Section 3 provides that “in the event of the death of the applicant Under paragraph (b) of Section 48, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended
for a homestead prior to the issuance of a patent (title), his widow shall be by Republic Act No. 1942, the applicant must prove that: (a) he or his
entitled to have a patent for the land applied issued to her” upon a proper predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
showing, and until a final title or patent is issued for the land to the applicant notirious possession and occupation of an agricultural land of the public
the Government remains the owner. domain; (b) such possession and occupation must be for a least thirty (30)
years preceding the filing of the application; and (c) such possession and
SPOUSES VIRGILIO DE GUZMAN, JR. V. COURT OF APPEALS occupation must be under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.
Section 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public
Land Act, prohibits the alienation or encumbrance of lands acquired under
free patent or homestead within a period of five years from the date of PADILLA V. REYES
issuance of the patent. it is well-settled that no public land can be acquired by private persons
without any grant, express or implied, from the government. A grant is
It is well-known that the homestead laws were designed to distribute conclusively presumed by law when the claimant, by himself or through his
disposable agricultural lots of the State to land-destitute citizens for their predecessors in interest, has occupied the land openly, continuously,
home and cultivation. Pursuant to such benevolent intention the State exclusively, and under a claim of title since July 26, 1894, or prior thereto.
prohibits the sale or encumbrance of the homestead (Section 116) within five
years after the grant of the patent. It aims to preserve and keep in the family HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN V. REPUBLIC OF THE
of the homesteader that portion of public land which the State had PHILIPPINES
gratuitously given to him. Under Section 124 of the Public Land Act, any Petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and
acquisition, conveyance, alienation, transfer, or other contract made or their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land since June
executed in violation of Sections 118 to 123 of the Public Land Act shall be 12, 1945. Without satisfying the requisite character and period of possession
unlawful and null and void from its execution. – possession and occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier – the land cannot be considered
TINGALAN V. SPOUSES RONALDO MELLIZA ipso jure converted to private property even upon the subsequent declaration
The subject contract of sale, being null and void from inception, did not pass of it as alienable and disposable.
any rights over the property from petitioner Anastacio to respondent-spouses.
Since petitioner Anastacio never lost ownership over the land in question, Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the land has
there was no need for him or his heirs to repurchase the same from remained ineligible for registration under Section 14(1) of the Property
respondent-spouses. With nothing to repurchase, laches could operate to bar Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be ineligible for land
petitioner and his heirs from asserting their rights to the property registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree unless
Congress enacts a law or the President issues a proclamation declaring the
DIRECTOR OF LANDS V. SARMIENTO land as no longer intended for public service or for the development of the
While it is true that tax receipts and declarations are not incontrovertible national wealth.
evidence of ownership, they constitute at least proof that the holder has a
claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of LUZVIMINDA CANLAS V. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
property for taxation purposes manifests not only one's sincere and honest An applicant for land registration or judicial confirmation of incomplete or
desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against imperfect title under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 must
the State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute
prove the following requisites:"(1) that the subject land forms part of the
needed revenues to the Government.
disposable and alienable lands of the public domain, and (2) that [the
applicant has] been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession ATUN V. EUSEBIO
and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945, or earlier." Section 46 of Act 496 expressly provides that no title to registered land in
derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession. This Court has repeatedly held that the right of the
Section 14 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration registered owner be recover possession of the registered property is equally
Decree governs the applications for registration of title to land: imprescriptible, since possession is a mere consequence of ownership. And if
prescription is unavailing against the registered owner, it must be equally
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper unavailing against the latter’s hereditary successors’ because they merely step
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether into the shoes of the decedent by operation of law (new Civil Code, Art. 777;
personally or through their duly authorized representatives: Art. 657, old), the title or right undergoing no change by its transmission
mortis causa.
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation The rule is settled that the legal heirs of a deceased may file an action arising
of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide out of a right belonging to their ancestor, without a separate judicial
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. declaration of their status as such, provided there is no pending special
proceeding for the settlement of the decedent’s estate
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription
under the provision of existing laws.
HEIRS OF SEGUNDA MANINGDING VS CA
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river While prescription among co-owners cannot take place when the acts of
beds by right of accession or accretion under the existing laws. ownership exercised are vague and uncertain, such prescription arises and
produces all its effects when the acts of ownership do not evince any doubt
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided as to the ouster of the rights of the other co-owners.
for by law. Where the land is owned in common, all the co-owners shall file
the application jointly. As disclosed by the records, Roque Bauzon and his heirs possessed the
property from 1948 to 1986 to the exclusion of petitioners who were never
given their shares of the fruits of the properties, for which reason they
PALOMO V. COURT OF APPEALS
demanded an accounting of the produce and the conveyance to them of their
It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot shares. Unfortunately they slept on their rights and allowed almost thirty-six
be owned by private persons. It is not registrable and possession thereof, no (36) years to lapse before attempting to assert their right. Perforce, they must
matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into private property, unless such lands suffer the consequence of their inaction.
are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable.
HODGES V. GARCIA
Neither do the tax receipts which were presented in evidence prove ownership The fact that the accretion to his land used to pertain to plaintiff’s estate,
of the parcels of land inasmuch as the weight of authority is that tax which is covered by a Torrens certificate of title, cannot preclude him
declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership in land registration cases. (Garcia) from being the owner thereof. Registration does not protect the
As correctly pointed out by the respondent Court of Appeals, the principle of riparian owner against the diminution of the area of his land through gradual
estoppel does not operate against the Government for the act of its agents. changes in the course of the adjoining stream. Accretions which the banks of
rivers may gradually receive from the effect of the current become the in one’s favor does not give him any right over the land if the vendor was not
property of the owners of the banks. anymore the owner of the land having previously sold the same to somebody
else even if the earlier sale was unrecorded.
CHAVEZ vs. PEA
Since the Amended Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) seeks to transfer to
JUANITA NAVAL VS CA
AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares110 of the
Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article The law applicable therefore is Act No. 3344, which provides for the
XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from registration of all instruments on land neither covered by the Spanish
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Also, since the Mortgage Law nor the Torrens System. Under this law, registration by the
Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 first buyer is constructive notice to the second buyer that can defeat his right
hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for as such buyer in good faith.
being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which Even if petitioner argues that she purchased and registered the subject land in
prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of good faith and without knowledge of any adverse claim thereto, respondents
the public domain. still have superior right over the disputed property.
PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can It is an established principle that no one can give what one does not have,
classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare nemo dat quod non habet. Accordingly, one can sell only what one owns or
them no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such is authorized to sell, and the buyer can acquire no more than what the seller
reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in can transfer legally. In the case at bar, since Ildefonso no longer owned the
view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987Constitution which prohibits subject land at the time of the sale to the petitioner, he had nothing to sell and
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public the latter did not acquire any right to it.
domain.
SPOUSES ABRIGO V. ROMANA DE VERA BAYOCA V. NOGALES
In a decided case, the court held that that registration must be done in the Art. 1544. Of the Civil Code governs the preferential rights of vendees in
proper registry in order to bind the land. Since the property in dispute in the cases of multiple sales which provides that “if the same thing should have
present case was already registered under the Torrens system, petitioners’ been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the
registration of the sale under Act 3344 was not effective for purposes of person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should
Article 1544 of the Civil Code. be movable property.
The Court upheld the right of a party who had registered the sale of land under Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person
the Property Registration Decree, as opposed to another who had registered acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
a deed of final conveyance under Act 3344.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who
RADIOWEALTH FINANCE CO. V. PALILEO in good faith was first in possession; and in the absence thereof, to the person
who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.”
Under Act No. 3344, registration of instruments affecting unregistered lands
is “without prejudice to a third party with a better right”. The aforequoted
phrase has been held by this Court to mean that the mere registration of a sale ADMINISTRATIVE METHOD OF REGISTRATION
A. HOMESTEAD PATENT The title to the land is therefore fully as well settled and adjudicated, within
B. FREE PATENT the meaning of the Cadastral Act, by a final decree in an ordinary land
C. RESIDENTIAL FREE PATENT, RA NO. 10023 registration case as it would be by a similar decree in cadastral case and,
D. COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW (CARL) obviously, it cannot have been the intention of the Legislature to provide a
OR RA 6657 special proceeding for the settlement and adjudication of titles already settled
E. INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ RIGHT ACT (IPRA) OR RA 8371 and adjudicated. It is, indeed, more than doubtful if the Legislature. would
have the power to enact such a provision had it so desired; the landholder
who possesses a settled and adjudicated title to his land cannot be deprived
BALBOA V. FARRALES of that title through another settlement and adjudication of a similar
Section 116 of Act No. 2874, which prohibits the sale of homestead land characterThe intention of the Legislature to exclude land already registered
during the period of five years subsequent to the issuance of the patent or form the operation of the Cadastral Act is further indicated by the provision
certificate of title upon which rests the decision of the court a quo, cannot be of section 18 of the Act to the effect that, no apportionment of any part of the
invoked to annul the sale in question. Said prohibition, if applied in the costs and expenses of cadastral proceedings can be made against such lands.
present case, would impair and diminish the vested rights acquired under Act
No. 926, contrary to the uniform doctrine followed in the United States, and HEIRS OF TENGCO V. HEIRS OF ALIWALAS
in violation of the express provisions of section 3 of the Jones Law. The rule is well-settled that an original certificate of title issued on the
strength of a homestead patent partakes of the nature of a certificate of title
The right, title and interest of the appellant having become vested under the issued in a judicial proceeding, as long as the land disposed of is really part
provisions of Act No. 926, his rights cannot be affected by any law passed of the disposable land of the public domain, and becomes indefeasible and
subsequent thereto. incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of the
promulgation of the order of the Director of Lands for the issuance of the
YBAÑEZ V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT patent.
It must be emphasized that a certificate of title issued under an administrative
proceeding pursuant to a homestead patent, as in the instant case, is as As correctly pointed out by the respondent Court of Appeals, Dr. Aliwalas'
indefeasible as a certificate of title issued under a judicial registration title to the property having become incontrovertible, such may no longer be
proceeding, provided the land covered by said certificate is a disposable collaterally attacked. If indeed there had been any fraud or misrepresentation
public land within the contemplation of the Public Land Law. in obtaining the title, an action for reversion instituted by the Solicitor
General would be the proper remedy.
In the instant case, the public land certificate of title issued to private
respondent attained the status of indefeasibility one (1) year after the issuance CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS AND QUALIFICATIONS
of patent on April 15, 1963, hence, it is no longer open to review on the
ground of actual fraud. CHEESMAN V. IAC
RAMOSO V. OBLIGADO The fundamental law prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land.
Accordingly, the order of registration issued by the cadastral court in favor Section14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution ordains that, "Save in cases
of the widow is null and void, and, consequently, no valid transfer could have of hereditary succession, no private land shall be transferred or conveyed
been made by her in favor of the petitioner, Armesto Ramos. In other words, except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or
the latter has no right to the property. hold lands of the public domain." Petitioner Thomas Cheesman was, of
course, charged with knowledge of this prohibition.
PAMINTUAN V. SAN AGUSTIN
MULLER V. MULLER JG SUMMIT HOLDINGS, INC. V. CA
Respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is the fact that PHILSECO owns land cannot deprive stockholders of their right
clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the of first refusal. No law disqualifies a person from purchasing shares in a
constitutional prohibition. landholding corporation even if the latter will exceed the allowed foreign
equity, what the law disqualifies is the corporation from owning land.
Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified from acquiring
lands of the public domain. Hence, they are also disqualified from acquiring The right of first refusal is a property right of PHILSECO shareholders,
private lands. The primary purpose of the constitutional provision is the KAWASAKI and NIDC, under the terms of their JVA. This right allows them
conservation of the national patrimony. to purchase the shares of their co-shareholder before they are offered to a
third party. The agreement of co-shareholders to mutually grant this right to
PHIL BANKING CORP V. LUI SHE each other, by itself, does not constitute a violation of the provisions of the
Constitution limiting land ownership to Filipinos and Filipino corporations.
The contracts show nothing that is necessarily illegal, but considered
collectively, they reveal an insidious patter to subvert by indirection what the
Constitution directly prohibits. To be sure, a lease to an alien for a reasonable RD OF RIZAL V. UNG SIU TEMPLE
period is valid, so is the option giving him the right to buy the property.
The fact that appellant has no capital stock does not exempt it from the
RAMIREZ V. VDA DE RAMIREZ Constitutional inhibition, since its member are of foreign nationality. The
purpose of the 60% requirement is to ensure that corporations or associations
The Constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire private lands allowed to acquire agricultural lands or to exploit natural resources shall be
does not extend to testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will controlled by Filipinos; and the spirit of the Constitution demands that in the
be for naught and meaningless. Any alien would be able to circumvent the absence of capital stock, controlling membership should be composed of
prohibition by paying money to a Philippine landowner in exchange for Filipino citizens.
devise of a piece of land. Notwithstanding this, the Court upholds the usufruct
in favour of Wanda because a usufruct does not vest title to the land in the ROMAN CATHOLIC APOSTOLIC ADMINISTRATOR OF DAVAO
usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to aliens which is proscribed by the V. LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSION
Constitution.
The bishops or archbishops, as the case may be, as corporation's sole are
merely administrators of the church properties that come to their possession,
TING HO JR. V. TENG GUI in which they hold in trust for the church. It could be seen that a corporation
sole is created not only to administer the temporalities of the church or
In the present case, the father of petitioners and respondent was a Chinese religious society where he belongs but also to hold and transmit the same to
citizen; therefore, he was disqualified from acquiring and owning real his successor in said office.
property in the Philippines. In fact, he was only occupying the subject lot by
virtue of the permission granted him by the then U.S. Naval Reservation
Office of Olongapo, Zambales. As correctly found by the CA, the deceased
Felix Ting Ho was never the owner of the subject lot in light of the
constitutional proscription and the respondent did not at any instance act as
the dummy of his father.