QUINTANA VS LERMA

24 Phil 285 | February 5, 1913 | Per Curiam

Facts:

In the case at bar, defendant-appellant Gelasio Lerma appeals from the judgment of the lower court
granting his wife, the plaintiff-appellee Maria Quintana, a sum of money allegedly due her based on a
contract they made for support.

As shown in the evidence, the two were married in 1901 and entered, in February 1905, into a written
agreement of separation, renouncing certain rights as against each other, dividing the conjugal property
between them and the defendant undertaking the duty to provide plaintiff P20-worth of monthly
support and maintenance to be given within the first three days of each month.

In his original answer to the action, Lerma claimed that Quintana forfeited her right to support by
committing adultery. However, this special defense was stricken out by the court on the ground that
under Art. 152 of the Civil Code, adultery is not a recognized ground upon which obligation to support
ceases.

The lower court refused to recognize the same defense when defendant reentered it in his amended
complaint.

Issue:

W/N the written agreement made by parties is void

W/N adultery may be permitted as a special defense against action for support

Ruling:

Yes. The agreement is void because Art. 1432 of the Civil Code provides that “in default of express
declarations in the marriage contract, the separation of the property of the consorts, during marriage,
shall only take place by virtue of a judicial decree, except in the case provided by article 50.” However,
the wife has a right of action against defendant under the Code.

Yes. While the plaintiff wife has the right of action, the Court ruled that the defendant may also set up
adultery as a special defense, which if properly proved and sustain will defeat the wife’s action.

Judgment reversed; cause remanded for new trial with instructions to permit the interposition of the
special defense of adultery and such amendments of the complaint and answer as may be necessary to
carry the judgment into effect.
HARDING vs. COMMERCIAL UNION ASSURANCE COMPANY

10 Augusy 1918 | Fisher, J.

Plaintiff: Mrs. Henry E. Harding and husband

Defendant: Commercial Union Assurance Company

DOCTRINE (Void Donations)

BRIEF (optional)

Mrs. Harding applied for car insurance with Commercial Union Assurance Company. When the
car was destroyed by fire, Mrs. Harding filed an insurance claim but the Commercial Union denied it.
One of the reasons was that the car does not belong to her since a gift from her husband is void under
the Civil Code. The Court ruled that the transfer did not interfere with their rights and interests.

FACTS

In February 1916, Mrs. Harding applied for car insurance for a Studebaker she received as a gift
from her husband. She was assisted by Smith, Bell, and Co. which was the duly authorized
representative (insurance agent) of Commercial Union Assurance Company in the Philippines.

The car’s value was estimated with the help of an experienced mechanic (Mr. Server). The car
was bought by Mr. Harding for P2,800.00. The mechanic, considering some repairs done, estimated the
value to be at P3,000.00.

This estimated value was the value disclosed by Mrs. Harding to Smith, Bell, and Co. She also
disclosed that the value was an estimate made by Luneta Garage (which also acts as an agent for Smith,
Bell, and Co).

In March 1916, a fire destroyed the Studebaker. Mrs. Harding filed an insurance claim but
Commercial Union denied it as it insisted that the representations and averments made as to the cost of
the car were false; and that said statement was a warranty.

Commercial Union stated that the car does not belong to Mrs. Harding because such a gift from
her husband is void under the Civil Code.

Supreme Court: ISSUES of the CASE

ISSUE: Whether or not Mrs. Harding is entitled to the insurance claim. (YES)

Held:

Commercial Union is not the proper party to attack the validity of the gift made by Mr. Harding
to his wife.

Although certain transfers from husband to wife or from wife to husband are prohibited in
article 1334, such prohibition can be taken advantage of only by persons who bear such a relation to the
parties making the transfer or to the property itself that such transfer interferes with their rights or
interests.

Even assuming they had the legal standing, we cannot say that the gift of an automobile by a
husband to his wife is not a moderate one. It depends on the circumstances of the parties, which was
not disclosed.

The subject property was part of the conjugal property of the Spouses. It was acquired during
the existence of a valid marriage between Joseph Sr. and Epifania. There was no decree of dissolution of
marriage, nor of their conjugal partnership
Matabuena v. Cervantes

G.R. No. L-28771 (March 31, 1971)

FACTS:

Felix Matabuena cohabitated with Respondent. During this period, Felix Matabuena
donated to Respondent a parcel of land. Later the two were married. After the death of Felix
Matabuena, his sister, Petitioner, sought the nullification of the donation citing Art.133 of the Civil
Code “Every donation between the spouses during the marriage shall be void.”

The trial court ruled that this case was not covered by the prohibition because the donation was
made at the time the deceased and Respondent were not yet married and were simply cohabitating.

ISSUE:

W/N the prohibition applies to donations between live-in partners.

HELD:

Yes. It is a fundamental principle in statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the
law is as much a part of the law as what is written. Since the reason for the ban on donations between
spouses during the marriage is to prevent the possibility of undue influence and improper pressure
being exerted by one spouse on the other, there is no reason why this prohibition shall not apply also to
common-law relationships.The court, however, said that the lack of the donation made by the
deceased to Respondent does not necessarily mean that the Petitioner will have exclusive rights to
the disputed property because the relationship between Felix and Respondent were legitimated by
marriage.