Romasanta, Ian Joshua P.

2013055978 – 1H – LTL
Atty. Pagaduan

MEMORANDUM OF LAW
TO: Mr. Mario Castello
FROM: Mr. Ian Joshua P. Romasanta
DATE: June 14, 2019
RE: The Accident on Congressional Avenue

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Brendon, who was enrolled in Best Drive Learning School,
was driving a Toyota owned by the driving school with his
instructor Ferdinand along Congressional Avenue when the
Toyota collided with another vehicle. He suffered minor
injuries.
Dianne, who was the driver of the other vehicle, suffered
serious injuries. She refused to have blood transfusion for
religious reasons despite the pleadings of the doctors. She died
as a result.
Felix, who was the passenger of Diane, also suffered serious
injuries that severely damaged his reproductive organ. He
became depressed and jumped from his hospital room window
and died.
Ferdinand also suffered serious injuries that damaged his
two kidneys. He then contracted with Brendon to give him his
kidney if it is compatible as his compensation for the injuries
he suffered.
Brendon’s kidneys were found to be compatible with
Ferdinand. However, Brendon’s wife did not want him to
comply and would be filing a Complaint for the Nullification of
the agreement.

II. QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Who can be held liable for the accident suffered
by Dianne? Brendon and/or Ferdinand, and/or
the driving school?
2. What is the extent of the liability of any, some or
all of the three persons mentioned above in
connection with the accident suffered by Dianne?
3. Is the fact that the Dianne refused blood
transfusion, which thereby caused her death due
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 to blood loss, material to the computation of
damages that can be recovered?
4. Who can be held liable for the accident suffered
by Felix? Brendon and/or Ferdinand, and/or the
driving school?
5. What is the extent of the liability of any, some or
all of the three persons mentioned above in
connection with the accident suffered by Felix?
6. Is the fact that the Felix chose to commit suicide
material to the computation of damages that can
be recovered?
7. Who can be held liable for the accident suffered
by Ferdinand?
8. Can the driving school hold Brendon liable for the
damage caused to the Toyota Fortuner?
9. Is the fact the student drivers can be foreseen to
cause accidents while learning how to drive
material for purposes of who can be held liable
for damages and the extent of damages that can
be recovered?
10.What possible defenses may Brendon raise in
order to partially or fully negate his liability, if
any, against Ferdinand and/or the driving school?
11.Is the Agreement between Brendon and
Ferdinand valid and enforceable?
12.Does Nadine have legal standing to ask for the
nullification of the aforesaid Agreement?
13.Can Nadine ask Brendon to be legally prohibited
from giving one of his kidneys to Ferdinand?

III. BRIEF ANSWERS

1. The Best Drive Learning School can be held liable
for the injuries suffered by Dianne because of the
vicarious liability of employers.
2. The liability of whoever was proven to be
negligent will cover actual damages and moral
damages.
3. Yes, it is material to the computation of damages
to be recovered. This is because the
compensation for the actual damages will differ if
Diane was able to stay alive.
4. The Best Drive Learning School can be held liable
for the injuries suffered by Dianne because of the
vicarious liability of employers.
5. The liability of whoever was proven to be
negligent will cover actual damages.
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 6. Yes, because the suicide of Felix himself was the
proximate cause of his death.
7. If it can be shown that it was Brendon who was
really negligent one, Brendan can be held liable.
However, if it was Ferdinand himself who had the
negligent act that caused the accident, no one
can be held liable.
8. Yes, if it was shown and proven by the driving
school that Brendon was the negligent one in
causing the accident. Otherwise, the driving
school cannot claim from Brendon.
9. Yes, this is because Brendon was only a student
and cannot be expected to drive the car carefully
like a licensed driver. This is of course dependent
to the determination of who was really negligent.
10.Brendon can raise the exempting circumstance of
accident, this will fully remove his criminal and
civil liability if he can prove it. If Brendan can
prove the negligence of the instructor, he can
pass the liability to the latter.
11.No, the agreement between Brendon and
Ferdinand is void because it has for its object a
thing outside the commerce of men. Also, the
cause of the contract was for the compensation
for the injuries suffered by Ferdinand, this is void
because damages cannot be paid in kind.
12.Yes, Nadine, as a spouse, has the interest to the
well-being of her husband.
13.Yes, Nadine has the interest to the well-being of
her husband.

IV. DISCUSSION
ISSUES 1 & 4

This accident is governed by the Chapter 2 of Title XVII

of The New Civil Code of the Philippines or the Quasi-Delicts.
Article 2176 states that:

“Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,

there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of
this Chapter.”

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 The accident that happened last May 10, 2019 is a quasi-
delict. The prime element of this is the negligence that caused
damage. The negligence however be the proximate cause of
that damage. The injured parties Diane Somera and Felix
Bocobo can demand compensation or damages for the
damage done to them from Ferdinand Lopez and Best Drive
Learning School.

The damages can be demanded not only from the

person who acted negligently but also from the one whom this
person is responsible for. This is the doctrine of vicarious
liability or imputed negligence provided for by Article 2180:

“The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable

not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for
those of persons whom one is responsible.

xxx

Employers shall be liable for damages caused by their

employees and household helpers acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former
are not engaged in any business or industry.

xxx

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease

when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father or a family to
prevent damage.”

The rationale of this vicarious liability is discussed in the

case of Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co., the Court stated that
“this moral responsibility may consist in having failed to
exercise due care in one’s own acts, or in having failed to
exercise due care in the selection and control of persons who,
by reasons of their status, occupy a position of dependency
with respect to the person made liable for their conduct.”

In Metro Manila Transit Corporation vs Court of Appeals,

it is further expressed:

The responsibility imposed arises by virtue of a

rebuttable presumption of negligence on the part of the
persons made responsible under this article, derived from their
failure to exercise due care and vigilance over the acts of
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subordinates to prevent them from causing damage.
Negligence is imputed to them by law, unless they prove the
contrary.

In this case, an employer is liable for the quasi-delicts

committed by his employees. It is first necessary to establish
the employer-employee relationship. Once this is done, the
plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable, that the
employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task
when the tort complained of was committed in order to make
him liable. (Martin vs. Court of Appeals)

If the offended party will file a civil action anchored in

Article 2180, the liability of the employer Best Drive Learning
School is direct, solidary, and immediate. This will however be
rebutted if the driving school was able to prove the diligence
and vigilance set forth by the last paragraph of such article.

ISSUE 2

The liability of whoever was proven to be negligent will

cover actual damages and moral damages. The heirs of Diane
can recover from the defendant the proven pecuniary loss.

Article 2199 to 2215 of the Civil Code covers Actual and

Compensatory Damages.

Article 2199 provides:

Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is

entitled to an adequate compensation only for such
pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved.
Such compensation is referred to as actual or
compensatory damages.

The indemnification of actual and compensatory

damages shall not only include the total proven value of the
loss, but also that of the profits that the offended party failed
to realize because of the accident as embodied by Article 2200.

The liability of the defendant also covers the earning

capacity of the deceased and support of his spouse and
children which is also what is contained in the provisions of
Article 2206 of the Civil Code which provides:

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 The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or
quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pesos, even
though there may have been mitigating circumstances.
In addition:

(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the

earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity
shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity
shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the
court, unless the deceased on account of permanent
physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no
earning capacity at the time of his death;

(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according

to the provisions of Article 291, the recipient who is not
an heir called to the decedent’s inheritance by the law
of testate or intestate succession, may demand support
from the person causing the death, for a period not
exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by
the court;

(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants

and ascendants, of the deceased may demand moral
damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of
the deceased.

In an action based on torts, actual damages include all

the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission
complained of.

Article 2202 of the Civil Code states that “in crimes and
quasi-delicts, the defendants shall be liable of all damages
which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or
omission complained of. It is not necessary that such damages
have been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen
by the defendant.”

The liability of the defendant will also extend to cover

moral damages. Moral damages does not require proof of
pecuniary loss as it is merely based on the internal state of a
person’s body and mind. These are awarded to give
compensation to such injuries incapable of pecuniary
estimation like mental anguish, sleepless nights, anxiety,
trauma, wounded feelings, besmirched reputation, social
humiliation, and physical suffering.

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 ISSUE 3

The refusal of Diane Somera to undergo blood

transfusion is material to the determination of the damages
that can be recovered from the liable persons. The blood
transfusion procedure had a chance of 90% that would have
saved her life. This is because death is also material to the
determination of the damages that can be recovered by the
heirs of Somera.

For if she underwent blood transfusion, the cost of that

medical procedure and the sequential hospitalization bills and
rehabilitation process fees will add up to the determination
and computation of the actual damages that can be claimed
and recovered from the negligent defendant. The loss will
obviously be much different had Diane accepted the procedure
and went to be able to stay alive. The computation on the loss
of earning capacity and support as well as the moral damages
that can be recovered will also be different if Diane did not die.

Somera’s death was the natural, logical, and direct

consequence of the accident that happened. The accident was
the proximate cause contemplated by the law on torts but the
refusal to undergo blood transfusion was critical and material
to determine the damages that can be recovered.

In Mckee vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, proximate

cause has been defined as “that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would
not have occured. And more comprehensively, the proximate
logical cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each
having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting
the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which
first acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent
and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at
the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person
might probably result therefrom.”

In proving that the negligence done was the proximate

cause of the damage suffered by Diane, the burden is on the

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one alleging it. If negligence cannot be established, there can
be no damages.
However, the fact that the victim would have lived had
he received appropriate medical attention is immaterial in the
criminal liability. It does not relieve the offender of a criminal
liability for the death of the victim. This ruling is based on the
proximate cause doctrine embodied in Article 4 of the Revised
Penal Code. (People vs. Sto. Domingo; People vs. Flores)

ISSUE 5

The negligent defendant is only liable to the actual and

compensatory damages for the physical injuries that Felix
Bocobo suffered.

The accident was not the proximate cause of the death

of Bocobo. His death was caused by the suicide by jumping off
the hospital room. Because of this, the defendant, which is the
one proven to be negligent, is only liable to the actual and
compensatory damages. It will not cover moral damages
according to Article 2206, which only gives moral damages in
case of death due to the negligent act or omission. Again, the
death was caused by Bocobo’s own act.

The loss of earning capacity will be computed as if

Bocobo was still alive and will be based on the discretion of the
court.

ISSUE 6

No, the commission of suicide by Felix Bocobo will not

be material for the computation of damages because this was
caused not by the negligent act of the defendant, but the
deceased’s own.

Article 2203 of the Civil Code provides:

The party suffering loss or injury must exercise the

diligence of a good father of a family to minimize the
damages resulting from the act or omission in question.

This means that the injured party must take good care
not to aggravate the damage done to him. This is because
some people might use this to abuse and aggravate his own
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injuries just to extort more compensation in the form of
“damages”. This article aims to prevent such immoral act. It is
the doctrine of avoidable consequences.

Under the doctrine of avoidable consequences, a party

cannot recover damages flowing from the consequences that
the party could reasonably have avoided. This is in fact the
intervening cause that breaks the proximate cause doctrine.
The defendant will only be liable to the proximate, logical,
direct, and natural consequences of his negligent act or
omission. Obviously, unfortunate as it may seem, the suicide is
not that.

The reason why this doctrine is not applicable to the

death of Diane is that the refusal of the blood transfusion was
not the proximate cause—meaning the injuries she suffered
may necessarily result to her death, it cannot be considered a
sufficient intervening cause that would have broken its
consequentiality. Furthermore, the refusal was based on
reasonable basis as it was prohibited by her religion.

ISSUE 7

As mentioned above, the negligence is needed to be

proven to impute a person to a liability for damages. If it was
proven that it was Brendon who committed negligent acts or
omissions, then damages arising from his act will be demanded
from him. This is also true for the injury suffered by Felix and
the death of Diane.

If there was a contributory negligence on the part of

Ferdinand and the immediate and proximate cause of the
injury he suffered was because of Brendon or the driving
school, he can still recover the damages, but the court shall
mitigate accordingly. Contributory negligence has been
defined in Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. vs. Court of Appeals as “the
act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the part
of the person injured which, concurring with the defendant’s
negligence, is the proximate cause of the injury.”

If the negligent act was done by Ferdinand Lopez

himself, nobody will be held liable for his own injuries. This is
obviously because no one will be blamed if the one who
blames is the sole reason of his injury. Ferdinand is barred

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from recovering damages that was caused by his sole
negligence.
Article 2179 of the Civil Code states that “when the
plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate
cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages.”

Best Drive Learning School can also be liable for the

injury suffered by Ferdinand and Brendon. This is so if it is
proven that the driving school was negligent on not foreseeing
the danger or harm in the work of Ferdinand considering that
their customers are students who are still learning how to
drive. It can be contended by Ferdinand that the driving school
did negligently failed to employ proper safety measures to
prevent the injuries that can be foreseeably caused by an
accident. In this case, the driving school shall be liable for
damages accordingly discussed above.

ISSUE 8 & 9

The fact that student drivers can be foreseen to cause

accidents while learning how to drive is material for purposes
of who can be held liable for damages and the extent of
damages that can be recovered. This is because the students
are not expected to have the skills of a licensed driver and with
that, the instructor assumes greater liability because he is the
one who is not only the one who has better knowledge on how
to drive but also the task and responsibility over the actions
and conduct of the student while driving.

Generally, student drivers who are enrolled in driving

schools are not liable for the accident the former may cause to
the latter’s vehicle. This is the so-called assumption of risk. It
presupposes that one is voluntarily exposing himself of a
known peril. This is where one who voluntarily assumes the
risk may not later ask for damages. (Menchavez vs. Teves, Jr.)

Again, however, if it can be shown that it was Brendon

who was gravely negligent in handling that car as a student,
the liability to the Toyota Fortuner would be imputed upon
him. The driving school have the burden of proving such
negligence.

ISSUE 10

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 Brendon can raise the exempting circumstance of
accident. This contemplates a situation where a person is in
fact in the act of doing something legal, exercising due care,
diligence and prudence, but in the process produces harm or
injury to someone or something not in the least mind of the
actor—an accidental result flowing out of a legal act.
(Talampas vs. People). This will either fully or partially negate
his liability depending on the evidence presented.

Brendon can also contend that Diane had the last clear
chance of avoiding the accident. Under the doctrine of last
clear chance, a person who has the last clear chance or
opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the
negligent acts of his opponent or the negligence of a third
person which is imputed to his opponent, is considered in law
solely responsible for the consequences of the accident. (Ong
vs. Metropolitan Water District) This will fully relieve Brendan
the liability and impute Diane as the sole negligent actor in the
accident.

Brendon can also raise the emergency rule. Under the

emergency rule, one who suddenly finds himself in a place of
danger, and is required to act without time to consider the
best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending
danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what
subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a
better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself
is brought about by his own negligence. (Gan vs. Court of
Appeals)

ISSUE 11
The agreement between Brendon and Ferdinand is void
and inexistent. It is because the object of such contract is
outside the commerce of man. A kidney can never an object of
a contract. Parts of the human body cannot be considered
object of contracts.

Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code:

The following contracts are inexistent and void from the
beginning:

xxx
(4) Those whose object are outside the commerce of
men;
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 xxx

These contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can the right

to set up the defense of illegality be waived.

Also, under Article 1347:

All things which are not outside the commerce of men,

including future things, may be the object of a contract.
All rights which are not intransmissible may also be the
object of contracts.

For the sake of argument, assuming that a person’s

kidney is within the commerce of men, in the case of Borlado
vs. Court of Appeals, the damages cannot be paid in kind. Also,
it is not yet proven in the proper court that Brendon is liable to
pay damages to Ferdinand. It is only until then will Brendan
pay an amount in legal tender as damages to Ferdinand.

ISSUE 12 & 13

Generally, only the parties involved in the void contract

and third persons directly affected by it may call for its
nullification. Under 1421 of the Civil Code specifically provides
that “the defense of illegality of contracts is not available to
third persons whose interests are not directly affected.”

However, being the wife of Brendon, Nadine has the

legal interest under the Family Code in asking for the
nullification of the said contract.

Under Article 72 of the Family Code, when one of the

spouses neglects his or her duties to the conjugal union or
commits acts which tend to bring danger, dishonor or injury to
the other or to the family, the aggrieved party may apply to
the court for relief. The agreement was for Brendon to give to
Ferdinand his kidney if it is found to be compatible. If Brendon
was to comply, this could bring danger to the family because of
him having only one kidney and it may affect him to comply
with his duties as a father or as a husband.

Also under the Family Code, Article 73 provides that

either spouse may exercise any legitimate profession,
occupation, business or activity without the consent of the
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other and the latter may object only on valid, serious, and
moral grounds. The activities mentioned therein also includes
contracts which can be objected by the other spouse on valid,
serious, and moral grounds. Brendon’s contract to give
Ferdinand his kidney is a valid, serious, and moral ground for
Nadine to ask for its illegality in case Ferdinand filed an action
for specific performance. The action for nullification of his wife
will be of no use because there is no valid contract to be
annulled to speak of because it is void from the beginning.

V. CONCLUSION

The case is hinged on who will be proven guilty of being

negligent in causing the accident. It is dependent on the pieces
of evidence of each party to convince the court. The best way
Brendon can be relieved from his liability is to present
evidence that will show his diligence and impute the
negligence of Ferdinand and Best Drive Learning School.
Brendon must show that he complied with his instructions
faithfully.

The refusal of Diane to undergo blood transfusion is

material because the cost of the medical procedure and her
subsequent hospitalization will add up to the actual and
compensatory damages that can be recovered from the
negligent defendant. Moral damages, loss of earning capacity
and support can also be demanded from the negligent
defendant. On the other hand, the suicide of Felix is not
material because it is the proximate cause of his death. It was
the efficient intervening cause that broke the chain of events
required by the proximate cause doctrine. Thus, the negligent
defendant shall only be liable up actual damages including the
loss of his earning capacity due to the injuries suffered by Felix,
and not for his death.

The damages due to Ferdinand will be dependent if he

can prove clearly and convincingly the negligence of Brendan.
He can also claim damages if it was the driving school who
failed to exercise due diligence required by law in employing
proper safety measures. Otherwise, Ferdinand cannot recover
from anybody.
The agreement of Brendon and Ferdinand is void and
inexistent for having for its object, the kidney, a thing outside
the commerce of men. Furthermore, the damages must be
paid in legal tender and cannot be in kind. This is also
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dependent if the negligence of Brendon will be proven.
Otherwise, no damages can be demanded from him. His wife,
Nadine, has all the legal right to interfere and ask the court for
the illegality of the contract in the event Ferdinand files an
action for specific performance of the contract and enforce
Brendon to give his kidney. The wife has the legal interest in
the well-being of her husband and the family.

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