Rotenstreich Time and Meaning in History 1987

TIME AND MEANING IN HISTORY
BOSTON STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Editor
ROBERT S. COHEN, Boston University
Editorial Advisory Board
ADOLF GRUNBAUM, University of Pittsburgh

SYLVAN S. SCHWEBER, Brandeis University
JOHN 1. STACHEL, Boston University
MARX W. WARTOFSKY, Baruch College of the City University of
New York
VOLUME 101
NATHAN ROTENSTREICH
TIME
AND MEANING
IN HISTORY
D. REIDEL PUBLISHING COMPANY

A MEMBER OF THE KLUWER ACADEMICPUBUSHERSGROUP
DORDRECHT/BOSTON/LANCASTER/TOKYO
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Rotenstreich, Nathan, 1914-

Time and meaning in history.
(Boston studies in the philosophy of science; v. 101)

Bibliography: p.
Includes indexes.
1. History - Philosophy. 2. Time. I. Title.
II. Series.
Q174.B67 vol. 101 [D16.91 901 87-20489
ISBN-13: 978-94-010-8212-9 e-ISBN: 978-94-009-3845-8
DOl: 10.1007/978-94-009-3845-8
Published by D. Reidel Publishing Company,

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Editorial Preface Vll
Introductory Note ix
Chapter 1: The Status of History 1

Chapter 2: The Subject and Process 25
Chapter 3: Progress and D~rection 53
Chapter 4: Interaction, Actions and Events 79
Chapter 5: Contexts and Individuals 94
Chapter 6: Conditioning Situations and Decisions 120
Chapter 7: Evaluations and Values 135
Chapter 8: Rhythm of Time 159
Chapter 9: The Settings and Ideologies 175
NOTES 207
INDEX OF NAMES 215
INDEX OF SUBJECTS 217

EDITORIAL PREFACE
There are several characteristics of Nathan Rotenstreich's work which

are striking: his thoughtful writings are both subtle and deep; they are
steeped in his critical appreciation of other thinkers of this and preceding
times, an appreciation which is formed by his learned understanding of
the history of philosophy; and with all this, he has an original and
independent intelligence. He has from time to time brought his skills to
bear upon historical scholarship, most notably perhaps in his book
Between Past and Present (1958, 2nd edition, 1973), his interpretive
essays in the philosophy of history Philosophy, History and Politics
(1976) and his scholarly work concerned with the influence of historical
development upon modern Jewish thought, Tradition and Reality
(1972). Related to these, and equally works of that philosophical
humanity which Professor Rotenstreich embodies, are his Humanism in
the Contemporary Era (1963), Spirit and Man: An Essay on Being and
Value (1963) and Reflection and Action (1983).
Rotenstreich combines both the naturalistic and the phenomenological
attitudes in an interesting and illuminating way through the full spectrum
of issues in the philosophy of history in this century. Surely he sets
boundaries to any doubtful extrapolation. Not only would he bring the
understanding of history back from those who claim it as only a positive
science but equally would he prevent the transformation of that
understanding into merely speculative inquiry. To some, his achievement
will rank among the finest achievements of the tradition which came
from German Idealism, that of culturally critical self-understanding.
The volume before us is classical, in structure, coverage, and
achievement. Rotenstreich investigates the central issues of historical
knowledge: time and temporal process, change and continuity,
evaluation, and moral responsibility. As his readers have come to expect
from his rigorous and disciplined scholarship, Rotenstreich works
vii
viii EDITORIAL PREFACE
through three levels of expository analysis: first, he sets forth what are,
in his judgment, the principal alternative philosophical theories of
historical understanding, and with these he quietly and dialectically leads
the reader to his own theory; second, Rotenstreich elaborates his own
theory of history as process, shows its power in clarification and often
in explanation of quite specific conceptual and (what may be surprising)
empirical issues; and third, we see Rotenstreich's critical as well as
enlightening analyses of controversies of our own times. There is little
point to go further here other than to point to the systematic integrity of
the work, the central role of his joining of 'reflectiveness' with
'relatedness', and the contrast they have with the various temporal series
of ahistorical processes of nature. A reader may see this in Rotenstreich' s
statement: " .. the precondition of the possibility of history consists in
man's reflective relatedness to the collective creations of mankind ... ".
Nathan Rotenstreich is Ahad Ha'am Professor of Philosophy at the

Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Academician of the Israel Academy of
Sciences and Humanities, and recipient of the Israel Prize for the
Humanities (1963). With S. H. Bergman, he translated Kant's three
Critiques as well as Kant's essay On Perpetual Peace into Hebrew.
June 1987 ROBERT S. COHEN

INTRODUCTORY NOTE
The present book approaches the domain and the phenomenon of

history by attempting to analyse history as a structure. The term 'struc-
ture' is not here used in the school-sense of that term nor does it point to
cognate expressions. There is no attempt to identify the invariables of
history. This is an attempt at investigating the various components of
the historical sphere, starting with the primary synthesis between time
as background and a comprehensive meaning and fragmentary or the-
matic meanings imported and introduced into the substructure of time.
These meanings are in turn related to actions, deeds, events, continuous
interpretations, reinterpretations, etc. Hence the historical domain can
be conceived of as an ongoing attempt to bestow partial meanings and
thus specific contents on the presupposed background of time. The
involvement of human beings in history, including their reflection on it,
is on the one hand Ian aspect of the process but is on the other hand
grounded in reflection, positing or creating the vantage poiIJt for obser-
vation. For understanding history from within, there is neither a first
historical deed nor an ultimate historical end. Reflection is continuously
involved in the historical process, and there is no first stage to it either.
The momentum of reflection is of its own origin, in spite of its involve-
ment in the process. The distinction and interaction between awareness
and process is again an essential aspect of history as a realm.
I wish to thank Professor Robert S. Cohen for his continued interest in

this study. I am grateful to Mrs. J.C. Kuipers for her kind attention and
patience and to Mr. Hayim Goldgraber for his help in giving the final
editorial touch to the manuscript.
Jerusalem, 1987 N.R.
IX
CHAPTER 1
THE STATUS OF HISTORY
Our concern in the present analysis is the question of history, with

emphasis on the significance of the meaning or meanings attributed to or
inherent in history. Some of the relevant concepts require a preliminary
exposition, although, as is usual in philosophical analysis, they will
accumulate additional content as the analysis progresses.
History can be defined, in a very broad sense, as a course of events
taking place in the course of time - or, to use the traditional term, cursus
temporum. At the outset we must limit the cursus, since we are con-
cerned with human deeds, actions, and events. Natural phenomena like
climatic conditions, or sporadic outbursts like earthquakes, ,become
historical events as human beings adjust to them or integrate them,
responding to, acknowledging, or anticipating them. Hence the cursus is
limited to processes that occur within the human orbit.
Human beings are not only isolated individuals; they belong to the
human race and to human kind at large. Any interpretation of history
may have to consider both the overall process which involves human
beings in their entirety, and also the impact which the total process has,
or may have, on the course of events as they affect human beings. The
problem is complicated by the fact that hum'an beings set goals for
themselves. When these goals are writ large, or transplanted to the
process of history, can we assume that there are trans-individual goals
and goals pertaining to mankind at large? The question requires that we
consider the possible interconnection between its goal and mankind as a
sum-total of individuals and also as an entity: does "mankind" project
goals, or do the goals create "mankind"?
This brings us to the second central problem of our investigation, the
problem of meaning. Goals are meanings in the sense that they are
contents entertained or aspired to. But in the historical context the
notion of meaning, however ambiguous, connotes not only goals, but
also whatever is significant, important, worthy, particular, characteris-
tic, or even - sometimes - inspiring and edifying. Considering meaning
from the historical point of view, we must ask whether and where in the
course of events the conjunction between occurrences and significance is
1
2 CHAPTER 1
most prominent. History is more than a series of occurrences, since

these occurrences are imbued with certain content, such as political
action, institutions, etc. The contents are not only the goals anticipated
or pursued; they are present within the process in the curs us itself.
Another aspect of the problem is that history, be it a pattern or just a
conglomerate of events occurring in time, is a sum-total. History presup-
poses time as a succession or as an order of succession, and integrates
that order into its own occurrences. To give a trivial example, from the
historical point of view it makes a difference whether universal suffrage
is characteristic of Athenian democracy in the 4th century B.c., or
became characteristic of the modem democratic state in the 19th and
20th century. The time element, though presupposed in its entirety by
history, becomes in turn an element within history. In our exploration
we presuppose both components of the cursus temporum, i.e., the
cursus and the tempus, and attempt to see their interrelation, as well as
the point at which the aspect of meaning becomes prominent.
II
Underlying the various philosophical approaches to the problem of the

nature and facticity of history is the assumption that the historical
domain is the sum-total of human events, creations, and institutions.
Another way of putting this assumption is that the uninterrupted pro-
cess of creativity, which is the other face of human events, is at once the
content, characteristic, and ground of existence of history. Self-impelled
and self-sustained, the historical process is a mode of existence superim-
posed on natural processes. This renders its existence problematical,
raising - perhaps - the question: What is the raison d'etre of the
historical process?
A critical analysis of the answers given to this question by Hegel,
Marx, and Heidegger comprises the first part of the present study; this
leads, in the second part, to the systematic conclusion that the very
question about the raison d'etre of history is invalid. A possibly more
adequate formulation of the problem is then proposed, which leads to
further systematic conclusions. These three philosophical pOSitions were
picked for analysis because they represent certain approaches to the
problem, and also because they deal with the point of departure of the
historical process and its awareness.
THE STATUS OF HISTORY 3
III
Hegel's approach to thy problem is based on his conception of history as

emergent knowledge, i.e., as the external manifestation of Spirit in
time. 1 This implies that the existence of history depends upon the
existence of a spiritual essence which attains self-knowledge by means of
the historical process. Self-knowledge of Spirit is not immediately given.
To know itself, Spirit - albeit the absolute real essence - must be
unfolded and made externally manifest in process. The conception of
time as the framework in which Spirit attains externality and, through
externality, self-knowledge, is essential to Hegel's explanation of the
nature and existence of history. Hegel's definition of history is at the
same time an explanation and validation of its raison d'etre. From the
definition of history as the external manifestation of Spirit in time it
follows that, were it not for the existence of history, Spirit would neither
know itself nor prevail in the actual world - that is, in the realm of
becoming. Although it finds reflection in history, the existence of Spirit
is not merely historical. Spirit exists as an absolute essence in itself. It is
destined to exist as this essence once its content is made manifest in
history, and once its self-knowledge is actually adequate to its content.
In history, Spirit is diffused, transcending its internal implicitness to
become determined and explicit in the process in time.
Hegel is suggesting that history occupies a functional position of
mediation, subservient to the attainment of self-knowledge by Spirit.
The existence of history qua occurrence is useful- useful for an essence
that, while using history, is not itself historical: its relation to time is not
internal but external. Externality in time is for the sake of the internality
of Spirit. It is true that Hegel allots a higher status to the externality of
Spirit than to the externality of nature. But the point is that neither
manifestation of externality is allotted an independent status, and both
are subservient to internality. So long as there is mediated becoming for
the sake of self-knowledge, history endures. The existence of history is
historical, i.e., temporal only. With achievement of that knowledge,
which is the essence of - absolute - philosophy, history reaches its end.
This conclusion is confirmed by Hegel's statement that the concept of
Spirit is the foundation of history, and history is the process of Spirit.
This process consists in the transcendence by Spirit of its first self-
conciousness, i.e., of that latent consciousness, for the sake of attaining
free self-consciousness. The categorical imperative of Spirit, "Know
4 CHAPTER 1
Thyself," is fulfilled. 2 The implication is that history serves as a field for

the fulfillment of a philosophical imperative formulated as the Socratic
call. It would thus be consonant with Hegel's conception to paraphrase
Fichte's saying about nature as the matter (Material) for the fulfillment
of our duty, and say that history is the field for the progressive fulfill-
ment, by Spirit, of the imperative "Know Thyself."
The spiritual character of history has to be understood - in a sense -
literally, because at least one of the definitions of Spirit is the knowledge
of itself in its self-externalization. That combination of the two aspects
makes Spirit fundamentally involved in a movement, and history is at
least one of the realms or avenues of that movement. Here we become
aware of the difference between process in history and process in
nature: nature is characterized by the repetition of the same phenomena
- its process is a uniform cycle. Against the self-repeating character of
the natural process, Spirit shapes itself continuously in different forms;
thus progress is one of its characteristics. We emphasize the position of
history in terms of Spirit underlying it and manifesting itself in it, though
that quality of history cannot be separated from the eventual achieve-
ment expressed in self-knowledge or in the consciousness of freedom.
Assigning the status of history to the realm of Spirit leads Hegel to some
basic consequences concerning both the course of history and its end as
the ultimate stage and goal. The consciousness of freedom, being the
manifestation of Spirit, is not confined to freedom in its moral connota-
tion. History becomes akin to philosophy, on that philosophy over-
comes the strangeness of objects, while in the self-externalization of
Spirit the strangeness is only temporary. Spirit as reason (Vernunft) is
meant to rest completely in itself. It cannot reach that position unless it
is explicating itself in the course of events - in the locus of history. Once
it has explicated itself, it returns to itself, as Hegel said himself, in the
reflective rhythm of Herausgehen, Sichauseinangerlegen, und zugleich
Zusichkommen.
For Hegel, the position of history is not on the border between nature
and freedom, but is integrated completely within the sphere of Spirit
and thus of freedom. Again we must emphasize - and this is significant
for what we may call the theorization of history - that freedom does not
connote spontaneity of the will or the decisions stemming from that
spontaneity. Freedom is explicating the fact that Spirit rests within
itself, through the dynamic process in time and through the perpetual
dynamics of reflection. Freedom exhibits essentially the self-referential

character of Spirit. The theorization of history, to use the expression
again, turns history into the history of thought that finds itself. To be
sure, to find itself thought has to go through detours such as political,
artistic, and religious processes. But in order to emphasize the self-
rounded and self-enclosed character of history in terms of Spirit, Hegel
must turn Spirit into the point of departure of history. History is the
process of manifesting that point of departure. Hence Hegel combines
two approaches to the process of history: history is both an instrument
of Spirit and its inherent or intrinsic manifestation.
The idea of making history a manifestation points to one nuance in
Hegel's theory, namely that Spirit operating in history and eventually
coming back to itself is - at least to some extent - an extra-historical
factor; or, to put it another way, by being a supra-historical factor Spirit
is also extra-historical. Our criticism of the view propounded lfy Hegel
will not proceed along the lines of Marx' criticism of him, substituting an
intra-historical factor for the supra- or extra historical one. We shall
return later to Marx' systematic position; for now, the following criti-
cisms of Hegel's characterization of the status of history have to be
brought forward.
(a) Let us assume, for the sake of the argument, the existence of that
essence called Spirit, implying self-externalization. It still does not
follow that history, qua process in time, is by the nature of Spirit the
mediating sphere, subservient to the attainment of the self-knowledge
of Spirit. Even if we grant that self-knowledge is an essential quality of
Spirit, it still does not follow that only in the process of a succession in
time, i.e., only in history, can the emergence of self-knowledge from
potentiality into its actuality be achieved.
(b) The assumption that consciousness and self-consciousness are
qualities of Spirit is not incompatible with the Aristotelian assumption
that there exists pure activity (actus purus) in which there is no poten-
tiality whatever; that pure activity is Spirit. Hegel's characterization of
Spirit could be compatible with a mode of self-reflection that does not
entail the external manifestation of Spirit in time. Self-externalization
could mean a kind of self-enclosed distinction between the reflecting
subject and the object reflected upon, without lodging the object and
the subject in time. It does not follow that, because Spirit has the
property of free self-knowledge, history is a means of actualizing that
6 CHAPTER 1
property. Only because history is there, and identified as such, does

Hegel move back from it to Spirit, and internalizes history in order to
externalize it and then internalize it again.
(c) As we have seen, there are two aspects in Hegel's system which
are not totally consonant: Spirit is creative by definition, whereas
history is merely ancillary or functional. Hegel could at the most claim
the following: given the existence of the process in time as a primary
datum, finite human beings, who subsist in that process, cannot com-
prehend the nature of Spirit at once. To put it differently, their aware-
ness cannot be full actuality, as it is for Spirit conceived from inside.
There is no immediate, that is to say, complete, contact between human
beings and Spirit. Men discover Spirit in the medium of their existence,
i.e., in time. But that human angle does not imply that Spirit is bound to
unfold itself in time, let alone to grasp its essence in time. Here Hegel
projects the human perspective on to the essence of Spirit; one may
wonder how this projection can be justified. To be sure, Hegel argues
that man's perspective is grounded in man's position as an actualizer of
Spirit; but this is a petitio principi. Eventually Hegel ascribes an instru-
mental or ancillary status, not only to history, but also to men them-
selves. We find here a kind of hypostasis of Spirit. Yet there is a
tendency to attribute human qualities to Spirit, in terms of the approach
to time as a medium of self-awareness, as well as the approach to history
as the sum-total of detours on the road to the achievement of self-
knowledge.
(d) To summarize, we can say that Hegel attempted to answer the
question of the status of history by connecting that question with
another one, namely: what brings the historical sphere as a process in
time into being? Hegel tries to come to grips with one question: through
what stages must the process of man's confrontation with Spirit pass, or,
how does mankind gradually attain self-knowledge? This is a post
factum characterization of the connection between spiritual contents
and history. The systematic attempt fails, since it fails to disclose the
reason for the very existence of the sphere of history.
IV
In contrast to Hegel's approach to the problem of history, and as a

conscious attempt to correct its flaws, Marx's approach may be said to
have developed from an intra-historical starting point. Marx does not

treat history as the handmaid of an extra-historical essence. But Marx's
starting-point turns out to be not quite so intra-historical as it seems.
The fact that in his early writings Marx names his system both "histori-
cal materialism" and "practical materialism" suggests that, for him,
history is connected with practice, or "revolutionary Praxis" as he calls
it. If Marx traces the origin of history to the causal' agency of an
intra-historical act, this is because that act is executed in history, and its
execution presupposes diverse historical circumstances. Yet there is
reason to maintain that this act can be called "intra-historical" only in a
qualified sense.
An immanent approach to the realm of history would seem to imply a
two-fold assumption: (a) the historical process is the sum-total of the
acts by which it is generated; (b) from the point of view of the process as
a whole, no particular historical act occupies a unique status. But Marx's
treatment of the problem is not controlled by this assumption. He refers
not only to acts within history but also to an act, or the structure of an
act, by which history itself is created. It is in these terms that he
discusses the status of economic production. His teaching is epitomized
in two key passages: Men can be distinguished from animals by con-
sciousness, religion, or anything we choose; yet men themselves first
begin to distinguish themselves from the animals when they begin to
produce their means of life. In producing their means of life, men
indirectly produce their material life itself.3 This implies that the first
historical act is the production of the means of satisfying the necessities
of life, the production of material life itself; this is the basic condition of
all history. 4
Marx's investigation of the "why" and "wherefore" of history led him
to suggest that there is a "first historical act." The status of history is
instrumental. History exists for the sake of production, directly de-
signed to satisfy man's wants and, indirectly, to be the source of new
wants. Were history not to be created, man's wants would not be
satisfied. Its creation is demanded by man's physical or natural struc-
ture. Since for Marx, history begins in an initial act that produces the
means to satisfy human wants, he endows economic processes with
causal efficacy in the ongoing historical process. Marx regards the
historical-economic processes connected with the means of production
as concrete realizations of the first historical act, i.e., of that act which
created the historical domain. Because he does not posit a dependence
8 CHAPTER 1
of the historical process on a hidden spiritual treasure which it reveals,

Marx does not treat the process in terms of the emergence from
potentiality into actuality of some latent content. Yet he does imply that
the generation of history has a final as well as an efficient cause.
Satisfaction of the wants of man is the final cause of the historical
process, while production is its efficient cause. The efficient causality of
production is entailed in the final causality of want-satisfaction. Treated
in these terms, history is made to occupy an instrumental status. For
Marx, however, the instrumentality of history does not mean that
history itself will come to an end, once its task of making Spirit manifest
and facilitating the fulfillment of self-knowledge is accomplished. His-
tory is as enduring proportion as its two-fold cause is inexhaustible:
history will last as long as men seek satisfaction of their wants and
produce the means of satisfying them.
The shift to intra-historical processes is related to the position of
praxis. For Hegel, history occupied a position between the potentiality
of Spirit and its full actualization. Hence history was related to the
manifestation of human potentialities, which qua potentiality are not
fulfilled and are therefore involved in a process of reaching that fulfill-
ment. This is not true when history is rdated to practice (or to what is
sometimes described as material practice). Practice is the sum-total of
acts and deeds related to human needs and aiming at their satisfaction.
Marx's concept of history does not start with human potentialities but
with human deficiencies or, in other words, with the fact that human
beings initially lack the means for satisfying the basic needs related to
physical or biological survival. Practice produces material relations
between human beings, and thus brings into existence whatever was
absent between them and for them in the first place. History is the
process of bringing about, through various detours, the harmony be-
tween need and satisfaction, replacing the harmony between the spir-
itual beginning and its full actualization.
Practice rooted in needs, and having an instrumental or teleological
direction, points both to the level of action and to its content, namely, to
process. In this sense practice points towards an all-embracing historical
process which is the totality of human existence. While Hegel distinctly
saw history as a process which is sublated (aufgehoben) by a supra-
historical reflection, for Marx history is the totality; what is called theory
is part and parcel of that process. Man cannot be detached or separated
from his needs and from their satisfaction. Therefore the anthropologi-
cal deScription of human existence is of man as a historical being, while

that being is a historical "becoming" - if the expression is permissible in
this context. The end of history is not only the full satisfaction of human
needs, but also the point of departure for the realization of freedom -
not freedom in the sense of reflection, but in the sense of concrete
hUman behaviour. That mode of behaviour cannot be materialized
unless human needs are satisfied. We find here the key to the well-
known statement about the transition from the realm of necessity to the
realm of freedom.
Having tried to outline the structure of Marx's reasoning in terms of
the position of history as a human realm and the factors operating in it,
we can make several critical observations:
(a) Marx fails to offer an account of the full complexity of history,
despite his announcement that, by shifting to practice, he accomplishes
this. He does not see that history has a retrospective aspect, related to
man's position in time and orientation towards the past, which is parallel
to his orientation towards the future as a forward extension of man's
place in time. The most the Marxist correlation of history and practice
can explain is the active orientation of human beings toward the future
and their planning of that future. The relationship between practice and
history cannot explain the parallel aspect of man's historical conscious-
ness, namely, his awareness that he inherits the past and is oriented
towards it. Events flow from the past to the present and from the
present to the future even when man is actively engaged in shaping the
fragment from the present to the future. Historical consciousness,
paradoxical as this may sound, is not a factor in Marx's system, precisely
because of his contraction to what he calls historical acts.
Hence Marx's hypothesis of the "first historical act" does not solve
the problem of man's bifocal historical consciousness, directed toward
the past and engaged in aiming at the future. That consciousness cannot
be explained by pointing to the act of production. One outcome of that
shortcoming in Marx's position can be found in his theoretical statement
that the practical orientation towards the future determines historical
consciousness or orientation towards the past, since the latter has only
secondary status. Yet this conclusion does not seem to be necessary,
even if we grant the motivating position of economic factors in the
future-directed process. We can distinguish between the motivating
factors directed toward the satisfaction of human needs and the reflec-
tive direction of the historical consciousness, which may discern the past
10 CHAPTER 1
without being determined by economic factors. Marx's shift towards

practice leads him to assign a monopoly to practice. He does not see that
even practice motivating the direction of the future does not discern the
dimension of the future. That dimension is an interpretation by con-
sciousness, which has to be distinguished from the acts and deeds that
fill up the open dimension of the future.
(b) There is no justification for the isolation of the single element of
production or the economic act from the historical complex as a whole,
and assigning to that act a predominant causal status in the process.
There are two assumptions in Marx's theory: (1) There are human needs
or wants which demand satisfaction; that demand is the final cause of
history. (2) There is a process of economic production subservient to the
satisfaction of those needs; that process is the efficient cause of history.
Thus certain factors, because of their alleged causal position, are iso-
lated from the concrete nexus. We cannot ignore the fact that one
inherent factor of the nexus is the verbal communication between
human beings involved in that nexus. This verbal communication is
related, not only to the instrumental aspect of information, including
information about wants, but also to the aspect of planning what is going
to be produced, and how, with a view to satisfying those needs and
wants. The acts of giving information and of understanding, the ability
to plan production in conformity with that understanding - all these
cannot be accounted for by the fact that man has wants that generate a
process of production. The process of production can be accounted for
by man's awareness of his wants; at least, the awareness of wants
presupposes awareness and activity. Precisely because awareness is
flexible, it can adjust to the wants and stimulate the active production of
means of satisfaction. The position of awareness and understanding is
structurally independent and presupposed, though topically it can be
related to human needs.
It would be a mistake to assume that the adjustment of awareness to
the process of production is, as such, uniform or monolithic. That
adjustment presupposes, or expresses itself in, the distinctions between
the instrumental function of certain products, like a hammer or any
tool, and the immediate satisfaction given by another sort of product,
like a loaf of bread. There is a difference between the instrumental
function of that which satisfies hunger and the instrumental function of
something that helps produce a tool- between products whose satisfac-
tional position is primary, and those whose position is secondary. Even
when we cling to the distinction between an efficient and a final cause,

the other distinctions cannot be obliterated; they appear within the
horizon of production. Hence, even when we move to the intra-
historical structure, we cannot identify a first historical act, so that
awareness is totally immersed in practice. The distinction between acts
and awareness is present even within the immanent historical structure.
Thus Marx's step from theory to practice, which was meant to explain
the very existence of history, is, to say the least, only a limited explana-
tion. It explains neither the profile of history nor its operating factors.
(c) The usual antithesis of theory and practice brought Marx to an
interpretation that is, to say the least, one-sided. Awareness is not
identical with theory. The non-biological essence of man, or man's
primary involvement in history, cannot be assessed through the process
of production without presupposing the mediation embodied in awareness.
Marx tried to make practice a totality of human attitudes and behaviour.
But he also tried to discern in practice the primary stratum or factor,
that is to say, production, and in this sense he spoke about the first
historical act.
At this point we may question not only the possibility of isolating a
core act, but also the identification between the primary act, which
allegedly brought about the leap from nature to history, with the
continuous position of production in the course of the historical process.
With all the emphasis placed on history as explication of practice and its
product, no adequate account is given of history in its Gestalt. We are
always supposed to come back to the primary act. But if we speak about
history, we have to speak concurrently about an increasing impact and a
Gestalt that becomes, as it were, ever denser. lheir aspect of the
historical process is not sufficiently emphasized in Marx. He is, to some
extent, epitomizing a certain trend, where we are supposedly called to
return from secondary developments to primary ones. This has its
impact on the issue of awareness, because, even within the process of
production, a distinction is implied between producer and product, and
this distinction can eventually become a point of departure for the
distinction between subject and object. If we see these distinctions in
the historical process, we may understand that certain basic structures
find their manifestation in the process, for example, awareness of the
gap between the need and its fulfillment. Here we should recall one of
the characterizations of the activity of consciousness put forward by
Wilhelm von Humboldt: To engage in reflection, the mind must
12 CHAPTER 1
momentarily arrest its incessant activity, in order to grasp the im-

pressions into a unity and thereby set that unity over and against itself as
an object. s
We mentioned that structure of consciousness and its activities, not
only to reiterate that production is an object of the intentionality of
consciousness, but also to emphasize the presentness of certain struc-
tures within the historical process, even when we characterize that
process in its connection to practice and to intra-historical factors of
production. Because of this structural consideration, it is difficult or
even impossible to isolate "the first historical act". We reach a conclu-
sion about the interaction among different factors and a kind of circular
structure of the historical process: we must read history from within.
Once history is with us, or we are in it, we may attempt to isolate factors
within the process.
To summarize, we can say that Marx's tendency to see history as a
self-sustaining process fails to give an adequate account of the dialectics
of that particular structure. 6
v
We come now to consider the third representative approach to time and
to history, that of Heidegger. We begin with one of Heidegger's main
statements or assumptions, that time should be regarded as the horizon
of every understanding and interpretation of Being. 7 This could imply
that the starting point and foundation of Heidegger's approach to
history is time, rather than a supra-historical presupposition of Spirit or
an intra-historical permanent factor promoting history, like production.
Heidegger, referring to what he calls historicity (Geschichtlichkeit) ,
states that Being is historical. 8 This is a fundamental ontological asser-
tion, since it points to the primary relation between Being and time.
Heidegger goes further and points to the correlation between tempor-
ality (Zeit!ichkeit) and historicity; within the horizon of temporality, the
emphasis is laid on finitude or death. Finitude (Endlichkeit) is the
implicit reason for the historicity of Being, since what Heidegger calls
Dasein exists as a finite mode of Being.
Here we encounter the relation between finitude and death, since
finitude means that Being is on the verge of death. 9 The term finitude
denotes the objective fact that the duration of man's existence is limited;
but it also signifies that death is the explication of the ultimate possibility
of man's existence. Yet the relation between finitude and death is more
than an objective structure of human existence. The consciousness of
finitude is continuously present in man's existence; man is characterized
by the constant anticipation of his end. Considering the status Heideg-
ger allots to death, we may characterize his system as a kind of "nega-
tive eschatology", at least in terms of individual human existence, since
death is a possibility of the existence of the individual. In this context
Heidegger coins the expression Jemeinigkeit, which emphasizes the
immediate and internal relationship between the personal mode of
existence and its doom.
This emphasis on time and its inherent relationship to death, though it
points to the primary position of time within the human horizon, may
mislead us when we speak of history. We find in Heidegger a predomi-
nance of the dimension of the future, the future within the personal
boundaries, or what he calls self-extension, which runs between birth
and death. The very fact that we are speaking here of the futAre as a
dimension is already a sort of abstraction, because future is present in
death and is not dealt with generally and universally. Thus future is the
becoming in which existence achieves its proper potential, where death
is conceived as the most concrete mode of Being. Though Heidegger
speaks about possibility in connection with the future, he does not
present the future as a dimension in which the active possibilities of
man's existence emerge from potentiality into actuality. "Possibility" is
not a latent potentiality to become manifest, but an immanent reality,
which he sometimes calls das schicksalhafte Geschick des Daseins, thus
combining the fate in which we are involved with the continuous
anticipation of it, imbued with anxiety. The true content of Being may
be said to lie in its end, doom or death, rather than in man's active
engagement, which may call into being something hitherto not existing.
The present is only the locus of the decisiveness or determination
(Entschlossenheit)lO going towards the future.
We have to be rather meticuluous in understanding the concept of
historicity, which Heidegger presents as central to his system. In the first
place, historicity is related to personal existence, and not to the public
realm of human actions and creations. If historicity is related to death,
and death is essentially one's own (jemeinig) , it cannot be related to that
non-personal realm which is history. Even when Heidegger speaks
about world-historical processes, he speaks about the relation to the
14 CHAPTER 1
future in this sense. Were he not to assume this connection between

personal existence and historicity as he interprets it, he would have no
justification for elevating the anticipation of the end, which is the
particular feature of individual consciousness, to so central a status in
his system.
Heidegger also refers to historicity in the "untrue", "unreal" sense of
that term, what he calls uneigentliche Geschichtlichkeit. By this he
means a kind of translation of personal doom and the anticipatory
consciousness of it into what he calls the extension of destinyll -
verfallen or Verfallenheit. We can conclude, from his various state-
ments, that he is alluding to impersonal structures and processes as
distinguished from personal ones, whose focus is death. Since death is of
a personal character, only that which is personal is primary. Whatever
transcends the personal is secondary and lacks authenticity. This lack of
authenticity appears in concepts like the infinity of physical time, as well
as in history once it implies notions like processes, circumstances,
indeterminate forces, etc. Precisely because of this basic aspect of
Heidegger's system, it may not provide a means for understanding the
phenomenon of history, even if we grant a distinction between histor-
icity and history.
After this attempt to explore some issues that may have a bearing on
the understanding of the phenomenon of history, we turn to some
critical comments related to Heidegger system:
(a) Considering Heidegger's influence on the present generation, we
might get the impression that he has indeed brought into the foreground
the phenomenon of human historicity, and thus given a decisive impetus
to a systematic quest for an explanation of the status of history. To be
sure, we may point to the aspect of internalization of history present in
Heidegger, an aspect which we have seen as the axis of the controversy
between Marx and Hegel. It is obvious that history is treated neither in
terms of spiritual essence, which it makes externally manifest, nor in
terms of human wants and needs conceived as the core of the historical
process and thus as a link between nature and history proper. For
Heidegger, historicity is dealt with only from the viewpoint of human
existence in time.
Heidegger gives unequivocal priority to man's relation to the future,
though future is interpreted not as a dimension of openness but as a
dimension of the end. Thus a certain interpretation of the future is
immediately imposed on the dimension of future. The question arises
whether Heidegger's concern with historicity amounts to a concern with

history proper, despite the similarity between the two terms and the
emphasis on time. Indeed, we can question the shift from historicity to
history, and ask whether or not this is an ambiguity that may lead us
astray.
Heidegger invokes the familiar distinction between history as a pro-
cess of events and history as the study of that process. He argues that the
problem of history pertains to the former and not to the latter. He adds
that to understand how history qua process or occurrences becomes a
possible object of historical research, one need only examine the nature
of the process. 12 The emphasis lies on the process, and not on the
detached understanding of it. Heidegger attributes primacy to occur-
rences, on the grounds that existence, i.e., historical events, is prior to
the science of history; he also widens the gulf between the two aspects,
viewing the first as in some sense self-sufficient. It does not follow from
this however, that the shift has a bearing on the meaning Heidegger
assigns to the concept of historicity. What then, is the connection
between Heidegger's concept of historicity as a process anticipating the
future qua doom, and the concept of history as a broad process of
human events and actions? This second meaning would seem to corres-
pond precisely to what Heidegger terms history in the "untrue" and
"unreal", that is to say, impersonal, sense. As a matter of fact, Heideg-
ger uses the term historicity, which is after all related to history, in a
metaphoric way, since in his view the central issue is the personal
anticipation of a personal future. But history in its proper sense is a
province of public events, creations, and institutions; as such it also
includes impersonal elements. The realm of history includes institutions
such as the state and law, whose very nature entails impersonality by
transcending the confines of individual persons. Another such institu-
tion is language, which does not belong only to the personal orbit. In
language we find a kind of intersection between the personal and the
transpersonal aspects. Conditioned by impersonal history in general,
and by the transpersonal structure of language in particular, one's
person verbal expression is a particular focus. But it becomes not only
uprooted, but also meaningless, in the most elementary sense of that
term, once we no longer conceive of language as grounded in the
transpersonal orbit. In any case, the impersonal aspect cannot be
understood as a common denominator of personal aspects, and thus as
uneigentlich in Heidegger's sense. The dichotomy between the authentic
16 CHAPTER 1
and non-authentic seems to be inapplicable to the sphere of history, in

spite of the attempt made by Heidegger.
Hence, contrary to Heidegger's appeal, we reach the conclusion that
his system turns out to be incapable of accounting for the historical
domain, understood both systematically and in the current sense of the
term. We may say that to proceed on the assumption that every
objectivization is a distortion, renunciation of authenticity, is to turn
one's back on history altogether. Hence the romantic treatment, as it
becomes prominent, shelves the problem of history rather than solving
the problem Hegel and Marx had set out to explore. Formulating the
problem again, and speaking in Heidegger's language, we face the
multiplicity of existents in time against the background of time as a
transpersonal order of succession - succession in the broad sense, and
not only as one's going toward the future.
(b) We can also question the second assumption, namely, that time is
a horizon of every interpretation of Being. In the first place, the
meaning of this is not clear: does it imply that occurrences in time,
including the succession of occurrences and our own anticipation of the
future, constitute the background of our interpretative acts, because
these acts take place in time? This would be a truism, since no one
would claim that the occurrence of an act does not occur in time. But
Heidegger's expression, "horizon of every interpretation", may suggest
that time is a content or theme of every act of interpretation, and not
merely its background or framework. This would imply that time as
content is present as an element of every interpretation, and that the
most essential dimension of time, the future, is and must be conceived
of as the adequate manifestation of the totality of Being. This is not a
.truism; but is it correct?
Any interpretation is a mode of reflective intentionality. To be sure,
all acts of this kind occur against the background of time; and some of
these acts have time as their object. If time is a content or theme
towards which reflection is directed, then it has the status of an object
which stands over and against reflective intentionality. Its status as an
object, however, does not in of itself engender reflection; reflection is
presupposed when meeting time as its subject-matter. Heidegger's
notion of the conscious anticipation of doom presupposes reflective
intentionality. We can say that the consciousness of doom reflects on the
consciousness of doom: reflective intentionality of doom is reflective
intentionality as such. This seems to be false, since a primary contrac-
tion of intentionality is being interpreted as synonymous with anticipa-

tion of death. Whereas Marx neglected awareness and moved directly
towards the first historical act, Heidegger neglects awareness and jumps
directly to a certain theme with which awareness is concerned. We may
be existentially involved in the anticipation of the end of each one of us.
But that existential anticipation does not make it into the structural
direction of consciousness, nor into the source of historical awareness.
The anticipatory interpretation of the end entails, albeit dimly, both
future and present, since anticipation starts in the present and is di-
rected towards the future. Once we are aware of dimensions qua
dimensions of time, we are concerned not only with the direction, but
also with the relations between the present or assumed data. We move
to an analysis of the meaning of the data as well as of the relations
pertaining between them. The structure of interpretation is thus charac-
terized by two basic trends - one analytic and the other synthetic. One
trend leads us to the distinction between diverse contents - in Heideg-
ger's case, between doom as a content and the anticipatory directedness
towards it, which is a content, too. The other trend leads to the
establishment of relations between the contents, placing the future in a
primary position against the present, and conceiving the' present as a
stepping-stone towards the future. The two trends have their own
positions, and do not merely follow the related contents. Both are
intrinsic to the structure of reflective consciousness, a structure that
cannot be reduced to contents. No matter how much weight a content
carries from an existential point of view, its systematic status as a
content of consciousness remains. Consequently, time cannot be con-
ceived as a horizon, occupying a higher status than the consciousness
directed towards it. We may sum up this objection to Heidegger's
treatment of history in a two-fold way: (a) the ontological premise
seems to be invalid, and (b) the philosophical interpretation of history
derived from that premise is not warranted.
(c) We can carry our critical analysis a step further. Just as Heidegger
misconstrues the status of time as a theme, he misconstrues the status of
its dimensions. Beyond the obvious differences between past and future,
Heidegger does not see the symmetry between their respective posi-
tions. The logic of his system suggests that whatever has been is in a
sense derivable from what is to be. But there is no reason to maintain
that the position of the future is prior to the position of the past.
Underlying man's relatedness to both the future and the past is a
18 CHAPTER 1
transcending of the present moment - "the here and now". That

transcendence finds its expression in both directions - towards the past
and towards the future. Hence transcendence itself cannot be derived
from either direction, and the transcendence towards the past cannot be
derived from that towards the future. Given that transcendence, history
cannot be treated exclusively in terms of either of the two directions.
Recognizing the transience of the present moment conjures up both past
and present. No ascription of primacy to any dimension of time is
warranted by the structure of our attitude to tim~, or by the position of
time as a comprehensive form of succession. To be sure, we do not deny
the difference between the dimensions of time nor between the different
attitudes towards it. But these differences are encompassed by the
structure of time, on the one hand, and by the transcending attitude, on
the other.
This correlation between the structure and the differences has signifi-
cance for history and historical awareness. The grounds of history, as a
process of occurrences in time, do not lie in one dimensien of time, but
in the primary correlation between time and reflection. We remain
within the sphere of time, but we also reflect upon it and discern the
orientation towards past, present, and future on the one hand, and
towards crystallized modes of human creativity, against the background
of occurrences in time, on the other.
From our critical analysis of the three representative systematic
conceptions of history, we conclude that there is no way to identify a
"first" beginning of history, either outside it or within it. There are no
constitutive acts of history. Hence we have to follow a different line:
history is presupposed, and we must analyse it from within. We need to
identify some elementary concepts which, though already historical, can
also be amplified to enable us to draw the broader contours of the
sphere of history. This is the next step in our exploration.
VI
Our approach to the problem involves abandoning the attempt to

determine the raison d' etre of history. Our starting point is the given fact
of man's existence in, and practical or reflective orientation to, the flow
of historical occurrence. We do not seek to explain the origin of history
in terms of its final or efficient cause, but to analyze the historical

complex in terms of its underlying assumption.13
Man's relation to time as the form or horizon of succession is the
foundation of the historical domain. In his day-to-day experience, man
is confronted with the fact of flux or temporal succession, i.e., that event
'b' follows event 'a'. Man recognizes, in addition to this formal element
of succession, an element of content in virtue of which event 'b' is
somehow connected with event 'a'. These two aspects - man's recogni-
tion of succession and discernment of inter-connection between succes-
sive phenomena - are two sides of the same coin. To describe a
phenomenon as occurring later or earlier than another phenomenon is
ipso facto to correlate the two phenomena. In perceiving succession,
one confronts the fact of transition, and also takes the first step toward
clarifying the relations that constitute transition. Discernment of the
reciprocal relation between the stages of the process is thus implicit in
recognition of the process.
Since it entails attentive directedness towards, and discernment of,
process, man's two-fold relatedness to time would not be possible were
he totally immersed in the process. Were our process-discerning related-
ness to time merely a matter of process, we could not discern process.
The relation to time implies a distinction between man, the discerning
subject, and time, the discerned object. Man may therefore be said to
occupy a double status in relation to the flow of events in time: on the
one hand, he lives in, and moves with, the process; but on the other
hand, he observes the process, and is detached from the observed
process. The condition of man's reflective relatedness to time lies not in
his existential engagement in the object, but in his conceptual intention-
ality toward it. An adequate account of historicity must start from that
basic relatedness to objects in general, and to time qua object in
particular. Ontologically, man is neither outside, nor on the threshold
of, nor totally inside, time. History is a particular interpretation given
by man to his involvement in and directedness toward time.
History, understood as man's interpretation of time, may be de-
scribed as (a) the sum-total of man-made processes in which such human
creations like language, law, economy, and state are crystallized, and as
(b) the sum-total of those processes in which man harnesses such natural
factors as rivers, weather, and the laws of nature, to his own ends. The
distinction between these two components of the historical complex may
20 CHAPTER 1
be formulated as follows: Whereas man-made crystallizations such as

language and state owe both their creation and their meaning to human
agency alone, natural factors integrated into human reality do not owe
their meaning to man's integrating activity. Thus, for example, the
currents of rivers navigated by man would retain a core of meaning even
were man not to harness them to his ends or integrate them into his
works. Beyond this difference, however, both aspects of history share a
common feature, pUblicity. In this respect, history may be conceived as
a public domain, i.e., as the province of men's concerted intentionality
and effort toward crystallizing creations that transcend the individual
domains of their creators. Impersonal publicity is thus one aspect of the
content of the historical complex.
From here, we can move to the identification of the precondition of
history. As the province of public creations crystallized beyond the
private domains of individual men, history presupposes a creative
process that neither begins nor ends in the present; this in turn presup-
poses that the structure of time is open, permitting an unimpeded flow
of the creative process along either or both of its channels. The open
structure of time underlies man's relation to the creations crystallized
over the ages by the effort of generations. In relating himself to the
collective creations of mankind, man adopts a position within their
framework as well as over and against it. This does not mean that man is
subject to shaping in the narrow sense of historical determinism - the
issue which will be discussed subsequently. But it does imply that he is
exposed to the influence and impact of historical creations. Thus, for
example, a measure of thematic determination is clearly involved in the
control of man's ideas by collective creations such as language. The
question to be answered is not, "What is the reason for the being of
history?" but rather, given the existence of history, "What is the
condition of its possibility?". The answer suggested is that the precon-
dition of history is man's reflective relatedness to the collective creations
of mankind and to the structure, in and of time, which constitutes the
background of the creative process. This relatedness is partly reflective,
partly practical. There is a practical-active advance from the present to
the future, and a reflective-retrospective concern with the past as the
domain of completed - though ongoing - creations. Beyond the differ-
ences between active orientation to the future and reflective orientation
to the past, both faces of the historical complex presuppose the open
structure of time, interpreted now as the future and now as the past. We
have already observed that transcending the present moment is the

precondition of relatedness to past and future alike. We can now add
that consciousness confronts the openness of time through its reflective
directed ness towards the past and its intervening directedness towards
the future. In transcending the present instant towards either future or
past, one releases oneself from full immersion in time. Detachment
from time-present is the condition of reflective relatedness to both
time-past and time-future.
VII
The methodical and thematic fruitfulness of an approach to the problem

of history controlled by the concept of reflective relatedness can be
shown by pointing out some elementary constituents of everyday his-
torical experience that invite interpretation in terms of reflective re-
latedness to collective creation and to the open structure of time. As our
first example, let us take that sense of process which leads man to
recognize the openness of time.
To perceive the passage of generations is to perceive that one stands
in the midst of this passage, in the midst of time. Latent in man's
awareness of the succession of generations are the seeds of his related-
ness to time in the philosophical sense. Implicit in the awareness of
biological succession is the historical consciousness of the open structure
of time. Once we realize that men have lived before our time and will
live after our time, we have perceived that the particular point where we
stand is neither the beginning nor the end, but the - shifting - middle of
time. In other words, we have discerned that time is open. "One
generation pas seth away and another generation cometh." Although
the succession of generations is, in a sense, a "pre-historical" or biologi-
cal datum, man's interpretation of it is historical, and creates a synthesis
of the biological and historical layers. Here, then, is an illustration of an
elementary human experience historically interpreted in terms of time's
open structure by a being endowed with reflective consciousness. This is
not to deny the obvious fact that, were he not endowed with historical
consciousness in the first place, man would not interpret his awareness
of the succession of generations in historical terms. Although an oc-
casion of historical consciousness, the experience of alternating gener-
ations is not its cause. The example merely illustrates the bearing of
22 CHAPTER 1
historical consciousness, qua relatedness to time as an open structure,

upon man's elementary experience.
What about the other element of historical consciousness, relatedness
to the collective creations of mankind? Is there concrete evidence of its
significance for man's elementary historical experience? The answer
follows from an analysis of language as a given component of man's
concrete reality, a component whose nature is historical. Language is a
collective, impersonal creation, whose existence precedes its use by a
particular person for self-expression or speech. Language is not created
when an individual speaks, but only released or realized thereby. In this
respect, man's relatedness to language involves a confrontation with a
collective creation of the many for the sake of the many. Only as one of
many can the individual partake of this public creation. Our purpose
here is not to analyze the systematic significance of language, but to
establish the relation between language as a collective creation and
historical consciousness as a mode of reflective relatedness to language
in particular and to the horizon of history in general. The existence of
language is contingent upon the speaker's transcendence of the act of
speech here and now, and upon his directedness toward what lies
beyond. Reflective relatedness to the "beyond" is the condition not only
of the existence of language, but also of its meaning as the theme or
content of intentionality. Intentionality whose theme is language is an
outstanding example of historical consciousness proper. Implicit in
man's encounter with language is his awareness (a) that he is not its
creator, (b) that he has inherited it from past generations, and (c) that
he is subject to determination or conditioning by its contents as histori-
cal creations. It follows that both phases of historical consciousness -
i.e., relatedness to collective creations and relatedness to time's open
structure - find their manifestation in man's relatedness to language.
Unlike man's awareness of the succession of generations, which adds
historical significance to a pre-historical given, man's confrontation with
language exposes the essentially historical meaning of the lingual
datum.
The foregoing analysis does not answer why history exists. Its modest
task, as stated, was to illustrate the bearing of historical consciousness
upon concrete experience, by indicating components of human experi-
ence that invite historical interpretation.
In view of its bearing upon the empirical components of historical
reality, reflective relatedness seems to afford a vantage point from which
one can survey the full sweep of the historical process. Both faces of
history - as the so-far completed process from pa,st to present and as the
ongoing process from present to future - presuppose relatedness as the
condition of their possibility. To put it another way, both reflective
directedness towards recorded history as well as creative directedness
towards the ongoing process of historical occurrence, presuppose man's
relatedness to the open structure of time. As the object of intentional-
ity, time becomes the theoretical and actual condition of history. Thus
man's double standpoint in history, both the denizen and the detached
observer of its domain, represents one realization of the relatedness.
The twofold condition of history consists in man's reflective directedness
towards the past and creative - but also reflective - directedness towards
the future.
VIII
Let us comment on the impact of these two experiences from a broader

point of view. We do not mean to say that history is a projection of the
two primary experiences presented above - the descendence and depen-
dence between generations, the relationship between individuals here
and now and the acquired language. On the contrary, historical aware-
ness is presupposed before we can interpret these two kinds of experi-
ence. To put it differently; experiences reinforce historical awareness by
giving it concreteness, or a foothold within the personal realm of every
human individual who interprets his genealogical dependence in more
than biological terms and interprets the existence of a language as a
historical legacy. We have to distinguish, therefore, between experi-
ences constituting history and experiences reinforcing historical con-
sciousness. We do not say that there is an experience which constitutes
time - what is called in contemporary philosophy zeitigen - since the
existence and the meaning of time are presupposed and not genetically
mvestigated. History is not explained genetically by the experience of
descendence and by the awareness of the acquisition of language. The
difference remains between the genesis of a sphere and occurrences
interpreted within that sphere, which in turn add meaning to it and build
a bridge between the personal orbit and the trans-personal and public
one.
Furthermore, we point here to partial experiences. The experience of
24 CHAPTER 1
genealogical dependence in its primary sense relates to the attitude of

sons toward their parents. As such, it does not embrace the broader
meaning of the relations between one generation and all its predeces-
sors. Only historical interpretation going beyond partial experiences can
add these broad contours to the experience of dependence, Mutatis
mutandis, the same applies to acquiring a language or entering the
domain of a language spoken in one's home by one's parents. The
experience of adjustment, or the experience of adaptation as such, is not
an experience of the historical, that is to say cumulative or transforma-
tive, character of languages. Only a historical interpretation in the strict
sense of the term, one referring to the sequence of events in time, can
amplify the primary experiences by seeing them as illustrations of a part
of the general character of languages as historical entities. Thus we find
a reciprocity between historical awareness and reinforcing experiences,
in the sense that the experiences turn history into an affair within one's
personal domain. One's personal domain can be understood only when
it is interpreted as lodged within its broad historical context. The
difference between the particularity of experiences and the breadth of
historical interpretation is maintained in spite of the mutual reinforce-
ment that we encounter here.
Having said this, we should look into two alleged possibilities of
interpreting history and demonstrate that particularity is overcome not
only on the level of the cursus of the events, but also on the level of the
underlying substratum of history and the direction of history. There-
fore, we shall now consider the historical subject, and then historical
progress, as comprehensive or all-embracing interpretations of history.
CHAPTER 2
THE SUBJECT AND PROCESS
We began our exploration with the awareness of time by concrete

human beings. Yet we cannot assume that this awareness implies
consciousness of time in its completeness. It can even be argued that
such consciousness is ontologically and cognitively impossible: time has
not completed its course or, put differently, we are always in the midst
of time. We have also seen that this self-awareness, lodged within the
course of time, is one component of historical consciousness. We must
conclude that our awareness of time is essentially an awareness of
segments of time. The same conclusion applies to events that occur in
time. We cannot have an overall view of occurrences in time, nor of
their full interrelations. We may attempt to broaden the scope of the
occurrences as well as the nexus of the interrelations, but such cumula-
tive incrementation can never encompass the totality of events. Thus the
more events we know and interrelations we conceive, the more we
become aware of the lacunae in our knowledge.
Attempts to introduce the concept of law or covering laws into the
historical orbit are intended to overcome the fragmentary nature of
historical awareness. If we know the laws of historical processes, we can
have an overall view of history without knowing the individual compo-
nents - events in time - that are subsumed under these laws. There is an
ever-recurring temptation, to introduce historical laws, not only because
they join history and science in the sense of Naturwissenschaften, but
also because they supply functional contexts or constant relations to
protect against fragmentation - which is the essential task of any
scientific law.
There are two well-known arguments against "historical" laws. First,
as a matter of fact, no historical laws have been demonstrated to have
programmatic, hypothetical, or material validity. Second, historical
events are individual: the French and Bolshevik revolutions may both
be cases of "revolution", but they are different individual events; they
cannot be subsumed under generalities that are tantamount to laws.
Since there are no events unless there is an awareness of them or, to put
it differently, there are no events outside the interaction between
25
26 CHAPTER 2
interpretation and time, no subsumption of events under "laws" can do

justice to the Gestalt of historical occurrences, where there is human
interpretation, involvement, response, reaction, and integration into
networks of events, and integration of those networks into human
self-consciousness. Given this impossibility of historical laws, and if no
enlargement or amplification can possibly overcome the inherent frag-
mentary nature of awareness, history can present itself to us only as the
sum-total of scattered fragments. The correlate of these fragments is
time on the one hand, and contexts of significance ,and meanings on the
other. The covering law, forming, as it were, a story above the events, is
not such a correlate. Here we must concern ourselves with a particular
device characteristic of some historical interpretations, namely, the
introduction of "subject" into the province of history. Human beings,
who are either historical agents or interpreters of historical occurrences,
see themselves as subjects. Since human beings are essentially impli-
cated in historical processes, either as causal agents or as prisms of
processes, they project their own position as subjects on the process.
Historical interpretation then becomes concerned with the issue whether
or not the process is related to a subject or to subjects. Although it is easy
to understand how this projection of subject on history originates, we must
take a critical look at its legitimacy.
II
To pursue this cntlque, we must ascertain again the distinguishing

marks of the historical sphere and of its datum in particular. To begin
with, the datum of historical awareness, and consequently of historical
research, is not what has been or once was a constituent of the real
world. l The notion that history is the study of what was once a present
reality, but is now a part of the past, rests upon two assumptions: The
first is that time-present is the real time or, at least, the real dimension
of time; to be present is to be real, to have been present is to be unreal.
The second assumption is that if the datum of history is what has been
real but is no longer so, then the datum of history is at once real and
unreal. But what constitutes the allegedly unreal aspect of the datum
dealt with by history? The only answer compatible with the notion
under consideration is that the unreal aspect of the datum of history is
its pastness. From this it follows, however, that the entire datum must
THE SUBJECT AND PROCESS 27
be unreal, since it lacks a present aspect ex hypothesi - and thus that

history deals with data that were once real, but are now unreal. This
conception of history invests the historical process with the power to
wear away objects and rob them of their reality.
It is a mistake to base the understanding of history on objects that
have been, i.e., on objects from which we are separated by the gulf of
time. Historical enquiry does not move from the object in the past to
the observer in the present, but from the observer in the present to the
object in the past. If historical process flows from an earlier to a later
time, we must regard it as a process from past to present. Historical
research, however, can only proceed from a starting-point in the present
to point in the past. Thus the discursive order of thought does not
correspond to the objective order of time.
Because its starting point is in the present, historical research, like
other empirical sciences, deals with a datum. The task of historical
research is to discern and explain the datum. Historical research is
distinguished from other empirical enquiries in that it conceives of the
datum as a datum that has become, and conceives of every point in the
present as a point that has become. 2 By treating present existence as the
product of the preceding process, historical research exposes the point
of encounter between past and present. This implies that the object of
history is neither isolated nor enclosed exclusively in the past.
III
Whether the subject occupies a position in the conceptual structure of

history would not be a difficult question if w~ could use either the
metaphysical deduction of concepts or the descriptive method to cope
with it. Unfortunately, neither method can help us solve our problem,
as the following analysis demonstrates:
(a) The metaphysical deduction of concepts: There is no fixed reservoir

of concepts that constitute the assumptions of knowledge. Such con-
cepts are neither encountered as given, nor analysed in terms of their
function because they are given. Kant employed what he called the
Metaphysical Deduction of concepts, i.e., the method of determining
concepts without reference to their specific epistemological function, to
outline the plan of the System of Pure Reason. In the course of its
28 CHAPTER 2
development, however, epistemological thought adopted a different

method. An adequate deduction of concepts is mainly transcendental,
showing that concepts fulfill a specific function in relation to a particular
problem. Starting from a problem that requires solution, the Transcen-
dental Deduction demonstrates that the required solution entails the
assumption of a certain concept. Thus with our problem, we cannot
regard the concept of subject as given and assert that, because it is
given, it fulfills a transcendental function in the historical sphere.
Instead, we must ask: What is the thematic-historical problem whose
solution requires the assumption of a concept in general and of the
concept of subject in particular?
Furthermore, even if - for the sake of argument - transcendental
analysis of one cognitive sphere indicates that the concept of subject is a
condition of that sphere, we are not entitled to conclude that this
concept is ipso facto present or necessary in relation to another cognitive
sphere. Each sphere requires a new demonstration, unless one assumes
the initial unity of the spheres - an assumption which itself must be
proved. Even if there is reason for assuming the epistemological validity
of the concept of subject in a particular sphere (ethics, law, sociology,
politics), we cannot automatically infer its epistemological validity in the
sphere of history. Transference is not a sufficient means for coping with
a concept's validity, since the specific implications of the concept must
be explored in each of the spheres.
It follows that we must change the meaning of the a priori status. It
can no longer be said that a concept is a priori if it precedes experience,
that is, if it is encountered as given without any relation to something
else. Only in relation to something else can we assume concepts; and-
in the case at hand - that something else is the cognitive sphere to which
those concepts belong. A concept is a priori, not if it precedes a
problem, but if it is valid in relation to that problem.
(b) The descriptive method: It is equally futile to adduce the givenness of

the concept of subject in a particular sphere of knowledge as proof of its
epistemological validity. It is obvious that historical research and his-
torical thought have recourse to the concept of subject. The language of
historical description and explanation uses terms borrowed trom per-
sonallife to denote the subject of actions and events. In the context of
historical thought and research the name "Moses" is used to denote a
subject of events, rather than a nexus or process of events; the events

associated with that name are regarded as manifestations of the subject
denoted by it. This applies not only to terms that denote primary or
individual subjects such as "Moses", but also to terms that denote
secondary or collective subjects, such as the Greek "polis", the "prole-
tariat", etc. But to accept the validity of concepts because they are
employed by a given science is to mistake an interview with a scientist or
scholar for epistemological analysis. The task of analysis is to probe the
validity of concepts, not merely to describe the concepts used in scien-
tific research or thought. Analysis of this kind entails, not division and
classification, but authentic criticism, that is, examination of concepts in
terms of their capacity to fulfill their allotted functions. Just as we do not
acknowledge a given reservoir of a priori concepts simply because it is
given, so we do not acknowledge the given set of concepts employed by
a particular science or by a particular scientist simply because it is given.
What datum provides the starting point from which we set out to
explore the preceding process of becoming? It is not the past as past, but
the past whose traces we encounter here and now, that con~Litutes the
datum for historical research. 3 Taking that past as its datum, historical
research explores the process of becoming expressed or made manifest
by its traces. Hence, discursive thought must proceed from the traces in
the present to the past, even though the objective process flows from
past to present. Towards what traces historical research is oriented, or
for what traces the historian seeks an explanation in the process - these
questions guide the historian in his pursuit. The answer to them depends
upon the principle of selection that controls our research. But the
relatedness of historical research to the traces is an assumption that does
not depend upon our principle of selection. On the contrary, were it not
for the fact that historical existence is bi-dimensional , i.e., a mode of
present existence which is permeated by the past, were it not for this
general distinguishing mark of historical existence, the question about
our principle of selection would be meaningless, and historical research
itself would lack grounding. It is the necessity of starting from the
datum, or the impossibility of starting from the past, which compels us
to study the datum. We are motivated to undertake historical research
because we can explain the datum in the present only by reference to a
preceding process of becoming. Historical research is not a matter of
curiosity or a quest for monumental examples (as Nietzsche would have
30 CHAPTER 2
it), but a cognitive necessity; it results from the very horizon of knowl-
edge or encounter with data the explanation of which is not inherent in
prior givenness.
We can now consider whether there is sufficient reason for assuming
the concept of subject as a condition of the cognitive sphere of history.
Since the concept of subject has several connotations, we must examine
whether there is any sense in which the concept can be regarded as a
necessary assumption of historical research. Let us therefore look into
some of the different meanings of the concept of subject.
IV
A. The substratum. Historical research starts from a datum in the

present, which it interprets as a product of the process of becoming. The
process of becoming is thus the means of explaining the datum. To
assume the concept of subject in the relation between the datum and
becoming, we must show that the subject is inherent either in the datum
or in becoming.
The datum consists of traces - a relic, a document, or an institution -
that we must confront and accept. Initially, the datum is a problem to be
solved, since we confront it as a constituent of reality, but do not
understand its place in the structure of reality. The datum lacks the
well-delineated image implied by the concept of subject. It is not
encountered as an ordered strw;:ture to be recognized rather than
explained. Were the datum ordered, were it known as a self-contained
substratum sustaining itself in its proper essence - as a subject -
historical research would not be necessary. The datum as such would be
a present Gestalt. Historical research is required because we are given
immediately the traces of historical actions (political and social facts,
cultural creations, etc.), and not their substratum, and because those
traces demand an explanation. If the traces as such constituted a
subject, or were the substratum given, historical existence would be
one-dimensional, and there would be no need to have recourse to the
other, past, dimension. Were its substratum given in its full stature,
historical existence would not be historical. It follows that the position
of subject is not inherent in the datum; it can be inherent, if anywhere,
only in the process of becoming. And if inherent in becoming, the
subject qua substratum must explain the givenness of the datum. The
datum must be conceived of as an expression, attribute, or effect of an

underlying substratum. By virtue of its connection with the becoming
that precedes it and with the becoming that follows it, any substratum
immanent in the process cannot be isolated from the process.
We know becoming as process, not as subject; and within that
continuous process we discern qualitative changes. Take, for example,
the process in time in which certain points appear, some carrying a
biographical connotation: "Moses," "Joshua," "1udas Maccabeus,"
"the Spanish expulsion," etc. The names used to denote those "points"
are more than mere proper names; they are also signs indicating that we
can - or try to - provide a historical explanation for each of those points.
In the language of historical research, a proper name is denominator to
which we have referred a series of events. Though perceived as links in a
single series, the events differ from one another. In a single series,
certain prominent events can be characterized not only by reference to
their place in the series, but also by qualitative characteristics, such as
the flight from Egypt to Midian, the confrontation with Pharaoh, etc.
The substratum of these characteristics or events is never isolated nor
separated from them. In other words, the substratum is never a subject
whose existence transcends the process of events. On the contrary, since
every event is determined within the series or within the process, there
is no justification for jumping over that series. Because events are given
in a series, we are not entitled to assume a factor that does not become,
and which exists independently as a substratum for becoming. Within
the context of the relation between the datum and the process of
becoming by which the datum is explained, the subject cannot be
conceived as immanent in either relatum. The subject must, accord-
ingly, be regarded as a third factor, which 'neither constituent of the
historical sphere entitles us to assume. The only function that the
subject, qua substratum, may be said to fulfill is that of explaining the
explanatory element, i.e., becoming. Understood in this sense, the
substratum is conceived as the source of becoming. Assuming the
substratum consists accordingly of two elements: (a) recourse to the
past, or to the process by which the datum is produced and explained;
and (b) a quest for an explanation of the explanation, or an answer to
the question, "What produced the process of becoming?" But if the
assumption of the concept of subject is arrived at by this procedure, that
assumption cannot satisfy the methodical requirements of the historical
sphere.
32 CHAPTER 2
Hence we must seek, not the methodical-transcendental assumption

of history, but its metaphysical assumption, when we ask, "What is the
source of becoming?" The question remains whether we must seek the
metaphysical assumption of history in a subject qua the creative source
of becoming. Or may we regard the process of becoming itself - i.e., the
series of events in time undergoing qualitative changes - as the meta-
physical assumption or presupposition of history? It has been remarked
that the world as a whole, if regarded historically, creates from within
itself.4 It may be added that there is no way to determine whether
becoming is an ultimate fact, or whether it depends upon a subject that
does not become. But were we to adopt the latter assumption, we would
face two problems:
(a) How does one make the transition from an external substratum to
the process? Or, to put it another way, how can one bridge the gap
beween an independent subject and a process of becoming which, by
introducing the subject into a structure of events, imposes upon it
relations with events? Having no alternative but to introduce into the
subject an element by virtue of which it is related to becoming, we rob it
of the very independence in which our assumption is anchored. We
faced these questions already in our analysis of Hegel's position.
(b) Second, is it necessary to assume a subject for every event in the
process, or does it suffice to assume a single subject for the process as a
whole? Determination, description, and characterization of an event
entail its integration into a frame of reference, or context. Thus, to
describe an event as a religious event, one assigns it a place in the
structure of religious events called, for example, the history of religion;
to determine an event as a political event one assigns it a place in the
structure of events known as the history of politics; and so on. It is
indeed possible to establish causal and/or reciprocal relations between
different kinds of events. But the question is whether the possibility -
and even the necessity - of such relations presupposes the assumption of
a single, common subject behind the multiplicity and diversity of events.
In any case, the assumption of a single and common subject is
incompatible with the qualitative starting-point of historical research,
i.e., with the diversity of historical events. In this respect the historical
sphere differs from that of the natural sciences. In the sphere of physics,
for example, diverse phenomena (light, sound) are unified because their
diversity is due to human-sensory factors that must be eliminated (as
Max Planck argued). But in the historical sphere it is neither necessary
nor possible to unify diverse phenomena, because their diversity is due-

at least in part - to differences of content that are independent of the
human-sensory factor. The involvement of the human agent is essential
in the historical context. An event may be defined as a religious event in
terms of its content, which pertains to the relation between man and a
transcendent being; an event may be defined as a political event in terms
of its content, which pertains to the relation between man and man.
Hence the assumption that historical events require a qualitative de-
scription is incompatible with the assumption that the explanation for
historical events must be sought in a factor that lies beyond them. By
linking historical events with a common subject we obliterate, rather
than illuminate, their qualitative aspects. This becomes clearer if we
conceive of all phenomena as explicable by reference to a single,
universal, subject - regardless of the sphere (History or Nature )inwhich
they are determined. The subject is assumed in order to serve as the
meeting-point of diverse relational structures.
It was not an analysis of becoming and the need to explain the
facticity of becoming that prompted Hegel to posit a common subject
for the universal process as a whole. Hegel accepted the qualitative
aspect of reality in spite of the possible gap between qualitative exis-
tence and the single subject. This duality in his position finds reflection
in his doctrine of the "Cunning of Reason", according to which all
events, regardless of their individual characteristics, serve the interests
of Spirit. In assuming that Spirit constitutes not only the substratum but
also the regulator of the process, Hegel evidently oversteps the limits of
an analysis concerned with the inner problems of history as an orbit of
events and as a sphere of knowledge. In any case, we learn more from
Hegel's theory of Spirit about the status of history and its essence as a
spiritual process than about the relation of the historical process to an
underlying subjects. 5
B. The enduring entity. Whether there is a subject that remains self-

identical in the process is a question which abandons the process in
quest of a factor that precedes it. The historical sphere contains both the
datum and the process. By analysing the process, we discern qualitative
events against the background of continuous time. Neither the nature
of the datum nor the nature of the qualitative events implies an
enduring subject. Every historical event as historical - i.e., as bi-
dimensional - is an enduring event. Endurance is a feature of all events
34 CHAPTER 2
whose beginning is a point in the past and whose given traces are a point
in the present. In this sense we can say that non-enduring events are not
historical events. But this is not the sense in which "endurance" is
employed in the natural sciences. There the assumption of an enduring
subject implies that, under certain conditions, certain measurements
lead to identical numerical results. 6 In the historical sphere, however,
there is no justification for assuming endurance as a quantitative iden-
tity. We are not looking for a sum of events that are given side by side,
but for a process of events that are given in succession. When we say
that a historical event endures, we do not mean to imply that it remains
permanent under all conditions, but rather that it is related to the
datum, i.e., that it is integrated into the structure of which it is a
constituent element.
In the structure called the history of politics, for example, the deter-
mination of events to be considered is controlled by our principle of
selection, i.e., the state or political activity. A particular event, such as
the Napoleonic wars, is not determinate and identical under all condi-
tions. It is rather determined within the structure we have defined by
reference to the concept of the state. Determination of events by
reference to qualitative components precludes the possibility of deter-
mining their isolated identity independent of the structure. Not even a
biological subject such as Napoleon (as distinguished from a collective
subject, e.g., the Age of Enlightenment) can be conceived of as endur-
ing or self-identical without deviating from the starting-point of histori-
cal research. On the historical stage, Napoleon appears within a context
of events and occurrences, each of which contributes a real content to
the empty series in time in which we assign it a position. Even were we
to ignore the arguments against assuming the subject qua substratum,
we would still not be entitled to assume that the subject qua substratum
is enduring or self-identical in every occurrence. Every qualitative event
adds some content to the subject or substratum with which it is con-
nected. In the historical sphere, the Napoleon who was the substratum
of actions during the Russian campaign is not the same Napoleon who
was the substratum of actions during the period of the Directorate.
Every event is added to its subject and, in relation to subsequent event,
constitutes a part of that subject. Hence not even the assumption of a
substratum that underlies events warrants the assumption of a self-
identical or self-contained subject that endures in all events. In the
historical sphere the subject qua substratum must be distinguished from
the subject as enduring. Consequently there is no justification for

deducing the latter from the former.
The assumption of an enduring or self-identical subject in history
pre-supposes a particular interpretation of the process of becoming and
of the events that occur within its framework. To make occurrence
depend upon an enduring factor, we must maintain (a) that occurrence
introduces no innovations into the factor upon which it depends, and
(b) that occurrence is merely a manifestation of the content latent in the
enduring factor. Because it does not enter the process of becoming, the
enduring subject retains its identity in relation to every stage of the
process. Hence, in relation to the enduring factor - i.e. subject - upon
which it depends, the process lacks qualitative-innovating characteris-
tics. Thus the assumption of an enduring subject in history presupposes
an interpretation of becoming that defines its essence as a manifestation
and not as a process of changes. Only if to become is to make an
enduring subject manifest can we conceive of the enduring factor as
both the self-identical subject and the substratum of its manifestations.
If this interpretation is valid, we may not distinguish between the
subject as substratum and the subject as enduring entity. Even so, there
remains the objection that an enduring subject is not entailed by the
assumptions of history. In other words: we do not make this assumption
unless we are interested in exposing the essence of reality and in
determining its metaphysical status, which may lead us beyond or above
history.
The difficulty in assuming an enduring subject in history can be
brought into relief by analysis of the term "people" in a historical frame
of reference. If "people" means an entity that endures and retains its
identity in every occurrence, then a people's existence is entirely inde-
pendent of history, and the definition of the term "people" is unhistori-
cal. But if by "people" we mean an entity bound up with the historical
process, and if we define that entity in terms of characteristics that come
to exist in the course of the process (e.g., language, territoriality,
statehood) and are involved in that process, we undermine the assump-
tion that a people is an enduring factor that undergoes no changes in the
process of becoming. This difficulty explains why Max Weber found it
impossible to define a people but in terms of the aspiration to shape a
state. Weber's definition is based on a functionalistic principle that sees
a people in terms of its relation to a particular structure of historical
becoming, viz., the establishment of a state.
36 CHAPTER 2
The problem that confronts us when we seek to characterize collective

subjects such as a people, and individual subjects such as Napoleon, is
the relation between the spheres of history and biology. We cannot
evade this problem because Napoleon is defined both in terms of his
relation to events in the sphere of history and also in terms of organic
characteristics in the sphere of biology. The historical characterization
of Napoleon is based upon the assumption that beyond or underneath
the historical sphere there lies a non-historical - i.e. biological or even
psychological- plane of existence. The same would apply, as a matter of
principle, to our characterization of a people. A people is defined not
only by reference to historical criteria such as a common destiny, a
common language, and a common culture, but sometimes also by
reference to biological criteria such as a common origin. With regard to
a people - since we refer to a collective entity and not to an organic
individual - there is no need to assume that the existence of common
historical characteristics implies the existence of common biological
characteristics. Nevertheless, here too we sometimes find an attempt to
bring together diverse spheres of existence.
The problem presented by this encounter of spheres may be formu-
lated as follows: If we assume an entity that undergoes no qualitative
changes in the biological sphere, but concurrently does undergo a
process of qualitative change in the historical sphere, we must explain
how an encounter between the two spheres is brought about; how, in
other words, a biological subject that does not change as a Gestalt, is
transmuted into an element of historical existence that does change. To
put it another way: How can we account for the transition from the
plane of biological existence, which is earlier in time, to the plane of
historical existence, which is later in time? The existence of qualitative
multiplicity is not explained, but only expressed, by the. assumption that
the biological subject is also a historical subject. Even granted the need
to assume an enduring subject, how does the historical sphere emerge
from the biological sphere? What accounts for the transformation of
mere events into historical events? Why do qualitative events occur in
the continuous series in time? An attempt to invest the biological
subject with the power to shatter continuous time and to call forth the
process of historical occurrence would amount to an admission that the
existence of different spheres cannot be explained by the assumption
that there would be no historical occurrence without a biological sub-
ject. Though it can be a necessary condition, the biological subject is not
an explanation. The only justification for assuming the biological sub-

ject in the sphere of historical occurrence is that it does exist as a
biological subject. Even if we assume that the concept of subject is valid
in the biological sphere, we are not entitled to transfer it to the historical
sphere.
The enduring subject assumed in the natural sphere cannot be intro-
duced into the historical sphere without bridging the gap between the
spheres of nature and history. What obliges us to assume an encounter
between different spheres obliges us a fortiori to assume an encounter
between historical phenomena such as trends, social movements, etc.,
which are determined within the limits of the historical sphere only. To
dissect such phenomena in order to expose their underlying biological
subject is equivalent to analysing propositions without subjects (e.g., it
is raining) with a view to demonstrating that they do have a subject,
namely being as a whole. If propositions can be treated in this manner
because we are concerned with their formal structure, am\ not their
qualitative content, historical phenomena cannot be so treated, because
it is precisely their qualitative content that we must explain. When our
task is to explain phenomena that must be conceived of as products of
the historical process, not as a superstructure erected on top of a
biological foundation, we have no reason for assuming an enduring
subject. Only in relation to a certain class of historical phenomena is it
permissible to assume a biological subject; and even with regard to this
class, the validity of the concept is confined within the limits of the
"pre-historical" sphere of nature. The fact that nature precedes history
in time does not entitle us to regard the natural sphere as a necessary,
built-in assumption of the historical sphere from the point of view of
history.
The conclusion that there is no enduring subject in history detracts
nothing from the validity of Kant's "first analogy of experience," which
states that "in all change of appearances substance is permanent; its
quantum in nature is neither increased nor diminished."7 The foregoing
analysis replies that an enduring subject is not an isolated subject. In the
historical sphere, one finds no factor that may be conceived of as a
substance in the strict sense of an immutable entity unaffected by
change. The historical process by its nature is unable to accommodate
self-identical and autonomous elements. Only in a functional sense can
the concept of an enduring substance be assumed in the historical
sphere. In other words, the concept is applicable only to a structure of
38 CHAPTER 2
relations among phenomena, and not to individual or isolated phe-

nomena. The enduring elements are to be sought within the limits of the
process, not beyond them.
C. The aspect of continuity. The assumption of a series of historical

events presupposes the continuity of time, and of physical time within
whose framework historical occurrences are determined. 8 The fact that
the plane of a historical series rests on the plane of continuous time finds
its reflection in the fact that only certain events - depending upon our
principle of selection - enter the sphere of historical concern and
exploration. The specific nature of these events obliges us to assume,
within historical occurrences, a continuous process in "pre"-historical
time, e.g., physical time. This raises the question of what entitles us to
assume a continuous historical series if historical events are conceived of
as specific events that have been picked out of the continuous temporal
process. In the sphere of nature, the continuity of physical time may be
regarded as the guarantee of the continuity of occurrence. But in the
sphere of history, where occurrences are determined not within but, so
to speak, on the basis of continuous time, the problem of continuity
arises in all its acuteness. The guarantee of continuity must be sought
not beyond, but within, historical occurrences, i.e., in the relation
between historical events. Our starting point prevents us from asking
what precedes occurrences, and forces us to seek the foundation for
continuity within the context of occurrences. What guarantees the
continuity of historical occurrences does not lie in something that
precedes occurrences, but is rather inherent in the relations that obtain
among diverse historical events. Hence the problem of continuity does
not concern the subject of the historical process, but rather the order
and structure of the historical process itself.
From the twofold assumption that (a) the existence of continuity
presupposes the existence of a subject of the process, and that (b) oc-
currences are an expression or manifestation of that subject, one could
draw the opposite conclusion that the continuity of events is im-
possible. May not the subject find expression in manifestations that
are given side by side and, consequently, in several parallel series? If so,
each event can be conceived of as a separate unit isolated from, or
unrelated to, the other events in the series. Again: historical continuity
derives its meaning from the relations obtaining among the historical
events themselves, and not from the relation obtaining between the
totality of events and their underlying subject. The problem of conti-

nuity is accordingly independent of whether there is an enduring subject
that retains its identity throughout the process. The diversity of histori-
cal events - which renders the assumption of their underlying identity
unnecessary - does not prevent us from assuming a subject of occur-
rences. But to make this assumption, and thus to crystallize the unity of
the process into the unity of a subject, is to project p certain epistemo-
logical principle on the sphere of historical reality. This too requires
specific justification in the terms of the province of history.
This stands out all the more clearly against the background of the
problem of continuity. In the sphere of historical occurrences, conti-
nuity is not a concept that determines the foundation upon which the
structure of events is erected. Rather, it is a functional concept, which
defines the relations between the events within the structure. The task
of historical research is not merely to describe events in such a way as to
establish their dependence upon a subject, but also to understand the
relations that obtain among the events themselves. Continuity is a
problem imposed upon historical research; no datum - not even the
enduring subject - can provide a solution to it.
D. Possibility. The modal aspect of historical occurrence poses a prob-

lem that is relevant to our enquiry, namely: Is it necessary to assume the
concept of subject in order to explain the position of the possibility-
concept in the historical sphere? As a "Postulate of Empirical Thought"
(Kant), the concept of possibility presupposes the existence of objects of
experience that have not yet been determined and that can and will be
determined by being integrated in a cognitive structure. Underlying the
scientific research that determined the existence of Neptune (in 1840)
was an a priori assumption of possibility. To determine the existence of
Neptune one had to assume that, in addition to the planets already
known, there might be other planets whose existence and place in the
solar system had yet to be determined. 9 As an assumption of empirical
science, then, the concept of possibility neither injures the structure nor
implies the detennination whether the existence or the non-existence of
heavenly bodies is possible. Scientific thought begins from the datum
and takes it as given, regardless of the fact that there is no rational
explanation for its givenness. To say that the datum is contingent, i.e.,
that its non-existence is conceivable, is only another way of expressing
its facticity.
40 CHAPTER 2
As the assumption of scientific thought in general, the concept of

possibility does not imply a question about the foundation of the datum,
but about the facts within the structure. The facts being given, the
concept of possibility presupposes that more facts may eventually be
given. In the sphere of science, possibility concerns the contents of the
structure, and not the foundation of its existence. In the sphere of
history, however, possibility can be understood in a different sense,
namely, as what might have happened if a certain historical event had
not occurred. For example: What would have been the course of
cultural development in Europe had the Greco-Persian wars ended in
the victory of the Persians? This thought experiment begins from the
known fact that these wars actually ended in a Greek victory. The
purpose of the experiment is not to eliminate the givenness of the fact,
but to examine the place that the fact occupies and the part that it plays
in the structure of cultural development. As Weber rightly observed the
question of what might have happened had a certain historical event not
occurred is related to the problem of causality in history. In other
words, if it could be shown that a Persian victory in the Persian wars
would have changed the course of European history, it could be con-
cluded that the Greek victory determined the course of historical
development in Europe. The possibility of a particular historical event
accordingly implies the question whether that event can be removed
from the historical structure. Starting from the given structure, we
confine our enquiry to the factors and facts that shaped it, within its
framework.
Raising the question of a historical event's possibility is not equivalent
to assuming the contingency of that event. To put it another way: in
exploring the question of historical possibility, we do not assume that
the existence or non-existence of an event is contingent upon the
decision of a particular subject. Here the concept of possibility is used in
an objective sense, and not with reference to the choice of an agent. The
question of objective possibility is applicable only within the limits of
the process, and does not extend to the origin of the process as such. It
would therefore be a mistake to assume that the use of the concept of
possibility depends upon the assumption of a historical subject and his
decision. It is not legitimate to ask what might have happened had
Napoleon decided not to invade Russia, because this question obliges us
to overstep the limits of the historical sphere. There is no place in
historical research for the Napoleon who makes a wide range of alterna-
tive decisions and takes alternative courses of historical action. Histori-

cal research, as empirical research, starts from given facts. The function
of Napoleon's historical decision, is to help us understand the factual
course of events and not to carry us beyond its limits.
Historical research does not have access to decision as a psychological
act known through introspection. In other words, the weighing of
different possibilities and the choice of one is a psychological factor, not
a datum for historical research. Starting from the facts, historical re-
search assumes decision as a fact, not as a source of a fact. Because that
research proceeds from the datum in the present to its explanation in the
past, historical research is unable to trace the process from its living
source in the past, i.e., from its origin in a subject who decides upon one
possibility among several. Whereas the direction of the living subject's
experience - known introspectively - is from present to future, the
direction of historical research is from present to past. This obviously
has a bearing on the issue of historical action, which will be explored
presently.
Once given as a fact of the past, the act of decision - as manifested in
the weighing of possibilities and in future-oriented intentionality -
ceases to constitute an act. The shift of perspective from present to past
robs decision of that intentionality to which it owes its active aspect.
Viewed from the perspective of historical research, the subject's deci-
sion, and consequently the subject himself, are transformed into empiri-
cal objects. This does not mean to deny that, regarded from his own
perspective, the subject remains a subject. It only means that historical
research encounters its limit in the existence of human subjects looked
at from within. Historical research cannot exhaust the meaning of
existence, because the meaning of the subject for himself is an aspect of
existence that lies beyond its ken.
As a presupposition of historical possibility, then, the subject cannot
be conceived of as a substratum, or as an enduring entity, or as a living
subject known to us by analogy with our own experience as active
subjects. As deciding among different possibilities, the subject is not
merely the passive substratum of the historical process, but also its
active shaper and creator. Yet both the meaning of possibility in history
analyzed above and the character of historical research imply that there
is no justification for assuming the living subject as a concept whose
meaning for historical research corresponds to its meaning for the active
subject's experience of intentionality.
42 CHAPTER 2
Thus, in whatever sense it is employed, subject cannot be conceived

of as an immanent assumption of the historical sphere. Whether as-
sumed in a passive capacity as a substratum or an enduring entity, or in
an active capacity as a source of decision by which the direction of the
process is determined, the concept of subject carries us beyond the
limits of historical research. As connoting a substratum and/or an
enduring entity, this concept is meaningful only if we seek the assump-
tions of becoming, that is, only if we ask what precedes history. As
connoting an active source of decision, the concept of subject is mean-
ingful only if we survey events as proceeding from the present to the
future, that is, only if we treat events as effects of intentionality. Since
intentionality is an act to which we have access through introspection,
our assumption of a living subject obliges us to depart from the sphere
of historical research, which is concerned with facts, and to ask what
decision posits the facts. Within the limits of historical research, which is
concerned with facts, there is no immanent reason for assuming the
concept of subject. To assume it is to unravel the web of historical
relations in order to explain its pattern in terms of one of its threads.
The question of the individual in history will lead us back to that issue.
If the concept of subject is not immanent to the historical sphere, why

do we nevertheless probe the problem of the subject's place in history?
The answer to this question is implied in our reference to the living
subject's place in history. The problem of the subject's place in history
arises because we project the empirical subject which each of us experi-
ences into or onto the inter-subjective or public sphere of history. An
analogy with action, and the events related to it, leads us to seek a
subject behind the process of historical events. This line of reasoning
can be illustrated by the statement that history is known where there is a
difference between the causal factor and the occurring, where not all
time is permeated by occurrence, where there is interest in occur-
rence.1O In other words, we seek a subject in history because we are
conscious of ourselves as being the subjects of history. Are we?
Is the actual subject the starting point of history? Is the projection of
the actual subject into the historical sphere legitimate? To say that the
starting point of historical research is the empirical subject means that
the starting point of history lies not in the world of historical facts or
traces (archeological remains, cities, socio-political movements) but in
the inner world of the historian. The starting point of historical research
is not the qualitative occurrences in the historian's inner world, i.e., not
his specific experiences, thoughts, and desires, but the occurrence in the
historian's inner world, i.e., his activity as given in his consciousness of
being active. Given a starting point in an introspectively known occur-
rence, how does one arrive at the world of facts. To answer this we must
assume both the factual datum and the mere occurrence known from
inner experience. This raises the further problem of whether one can
assume an occurrence as a means of explaining the factual datum on the
basis of the mode of occurrence, which we know from inner experience.
If we can, then every historical occurrence must be conceived of as the
effect of subjects, i.e., as a consequence of his decisions, intentions, etc.
One cannot conceive of occurrences in this manner without contract-
ing the historical sphere, that is, without removing from its compass
those facts or events which cannot be conceived of as the effects of
subjects unless the "Cunning of Reason" is assigned a far-reaching
metaphysical meaning. Yet certain natural phenomena, such as the
Lisbon earthquake or the Russian winter, are integrated into and leave
their traces upon the historical process. If the historical process absorbs
natural occurrences - i.e., events that are initially asserted by the
instruments of natural science - then the focus of historical research lies
not in the existential character of the event but in its place in the
historical context. Even the historical efficacy of ideas is the efficacy of
meaningful facts, not of living subjects. A historical occurrence is an
ultimate fact whose existence cannot be derived from the mode of
occurrence that we experience introspectively.
This being the case, there is no justification for linking causality or
conformity to law in history with the question of the existence of
historical subjects. Because historical occurrences are a process sus-
tained by the relations among events, it seems unjustifiable to assert
(a) that historical causality is the causality of subjects, and (b) that
history accordingly includes an irrational element which transcends its
law-abiding structureY The relation that sustains the historical process
obtains not between occurrences and their subject, but among the events
themselves or among the facts encompassed by occurrences. Only by
analyzing the relation among the events can we handle the question of
its conformity to law and its amenability to causal explanation. The
44 CHAPTER 2
answer to this question is clearly not to be found in a factor that is not

integrated into the structure of history. To what extent the living human
subject stands over and against occurrences can be seen in the place of
the individuals in history and in the aspect of personal responsibility
related to it. 12
VI
It is true that the routine methodology of historical research is not

controlled by this distinction between the relations that obtain within
the framework of occurrences among its constituent events and the
relation that obtains between occurrences and a supposedly existing,
underlying active subject. In practice, historical research blurs this
distinction and defines the "historical personality" not only in terms of
its determinable historical traces, but also in terms of its biological,
mental, and spiritual characteristics. Thus the scope of historical re-
search is extended beyond its proper limits. As a result, the continuum
that is determined from the vantage point of the given present encoun-
ters the continuum determined from the vantage point of its directed-
ness towards the future - from the position of engaged agents.
The purpose of pointing out the distinction between the two factors,
which in actual practice are intermingled, is to expose a critical problem
of historical research. The need to distinguish between the two modes of
relation is an immanent problem of historical research. Historical
research must be controlled by an acknowledgement of this distinction.
It therefore becomes necessary to point out the basic difference between
history and biography.
History is concerned with the effects of the historical personality in
time, i.e., with events and their traces. For the historian, a personality is
not a creature of flesh and blood whose characteristics must be painted
in life-like detail, but a locus of historical events that must be deter-
mined step by step. For the biographer, the historical personality is
more than a locus of historically significant events. Hence the biogra-
pher describes aspects that do not pertain to the personality's place in
history. Biography does more than reconstruct events of historical
importance; it also fills in the lacunae among those events with incidents
and character traits that are significant within the sphere of the person-
ality, even though they are not the concern of historical research. A
biography tries to exhaust the wealth of the living personality or encom-

pass all the by-ways of its life. All discursive thought finds its limit in the
continuity of life as embodied in the living subject. This is so because the
biographer does not acknowledge the limits circumscribed by historical
research, and pushes his enquiry beyond them. This difference between
history and biography obliges the historian to decide whether to pre-
serve or blur the distinction between his own perspective and that of the
biographer.
The relations between matters within the limits of historical knowl-
edge and matters beyond those limits, in the sphere of other modes of
knowledge, pose a fundamental problem. We are faced with limits of
knowledge which are not absolute but relative, because they are cir-
cumscribed from the perspective of a particular methodical or thematic
principle. The principle of historical research demands that we abide by
certain limits without asking about the limits of knowledge in general.
By conforming to this principle, we gain a vantage point from which to
observe the world, and a field of knowledge with its own direciion. To
understand this we must be aware that the spheres of psychology,
biology, etc., lie beyond the limits circumscribed by the regulative
principle of history, and that the facts encompassed by those spheres
need not be integrated into the historical sphere unless they have left
traces in history. In the house of knowledge there are many mansions,
and only one of them is occupied by historical knowledge. The sphere of
knowledge, in other words, has many layers. To recognize this structure
is to realize that we must not blur the bounds between its layers. Hence
it is impossible to remain within the limits of historical research and at
the same time to abrogate the principle by which those limits are
defined.
This point can be illustrated by considering Dilthey's theory of
"Understanding" (Verstehen). For our purposes it suffices to consider
only those aspects of the theory that bear upon the problem of the
subject in history. The theory of "Understanding" endeavors not
merely to determine historical events in terms of their place in the
context of occurrences, but also to interpret events as expressions of an
all-encompassing sphere called the sphere of "Life." "Life" as back-
ground, events as expression of that background, and "Understanding"
as the means of explaining the event's relations to, and sustenance by,
the background: these three factors constitute the conceptual triad upon
which Dilthey's theory is based. 13 That background is not an assumption
46 CHAPTER 2
that imposes upon the event an element it does not contain ab initio.
The background is not a factor separate from the datum, but a factor we
determine by observing our own experiences. Just as our experiences
and actions are expressions of a living subject, so the given events are
expressions of a background whose latent riches are not exhausted in
the manifest event. The humanities (Geisteswissenschaften) take their
departure from, and sustain a perpetual relationship with, life. 14 Hence
phenomena can and should be understood in isolation, and not in
relation to the chain of events. The core of every spiritual phenomenon
is found within the phenomenon itself, according to Dilthey.15 Only if
this conception of the phenomenon is valid can Dilthey's theory as a
whole bear the brunt of criticism.
Is a phenomenon known by being isolated from the structure and
related to the background by which it is nurtured, or is it known by
being integrated into the context and related to the chain of events of
which it is a link? For here, it seems, lies the decisive difference between
"Understanding" and knowledge in the strict sense of the term. Not
only knowledge, but even the assumption that the known exists, presup-
pose a determination of relations as the condition of their possibility.
But "Understanding" has no alternative to knowing the event by
defining its root. Now, to "understand" an event as an expression of
"life" is to know it, not as a fact, but as a manifestation of a primary
factor. The trouble is that we lack a criterion for determining where to
end our quest for the primordial background. If it is permissible to go
beyond the event and its place in the relational structure in pursuit of an
underlying background, then it is permissible to go beyond the back-
ground in quest of a more rudimentary layer; and there is no criterion to
stop us. We know this argument from the discussions about the position
of the concept of substance in other spheres of knowledge as well.
By contrast, historical research proper is kept within bounds by a
methodological criterion, and does not probe the problem of the nur-
turing root. The nature of the background against which the mode of
occurrence called history emerges is immaterial to historical research.
Every metaphysic (be it a metaphysic of nature, wherein historical
occurrence figures as a function of nature or a mode of "life," or a
metaphysic of Spirit, wherein historical occurrence figures as a hand-
maid of Spirit) can have recourse to historical research. This is because
historical research is an immanent mode of enquiry concerned with the
relations among events, and not with their existential or ultimate root.
The point illustrated by Dilthey's doctrine is that the assumption of a

subject in history reflects a trend of thought that seeks to understand
events in isolation from, rather than in relation to, a structure. In the
beginning was this trend; and the trend said, as it were: let there be a
subject to serve as my foundation! The projection of inner experience
into the outer sphere of facts is connected with the trend of thought that
seeks the core of every phenomenon within the phenomenon itself. This
projection can find no justification in the structure of history itself. Not
by chance, then, does Dilthey see biography as the crown of historical
research, and autobiography as the key to understanding of history. In
his view, the clue to the meaning of history lies in descriptions that go
beyond the structure of relations with a view to revealing the "full
personality" that lurks beneath the structure. Just as it is wrong to
violate the limits of an enquiry into the events encompassed by the
structure, so is it wrong to substitute biographical description for histori-
cal research. Biography presupposes historical research as its back-
ground and point of departure. Only after the historical frame of
reference has been established, and the events with their traces have
been determined, does the biographer fill in the lacunae between those
events in an effort to present the full personal image of his subject.
Moreover, unless a person is of a direct or indirect historical interest, he
will not be a subject for biographical description. Biography, III other
words, is controlled by a particular principle of selection, and is written
from a particular perspective. There is an inner reason for this, though
the biographer may not be aware of it. Biographical description does not
move from a portrayal of a figure's full personality to a historical study of
the background of events and their interrelations, but the other way
round. Hence the assumption of a subject of biographical description
presupposes that relational structure of events that constitutes the
biography's background and point of departure. The concept of subject
assumed by biographical description is not given by historical research
proper, but is a supplementary notion posited by an enquiry that
oversteps the limits of the historical sphere.
What biographical description is to historical research, monographic
description is to studies in the history of literature or philosophy. Taking
its departure from the structure, monographic description proceeds to
determine the place of a particular system within that structure. A
monographic description of an individual philosopher and his thought is
designed to supplement the historical facts with information about
48 CHAPTER 2
aspects that have left no traces - or no direct traces - in history. The

relation between the historical and monographic approaches can be
illustrated by comparing two possible ways of writing the history of
philosophy. One way would be to expound the problems that arose in
the course of its development and to explain the relation among the
various systematic attempts to solve them; the other would be to
describe the individual thinkers and to analyze the relation between
philosophical problems and the thinkers who posed them. Whereas the
historical approach reveals the relations that obtain within the history of
thought, the monographic approach reveals the thinkers and their
thought as self-contained units whose content has been only partially
integrated into the historical structure. Not all elements can be inte-
grated into the historical structure, because not all elements have left
traces that serve as a given starting point for historical research. Those
elements that are left out of the historical sphere become subject-matter
for monographical description, which, by supplementing the historical
datum, paints a fuller picture - and therefore a different one - than
could have been painted within the limits of historical research.
VII
A number of conclusions follow concerning the relation between

history and various spheres of philosophical concern and knowledge
follow from the preceding analysis of some of the reasons why the
concept of subject cannot be regarded as an immanent assumption of
history, in the sense of a presupposition of historical exploration.
A. History and ethical theory. The assumption that there is an inherent

relation between history and ethical theory underlies Hermann Cohen's
attempt to present ethical theory as the logic of human reality; There is
no reason for objecting to this attempt, as long as history is regarded as
the sphere in which the principle of ethics is - or can be - realized. 16 But
what is implied by the realization of the ethical principle in history?
Does the ethical principle regulate the historical process in the capacity
of a goal to which it advances, or does the ethical principle presuppose
the historical sphere for its realization, so that the historical process is
accordingly the medium of moral realization. To adopt the latter inter-
pretation one would have to assume that in itself, i.e., as a pure meaning
not embodied in a datum, the ethical principle is an empty abstraction, a
mere meaning that lacks the concreteness of a moral command. If this is
granted, there is room for H. Cohen's assertion that the moral principle
requires an empirical sphere for its realization. Fulfilling this require-
ment, the existence of the historical sphere may be regarded as a moral
postulate; not, however, in the sense of a postulate needed for the
determination of the moral meaning, but in the sense of a postulate
needed for the realization of that meaning.
Because of the extra-historical status of the concept of subject, not
even the foregoing conception of history warrants the conclusions that
the transcendental sphere of history is ethical theory, and that the
relation between ethical theory and history is analogous to the relation
between logic and the natural sciences. The concept of subject is a
necessary assumption of ethical theory. Moreover, unlike historical
research, ethical analysis is not confined to an examination of the
relation among diverse actions, nor does it accomplish its task simply by
exposing the causal connection between one act and another. Its task is
to seek out the subject responsible for those acts. The question it must
answer is not, "what are the relations within a given structure of
actions?" but "What is the source of that structure?" Without a subject,
the very moral perspective would be meaningless. In this respect, there
is a fundamental difference between the ethical and historical perspec-
tives. The purpose of historical research is to determine the relations
among various events; the purpose of ethical analysis is to determine the
relation of occurrences or deeds to their active subject, qua agent, so
that action emerges as the consequence of intentionality and decision.
Hence ethical theory is entitled to ask about the subject of intentionality
and his responsibility for its consequences.
The moral interpretation of history, according to which the historical
process is characterized by intentionality towards a moral goal, transfers
the concept of subject from the sphere of ethics to the sphere of history.
But a study of the historical datum does not entitle us to go beyond the
limits of the historical sphere in order to establish such a relation between
history and ethics, let alone to present ethical theory as the transcenden-
tal assumption of historical research. From the perspective of ethics we
can only demand that historical existence acknowledges its limits, by not
representing itself as the realization of a subject or of subjects, and by
50 CHAPTER 2
recognizing that the status of the subject lies beyond its reach. The
topics of historical progress and the individual in history will bring this
consideration into relief.
B. History and the science of human reality. Let us see now whether the
function of history is to be sought in a science of human existence, as has
been suggested. In order to present history as a science of existence,
Rickert had recourse to the qualitative-individual aspect of the datum of
historical research. The individual figures that serve as the starting point
of historical research are living subjects. 17 Yet the existence of the living
subject, which we know through inner experience, is not accessible to
historical research, and accordingly does not constitute a datum for it.
To introduce the living subject into our consideration requires limitation
of the historical perspective on the one hand, and enlargement of the
perspective, by not identifying the human scope with the historical
orbit, on the other. Because it has no access to the pre-conceptual
experience that constitutes the world of the living subject, historical
research is not a science of existence in the sense of a science that has
immediate access to the mode of existence known through inner experi-
ence. As the source of action, the subject represents a factor beyond the
reach of science. Regarded from the viewpoint of their distance from
existence, all the sciences, induding history, are equal.
C. History and the social sciences. To the extent that they deal with the
human collective or collectives as embodied in law, state, people, etc.,
social sciences are based upon history and historical research. For it is in
the historical sphere that the occurrences defined as collective phe-
nomena take place. But the objective of the social sciences is neither to
characterize their object as an historical occurrence, nor to explain it
merely in terms of its dynamics. The purpose of the social sciences is to
characterize their subject matter as a given unit, and to analyse that unit
without reference to the historical process by which it is produced and
into which it is integrated. It may therefore be said that, in the social
sciences, the dynamic viewpoint is supplemented by a static viewpoint,
which abstracts the object from its historical context.
It is from this static viewpoint that social sciences assume or may
assume the concept of subject. For the social scientist, it is not enough
to determine his object's position in the structure of history. His task is
to analyze the attributes of that object as an entity. Hence the same
people or state that the historian treats as a complex of functions or as a

nexus of relations, is treated by the social scientist as a subject of
particular attributes or trends. As a result of the shift from the dynamic
to the static viewpoint, the objects of the social sciences are endowed
with a substantiality they lack as the objects of historical research. But
because the dynamic viewpoint is not abandoned, the objects of the
social sciences seem to occupy a double status. On the one hand, as
given and inseparable from the historical process, the object lacks
substantiality, endurance, and the active force of a self-sustaining sub-
ject. On the other hand, as observed from the static viewpoint, in
abstraction from the historical process, the same object appears as an
active subject. Just as historical research cannot be said to preserve the
distinction between the viewpoints of history and biography, so the
social sciences cannot be said to preserve the distinction between their
static viewpoint and the dynamic viewpoint of historical research.
Nevertheless, an analysis of the respective points of views indicates that
even~ually this distinction must not be blurred. What the historian
regards as a structure of functions, the social scientist regards as a
subject. Taking the findings of historical research as their starting point,
the social sciences assume the givenness of the historical sphere and the
facticity of historical occurrence. By making this assumption, the social
sciences hypostatize the historical sphere and its contents. As the
foundation of the social sciences, historical existence becomes a subject
whose attributes are defined by those sciences. To put it another way,
from the viewpoint of the edifice erected upon it the foundation is
transformed into a subject, despite the fact that within its own limits it
remains a network of functions. What history is to the social sciences,
biology is to history. From the viewpoint of the historical edifice erected
upon it the biological foundation is transformed into a subject, despite
the fact that, within the limits of the biological sphere, the so-called
biological subject is only a structure of functions whose source is not
within the province of biological research. As a biological organism,
Napoleon is defined in terms of molecules and organic functions, and
not in terms of attributes inhering in a subject. But as a historical figure,
or as seen from a historical observation-point erected upon the biologi-
cal foundation, the biological Napoleon is transformed into a subject
whose anatomy is not the historian's concern. I8
The foregoing considerations warrant the conclusion that, in the
sphere of knowledge, anything that functions as a foundation becomes a
52 CHAPTER 2
subject in relation to the edifice erected upon it. Within this structure of
relations among diverse cognitive spheres, the concept of a subject is
given as a relational category. Its function as a foundation is not
absolute, but relative to the edifice erected upon it. Only in relation to
that cognitive edifice may the foundation be regarded as a subject. The
ultimate, absolute subject is an agent that does not reside in the house of
empirical knowledge. Within the limits of the empirical sphere there is
no absolute subject. As the foundation of an empirical edifice, the
subject is not absolute; and as absolute, the ultimate factor is not a
subject. The meaning of the absolute subject is not empirical, but
metaphysical and moral.
CHAPTER 3
PROGRESS AND DIRECTION
II
The concept of progress connotes the advancement that occurs via a

certain process throughout the stages in which that process takes place
and becomes manifest. Not only is there an advancement, there is
eventually an achievement that can be described and evaluated as such.
We must distinguish between accumulation and progress, though
sometimes the two concepts are presented as if they refer to the same
basic feature of history or of culture. It is said, for instance, that from
the point of view of technical inventions, and the scientific thought that
makes such intentions possible, Western civilization has proved itself to
be more "cumulative" than other civilizations. Western civilization, it is
said, started with the initial stock of neolithic culture. It sqccessfully
introduced a number of improvements, like alphabetic script, arithme-
tic, and geometry. After a period of stagnation, it produced an in-
dustrial revolution so comprehensive and far-reaching that the only
comparison that can be made is with the neolithic revolution itself.l In
this context accumulation means here that a great number of inventions
have tended in the same direction. That direction may be the technical
coordination or the improvement of methods of production, since
otherwise it would be meaningless to point to a line from the neolithic
revolution to the industrial revolution. The accumulation is not only of
revolutions, but of revolutions measurable and comparable by the
criterion of techniques or methods of production. As we see from this
example, the distinction between accumulation and improvement is not
a sharp one, since accumulation refers to tools or modes of behavior;
the tools of the neolithic pe~iod or revolution were not carried over to
the industrial revolution or retained in the subsequent period. The
attitude of mastering the environment persists, but its expressions and
manifestations changed quantitatively and qualitatively.
The idea of progress presupposes the notion of accumulation once the
aspect of improvement is inherent in that notion. By the same token,
the idea of progress adds two significant components to the underlying
notion of accumulation: (a) We do not refer only to a certain line in the
historical process, such as modes of production or the supremacy of
53
54 CHAPTER 3
human beings over their environment. We also refer to the process in its
full integration: the whole historical process moves in a certain direc-
tion. The secondary spheres of that process converge and create one
totality, which is imbued with an inherent advancement over the pre-
ceding periods. Progress is assessed when achievements are compared
or evaluated by a criterion applied to them as they become manifest in
the course of the process. (b) The second feature is that of the criterion
of evaluation: historical progress is a factual exhibition of that which had
or ought to be exhibited, of that which is worth exhibiting. If we take,
for instance, scientific civilization, and we can view it not only as an
instrument for the improvement of technological tools but also as a
progress in the strict sense of the term, because we view science as a
major manifestation of human rationality. We presuppose that ration-
ality, or ratio, initially only potentially, ought to be actualized, and thus
become historically present and tangible. Whereas the notion of accu-
mulation evaluates the process mainly from the point of view of the
factual relations between stages via the notion of progress, we introduce
into our historical awareness a supra-historical criterion, ratio, by which
the stages of the process are assessed and evaluated. From this point of
view the notion of historical progress epitomizes the total meaning of
history. We can be even more daring and say that historical progress,
understood as a converging advancement of all the sub currents of the
historical process, is one of the major explications of the attempt to read
history as a total meaning assigned to the process. We shall now explore
some of the detailed presuppositions of the notion of progress, and take
a critical look at them.
II
The true encounter between the process and the norm ought to be
ascribed an absolute or independent status in its capacity as the key to
the direction and meaning of the historical process. This is taken for
granted by the proponents of the idea of progress, however much they
disagree about the content of the norm.
Our task is to analyze the theoretical assumptions upon which the
idea of historical progress is based - a task which cannot be accom-
plished simply by describing the historical background or the "climate of
opinion" in which this idea found widespread acceptance. For our
PROGRESS AND DIRECTION 55
purposes it is irrelevant that this idea came into currency in the nine-
teenth century, when confidence in the march of civilization reached a
peak, and men sought theoretical justification for their feeling that they
had come a long way toward achieving the goal of human history. The
question to be answered is not under what circumstances the idea can be
or has been propagated, but upon what theoretical assumptions the idea
is based. To answer this question, we must explore the conceptual
contexts relevant to the doctrine of progress, rather than the historical
reasons for its popular appeal.
It has often been remarked that the idea of progress is related to the
doctrine of Providence. According to Bury's influential interpretation of
this relationship, faith in progress is a secular substitute for the earlier
religious belief in Providence. Because the idea of progress is incompati-
ble with the doctrine of Providence - so the argument runs - the latter
had to lose ground before the former could become the controlling idea
in the theory of history. What Bury means to imply is not that both
views of the historical process cannot be entertained by one and the
same thinker, but that, regarded from the viewpoint of their inner logic,
these views are mutually exclusive. 2
Yet this interpretation of the relationship between the idea of prog-
ress and the doctrine of Providence is valid only in part. Its validity
depends upon the adequacy or inadequacy of Bury's conception of
historical progress as a continuous advance initiated, sustained, and
regulated by the intra-historical forces of human knowledge, science,
economics, and politics. If historical advance is indeed a self-sustaining
process, nurtured exclusively by intra-historical forces and governed
exclusively by their mechanism, then the idea of historical progress
excludes the idea of Providence almost by definition. Given a different
conception of historical progress, there is no reason why it cannot be
reconciled - at least partially - with the doctrine of Providence.
One can learn this from certain interpretations of the relationship
between Providence and progress. Some trends in Jewish mysticism
conceive of redemption in terms of a gradual process of restitution
(Tikkun). As Gershom Scholem points out: "The process in which God
conceives, brings forth and develops Himself does not reach its final
conclusion in God. Certain parts of the process of restitution are
allotted to man. . . . In certain spheres of being, divine and human
existence are interwined. The intrinsic, extra-mundane process of Tikkun,
symbolically described as the birth of God's personality, corresponds to
56 CHAPTER 3
the process of mundane history .... Every act of man is related to this
final task which God has set for His creatures.,,3 Restoration or Restitu-
tion of Creation is achieved, not by a miraculous Divine act, but by a
gradual law-abiding process of purification.
Here, then, is an interpretation of the mundane process of historical
progress as intimately interrelated with Divine Providence. The interre-
lation between the two ideas is not confined to an individual thinker who
happens to entertain both at once. It is rather entailed in the conception
of the Creator who is detached from the deeds of his creatures aimed at
the realization of the design of the creator himself.
It is not only in Jewish mysticism that one finds the idea of progress
correlated with the doctrine of Providence. This correlation is also
found in the writings of Renaissance thinkers who considered the
philosophy of history in the strict sense of the term. Paracelsus, for
example, maintains that God governs his creation in such a way as to
direct it, by means of a gradual process, toward the highest good. 4
Herder regards Providence as a force operative in the historical process
(this follows from his explanation of men's failure to find God in
History). Attributing the situation of the empirical observer of history
who has lost sight of God and belief in Providence to an erroneous or
inadequate conception of divine government, Herder advocates an
approach that seeks in history the divine design found in Nature. Since
man is but a minute part of the universe as a whole, argues Herder, his
history must be correlated with the cosmic fabric in which it is interwo-
ven. Human history is a process in which God works for our salvation
through our own endeavors, abilities, and understanding. s Herder's
interpretation of the relationship between divine Providence and his-
torical progress bears a strong resemblance to another doctrine which
holds the two ideas to be complementary rather than mutually exclu-
sive. This is the doctrine of concursus - mentioned also by Kant -
according to which man and God cooperate in the creation of the
historical process.
Even this brief survey of some relevant sources suffices to invalidate
Bury's contention that, owing to the absolute autonomy of history, the
idea of progress is incompatible with the doctrine of Providence.
Another reason for questioning Bury's divorce between progress and
Providence lies in the conception of Providence that dictates it. The
implied notion that Providence entails direct divine intervention in
every historical event and act is by no means self-evident, as follows
from the medieval philosophical controversy whether Providence is

"particular" or "universal". Whereas the thinkers who argue that Provi-
dence is particular maintain that divine government extends to each and
every occurrence, those who argue that Providence is universal maintain
that divine government refers to the establishment of the overriding order
of creation. When transferred to historical reality, as one domain among
others in which God's design is shadowed forth, the latter conception of
Providence can be readily reconciled with the idea of historical progress.
Thus, for example, Philo's distinction between universal Providence,
whose operations are law-abiding, and particular Providence, whose
miraculous operation may violate the laws of nature, can be applied to
history in such a way as to reconcile Providence with progress.
This is not to advocate an idea of progress diametrically opposed to
Bury's, but to suggest a more moderate interpretation of the relation-
ship between the idea of progress and the doctrine of Providence: the
two conceptions are not only compatible but sometimes, perhaps, even
complementary. 6
III
From the specific problem of the relationship between the idea of

progress and the doctrine of Providence, let us now turn to the more
general problem of the relationship between the idea of progress and
religious tradition, especially Christian tradition. Oscar Cullman shows
that, from the standpoint of its underlying assumptions, the doctrine of
progress is not so remote from the Christian approach to history as it
might seem at first sight. Both have a more or less positive attitude
toward time. For both, the ultimate goal of mankind is linked with the
final end of history. Unlike the pagan philosophers, who maintained
that the highest good could be attained only through liberation or
emancipation from time, Christian thinkers maintain that salvation
comes as the culmination of the historical process itself.? The role
allotted by Christian thought to time, as the stage on which redemption
is enacted, reflects an orientation to reality in time similar to the
time-orientation of the doctrine of progress. In this respect, the idea of
progress may be regarded as a secular translation of the value that the
religious tradition in general, and its Christian current in particular, set
upon the final end realized in and through the process in time.
58 CHAPTER 3
Further evidence of Christianity's attitude toward time is afforded by

its conception of reality in time as a realm that can absorb contents and
meanings. To put it another way, in Christian thought the process offers
no resistance to the element of content or meaning, which appears on
the actual stage of history with the advent of Jesus Christ. A secular
version of this notion controls the assumption, underlying the doctrine
of progress, that time is a realm able to accommodate an encounter with
a universal norm - be that norm freedom, equality, internationalism, or
whatever.
Because it involves both an affirmation of the process in time and an
estimation of that process as a mere transition toward the total en-
counter between time and telos, or as a mere corridor to the heavenly
kingdom, the Christian attitude toward time is somewhat ambivalent.
While knowing that the world he lives in is destined to pass away, the
believer knows also that this world has been allotted a place in the
system of salvational history by the divine will. This ambivalent relation
to time, negating it as an imperfect encounter with content yet affirming
it as a preparation for content, is characteristic of the doctrine of
progress as well.
Before examining more closely the implications of process in time as
capable of accommodating an encounter with content, it is necessary to
analyze another assumption about time upon which the idea of progress
is based. The concept of history as perpetual advancement toward a
final end presupposes that the structure of time is open and continuous.
The continuum of time, whose focus is the future, constitutes the
domain in which the absorption of content is possible as a matter of
principle. As time advances, the absorption of content increases and
improves. Because of the open and continuous structure of time, more
and more contents worthy of existence are afforded the opportunity of
existing as reality in time. Hence the openness of time guarantees the
possibility of progress; the idea of progress is one interpretation of time
as the basic presupposition of historical consciousness.
Furthermore, since the continuum of time can be observed, it is
possible to know its nature and to distinguish between those of its
constituents that have passed away because their passing away was
desirable and those that are being brought into existence because their
existence is desirable. In other words, the doctrine of progress assumes
that whatever is later in time is superior in value and significance, and
consequently that the very continuity of time provides a touchstone for
evaluating contents. From the standpoint of human knowledge time is

an educational process, with man as student and God as teacher. The
greater the time-span surveyed, the higher the level of education. And
the closer we come to doomsday, the more do learning, wit, and reason
abound. 8 '
Thus the flow of the continuum from past to future is an index of

advancement. Given the linear (rather than cyclical) structure of time,
an increase in length is a rise iIi degree of perfection. In other words, the
idea of progress is based upon a twofold assumption concerning the
nature and status of time. Time is at once a medium for content-
absorption and a structural index of advancement. Because time is an
open continuum, it can absorb more and more contents; and because it
is a forward-flowing continuum, it can regulate the evaluation of the
contents absorbed. This is the assumption that underlies Bacon's con-
tention: "With regard to authority, it shows a feeble mind to grant so
much to authors, and yet to deny time his rights, who is the author of
authors, nay rather of all authority. For rightly is truth called the
daughter of time, not of authority."9 To Bacon's mind, one cannot
invest creations of earlier ages with authority, unless one uproots them
from their content in time and evaluates them without reference to the
sphere in which they were created. Conversely, one cannot consider
creations in their context in time without placing the process in time in a
governing position.
From the conception of time as not only a formal and passive frame-
work of creation, but also as an active and formative factor in creation,
the primacy or supremacy of the future seems to follow. The future
becomes a storehouse of hidden contents still to be revealed, while the
past is a cemetery of already revealed contents. The supremacy of the
future over the past means that whatever is yet to be revealed is
preferable to whatever has already been revealed. Time as a total
background of history can absorb the total meaning, direction, and
objective of history.
IV
In the light of the assumption that time occupies a guiding status by

virtue of its structure as a continuum, we can understand why the pro-
ponents of progress evince an irreverence for the authority of classical
60 CHAPTER 3
antiquity. Consider, for example, the argument Pascal puts forward in

his "Preface to the Treatise on Vaccuum" in proof of the need to "limit
this respect we have for the ancients." According to Pascal, one
must distinguish between "matters in which we only seek to know what
the authors have written, as in history, geography, jurisprudence,
languages and especially in theology," where "authority alone can
enlighten us" and matters "that are subject to experiment and reason-
ing," such as "geometry, arithmetic, music, physics, medicine, architec-
ture and all the sciences that. . . .should be augmented in order to
become perfect." With regard to the latter, Pascal asserts that authority
is useless, "as subjects of this kind are proportioned to the grasp of the
mind (which) finds full liberty to extend them; its inexhaustible fertility
produces continually and its inventions may be multiplied altogether
without limit and without interruption."l0
The tour de force whereby Pascal inverts the position of "ancients"
and "moderns" is well worth citing at length:
Men are at the present day ... in the same condition in which those ancient philosophers
would have been found, could they have survived till the present time, adding to the
knowledge which they possessed that which their studies would have acquired by the aid
of so many centuries. Thence it is that by an especial prerogative, not only does each man
advance from day to day in the sciences but all mankind together make continual progress
in proportion as the world grows older, since the same thing happens in the succession of
men as in the different ages of individuals. So that the whole succession of men, during the
course of many ages, should be considered as a single man who subsists forever and learns
continually, whence we see with what injustice we respect antiquity in philosophers; for as
old age is that period of life most remote from infancy, who does not see that old age in
this universal man ought not to be sought in the times nearest his birth, but in those most
remote from it? Those whom we call ancient were really new in all things, and properly
constituted the infancy of mankind. And as we have joined to their knowledge the
experience of the centuries which have followed them, it is in ourselves that we should find
this antiquity that we revere in others. (Italics added.)Y
Pascal's revaluation of the relation between ancients and moderns from

the viewpoint of "authority" is important for more reasons than
one. First of all, it is based upon an analogy between individual men and
"universal man" which, as we shall see, constitutes in a sense the
ultimate foundation of the idea of progress. Second, it implies a rejec-
tion, or at least a qualification, of the ideal of Renaissance humanism,
dictated by a tendency to elevate the sciences above literary and histori-
cal studies. Finally, it is controlled by the notion that the very flow from
past to future (infancy to old age) renders authority to whatever is

subsequent in time.
Essential to Pascal's attitude towards antiquity is his distinction be-
tween matters in which formulated authority and chronological priority
carry regulative weight, and matters in which accumulated experience
alone carries that weight. The same would apply to Fontenelle's attitude
towards antiquity. Posteriority, Fontenelle claims, is more important in
science than in art. Since science depends on experience, it takes time to
ripen, and a later stage of development is more mature than an earlier
one. Art, however, depends less upon accumulated experience than
upon vivacity and vigor of imagination. Hence in its province ripeness or
perfection can be attained more readily and rapidly. 12
Fontenelle's distinction makes it possible to uphold the ideal of
Renaissance humanism in the realm of art and, at the same time, to
advocate the idea of continuous adyancement and progress in the realm
of science. From the viewpoint of progress, the importance of science
lies in the structure of its advance, which corresponds to the structure of
the continuum of time itself. Hence science can be conceived as repre-
senting time, in its ontological structure. Thus the rhythm of scientific
advancement adumbrates the rhythm of historical progress.
Oriented to the realm of time and history, the doctrine of progress is
not indifferent to the realm of nature. Only on the assumption that
nature is governed by universal and immutable laws can one be confi-
dent that no upheaval in the order of nature will undermine the achieve-
ments accumulated in the historical process. To be sure there are other
reasons for assuming the regularity of nature. The doctrine of Provi-
dence, for example, can interpret nature's conformity to law as evidence
that it is governed by divine wisdom. The theoretical and applied
sciences rely upon the regularity of nature in order to know its mecha-
nism and use the knowledge to control or intervene in its processes.
Conformity to law in nature is the precondition of regular advancement
in history.
Condorcet, alluding explicitly to the order of nature, maintains that
so long as the laws of nature entail no upheaval or cause no general
change that is likely to rob mankind of its present abilities and resour-
ces, the possibility of progress can be taken for granted. 13 Even Kant
has recourse to the regularity of nature when he tries to establish the
possibility of realizing the principles of morality. In the Critique of
Practical Reason Kant argues that the law-abiding order of nature is the
62 CHAPTER 3
necessary precondition for shaping human reality in conformity to the

moral law. The order of nature mediates moral principles, which as such
transcend nature. 14 But whereas Condorcet emphasizes the similarity,
or even identity, between the laws governing natural processes and
those governing human advancement, Kant stresses the difference be-
tween them.
According to Condorcet, the necessity and immutability of the uni-
versal laws of nature constitute the sole basis for our belief in natural
science as well as in the advancement of man's intellectual and moral
abilitiesY This implies either (a) that there is an identity between
conformity to law in nature and conformity to law in history; or, at least,
(b) that an analogy can be drawn between the law-abiding processes of
nature and the law-abiding advance of the historical process. Kant did
not draw such far-reaching conclusions from his assumption that the
regularity of nature is the precondition for realizing moral principles.
He tended to regard progress as a moral idea or duty. As evidence one
can cite his explicit assertion that the aim of progress cannot be imposed
by immediate experience, or his treatment of progress and eternal peace
as moral duties. In neither instance is reference made to the law of
nature.
Turgot too stresses the differences rather than the similarities be-
tween the law-abiding processes of nature and the law-abiding process
of historical progress. In nature, conformity to law implies that no basic
changes will be produced by the succession of generations; whereas in
the process of progress, conformity to law implies precisely the oppo-
site. Because in history profound changes are wrought by the succession
of generations, progress cannot be conceived as historical manifestation
of a universal law of nature. It must rather be regarded as an internal
attribute or law of the historical domain proper. 16
Yet both interpretations of the relation between nature and history
consider the regularity of nature the conditio sine qua non of scientific
advancement. In conjunction with the assumption of the openness and
continuity of time, the assumption of nature's conformity to law affords
the possibility of scientific advancement. Given these two assumptions,
it may be presumed that the longer the time-span covered, the greater is
man's knowledge of nature and, hence, the greater is his power to
control and intervene in its processes. For, as we have seen, continuous
time is not only the medium, but also the index, of advancing achieve-
ment.
This conception of time raises certain moral questions, of which some

proponents of progress were not always aware. Does not the assumption
that whatever is later is riper imply that whatever is earlier is merely
preparatory? Does it not rob whatever is earlier of its independent
status by treating it as a mere instrument? It is not only the position of
classical antiquity which, as we have seen, is revaluated or devaluated,
at least in the realm of science. It is also a ques~ion of the earlier
generations of men, which come to be regarded as mere means for the
sake of their successors.
Indeed Kant was confronted with this question. For his categorical
imperative that each man should nev~r treat himself and all others
merely as means, but at the same time as ends in themselves, seems to
be violated by the idea of progress insofar as it allots a merely instru-
mental status to earlier generations of men. In an effort to surmount this
difficulty, Kant suggests that the men of earlier generations who labored
to lay the foundations and erect the scaffolding of the house which
stands one story higher in nature's design were not destined to live in the
house they had built. Only later generations of men would be fortunate
enough to live in the house built by their predecessors. 17
It is doubtful, however, whether there can be any satisfactory solution
to the difficulty as long as it is assumed that whatever is later is
preferable to whatever is earlier. 18 One cannot proceed on this assump-
tion without arranging the succession of generations in a ladder leading
to the last, and thus highest, generation. Another, perhaps more effec-
tive attempt to overcome the moral difficulty involved in the idea of
progress is implicit in Kant's treatment of this idea as a duty. As motives
and incentives to action, duty and self-interest or utility are mutually
exclusive. Consequently the pursuit of progress, understood as action in
conformity to duty, does not imply the exploitation of an earlier genera-
tion of men by a later generation. All generations together pursue
progress as the common goal of mankind. Each generation looks for-
ward to its successor as to a possibility of realizing the common goal. In
its capacity as a duty, the idea of progress calls for orientation to the
future without regard to the position that earlier generations happen to
occupy in relation to later generations. Since the pursuit of progress is
the concern of mankind as a whole, or a human-universal goal, the
question ~ Which particular generation will actually achieve this goal? ~
is irrelevant. Thus, by presenting history's final end as the universal goal
of mankind, and the particular generation which realizes that end as the
64 CHAPTER 3
representative of mankind, Kant minimizes the importance of those

empirical differences between successive generations that are unavoid-
able in a context characterized by continuity, priority, and posteriority.
We can survey the succession of generations without making an
earlier generation the handmaid of its successor by assuming that human
history is a unity. The unity of mankind may accordingly be regarded as
still another assumption of the idea of progress. Based on this assump-
tion, Condorcet subordinates all nations and all stages of the historical
process to one and the same law .19 This assumption, too, permits Hegel
to posit consciousness of freedom as the universal goal of human
history, to arrange all peoples and religions in a single scheme with
respect to this goal, and to evaluate the achievements of those diverse
peoples and religions by reference to his all-encompassing scheme. 20
From the foregoing analysis of the assumptions underlying the idea of

historical progress we may conclude that this idea, though subject to
different interpretations, is anchored in a more or less coherent struc-
ture of thought. Now we must examine the validity of this structure of
thought. Before we begin, it might be appropriate to explain what this
test does and does not involve.
Obviously, it does not involve a denial of the great popular reputation
enjoyed by the idea of progress. The influence of this idea is evident not
only from the frequent, though vague, use of the term "progress" in the
language of everyday life, but also from the treatment of the transition
from traditional to rational modes of social organization, occasionally
found in sociological literature, as a historical advance. To be sure, the
influence of an idea is no index of its validity.
The validity of the doctrine of progress depends upon the tenability of
its assumptions. To criticize those assumptions one can either adduce
empirical evidence that seems to contradict them, or expose the in-
adequate conception of the structure of history by which they are
controlled. One question to be addressed is whether the actual course of
history has advanced on all fronts, or whether it is moving towards a
single and universal goal. 21 Another question is whether history harbors
dormant potentialities that have failed to awaken, not because anything
in their nature is opposed to progress but because the nature of the
continuum entails the existence of dormant potentialities. Among the

critics of the doctrine of progress is Freud. In his later writings, Freud
set out to show that culture is a superstructure whose foundations are
constantly threatened by the aggressive forces latent in human nature.
Unlike the Leibnizian potentialities,22 these aggressive forces, accord-
ing to Freud, actively oppose the creative advance, destroying cultural
achievements and causing regression. 23 Freud's critique is empirical; it
consists of an exposure of historical reality as it is, and of a demonstra-
tion that the trend absent from historical reality is the very trend whose
absence renders perpetual progress inconceivable.
The critique presented here is theoretical or structural. Its purpose is
to show that the structure of historical reality affords no footing for the
theoretical assumptions upon which the idea of progress is based.
To posit the existence of an all-encompassing process of progressive
advancement towards the realization of a universal human goal is to
presume that historical reality can accommodate an uninterrupted en-
counter - and eventually a total merger - between the dimension of
reality and the dimension of moral meaning (equality, freedom, or
humanity). Even the less presumptuous assumption - which substitutes
for a total merger of the two dimensions an incessant, unlimited prog-
ression toward the encounter between reality and meaning - presup-
poses the possibility of a continuous approximation of reality to the
norm, within the process itself, and in all its segments. The assumption
of historical advancement implies that the encounter between meaning
and reality is not confined to certain regions of history, such as science
or the technical organization of production, but is an attribute of the
historical domain as a whole. Just as humanity as a whole is consistent to
be the subject or the substance of progress, so history as a whole -
including socio-political activity, scientific enquiry, economic organiza-
tion, literary and artistic creation, and day-by-day human relations - is
the purported province of progress. The unity of history is the formal
precondition of progress as an all-encompassing encounter between
reality and norm. This condition is fulfilled only if (a) the multiplicity of
human beings of which history is made up can be placed in a single
substance - or subject - called humanity, and if (b) the multiple fields of
human activity can be subordinated to, and measured by, a single norm
conceived as their common goal. We shall demonstrate that the struc-
ture of history renders the fulfilment of this twofold condition inconceiv-
able.
66 CHAPTER 3
By its very nature, the historical domain cannot accommodate a total

merger between reality and meaning. As merger of this kind is possible
only in a domain whose meaning is immanent in its very existence and
whose existence is not created, but is given ab initio. History, however,
is a domain whose reality is being continuously created. There is no
ground for correlating its existence with any meaning whatever. There
are two domains of being whose very existence implies their meaning.
One is the domain of empirical man, whose freedom is implied by his
nature and status as a creature endowed with understanding; the other is
the domain of God, whose holiness is implied by his nature and status as
separate from, and other than, empirical reality. In neither of these
domains is the meaning realized progressively. In both domains, a
realized meaning inheres in the very status of the existent, be it empiri-
cal man as free, or be it God as holy. Both meanings or norms are
merely elements of the definition of the existent in which they inhere.
Were empirical man, as an understanding creature, not free, he would
be an object, rather than a being understanding objects. Were God not
holy, there would be neither distinction nor difference between him and
the empirical reality of the world. Because the normative status of the
existent is in both cases an explication of its status, the encounter
between existence and norm is not the produc·t of a progressive advance.
The merger of meaning with existence, and the progressive advance of
existence toward meaning, are mutually exclusive.
Nor is the more moderate assumption, which substitutes for a com-
plete merger a progressive and cumulative advance toward a total
encounter between reality and meaning, compatible with the created
and continuously recreated character of the historical process. 24 As we
have seen, this assumption presupposes that the longer the time-span
covered, the greater the accumulation of realized contents worthy of
being brought into existence. The problem, however, is that the cumula-
tive character of the process is no guarantee of its advancement toward
the norm set as the universal goal of mankind. Accumulation of realized
meanings is effected by particular acts of meaning-realization, and these
need not be oriented to the universal norm. The assumption that the
historical process is cumulative implies that all meanings realized within
its framework are accumulated, i.e., that meanings other than those
realized by acts conforming to the universal norm must also be accumu-
lated. Hence, if history is a cumulative process, there is no telling
whether an earlier crystallization of meaning, which has sunk into
oblivion will not re-emerge to become a formative factor in the actual

process. Whether an element, once vital but now dormant, will be
revived or left dormant depends on whether particular actions here and
now will or will not be oriented to its revival. Implicit in the cumulative
character of progress is the possibility that later realizations of meaning
will be flooded by earlier ones, despite the irreversibility and irremedia-
bility of the order of time as priority and posteriority. This explains why
the Teutonic myth could rear its head within the orbit of the Christian
civilization. That the earlier, and as such inferior, world outlook and
code of conduct endured, in dormant or "undeveloped" form, in the
heart of the later and superior shows that it is impossible to regard the
cumulative character of history as a guarantee of a continous advance
toward an all-encompassing encounter with a universal norm. On the
contrary, the permeation of historical reality by the diverse realized
contents accumulated over the course of time harbors the possibility
. that earlier content-realizations will impede creative advance towards
the norm history is destined to realize.
By precluding the possibility of a selective encounter between the
process of content-realization and a single norm, the cumulative charac-
ter of history does not justify the attempt made by the proponents of
progress to identify some single content as the goal of history. The mode
of content-realization present in history is not the mode of content-
realization posited by the doctrine of progress. In the first place, history
has no one meaning that clearly and distinctly suppresses all others. In
the second place, even in those regions of history where specific princi-
ples or norms are realized, the realization is partial and piecemeal. The
mode in which such principles as equality, freedom, and rational organi-
zation of society are realized does not produce an objective, self-
regulating, and self-revealing historical trend. Meanings always owe
their realization to the actions of human beings in pursuit of contents
and meanings. The specific mode in which specific contents are realized
depends upon the particular interpretation men give these contents
under the particular circumstances in which they are to be realized; the
specific content of the meaning realized depends on men's decision to
admit or not to admit a particular content into their existence. Indeed,
refusal of admission is also a mode of meaning-realization.
Because of its dependence on the decision and agency of human
beings, no particular realization of a principle in the present guarantees
the future realization of that same principle. It is therefore impossible to
68 CHAPTER 3
accept the progressivist assumption that there is a self-regulating and

self-sustaining historical trend in relation to which no particular
meaning-realization occupies a status in its own right, because all
meaning-realizations have a merely instrumental status. The foundation
of this assumption is shaken by the nature of history as a process
sustained and regulated by human beings who direct themselves towards
the realization of particular contents.
In this connection it is worth noticing the self-contradiction implicit in
the assumption concerning the possibility, even the necessity, of fore-
knowing and predicting the nature of the next stage in the historical
advance, e.g., as a fuller realization of freedom, equality, or humanity.
Suppose that some people would not want equality to be realized: could
not the foreknowledge and prediction of its eventual realization evoke
them to organize resistance to the fulfilment of that prediction? Even
were the principle of equality to triumph over the resistance offered by
its adversaries, it would not be able to wipe out all traces of their
resistance. The vanquished enemy endures in the same historical reality
in which the victorious principle prevails. Consequently, there is a
difference between historical existence whose encounter with the
equality-principle entails suppression of resistance in the form, say, of
apartheid, and historical existence whose encounter with the equality-
principle is effected by a trend to which no resistance is offered. Thus
the prediction of the destination of the historical process, whose possi-
bility is presupposed by the proponents of progress, is likely to defeat its
own purpose by eliciting active opposition, whose formative role in the
process cannot be denied. 25 There exist not only self-fulfilling prophe-
cies, but also self-defeating prophecies as well.
VI
Another assumption of the doctrine of progress which lacks justification

within the structure of historical reality is the assumption that all stages
and regions of history constitute a coherent, all-encompassing unity
subservient to a single purpose. On the basis of this assumption, all
historical eras, events, activities, and agents are evaluated only from the
viewpoint of their involvement in the realization of the common pur-
pose. It is not by chanc~ that the proponents of progress draw the
analogy, which we have analyzed above, between the course of history
as a coherent unity and the life of an individual human being as an

organic unity.
The analogy, however, is false, because the organic unity of the
individual, properly understood, finds no counterpart in the structure of
history. Up to a point the analogy seems plausible enough. In a sense,
there is room for arguing that just as an individual is composed of
diverse organs, each with its own structure and function, so historical
reality consists of diverse factors, each with its own structure and
function. But here the analogy ends. For whereas the function of an
individual's organs cannot be defined or evaluated without reference to
their place in the organism as a whole, it is by no means obvious that the
diverse historical acts, agents, occurrences, and ages can or should be
defined and evaluated with reference to a hypothetical unity of history.
The proponents of progress must answer whether the diverse compo-
nent elements of history can legitimately be denied an indtpendent
status and reduced to "organs" of a hypothetical organism called His-
tory (with a capital "H".)
Hegel's doctrine of the "Cunning of Reason" - to which we alluded
before is intended to make it possible to answer this question in the
affirmative. According to this doctrine, whether he knows it or not,
whether he wants to or not, the individual always acts in the general
interest of the universal trend of history, even when he thinks he is
acting in his own interest alone. Hegel puts it this way:
Reason is as cunning as it is powerful. Cunning may be said to lie in the intermediative

action which, while it permits the objects to follow their own bend and act upon one
another till they waste away, and does not itself directly interfere in the process, is
nevertheless only working out its own aims. With this explanation, Divine Providence may
be said to stand to the world and its process in the capacity of absolute cunning. God lets
men do as they please with their particular passions and interests; but the result is the
accomplishment of - not their plans, but His, and these differ decidedly from the ends
primarily thought by those whom He employs.26
Hegel himself points to the affinity between the impact of reason in the
historical process and the position of Divine Providence, as that position
has been traditionally conceived. Reason, in terms of the architecture of
the system and the impact of its guiding interference in the process,
replaces Divine Providence; and thus we come back to the start of our
exploration of the presuppositions of the notion of progress.
Yet the most important aspect of Hegel's theory is the underlying
70 CHAPTER 3
optimism which that theory represents and tries to substantiate. The

process is left to its own immanent causes; reason (rather: Reason),
being both cunning and powerful, can allow the process to be motivated
by its own immanent and limited objectives, since the overriding objec-
tive takes care of itself and takes advantage of whatever occurs in the
process. Since reason is cunning and powerful, we may be led to assume
that the greater the discrepancy between the process and its immanent
rhythm and reason and its own objective, the more manifest and
overriding reason is. After all, the objective of the historical process is
not only to embody reason in an opaque way, but also to make the
embodiment known. One way to make a thing known is to make it
victorious, and one of the ways to show its victory is to show that victory
takes place against all the forces that fight against the victorious factor,
which is reason. Here we must question Hegel's assumption that reason
invented the passions and interests pursuing their own objectives in
order to be victorious, and that, because of the discrepancy between the
different rhythms, a post factum adjustment takes place between reason
and the factors operating in the process. Moreover, if persons are
involved in the historical process, and even if we grant that they are
motivated by passions, they do not totally lack self-awareness, self-
interpretation, and self-evaluation of their own objectives. These as-
pects, even when they are subservient to passions, are themselves
reflective attitudes whose subject matter, but not origin, is the passions.
Hegel does not assume that human beings regard themselves as organs
of the historical whole and see their actions as instrumental in realizing
the end of reason. Sometimes, observing historical agents who consider
themselves to be organs of the overriding process, we would judge them
to be megalomaniacs who see their particular locus in history as a locus
in history at large. Hence Hegel must account not only for the discrep-
ancy between passions and reason, but also that between self-reflection,
limited as it may be, and the self-reflection of reason, which can emerge
only at the end of the process.
To be embodied as the end of the historical process, reason is a
meaning in the process and of the process, both the sum-total of
contents as well as the sum-total of acts of contemplation or reflection
on the contents. Who is the subject contemplating the final result of
history? Does the subject contemplating this result knows of the cun-
ning of reason? Does he know only of the concept of cunning, or does
he also know the particular cases in which the cunning of reason became
evident in the process from the very beginning of history up to the final
result? How does the subject who ponders the cunning of reason
integrate within his consciousness the various detours with the final
result? We raise these questions because we cannot assume that the
meaning of the historical processes is not mediated through the con-
sciousness of the finite and limited subjects of history. Unless we
assume this, we have to assume that reason, as un?erstood in the
context of the system and in the notion of cunning, . is a; kind of' entity
that overshadows the process, self-enclosed and essentially detached
from the process and from its own position - though the process can be
viewed as leading to reason from the vantage point of the process. We
are back here to our previous quandary: What does spirit or reason need
the process for?
There are several objections to this doctrine. For one thing, the
doctrine inadvertently admits the very fact it is designed to explain
away, namely, that human beings rarely regard themselves as organs of
the historical whole and their actions as instrumental to realizing its end.
For another, the argument used to explain this fact away amounts to an
assertion that he who acts in his own interest acts blindly, and that,
therefore, his private intention is no measure of his achievement. Only
inadequate knowledge of himself and his status in history can make a
man act, or think he acts, in his own interest. In history, a man's
independent individual status is an illusion. Only his status as organ or
instrument of the universal trend is real.
This argument is both presumptuous and problematic: presumptuous
because it assumes that the universal trend of history can be known, and
problematic because it robs individual agents- and actions of their
independent status and reduces them to mere instruments. Conscious
that the conception of their independent status as a mere error or
illusion entails the devaluation of the intrinsic value of individual agents
and acts, Collingwood rightly observes that, "Bach was not trying to
write like Beethoven and failing; Athens was not a relatively unsuccess-
ful attempt to produce Rome; Plato was himself, not a half-developed
Aristotle. "27
To formulate Collingwood's objection in terms of the present
analysis, one can say that the tendency to regard earlier acts and agents
as mere instruments for the sake of an overriding harmonious purpose is
encouraged by the assumption that continuous time is not only the me-
dium, but also the measure, of historical achievement and advancement.
72 CHAPTER 3
This assumption reflects a one-sided conception of the nature of time

as a constituent of human reality. It is because they emphasize only
one aspect of time - namely its formal structure - as the order of
succession that the proponents of progress evaluate historical events
primarily in terms of their place in the scale of time. Were they to
pursue the implications of their own assumption that time is also a
continuous medium or background of human activity, they would have
to ascribe importance to the meanings that men attach to time present,
to the guidance they derive from time past, and to the ends they plan to
realize in time future. Because of this myopic concentration upon the
impersonal aspect Of time as the order of succession, the theory of
progress fails to allot a status to individuals' directedness toward their
own particular time. The theory turns their directedness into a mere
instrument of a universal end destined to be realized in a time-
dimension that transcends the limits of particular persons and their
particular ends as well as the order of particular events.
It follows from the foregoing considerations that no foundation can be
presented for the assumption that history constitutes an organic whole
whose component parts (acts, agents, events, and eras) are to be
evaluated only from the viewpoint of the universal trend. As an over-
simplified account of the complex, multi-faceted character of time and
history alike, this assumption is inadequate.
To question the assumption that history is an organic, all-
encompassing unity is ipso facto to question the assumption that the
historical process is a progressive advance toward the realization of an
all-encompassing content or norm. The latter assumption, like the
former, over-simplifies the character of the historical complex. One
cannot survey the historical process from the viewpoint of a single
normative content without looking for a single rhythm that characterizes
the historical domain as a whole, and without overlooking the manifold,
diverse rhythms that characterize the manifold, diverse creative do-
mains (religion, art, science, politics, philosophy, etc.) which together
constitute the historical domain as a whole. That the proponents of
progress find only one "pulse-beat" in their hypothetical organism is
due in no small measure to their elevation of science to the status of the
heart or pulmonary artery of that organism.
Here, again, the analogy is misleading. For whereas it makes no sense
to measure the advantages and disadvantages of one organ in relation to
another, it does make sense to measure the advantages and disadvan-
tages of one creative domain in relation to another. To put it more

concretely, while one would never consider whether the heart or the
brain is preferable, one would, and often does, ponder whether religion
is preferable to philosophy, or vice versa. The answer to the latter ques-
tion depends on one's criterion of evaluation. If the two creative
domains are evaluated with reference to theoretical criteria, philosophy
enjoys an advantage over religion. For while religion is not an analytical
domain and does not necessarily provide theoretical justification of its
own foundations, philosophy is an analytical domain that affords insight
not only into its own foundations, but also into the foundations of
religion. If, on the other hand, one evaluates these creative domains by
reference to consequential criteria, then religion seems to enjoy an
advantage over philosophy. For while philosophy can neither create
public ways of life nor cement societies, religion can. Thus which
creative domain is preferable depends on one's criterion of preference.
If one thinks that the theoretical advantages of an analytical outlook
outweigh its impact, one may give preference to philosophy. If, on the
other hand, one sees a greater advantage in the concrete capacity to
create ways of life and mold patterns of social conduct, one may give
religion preference. This reservation does not breed relativism, since it
is based on the nature of the respective orbits of activity (in this case,
religion and philosophy), and refers to their position in actual history
rather than to their status in the system structured - and we take this as
an example only - by Hegel's presuppositions as to the status of
different modes of activity.
But one cannot have it both ways. One domain's gain is another
domain's loss. In history, accumulation and elimination go hand in
hand. A price is paid for the rise of a creative domain or trend. This
applies no less to the relations between concrete processes such as
handicraft and mechanized production than to the relations between
creative domains sui generis, such as religion and philosophy. With the
rise of mechanized production and the decline of handicraft, the advan-
tages of the latter - e.g., the craftsman's intimate relation to, and
impress upon, the finished product - are lost. Here even accumulation,
let alone progress, is missing.
Thus an evaluation of the historical process by reference to an
over-arching universal norm involves an over-simplified conception of
history's complex structure, and an over-optimistic view of the vicissi-
tudes of its course.
74 CHAPTER 3
VII
To conclude our criticism of the idea of progress and its theoretical

assumptions, let us reconsider whether an all-encompassing encounter
between reality and normative meaning is possible. It follows from the
difference between the status of principles in themselves and the status
of principle-realizations that such an encounter is not possible. Whereas
principles such as freedom and equality, as principles, can occupy an
absolute status, their partial realizations do not. NQ realization occupies
an absolute status, because no realization can exhaust the content of the
principle realized, or nullify the need for further realizations thereof.
The study of history teaches us that no act of equality-realization
can render future or further acts of equality-realization impossible or
unnecessary. The realization of political equality, e.g. in the form
of universal suffrage, left unrealized other aspects of the equality-
principle, such as equal working conditions and equal educational
opportunities. This is but one illustration of the general fact that
tomorrow's needs for, and possibilities of, principle-realization are
neither cancelled nor fulfilled by the partial realization of principles
today. Part of the status of principles is due to their vagueness: equality
partially materialized creates conditions and situations that call on the
one hand for an ongoing interpretation, and on the other for an attempt
to materialize the principle within the situation already established by
previous steps of materialization of the same principle.
The proponent of progress must disregard this essential characteristic
of principle-realization if he would elevate the intra-historical encounter
between reality and norm to an absolute status. The over-estimation of
partial principle-realizations entailed by the idea of progress explains
why the theory of progress tends to ignore the problema tics and dialec-
tics of the process of realization of principles. To come back to our
example from a different angle: the doctrine of progress cannot account
for the problems created by equality-realization either in the form of
compulsory education or in the form of legal restriction of working
hours. Since equality of educational opportunity is not realized in a
vacuum, but among individual human beings endowed with diverse
abilities and diverse inclinations, its realization is as problematic and as
complex as the reality in which it is realized. The same applies to the
reduction of working hours, which occurs among human beings whose
character may be dynamic or phlegmatic.
A view of history that focuses upon an eventual total encounter

between the dimensions of reality and a normative meaning cannot
account for the problematic aspect and dialectics of realization of
principles in concrete circumstances, which are ordered by factors other
than the principle realized. There is a fallacy of "misplaced absolute-
ness" in the assumption that history, as a process of progressive realiza-
tion, will eventually attain the absolute status occupied by principles.
The doctrine of progress leads to this fallacy because it posits a specific
principle - be it freedom, equality, or humanity - as the goal of history
as a whole. Once again we must question the justification for assuming
the existence, in the historical domain, of a single channel into which all
currents of human creation flow.
Since, as we have seen, science is generally taken to be a central
channel or model of this kind, we may reformulate the question, and ask
what justification there is for presenting the advance of science as a
channel or model for the advance of history as a whole. There is none.
In the. first place, the multi-faceted structure of history, encompassing a
manifold of domains each with its own advantages and disadvantages,
stands out against the assumption that in history an advance or gain
from the viewpoint of one domain is without qualification an advance
from the viewpoint of history as a whole. Secondly, while science is a
domain of theory or knowledge, history is a domain of deeds. There is a
fundamental difference between the rhythm of theory and the rhythm of
deeds, a difference that invalidates the coalescence of historical progress
with scientific advance. Achievements in the domain of science have a
higher degree of depersonalization than those in the domain of deeds.
Neither the rules and methods of scientific activity nor its findings
depend upon the particular individuals credited with their invention or
discovery. Because scientific findings and achievements are non-
personal, there is an impersonal body of knowledge that exists indepen-
dently of any particular person's knowledge of it. Thus, for example,
"humanity" may be said to enjoy knowledge of Einstein's theory, even
though most human beings know nothing about it.
Matters are different in the domain of deeds. One can, of course,
conceive of the institutions in the domain of deeds as depersonalized
factors corresponding to the depersonalized methods and rules found in
the domain of knowledge. Still, there is a difference between the
domain of deeds and the depersonalized character of scientific findings
and achievements. Practical achievement depends on particular acts and
76 CHAPTER 3
particular agents. The existence of an achievement tomorrow is not

implied, let alone guaranteed, by its existence and the performance of
acts leading to it today. You cannot string isolated practical accomplish-
ments into a necklace of achievement as you can do with isolated
scientific findings. In the less depersonalized domain of deeds, the
achievements of individuals do not become the public, depersonalized
property of humanity.
It is therefore unjustified to set up the advance in the domain of knowl-
edge as the model or central channel for progress in the domain of deeds
as well. Given the basic differences between these two realms of
human existence, it is impossible to reduce the rhythm of one to the
rhythm of the other, or to correlate the total process of historical
progress with the cumulative advance of knowledge. But if the equation
of progress in history with advance in knowledge is invalid, there is no
theoretical foundation for the idea of progress, at least not as it has been
formulated by its leading proponents.
To salvage this idea, it would have to be reformulated in terms of
partial and piecemeal achievement, evaluated from a particular perspec-
tive: "from a particular perspective," because all depends on the do-
main from whose vantage point achievement is evaluated; "from a
particular perspective," because there is no all-encompassing destina-
tion and consequently no all-encompassing measure of achievement;
"partial and piecemeal achievement," because in concrete human exis-
tence the process of progress is nurtured by incomplete realizations of
diverse determinate ends. To formulate the idea in less modest terms,
and posit a cumulative advance on all fronts towards a total encounter
between the dimensions of concrete reality and ideal norms, meanings,
or principles, is to distort the character of both dimensions. Concrete
historical reality (a tautology) owes whatever meaningful status it at-
tains, not to its formal structure, but to its continuous creation by
human beings directing themselves in time towards ends posited in it.
There is no universal content corresponding to the universal time-
framework of history. In the dimension of concrete historical reality
there is only a multiplicity of particular contents, each as partial as the
portions of time to which men direct themselves in order to realize
particular ends. In the dimension of ideal meaning there is a multiplicity
of absolute principles, such as truth, freedom, and equality, none of
which is total. Progress, as a total encounter between reality and
meaning, is precluded by the very nature of these basic divisions of
human reality. Absolute meanings such as truth, freedom, or equality

are not total, because their realization in concrete situations is not
implicit in their conceptual essence. The realized meanings that perme-
ate concrete historical existence are not total because, as realizations,
they are partial and piecemeal. History is time with a meaning or
meanings given to it by actual human beings, and not time with a built-in
meaning of its own.
Before continuing our exploration, let us sum up our analysis of the
position of progress and of the subject in history. The two notions are
cognate in the sense that both refer to total issues; both provide
perspectives for looking at the historical process from the vantage point
of a position that pretends to be both immanent and transcendent, both
within and outside the historical process. In its variations, the notivn of
subject allegedly represents the ultimate carrier of the process. The
carrier is part of the process, and in this sense immanent; but by the
same token it is introduced into the process from outside, since human-
ity or reason or society is not simply the sum total of consequtive
historical events. Mutatis mutandis, the same argument applies to the
notion of progress. Progress is the normative end of history and thus the
ultimate criterion for evaluating the process and its stages. Insofar as it
is an end, it may have a normative meaning - e.g., the norm of freedom
or equality - or it may have a speculative meaning, which concurrently
has a normative validity, like the notion of reason. But the norm is not
extraneous to the historical process; it does not appear on the horizon of
history newborn from the forehead of Zeus; it appears in the process
step by step, and shapes the stages. We know the norm before it is fully
realized; the same reasoning applies to ethical considerations and to
speculative interpretation.
Our main argument against the two attempts to look at history - from
the point of view of its origin, qua subject, or of its end, qua progress - is
that there is a basic clash between the two notions and the partialness of
experiencing the historical process, between the limited meeting be-
tween meaning and time and the totalistic projections characteristic
both of the subject in history and of progress as the ultimate historical
norm. The link is supposedly the process, and continuous progress its
achievement.
Let us reiterate that our criticism of the notion of historical progress is
not based upon empirical considerations, despite reservations about the
optimism of any version of historical progress, an optimism expressed
78 CHAPTER 3
by Duns Scotus when he said: "In the process of human generations the
message of truth has always increased." We are not questioning this
optimism by looking at historical data and pointing to the problematic
situations created by partial historical achievements, which give birth to
new problems even when they solve old ones. In the present-day climate
of opinion technology would be a case in point to show that historical
achievements carry within themselves new problems. One of the driving
forces of the technological revolution is the continuous attempt to
alleviate physical burdens and make life "easier". In a certain sense this
has been achieved; but at the same time life has become more difficult,
and the stress of the interaction between human beings and their
environment has become even stronger. We repeat: we are not raising
here empirical questions, but a categorial one, namely, whether we can
be involved in history and at the same time look at history from the
outside as ideal observers.
We have already introduced the idea that there are only partial events
and partial subjects experiencing them. We will now proceed to the
partial factors in history. Our concern will be with events and actions,
with human individuals and their position in the process.
CHAPTER 4
INTERACTION, ACTIONS AND EVENTS
This part of our exploration refers to partial facets of the historical

process, as the term "events" indicates. We do not use the term "event"
(Ereignis) in the way it became popular through Heidegger, for whom
Ereignis is the self-transmission of Being into thinking ontological or
cosmic dimensions. We mean rather scattered occurrences taking place
in time, situations in which human beings are implicated and find
themselves, and which they try to shape to some extent. Underlying this
limited interpretation of "event" - which corresponds to the everyday
usage of the concept - is the view that history or historicity is not a
self-enclosed and total sphere. History itself is the sum-total of events
which occur in reality at large, and thus against the background of
nature. Sometimes historical occurrences integrate natural occurrences
into their own context. Even when human attempts are nullified by
natural occurrences, the meeting between the human aspect and the
natural occurrence is still a historical event. Not all its components are
historical, though, in the sense of being man-made occurrences whose
original meaning depends upon the significance bestowed on them by
human acts. Natural occurrences have their own meaning in so far as
nature goes. Only from the point of view of history can they be
integrated into the nexus of historical events and actions.
We are about to analyze whether or not the historical domain should
be characterized as one of events or one of actions, or both. We
deliberately disregard, at least at the beginning of our analysis, the
particularity of the historical domain so far as the relation between
dimensions of time goes. We deal only with certain features of the
datum of history. We can put the question by employing the traditional
distinction between res gestae and historia rerum gestarum, and asking
whether res gestae are events or actions, or perhaps neither of the two.
The common feature of actions and events is that they belong to what
is called "change." Change connotes shifts or regroupings in a given
state of affairs or situations. Events can be understood as changes, and
hence as particular shifts and transformations of a given situation; they
can also be understood as the outcomes of those shifts. When history as
79
80 CHAPTER 4
investigation, or historia rerum gestarum, engages in deciphering its

subject matter, it encounters data like documents or institutions, or
situations like wars or unemployment. The data of historical investiga-
tion are accomplished events, events that were manifested in docu-
ments, in relics of the past, in situations (e.g., institutions), or in states
of affairs (e.g., unemployment). The accomplished datum can be seen
as an event, or as a finalization of a course of events. Situations or
institutions are continuous events, but are also continuous actions. A
parliament is obviously not only the building, but also the sum-total of
procedures and of the human beings meeting in the building and acting
according to certain procedures, habits, codes, or rules. Hence a parlia-
ment is a continuous chain of events; the existence of a parliament is
characterized by the fact that though to some extent events happen in it
and thus changes occur in it, in a certain sense these events do not
change the parliament as an institution. The line of demarcation be-
tween that which goes by the name of event and that which goes by the
name of act or action cannot be drawn simply by pointing to the datum
approached by historical investigation.
We may comment now, in a preliminary way, upon actions or deeds
in general, from the point of view of their accomplishment, and not
from the point of view of the agent (although the question of the agent is
sometimes crucial within the historical context). Insofar as every action
is meant to posit something, positing may mean placing something in a
context or bringing something about. To move a table is to posit it
within a context, while to build a table as an artifact is to effect its
existence (to bring it into being). In this sense we must distinguish,
following the Greek and medieval distinction, between acts referring to
the actor himself and acts whose result lies outside the actor. Praxis in
Greek meant action that shaped the actor, while poiesis had effects in
the outside world, such as bridges or houses. Knowledge of an object is
also an act, since it leads to awareness of the object, or places the object
within the horizon of the knower, and can be identified in Husserl's
sense as Selbsthabe. 1 In contrast to the self-referential character of acts,
the accomplishment of objects, shaping their quality, creating condi-
tions - all these are transitive acts: they go out beyond the scope of
self-reference and thus beyond the scope of the person or actor.
We have already made the distinction between the agent or actor and
the act or the activity. Yet that distinction is somehow problematic
within the scope of history. Making this distinction involves several tacit
INTERACTION, ACTIONS AND EVENTS 81
presuppositions: every act exhibits a power used; to do is to work, and

thus to handle things. These descriptions imply an act of exhibiting one's
power - will or thinking or both - by setting them or positing them.
Another presupposition is expressed in the saying: operari sequitur esse.
To put it differently, to do things presupposes reality or existence, and
thus the doer. The third presupposition is that energy or the will is the
power exhibited by the deed or invested in it, and behind that energy
stands the motivating person or agent. This is presupposed even when
we do not perceive the energy but its outcome only, and cannot
distinguish between the agent and his will. Since acts or deeds change
the state of affairs, we presuppose the existence of the state of affairs in
terms of which the change occurs; the existence of the doer as distin-
guished from his deed is ultimately part of the presupposition that there
exists a state of affairs which is both the background and the cause of the
deeds accomplished.
In the historical domain, however, it is rather difficult to distinguish
between the background and the cause, between the agent and his
accomplishment, let alone between the deed and the will, which finds its
externalization in deeds or accomplishments.
II
There are several reasons why history - and the philosophy of history -
are fascinated by the position of the individual and his role in history,
or, in common pariance, by the position of heroes in history. One
explanation for that fascination is that, where individuals in history are
concerned, the transfer of the common-sense presuppositions about
deeds and acts of positing seems to be warranted. Take for example
Collingwood's description of human action in history, focusing on
Caesar's invasion of Britain. According to Collingwood, every con-
scious act, including acts in history, has two sides. One is the physical
side - the passage of Caesar and his army across the English channel.
The other consists of thought - Caesar's intention or plan to conquer
Britain. An event - or an act of Caesar's - is, therefore, a combination
of a physical aspect and a mental one, or a unity of the outside and the
inside. The outside aspect includes the body of the agent as well as the
equipment at his disposal, such as the ships and his army. In the inside
aspect, Collingwood distinguished two elements, which he called causa
82 CHAPTER 4
quod and causa ut. The causa quod of an act or an event is the agent's
estimation of the situation in which he acts. That estimation, performed
by the agent, who in this sense is distinct from the act of estimation and
all other acts concomitant with it, comprises the military assessment or
the strategic evaluation of the situation - for instance, how many men he
needs in order to accomplish what he has planned. This aspect of causa
quod precedes the subsequent elements of planning as well as the actual
doing. The two aspects combine; moreover, once we presuppose that a
historical event is a combination of the inside and outside aspects, one
could make a case - though Collingwood does not - that all these
distinctions are post factum constructs. We attempt to articulate the
inside aspects by distinguishing within them either coexisting compo-
nents, like estimation of the initial strategic situation and the planning
for the men needed to bring about the effect, or consecutive elements,
namely, conceiving the plan to conquer Britain as an objective or as an
intention. Here the directedness of Caesar towards that objective leads
to the subsequent steps he takes for the sake of his causa ut. In this sense
causa ut is the overriding objective, constructed in order to narrate the
events or deeds which led to the final act. We can put it as follows: the
narration presupposes that we know introspectively how we approach
plans in our immediate situation. We then transpose that introspective
knowledge to the historical agent or hero.2
Be it as it may, this is a simple situation, since we are concerned here
with individual agents, and many of the presuppositions pertaining to
agents can be transplanted to the realm of history. There is no need to
question this transplantation, because it is obvious that not all events
with which history is concerned are related to biographical individuals.
In this context we must recall Austin's caution: "All 'actions' are, as
actions (meaning what?), equal, composing a quarrel with striking a
match, winning a war with sneezing: wars still, we assimilate them one
and all to the supposedly most obvious and easy cases, such as posting a
letter or moving fingers, just as we assimilate all 'things' to horses or
beds.,,3
We shall look now into some of the prevailing descriptions of actions,
in order to see whether they are applicable to the domain of history. We
shall thus attempt to clarify the basic issue: in what sense does history
embrace events, actions, or both?
If action is to be subsumed under the generic term "practice," and
practice, to use John Rawls'description, is a form of activity specified by
a system of rules while the system defines offices, rules, moves, penal-
ties, defences, etc. - then it is questionable whether practice in this
sense can be applied to the historical realm and to historical action. Are
historical actions, like the emergence of Protestantism or start of the
French and the Bolshevik revolutions, specified by a system of rules?
Post factum somebody may try to decipher the system of rules that gives
structure to an activity like the renaissance of a religion or a revolution.
But it is questionable whether rules specify the individuals and groups
involved in the activity. To some extent we can even say that it is part of
the situation to overrule the rules - e.g., not to cling to the ecclesiastic
hierarchy, let alone to the existing social order. Somehow that descrip-
tion of practice is too much guided by the model or paradigm of a
certain type of activity, like games: games are governed by rules that an
individual must learn before he can be a participant in the specific game;
he must observe them lest he be excluded from the activity of the game.
When Rawls says that the rules are publicly known and understood as
definitive, we again encounter a paradox:4 since history is a public
realm, the actions and activities taking place within that realm are public
by definition, at least with respect to their outcome (for there might be
secret or individual actions leading to historical outcomes). But we may
still wonder whether the position of an action within the public sphere is
identical with the character of the action as guided by public rules, or by
rules publicly known.
The extent to which the current descriptions of actions and activities
cling naively to the individual model can be seen from additional
features usually attributed to actions. The first is that of responsibility:
actions, as related to agents, raise the question of'the responsibilities of
the agents. Let us take a rather difficult and invidious example - the
guilt of the German people during the Nazi period. A simple transposi-
tion of the notion of the individual in his personal sphere does not apply
to the historical sphere, unless we refer again specifically to individuals,
like Hitler or Eichmann. Responsibility implying the attributability of
an action as well as accountability takes a different shape when it applies
to groups of people, since vis-a-vis groups we cannot point to an explicit
will or implied in the action and thus serving as the groundwork for
responsibility. Attitudes of consent, even of passive consent, contribute
to the total historical situation, though we cannot presuppose or point to
will as initiating an action. In the attitude of consent we can discern an
adherence to an action initiated by a person or a group of persons; here,
84 CHAPTER 4
too, we have to distinguish between an expressed consent and a tacit

consent. Moreover, we can and probably must, attribute responsibility
to a group not only from the point of view of the agent implied, but also
from the point of view of the magnitude of the result - and the Nazi era
and the question of guilt is a case in point. A consent that does not lead
to events of a catastrophic order of magnitude may not count for a great
deal historically. From the event as an outcome we regress to the
activity and to those responsible for the activity. Hence, in the sphere of
history, when we do not identify individual agents, we cannot pinpoint
an individual agent and the activity or action emerging out of the agent.
We reconstruct the agent from the vantage of the event, and point
retrospectively to a continuity from the event to the agent without
clearly delineating the boundaries of the reconstructed agent. The topic
of individual agents will be dealt with in a subsequent part of our
exploration.
III
Another description of activity is as a mental action - setting ourselves to

do something, that is to say, to bring something about. In this context,
we must draw a distinction between intent and purpose, or, as suggested
by Austin, between acting intentionally, deliberately, and on purpose.
Insofar as intention is concerned, the distinction between consciousness
and goal-directedness is significant. Within the historical context, the
goal-directedness appears, e.g., the renaissance of a certain religion, a
revolution, or victory in a war. But the outcomes of that goal-
directedness go beyond the goal, and are initiated by historical agents
who lack the intention to bring about all the outcomes of the actions.
Agents cannot be aware of all the outcomes, since the results may lie in
the future of the agent-individual or group, and still be traced to the
action, even when we call this hindsight. But the distinction between
intention and goal is significant for the historical sphere: it implies the
difference between intention or intentionality belonging to the con-
sciousness of individuals, and goals, which, by the very fact that they can
be defined, create a kind of a trans-individual focus. Whatever their
intentions, many human beings, as agents, can share in the goal and be
directed toward the goal. They meet, as it were, in the goal, although
their intentions and motivations may differ.
Within the sphere of history, moreover, the trans-personal locus of
goals may initiate directedness; directedness is not necessarily the initial

step. Let us take a simple example: by way of intentionality or even
goal-directedness, when we start from the position of the agents, many
human beings might be inspired by attitudes of protest, dissatisfaction,
malaise, crises, or expectations. Their attitudes can be described as
goal-directed, because their goal might be to express their bitterness or
even to undermine the present system which in their eyes is accountable
(whatever this may mean) for the mischiefs and their misgivings. The
goal of a new social system or of utopian communities to be formed
parallel to the existing system or to replace it is a goal that can as such
initiate a new goal-directedness; or, as happens every so often in
history, one goal-directedness takes advantage of another goal-
directedness, utilizing its energies and reinforcing itself by it. Here,
too, we have to distinguish between goals set by individuals, who in
their intentionality can entertain goals, as against certain delineated
conceptual nuclei like systems or modes of existence and life, whose
trans-individual status attracts individuals without having to as.-;ume a
continuity from consciousness and intentionality to goal-directedness.
Because of the trans-individual status of goals, we can point to trans-
individual actions. These actions cannot be listed either with psychic
events or with bodily events; they are, to use Max Scheler's expression,
psycho-physically indifferent. Scheler used that term for the nature of
the person, but a fortiori it can be used, even more properly, for the
nature of the historical action al.J the historical agent, if the distinction
between the two is to be maintained at all. Parallel to that Scheler also
suggested the distinction between functions and acts. Among functions
are seeing, hearing, testing, etc., as well as all sorts of attention,
observation, etc. Among acts are all those attitudes in which something
is meant (etwas "gemeint" wird). 5 In the historical sphere, precisely
because of the goal-directedness, the directedness reinforces the enter-
tainment of goals, and goals create the directedness out of their own
resources. Thus an intersubjective realm is present, which cannot be
reduced either to functions or to actions as mental activities implying the
component of will or willing. The fact that we use the expression
"action" connotes the occurrences taking place; because human beings
are involved, we tend again to transpose on the intersubjective level
of history the descriptions that mayor may not hold good for actions
by individuals. We are probably victims of what might be called
"individual-morphism," parallel to the well-known anthropomorphism.
We have referred above to the element of will present in actions by
86 CHAPTER 4
individuals. Oakeshott says of practice that it is the exercise of the will;

practical thought is volition; practical experience is the world sub specie
voluntatis. Oakeshott is consistent, because the stress he lays on the
exercise of will leads him to the statement that the self, engaged in
practical experience, is what is separate or unique and self-contained.
This position can be maintained only if we posit a far-reaching chasm
between the mode of practice and the mode of history. History is to be
listed within the broad scope of alteration of existence. It is not merely a
program for action but action itself - again to use Oakeshott's terms.
Practice and history imply and depend upon something which is "to be"
but is "not yet". History is practice. Hence we can speak of historical
practice and historical action. But as long as we confine practice to the
exercise of will, we are somehow at a loss; because of our individual-
morphic description of action, we are looking for a trans-individual will.
Either we find that will in a sort of Volksseele or "will of the proletar-
iat", and thus maintain a consistent description of action; or we do not
find the component of will, and see history only from the sub specie
praeteritorum (in Oakeshott's sense), from the point of view of depen-
dence upon the past rather than that of occurrences en route and their
results. 6 But once we emphasize the inter-subjective character of his-
tory, which, by definition, cannot contain components like will or
intentionality, which are characteristic of individuals, we must distin-
guish between the structure of history, including historical actions,
and a certain theory of action which at best is applicable in the sphere
of individual agents, and not necessarily in the sphere of trans-
individuality. If the focus is, for example, on national self-determination,
the agent is a people; if the focus is the share in the "national cake," the
agents are those who are interested or those whose goal-directedness
lies in the national income and its distribution. It is precisely because of
this trans-individuality that the historical sphere is characterized by the
coexistence of different goals and foci, and consequently by a coexis-
tence of agents defined or delineated from the point of view of the
different foci. 7
IV
Our previous reference to goals as creating the intersubjective realm of

history could be interpreted as suggesting a cause or a prime mover for
the establishment or emergence of the historical sphere. But this is not

so, since intersubjectivity is not created from sources outside itself - be
they the goal or values. Here we reiterate, from a different angle, the
conclusion of the first part of this exploration, concerning the status of
history. Solidarity, to refer to this example, characterized by the institu-
tionalization of shared value-orientations, is only one expression of the
infrastructure of intersubjectivity, which as such can be focused or
reinforced but not created, by shared values. 8 The hIstorical sphere
originates out of itself; no extra- or intra-historical cause creates history.
Intersubjectivity is related to the awareness of those involved in the
context and implies that reality does not begin with themselves. From
the position of the awareness of people as placed in the midst of time,
history attributes no primacy to the awareness of the past or the
existence of predecessors. From the point of view of the awareness of
intersubjectivity and, along with this, of the historical realm, the notion
of "Vorwelt" does not occupy a more primary position than the notion
of what might perhaps be called, for the sake of symmetry, a "Fol-
gewelt" or "Nachwelt",9 that is to say, the reality of the future in the
future. Thus we come back to the fundamental interrelation between
time and meaning.
The reference to the preceding world as well as to the succeeding one
is a certain interpretation of the openness of reality, which, as we have
seen, is the ontological presupposition of any attitude that introduces
changes into reality and brings about events or results. Once that
openness is presupposed, it becomes more closely interpreted as an
openness in terms of time; the past and the future indicate the specific
vectors of the open-endedness. Were it not for the possibility of going
beyond the present, the rigidity or closedness of the past could not be
discerned. Once human beings find themselves embraced by a broader
reality, by the openness of reality in general, and by the trans-personal
or trans-individual status of time, the alleged subjectivity is broken
through: individuals reflect upon themselves as referring or relating to
spheres outside themselves. In this sense trans-personality is the onto-
logical precondition for transsubjectivity or intersubjectivity. Hence it can
be said that an individual agent cannot be historically a prime mover,
but only an interpreter or an agent for the focusing and materialization
of conditions, situations, directions, etc. Transsubjectivity looms large
even vis-a-vis individual historical agents, i.e., "great" historical indivi-
duals. From this point of view historical action is never a new beginning;
88 CHAPTER 4
it is an action insofar as it brings about a certain course of events, but it

is an event insofar as things emerge or come to exist in the action. As a
matter of fact, the concept of events related to evenio is applicable in the
context, because it implies the notion of coming, coming out, coming
along. Hence we may perhaps coin an expression like activent to
combine the aspect of action with that of event. If we refer to the notion
of action at all, we may take advantage of the distinction suggested by
Arthur C. Danto: "That is, if there are any actions at all, there must be
two distinct kinds of actions: those performed by an individual M.,
which he may be said to have caused to happen, and those actions, also
performed by M., which he cannot be said to have caused to happen.
The latter I shall designate as basic actions."lo
The lack of a primary historical "fountainhead," which we tried to
explain by the very structure of time, can also be explained by looking at
the aspect of content. Historical actions presuppose the day-to-day
infrastructure of human existence, and thus mainly the infrastructure of
the public realm, even when that realm is not audible or visible. To be
sure, it can be said that human existence in the public realm proceeds
without being noticed by a special reflection referring to it. The day-to-
day events are referred to only in critical situations. As Dewey ob-
served, a hitch in the works occasions emotion and provokes thought.
-At certain turning points, the infrastructure of reality gains historical
meaning and significance because certain problems become prominent.
This is, for example, the nature of an economic crisis, in the sense that
work, earning, and interaction between human beings are all presup-
posed; certain problems emerge out of the context which make the
"smooth" proceeding or course impossible, or, to put it differently,
which call for a certain deliberate intervention in the course of events up
to the moment of intervention. The infrastructure is not created by the
action; it conditions the action, because an attempt to come to grips with
an economic crisis is bound to differ from an attempt to come to grips
with, shall we say, a crisis in the curriculum of a school. Action in the
strict sense of the term is future-directed, because it is meant to bring
about changes in the situation. It is also past-directed, because the
infrastructure to be changed has been read carefully and the pro-
grammed action adequately defined and carried out. Let us take another,
topical - if trivial - example: in the American school system busing
could become a program of action only because the existence of buses is
presupposed. But this existence is not confined to the vehicles in the
physical sense; it comprises the facts or events that people ride in buses.
Buses are meant to overcome distances in the geographical sense; as
instruments for overcoming geographical distances they eventually be-
come instruments for overcoming social distances. Here, too, the infra-
structure is of a social or intersubjective character. That character
cannot be limited to the value-aspect or to the goal-component. It is a
kind of a Gestalt; historical changes, events, or actions are essentially
extractions of certain components of the infrastructure that make them
into foci of action. In this sense a focus of action becomes an event
because of its involvement in the infrastructure, on the one hand, and its
impact on the course of subsequent events or actions, on the other. The
grounding of the focus of action in the infrastructure reinforces the
position that there is no new beginning in history. It also reinforces the
fact that the impact of events transcends the intention, because by its
very essence, the event is involved in the course of reality or in the
course of time. An event and a cluster of events cannot therefore fully
control either reality or time. If we use the two terms, intention and
motive, in the sense suggested by G.E.M. Anscombe - "A man's
intention is what he aims at or chooses; his motive is what determines
the aim or choice"ll - we realize that reality sweeps the agent along in
both aspects: sometimes his motives become irrelevant by virtue of the
step towards transpersonalization that is characteristic of historical
actions or events; sometimes his intentions become obsolete. A historical
event or the outcome of an action becomes interwoven with other events
or with the broad reality over which he has not and cannot have control.
Hence even when we add Max Weber's notion of social action to our
analysis we still must doubt whether that notion does justice to the
complexity of the historical realm. Weber describes a social action as
one related to the behavior of others. As such it includes both action
proper - a deed - as well as the failure to act and passive acquiescence.
Since the emphasis is on the relation to the others, social action may be
oriented to the past as well as to the present or to the expected future
behavior of others. 12 One could assume that historical action is a social
action in the first place since it involves interaction and is related to, or
implied in, what goes on between various peoples. Historical action is
90 CHAPTER 4
oriented toward the behavior of others, since it lies within a sphere that
is public or common; different peoples are placed in that sphere before
the action proper begins. Yet Weber's description of social action is, as
said, limited, and does not do justice to the complexities of history and
historical action. Let us take an example quoted by Weber himself,
namely, that religious behavior is not social if it is merely a matter of
contemplation or of solitary prayer. But what sort of prayer is the
solitary individual uttering? Is it one that he received from tradition,
e.g., in the form of a prayer-book? To be sure, he uses it within the
confines of his own individual existence. He may 'use the same prayer
employed by another individual or by a church-goer who prays with
others and interacts with them. If social action connotes a present or
momentary interaction with others, the behavior of the solitary worship-
per is not social. But if sociality or social action connotes an involvement
in a sphere that provides a common ground for individuals, even when
here and now they are alone the shape of the situation is different.
Interestingly, when Weber refers to the orientation towards the past, he
cites the example of an individual motivated by revenge for a past
attack. His example points to the immediate impact a past situation may
have on the emotions of the individual involved. But when we speak of
the realm of history, there is no personal involvement in the "existen-
tial" impact of the past act, which on one's present response; there is
more of an anonymous involvement of many individuals in a past as well
as a sort of deliberate or non-deliberate selection of events from the
past, remembered or re-instituted by those living in the present. The
social character of the past serves as a reservoir, as a background, a
score for individual selections, as principles for actions or norms, etc.
The social action, as described by Weber, is based on a model of linear
or horizontal relationships between co-present individuals. The position
of the historical realm and the interaction between the dimensions of
time and the human beings involved in those dimensions is, however, of
a different character. There is no interaction, since the individuals are
not co-present; the past is reconstructed and brought to the present,
while the future is anticipated. Individuals extend the network of their
relationships in the directions prescribed by dimensions of time, which
are in turn interpreted by them as containing contents of different
meaning or impact.
If we take Weber's description as a model of social action, we are
bound to arrive at a paradoxical conclusion: the interaction between
human beings within the historical realm is not a social action proper.
To avoid this paradoxical conclusion, we have to extend the meaning of
social action to include interaction between human beings, whether the
context of that interaction. - both in terms of time and in terms of
meaning - is in the present or transcends it. This is rather significant as
an attempt to describe the nature of action in history, as well as the
interrelation between actions and events. Actions occurring in the
present, if they are of a historical character, occur against the back-
ground of given circumstances, which, historically speaking, are events
or results of actions initiated in the past. A historical actor or agent is
aware - whether his actual or topical awareness is focused or not - that
he acts in certain circumstances. Did he not conceive of the circum-
stances as historical, that is to say, as results of actions, he would not
initiate action of his own. He would take the world or reality as closed,
preventing any intervention in the course of reality. But the conscious or
unconscious presupposition of any action, including historical action, is
that reality is not closed. A historical agent, whether an individual or a
group' of individuals, presupposes history, that is to say, the constant
shift from action to results or events, or the perennial possibility of
initiating actions that will result in events.
VI
The locus of action is here and now. The historical agent assumes that
his action will result in an event and become a historical event proper to
be discerned by a future observer. There is a constant shift from actions
to events; what is a historical action can be gauged by the historical
events or by those actions that become events. The interpretation of an
action as an event follows the principle of wirklich ist was wirksam ist,
or, put differently, we return from the results to the actions that initiated
them.
If this shift from action to events is characteristic of the historical
sphere, then we may reiterate the previous comment: underlying the
historical realm and the historical action occurring in it is the continuous
awareness that we are in the midst of time, and that reality does not
begin with ourselves.13 A historical action, accompanied by that aware-
ness, may bring about an anti-egocentric grasp of historical actions and
agents. History is an anti-egocentric realm par excellence. The shift from
92 CHAPTER 4
action to events, and the evolution of events into the background for
action, that continuous shift characteristic of history, may lead us to a
further conclusion related to the distinction between history as res gestae
and history as the narration of rerum gestarum. History as res gestae is a
forward-looking action occurring against the background of given
events, that is to say, of results of actions that occurred previously.
History, as a narration of rerum gestarum, is an attempt to look at
events as results of actions, or to find the causal or hermeneutic relation-
ship between events that are the point of departure of our interpretation
or observation and actions that resulted in the events. Historical action
proper as an occurrence or as an activity presupposes events, while
historical narration presupposes actions. Historical occurrences are
characterized by actions in which historical agents are involved against
the background of events. Historical events presuppose actions; they
are historical since these actions occurred in the past, and are not and
cannot be experienced by the observer in the present. The present is the
locus of action; events do not occur in the present, but they can be
traced from the present. The distinction lies therefore in the parallel
distinction between the locus and the point of departure, though the two
perspectives are correlated. History is perpetually recreated; the shift
from actions to events, and the reconstruction of actions from events,
epitomize the character of the historical realm. It follows that history
presupposes itself: the public realm, for instance, institutions or lan-
guages, is not created by a summing-up of individual deeds or voices.
The public realm, reshaped as it is, is presupposed in the first place, and
so are changes occurring within the public realm, though they may bring
about significant or even radical innovations. Whatever applies to the
circularity of the public realm applies also to the circularity of history
and to historical action. Historical action presupposes the historical
realm. That presupposition can be pointed to by employing the concept
of events. Hence we may say that actions presuppose events and events
can lead to action; both components or correlates are embraced by the
common sphere of history, on the one hand, while they keep recreating
that common sphere, on the other. This circularity is present in the
interlaced connection between situations and individuals, though indivi-
duals - as we shall see presently - break through the circularity never-
theless.
From the preceding analysis we may draw additional conclusions as to
the nature of history. History is a sphere, not a particular content: what
is or is not historical cannot be decided from the point of view of the
substance of an action or an event, but only from the point of view of the
place, position, or impact of the action or event. History, in the spheric
and not substantive sense, is a process of incorporation or integration of
substantive actions and events into its own motion or continuity. History
presupposes substantive contents like scientific events, political acts, or
technology. The substantive contents become historical events within
the limited spheres delineated by the contents, for example, events in
the history of science or politics or technology. They may become events
within the broader scope of history, maintaining their substantive
meaning by having an impact beyond the boundaries delineated by that
meaning. The Theory of Relativity - to mention one example - became
an event not only in the history of science but in history at large because
of the impact it had on the atomic bomb, and through the atomic bomb
on the course of world history. Since there is no primary substantive
aspect to history, what becomes historical is a post factum assertion.
The second conclusion is this: since historical meanings are meanings
that gain impact, historical events are essentially radiating occrrrences,
similar to the sense used by William Stern in his theory of values,
namely, "strahlende Werte". To put it differently, they are events
insofar as they have effects. But once we introduce into the scope of our
analysis the metaphor of radiation, we may say, in light of present-day
experience (and without being overly sarcastic), that historical events
might be radiating in the neutral sense or might be radiating in the sense
attributed to nuclear energy. The impact might be neutral, benign, or
malignant. The emphasis placed on the aftermath of events, which in
turn is related to the lack of substantive meaning of history, opens the
door to the evaluation of historical events. The primary evaluation is the
assessment of the fact that events equal impact. That assessment in turn
can lead to subsequent assessments and evaluations as to the nature of
the impact - whether it was beneficial or harmful to subsequent genera-
tions, or what sort of substantive meaning the event contained from the
aspect of the particular sphere to which it belongs, as distinguished from
the aspect of the historical process. Here, too, the distinction between
meanings and impacts related to the analysis of action in history leads us
to reconsider the interplay between action and events, on the one hand,
and to have reservations about the value-free interpretations, on the
other.
The subsequent analysis will bring into prominence certain aspects of
that interplay, both in terms of human agents as well as in terms of the
position of evaluation in historical awareness and interpretation.
CHAPTER 5
CONTEXTS AND INDIVIDUALS
We now turn to considering the position of individuals in the historical

process. Then we shall raise several additional questions about the
position of individuals in and vis-a-vis the process, including the accoun-
tability of individuals.
The position of individuals connotes their status as members of
mankind. As a member of the species, the individual is separate from
other individuals. In this sense, each individual occupies a place in
space. In addition, each individual is endowed with a sense of self-
identity, whether vague, dim, pronounced, or explicit. The aspect of
self-identity adds to what might be described as the positional aspect of
individuals, their referential, or more precisely the self-referential,
aspect. From the point of view of self-identity, individuals may and will
look at themselves as involved in processes and nexuses. But concur-
rently they will look at the involvement - that is to say, understand it,
interpret it, and sometimes even take a stand against it.
We started our exploration of the nature of the historical process from
the background of time and the acts of bestowing meaning to time. Now
we are in a sense contracting the scope of our analysis. We started with
the broad aspects of the historical process, from the angle of its begin-
ning qua subject and of its end qua progress; we continued to explore
the partial structures of the process, characterized by the interplay
between events and actions. Now we make a further step in the direc-
tion of contraction by pointing to individuals as agents of the process.
Yet we may ask: whence do we draw the concept of individuals? After
all, the point of departure of our analysis is the infrastructure of the
historical process. That infrastructure contains nexuses, not separated
data. The individual, as we understand the term, connotes a separate
entity. How can such an entity be lodged within the web of events and
actions? This is the first question to which we must address ourselves.
We shall attempt to present a two-fold answer to that question.
(a) The individual as a separate entity is not detached from the
process and from the nexuses characteristic of the events and actions
taking place in the process or implicated in it. Separation implies also
that from which separation occurs. In the simple sense of the term, each
94
CONTEXTS AND INDIVIDUALS 95
individual is separated from other individuals through his position in

space. But even as a separate entity an individual can be involved in the
process and interact with events yet still retain his position as an
individual. Even if we assume the determining character of events, such
determination does not necessarily have the impact of a hurricane on
those exposed to it. Events do not sweep away individuals; at the most
they determine or condition them. Individuals are preserved, though
events mold their actions, intentions,and goals. Hence there is no
contradiction between the web of relation~ epitomized by the concept of
events and the position of individuals.
(b) Our second answer is related more to the ontology of history than
to its phenomenology. Individuals in the sense described above repre-
sent given data of reality precisely because individuals are biologically
grounded or guaranteed. The historical process, as a continuous interac-
tion between time and meanings, cannot efface the biological stratum of
reality. The process itself occurs against the background of biological
reality - as we have seen in the first part of our analysis, when we dealt
with how historical consciousness interprets historically biological data
of descendence. To be sure, this is an interpretation of data, not an
invention or obliteration of data for the sake of creating new ones. The
position of individuals as spathlily separated and referentially self-
identical can be carried over from reality at large to the historical
nexuses. Within those nexuses that position can receive its particular
interpretation - interpretation in the strict sense of the term, namely,
conveyance of meanings from within the sphere (history) to data stem-
ming from without (reality at large or the biological substrata of human
existence) .
It is no accident that the problem of the place of individuals in the
historical process appears most prominently in the case of historical
individuals, those individuals who influenced the course of historical
events, or, in other words, those who initiated historical actions. Since
history is an interplay between events and actions, it is plausible to
assume that individuals appear vis-a-vis situations as agents. The n.otion
of an agent is in this sense the functional manifestation of both the
positional and the referential status of the individual. Having limited the
first part of our analysis to this aspect of the place of individuals, we
have to preface that analysis with a few comments on the notion that
individuals,historical individuals in particular, are conditioned by the
historical process.
96 CHAPTER 5
II
Since we started from the biological layer, the first question we face is
whether it makes sense to transpose the notion of determination, as
found in the biological sphere, to the sphere of history. There is a
tendency, sometimes called reductionist, to suppose that a model of
determination can be applied to another sphere than that in which it was
originally formulated; hence the model of biological determination
could be transferred to the area of history.
But this is not so. Unlike the biological sphere, the historical sphere is
characterized by the basic fact that occurrences take place via the
responses of individuals; through their responses individuals activate
their awareness. They are not determined in the same sense that the
genetic code determines the organism. If they are determined at all,
their determination is not opaque, but presupposes the prism of aware-
ness. In this sense the historical process cannot be viewed as linear,
progressing from causes to effects, but rather as circular, moving from
the cause, i.e., the process and its context, to the human individual or
individuals who occupy their positions, and respond from that position
to the process. The responding individual is open to the process; the
process lacks determining impact unless it is mediated through aware-
ness. This feature of the historical process precludes the possibility of
seeing it as a simple continuation of the evolutionary process.
Hence we must suggest a softer version of determination, once the
unequivocal prescriptive character of determination is precluded. That
version has two main aspects. The first aspect can be put negatively,
namely, that the individual does not initiate the processes - if he
initiates them, at all - de novo. His acts and actions are continuations,
since they are responses and take place in situations. The individual
does not invent the situations in which he acts; they are given, and that
givenness renders them historical. Moreover, the background of time is
presupposed. The individual, even when he gives direction to the
process in time, does not create time at large, which can be viewed as a
reservoir of directions. Individuals interact, and their actions are inter-
actions. In this sense - and we come now to the second aspect of the
softer version of determination - the historical nexus, as described
previously, prescribes to a certain extent the interventions of individu-
als, including historical individuals. It makes a difference whether the
individual acts in a city, a state, or a global society; whether he conducts
a war where his weapons are stones or boats, or of the kind that may
bring about what is nowadays called "overkill." These differences of
situation shape the actions of individuals and change them both quanti-
tatively and qualitatively, since the horizon of individual awareness is to
a very large extent delineated by the situations and infrastructure of the
process. To be sure, additional factors can enter the total nexus deter-
mining the actions of individuals - not only surrounding facts, but also
those guiding one's reflections, such as awareness of the consequences
of actions, norms of behavior, etc. Hence, when we move now to an
exploration of the relation between individuals and processes, we are
not oblivious of the intricacies of the histori~al process and the uncer-
tainty about the line of demarcation between actions and events.
III
As a matter of fact, the nature of the individual's role in history is a

problem that arises not only in philosophical and historical literature on
the subject, but in popular discussions as well. It is noteworthy that the
popular presentations of the problem frequently reflect the two extreme
positions between which a systematic treatment vacillates. We may take
Thomas Carlyle as a leading representative of one position; the other
position - especially in the perspective of present-day currents - may be
illustrated by the Marxist theory as expounded by Georgi Plekhanov. It
is true that the opposite extreme from Carlyle also includes such
non-Marxist thinkers as the historian Karl Lamprecht, who minimizes
the individual's role in history and emphasizes the role of society as the
historical cause par excellence. Nevertheless, the Marxist position, as
formulated by Plekhanov, seems to be a representative formulation for
critical analysis.
In order to establish the conceptual framework of the extremes
represented by Carlyle and Plekhanov, we should consider the tacit
assumptions that underlie the discussions of the individual's place in
history. The relation between the individual and history is frequently
presented as analogous or equivalent to the relation between the
individual and society. Implicit in the assumption that the two relations
are one is the further assumption that the concept of history and the
concept of society are the same. The latter assumption is not entirely
without justification; for if one defines "history" as the sum-total of
98 CHAPTER 5
human events, and "society" as the sum-total of myriads of human

beings and their activities, then one may claim that, insofar as they both
designate sum-totals, the two terms are interchangeable.
Such as identification of history with society ignores, however, the
major differences between them. History pertains not only to the
province of social events but also to the process of the generations, the
dimension in which changes occur, and to the sum-total of changes
accumulated over the ages down to the present; whereas society is a
comprehensive institution, or a sum-total of behavior'patterns in which
myriads of individuals are involved at a particular period of time. Thus
defined, society may indeed be said to have a history, both in the sense
that the patterns of conduct to which individuals conform have a past,
and in the sense that these patterns of conduct are undergoing changes
that will be studied by the historians of the future. Yet the province of
the historian differs from that of the social scientist: the historian must
survey the full sweep of the process of generations, whereas the sociolo-
gist is concerned with a particular cross-section of that proce'ss, which
alone constitutes "society" in the strict sense of the term.
This blurring of the distinction between the provinces of history and
society is a source of still another misconception that has direct bearing
upon the problem of the individual's place in history. The assumption
that "history" and "society" overlap in meaning leads to the conclusion
that "society" constitutes a decisive historical factor. This conclusion
may take one of two forms. On the one hand, it finds expression in the
notion that society is the historical cause par excellence, a cause that not
only creates all historical processes, but also determines the individuals
whose lives and activities are allegedly determined by those processes.
In view of the Marxists' concern with causal analysis in general and with
establishing the causal efficacy of society in particular, their emphasis of
this notion can be understood.
On the other hand, the conclusion that society is a decisive historical
factor may find expression in the notion that the proper subject matter
of history is society. Here, society is seen not as the historical cause but
as the object of historical research. Karl Lamprecht had this notion in
mind when he claimed that the proper object of historical research is not
the individual but society, because society alone is an object amenable
to rational analysis; the individual by his very irrational - or even
anti-rational - nature is an object that resists methodical analysis.
The tendency to blur the distinction between society and history thus
accompanies two opposite views of the relation between the individual

and history. The view, that society is the cause of historical processes
might be called ontological. Insofar as it is concerned with the nature of
reality or tends to link historical research with ontological analysis, it
assigns to society the status of an active force or cause. The other view,
which holds society to be the proper subject-matter of historical re-
search, might be called methodological. It is not concerned with the
nature of reality; on the contrary, admitting the operation of diverse
active forces, it isolates the active force of society as the factor that lends
itself most readily to methodical and thus rational research verifiable by
data, which in turn are amenable to verification.
IV
Let us now examine the two opposed conceptions of the individual's

place in· history. To begin with, it should be noted that both the
Carlylian and the Marxist conceptions are popular metamorphoses of
systematic philosophical standpoints. Carlyle may be said to have popu-
larized the pivotal idea of Fichte's early writings. Even though in On
Heroes and Hero-worship and the Heroic in History Fichte is mentioned
only in connection with a side issue, his influence on the dominant idea
of the book as a whole is apparent. Carlyle's interpretation of the
individual's role in history seems to be governed by Fichte's doctrine
that the "I" is self-positing and self-constituting because its nature and
its activity are one. From this definition it follows that the "I", being the
spontaneous source of all situations, is neither preceded by any datum
nor dependent upon any circumstances. Transferring this idea of Fich-
te's to a historical and empirical context, Carlyle declares that they are
great men who "have shaped themselves," and that "Universal History,
the history of what man has accomplished in this world, is at bottom, the
History of Great Men who have worked here. "1 This declaration may be
understood as a simplified variation on the central argument of Fichte's
"Theory of Science" (Wissenschaftslehre).
On the other hand, Plekhanov's conception of the individual's role
in history is a simplification or popularization of an idea presented
by Hegel in the Philosophy of History, namely, that the function of
the creative agent in history is to actualize the objective trend of
the universal historical process. 2 Obviously, this idea of Hegel's is
100 CHAPTER 5
connected with his doctrine of the "Cunning of Reason," to which we

referred previously, according to which the individual is the instrument
of rational or universal ends transcending his own, even when he acts on
the assumption that he is pursuing his private interests.
A critical analysis of Carlyle's theory that history is at bottom the
history of great men reveals that what Carlyle means by a great man is
far from clear. Nowhere in the biographical sketches of Heroes and
Hero-worship does Carlyle try to define the distinguishing marks of the
hero, or does he attempt to differentiate between the various types of
heroism exemplified by the great men whose work he regards as consti-
tutive of universal history. Thus he marshals into the ranks of great men
founders of religions, men of letters, speculative thinkers, statesmen,
military leaders. He fails to remark that this heterogeneous assortment
should be divided into at least two classes: those great or creative men
whose work as statesmen, legislators, or military leaders was intrinsi-
cally oriented to, and exhausted in, the historical domain; and those
great or creative men whose work as religious leaders or men of letters,
while neither oriented to, nor exhausted in, the historical domain,
nevertheless left an ineffaceable trace upon the historical process.
This sort of classification is called for because the achievement of men
like Dante, Luther, and Rousseau cannot be confined to their role in
universal history. The inner logic of a literary, religious, or philosophi-
cal creation is determined by the specific nature of the sphere (litera-
ture, religion, or philosophy) in which that creation was crystallized.
Such creations can, indeed, be studied from the viewpoint of their
influence upon universal history. But this does not imply that their
essence can be adequately accounted for by circumscribing their place in
the historical process, i.e., in the course of human events through the
ages.
Carlyle himself seems to admit that there is reason for distinguishing
among types of great men when he remarks that nature does not make
all great men in the self-same mold. But the question he raises, whether
the distinction derives from a "diversity of nature" or a "diversity of
circumstances", 3 misses the main point. From the viewpoint of the
individual's place in history, this question seems to be less fundamental
than the one Carlyle neglects, namely, the distinction between the great
or creative man whose work is oriented to, and crystallized in, the
historical domain on the one hand, and the great or creative man whose
work is oriented to, and crystallized in, the domain of literature,
religion, or philosophy, on the other. This failure to draw the latter

distinction accounts largely for Carlyle's failure to define the nature of
the great man. To be sure, it might be argued that Carlyle does define
the nature of the great man, at least implicitly. Underlying Carlyle's line
of reasoning - so the argument might run -is the definition of the great
man as an author of change. For this definition it makes no difference
whether the change occurs in the historical domain sensu stricto, or
whether it originates in other domains of human activity, such as
literature, religion, and philosophy. Even if this is so, Carlyle's concept
of history, as reflected in this definition, remains inadequate.
History involves more than the mere occurrence or mere creation of
change. A further constitutive factor of history, which Carlyle over-
looks, consists in what might be called the integration of change.
Historical development presupposes the non-existence of an absolute
beginning in history, or the pre-existence of a reality in which changes
occur. This basic aspect of history is the manifestation of the presupposi-
tion and presence of time for the historical contexts. Historical process
consists both in (a) the absorption of change by an existing reality, and
in (b) the self-reconstruction of that reality through the integration of
change into its texture. Historical change neither occurs in a vacuum nor
creates the context in which it occurs. Hence, even if Carlyle's definition
of the great man as an author of change is satisfactory, the conception of
historical reality implied by this definition is probably unsatisfactory. To
be adequate, a conception of historical reality must account not only for
the cause of historical changes but also for their absorption or integra-
tion. Historical reality is the sum-total of changes, integrations accumu-
lated in the process of generations. Hence there is no justification for
reducing it to a mere province of change or to a field of activity for the
creator of change. This argument is a restatement of the previously
analyzed relationship between actions and events.
Nor is the integration of change the only constituent factor of histori-
cal reality neglected by Carlyle's conception of the relation between the
great man and history. Another factor ignored when history is treated
solely in terms of changes and their creators is the position of historical
consciousness. Historical consciousness cannot be conceived as the
achievement of a single individual, be he ever so great, we cannot leave
out the reflective relatedness of many individuals towards changes
undergone by, and integrated into, reality: towards the process of
change as well as towards the creators of change. Many individuals
102 CHAPTER 5
participate in historical consciousness. These individuals live and act

long after the last chapter in the biography of the change-creating
individual has been written. Their participation in shaping historical
consciousness entails their orientation not only to the past, but also to
the public molds in which their life is cast, patterns such as language,
mores, the institutions of the state and the law, etc.
Thus the complexity of history as the object of historical conscious-
ness and as the dimension of change-integration is obscured by the
contention that universal history is at bottom the history of the great
men who have worked here. We shall now examine the opposite
contention, namely, that universal history is at bottom the history of the
social forces which have operated here, to see whether it affords a more
satisfactory account of the complex relations between the individual and
history.
Let us then turn to the opposite pole, the Marxist position as formulated
in Plekhanov's essay on "The Role of the Individual in History."
The purpose of Plekhanov's essay is to prove (a) that society is the
historical cause par excellence, and (b) that this status of society is not
incompatible with the ability of individuals to playa significant role in
history. Plekhanov's argument is based on the assumption that the
nature and influence of the individual's- actions are determined by the
social forces operating at his time. In other words, Plekhanov identifies
"society" with the totality of circumstances in which the individual
undertakes his action: "The effect of personal peculiarities ... is unde-
niable; but no less undeniable is the fact that it could occur only in
the given social conditions."4
To demonstrate his contention, Plekhanov cites several historical
figures whose actions were dictated by social circumstances that they
themselves did not create. Thus, for example, the Marquise de Pompa-
dour" ... was strong not by her own strength, but by the power of the
king who was subject to her will. Can we say that the character of Louis
XV was exactly what it was inevitably bound to be, in view of the
general course of development of social relations in France? No, given
the same course of development a king might have appeared in his place
with a different attitude towards women." He concludes that" ... it is
the relation of social forces which, in the last analysis, explains the fact
that Louis XV's character and the caprices of his favorite, could have
such a deplorable influence on the fate of France."5
Having adduced this example, Plekhanov proceeds to argue that
although individuals can sometimes wield considerable influence upon
the fate of society, "the possibility of exercising this influence, and its
extent, are determined by the form or organization of society, by the
relation of forces within it." Expanding on this point, Prekhanov goes
on to say that although "the extent of personal influence may also be
determined by the talents of the individual . . . the individual can
display his talents only when he occupies the position in society neces-
sary for this. Why was the fate of France in the hands of a man who
totally lacked the ability and desire to serve society? Because such was
the form of organization of that society. It is the form of organization
that in any given period determines the role ... that may fall to the lot
of ... individuals."6
Here Plekhanov has advanced a step further in his argument. After
claiming that the extent of an individual's influence is determined by
social conditions, he now adds that an individual cannot influence the
course of social development unless his position in the existing social
system enables him to do so. In support of his contention that the course
of historical events is determined not by "personal qualities of individu-
als" but by "the state of productive forces," Plekhanov argues that
individuals are historical causes "only in the sense, perhaps, that ...
(they) possess more or less talent for making technical improvements,
discoveries, and inventions."7 By defining effective personal action as an
instrument to improve a given social setting, Ple}chanov evidently in-
tends to restrict the influence of individual agents. Not content with this
restriction, he goes so far as to reduce the fact that a particular historical
individual played a particular historical role to a caprice of fortune.
According to him, even "the 18th Brumaire and its influence on the
internal life of France . . . (as well as) on the general course and
outcome of events, would probably have been the same as they were
under Napoleon" had Napoleon "been killed like Jourdan."s What the
situation in France required was "a good sword" to restore order. Had
Napoleon been killed, "the place. . . (he) succeeded in occupying
would, probably, not have remained vacant.,,9 It so happened that
Napoleon lived to play the role of the good sword. Hence, argues
Plekhanov, Napoleon "prevented all the other generals from playing
104 CHAPTER 5
this role, and some of them might have performed it in the same way, or
almost the same way, as he did."to Plekhanov thus implies not only that
the individual agent is detennined by the given social circumstances, but
also that a particular individual agent, whose action was historically
effective, could have been replaced by another individual agent equally
capable of carrying out the action demanded by the social circum-
stances. One could say that Plekhanov conceives of the individual agent
as a mere variable, whose function could have been fulfilled by another
individual without altering the general direction of the historical pro-
cess. It follows that the individual agent is determined by the given
circumstances in which he acts, and that the individual himself, as
individual, occupies a contingent status. For it is only by chance that this
particular individual, rather than another, happened to actualize the
historical trend.
In considering historical developments not only in terms of what
actually occurred but also in terms of what might have occurred,
Plekhanov oversteps the bounds of historical analysis. Instead of con-
fining himself to an analysis of the causes that produced a certain
historical situation, Plekhanov analyzes the status of the individual
actualizer, in order to demonstrate the contingency of that status in
relation to the necessity of the given social circumstances:
If, owing to certain mechanical or physiological causes unconnected with the general
course of the social-political and intellectual development of Italy, Raphael, Michel-
angelo, and Leonardo da Vinci had died in their infancy, Italian art would have been less
perfect, but the general trend of its development in the period of the Renaissance would
have remained the same. Raphael, Leonardo da Vinci, and Michelangelo did not create
this trend; they were merely its best representatives. l l
This assertion is merely a corollary to Plekhanov's general postulate

that, in relation to history, individual agents have the status, not of
creators, but of representatives and, at the most, improvers. Just as in
the comprehensive realm of history, political and military development
is not initiated, but only improved, by individuals, so, in the limited
realm of spiritual or intellectual events known as the Renaissance, the
trend of development is not produced, but only perfected, by its fore-
most individual representatives.
Having outlined Plekhanov's argument, let us see whether it can bear
the brunt of criticism.
Our first critical observation is partly historical, partly systematic.
From a historical viewpoint, Plekhanov's assumption that society, as the

historical cause par excellence, constitutes an independent force which
uses individuals as its instruments may be regarded as a variation on a
Machiavellian motif. In The Discourses, Machiavelli often recurs to the
idea that, "It ... is the course of Fortune, when she wishes to effect
some great result, to select for her instrument a man of such spirit and
ability that he will recognize the opportunity which is afforded him. "12
Expressing the same idea in a slightly different form, Machiavelli claims
that "he errs least and will be most favored by fortune who suits
proceedings to the time ... "13 But his most emphatic formulation of
this idea reads, "I repeat, ... as an incontrovertible truth, proved by all
history, that men may second Fortune, but cannot defeat (her). "14
The echo of these statements in Plekhanov's lead to the conclusion
that Plekhanov translated Machiavelli's thought into Marxist terms,
replacing myth by methodology and Fortune by Society. When due
allowance for this translation is made, it becomes clear that the position
Plekhanov allots the individual in relation to society is the same position
that Machiavelli allotted the individual in relation to Fortune. Both
ascribe the general trend of historical development to the causal efficacy
and guiding weight of an impersonal active force, be it Fortune or
Society. Plekhanov believes that the features and trends of society are
unambiguous, and also that knowledge of society'S present features and
trends facilitates foreknowledge of the direction in which these features
and trends will develop. Even those individuals who are ignorant of the
general trend of social development, are inevitably determined by it.
Wise individuals, in other words, will follow Machiavelli's advice and
deliberately suit their actions to the trend of their time. But even unwise
individuals will act in conformity to what is demanded by the prevailing
circumstances. For, consciously or unconsciously, willy-nilly, every
individual acts as the instrument of the impersonal social forces opera-
tive in his day.
Plekhanov does not present this doctrine as a sociological interpreta-
tion of Machiavelli's Discourses, but of Hegel's approach to the indivi-
dual's role in history. There are indeed certain aspects of Hegel's system
- such as his idea of the "cunning of Reason," already mentioned in the
previous parts of our analysis, or his conception of the individual
historical agent as the actualizer of universal history - that seem to
support Plekhanov's conception of the individual's role in history. There
is, however, a passage in Hegel's Philosophy of Right, that Plekhanov
106 CHAPTER 5
would find difficult to reconcile with his own thesis. We refer to the
supplementary note to paragraph 318, which reads as follows:
Public opinion contains all kinds of falsity and truth, but it takes a great man to find the
truth in it. The great man of the age is the one who can put into words the will of his age,
tell his age what its will is, and accomplish it. What he does is the heart and the essence of
his age, he actualizes his age. The man who lacks sense enough to despise public opinion
expressed in gossip will never do anything great. IS
Only at first glance does this passage seems to provide support for
Plekhanov's conception of the great man as the actualizer of his age. For
the opening sentence of the passage alludes to one function of the great
man for which Plekhanov fails to account. If "Public opinion contains all
kinds of falsity and truth," then the social circumstances in which the
great man acts are not unambiguous; the great man must discern their
true essence before he can actualize his age. According to Hegel, then,
the great man is not only the actualizer of his age, but also its interpre-
ter. At this point Hegel's view actually contradicts Plekhanov's position.
In the first place, the interpretative aspect of the individual's relation to
his age makes it impossible to reduce this relation to one of causal
determination, since the relation of interpreter to the interpreted is not
one of effect to cause. In the second place, the conception of the
individual as interpreter is incompatible with the conception of the
individual as a quantum, since no two individuals interpret their age in
exactly the same. 16 It is no wonder, then, that Plekhanov ignores the
interpretative aspect of the individual's role in history.
Yet the existence of the interpretative element follows from Plekha-
nov's own premises: one cannot posit social trends awaiting actualiza-
tion without confronting the question of interpretation. Insofar as he
evades this question, Plekhanov is no follower of Hegel. To follow in
Hegel's footsteps is to admit that the individual agent confronts circum-
stances pregnant with many different possibilities, of which only some
are true, and that the individual agent is likely to select sometimes an
untrue or inessential possibility. That Hegel would probably deny the
greatness of an individual who fails to distinguish between truth and
falsity is immaterial to the issue at hand. The point is that Hegel would
admit the fundamental possibility of a mistaken choice.
If a mistaken choice is possible, then it is possible for an individual to
be an agent without being the instrument of a true or essential trend.
Given this possibility, one cannot conceive of an individual agent as a
"carbon copy" of ,the circumstances in which he acts; nor can those

circumstances be conceived as the genuine original of his action. The
ambiguity of the circumstances and the consequent possibility of mista-
ken interpretation lead us to assume that the individual's relation to his
circumstances contains an element that the circumstances lack. Were
the individual a "carbon copy" of his age, would there be any need for
him to distinguish between its true and false trends, its essential and
inessential features? Were the individual a "carbon copy" of his circum-
stances, would there be any justification for crediting him with the
actualization of a general trend?
This difficulty is not removed by Plekhanov's conception of the
individual as a quantum. For - to take his own example - even if
Napoleon had been killed, his historical role as actualizer of an order
could have been fulfilled by another individual. The relation of actuali-
zation that obtains between any individual and his circumstances pre-
supposes a factor that those circumstances lack, a factor that enables the
individual to relate himself to his circumstances, to interpret them, and
to adopt a course of action based upon his interpretation. That factor is
consciousness. The individual's reaction to his circumstances is a con-
scious, reflective act. Were he not endowed with consciousness, the
individual would be unable to sustain a relation of actualization with his
circumstances. Hence historical consciousness is part of the total histori-
cal situation, and cannot be viewed as its reflection. Reflection qua
pondering - yes; reflection qua mirroring - no.
What applies to the relation between individual agents and socio-
historical trends applies a fortiori to the relation between individual
creators and spiritual-cultural trends, such as the Italian Renaissance.
Plekhanov's contention that Raphael, Michelangelo, and Leonardo da
Vinci merely perfected the features of the general trend called the
Renaissance is only a corollary to his general thesis that individual
agents, no matter how creative, at most improve the image of their age.
Plekhanov's conception of the relation between creative individuals and
the cultural currents with which they are associated is based upon the
twofold assumption that (a) such currents exist, and that (b) the creative
individuals associated with these currents do not produce their features,
but only perfect them. This twofold assumption leads to abandonment
of the definition of a cultural current as the sum-total of individual
creations included in its compass, and to adoption of an ontological
premise that the existence and essence of a spiritual trend is not
108 CHAPTER 5
dependent upon the creative individuals in whose works it is embodied.

As a matter of fact there is more myth than method in Plekhanov's
manner of hypostatizing not only social forces but also creative currents.
Cultural-intellectual currents would have neither influence nor meaning
were they not reflected in, and expressed through, the consciousness of
creative individuals. Conscious expression - be it artistic, literary, or
theoretical- is the essence of various trends. There is, consequently, no
room for distinguishing between the basic image of a trend and its
perfected reflection in the works of its individual representatives. Nor,
for that matter, is the meaning of Plekhanov's distinction clear. If it
means that the creative work is to the creative trend what a finished
building is to its model or blueprint, then the validity of the model is
doubtful. It is doubtful whether the blueprint analogy sheds any light on
the nature of literary, artistic, or philosophical creation. If anything, the
nature of these diverse modes of creative activity is obscured by the
assumption that lurking in the atmosphere of the universe are certain
basic motifs that await the appearance of a Plato, a Dante, or a Raphael
to give them expression or to render them more perfect. Instead of
explaining the inner logic of the artistic, literary, and philosophical
spheres, and how they differ from one another, the blueprint analogy
obscures their intrinsic distinguishing marks by lumping them all
together in an external frame of reference.
Yet Plekhanov cannot help disregarding the inner structure by virtue
of which one creative sphere differs from another. Were he to call
attention to the structure of each sphere, he could not avoid calling
attention to the reciprocal relation between the creative sphere and the
creators whose creations it encompasses. Acknowledgement of such a
reciprocal relation would refute the contention that the relation of an
individual creator to the trend he represents is an external - if not
contingent - relation in the sense that one of its terms, the individual, is
a mere quantum.
VI
To conclude the analysis of the Carlyle's and Plekhanov's concepts of

the individual's place in history, it may be said that neither offers an
adequate or comprehensive explanation of the complex relation be-
tween the individual and history because neither provides an analysis of
the related terms or presupposes such an analysis. One cannot formu-

late, the problem at hand, let alone solve it, without first determining
the nature and status of the individual on the one hand, and of the
historical domain on the other. Any adequate presentation of the
relation between the individual and history must transcend the limits of
historical analysis, and undertake a philosophical analysis both of the
individual's fundamental status in the universe and of the fundamental
status of history in the scope of human creativity.
To establish the foundation of the individual's place in the universe
implies a criticism of the Marxist concept of the individual's place in
history. Only human individuals are endowed with consciousness. As
such, an individual cannot be conceived of merely as a product of
history, unless the fact that he is endowed with consciousness is likewise
conceived of as the product of history. Make man a "carbon copy" of his
historical circumstances, and you must make consciousnest a "carbon
copy" of those circumstances - consciousness connoting here the sum-
total of activities of awareness and elucidation, and disregarding the
contents entertained by consciousness. This, however, one cannot do;
consciousness is not exhausted in its contents, that is, in the social,
economic, political, and military circumstances to which the individual
relates himself. The most one can say is that insofar as they are
crystallized in history, these contents of consciousness are historical.
But one cannot say that the form or structure of consciousness, i. e.,
intentionality, is historical. No nexus of historical circumstances can
account for the form or structure of consciousness as manifested in the
acts of understanding, attending to, or discerning circumstances. Under-
standing, attention, and discernment are manifestations of conscious-
ness, not copies or epiphenomena of contents. Hence only one element
of the individual's relatedness to his circumstances, namely, the circum-
stances, can be explained as the product of history. The other element,
the individual's relatedness, being conscious, cannot be explained as a
mere product of history.
It is an error to assume that marshalling empirical facts can give an
adequate explanation of reality and the data thereof, including the
primary datum of consciousness which is the attribute of individuals
only. By virtue of consciousness, with which he alone is endowed, the
individual occupies a trans-empirical status, i.e., a primary status that
resists derivation from any empirical event or nexus of events whatever.
Given man's place in the universe, any adequate approach to the
110 CHAPTER 5
problem of man's place in history must be based upon the following

assumptions:
(a) Since history is an empirical and collective creation of manifold
individuals in time, there is no room for assuming that the historical
process can either create or destroy the place of the individual
grounded in what is a primary status.
(b) Consequently, there is no philosophical justification for attempts to
establish the individual's position in history upon a historical foun-
dation only. Attempts of this kind are prompted by the mistaken
assumption that the historical domain constitutes the universal field
in which man's status is made manifest.
(c) Accordingly, the relation between the individual and history must
be conceived of as only one particular illustration of the fundamen-
tal relations that obtain between man and the universe, i.e., be-
tween man and the totality of circumstances towards which
individuals endowed with consciousness relate themselves.17 His-
torical circumstances are a contraction of circumstances in general;
being historical they also contain the component of individual
consciousness.
VII
Having circumscribed the individual's place in history in terms of his

consciousness, let us proceed by determining the status of history as a
collective human creation, or as a sum-total of domains that are by
definition common or public. The historian is concerned with such
collective human creations as society, economy, state, law, organiza-
tion, that is, with collective creations that are crystallized in, and
contribute to, the public domain. To the extent that he deals with
literary, artistic, or philosophical creations, the historian is interested in
the direct or indirect influence of those creations upon the public
domain. Those creations may have been created for the sake of art, or
for the sake of theory or belief. But for the historian they are significant
insofar as they left a mark on the public domain of society or state. In
dealing with philosophical or religious works, the historian's purpose is
either to determine how· those works shaped the image of the public
domain, or, conversely, how the image of the public domain was
reflected in those works. Even in the history of philosophy and the
history of literature philosophical and literary works are studied from

the viewpoint of their influence upon, and indebtedness to, the public
domain (of philosophy or literature) in which they were crystallized and
to which they in turn contributed. This is an aspect of historical events as
"fruit bearing" or as "radiating", to come back to the previous meta-
phor.
History, then, as the history of humanity, encompasses all human
creations that have left their mark upon the public domain. The division
of history into specialized fields of research is determined by the diverse
public domains (of society, state, economy, law, etc.) with which the
historian deals. The historian deals with society as a public domain,
either in the general sense of society as the comprehensive form of
men's life and activity in concert, or in the more specific sense as an
institutionalized crystallization of human togetherness. In the latter
case, the historian points out the aspects in which society differs from
other institutionalized crystallizations, such as the state or the law.
Hence the point to bear in mind when we consider the individual's
place in history is that history pertains to the public domain and its
creations, and is created by the concerted activity of myriads of indivi-
duals. It follows that the human creations constitutive of history are in
some measure independent of the individual as individual. A public
domain, in other words, is characterized by some measure of deperson-
alization. Depersonalization is common to language, law, economy,
church, and state - much as these collective human creations differ in
their core or content. Only because a legal system is partly independent
of the individuals whose interrelations it regulates; only because a
collective pattern of conduct is partly independent of the individuals
whose behavior it moulds; only because the religious way of life is partly
independent of the personal emotions of individual believers: only thus
can there be a public domain called history. To put the same idea
negatively, were there no collective creations separated from the private
domains of individuals, were human reality merely the sum-total of
private, individual domains, there would be no public domain and,
consequently, no historical domain. To be sure, the history of law,
economy, state, or church deals with objects far more depersonalized
than those of literary, artistic, or philosophical history. It is true that
every creation - a work of art or of thought - becomes partly inde-
pendent of its creator for the simple reason that all creations entail for-
mulation, whether in words (philosophy) or in stone, (sculpture).
112 CHAPTER 5
Nevertheless, there is a marked difference between the mode of inde-

pendence from the individual that characterizes artistic, literary, and
philosophical creations and the mode of independence from individuals
that characterizes the collective creations constituting the public domain
of history. In works of literature, philosophy, and art, the personality of
the creator leaves an ineffaceable mark upon the creation. By their very
essence, such works embody a particular individual's personal interpre-
tation or concrete experience of the world. By contrast, the collective
creations constituting the public domain do not reflect the personal
image of their creators. Collective creations owe their existence to
men's deliberate endeavor to create depersonalized crystallizations of
their togetherness. Depersonalization is the aim of the many individuals
who participate in the creation of the public domain and its institutions,
because depersonalization is a necessary precondition of the validity and
authority of the law, of the universal communicability of language, and
of the legitimate sovereignty of the state. The raison d'etre of works of
literature, philosophy, and art is not depersonalization but expression.
Only because expression entails formulation or technique are these
creations somewhat depersonalized. But the aim of collective creations
is essentially the establishment of depersonalized patterns and domains.
It is because individuals aim at depersonalization that they create the
public domain and its institutions, depersonalization or transpersonali-
zation being the other side of the coin of the public domain. Individuals
aim - from a certain perspective - to create such a domain. Since the
object of history is the public domain and, consequently, human collec-
tivity, we can say that men's actions and aims are historical if they are
oriented to, and take their departure from, collectivity. The public
domain is accordingly the starting point of men's concrete actions in
history, even when those actions are designed to alter the existing image
of the public domain.
Does the depersonalized nature of the historical domain and its
institutions warrant the conclusion that the individual plays no signifi-
cant part in history? Such a conclusion would be over-hasty; for the
independence of the public domain and its institutions is partial, not
total. Depersonalized though it is, the public domain is neither self-
enclosed nor self-sustaining. A completely self-contained or totally
depersonalized public domain would lack actuality. The public domain
of history is actual only so long as living individuals lead their lives
within its framework and orient themselves to sustain it. A public
domain that has been completely depersonalized and severed from

actual human beings is a fossil that has lost its historical actuality and its
power to direct the behavior of human beings who lead their life in time.
The status occupied by the public domain of history is neither fully
depersonalized nor fully personalized. There is no justification for the
assumption that the public domain is the historical cause par excellence,
or that the relation of the public domain to the individuals who live and
act within its framework is a relation of cause to effect. The public
domain owes its existence to the participation of actual human beings in
its sustenance. It is true that the public domain and its institutions
determine the way of life of actual human beings; but it is no less true that
the public domain would be powerless were it not sustained by the very
individuals whose way of life it determines. Deprive the public domain
of the participation of actual individuals, and it remains a mere fossil of
an earlier age, a remnant powerless to mold the life and activities of
individuals. Hence the causal theory of the relation between public
institutions such as language, law, economy, and church, on the one
hand, and the individuals whose way of life and course of action they no
doubt shape, on the other, cannot adequately account for the complex
and reciprocal relations obtaining between a given historical reality and
the individuals to whom it owes its actuality. In other words, the causal
theory fails to explain the fact that the existence of the public domain
depends upon men's orientation towards the depersonalized crystalliza-
tion of their togetherness - historical collectivities.
This applies not only to the public domain in general, but also to the
collective creations it encompasses. Thus, for example, it is doubtful
whether the relation of language to the individuals by whom it is spoken
can be conceived of as cause and effect. The fact that a living or actual
language is spoken by living or actual individuals is not accounted for -
at least not totally - by the causal relationship. We need a different
perspective, one in which the individual figures not only as the actua-
lizer, but even to some extent as the creator, of a living language. The
same is true of other structures of human togetherness. Thus the
economic structure is obviously based upon the distribution of functions
among the individuals encompassed by its framework. Were those
individuals not to fulfill their allotted functions, were they not to act in
conformity to the structure's inner logic, the structure would collapse.
Reciprocity is the infrastructure of the public domain, and reciprocity
presupposes and encompasses individuals.
114 CHAPTER 5
Though it depends upon individual human beings for its actualization,

the economic realm also depends upon the understanding with which
those actual human beings are endowed, that is to say, upon their power
to comprehend their allotted place and function within the realm.
Similarly, though it depends upon individual human beings· for its
actualization, a living language also depends. upon the understanding
with which actual human beings are endowed, upon their power to grasp
the meaning of its words and the nature of its synta,x. The purpose of
these remarks is not to analyze the nature of such collective creations as
language or economy, but to point out the fallacy involved in reasoning
from the fact that the historical domain and its institutions are public to
the conclusion that the public domain of history is an independent,
self-sustained factor whose relation to actual individuals is one of cause
(public) to effect (individuals).
The complexity of the relation between the historical domain and the
individuals who live and act within its framework is reflected in the
complexity of the relation between so-called "historical hours" or
"historical situations" and the individuals by whom they are created. As
we have emphasized in the previous analysis of Plekhanov's position, no
historical situation is unambiguous: every historical situation is pregnant
with different possibilities. The multiplicity of possibilities which makes
for ambiguity is due partly to the diversity of factors whose earlier
operation produced the given situation, and partly to the diversity of
individual attitudes towards, or interpretations of, the situation, atti-
tudes and interpretations which inspire different aims and prompt
different courses of action. Events are as complex as actions.
Luther's work can be cited as an illustration of the complex relation
between the historical situation and the individuals who respond to it.
Luther was confronted with a situation that harbored several possibili-
ties. Criticism of the Catholic Church and establishment of a separate
ecclesiastic organization was one possibility. But reconciliation with the
existing ecclesiastic organization or action within its fold was another
possibility, and introverted dissent unaccompanied by open separation
was still another. Th.us the historical situation, like the historical institu-
tion, owes its actual meaning to the individuals who relate themselves to
it and interpret it in their respective responses.
Unlike the historical institution, however, historical situation is actu-
alized not through collective participation of individuals in it, but
through creative action against the background of that situation. This is
why a full realization of any given historical situation and the spectrum
of its potentialities is impossible. Creative action, being designed to
realize one specific aim suggested by the historical situation or one
specific possibility harbored by it, is always limited. Any historical
situation harbors at least two possibilities of action - altering the given
state of affairs and sustaining it as is, though even sustaining it is a
realization of potentialities and not mere inertia. We may apply here the
maxim that every determination is a negation: giving momentum to one
course of action negates other courses.
The existence of at least two possibilities is a sufficient reason for
rejecting the attempt to present the relation of cause to effect as the
model for the relation of historical situation to the individual agents who
respond to it. Historical change, or the emergence of a new historical
situation, would be impossible if individual agents did not relate them-
selves to a given situation in order to interpret its meaning and realize one
of its possibilities. That individuals cannot create a historical situation ex
nihilo is certain; it is equally certain that one historical situation can
give birth to another only if the possibilities with which it is pregnant are
interpreted, mediated, and realized by individual agents. In this sense
individuals are contractors of historical situations, and in two senses: as
agents, and as limiting the range of the possibilities to one possibility
and becoming engaged in its materialization.
VIII
It is not only the "great individual" who occupies the status of interpre-
ter and actualizer of history. Every individual occupies this status,
because only individuals are endowed with consciousness, which gives
them the ability to discern the character of a given state of affairs, to
adopt a course of action in keeping with that discernment, and, conse-
quently, to alter the configuration of the given state of affairs. Paradoxi-
cally, the source of the individual's power to change historical reality lies
in his ability to actualize only one possibility latent in a historical
situation that by its nature harbors several possibilities. The individual's
strength, in other words, lies in his weakness, i.e., in his inability to
actualize all the possibilities inherent in the situation to which he relates
himself. Because he is not omnipotent, man is not impotent in relation
to historical evolution. "Great individuals" amplify the basic position of
116 CHAPTER 5
individuals in the world by propelling historical events through their

actions.
"The human mind," said William James, "is essentially partial. It can
be efficient at all only by picking out what to attend to, and ignoring
everything else, by narrowing its point of view. "17 To apply this obser-
vation to the problem at hand, we can say that only by "picking out"
one possibility to realize can the human individual channel the historical
current in a determinate direction; for a determinate direction is neces-
sarily limited, and even one-sided, in relation to the full sweep of the
historical current. To channel the current in a determinate direction is
the task or the achievement of the "great man."
In this respect, there is a difference between the status in history of a
great individual as an author of historical change and the status in
history of "common" individuals as the actualizers of historical institu-
tions. One cannot single out a particular individual as the shaper of an
institution's actual image, because public institutions are actualized
through the collective participation of many individuals. But one can
single out a particular individual as the author of a historical change,
because historical changes are brought about by a creative realization.
Accordingly, one may define the great or creative man as an activating
interpreter of historical possibilities. With due allowance for various
types of creative individuals and various modes of creative action, the
basic distinguishing mark of the great man may be defined as the power
to isolate one possibility as a goal and to adopt one course of action as
the means of attaining that goal. If every historical alteration entails
limitation - if, in other words, every historical alteration presupposes
channeling the historical current towards a determinate goal - then
historical alteration will always need someone to limit it, someone
whose very nature leads him to limit it. Hence historical change will
never be able to do without individuals. Change amounts to a new
morphe; it presupposes the context as an amorphous sum-total of
potentialities, and the individual or individuals who mediate between
the amorphous situation and the new morphe to come.
To come back to our characterization of the great man, we can say
that the introduction of change in the public domain, its institutions, or
its intellectual climate is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of
greatness. From a formal or functional viewpoint, that man is great who
alters the configuration of the public domain. However, a man's stature
can be measured not only by formal but also by thematic criteria, not
only in terms of the fact that he introduced a change but also in terms of
the value of that change. From a thematic viewpoint, a man's stature
may be measured in terms of whether the change with which he is
credited did or did not satisfy certain human expectations, did or did not
proceed from the pursuit of principles such as truth, goodness, etc.
Once the formal standard of evaluation is allowed, thematic standards
of evaluation must also be allowed. Exposure to evaluation by thematic
standards is the price the great individual must pay for his place in
history.
The dependence of historical institutions and situations upon indivi-
duals, who alone can interpret and actualize their meaning, becomes
clearer when we recall the distinction between history, as the province
of depersonalized collective creations, and philosophy, literature, or
art, as the province of personal expressions. Like the collective crea-
tions that constitute the public domain of history, the creations crystal-
lized in the philosophical, literary, and artistic domains are the fruit of
the individual's interpretative response to the world and to his dxperi-
ence thereof. But unlike collective creations, literary, philosophical,
and artistic works are not created for the sake of constituting a deper-
sonalized public domain. Hence, properly speaking, there is no collec-·
tive domain of literature, philosophy, or art. The manifold personal
worlds that make up the world of literature do not add up to a single,
depersonalized, collective domain. The same is true of the manifold
worlds of philosophy. Literary or philosophical creations can contribute
to shaping the public domain of history, for example by promoting the
adoption of legal and political measures, by inspiring social movements,
etc. But the influence of these creations upon the public domain does·
not exhaust their essence as manifestation of their creators' interpreta-
tion of the world. In a work of literature or philosophy, no matter how
great its public influence, there always remains a unique dimension by
virtue of which it resists complete absorption by the collective domain.
This resistance to complete integration in the public domain is a major
reason why literary and philosophical creations are less dependent upon
our interpretation than the collective or institutional creations that
constitute the public domain. As a partially private world, a personal
c{eation carries its own actualizing interpretation. Bearing the inefface-
able stamp of its creator, the personal creation is itself an interpretative
actualization of experience, which our interpretation can illuminate but
not alter, let alone uproot.
118 CHAPTER 5
By contrast, depersonalized collective creations do not carry their

own interpretative actualization. Having no actuality other than the
interpretative response they evoke in actual individuals, public creations
lack that measure of independence from our interpretation which char-
acterizes private creations. The dependence of the public domain upon
the individuals who interpret and actualize its meaning cannot be
accounted for by the "carbon copy" theory of the relation between the
individual and history. Contrary to the major premise of this theory,
there is no prime mover in terms of which historical reality, in all its
complexity, can be explained. History is neither the product of out-
standing individuals nor the product of impersonal forces. It is a deper-
sonalized human creation, which owes its influence upon individuals to
the perpetual participation of those individuals in its interpretation and
actualization and in the web of relations pertaining to it. 18
At this juncture, we can relate the analysis of the status of historical
individuals to our preceding analysis of the web of relations between
events and actions. We can replace the notion of context by the notion
of events, since both connote situations given and interpreted, in which
actions and initiations take place. These in turn are interpreted by
individuals who relate themselves to events and are not totally im-
mersed in contexts; they can initiate actions, and thus become historical
agents. Insofar as events amount to context and situations, actions may
amount to initiations and to deeds performed as consequences of the
initiations. Neither events nor actions, neither contexts nor individuals,
can be viewed apart from their inte~relation. Contexts are not merely
opaque sum-totals of data, since their position as contexts already
implies an interpretation performed by the individuals involved in them.
Whether or not the context is the environment of the city or the
economic situation of the state or international or global interdepen-
dence, whether that interdependence is one of two super-powers or
what is now called multi-polar - all these are interpretations of data.
The data do not impose themselves on the individuals, but neither do
the individuals invent the data or create them out of nothing. The basic
position of the human condition, the intentionality of consciousness to
data and the presentness of data, is preserved in the historical context. It
finds its terminological manifestation in the distinction between events
and actions, as well as in the broader conception of the position of
individuals within the historical frame of reference. This conclusion will
be reinforced by our subsequent analysis, which starts from history,

moves to the position of human individuals, and comes back to histori-
cal situations, including the aspect of individual responsibility in the
historical process.
CHAPTER 6
CONDITIONING SITUATIONS AND DECISIONS
Let us recapitulate the course of our argument and the method we are
following. Our point of departure was the historical process and the
historical context. In both we discerned the position of individuals as
mediators and agents. We discerned the implication of individuals in the
process by pointing to their double position - involvement in the
processes and reflection on the meanings of the processes and of the
situations. With no warrant to assume the presence and the necessity for
a total subject of the process, we started with individuals implicated in
processes. Thus starting from the analysis of history we arrived at the
position of individuals. That position is not an outcome of the historical
process - and conversely, individuals are involved in history and playa
role in it by virtue of their very presence in it. The involvement of
individuals in history is grounded in the primary position of individuals,
and not in the independent or self-sufficient locus of history. History can
explicate features of individual existence, but it can neither create them
nor erase individuals. We now proceed to explore the problem of
situations and decisions in history.
II
We start this part of our analysis by exploring the phenomenon of human

freedom in history from three interrelated vantage points, namely: (a) the
nature of the relation between freedom and necessity; (b) the ambiguity of
the correlative concepts freedom and necessity, entailed by the diverse
modes of circumstances denoted by the term "necessity"; and (c) the
moral and political implications of the ontological foundation of free-
dom, anchored in man as an empirical individual on the one hand, and
in the human essence on the other. The last aspect has a direct bearing
on the domain of history.
Regarded from the vantage point of its relation to necessity, freedom
is subject to different interpretations. One interpretation, that for
example of Spinoza, defines freedom as self-determination, and sees the
120
CONDITIONING SITUATIONS 121
relation between freedom and necessity as one of identity. Another

interpretation, that of Kant, describes freedom as the opposite of
necessity, and sees the relation between freedom and necessity as an
antinomy or antithesis. A third interpretation sees freedom and neces-
sity as neither essentially identical nor diametrically opposed, but rather
complementary.
Since our concern is with the broad aspect of determination by
historical contexts, we should deal with the broadest interpretation of
freedom and necessity and their identity, as formulated by Spinoza.
Spinoza was led to identify freedom with necessity by the following line
of reasoning: Necessity, qua causal determination, obtains throughout
nature; since nature is an all-inclusive whole, no external factor deter-
mines it from without. Determination is an internal or immanent mode
of necessity. Since freedom is defined as self-determination, there is no
difference between it and necessity. Whether or not this line of reason-
ing is valid, it must be rejected as a possible solution to the specific
problem of human freedom and its manifestation in history.
Regarded from the viewpoint of its relation to necessity, human
freedom must be defined, not by reference to the mode of determina-
tion operative in nature, but by reference to the modes of necessity
operative in human reality. Spinoza's line of reasoning can be trans-
ferred from the totality of nature to human reality - which is only a part
of that totality - in the following fashion: Just as in nature freedom
connotes determination from within the totality by its own immanent
laws, so in human reality freedom is determination from within that
reality by its immanent laws. And just as in Nature necessity and
freedom (qua self-determination) are identical, so in human reality, are
necessity and freedom (qua self-determination) identical.
There are two objections to this microcosmic translation of Spinoza's
theory of macro cosmic freedom. One is that it does not seem to be in
keeping with Spinoza's own premises. Nothing in his philosophy war-
rants the assertion that what applies to nature as a whole applies to a
particular part thereof as well. Spinoza's distinction between the struc-
ture of substance and the structure of its modes seems rather to imply
the opposite. The other objection is that one cannot draw an analogy
between the macrocosmos of nature and the microcosmos of man
without assuming that reason and its laws in the context of nature are
identical to reason and its laws in the context of human reality. In other
words, transfer to the microcosm is possible only on the assumption that
122 CHAPTER 6
reason is not a province of reflective relatedness to contents, but a

totality of objective contents whose interrelations are controlled by
rational laws - such as the law of contradiction. This would imply a shift
of reason from the sphere of reflection as relatedness to content to the
sphere of thematic - material- laws. The line of reasoning that trans-
forms reason from a reflective activity into an objective structure might
be called an objectification of reason. To objectify reason, one must
assume that only certain contents - e.g., unity, universality, or infinity-
can be included in the province of reason, while other contents - e.g.,
data of sense-impressions, feelings like attachment, repulsion, etc. -
must be relegated to the realm of other modes of perception or thought.
Unlike the microcosmic translation, this objectification of reason is in
keeping with Spinoza's teaching, insofar as it considers reason from the
viewpoint of its given contents and not in terms of the subject's reflec-
tive relatedness to those contents.
Yet to objectify reason in this fashion is to neglect its active aspect.
Above and beyond the contents to which it refers - such as unity or
coherence - reason consists in the reflective activity of what has been
described as awareness. Only by taking this active aspect of reason into
account can one explain the fact that reason relates to contents such as
sense-impressions, feelings, and mental images, that is, to contents that
lie beyond its proper province. The active aspect of reason - its capacity
of reflection, which is neither reducible to, nor exhausted in, the
contents reflected upon - must be stressed because it constitutes the
foundation of human freedom. The proper study of an enquiry into
human freedom is man's capacity of reflection, and not the contents to
which that capacity relates itself.
III
Before exploring the nature of freedom as anchored in man's capacity of

reflection, it is necessary to consider the multiple meanings of freedom
entailed by the manifold modes of necessity to which freedom is related.
The specific meaning of freedom depends upon the specific mode of
necessity with which it is correlated, which in turn depends upon the
particular kind of determination by circumstances that one has in mind.
Thus one can correlate freedom with necessity in the general sense of
determination by physical and biological circumstances, with necessity
CONDITIONING SITUA ToIONS 123
in the more restricted sense of determination by such man-made factors

as social, political, cultural, and broadly historical circumstances, or
again in the still more restricted sense of determination by such psycho-
logical factors as instinctive urges and subconscious drives.
Given the different orders of circumstances by reference to which
man's freedom from total determination is defined, and given the
multiplicity of possible relations between freedom and necessity implicit
therein, one must specify the meaning of the problem of freedom before
proposing a partial solution to that problem. The specific problem we
propose to treat is that of the relation between human freedom and
necessity in the sense of determination by man-made circumstances sui
generis, i.e., by circumstances created by human society in the course of
its history. Let us consider the extent to which human freedom is
restricted by historical necessity, and to what extent there remains,
within the historical domain itself, an island of freedom that no histori-
cal circumstances can crush.
At this juncture we must again come to grips with the Marxian
doctrine of historical determinism, according to which man's historical
circumstances, much as they differ from his physico-biological circum-
stances, are governed by laws as inexorable and determinative as the
laws of nature. The influence wielded on many by economic law, for
example, is as potent as that wielded by biological or physical laws. This
argument discloses what might be called the paradox of human deter-
minism: How can man be totally determined by circumstances whose
creation bears witness to the freedom of their creator? If there is an
immanent law of human reality, a law that human society imposes upon
itself from within and whose existence is a major premise of human
determinism, such a specifically human law presupposes, as the condi-
tion of its establishment, the existence of specifically human attributes.
The question confronting that theory is: What becomes of those specifi-
cally human attributes once they have established specifically human
laws? The answer must be that they disappear. Indeed, according to the
implicit Marxian point of view, man's proper attributes were revealed in
the initial stage of the historical process, the stage that marked the
establishment of economic relations among men. The question, how-
ever, is whether human history can conceal or cancel the human charac-
teristics or capacities that constitute the condition of its creation.
Marxian theory shelves, but does not solve, this question by the concept
that only at the end of the historical process, i.e., only in the future, will
124 CHAPTER 6
man's prehistorical characteristics, to which the process owes its incep-

tion, be revealed once more. What then becomes of those characteris-
tics in the long interregnum between the beginning and the end of
history. Are they subject to total determination by man-made circum-
stances? If not, the doctrine of historical or human determinism cannot
bear the burden of criticism. Specifically human attributes, such as
reflection, intentionality towards objects, and the capacity of adopting
an attitude, cannot be erased by the circumstances under which man
exercises them. Circumstances can wield a conditioning influence only
upon the concrete events and processes towards which man directs
himself and in relation to which he adopts his standpoint. In other
words, while they can determine what trials a man will undergo, what
events he will reflect upon, and consequently justify or condemn,
circumstances cannot determine the act of reflection that constitutes an
independent and irreducible element of man's status. Neither contents,
nor the circusmtances in the context of which contents are determined,
can determine man's intentional directedness towards them.
IV
The assertion that reflection and intentionality are not determined or

elicited by their contents should not be taken as a variation on the
Kantian motif that man is a citizen of two worlds - a motif that assumes
a radical gulf between the empirical realm of necessity and the non-
empirical realm of freedom. Within the limits of experience - in the
empirical world - a distinction can and should be drawn between two
modes of human conduct, one of which is subject to determination by
circumstances, and the other not. The latter mode of conduct is repre-
sented by man's relatedness to his circumstances, including determina-
tive circumstances. The relatedness as such always contains a reflective
nucleus, which cannot be explained in terms of the causal contexts of
determination operative in the empirical world. Hence the position
outlined here does not carry Kant's implication that there are two kinds
of causality, a causality of necessity arid a causality of freedom. Man's
intentionality or relatedness to objects is not a relation of cause to
effect. No causality is involved in man's intentionality towards an
object, in his understanding of its content, in his analysis of its distin-
guishing marks, and in his determination of its place in a particular
relational structure. The object is not the "cause" of its understanding,

nor is understanding the "cause" of its object. Intentionality is a relation
sui generis, which resists reduction to any other mode of relationship.
This is an ontological restatement of the conclusion of our previous
analysis of the position of individuals in historical contexts. That posi-
tion is a manifestation of the basic ontological position; or, conversely,
the ontological status is an amplification and articulation of the position
of individuals in history.
To put it differently: though operative in the empirical world, under-
standing is an independant factor that cannot be derived from any other
factor operative in that world. Though revealed in the empirical world,
understanding is not determined by the laws governing empirical phe-
nomena. Paradoxically, the difference between understanding and its
object pertains only to the nature of a finite creature. An infinite
understanding is identical with its object, because its relation to its
object is one of creation: the infinite mind supposedly creates its
objects. As creator of its object, an infinite understanding determines
the laws by which that object is governed, rather than being determined
by them. Human understanding, by contrast, as the attribute of a finite
creature, is grounded in its status as human understanding. Through his
determination by the status of human understanding, man is released
from absolute determination by contents or circumstances. Human
freedom may thus be correlated with two distinct modes of human
determination, namely, determination by the immanent laws of human
reality and determination by the irreducible status of human under-
standing. In virtue of its independent status, understanding is beyond
the reach of the laws of human reality. Because his understanding is not
subject to determination by those laws, man is subject to determination
both by those laws and by the status of his understanding. Here again we
amplify the position of historical agents as finite, i.e., as separated from
the objects and contexts though related to them.
This implies an additional aspect in which this approach to the
problem of human freedom differs from that of Kant. Kant emphasized
the difference between the laws of understanding and the imperatives of
will, conceiving of will as one among many constituents of human
action. We focus, not on will as a constituent of human action, but on
understanding and its status as the foundation or starting point of
action. To put it another way, we are concerned here with freedom, not
as an attribute of voluntary action, but as a corollary of understanding as
126 CHAPTER 6
the factor regulating voluntary action. Historical actions are grounded

in understanding. Voluntary action is directed from and by the stand-
point of the agent. The agent's ability to adopt a guiding standpoint in
relation to his circumstances presupposes his withdrawal from those
circumstances - i.e., reflection. The possibility of withdrawal is afforded
by his status as a creature endowed with understanding. By virtue of its
status, understanding is separate from its object. Only because he is
endowed with understanding and thus removed from his circumstances
can the agent take a voluntary course of action in relation to them.
Owing to the understanding distance between himself and his surround-
ings, man can set certain objectives for himself or evaluate his situation.
Hence, the foundation of freedom lies on the plane of intentionality,
and not on the plane of volition. We ground action in intentionality in
general, and not in will specifically. The historical agent, in order to
function as an agent, is bound to be a reflective being.
This applies not only to man's intentionality towards his circum-
stances but also, and primarily, to man's intentionality towards his will.
The aspect of free will is consequently only a particular aspect of the
more fundamental question concerning freedom as an attribute of man's
status, a status that is "in the world, but not of it." Man not only lives in
the world, he also relates or directs himself towards it. To isolate the
problem of free will from its proper context - the context of man's
reflective relatedness to the world ~ is to obscure the fundamental
difference between man's will on the one hand and his drives, inclina-
tions, and urges on the other. Hence we do not accept Kant's contention
that the proper context of freedom is the realm of pure will, nor his
identification of pure will and pure reason. Kant was led to posit this
identification because he placed pure will beyond the limits of experi-
ence. The point is that freedom finds a footing within the limits of
experience. To be a citizen of the empirical world, man must relate
himself - reflectively or intentionally - to the conditions of his citizen-
ship. It is therefore within the limits of the' empirical world that we apply
the rule that man's reflective relatedness to circumstances is not a
continuation of those circumstances but an independent and irreducible
attribute of a creature endowed with understanding, that is, with the
capacity of reflecting upon, and adopting a standpoint in relation to, the
world in which he lives.
v
The dimensions of the problem of freedom are not macrocosmic but
microcosmic. Reflective relatedness and the capacity of adopting a
standpoint are attributes of finite man, not of the universe at large. The
universe is not known to possess these powers. Only'by extrapolation
from human reality might it be argued, in Spinozian terms, that under-
standing, intentionality, or reflective relatedness is an attribute of the
cosmos. But Spinoza would probably be disconcerted by an attempt to
interpret his ontological philosophy as an extrapolation from the human
domain.
Verbal communication, the continuity of the generations, the social
and institutional forms of human interrelations, the diverse ways in
which men interpret their encounter with the empirical world - all these
bear witness to man's reflective relatedness to reality. In other words,
the relatedness of understanding is not a hypothesis projected into the
empirical world, but a primary datum that we encounter in the world.
As inherent in man's status, reflective understanding is a component of
the empirical human world. Reflective relatedness is the precondition of
historical consciousness, and by the same token a manifestation of
human freedom as an attitude grounded in man.
VI
Having indicated the assumption of our approach to the problem of

human freedom, we may now consider some ethical, political, and
hence historical conclusions that seem to follow from this assumption.
To clarify the connection between the foundation of freedom and its
ethical implications, including the historical process, we may consider
Fichte's attempt to derive a moral imperative from the ontology of
consciousness.
Proceeding on the assumption that consciousness is a free fun,c~jon
determined by itself, Fichte formulated the moral imperative "Be!" The
trouble with this formulation, as it stands, is that it does not safeguard
the status of consciousness as the attribute of the individual. For the
duty to "be" might be interpreted as a duty to be an integral part of
some political, national, or racial whole, or as a duty to annihilate one's
individuality through some sort of union with a supra-individual entity.
128 CHAPTER 6
A more adequate formulation of the moral imperative implied in

freedom is: "Be so that your existence will preserve the 'be.'''
To be an individual, one must sustain one's status as subject, on the
one hand, and the subject-status of one's fellow man, on the other. Thus
formulated, the imperative "Be" is not only formal, but also thematic or
material. For a thematic element is implicit in the duty to "be" as a duty
to direct oneself towards the existence of the agent as subject, be that
subject oneself or one's fellow man. From the status of freedom, which
might also be described as the objective status of freedom, a moral
consequence of subjective import follows. Freedom evokes the moral
obligation to sustain the existence of freedom by safeguarding its foun-
dation, i.e., the individual agent as a creature endowed with conscious-
ness or reflective relatedness. Put negatively, the moral implication of
freedom as an attribute of the individual is that conduct capable of
undermining the foundation of free action must be prevented or removed.
Another moral conclusion from the ontology of freedom is that man is
a responsible or accountable creature. What is the connection between
man's ability to relate himself to his circumstances and human responsi-
bility? Man's relatedness to his circumstances pres,",pposes his under-
standing distance from those circumstances, that which is established by
his status as subject and not by the conditioning circumstances. Hence
man alone is responsible for sustaining that understanding distance. A
failure to relate oneself reflectively to one's circumstances and to adopt
a standpoint in relation to them is a failure to fulfill a moral imperative.
Though there may be some excuse for a man whose actions, or their
consequences, fail to fulfill the moral imperative due to circumstances
beyond his control, there is no excuse for a man who fails to fulfill the
moral imperative due to a factor for which he alone is responsible - his
freedom and its exercise.
A man is entirely to blame who, by failing to reflect upon and adopt
an attitude towards his circumstances - i.e., by failing to exercise his
freedom - annihilates himself, or drowns himself in his surroundings.
Hence one must reject the moral apologia that men's failure to fulfill the
moral imperative is no fault of their own, but the fault of their "cog-
like" status in the cosmic or political machine. A man who surrenders
his status as subject to become a "cog" in the cosmic machine is guilty of
abandoning his status in the cosmos. A man who submits to being a
"cog" in a political machine is doubly gUilty. For, unlike the cosmic
machine, a political machine is man-made, and owes its existence to the
very freedom of reflective relatedness that its would-be cog has for-
feited. Furthermore, whereas being a "cog" in the cosmic machine is to
surrender to necessity, being a "cog" in the political machine is to
surrender to coercion.
The political consequence of man's moral duty to sustain his subject-
status is that no duty imposed by the state is binding upon man's attitude
towards that duty. As endowed with understanding, man is invested
with the authority to direct himself and to adept a standpoint towards
the political domain and its affairs. The standpoint he is authorized to
adopt can acknowledge the existence of non-political domains (such as
the domains of philosophical, scientific, and artistic activity) and regard
the political domain as a merely partial sphere of human reality.
Man's reflective relatedness to the world is manifested in activities
whose nature and structure are not determined by the structure of the
political interrelations between man and man. Thus, for example, in his
cognitive activity, the individual relates himself reflectively to the uni-
verse at large in an attempt to decipher its meaning. This mode of
reflective relatedness is independent of the individual's place in the
network of political relations. In this case, to sustain one's freedom
vis-a-vis one's circumstances is to sustain one's freedom from total
determination by one's political circumstances. Freedom from political
determination is accordingly the condition of freedom for the sake of
non-political activities, as well as the condition of freedom for the sake
of political activity or of adopting a political standpoint. It should be
emphasized that the factual foundation of freedom in the status of
empirical man does not imply an arbitrary feature in the nature of
freedom. On the contrary, freedom, as an attribute of the human
essence, i.e., of human understanding, is a well-founded fact. The
human essence, as we have seen, is not determined by causal laws. In
other words, the laws that control psychological and social phenomena
cannot be applied to the human essence, which is not a mere phenome-
non but rather the precondition of all human phenomena.
By human essence we mean here the universal essence of Man, and
not the particular essence of an individual man. The existence of a
human essence affords a standard by which one can judge the actions
and evaluate the intentions of individual men. Because he participates
in the human essence, man can always be judged in terms of whether he
shapes his concrete existence in the image of that essence, i.e., in terms
of whether he exercises his power of understanding by relating himself
130 CHAPTER 6
reflectively towards his circumstances, by adopting a standpoint in

relation to them, etc. Hence arises man's perpetual exposure to criticism
and self-criticism. A freedom that imposes duties on man, and renders
him responsible and exposed to criticism, is not capricious. Its founda-
tion is the essence of man. A well-founded freedom is not a freedom
with a fixed meaning. On the contrary, the multiple meanings of
freedom are implied by the capacity of understanding upon which
freedom is founded. Man's ability to relate himself reflectively to his
circumstances affords the possibility of interpreting reft.ective related-
ness, or freedom, in various ways. Here again we see the impact of the
description of man's status on his position in history in bringing about
the selection of the potentialities inherent in the historical situation as
well as the implications of his intentionalities and actions on his respon-
sibility.
VII
A person is responsible, or considered as such, when he takes upon

himself the deeds performed by him and pari passu the actual and
possible consequences of those deeds. To be sure, this situation of
taking one's deeds upon oneself is a multi-faceted phenomenon: when
one does this, one identifies himself with the deeds; he recognizes them
as his own and looks upon himself as their agent, originator, or initiator.
Simultaneously, a person who takes upon himself the deeds is bound to
view himself as being distinct from his deeds. Otherwise - were he totally
identical with his deeds - there would be no room for the act of
identification. The person would be the sum-total of the deeds and their
consequences, and thus would not be a person in the sense of an
originator or initiator of deeds. It is for this reason that the duality of
identification and function is implied by the phenomenon of responsi-
bility and the attitude of being responsible. Bradley, in his analysis of
the conditions of responsibility, rightly pointed out the aspect of the
identity of the person as well as the aspect of attributing the deeds to the
identical person or, in his own words, having the deeds as "mine".1 Yet
Bradley did not sufficiently emphasize the complementary aspect: the
assumption of the person is essential for the self-attribution of the deeds
to a person, or the attribution of the deeds to him by another person. By
the same token, the identical person is occupying what might be de-
scribed as a surplus position vis-a-vis deeds. The attribution or self-

attribution does not make the person immersed in his deeds, nor does
the identification make the person identical with his deeds. The identifi-
cation does not amount to a full identity.
There is a second feature in the phenomenon and attitude of responsi-
bility which is prominent even in our verbal expressions or descriptions.
This aspect of the notion of responsibility appears in what is called in
English "answerability" (Verantwortung); it can be posited as a thema-
tic or objective pole in the phenomenon of responsibility. A person is
responsible, or is viewed as such, when he answers to certain demands,
when he cares for what he is expected or supposed to care for truth or
benevolence, friendship, service, his family, his pupils, his society, etc.
He is responsible when he is trustworthy. To be trustworthy presup-
poses, again, an identical person who takes upon himself the deeds
emanating out of himself. But at the same time, to be trustworthy
presupposes certain standards of behavior or a certain expectation,
since trust is an attitude of expectation, rooted in the evaluation of a
person on the one hand and the adherence to certain features of
behavior on the other. One is expected to be a person standing behind
one's deeds, and at the same time one is expected to observe certain
material or thematic criteria of action or behavior. The personal and
thematic aspects have to be present in order to describe the full scope of
the notion of responsibility and its moral connotation. It is in this sense that
responsibility epitomizes the generic structure of the ethical domain. 2
In legal thinking and legal evaluation we encounter the same structure. 3
When self-control or reflection, or the capacity for the two, is taken as
essential for ascribing responsibility to a person, we f)nd that self-control
and pondering are manifestations of the position of the identical person.
Hence the capacity to pass judgment on oneself and the self-expectation
of behaving in a certain way are related to responsibility in legal
reasoning, and are grounds for ascription of responsibility. Insofar as
accountability is implied, legal reasoning presupposes the capacity to
reflect, and that capacity in turn presupposes a reflecting person not
confined to a single or to scattered acts of reflection. That act of
reflection, and more so the totality of reflection, is not an unguided
activity; on the contrary, it is guided by principles, and in the first place
by the paramount principle applied to thinking in general, which is the
principle of truth. But even when we address ourselves to principles of a
more limited character, like that of decency or honesty, or conformity to
132 CHAPTER 6
rules pertaining to respect for another person, we point to thematic

principles. These are placed within the horizon of responsibility and are
preconditions of responsibility.
These remarks are a point of departure for an analysis of the question
of responsibility related to a historical case. A closer exploration is to be
guided by the concept of the correlative structure of responsibility. 4 The
notion of the identity of the person, while that identity serves as a
presupposition of responsibility, carries with it an attitude which Ber-
nard Williams called dissociations: i.e. men may dissociate themselves
from roles they bear, roles which bring with them certain sorts of
assessment of their activities. 5 We may put it differently by emphasizing
again that an identical person is both identified and detached from his
specific deeds. When a person is an identical person, this is not only an
objective or a given fact. He is imbued with his self-awareness as an
identical person, along with all the dialectical features that accompany
that self-awareness. But once a person assesses himself as identical, he is
not only dissociating himself from his deeds and roles, accepting them
while dissociating himself from them; he also lodges himself in a context
with the surrounding world that is not himself. That world, in turn,
consists both of things as objects and other persons recognized in their
humanity, and thus possessing an implied self-awareness as persons.
There can be no self-assessment of a person as a person unless he is
related to other persons recognized as such, and to objects recognized as
objects, lacking the quality of being persons. It is in this sense that
responsibility as grounded in self-awareness presupposes a reflective
attitude in the broad sense of that term.
When a person obeys an order - to come back to that example - the
order is understood by him as an order. This awareness is related to the
meaning of the order; that very same awareness guides him, or prompts
him, to accept the order and to obey it. A person obeying an order is not
a "carbon copy" of the order; he retains his quality of being a person in
spite of the submissiveness exemplified by his obedience. Hence only an
autonomous person can erase his autonomy and become obedient even
in the most extreme sense of that notion. This leads to the conclusion
that, as long as self-awareness is maintained, a person is responsible for
erasing his responsibility. Only in psychiatric conditions where reflec-
tion vanishes do we face a situation where a person retains the bodily
posture of a person but does not retain his capacity of understanding or
reflection. The excuse that one does not dissociate oneself from an order
is invalid, because the lack of dissociation is a salient or a tacit decision

and as such presupposes a person engaged in that decision. The Hebrew
term for responsibility is ahrayut, derived from ahar, meaning "be-
hind". A responsible person is one who stands behind his deeds. In that
position, he responds to claims and demands or is capable of responding
to them.
We encounter, therefore, a structure where moral and factual data
are interwoven. Because a person is factually a person, he is called to
order by the norm of responsibility in its personal and thematic aspects.
As long as a person retains through his self-awareness his position as a
person, he cannot denounce his responsibility. Only when a person is
objectively losing his quality as a person, and this is assessed by an
observer, for instance a doctor, is he released from his responsibility.
The paradoxical position of the person as a subject, exemplified in the
phenomenon of responsibility, lies in that the person himself cannot
declare himself irresponsible, because the act of declaration as such and
in itself - whatever its direction - is a manifestation of the status of being
a person. Only in the eyes of others does a person cease to be a person
when this is objectively warranted.
History is a public domain, and as such contains a component of
depersonalization. But depersonalization is not a primary datum; it is
created by individuals, and we have to emphasize the verb "created."
No creation erases or uproots its creators. Even the move to the
depersonalized sphere does not affect the tension and interaction be-
tween individuals as persons and the sphere established by them by
removing the common ground qua public domain from the personal
orbits, in the limited sense of the term. One manifestation of the
continuous presence of individuals within and vis-a-vis the depersonal-
ized orbits is the fact that individuals are responsible for their actions
and deeds and, in a more limited sense, for the way they attempt to
mold the depersonalized public realms or, by the same token, to refrain
from doing so. Individuals cannot be viewed as responsible for situa-
tions they inherited, but they are responsible for not attempting to
change the situations if the thematic aspect of responsibility demands
that change. Individual passivity is the outcome of an action or of a tacit
~ecision and is not imposed on individuals, at least not insofar as their
evaluation of the situation encountered goes. To become aware that one
"cannot help it" does not amount to affirming, by way of a sort of am or
fati, that which one cannot help. The ultimate residuum of evaluation or
134 CHAPTER 6
taking a stand is pondering the situation; and here we have to distin-

guish between intentionality in the reflective sense and change as an
interference in the course of events within the scope of reality. Precisely
since we ground freedom in reflection and not in will, we have to accept
the consequence that responsibility does not necessarily amount to a
real action, but to a position of evaluation of the situation in which one
finds himself.
An additional conclusion is called for at this point, a conclusion
concerned less with freedom and more with the distinction between a
historical spectator and the historical course of events. We alluded to it
by mentioning res gestae and historia rerum gestarum. Insofar as there is
historical consciousness already on the level of historical events or
processes or, put differently, on the level of the presence of individuals
in the historical context, we cannot assume that being a spectator is an
innovation on the level of historia rerum gestarum. On the contrary, res
gestae themselves are imbued with spectators. Historia rerum gestarum,
as any deliberate reflective activity, is merely an amplification of the
position of spectators involved in events and actions and now delib-
erately removed from events and actions. Consciousness and reflection
are present in the historical context. History qua historiography is an
abstraction performed by reflection for the sake of reflection. Since this
is so, we may ask whether reflection as reflection on the level of historia
rerum gestarum loses the aspect of evaluation by abstraction and separa-
tion. It is from this point that we now turn to explore the alleged
detachment of history from values.
CHAPTER 7
EVALVA TION AND VALVES
We have already introduced the aspect of evaluation into our explora-

tion. We now begin exploration of the value-involvement in history with
evaluation rather than with values as such, because our point of depar-
ture lies in awareness and in historical consciousness and action, which
contain the component of evaluation. Moreover, as we have seen, since
awareness is also present on the level of the course of events, the rise of
historical research as a discipline is not a new beginning, but a continua-
tion and amplification of an ingredient present in the subject matter of
historical research, namely, events and actions. One of the dilemmas of
historical research is that it is concerned with evaluating those involved
in the process, yet faces the question of the value principles guiding the
research, or, to put it differently, the principles guiding the observing
consciousness as against what might be described as the involved con-
sciousness. Since we start with the component of evaluation, not of
values, we are bound to ask some of the questions implied in that duality
or correlation of evaluation and values as principles of evaluation.
There is a certain presupposition about the meaning of values or
ethical norms and principles - what is meant by the generic expression
"the moral or ethical ought." The presupposition is that the ethical
"ought" is not a necessity of nature, but a demand addressed to human
subjects in the direction of a certain attitude or behavior - evaluation, in
the sense used here. Though the evaluating subject has a kind of
perception or conception of the binding norm, however dim or explicit,
the norm is not encountered in the environment in the way one encoun-
ters trees or forests or real and present human beings, and even
institutions or structures like languages. For the exposition of value
involvement in history, it suffices now to underline the position of the
demanding or obliging "ought," without considering the intrinsic char-
acter of the "ought" and its own justification or grounding. Since our
exploration proceeds from the positions of evaluation, it is enough to
say that values guide evaluation, irrespective of their own status.
To be sure, an analysis of history that centers around historical
awareness as the meeting ground between time and meanings contains
135
136 CHAPTER 7
in itself a certain conclusion as to the dependence, real or alleged, of

values upon the historical process. Values as manifesting demands, and
justified demands at that, are not part of the environment. Their
presence requires the awareness of real human subjects, as crystallizing
attitudes of evaluation and evoking those attitudes. As meanings, values
are abstracted from the configuration of acts or attitudes of evaluation;
they are in a sense secondary in the time sequence, inasmuch as we start
from empirical subjects and their attitudes. In terms of their own
intrinsic position, though, it can perhaps be shown that values are
primary, and elicit acts of evaluation and codes of behavior imbued with
them. Yet insofar as we start from awareness, we have to be consistent
by stipulating that awareness implies evaluation, and through evaluation
we eventually come to values. Evaluations are rationes cognoscendi of
values, even when a theory of values will eventually present values as
such as rationes essendi of evaluations. Having said this, we have to see
the difference between abstracting values as meanings from historical
configurations in which evaluations are present, and making values
dependent upon historical configurations. That dependence, amounting
to the view that historical configurations determine values as meanings,
does not follow from the successive awareness or ascendance from
evaluations to values. On the contrary: historical evaluation is implied
in the historical context, and that context is a synthesis of the meaning of
time as a background and of specific meanings imported into time. Time
or process is shaped by a primary synthesis between time as a broadest
meaning and particular meanings introduced into time. Hence the shift
to values as meanings is not a total transformation from data encoun-
tered and meanings conceived. On the contrary, we are involved in
configurations of meanings in the first place. Therefore the abstraction
of values as meanings is not a new beginning or leap. Ethical relativity
does not follow from the primacy, insofar as history is concerned, of acts
of evaluation vis-a-vis meanings, in the abstract sense embodied in
values. As a matter of fact, there are two acts of abstraction: one that
discerns, i.e., abstracts, the presence of evaluation in historical aware-
ness as a primary synthesis, and another that relates evaluation to the
guiding principles as values.
Insofar as the sphere of values as meanings is our concern here, we
must delineate more closely the spectrum of values that have an impact
on history. Not all values guide the historical orbit or are meant to guide
it. Values guiding one's own personal sphere, such as giving preference
EVALUATIONS AND VALUES 137
to future gratification over an instantaneous one, or taking the attitude

that shaping is more significant than merely giving expression, have a
consequent historical import, but are not meant to direct or to mold
directly - the historical realm as a public realm. These values have to be
distinguished from those meant in the first place to guide ends or
objectives of interpersonal relations, like order, justice, economic ex-
change, distribution of political power, etc. Hence the question about
values in history pertains to a certain group of values and their involve-
ment in giving meaning to the process, the evaluation of those mean-
ings, and the syntheses between processes and meanings, from the point
of view of either the historical agent or the historical observer. That
limitation of the broad or total sphere of values to a certain group is
guided by the selection implied in the nature of history, and it works in
both directions. History would be vacuous unless guided by certain
meanings; the meaning of those meanings would be void were it not
applied to concrete processes and to the opportunities offered by the
configurational character of history as the synthesis of time as back-
ground and concrete meanings invested in superimposed on time.
Hence it will be the task of this part of our analysis to look into
whether the involvement of values in the process, being an essential
feature of the process as such, can be abstracted on the level of historical
investigation in the disciplinary sense of that term. We face history, but
also human sciences in general and the social sciences in particular. This
is even more so because theory of the social sciences deliberately
presented the view that they can be emancipated or freed from values.
That theory - which every so often formulated the basic position
vis-ii-vis values - had its direct or indirect impact on the self-
consciousness of historical investigation, and not only on the program-
matic position of the social sciences in the limited sense of that term.
II
Speaking about experience in the human context, as when we use the

phrase "an experienced person," it is almost impossible to distinguish
between the cognitive and the evaluative. An experienced person is not
one who has merely seen places, but one who encountered other persons
in their diverse situations. He knows not only the overt behavior of the
persons and the situations involved, but also what is important and, to
138 CHAPTER 7
some extent, why people do what they do. He knows what can be
expected, and what can and should be the outcome of a situation.
Human sciences, the humanities, history and social sciences are closer
to the level of experience, in this sense, than are the natural sciences.
The reason for this proximity is not only biographical, nor is it a part of a
kind of "underdeveloped" stage of the human sciences, as some might
be inclined to argue. To be sure, modern natural science depends upon
hypotheses, abstractions, and models. But it can do t~at because there is
no involvement between the subject-matter of their research and the
methods applied to that subject-matter. Though the knowing subject is
part of the nature studied by him, or he himself is genetically deter-
mined by the genes that are his subject-matter, nevertheless he has the
cognitive perspective of a subject addressing himself to an object. The
hypotheses and methods are both the chasm and the bridge between
himself and his subject-matter. The cognitive attitude has sufficient
perspective to deal with data despite the impact of the data on the
subject since the subject himself is involved in the realm of the data.
Thus the methodical character of knowledge provides for a methodical
distance between subject and object, even if the distance is not real in
terms of the causal chain, time sequence, etc. This intersection between
determination and distance has its impact on certain reflective attitudes;
an illustration of the case in point is the inherent skepticism towards
introspection insofar as introspection is viewed as a reflective attitude.
By its very nature, introspection cannot be depersonalized or methodi-
cally rendered. The subject engaged in introspection is by the same
token his own object, and thus determination and distance appear
rather difficult or even possibly out of the reach of the subject.
Human sciences are in an "in between" situation - between the model
and methods of the natural sciences and the complications of introspec-
tion mentioned before. History, sociology, and political science are not
introspective disciplines. On the contrary, the subject-matter of these
branches of research is public; even when a historian is concerned with
individuals, he is not concerned with himself. His exploration of the
individual is guided by the position of the individual in the public realm
in shaping the course of events through actions or ideas that did or do
have their impact on the course of events. Yet the reference to the
public is always within the human boundaries. Even those who advocate
any kind of determinism, and are concerned with formulating "cover-
ing" explanatory historical laws, do not take advantage of genetic laws,
though they operate in the human, and thus in the historical, realm as
well. Historical determinism is an attempt to put forward a structure of
history in the immanent sense of the term. A demarcation line is implied
between what is called history or society on the one hand, and nature or
cosmos on the other. The same pertains to sociology and political
science. Even when the social sciences apply themselves to phenomena
that are explained by biochemistry, such as malnutrition, they do not
explore the biochemical mechanism caused by malnutrition or the
chemical factors bringing about malnutrition. They presuppose the
biochemical aspects and are concerned with illness and its impact, with
anxieties, stress, or social dissent and aspirations caused by factors
whose ratio essendi lies in the biological sphere, but whose results
appear in the social configuration.
The confinement to human boundaries characteristic of history and
the social sciences in general precludes the possibility of a total detach-
ment of the exploring subject from his object. Thus there is the possibil-
ity of what is called "learning from history," but might also be called
"teaching by history." A historian sometimes presents an analysis of a
situation in the past and the agents involved in it, and he has a better
knowledge of the operating forces than did the agents themselves. If a
historian of the English parliamentary system carries out a Statistical
Study of the correlation between the social milieu of M.P.s in the
eighteenth century and their parliamentary behavior, he assumes that
some motivation, related to the effect of one's upbringing and interests
on one's behavior, operated in the eighteenth century. Whether the
agents knew about this correlation might be relevant, or may in itself be
a socio-historical fact that calls for explanation; indeed, different kinds
of explanations can be provided for that unawareness and even self-
deception if one takes a stronger, ideologically tinged view.
Yet the historical sphere does provide for a certain replacement of the
distance between the subject and the object, through the temporal
distance between the subject-matter of historical investigation and the
historian. The historian knows, at least, that he can apply the guiding
principle, mentioned before, wirklich ist was wirksam war. The tracing
of the wirksam, the active or influential consequences or results of
events, or, the other way round, the tracing of causes whose effects are
established, becomes the major concern of historical investigation,
giving it a methodical character despite the fact that both the subject-
matter and the subject are within the common human sphere. The
140 CHAPTER 7
situation becomes more complicated and difficult in social sciences like

sociology, economics, or political science, insofar as we understand
these branches of research to deal with structures and situations whose
causes are in the past but which are viewed non-historically. In this
sense the social sciences are all present-oriented, though they may
assume a methodical detachment and apply their methods to tribes
known as primitive. The primitive tribes studied are in the present and
are encountered in the present - and plainly not in history. The orienta-
tion towards the present inherent in the social science makes the
proximity between subject and object more visible, and thus cognitively
more problematic, than is the case in historical research.
Against this background the question of the values and the involve-
ment of social sciences and the social scientist with them becomes
understandable. The social scientist does have a position of his own,
directly or indirectly, in the economic system he is studying. He partici-
pates in the political process; he is an educator, or his children are
exposed to the educational system and to the interaction between that
system and the political and social structure. He studies structures of
which he is a part; he investigates his contemporaries, assuming motiva-
tions and interests of which he is at least to some extent aware from his
own personal orbit. He may easily project what he knows from his
personal experience onto interpersonal interactions. He learns from his
peers and teaches them simultaneously. Who will call him to order or
provide a formula for the distinction between his personal involvement
and his scholarly interest or curiosity?
It is against this background that the "question of values" in the social
sciences and in historical research comes to the foreground. The posi-
tion known as "freedom from values" was and is an attempt to resolve
this inherent dilemma of the human sciences and to make them as
methodical as possible, shaping them after the model of the natural
sciences.
III
The involvement of the subject in its object or subject-matter is pre-

supposed by the cognitive situation of the social sciences. This involve-
ment is characterized by the fact that the human situation, in its
historical and social structure, is one where "values" are among the
most prominent factors.
Weber said that he was only formulating a trivial truth and everyday
experience by stating that every object that is an object of history is
necessarily related to a value. 1 Weber took "value" in its most elemen-
tary sense: that which human beings hold as "important" or "precious."
To hold something as precious is obviously to ascribe a certain aspect of
meaning to things or events. Thus values belong to the realm of the
significant; for Weber to be meaningful is to be significant, to be related
to one's strivings, aspirations, or expectations. This leads to a further,
more refined, statement. Human beings endow reality with meaning
and significance (Sinn und Bedeutung). This meeting between reality
and meaning is what goes by the name of "culture". Thus a concept of
culture is a valuf!-concept. The empirical reality for us is "culture";
insofar as it is placed in relation to ideas or values, it comprises only
those components of reality which through that relation become signifi-
cant for us. 2
When Weber speaks in this context of significance for us, it is not
clear who are the "we" for whom reality becomes significant. Prooably
he assumes "we" are what he calls Kulturmenschen, endowed with the
capacity and will to render reality significant or meaningful. The sociolo-
gist or the investigator is, by definition, a Kulturmensch. His is a
Kultur-acitivity or enterprise. He is part of the human condition charac-
terized by attitudes, stands, values, etc. Moreover, the Kulturmensch is
characterized not only by wills and aspirations, but also by passions
related to these stands: "nothing is valuable for man as man that he
cannot view with passion (Leidenschaft)."3
The investigator is involved passionately in the situation; and passions
contradict the cognitive distance and the separation between the subject
and its object. This would eventually lead to the conclusion that to avoid
taking a stand because of cognitive considerations runs counter to the
definition of man. The investigator has to suppress not only predilec-
tions and biases, but also the very human condition that he is investigat-
ing. Clearly this is not the case in the natural sciences. The galaxies do
not behave passionately, and Leidenschaft is not a characteristic feature
of electrons. Thus the Kulturmensch does not have to suppress his
strivings while investigating Nature. The only value he pursues a parte
subjecti is the value of truth, while his object is indifferent to that value.
This is not the case with the value-charged human situation. Human
beings, endowing reality with meaning and significance, endow it with
meanings outside the meaning and value of truth. The social sciences
obviously adhere to the value of truth; but human beings engaged in
142 CHAPTER 7
social sciences have vested interests outside the interest in the value of
truth. Weber thought that he could escape or overcome by means of
method this inherent dilemma by assuming that the subject adheres only
to the value of truth while his objects follow values in their diversity.
The dilemma becomes even more acute since the concept of value,
made explicit by Weber, has a particular connotation that must be seen
in its systematic consequences. Values are the precious objects of
aspiration. They are related to human beings who endow reality with
meaning. There is an implicit interaction between man and values.
Segments of reality are values because we value them as such, and we
value them because we are Kulturmenschen who cannot help but look at
reality through the prism of values. Weber seems to be close to looking
at values as that which is desired. To be desired is to be significant,
irrespective of the justification for the desirability and significance. He
seems to assume that the valuing human being is a Kulturmensch, and
because he is a Kulturmensch needs a kind of a thematic pole for his
valuations.
Actually he should have spoken about valuable things and not about
values. Unlike valuable things, values are principles of valuations and
not things or merely goals. They are norms, measures, standards. To be
sure, Weber does speak about ultimate measures (letzte Masstiibe)4
which become manifest in the concrete value-judgement. Since he tries
to establish the intrinsic contact between the definition of man in
general and values, he cannot say that man as man relates to the
ultimate measures. He can only say. that man as man refers to desired
things and goals, or that he gives things the position of goals and thus
renders them significant or meaningful. He seems to indicate that one of
the qualifications introduced by the social sciences vis-a-vis their parti-
cular subject-matter is the tendency to bring to light the ultimate
measures implied in the attitudes and stands taken by human beings at
large. Indeed he says: "to bring to consciousness the ultimate measures
which manifest themselves in the concrete value-judgement."s
Yet one cannot assume that human beings endowing reality with
meaning do so unconsciously. There is a distinction, which Weber
possibly does not make, between consciousness as the sum-total of acts
of awareness and consciousness as the sum-total of attitudes. But even
when we take an attitude without knowing the reasons for our attitude,
taking the attitude is a vis-a-vis position; alertness and distinctions are
implied in every attitude. When Weber speaks in this context about
"ultimate measures", one may wonder to what extent he is dealing with

ultimate measures from the point of view of the investigated society. To
what extent does an investigated society relate, for example, to funda-
mental distinctions between sacred and profane, or between achieve-
ment and failure? Or is he dealing with ultimate measures in terms of a
set of principles that is not culturally conditioned, like "justice" in Plato
or "man as an end, not as a means only" in Kant, or "self-reflection" in
Hegel? The ambiguous locus of the "ultimate" leads 11S to the issue of
plurality of values and their relativity, which is taken to be concomitant
or even synonymous with plurality.
IV
Weber seems to have assumed that there are universal orders of abstract
values like religion, art, and the state, but that there are· no universal
material values - what might be described as substantive values. Univer-
sal and thus constant are (a) the relation between man and values in the
sense explored before, and (b) the structuring of these relations in
certain recurring spheres like religion, art, and the state. Within these
spheres there are different values because there are different evalua-
tions. In a telling example Weber refers to Buddhist ethics, where any
activity related to a goal is rejected, precisely because it is related to a
goal, and as such will lead us to forgo redemption. At this point, he says,
one can hardly assume that any of us shares this view. But at the same
time it is impossible to contradict such an ethical system in the sense we
reject a false calculation or a mistake in a medical diagnosis. 6
Let us take a closer look at the example. Weber seems to assume that
an activity related to a goal (Zweckhandlung) runs counter to redemp-
tion. But this is not so. Redemption is a goal and has to be taken as such;
an attitude toward a goal is implied in the expectation of redemption.
Secondly, there is an activity in Buddhist ethics in the very severe
discipline advocated and practiced. To be sure, that activity is not one of
success, but one of inner discipline and extinction of passions. Thus tine
cannot say that we encounter here plainly different sets of values; at
most there are different interpretations of sets of values. The example
may be viewed as an example of relativism, within a non-relativistic
situation of value-orientations and goal-orientation. But the goal in
Weber's example lacks the dimension of externality. Hence one may
144 CHAPTER 7
wonder whether the examples referred to warrant the relativistic or

pluralistic conclusion that Weber seeks, since he wants to substantiate
the absence of a stand on the end of the social sciences by the plurality
of stands on the end of the subject-matter of the social sciences. He
wants to show that the only stand to be taken vis-ii-vis the "anarchy" of
values on the end of the subject-matter is not to take a stand at all; but
only to explore the situation, to be neutral or value-free (wertfrei). The
fundamental and the empirical considerations seem to coincide here.
From the fundamental point of view, investigation can be neutral
vis-ii-vis the human condition imbued with values; and empirically,
vis-ii-vis the plurality of values, one has to reserve judgement and be
"value-free". We touch here on what is an interpretation of Kant's
distinction between the "being" and the "ought" (Sein und Sol/en) - an
issue which is central to contemporary discussions about ethics.
Indeed, one may suggest that the distinction between "is" and
"ought" is fundamental. Knowledge is about "is"; and historical knowl-
edge, or that incorporated in the social sciences as a branch of knowl-
edge, has to be viewed as knowledge of areas of "is". But does the
concentration on the "is" from the point of knowledge lead us
to the parallel view that the "ought" belongs only to position-taking, or
at most to endowing the "is" with meaning? The tendency in Weber,
and the atmosphere he helped to create, is to view the "ought", the
values, as being subjective. The attempt to see the coincidence between
the "is" and the "ought" on the one hand, and the objective and
SUbjective on the other, runs counter to one of the fundamental asser-
tions of Kant--in spite of the pronounced indebtdeness to Kant. Kant
says of the "ought": "The 'ought' expresses a possible action, the
ground of which cannot be anything but a mere concept.'o Kant also
says: "We have in us a faculty ... related to objective grounds ....
This faculty is called 'reason' and, so far as we consider a being (man)
entirely according to this objectively determinable reason, he cannot be
considered as a being of sense .... Grounds of reason give the rule
universally to actions, according to principles, without influence of the
circumstances of either time or place."8
Following the Kantian line, it must be said (a) that reason operates
both in the sphere of knowledge of the "is" as well as in the sphere of
being determined by the "ought," though in the first instance it is reason
qua understanding, while in the second instance it is reason proper, that
is to say, pure reason. (b) Hence it follows - paradoxically as it may
sound to one shaped by the mood of the social sciences - that in Kant
the realm of values is more rational than the realm of knowledge,
insofar as the realm of knowledge is related only to reason and not to a
synthesis between reason and data. Thus transplanting the distinction
between "is" and "ought" to the distinction between knowing values
and viewing them as expressions of feelings, interests, or attitudes about
which ultimately we cannot argue (e.g., the distinction between Bud-
dhism and an ethical system based on goals), resembles Kant's distinc-
tion only verbally; it merely takes advantage of the dichotomy of "is"
versus "ought", but gives that dichotomy a different meaning from that
formulated in Kant's system.
This means that knowledge of values can at most be engaged in the
immanent value-presuppositions underlying human behavior as studied
empirically by the social sciences. Hence knowledge as such cannot pass
judgement on these values; it can only take them as they are. Weber's
statement that it is the task of social sciences to bring the ultimate
measures to awareness or consciousness can refer only to ultimate
measures insofar as they are conceived by those involved in pursuing a
certain set of values. These values are ultimate for the agent, but not for
imperatives or reason or an "ought" having its own logic. When we
deal, for instance, with Protestant ethics, and point to the relation
between election and pre-determination on the one hand, and economic
success on the other, we are elucidating the ultimate measures from the
point of view of Protestant ethics, and not from the position of achieve-
ment in human life or the relation of a social status to an intrinsic moral
position. Gunnar Myrdal follows this line when he says that we are
engaged in raising to full awareness the evaluations that actually deter-
mine our theoretical as well as our practical research, in order to
scrutinize them from the point of view of relevance, significance, and
feasibility in the society under study; or, generally speaking, we are
engaged in bringing the valuations out into the open. 9
v
Here we encounter some crucial issues related to values versus reality,
including historical reality. The philosophical presupposition of the distinc-
tion as presented in the social sciences, unlike the distinction as presented
in Kant, is that, empirically speaking, we know the demarcation line
146 CHAPTER 7
between what belongs to the realm of "is" and what belongs to the
realm of values. Is this really so? Consider again Weber's example of the
incommensurability of goal-based and Buddhist ethics. Is it really only a
question of values, or of what one is obliged to do? There are many
significant factual points involved. The major "factual issue" is the
existence or reality of personality. In the present context personality
is understood as an individual endowed with self-consciousness, refer-
ring his self-consciousness to himself, reflecting up~:m himself and his
position in the world, relating himself to other human beings and to the
world at large from the position of his self-consciousness. Buddhism
does not take the view that personality reflecting upon itself is to be
preserved. The reflection of the personality is not an indication of the
real and indelible existence of the personality. We may say that the
personality exists "for us," but not "in itself." As against this Aristote-
lian, Kantian, Biblical, and Christian ethics are all based upon the
supposition that personality does exist, and that the realization of values
or of the good does not erase the personality. Opinions differ as to what
the personality has to do in order to behave morally: to be engaged in
theoria, to be an autonomous law-giver, to perform deeds, to obey
commandments, or to find salvation in faith. Indeed, these are different
interpretations of the "ought" binding the "is" of the personality. But
the ethical imperative of the "ought" does not create its own support,
that is to say the "is" of the personality. The difference between
Buddhism and these ethical systems is related to different readings of
the descriptive position of man in the world. It is not related only to
different value-systems, if values are taken in the limited sense of the
term.
The combination of the factual and valuational is to be found not only
on the level of the "abstract" concept of personality; it appears on a
more "concrete" level of phenomena closely studied by anthropology
and the social sciences in general. A telling case in point is the phenome-
non of incest prohibitions. Claude Levi-Strauss, for instance, takes the
irreducible character of the basic unit of kinship as a direct result of the
universal presence of the incest taboo. He even says that the incest
prohibition is the basis of human society: in a sense it "is" the society. 10
One may wonder whether this particular explanation is empirically
warranted and methodologically substantiated. But one things is clear:
the incest prohibition contains what may be called a factual identifica-
tion, that is, the identification of parents and siblings and a move toward
a certain evaluation of the relation between parents and siblings: One's

own activity and involyement in reproducing life is placed on a different
level than one's sharing in the source of one's own life. The factual
distinction is implied in the incest prohibition, though that distinction is
placed on a level that can be identified as moral or ethical, at least in its
negative and prohibiting quality; what should not be done or - positively
- what boundaries should and ought to be observed. The factual
distinction between inheriting life and procreation of life is rendered in
ethical terms. The alleged clear-cut borderline between the factual and
the moral does not apply to what is considered empirically to be a major
facet of human life and social behavior.
Here we encounter a methodical mistake. The social sciences, as
empirical sciences, make two tacit philosophical commitments: (a) that
there is a clear-cut distinction between facts and values, and (b) that
values proper, being rooted in Stellungnahmen, are eventually of a
subjectjve character and thus of relative validity only. Why should
empirical sciences make far-reaching philosophical commitments or
present themselves as indirectly supporting a philosophical outlook? It
is a mistake for philosophy to commit itself to a certain stage in the
development of the sciences, whether Euclidian geometry, teleological
biology, or physics guided by strict causality. Conversely, it is a mistake
for empirical sciences to commit themselves to a certain philosophy, and
find their justification in that and not in another philosophical view.
What can be said is the following: a study of a society or of a culture
is not value-free. It only suspends the ultimate evaluation of a culture,
though the ultimate evaluation of a culture might be the next step in
terms of the public discussion or in terms of a discipline, be it science or
philosophy. Here the factual identification and the ethical assumption
go together. There is a difference between saying that the only objective
value is truth, and that the empirical sciences are subject to that value,
while all other values are of a non-objective character, on the one hand,
and the position that adherence to the value of truth leads us to the
suspension of other values, on the other hand. Since we adhere to the
value of truth, we do not pass judgment on the justification of the values
we study; we only turn methodically the other values into objects of our
study.
Subjecting ourselves to the value of truth engenders ipso facto within
the area of empirical research, and pari passu on the part of the
individual researcher, a position of evaluation vis-a-vis the object under
148 CHAPTER 7
study. In order to study a human object, whether a patient, a society, or

a culture, we have to preserve the human object. This is not only a
"strategic device" to prevent the self-defeating outcome of our re-
search, that is, to proceed with surgery and kill the patient. It is
intrinsically implied in the attitude of studying an object within its own
contours, of respecting the object as it stands. Respect may take a
negative, minimal direction - refraining from intruding; and it may take
a more positive direction - a regard for a quality, at least to the extent
that the quality is worth being studied. But respect is not only related to
the cognitive counterpart; it is a human response of a general character.
As such, it may have some bearing on the activity of the social sciences
and their impact.
Wherever respect is involved, we must interpret the significance of
refraining from intruding. A doctor may exhibit his respect for his
patient by being totally frank with him. But he may also exhibit his
respect by weighing whether an aura of deception or self-deception can
to some extent maintain the vitality of the patient, even when frankness
will not be observed. Frankness and restraint can be manifestations of
respect. Every so often there are clashes between interpretations of
values, or secondary expressions of them, rather than clashes between
two sets of values, like the value of the personality and the value of the
cosmos and immersion in it. Empirical science faces this problem too.
The adherence to truth has to lead to an open and frank expression of
findings as invidious as, for example, the fact - if fact it be - that certain
races or groups of individuals show a statistically lower distribution of
intelligence. But it is only legitimate for the social scientist to weigh
whether or not his findings will create additional disillusionment: those
who are affected by these findings may come to the conclusion that there
is no point in striving to change the educational system because some
students are genetically disadvantaged. Moreover, in addition to those
directly affected, the society at large may also arrive at this conclu-
sion and refrain from further efforts to create environments conducive
to learning, social mobility, etc. The social scientist could also take the
view that by presenting his findings he will mobilize an additional effort,
even for the sake of certain individuals and their uplifting; he will follow
the motto of Justice Brandeis, quoted by Isaiah Berlin, that the irresisti-
ble is often only that which is not resisted. In any case, the social
scientist, though adhering to the principle of truth, cannot be oblivious
of this attitude and involvement in society, be that involvement pre-
scientific, post-scientific, or, as with the notion of respect, implied in his

scientific attitude. Again the distinction between a methodical detach-
ment from involvement and a real detachment from it might be helpful.
Suppose that there is a real clash between values, including the clash
between truth and respect; suppose further that the resolution of this
clash cannot follow the lines suggested above: then we cannot say that
only the value of truth is binding, and all other values are relative or
secondary. There is a real clash in bringing about real dilemmas that
cannot be resolved by storing one horn of the dilemma in the compart-
ment of relativity and the other in the compartment of absoluteness.
The situation seems to be similar to that raised in one of Sartre's
example: the young man who wanted guidance as to whether he should
stay at home and look after his mother or join the Free French forces.
The clash is between one's obligations as a son, on the one hand, and as
a citizen - or person - on the other. This is a clash between two loyalties;
it is not a question of one loyalty's being of a different magnitude of
validity than the other. Opposing values may indeed lead to clashes, but
the saying that the clashes are only subjectively determined evades the
issue.
The distinction between the factual and the valuational is not as clear
as assumed. The contemporary social sciences are inclined to explain
events and situations by referring to ultimate motives of an empirical,
rather than a metaphysical or ontological, character. If social tensions
are explained by the notion that the levels of aspiration rise, and only
those who aspire rebel while those who are apathetic do not, the
assumption is being made that aspiration is an ultimate motivating
factor in human behavior. When we explain a situation by referring to
such a factor, we understand both in the strict cognitive sense of the
term as well as in the sense of the French saying "to understand
everything is to forgive everything." The explanation put forward by the
social scientists implies an attitude of respect, forbearance, and even
compassion. This applies not only to lofty explanations of aspiration; it
also applies to explanations of fear, self-interest, or any mode of
ascribing motivations to human agents in human situations. If we
assume that self-interest is an ultimate motive, we do not study actions
or social life in a value-free way only. We also say that "you shouldn't
blame" those studied, who are motivated by what is considered to be a
legitimate motivation because it is on the edge of the factual and
ultimate. The social sciences do not imply that what they study is good,
150 CHAPTER 7
but they do imply that what they study shouldn't be blamed. Not to be
blamed is not praiseworthy, but it certainly does not represent condem-
nation, and as such a mitigated value-attitude is involved.
Suppose that we refer in our explanation to a motivating factor or
attitude that is not neutral, but praiseworthy. If the social sciences
explain the achievements, for example, of armed forces, by pointing to
the intelligence qua flexibility of every individual soldier or to the
independence of each rank within the hierarchical structure; by assum-
ing that the ultimate test for achievement lies in self-reliance and lack of
dependence on th'e central command, then in these cases the social
sciences are addressing themselves to what commonly goes by the name
of intelligence. They assume that intelligence is valuable not only
because it is related to homo sapiens by definition, but also because it
"works"; it brings about success and achievements that can be measured
and have a historical impact. These are cases where action is motivated
by taking advantage of positive-value factors like intelligence, leading to
the far-reaching conclusion that what is worthy intrinsically might also
be fruitful operationally. To be sure, we do not imply that the explana-
tion put forward by social scientists always works in this direction: the
previous examples of aspirations and self-interest point to the fact that
the explanation by "intelligence" is, to say the least, not the only
possible explanation. The implication is that there are cases where the
social sciences explain actions not by subjective values based on stands,
but by what they assume to be objective values, either positively or at
least as an ultimate motivating factor whose value lies in facticity, and
thus delineates the ultimate borderline of the human situation.
There is a circumlocution here. The social sciences teach us what
those ultimate factors are, and persuade us to see in their operation
sufficient explanations; from this point of view they are responsible for
the value-stands we take. Since they teach us these value-stands, they
cannot say that the value-stands are merely subjective Stellungnahmen.
They are, after all, an operative, persuasive consequence of the findings
of a branch of empirical science. Hence the social sciences are willy-nilly
involved in social situations. In addition, they create the situations in
which they are involved, and thus are bound to take into account the
consequences of their findings. We are aware now that even biology,
genetics and physics must face the consequences of their findings. A
fortiori the social sciences face this question, because, after all, the
consequences on human behavior of their findings and explanations of it
are closer to these findings than is the case with the natural sciences. The
consequences of the natural sciences have to go through the prism of the
human agents, while the findings of social scientists are about agents
who, as agents, are by definition the prism in the findings.
We have previously considered the mode of explanation pursued by
the social scientists while referring to "ultimate" factors like interests or
aspiration. Once explanation is applied to factots whose position is
supposedly "ultimate," a justification is implicit; behavior "that cannot
be helped" alludes to the factors operating and occupying a special
position within the spectrum of human activity. This is an indirect
justification, and the evaluation involved is accordingly indirect, too.
There are also direct evaluations, such as alienation, so much in the
forefront of contemporary social research, and social equilibrium, the
concern of political theory.
As to the concept of alienation, one may suggest a rough distinction
between a philosophical exploration of alienation and the investigation
of empirical phenomena like apathy, disappointment, and resentment,
all allegedly related to alienation. ll In the philosophical sense, aliena-
tion is a perversion of the fundamental position of man as a person. Man
is alienated, alienation is imposed on him, when he is looked at as a
means or as a commodity, and thus'ceases to be approached as a person.
Hence there exists a dichotomy between the ontological and the moral
position of man, on the one hand, and his factual status in the overt
character of the society, on the other. Yet empirical sociological re-
search does not leave things in this sundered state. The assumption is
that a man placed, in spite of himself, in an ~lienated position expresses
his feelings about the enforced alienation in his bitterness, indications of
awareness of injustice, or doubt as to the authority of the patterns of
social behavior. The social sciences address themselves here to more
than the value of human personality inherent in the agents studied who
reject alienation. They also maintain the value of human personality
from the point of view of the social sciences as such. They take a morally
charged concept like alienation, with its presuppositions and consequ-
ences, as the topic of their empirical investigation. Feelings of injustice
and bitterness empirically encountered and studied are then taken,
explicitly or implicitly, as justified. Empirical research is not neutral
here; it is not value-free. It adheres to the value of the subject matter-
and this is not a reproof. The social sciences cannot help but adhere to
these values. The question is, why should they pretend to be value-free
152 CHAPTER 7
in theory and adhere to values in practice? Or, to put it differently, why

should they maintain the position of lack of self-consciousness or self-
explication? It is legitimate to demand from science and scientists a
minimum of s~lf-knowledge, even when we do not indulge in an ex-
treme interpretation of the Socratic maxim.
The question of equilibrium is not totally disconnected from the topic
of alienation, though the context is different. Methodically, alienation is
viewed as a social concept, which sometimes has a political connotation,
while equilibrium between diversity and integration of societies and
organizations is presented as a tension desirable for the operation of
political regimes. When we assume that such an equilibrium is essential
for the operation of a good society, we assume that society must be
composed of different groups who pursue their different aims. The
integration of the groups and their ends brings about an inevitable
compromise, and also exhibits the rhythm of diversity and unity that is
supposed to be in accordance with human needs or lifestyles, or eventu-
ally with broader aspects of unity and plurality characteristic of the
world and of man in the world. Here again it does not seem to be
relevant whether we regard the equilibrium between unity and diversity
as essential in a cosmic rhythm, or whether we are satisfied with
presenting it as a desirable feature and outlet for social and political
behavior. 12 In both cases, the social sciences or political theory address
themselves to value-concepts. Here again the imperative of adequacy or
the imperative of self-knowledge should lead to facing the issue and not
to shelving it. 13
VII
We may sum up the gist of our argument as follows: (a) The notion of
value-free social sciences makes a certain philosophical commitment as
to the subjective or relative character of values. Trying to avoid the
pitfalls of subjectivity, this notion opposes adherence to truth against
adherence to other values. This seems to be an over-commitment to one
possible interpretation of the position of values; one may wonder
whether real service and justice is rendered to the social sciences.
(b) The notion of value-free social sciences is presented as an emulation
of what supposedly goes on in the natural sciences, where the object or the
subject-matter is value-free, while the scientific investigation adheres
only to the value of truth. But in this case the emulation seems to be
misplaced, because of what might be called the ontological identity
between the subject and the object in the social sciences. That identity
does not pertain to the relation between the scientist as the subject of
the natural sciences and his object, even when this object lies in the
sphere of biology and the organism of the subject is also of a biological
character. The social sciences presuppose the impact of their findings,
and this impact in turn presupposes an affinity between the scientist and
his pursued object and what Chaim Perelman would call his audience.
(c) The social sciences do explicitly impose value-concepts and evalua-
tions, implying either a justification or criticism of the phenomena
e~plored.
VIII
At this point it is appropriate to return to our primary considerations

regarding the nature of historical events, whose historical aspect
amounts to the traces they leave within the course of subsequent events
and the present-day state of affairs. Historical events are historical
because of their impact. We distinguish between two layers, which are
concurrently two steps of historical consciousness: the consciousness
involved in action, which as such can aim at the achievement of the
position of historical events, and historical consciousness looking back-
ward and reconstructing from the traces the significance of actions and
events. Those that left traces changed the course of the historical
process, and are, to apply a term frequently abused, relevant. The
aspect of historical consciousness in the second sense takes the shape of
historical awareness at large, as well as that of historical research as a
discipline.
Historical consciousness in its second, retrospective direction, start
from a situation that is concerned with exploring the unfolding aspect of
the situation; it is concerned with causes as well as components of the
state of affairs. Historical consciousness considers the state of affairs to
be worth exploring, and by the same token considers the process that
led to that state of affairs as one that has a real impact on the state of
affairs. Hence the discernment of significance, both in the present as
well as in the past, is inherently connected with, or interwoven in,
historical consciousness. While historical consciousness, as involved in
154 CHAPTER 7
action, attaches significance to objectives and aims, historical conscious-

ness as reconstruction attaches significance to the effect as well as to the
causes and intervening process. It goes without saying that the term
"significance" is both value-loaded and ambiguous. The significance of
the causes and the process is gauged by the significance of the state of
affairs that provides the point of departure for the retrospective and
reconstructive direction of historical consciousness. But what is signifi-
cant for the present state of affairs? Is it just i~s novelty, the new
ingredient brought into reality? Is it the significance for the understand-
ing of the past? If a new document is found, for example the Dead Sea
Scrolls, the significance does not lie in the very fact that there is a new
element in the landscape or the caves, but that there is a new and
previously unknown dimension to the past. At this juncture we may ask
questions like these: To what extent do the Scrolls shed light on the
emergence of Christianity? Do they represent a new version of religious
faith, a sect whose existence w'!.s unknown and the existence of which
enriches the spectrum of religiosity as a fact in the morphological sense
as well as in a given historical configuration? The factual and value-
aspects questions of this sort eventually overlap. Significance is close to
novelty, on the one hand, and to the representative character of the
phenomenon which, within historical reality, makes manifest the poten-
tialities of religious attitudes previously unknown, on the other.
Questions about significance, with the variety of meanings of that
term, are not confined to retrospection when we ask about the signifi-
cance of the traces and changes as consequences of the state of affairs.
We study the parliamentary system, for example, analyze its different
institutions, and trace them to some ideological or philosophical consid-
erations of the past, as well as to factions, controversies, and socio-
historical groups that operated in the past and had their impact on the
present state of affairs. In this context questions like: Is the system in its
present-day configuration, while related to the past, adjustable to
present-day conditions? Does it strike the proper equilibrium between
various institutions, or, to put it differently, does the check and balance
aspect, as conceived in the past, still work in the present? In this context
the meaning of the term "work" is again value-loaded and ambiguous.
It may connote working in the so-called pragmatic sense, i.e., whether
decisions are taken within a reasonable span of time, or it can be taken
in the intrinsic sense - whether the decisions conform to the principles of
justice or equity, or even to those inherent in the parliamentary system
as such. Be this as it may, the strict distinction between factual discern-

ment and value-considerations cannot be upheld. The very attempt to
introduce a distinction of this sort imposes on consciousness and on
research norms that are not germane to the domain, or that indirectly
change the character of the historical orbit by widening the gap between
the subject-matter of historical investigation and the cognitive subject of
that investigation. There is no need to impose upon the historical
process an overriding value implied in the integrating norm of progress-
as we have seen before. But it does not follow that it is not justified to
introduce value considerations into our approach to the historical pro-
cess, once they are present in the historical subjects involved in the
process and are reflected both in the sense of being repeated and in the
sense of being related to the attitude of pondering on the level of
cognition.
Now we come back to the distinction between historical processes and
their i!lvestigation. Insofar as the investigation addresses itself to the
traces of processes, it points to what might be described as the minimal
residua of values, since it addresses itself to the impact of processes or of
certain modes of behavior and attitudes. In the historical process we
may find manifestations of attitudes like cooperation, trust, and expec-
tation, as well as their opposites -lack of cooperation, hostility, lack of
trust, envy, etc. Neither direct involvement in the process, which
contains value-aspects including attitudes, nor historical research are
bound to reflect upon the norms as such, upon the meaning of con-
fidence or cooperation, let alone upon their justification. Human beings
involved in the process may not even reflect on their motivation insofar
as it is imbued with virtue.
Historical research, being more reflective by definition, may extract
the virtues from the attitudes and refer specifically to trust and coopera-
tion, to concern with welfare and participation, to the presence of the
common good on the horizon of the public and its leaders, etc. Even
that reflective extraction is not necessarily connected with a deliberate
concern for the position of norms and values and in vis-a-vis human
existence. This division of labor between reflection on the level of
historical research and on the level of philosophical analysis is present in
the context. This division of labor has as its concomitant an anti-
historistic (derived from: Historismus) consequence, namely, that cer-
tain attitudes, which are present in the historical process and are
reflected upon in the historical investigation, do not originate from
156 CHAPTER 7
historical situations or the involvement of human beings in those situa-

tions. The situation can be seen as a configuration invested with a
value-ingredient. There is a difference between a configurational read-
ing of a situation and one that reads processes as causes and values as
their effects.
But historical research, being a reflective attitude, makes us aware of
a dimension of human existence which is not only invested with values
as factors in the configuration; it emerges as a situation that makes us
aware of values. If historical awareness amounts to the awareness that
we are in the midst of time, implicated willy-nilly in processes, we
become aware of the finitude of man; but, contrary to Heidegger, that
finitude is related to our consciousness of being in the middle, not to
consciousness of the end. History, like reality, does not begin with us.
This mode of awareness has an intrinsic limitation, making us conscious
that we are not creators of reality, but also that since we encounter a
reality we have not created we may be responsible for it, or ought to
attempt to change it in a responsible way. The responsibility implied
here is similar to the responsibility of the physician: the first thing is to
do no harm, that is, not to destroy the reality in which we find ourselves.
To be aware of our position in the midst of the process is not to impose
on the situation encountered an eschatological or apocalyptic meaning -
to uproot it totally, or to attempt to replace it by another reality. If our
reflection begins in the midst of time, we cannot uproot ourselves from
that locus and see ourselves in the midst of time in the next step, once
we have uprooted the reality. If there is an eschaton, we shall cease t\l
exist after the eschaton is reached. But if we do not cease to exist, we
shall again be reflecting upon our situation, looking before and after,
and thus comparing what we have done with our eschatological aspira-
tion and with the consequences of that attempt. The introduction of
reflection into the historical orbit is not the introduction of normative
considerations in the philosophical sense of the term, namely, the
justification of the norms, their variety, and their interrelation. Histori-
cal reflection amounts here to the articulation of the subject-matter of
history as a primary nexus between time and meaning, whereas the
locus in time gains a meaning once that locus is understood as being
involved in the process - in other words,.in the midst of time. Historical
research or reflection "of the second order" - reflection "of the first
order" is already present and operative in the process itself - leads us to
a point where the question of the results of our actions becomes
EV ALUA TIONS AND VALUES 157
significant not only functionally - that is to say, what will be the results
of our actions - but also intrinsically - namely, what will be the
value-aspect of the results of our actions.
In this context there are particular historical situations that make that
value-awareness sharper than it used to be. The post-Nazi period can be
seen, historically and reflectively, as one of those turning periods in
human history that do not allow us to be oblivious of the value-
component in historical action. The Nazi enterprise can be interpreted
as an attempt to remove the Reich of the Teutonic race from its
involvement in the process to the position of an eschaton, or to bestow
on the Teutonic race the status of total superiority vis-a-vis other human
beings, a total superiority that allowed it to place certain human beings,
e.g., the Jews, outside the human orbit. The fact that actions of this sort
were possible and brought about historical events imposes on historical
reflection a new configuration, inasmuch as historical reflection is bound
to attempt to analyze the causes of situations as well as to read their
historical results. We cannot avoid questioning the broader 1'-uman
meaning of the situations that are the subject-matter of the investiga-
tion. Adherence to truth as the guiding principle of reflection leads us to
read the effects not only as data but also as to their meaning from a
variety of points of view, including that of values. To be sure, we may
come to the conclusion that the agents' historical awareness, as well as
that of the retrospective onlookers or investigators, is broader than the
historical explanation. We may not understand all the events, or we may
not know the sum-total of the causes that brought them about. As
historical awareness on the level of the agents presupposes the breadth
of the historical process, so historical awareness on the level of retro-
spection presupposes historical awareness by the agents, which in turn
presupposes their involvement in the process. The evaluation of histori-
cal actions and their results is not "a refuge of ignorance," but an
explication or articulation of a certain aspect of historical actions and
events. These have to be viewed from the perspective of values, even
when we do not present a causal explanation of the actions and events.
Here again the Nazi period and post-Nazi reflection is a case in point.
Suppose that we cannot present a full explanation of the actions and
events, i.e., of the web of relations between the impersonal course of
history and the impact of the historical figures involved. Nevertheless,
the meaning of their actions or the results of the events are discernible,
and so is the value aspect. The destruction, the concentration camps,
158 CHAPTER 7
the wars, can all be interpreted without being fully grounded in an

exhaustive description or analysis. The value consideration is not unre-
lated to the processes but neither is it totally immersed in them.
Reflection allows and calls for distinctions, including the distinction
between explanation and evaluation, even when we entertain the cogni-
tive utopia of a full merger of all these different approaches to the
historical process and the coalescence of the different levels of historical
consciousness.
We started this exploration with the broad status of history, and
wound it up with the evaluations and values inherent in that status. This
aspect will now be analyzed in an exploration of our awareness of the
velocity of historical time, and of the impact of situations on ideologies.
CHAPTER 8
THE RHYTHM OF TIME
We now turn to a structural issue: the interpretation or experience of

time itself. We live in a historical present whose characteristic structural
feature is its accelerated pace. We experience the velocity of events. But
our experience is not confined to events in the thematic sense - political,
social, technical, etc: It is related to their position in terms of their
duration and their passage in time. 1
The situation is problematic on several counts: In the first place, the
present - meaning the historical present, not the personal present that
depends on the perception of time by single individuals - is sometimes
experienced as enduring, and sometimes as short-lived. Two German
expressions describe the personal experience of time: Langweile, (te-
dium), which connotes a prolonged time-experience, and Kurzweil
(pastime), which connotes a short one, as perceived by a person in
certain circumstances. The German expressions are apt because they
contain a reference to the time-span, unlike the French ennui or the
English "boredom."
Within the context of personal time, the objective time-sequence
provides a framework, of both succession and duration, for the response
of individuals to whatever occurs within that comprehensive framework.
The structure of personal time and its pace does not contain an inten-
tionality to the framework of succession and duration. By definition it
refers to the personal experience qua response, where the emphasis is
placed on the rhythm rather than on the thematic core of occurrences.
The present is more than an instantaneous moment: as such it could not
be perceived or interpreted, either as prolonged or as fleeting. The
present moment is fleeting by definition. The historical present is
therefore in one sense a sum-total of instants, but in another sense it h~s
a shape of its own, which is experienced as short-lived, or prolonged, or
even tedious. The present in this sense is an interpretation or a construc-
tion (though not of a theoretical or hypothetical nature) evoking a
response; thus it is an experience. Within the individual sphere we relate
to a pivotal entity - the person. The person is quasi-stable or consistent;
the experience of the different rhythms of the temporal flux are ab initio
159
160 CHAPTER 8
related to his stability. The stable person is influenced by his time

experiences, but is not totally molded by them; they are incorporated
into his stability, which is thus imbued with his experience or awareness
of the time-rhythm.
The pace of the present as a historical present refers to a different
sphere. In the historical present we refer to a span of time which, as
historical, is by definition intersubjective or public; that is to say, there
is no primary consistent person, nor identified individual persons in the
plural, involved in and responding to the rhythm of time. In a sense,
history (as well as the historical span of time under consideration)
creates the subjects out of their own resources. In their plurality these
subjects may experience time as involving them in an accelerated
process or pace. If we analyze a position in time, which is concurrently a
situation of time grounded in a construction, we may ask: in what sense
can we refer to an experience of a present, analogous to the personal
present, in terms of its slowness? To speak of the velocity of a period of
time, we must explain: (a) how certain basic events create a response
justifiably identified as characterized by the perception or interpretation
of an accelerated pace; (b) how this response is not confined to a certain
individual, but creates a style of life whose locus is the present, and
whose characteristic feature is the experience we describe as short-lived.
In this sense our exploration is indeed concerned with the Zeitgeist, in
terms of the historical present of our generation. We use the vague term
"generation" in full awareness that, in this context, it cannot have a
biological or genealogical connotation. Every historical "generation"
comprises more than one biological generation: there is both simulta-
neity and succession here. To be sure, one possible aspect of the velocity
of the historical present is the accelerated sense of succession within the
coexistence of generations. But dealing with the Zeitgeist is both
methodically and substantively rather difficult. Any analysis of a Zeit-
geist is, to use Jean Paul's metaphor, like the dissolution of the rainbow,
which leads to the discernment of the falling drops: nothing remains of
the rainbow but the drops. Analogously, an analysis of a certain passage
of time - passage both as period and as a fleeting moment - will lead to
the dismembering of a structure. The problem, then, is that we refer to a
certain structure, but at the same time assume that this structure,
though possibly constructed, is still experienced by us. In this sense we
lodge our analysis on the borderline between structures and experi-
ences, being aware of the difficulties inherent in such a position. 2
RHYTHM OF TIME 161
A present moment can be understood not only as a passing "now,"

but also as an interval between that which preceded and that which will
ensue. The very notion of an interval is already an interpretation of the
passing "now," because it relates the "now" to the background in terms
of time and to the open future horizon. When we are concerned with the
analysis of our own present we may consider the present as an interval.
Yet objectively the present always occupies that position: against the
background of succession there emerges a mode - or span - of duration
characteristic of the present. The structure and the response, which is its
correlate, may preoccupy our awareness of perception to such an extent
that the objective position of the present is obliterated by the density
and intensity of the experience and of the responses inherent in it. This
amounts to a preoccupation with our own present, which does not carry
with itself awareness of the position of that present within the broader
dimensions of time and the temporal process. We may recall Shakes-
peare in A Midsummer-Night's Dream (III, 2, 445): "My legs can keep
no pace with my desires" - a verse that epitomizes one aspect of the
forthcoming exploration. Where there is no distinction between one's
standing ("legs") and one's horizon ("desires"), we are concerned with
the present to such an extent that we experience it intensively.
The accelerating pace of history, refers both to the experience of time
(the dimensional component) and to the experience of certain events
(the material or topical components). Only a synthesis ofthe two makes
the notion of velocity plausible. To put it differently, though the notion
of velocity is bound up with the dimension of time, its associations are
carried over from the component of time to the component of events.
We experience events as taking place in an accelerated process, shaped
by the structure of time or by their relation to it. This is a kind of a
re-statement of the structure of history in general.
II
We come back to the distinction between actions and events. Actions,

as we have seen, are the facts accomplished by human beings or by the
intervention of natural occurrences like volcanic eruptions or mon-
soons, whose impact on the human sphere brings about responses or
changes in the human realm. It makes no difference whether the actions
are taken by an individual, by certain individuals accidentally gathered
162 CHAPTER 8
together, or by more definite groups of individuals. The concept of

action comprises both the initiating aspect and the occurrence. Events
are actions with an impact qua effects, results, and responses to actions
initiated. Columbus' journey to America, for instance, journey can be
understood as an action. But its impact (supposing that there is a causal
connection at stake) makes it a historical event, the discovery of the
continent, leading to the chain of events following that discovery.
Within each particular event, such as the Revolutionary or Civil War,
we may discern a multitude of actions that compose the event. By and
large, a broad designation like a revolution is understood as an event
because it comprises the actions on the one hand and the results on the
other. An event lies at a crossroads between the actions initiating it and
the impact following them. The impact can be seen both as a summation
of the past actions and as a point of departure for those to f9110w in the
future.
This resume of the multi-faceted structure of the dimension of mean-
ings inherent in events in history has been inserted here in order to
permit analysis of the notion of the velocity of events, confining
ourselves to events in the sense described. This velocity may mean a
rapid impact, that is to say, that actions have a more or less immediate
impact. They are quickly turned into events, as, for instance, decoloni-
zation as a broad historical event occurred within the rather short span
of time of the generation after World War II. The impact of that event
on both the decolonized peoples and the previous colonial powers was
also rather quick.
Since events amount to the impact of an action, the impact, viewed
from the perspective of the velocity of the process, becomes palpable
shortly after the occurrence of the action. There is no prolonged lapse of
time between the action and the impact, hardly any kind of a "grey"
interval between them. In other words, the response to actions is closely
related to their time parameter as well as to the paramount meaning of a
specific action. To use the previous example: those engaged in the
process of decolonization have grasped the occurrence, have seen its
bearing on their situation from the standpoint of both the decolonized
peoples and the ruling ones. One aspects of this quick turn from actions
to events, i.e., from the occurrence to its impact, looked at from the
perspective of response, may lie in an understanding of what is in the
actions qua events, or in the anticipation of what follows or will follow
from the actions. We can ask whether this turn is due to the accumu-
RHYTHM OF TIME 163
lated historical experience, that is to say, either we have learned from

the past that actions of a certain order becomes events, or we are aware
of the magnitude of actions. Perhaps we are more aware of the future
dimension, and are therefore more inclined to anticipate the future. In
this sense our future-orientedness elicits our response to the events
grounded in the past. We cannot say that our historical experience, in
terms of the accelerated tempo, is due only to the accumulated lessons;
it may also have something to do with realizing that the future horizon is
open, and bringing it into the scope of our present. We experience the
velocity of events - also - because we are future-oriented. This is so
even though the question may still be asked whether the future is within
our near horizon or is a distant future. Perhaps there is a correlation
between turning ourselves toward the near future, responding to the
past, and directing ourselves to the far, let alone to the eschatological
future; with the understanding that the distant future is not only un-
known but will also "take care of itself"; in this sense our response is of
little significance. There is an additional correlation to be observed, that
between the immediacy of response and its intensity: where the context
of existence becomes dominated by decolonization, new industries have
to be built in the former ruling country, which can no longer rely on raw
materials and agricultural products, on cheap manpower, or on a
dumping ground for surplus scions of the ruling elite. Concurrently
there is the impact of the event on the former colonies, which must
adjust themselves to the new situation educationally, socially, and
politically, even more so when de co Ionization WllS an aspired-for goal
and not a by-product of other events. This intensity, of a thematic or
material character, expresses itself in the pace of the chariges, and thus
contributes to and enhances the experience of velocity. Eventually the
aspect of time in the strict sense and the combination of actions and
events proper coalesce and mutually reinforce each other and can no
longer be distinguished from each other. Here too the historical process
and awareness of it approach very close to each other.
Awareness of the speed of historical events does not imply the
position of time as a formalized reference point or points. 3 Nor do we
refer in this context to another aspect of time, periodization, since we
refer not to epochs but to the experience of the course of time and all its
implications. To be sure, one could assume that awareness of speed is
grounded in the valuation of speed as an important factor in a culture as
well as in the context of individual motivation. Yet even when this
164 CHAPTER 8
grounding is seen as warranted, we may still emphasize the experiential

aspect, though it is a plausible assumption that the various aspects are
intertwined in historical consciousness. In order to shed additional light
on the issue before us and before moving to a structural analysis of our
own historical present, let us insert a comment based on some observa-
tions of J. Huizinga. 4
III
Huizinga lists the tremendous changes that were taking place in the year
1500: the Earth is being discovered; the riddle of the structure of the
universe is being solved; the church is splitting; the printing press is
operating and books proliferating in consequence; means of warfare are
becoming more destructive; the credit economy and monetary transac-
tions are spreading; classical Greek literature is being rediscovered; old
architectural forms are being scorned; art is vital and flourishing. During
the period 1789 to 1815, the following developments took place: the
central power of continental Europe succumbs to the lunacy of the
philosophers and to the fury of the mob, only to reemerge soon after
through the deeds and the good fortune of a military genius; liberty is
rung in and canonical faith discarded; Europe is being subverted and
finally patched together again; the steam engine has started puffing and
the new spinning jennies are rattling; science conquers one area after
another; the world of the spirit is being enriched by German philosophy;
life becomes more beautiful through German music; America comes of
age politically and economically, but remains a cultural infant. Summing
up, Huizinga says that in both periods the seismograph of history seems
at first glance to be showing movements as strong as those of today. But
for Huizinga this is not the case, since by his estimation in 1500 and in
1800 the foundations of society were not shaken as violently as they are
today. In retrospect, moreover, and despite the crises that characterize
them, those two periods are part of an upward development. A com-
parison of our own time with those two periods gives the impression that
the world now is undergoing more intense and more thorough changes.
Characterizing our own world in brief, Huizinga says that in our own
world, technical efficiency (Nutzejfect) rules more and more, productive
capacity increases, the potential of discovering what can be experienced
triumphs daily in new discoveries. The speed of change is entirely
RHYTHM OF TIME 165
different: what in those days was measurable by centuries seems mea-

surable to us by years.
When Huizinga sums up the historical crises of the past, he lists what
can be called pivotal events. These changed the scene of history, and
apparently pari passu historical awareness as well. Huizinga lists a
variety of events; probably the variable multitude of events - intercon-
nected or not - is supposed to have an impact on the historical process.
When he deals with the present situation, he enumerates several topical
events, two of them, efficiency and productivity in the economic sphere.
He then mentions the push towards the unknown, epitomized in scien-
tific discoveries. Yet when he mentions what he specifically calls the
tempo of the changes he makes no attempt to explore the correlation
between the topical events and the tempo, i.e., between what we called
before the thematic and the dimensional aspects. It seems plausible to
assume that there is such a correlation; perhaps the pace of cbange as
such becomes a pivotal event. Dwelling on the distinction between
events and the experience of time, we must look more closely into the
structure of the present, in order to discern this particular feature of the
"present present" in terms of its speed.
IV
An analogy to some of the pivotal events characteristic, for instance, of

1500 - such as the discovery of new continents - has to be eliminated
from the present analysis, unless we include space research as expanding
our cosmic awareness. But this expansion of our spatial horizon -
important as it may be - is grounded in our technological civilization and
the new instruments produced by it, and should therefore be included in
the broader context of the new technology.
Before we identify certain thematic or instrumental changes charac-
teristic of the modern period, we need to identify a broader aspect that
is both cause and effect of the particular modern experience of historical
time. Events are experienced in our own time; their impact is immedi-
ately visible, felt, or absorbed. The interval between action and event is
short. We are trying to identify the aspect of the velocity that enables us
to perceive the phenomenon and posit it within the context of the
historical process. We are in a situation where we do not reconstruct
events in order to realize their eventual impact. We respond to events;
166 CHAPTER 8
in a sense we experience them without the need for a distanced post

factum reflection. This shortness of interval becomes itself a pivotal
event, irrespective of the topics implied, though there is an interconnec-
tion between the topical aspect of the events and their technological
momentum, mainly through the mass-communication media. Still, re-
maining within the context of the interval between events and re-
sponses, we may say that nowadays events are more translucent than
they used to be. We do not wait to gain a historical perspective in order
to realize here and now the meaning of the events. Precisely the
abnegation or neutralization of the perspective is the background for -
or the other side of - the immediate response. The speed of historical
time, and the awareness of events and their impacts, are two aspects of
the same structure. We are more aware of what is going on, in two
senses. First, as a matter of perspective, events are interconnected and
dominate the scene, including our own behavior and responses. The
second sense is informational: we know more about what is going on
around us. We are informed about events shortly after their occurrence,
and know their details and background, whether real or spurious.
Events are literally brought home to us, and thus elicit our response.
When these two aspects of our awareness are brought together, they
change the experiential situation to the extent that we are preoccupied
with the events occurring in our immediate surroundings. We attribute
to them a greater impact. Thus the trend towards reconstructuring the
past, as grounded in and enhancing the historical perspective, is
superseded by an adherence to the present, which, because of its
character, makes reflection somewhat redundant.
To return to Huizinga's resume of the historical changes, we should
note that Huizinga speaks of two aspects - the aspect of change and the
aspect of speed. Speed can be understood as a variation of change or as
change intensified. We may refer to change retrospectively, while our
experience of speed is of a rhythm in which we are presently involved.
Hence, when we attempt to explore the rhythm of the present-day
situation with reference to our overriding experience of the velocity of
events, it might be plausible to try to identify certain pivotal events that
elicit the response qua experience of velocity. Here again we should
look at certain configurations, Gestalten, dynamic as they may be, which
combine the events with responses.
RHYTHM OF TIME 167
First let us look at one type of events which by definition carries in itself
turnover or speed. We refer to vogues and fashions, which are essen-
tially temporary, shifting in their manifestations, "modish." The chang-
ing appearance and response are inherent to fashion, since without the
response - popularity, popular esteem, or following a pattern - a vogue
is meaningless and pointless. An additional element has to be men-
tioned, namely, that vogue and fashion frequently refer to apparel.
Thus visibility is a component of a vogue and mediates between the
material ingredients of the vogue and the response to them.
We conclude at this point that the acceleration of historical events is
to some extent modelled after the transience of fashion. One of the
aspects of the contemporary economic process is the tendency to pro-
duce articles that being often and speedily replaced, keep the economic
process going, labor capacity employed, and consumption following the
changing fashion of products available what can be described as
"built-in-obsolescence" looked at from the other end. We could say
that vogue or fashion has become a paradigm of the economic and the
social process, and this statement would not be oblivious to the inner
dynamics of the ever-changing products presented to the public. There
is a connection between that character of the productive process and
consumption, on the one hand, and a basic consideration of the
economic process as such, on the other, namely, the drive towards full
employment, continuous incomes, and the avoidance of an imbalance of
supply and demand. Demand evokes supply and supply evokes demand;
thus, because the economic process brings about the obsolescence of its
own products, it brings its ever-changing products to the attention of
human beings, or even the supremacy of process over products.
We do not suppose that the experience as such, which may lead to a
certain interpretation of the events, precedes the events, nor do· we
suppose that the events precede the response. A certain experience
directs our awareness of the human situation, which in turn is reinforced
by the short-lived character of material events. This circular relation of
events and responses moves the overall climate of opinion or mood -
mood and mode - in the direction of apprehending the velocity of
events.
We opened this part of our analysis by pointing to one significant, but
only partial, aspect of the process, namely, the economic pattern. A
168 CHAPTER 8
second observation concerning components active within and respond-

ing to the process it has to be added to the profile. Again this is a
structural aspect and not a materially identified event, namely, the
active participation of younger people in the life of modern society, both
as consumers of goods and commodities and as participants in the
shaping of the general mood. It has been observed aphoristically that
young people are careless - they do not care about longevity. This is a
paradox of sorts, since, objectively, young people have an open future
before them. A long distance separates their "here and now" from what
is beyond them in the chronological sense . Yet the existence of this
future dimension does not mean that instantaneous gratifications, and
thus experiences of the here and now, are inferior to, or have to be
deferred until the emergence of, whatever lies in the future beyond the
present moment. On the contrary, we find in real life a conjunction of
the objectively extended dimension of time with the immediacy of
responses and expectations. This conjunction is perhaps one of the
contributing factors - this time from the perspective of the human strata -
to the Gestalt we are trying to outline: an intensified and acce.Jerated
sense of the present, which engineers the experience of acceleration
characteristic of the contemporary relation to the historical present.
Here we have introduced a change in the historical situation into our
analysis, because the shifting emphasis towards the younger generation
is the other side of the coin of the obsolescence of the traditional
society, which attributed priority to past generations and to the legacies
received from them. But we have not yet identified particular contem-
porary events that either intensity or enhance the experience of velocity.
This is the next step of our analysis. Broadly and schematically speak-
ing, we can say as follows: in terms of the structure of time, traditional
society adheres to duration, while modern society adheres to succession,
and is motivated by a sense of accelerated succession.
VI
"What is meant by asserting that human history has accelerated? The

inference is that what would have happened later has happened sooner;
and that changes in timing may have modified substantive development."5
Correlation of the pace with substantive or thematic developments is
characteristic of the process. The description of the phenomenon,
RHYTHM OF TIME 169
namely, that what would have happened later has happened sooner, is
in a sense just a nominal description of what we referred to as the
accelerated process. Since historical time - and time in general - are
irreversible, whatever happens can be related to the future by being
aware of future events within the horizon of the present. What events of
the past, or, to use a broader expression, what patterns of the past, in
their impact on the present, bring about that configuration of both the
substantive and the rhythmic elements?
This development has to do with the impact of the phenomenon of
achievement in modern civilization. We may say that achievement is
more than possession or ownership, because these may have only a legal
connotation. We can possess or own something without necessarily
being affected by it in our day-to-day behavior. We may take advantage
of a property at certain occasions, and this puts into effect the status of
ownership. We may forgo that advantage, and even pass the property
from one generation to the next, without integrating it into our everyday
existence and mode of behavior. This does not apply to the phenome-
non of achievement, which inherently connotes a certain position within
the context of one's own existence, as well as a concomitant experience
- the feeling of arrival or even satisfaction, the expectation before the
achievement and its evaluation and integration into one's own context
after it has come about. Unlike possession, which amounts to holding or
accepting achievement combines the effort with a result, and thus is ab
initio integrated into one's existence and pari passu one's experience.
Achievement relates to the actions taken by the individual or individuals
aimed at bringing results within the scope of his - or their - continuous
existence; the result is interwoven with the echo it elicits. Achievement
is both a process aimed at finishing an action and its completion.
Achievement implies success. Thus achievement comprises simulta-
neously the component of that which occurred, and the affirmation
evoked by the occurrence, which gives it meaning and hence significance
within one's personal orbit. In contemporary civilization there is no
need to ground achievement in the basic notion of human rights, in the
sense that the person demanding his rights interprets them as expected
achievements - responses to his demands by the world, the civilization,
and the society - and exerts himself in order to bring about those
responses. Striving for achievements is a particular human phenome-
non. Hence it is part of modern civilization, both by virtue of ideational
considerations in terms of rights and by virtue of the actual process of
170 CHAPTER 8
that civilization, which appears to be open to changes and new products.

These in turn may be incorporated into the existence of individuals,
furnishing the background for the process and experience of achieve-
ment. In achievements we find another phenomenological feature of
human experience, namely, that achievements depend on certain occur-
rences such as changes in society, the economic effects of these changes,
services offered to individuals, etc. At the same time, achievements are
not dictated by the impersonal trends of society but depend on the
achiever's anticipating those trends and changes, :iccepting them, and
even enjoying them. The experiential aspect of achievements is there-
fore enhanced and amplified by their hedonic, if not hedonistic, aspect.
A further characteristic of the phenomenon of achievement, which
does not exclusively belong to contemporary civilization, is the
broadening of the realm of achievements in terms of their direction and
motivation. Achievements are not confined to material products nor to
advancement on the social ladder . Achievement in contemporary civili-
zation includes services offered by civilization, e.g., the 'educational
structure, auxiliary instruments for education, health services, and
whatever goes with these. On the one hand there are structures like the
educational system or health services, but on the other hand these
concern individuals who are supposed to benefit from these structural
arrangements and who expect and demand them. Hence the aspect of
achievement is reinforced by the general egalitarian trend: the sum-total
of potentials available in our civilization is expected to be within the
reach of every individual in modern society. This egalitarian trend
changes the climate of opinion in modern society in the sense that the
emphasis moves from the aspect of effort inherent in the notion of
achievement to the aspect of the result to be achieved. The emphasis
shifts from equality of opportunity to equality of success - to the
end-product of the process or expectation. The end-product as such is
supposed to be offered and brought home by society or by civilization,
thus creating a new pattern for day-to-day human behavior.
In what way are these different elements of achievement pertinent to
the experience of the rate of this historical process, so that the latter
seems to gather momentum in the orientation towards achievement and
through it? In the first place it has to be observed that, if in achieve-
ments the stress is on the personal realm, people are disinclined to
postpone or to relegate the results of their efforts beyond the boundaries
of their own personal existence and to look forward to posterity, their
RHYTHM OF TIME 171
future reputation, their children, etc. The tendency is to experience

achievements here and now, and thus to accelerate the process or to
shorten the interval between the investment and the proceeds. There
emerges a correlation between the trend toward achievements and the
trend toward instantaneous gratification, which is by definition an
experience within one's lifetime, and as such becomes a force to bring
events within the horizon of the present. Obviously this trend is rein-
forced by the emphasis placed on results, since the result rather than the
effort is meant to place success within the boundaries of the individual
experience.
The drive towards achievements is not a mere invention of the
present. It is in a sense an egalitarian interpretation of the lesson of the
past. In the past certain people have been observed to enjoy achieve-
ments. What we now notice - and this seems to be a significant factor in
the acceleration of the historical present - is the universalization of the
notion and motivation of achievement, which becomes a driving factor
in the ·behavior of many individuals. More and more people, realizing
that there are two sides of the same coin want to enjoy both achieving
and experiencing the achievement. Universalization creates the broad
global climate for the centrality of achievements and related aspects in
present-day civilization. Universalization, which is here synonymous
with the egalitarian trend, can be understood as the spread or dissemi-
nation of the awareness that achievements are within reach of human
aspirations and are legitimately to be pursued. Therefore there is no
culminating satisfaction inherent in and accompanying achievements,
unlike the eudaimonia in the classical sense as an enduring state of mind
- though even the classical authors had certain r~servations about the
permanence of the state of eudaimonia. Satisfaction as an instantaneous
feeling gives rise to a continuous expectation of satisfactions and their
chain, which as such, causes the shift from a state or position to a
process. This in turn accelerates the process and the concomitant
experience of it. The emphasis does not lie on awareness qua informa-
tion about what is going on, though of course that element cannot be
absent. It lies in the awareness of what is achievable or what has been
achieved, and can thus be a universal norm or focus of expectations and
pari passu the starting point of a new jump towards the expected
achievement. The dimension of the future is open and filled by the -
ongoing - achievements. 6
172 CHAPTER 8
VII
Lasswell rightly relates the accelerated tempo and direction of world

history to the impact of the mass media. It is obvious that the mass
media spread the awareness of what is going on and thus, to use the
language employed before, shorten the interval between actions and the
awareness of their impact as events. The mass media, by disseminating
information, create an atmosphere of universality, which carries in itself
possibilities for imitation or for attempts to transplant an achievement
from one place to another. There exists, as we have seen, an interrela-
tion between the pace of achievements and their diffusion.
There is a causal connection between the mass media and the acceler-
ated pace of events not only in terms of the thematic impact of the
media on the awareness of time, but also - and parallel to that - in terms
of the affinity between their structural impact on the experience of time.
This feature can perhaps be described as the primacy of visual impres-
sions or perceptions - though by and large the same would apply to
aural impressions as well, and a fortiori to the compound of visibility
and audibility. The Biblical verse in Isaiah 42:20 comes to mind:
"Seeing many things but thou observest not." Isaiah probably had in
mind observing as adhering or following. In a broad sense we may
understand observing as paying attention or keeping in mind, and not
only keeping and adhering to a practice. In this sense the mass-media
culture creates a continuous stream of impressions in which there is little
time for the absorption - let alone interpretation - of the impressions to
allow them to leave a long-term impact on the experiencing person. The
perceptions are lively and easily taken in, but they are not lasting.
Visibility and audibility do not lead the observers to reflect on the
phenomena perceived. The phenomena with which they are presented
seem to be existential, and do not elicit an inquisitive approach. When
the mass media repeatedly present the same occurrence in slow motion,
these repetitions are only meant to intensify the impression, not to add a
dimension to our understanding of the impressions perceived. We
remain confronted by the artificially presented slow-moving phenome-
non within "the atomic action." We do not, and are not called upon, to
conceive the broader dimensions of the occurrence shown. We notice
the interrelation between the liveliness of the occurrences perceived and
their short-lived span in time. This is intensified by the structure of
audibility and visibility, that is to say, that occurrences appear before
RHYTHM OF TIME 173
our eyes or ears in quick succession. Our encounter with reality as

transmitted through the mass media elicits a sense of brevity in our
awareness of the phenomena. Their duration in time cannot be separ-
ated from the content or meaning of the preceding and following
phenomena perceived, since the next phenomenon in line is already
pushing the previously perceived one behind the scene of audibility and
visibility. In this sense awareness of accelerated time is related to our
experience of reality, which is conveyed through the media. Though the
media are supposed to make us perceive reality as it occurs, even at the
place and time of the occurrence, the mediation does not leave the
occurrences in their immanent place and time. It transforms them
through the accelerated process of the structure of the media, which
shapes our perception. The very shift from conception to perception is
already imbued with the turning of the attention to that which is
immediately given. This structure, again, is germane to some of the
other factors operating in modern culture, whose combined effect leads
to the acceleration and our awareness of it.
To be sure, one would be cautious vis-a-vis the impact of the mass
media if one were aware that media are nothing but media, that is to
say, that they do not present reality according to its inner structure but
according to the rhythm prescribed by the media qua mediators. The
immediacy is not really immediate, and we could apply here in a broad
sense Hegel's well-known saying that everything immediate is already
mediated. Any caution grounded in the awareness of the effect 'Of the
media themselves may be counter-balanced by another aspect to which
we referred before, namely, the shift from actions to effects. That shift
has the paradoxical consequence that we are immediately aware of the
impact of actions qua historical events. Thus we are in one sense carried
away by impressions and perceptions, but are at the same time histori-
cally conscious in the sense of being aware of the consequences of the
occurrences. This combination of the perceptive and the historical
aspects became paramount, and we can say even visible, in the impact
the Vietnam War and its visible availability in everyone's home through
the media, and mainly television, had on American society and its
political climate .
. We should not attribute to one aspect or structure of the present-day
historical situation and the experience of time referring to it an exclusive
effect insofar as the experience of the velocity of the process goes. Only
when we notice the impact of several components, each with its own
174 CHAPTER 8
rhythm, but which can be combined to produce an impact with a

comprehensive structure, can we understand that we live in a historical
situation where certain thematic or material developments are inter-
twined with certain responses. The fact that these aspects appear
together can serve as a point of departure for an attempt to understand
the historical situation of the present in which the understanding is
explicated both from within the situation and from the perspective of an
observer. A phenomenology of history is reinforced by a phenomeno-
logical approach to the structures and phenomena composing it.
The tempo of the present is not a given fact or structure. It involves
the response of human beings existing in the present, who by their
responses may accelerate or retard the tempo. The aspect of duration is
superseded, and, as Hegel observed in the context of his own present,
there is no more respect (Ehrfurcht, the word Hegel used is a stronger
expression) before that which exists; men seek to maintain the validity
of its own will. 7 Hegel discerned in this tendency the prevalent emphasis
of the subjectivistic position as expressed in "the standpoint of con-
science". One may also trace a line of continuity from this emphasis on
conscience to what is today viewed as authenticity. The affinity between
this mood and the awareness of the pace of time as a process as
opposed to a mere instantaneous situation helps us appreciate the
difference between that which is immediate and "spontaneous authen-
ticity" and that which "takes time," i.e., the process.
The exploration of the status of ideologies within the process of time -
and vis-a-vis time - may shed son;te additional light on the volatile
conjunction of time and meaning.
CHAPTER 9
THE SETTINGS AND IDEOLOGIES
We have employed the terms "determination," "determining," "to be

determined," etc. in various contexts. The terms connote the strict
sense of being causally conditioned up - or down - to "softer" versions
of being related, posited etc.
Ideologies have been presented as formulated structures of ideals
related, that is, determined, by historical situations. Hence it is appro-
priate to wind up our analysis with a closer examination of the impact of
historical situations on ideologies, their contents, and directions. In this
analysis of the relationship between ideology and history we shall
attempt to describe the possible impact of the historical process on the
formulation of the specific contents of ideologies, as well as the position
of ideology, within the historical dimension of a society.
Let us begin with some observations about the concepts to be employed

- first, the concept of ideology. It is essential to observe that the
formulation of this concept implies an aspect of determination by factors
that do not belong to the realm of ideas. The concept of ideology is not
related to the classic Greek ideologia - a private opinion or thought
(from the root idios) - but to the notion of "idea" and its transforma-
tions. The concept is loaded with a sensualist or empiricist nuance.
When Destutt de Tracy introduced the term he was influenced by the
sensualist position, which saw ideas as deriving from basic urges or
directions of human nature, like feelings or desires, and physical exis-
tence in general. It is reasonable to conjecture that Thomas Jefferson
adduced his own concept of ideology from the French milieu with which
he was familiar.
But even when we go beyond determination by the physiological
infrastructure of human existence to the concept as understood, for
instance, in Marx and in historical materialism in general, the emphasis
on the secondary aspect of ideology has been retained. This secondary
aspect implies determination of the ideology by social-historical condi-
tions and these are essentially economic. Economic activity is taken as
175
176 CHAPTER 9
the primary factor in activizing and guiding the historical process, and
thus in shaping the response to or understanding of that process, not
only in the past but also towards the future: attempts to shape the
process are therefore basically guided by the economic infrastructure.
Ideological guidance is thus itself guided by an extra-ideological infra-
structure inherent in the economic sphere. The significance of this view
lies in its central position, i.e., that since economic existence is the basic
factor in the existence of every human being, it is by the same token a
social factor. Society absorbs into its structure and processes the pre-
sence and impact of this factor, which in turn is not confined to existence
in the limited sense of the term. The economic factor is not like the
physiological, which by its essence and locus is confined to the realm of
individuals as physiological or psycho-physical entities. The economic
factor, as the basic concern of every human being because it concerns
his subsistence, is a historical factor, in terms of both the synchronic and
diachronic dimensions of society. In that position, the determinative
relationship between ideology and the basic infrastructure remains the
same as in the sensualist interpretation of the concept of ideology; that
is to say, there is a dependence of the concepts and ideas on the
infrastructure.
There are evidently many difficulties inherent in this structure, arising
from the dialectical milieu in which it was formulated. However, for our
present purposes we need not discuss these difficulties. In addition, it
must be taken into account that the economic sphere has its own
structure and cannot be reduced to one factor, as could be done with the
sensualist infrastructure. We are of course referring to the distinction
between the powers of production and its relations or conditions, a
distinction that in itself represents an essential feature of this whole
structure, namely, that the economic sphere is not one-dimensional, and
its impact must reflect the inter-relation between its component ele-
ments. Nevertheless, we must emphasize that the forms of conscious-
ness determined by the economic infrastructure are understood as
implying the appearance (Schein) of independence, as Marx put it.
Because of Marx's influence, we can say that the precarious indepen-
dence of ideology has become the feature most commonly attributed to
it. Moreover, in addition to Marx's impact on the formulation and
interpretation of the concept, the impact of the nature of the ideology as
such became significant. This is the case for instance in Karl Mann-
heim's interpretation of the concept of ideology, where the emphasis is
SETTINGS AND IDEOLOGIES 177
on the position of one's thinking, and the connection between that

position and the formulation of the thought-content. The conjunction of
the concepts of ideology and utopia is relevant. Utopia represents a
vision that goes beyond prevailing circumstances, while if the concept of
ideology is brought into the discussion it too is seen to transcend the
present. Yet determination by circumstances emphasizes that tran-
scending the present in the direction of the future does not imply the
absence of determination by factors of and in the present.
II
We must now briefly consider the subject of society, and especially the
relationship between it and economic factors. Society, broadly inter-
preted, connotes the modes of co-existence between human individuals.
Society may and does mold co-existence, but it always presupposes it
both factually as well as conceptually. The notion of society in this sense
is a broad one; any distinction - as, for instance, between community
and society - is not relevant in identifying the position of society as a
mode of co-existence. If we take society in this broad sense, we may
interpret it as connoting the family, the relation between parents and
their progeny; the structures of relations based on occupation; or a
people in the historical or linguistic sense of the term, and the manifes-
tations of co-existence in statehood and its various attributes. We may
ask: if the structure of the society is the determining factor of an
ideology, to what societal context are we referring? Thus, for instance,
is ideology conditioned by the broad dimensions of human co-existence,
or by the limited ones? This question emerges when we refer to the
determination of ideology by economic existence because - to return to
the family - the modern family can be understood as a consumer entity,
while society as a whole is both a productive entity and also a sum-total
of consumers. Moreover, when we refer to the distinction between
forces and relations of production we refer to a context that clearly goes
beyond co-existence within a family. Hence an attempt to identify
society as having a determining impact on ideology presupposes a
conceptual interpretation of society. This observation leads us to con-
sider whether society can be understood as an existence without presup-
posing its uninterrupted self-identification. Such an identification is not
possible without the continuous intervention of individuals and their
178 CHAPTER 9
reflection 1 - to come back to the impact of individuals on the processes,

the topic explored previously.
When ideology is seen in the context of determination by historical
circumstances, we discern the affinity between that interpretation and a
relativistic interpretation - which is an evaluation of any binding norma-
tive approach to existence or to reality. Hence some of the doubts that
arise concerning relativism are also relevant in considering the concept
of ideology.
III
It is in this context that we may suggest some doubts about the notion of
determination, affecting what we may call again the positional as well as
the thematic aspects of ideology.
The first point, concerning the positional aspect, is obvious. Even
when we admit an interpretation of ideology in terms of determination
by circumstances, it still remains an interpretation of reality or exis-
tence. The interpretative aspect comprises several components. Ideol-
ogy is not a "photocopy" of any reality, since it contains by definition a
kind of contractive selection of the aspects of reality that are interpreted
in the ideological context. Suppose that we devise an ideology based on
the motivation of Jmman behavior and acts, and in this context we
emphasise the religious or economic motivation. In order to present a
position related to motivation we must perform some cognitive steps; in
the first place we must identify that stratum of the motivation which is
the nucleus of the ideology at stake. Such an identification calls for an
understanding or awareness of the theme of the stratum, namely -
coming back to our examples - what is a religious motivation or what is
an economic motivation, and why do we shift - whether we articulate
this or not - from emphasizing the religious motivation to emphasizing
the economic one. If we limit ourselves to a certain type of religion, one
that negates the reality of the terrestiallevel of human existence, or one
that admits the relative independence of that existence by limiting our
relation to transcendence to the notion of creation - .the variety of
different religious views is bound to lead us beyond the religious posi-
tion integrated into a certain ideology. When we identify a motivation as
religious we are recognizing a dimension that is not identical with a
particular religious interpretation, and at the same time placing this
interpretation in a context that is broader than its own thematic nucleus.

The same applies, with all due differences, to an ideology that refers to
the economic infrastructure of human behavior. Such an ideology goes
beyond the differences between, for instance, the feudal and capitalist
systems. It is obliged to define the differences between systems or eras
of the historical process within the context of the components of an
economic structure, such as the differences between powers and rela-
tions of production. To put it differently, in order to identify an infra-
structure as occupying a permanent position in the historical process, it
is essential to define the permanent features of that infrastructure, and
thus to abstract or go beyond the data of the process as they first appear.
Hence we may say that every ideology is an interpretation, and that as
such it presupposes the identification of the stratum integrated in it as
well as of the relevant features of that stratum.
Hence to some extent the formulation of an ideology presupposes a
conception of the given reality on the one hand and a kind of an ideal
type of ideology on the other. These interpretative components of an
ideology cannot be reduced to determination by the structure inter-
preted by the ideology.
IV
Our first conclusion is that the interpretative attitude inherent in any

ideology is not itself a consequence of the ideology. An interpretative
attitude presupposes both a reflective attitude and reference to exis-
tence or reality. The reference to reality in turn presupposes awareness
of differences between the realms of reality and of ideology, even for
those who assume that ideology depends upon circumstances. Such
reference implies an awareness of the difference e.g. between nature
and history or between cosmos and society. The determination does not
arise from a process, since the realms at stake are constant, and
therefore to be discerned in their constant structure. They are open to
awareness or identification guided by the principle of tru.th, and are not
determined by circumstances. Only those realms that are essentially
open to changes, that is, realms of a historical character, can be viewed
as presenting a determining position for an ideology. Hence ideology, as
formulation in the thematic sense, presupposes a broader view of reality
than that expressed in the ideology itself, even when we grant the
180 CHAPTER 9
incorporation of the components of the surrounding ahistorical reality.

For instance, an ideology takes for granted the presence of worldly
existence, in either the religious or the economic sense of the term.
Among the means of production we obviously include natural resour-
ces. Their content and position are identified by science or technology
(the latter relying on the findings of the former). In this sense identifica-
tion of the means of production cannot be detached from a non-
ideological interpretation. An ideological interpretation thus presup-
poses not only that which is beyond itself, but also an interrelation
between the extraneous aspects and those immanent in the concept of
ideology. Hence ideology presupposes not only the reflective attitude as
such but also the substantive elements of the reflective attitude.
v
We can now take a further step in discerning the non-ideological aspects
contained in an ideology. The first is justification. An ideology, though
presenting itself as determined by circumstances, is intended to be valid,
or at least partially so, in terms of the circumstances first identified and
then recognized as having a determining position. The ideology of
historical materialism is a clear case in point. It attempted to identify the
rhythm of economic existence and to predict the outcome of the eco-
nomic process. Prediction by definition refers to future circumstances,
which are meant to be not only circumstances in the objective sense of
the term but also to possess the ability to verify the ideology that refers
to them. Justification is a broader concept than the particular ideology
in question, since justification applies also to the identification of events
or data in nature. Perhaps in this sphere the concept of justification is
formulated and transferred from the primary context to other contexts.
It is obvious that, even in a theoretical reference to data, when we deal
with justification or verification we must distinguish between different
data - those that can be taken as relevant for the verification, and those
that can be set aside. If this is so in the theoretical sphere, then it is a
fortiori so in the ideological attitude: To justify or verify the attitude
presented by an ideology we must justify both the outcome and also our
choice of these particular data rather than others. Suppose that the
capitalist system includes affluent periods; to justify the ideology implies
that affluence cannot be taken as nullifying the prediction, but only as an

episode containing in itself the ensuing impoverishment predicted by the
ideology. Precisely because the reference is to historical data, the
historical process, open towards the future, enables us to look for
justification beyond the data already present, and to discern in them the
seeds of new data that will provide justification of the prediction. The
proposition refers to the structure of the historical process itself in terms
of its open-endedness, and also in terms of the impact of that openness
on the data, whether they have to be read as they stand or as dynami-
cally containing seeds of the process that will change their present
character. These aspects, whether interrelated or contradictory, must be
presupposed by the ideological concept when it is intended to be
justified by certain events, and when that justification-to-come is inhe-
rent in the ideology.
VI
Another aspect concerns a certain interpretation of the justitication.

Ideologies are not only theoretical attitudes; they are not confined to the
discernment of the data or facts as they are. They are meant to direct an
intervention in the course of events. That intervention in turn contains
two components: one is the attitude of intervention, and the other is its
direction. Intervention presupposes a distance between intervening
human beings and the surrounding circumstances or reality in which
they intervene. Even when we follow the deterministic line in interpret-
ing ideologies, and admit that the intervening attitude implying distance
is itself determined by circumstances, we still face the well-known
dilemma of explaining misinterpretation of the intervening attitude by
what is a proper reading of reality. There is a short-sightedness here
even when it can be explained, that is, human beings intervene in reality
against the background of distance even when there is no thematic
distance. Yet this concession to the ideological bias cannot be fully
maintained, since we must distinguish again between the aspect of
attitude and the component of the subject-matter or theme. Even when
we grant that thematically we are determined by circumstances, for in-
stance that we interfere in the economic process because economic circum-
stances are humanly the most prominent and pressing, the essential
182 CHAPTER 9
component of the attitude, i.e., facing circumstances from a certain

distance, cannot be eliminated. By and large we can say that the
difference between the component of attitude - the positional compo-
nent - and the component of the subject-matter to which the attitude
refers - the thematic component - must be maintained in spite of the
ideological interpretation, because it is presupposed by that interpreta-
tion. Ideology by definition is meant to intervene in historical reality or
guide intervention in it. But that reality presupposes the basic capacities
of human beings, which in turn are presupposed by the historical
process and by a certain reading of that process.
Ideology is meant to intervene in circumstances. That intervention is
related to certain principles, for instance to the principle of equality or
freedom, freedom in general or national independence in particular,
etc. Ideologies are meant to guide the intervention in order to change
the circumstances and implement certain principles in the process of
change. Even when the principles take a concrete shape, for instance,
that equality is not of an inter-individual character but of an intercollec-
tive one, becoming manifest when a certain group of human beings
attempts to reach collective independence equal to the collective inde-
pendence inherent in the existence of other groups; or when freedom in
terms of the capacity to decide one's own fate is of an individual
character vis-a-vis economic circumstances, and collective freedom is
taken as an instrument for the sake of individual freedom - these are
relations to a certain range of principles as well as attempts to imple-
ment these principles in the circumstantial context. We must further
distinguish an additional quality of these principles that can guide action
and be implemented in a structure of circumstances. What is the
difference between the principle of truth and the principle of freedom or
equality or respect for human beings? Can the principle of truth guide
an ideology, or are only those principles with a meaning in terms of the
conditions of human existence capable of guiding ideologies or being
incorporated in them? Even when ideologies are taken as being deter-
mined by circumstances they must be seen in a broader context, that is
to say, in reference to principles or to the choice of certain principles
that appear to have the built-in character of a possible guide to human
actions. Hence what is valid vis-a-vis the historical process in general is
valid also concerning ideologies in the process.
VII
We shall now deal with some of the basic aspects of ideology in an

attempt to analyze several structural issues. We are referring to the
socio-political direction of the concept, and not to its basic meaning as a
continuation of the data of sensuality. In the first place, we are con-
cerned with the meaning of the concept of interests, since they are
considered to be the basic factor in construing a conception about
society or the historical process. Then we shall ask specific questions
about the notion of determination, since this notion is attributed to
interests and their influence in general and on ideologies in particular.
The concept of ideology, as formulated mainly within the Marxist
context, probably contains a reversal of Hegel's concept of the Zeitgeist.
Hegel says that political history, art, and religion do not give rise to
philosophy, nor is philosophy their basis. All of them, including philo-
sophy, have a common root in the spirit of the time. 2 The essence of this
notion is that it regards a period of history or a period in time as a
whole, entailing all the various manifestations of creativity. There is no
inherent causal relationship between these various manifestations, nor
one predominant factor. The concept of ideology - and it seems plausi-
ble to assume that Marx's critique of Hegel's statements was significant
in that context - is an attempt to alter the structure of the relation
between the various expressions of human creativity, and to attribute to
one level within the historical process a prevailing significance vis-a-vis
the other manifestations.
This impact centers on the interest or interests that concern every
class in the society, operating within the historical process. In terms of
the future structure of society, the proletariat is the dominant force. But
what are interests? How can they be viewed as a basic causative factor in
shaping the process? A look at the transformations of the concept shows
unequivocally that the locus of interests, and concurrently their mean-
ing, has changed within the process of modern history. Thus, for
instance, even when the concept is understood to mean an advantage or
a possible advantage, the fact that it can be used in relation to states
allows the distinction, between or juxtaposition of private commodity
and public concern, commodum privatum and negotium publicum. The
distinction between the private or personal and the public orbit suggests
a possible superiority, either in favor of the public area or redounding to
one's personal advantage. It is no accident that this component of
184 CHAPTER 9
advantage or benefit has led to the interpretation of interests in terms of

egoism or pursuit of private goals. Because interest has been seen in this
context, some moral philosophers have treated virtues as contradicting
interests. To be sure, the aspect of concern implied in the primary
notion of interest is expanded when it is said, for instance, that there is a
moral interest that is a part of virtue. We find this shift in Rousseau even
before Kant. In Marx we find the notion that interests express the life
situation, and can thus be an expression of a person's class situation.
This is already a shift from the self-enclosed personal aspect to a
collective one, and at the same time an attempt to attribute to the
collective locus of the interest the determining position vis-iI-vis the
various manifestations of human creativity. Instead of Hegel's whole,
the "storey structure" (Unterbau-Uberbau) is brought into prominence
thus placing the motivation of interests in a primary position, while the
various manifestations of creativity become subservient to them.
But if this is so, and the position of interest as a primary causal factor
is assumed, we must ask how interests work and how they exert their
impact. The accepted usage of the term "being determined," as applied
to interests, is more a verbal than a conceptual assertion. Do interests
affect human creativity and behavior as a cause does, in the normal
sense of the term? Is there a necessity in the succession of effects caused
by interests? It is difficult to accept this interpretation in the context of
the historical process, since the shift to history imposes on the relation
between cause and effect the whole complex structure of this process.
Can we assume that determinateness, as fixed in a particular direction,
can be asserted within the historical process once we can not deny that
human beings are present in that process? Even when people are
immersed in a collective complexity, determinateness (as directing in a
fixed mode) passes through their consciousness. The aspect of con-
sciousness does not emerge only when interests are understood, in the
Marxian sense, as interests for themselves, as distinguished from inter-
ests in themselves. Consciousness is already present in the channel
between the situation in life and the formulation, vague as it may be, of
the interests. The acceptance of interests is a human response, even
when we attribute to them a prevailing impact on the human orienta-
tion, because interests are understood to be located in the social sphere.
They are not like urges or impulses in the unconscious sense of these
terms, as used in psychoanalysis; no causal position can be attributed to
them unless we assume an interaction between situations and responses.
Response is not meaningless, but refers to a situation molded by

interests; and interests are not, for instance, a matter of climate, but are
by definition part of a human context and thus express reciprocity
between the situation and the awareness of it. Even when we assume
that the situation is the major, or even the only, "determining" factor,
the position of awareness and its major elements cannot be ignored.
It is not enough to be conscious of this structural aspect. Interests that
allegedly determine human behavior are meant to lead towards the
future, and thus to shape the future in a certain pattern. Can we assume
that awareness of the future inheres in interests as an embracing situa-
tion, or is awareness rather a manifestation of human intentionality
towards situations, whatever they may be? Thus human awareness turns
a situation into a determining factor, or, less dogmatically, modifies and
directs it towards the future. The aspect of direction and the aspect of
impact thus become interrelated; hence no exclusive position can be
attributed to a single aspect of the structure. Broadly speaking, neither
what goes by the common name of an idealistic or a materialistic
interpretation of ideology can do justice to the correlation implied in the
structure, since each bestows preference on only one of the correlated
aspects. We can say that the materialistic interpretation of ideology is a
kind of reaction to Hegel's interpretation of the whole. The demarca-
tion line between reaction and over-reaction is rather thin, however.
VII
The question arises whether a less extreme presentation of the concept

of ideology, like Mannheim's, is more congenial to our concern. Mann-
heim refers to a modern theory of knowledge, taking account of the
relational as distinct from the merely relative character of historical
knowledge. His theory starts with the assumption that there are spheres
of thought in which it is impossible to conceive of absolute truth existing
independently of the various positions of the subject and unrelated to
the social context. To emphasise this point Mannheim says: "Even a god
could not formulate a proposition on historical subjects like 2 X 2 = 4,
for what is intelligible in history can be formulated only with reference
to problems and conceptual constructions which themselves arise in the
flux of historical experience." Mannheim says further that knowledge,
seen in the light of the total conception of ideology, is by no means an
186 CHAPTER 9
illusory experience, because ideology is a relational concept, not an

illusion. "Knowledge arising out of our experience in actual life situa-
tions, though not absolute, is knowledge nonetheless .... Relationism
signifies merely that all of the elements of meaning in a given situation
have reference to one another and derive their significance from this
reciprocal interrelationship .... When the social situation changes, the
system of norms to which it has previously given birth ceases to be in
harmony with it.,,3
Does relationism signify a return to the notion of the whole, as
implied in Hegel's concept of the spirit of time? After all, the inter-
dependence between various manifestations or interpretations of his-
torical situations becomes obsolete when the situations change. When
new data are discovered, established scientific theories must change in
order to confront these data or incorporate them into the fabric of
existing theory. There is no awareness that is not relational. If relation-
ism is meant to emphasize the transitional position of a conceptual
presentation, then the very denial of the absolute validity of such a
presentation leads to the assertion of its relational aspect. The distinc-
tion between situation, awareness, and formulation by awareness refer-
ring to situation, maintains the relational structure and also structure as
such. Here we must look into an additional aspect of the accepted
interpretations of ideologies, namely their instrumental validity, which
is to some extent implied by Mannheim when he says that the validity of
norms of knowledge depends upon the given frame of thought, whether
that dependence is interpreted as a causal dependence or as a vague
relational context.
We can thus conclude, if only tentatively, that the notion of determi-
nation within the historical context, and more specifically in terms of
historical actions and ideologies, is ambiguous, due to the presence of
interpretation within an vis-a-vis the historical process. Interpretation is
based on reflection, and thus cannot be represented as determined by
the process. We can say that the position of interpretation is not an
outcome of the process, even when we assume for the sake of argument
that the themes of interpretation are identified because of their presence
in the process.
VIII
We arrive at a further question, namely, the meaning of ideology in the

historical context, and especially for Marx. Marx makes a distinction
between conditions of production, which can be determined with the
precision of natural science, and the various thematic systems, such as
law, politics, religion, aesthetics, or philosophy, in which man becomes
conscious of the conflicts within the economic sphere and works them
out. Consciousness is to be explained as arising from the contradictions
of material life. 4 There is no need to expand this broad description of
consciousness, since systematically and terminologically it must be
located more in the interpretative than the thematic area. Within the
thematic interpretations or projections of the material conditions of
production, all the above forms are listed under the heading of ideology.
Hence we are bound to ask what makes these forms ideological, and
how the division into law, politics, philosophy, etc., comes about, if they
are all determined by the precisely identifiable conditions of production,
which are the general or generic cause.
Let us first distinguish between manifestations of the material histori-
cal context, in terms of projection into a transcendent sphere, and
manifestations that are of a normative or interpretative character.
Projections into the sphere of transcendence are hypostases as present
in religion; and here Marx followed Feuerbach. But even so, he had to
distinguish between the sphere and the content. Suppose, that the
content is a projection of aspirations or wishes in the direction of their
fulfilment. What is lacking on the level of a~pirations and wishes is
pictured as being accomplished on the level of projection. As long as we
remain within the correlation between wishes and their content we can
say that, since wishes are meant to be fulfilled, the wish as such leads to
presuming its own fulfilment. (To use a more recent analogy, the
fulfilment would be like that in dreams, according to Freud.) But this
leads us to the conclusion that fulfilment occurs within the transcendent
sphere, i.e., that of divine reality. The question arises: how does the
aspiration as such lead beyond itself to a sphere beyond its own opera-
tion? We may ask further whether the conjunction between the content
of the wish and the transcendent reality can be explained by the driving
factor of the wish as such. This question refers in the first place to
Feuerbach, and thus also to Marx.
188 CHAPTER 9
We may go one step further. Suppose that the material conditions

underlie the wishes and suppose that they underlie the various forms
listed by Marx: Where do we find the explanation of the multiplicity of
forms - those directed to guiding human and social reality (like legal and
political systems), those that represent isolated modes of creativity
(aesthetics), and those that are directed towards various spheres of
principles and reality (philosophy)? Let us consider the philosophical
manifestation. Suppose we argue that Kant's philosophy is essentially an
interpretation of the French Revolution and its impact, based on the
central assumption that human beings legislate the world for them-
selves. Kant's philosophy would then be regarded as a philosophical
translation or projection of the basic theme of the French Revolution,
namely, the representation of human sovereignty as inherent in and
stemming from human existence. Suppose further that we see the
French Revolution as determined by empirical changes in human exis-
tence and ultimately in conditions of production. Granting for the sake
of argument these two assumptions, we may still ask about the specific
meaning of that determination. First, how is it that legislation in Kant's
sense is attributed to understanding and to reason and not to human
beings in the empirical sense of that term, beings involved in the process
of encountering the material conditwns of their existence? Is this a
projection in the sense of fulfilment? The empirical human beings did
not solve the problems related to their material productions, and the
French Revolution, as an event that elevated human sovereignty deter-
mined by material conditions, failed to achieve its aim. Does this mean
that Kant's attribution of autonomous human legislation to understand-
ing and reason represents a pseudo-fulfilment of something that failed
on the level of empirical socio-political existence? Here we must be
aware that the distinction between understanding and reason was not
invented by Kant. It is part of the philosophical tradition, both termino-
logically and systematically. We must broaden the scope of the historical
context in which Kant's philosophy was formulated, since it specifically
refers to science in the modern sense of the term. The problem is
therefore to identify the relation between understanding and reason
vis-a.-vis nature and vis-a-vis human existence in history, in the political
sphere, in international relations, etc. Perhaps the projected character
of the autonomous legislation would serve as a pseudo-satisfaction
against the fact of disappointment because of the failure of the French
Revolution, if it were expanded to entail various manifestations vis-a-vis
nature but were at the same time confined to the sphere of social and
political existence. Or perhaps it should be assumed that the larger the
scope of fulfilment the greater will be the satisfaction, even though
expansion of the sphere may reduce its intensity.
Furthermore, if we take Kant's notion of legislation as our point of
departure, we cannot ignore a major aspect of his system, the primacy
of practical reason. The legislation of reason, important in understand-
ing nature, is still more prominent in ethics, which by definition does not
refer to nature. If this is so, then the ethical sphere, which contains the
norms of human behavior, is closer to human sovereignty, in the
non-empirical sense of that term, than science is. What are the conse-
quences of this shift for Kant's system? Can we retain the view that this
system is a projection of aspirations in the direction of human sover-
eignty on the socia-political level? If this were so, the projection would
be so grandiose as to lose its alleged raison d'etre, since it is fulfilled in
the sphere of practical reason.
We may now ask the question already suggested: how do we arrive at
the difference between knowledge and ethics? Is this distinction also
grounded in material conditions? Or is the thematic difference between
what I know and what I ought to do perhaps an extrapolation of the
difference between various approaches to reality and, by the same
token, between various interpretations or interpretations of interpreta-
tions.
An additional issue is related to the difference between major philo-
sophical systems. How is it that Hegel did not present knowledge and
norms of human behavior in terms of legislation, but in terms of
exposition of what is latent in the data? Rationality in Hegel is not the
imposition of forms on data, or on urges, but the identity between data
and reason, an identity that is explicated rationally (in terms of Ver-
nun!t) within the context of various modes of behavior, reality, pro-
cesses, etc. Why doesn't Hegel interpret the French Revolution as a
philosopher of human sovereignty, instead of as a philosopher of the
identity between human beings and the world. Hegel was interested in
the French Revolution,S and the distance in time between him and Kant
is not so great that his system should be viewed as determined by a new
era in human history and by the factors and causes shaping it. These are
questions of a structural and empirical character, intended to demon-
strate that presenting various modes of human interpretative creativity
as ideologies is a sort of replacement of Hegel's notion of "the spirit of
190 CHAPTER 9
time"; they also point to the alleged secondary thematic position of

these interpretations, which relate to a common infrastructure rather
than to one another. This "over-ideologization" of various modes of
creativity is suspect, but has been adopted in the process of depicting
these modes as ideologies. We may sum up by saying that we are unable
to define the various modes as ideologies unless we over-ideologize. The
question about the nature of ideology remains to be asked even within
the context of ideologies, let alone within the broad spectrum of human
creativity.
IX
Since we are concerned with how ideology focuses on aspects of socio-

historical reality and guides human intervention, ideology in the sense
of building transmundane hypostases is ab initio excluded. Ideologies in
the socio-historical sense do not imagine a fulfilment of human interests
and desires with the goal of building an extra-terrestrial reality. They
wish to shape reality in accordance with the interaction between the
needs and solutions of their inherent problems. Hence the status of
ideologies between needs and solutions is instrumental, not hypostatic.
This position of ideologies, which also shapes their content, requires
that we look at their instrumental justification and character. What is
the meaning of "instrument" in this context? We cannot assume that the
created instruments are an extension of already existing ones, as a
hammer is. Ideologies cannot be separated from the level of ideas, that
is, from certain conceptual identifications, and, to use the term "deter-
mination" loosely, they are determined by the insfrastructure of ideas.
The manifold nature of ideologies comes to the fore when we see
economic needs as promoting the formulation of an ideology and its
application to problem-solving. Why have economic needs been taken
as a primary stratum upon which ideologies have been erected? Eco-
nomic needs - or even economic plight -.are identified as primary needs
(let us call them causes) because the economic infrastructure is iden-
tified as the other side of the coin of human subsistence. The economic
aspects are a sort of intermediary stratum between the physical or
organic level of human reality and behavior and its modes in the social
realms of that reality. The primary aspect of the economic stratum is
due to its position vis-a.-vis the basic existence and presence of human
beings within the context of their multiple reality. Organisms cannot

exist in the literal sense of that word without the subsistence provided,
not by given natural resources, but by an activity of an economic
character, producing the materials necessary for subsistence and mutual
exchange between the producing human beings who are thus both
producers and consumers. Subsistence is therefore embedded in the
network of inter-human relations; on that primary level there is already
a sort of a structure. Human beings can be understood as driven by the
need or urge inherent in that structure, which is evidently of a dynamic
character. Since we represent the impact of that structure as inherent in
primary needs, or in an activity related to them, we can say that the
economic stratum is a social projection of primum vivere. Yet vis-a-vis
that primary stratum an identification is essential, because people, even
when driven by needs and urges, are interpreting beings. To put it
differently, the structure of human existence as a Gestalt cannot be set
aside even when a certain mode of this existence is identified as primary.
Primacy defines the force of the impact, but does not exclude the profile
of human beings as able to respond to the impact and as integrated into
the whole structure of their existence, both on the individual and the
collective level. Here again we must distinguish between the interpreta-
tive attitude as such and the thematic focus of that attitude on primary
needs and urges.
Now we can take a further step. Ideologies are not meant to be
descriptions of reality. They are intended to be guides, and thus instru-
ments. When we speak about identifications of strata of reality we can
assume a difference between identifications as s~atements and identifica-
tions as calling for certain solutions. This difference can apply to various
structures of socio-economic reality, including rather complex structures
such as the capitalist system, the various distinctions between the forces
of production and the distribution of production, the distinction be-
tween classes on the basis of their position within the complexity of
production, and the anticipation and prediction of future events. The
far-reaching assumption that the problems inherent in the needs ofthe
proletariat contain the basis for their solution and also lead to the
solution by the process itself is an identification of reality in its dialecti-
cal structure. Such an identification can be regarded as a mode of
interpretation, whether or not the process of reality vindicates the
interpretation. The Gestalt of the identification has a meaning that can
be separated from the element of verification. Even when we grant not
192 CHAPTER 9
only the primary aspect of economic existence but also the monopolistic
impact of that interpretation of it the identification of the primary with
that which occupies a monopolistic status is an identification of an
interpretative character, underlying the ideology and built into it.
Once we assume that instrumental position of ideologies, we must ask
whether the instrument will necessarily remain within its primary con-
text as a device built for the sake of the driving force initially inherent in
the structure. Here we touch on the interpretation of ideologies not as
formulations of guiding principles to bring about a solution, but as a sort
of pseudo-fulfilment, without reaching the extremist view of them as
extra-worldly projections. Empirically speaking, socio-historical reality,
though primarily related to subsistence, is characterized by the existence
of different ideologies. Nationalistic ideologies, religious ideologies, and
others, are all part of the spectrum of human existence, even when, in
terms of a motivational interpretation, we attribute primacy to one of
them. Hence when a variety of ideologies is present, the causal relation
between ideologies and the elementary level of human existence does
not prescribe adherence to one particular ideology because of its sug-
gested relation or affinity to the primary level.
The experience of modern or post-modern history illustrates this
complex network of relations between ideologies. When peoples of the
Third World preferred national independence over their involvement in
a network of imperialist modes of domination they were often dismiss-
ing the economic benefits of belonging to an imperialist structure. It can
be said that such a preference does not negate the primary position of
the economic infrastructure: it is merely a temporary preference, meant
to enable the creation of a new economic infrastructure that will lead to
a new mode of interaction between the economic level and the encom-
passing structure. Such a temporary regrouping of motivations and goals
is possible because the primary aspect of subsistence is not as unambi-
guous as it may appear. What is subsistence of the organism: is it
satisfaction of its elementary needs such as food and drink? Does it also
include shelter? How are these needs ramified or refined? Where do we
draw the line between the urge for subsistence in the primary sense of
the term and the dynamic and developing aspects that rder to refined
needs leading to refined satisfaction? Precisely at this point we become
aware of the difference between organic satisfaction and the socio-
cultural aspects of the materials and products invented and imported for
the sake of satisfaction. If we remain within the primary sphere we are
bound to be guided by the limits of organic existence in the physical- or

medical- sense of that term. There is a limit to medical intervention,
which can promote longevity but not immortality. In economic activity
there is, at least empirically speaking, no limit to intervention, because
there is no limit to "refinement of refinement." Production goes beyond
primary needs, and consumption is not limited to primary absorption by
the organism of produce or product. Hense we may refer to an aliena-
tion within the process of production and consumption or - to use a
gentler term - to the independent momentum of the process, while
granting that the roots of the process exist on the primary level.
If this is so, then the preference given to one line or channel of
ideology over another is less determined by the primary stratum than
may appear when we adopt the view of that stratum's primary impact.
Hence the broader structure of the socio-historical aspect of human
existence is open to various interpretations, and thus also to various
ideologies. Our example of the possible contrast between economic
concerns and nationalism is a case in point.
For the sake of argument, let us grant that there is an all-pervasive
cause within history determining the emergence and substance of
ideologies. We still face the question of the meaning of that determina-
tion, because, in contrast to natural processes, the cause is imbued with
a meaning, namely, the economic infrastructure and the forces of
production. Ideologies are not only mirrors, but also suggested instru-
ments for the solution of problems inherent in the infrastructure. We
are thus placed within a structure of meanings, both on the level of
cause and on the level of ideology. One of the major manifestations of
the continuity between the assumed cause and the assumed effect is the
variety of interpretations of the modes of instrumentality for solving the
problem on the level of the motivating cause. The distinction between
an approach based on the principle of freedom versus another ap-
proach, based on the principle of equality, is an illustration; when
freedom is established as a guiding principle it should be expressed and
applied also in the realm of the need for subsistence. In this sense, the
solution should not subvert the guiding principle. The application of the
principle to the realm of economic activity is motivated first by the
interpretation that freedom connotes a certain distance between human
beings and their environment, since without that distance the human
agents will be subjugated to the circumstances of their existence, and
freedom will either be extirpated or remain void of content. Hence the
194 CHAPTER 9
attitude to economic circumstances is intended to materialize the princi-

ple of freedom on the most vital level of human existence. Furthermore,
the hard core of freedom on the level of subsistence is the precondition
for the expression of freedom on other levels. Realization of this
precondition is an attempt to respond to the basic necessity without
which freedom would be no more than a word. To face necessity for the
sake of freedom, moreover, opens up the way for'additional concrete
manifestations of freedom.
The principle of equality can be contrasted with that of freedom, since
equality by definition refers to interaction and mutual recognition
among human beings. Economic activity is essentially based on inter-
human relations. Therefore we are here dealing with a cluster of
relationships in which the economic inter-relation is inherent.
We do not imply that this distinction between principles and their
application will necessarily lead us to a certain ideological formulation,
such as liberalism or socialism. What these examples do is to illustrate
that, since we start from an attitude of interpretation, there is no a priori
area dictating the direction of the interpretation. Interpretation is not
only involved in the reflective attitude to the historical realm; it also
becomes imbued with substantive components and with the components
of what can be considered as basic principles or normative guides of
human behavior. At the same time we must recognize the partialness of
the interpretations. No ideology is a total ideology, representing the
entire spectrum of principles characterized by their instrumentality in
terms of the situational problems they are meant to solve.
x
Before we take a further step in analyzing the pole of principles and the
pole of situations, an additional observation may be relevant. Empiri-
cally speaking, that is to say looking at the historical process, we
encounter different ideologies, some of which originate in the same
substructure of human attitudes. An example is the clash between the
medieval ideology of the state and the ecclesiastic ideology, and the
extent to which the distinction between the terrestial and divine aspects
of human reality led to modes of dependence or of superiority of one or
other aspect. Even if one granted, for the sake of argument, that both
ideologies were motivated by a common cause - economics - the duality
was historically present. The reduction of ideologies to their common

cause does not diminish the difference between them; and historically
and empirically, the clash had a major impact on historical events. It
follows that the instrumental aspect of ideologies is not necessarily
unequivocal, because - again for the sake of argument - we notice that
to some extent the ideologies become estranged from their primary
motivation. Either they elicit related motivations, or acquire a kind of
independence that the search for primary causes does not sufficiently
account for.
Moreover, the understanding of historical processes leads us to the
conclusion that in certain circumstances one ideology may serve as an
instrument for another, and not only as a formulation running parallel
to it. Two aspects of the modern period are relevant to this observation:
we have already referred to the fact that the aspiration towards national
independence brings about a postponing of economic considerations
and benefits for the sake of national sovereignty. The usual explanation
of this postponement is that once national independence is established
economic problems will again be major issues, demanding a solution
within the limits of national sovereignty. Nationalist aspiration is not
meant to be totalistic, but is rather a precondition for the establishment
of the proper framework for economic concerns. Nationalist ideology is
a kind of instrument for the solution of economic problems, but an
instrument as a precondition, not as a direct tool for confronting the
problem.
Another example is perhaps more paradoxical. Communist Poland,
in spite of its regime, has had to accept the strong influence of the
Catholic church. The Church, with all its traditions and loyalties, is
more widely acknowledged than any other expression of - tacit -
dissent. A totalitarian regime has had to accept the existence of an
organization based on an ideology - if we apply the term ideology to
religious tradition and its manifestations. It seems, however, that be-
cause of the Church's position, people who oppose the state ideology
and the regime based on it join the church without adhering to its
ideology. The religious ideology and its empirical structure serve as
camouflage for other commitments and orientations that are not
oriented towards tradition or the church. We see from this assistance.
granted de facto by one ideology to another that the very presence of a
difference between ideologies may turn one of them into an instrument
to realize or at least preserve aspirations. There is a kind of understanding
196 CHAPTER 9
that the gap between the non-expressed ideologies is deeper than

that between the church and the regime, or is at least not taken by the
regime as leading to open hostility between it and the dissenting ideol-
ogy.
This example calls our attention to the fact that even when there is
one overriding cause for the formulation of ideologies, there is still an
empirical justification for recognizing ideological variety. Once ideolo-
gies are understood as formulations of concepts and guiding notions
within the historical process, motivated by historical causes, we must
look at the broad spectrum of relations and modes emerging within the
historical process. If we take history seriously we must not only attempt
to identify the alleged primary cause, but also to discern the profile of
the historical process, without minimizing the differences between the
notion of profile, which is static, and the notion of process, which by
definition is dynamic.
XI
The characterization of ideology as instrument calls for a more precise

exposition of the term. We may distinguish two basic components in the
structure of ideologies: the descriptive or analytical, and the normative.
The descriptive component refers to the subject-matter to which the
ideology is related - the rights of a political system versus the Church
and the latter's ideological presuppositions, or the position of the people
vis-a-vis the monarch, or the subsistence of human beings and the
predicaments implied in it, etc. Furthermore, ideologies are not total
structures; looked at from within, they refer to certain aspects within the
historical process or the broad realm of human existence. But let us
suppose that ideologies are total structures. Because they refer to
specific issues, the very specification of the issues relates the ideologies
to defined matters that must be identified so that a certain component
can be applied, that is to say, that the solutions proposed or envisaged
be achieved. Ideologies, because of the component of solution,
turn topics into problems, but cannot be limited to delineating the
problems. They are concerned with solutions and with the mobilization
of human support for these solutions. The solution in turn may lead to
different attitudes - for instance, to accepting the duality of Church and
State, or to subordinating the one to the other. The solution may lead to
a status quo of laisser faire and laisser passer, or it may lead towards a
social structure that accepts the responsibility to solve human poverty.
The same reasoning applies to ideologies in the sphere of international
relations, whether the interest present in the structure of the societies is
identical with the constant elements that must be preserved, or whether
the orientational aspects are of prevailing significance; the clash be-
tween the West and the USSR would thus be an ideological clash par
excellence.
XII
Once we isolate these aspects of the ideological cluster, we must again

question the relation between ideology and the historical process. It is
obvious that the descriptive elements of ideologies, i.e., the identifica-
tion and analysis of the issues involved, are related to the hi~torical
process. This relation can be taken in two senses. First, the reference to
the issues is a reference to problematic aspects in the historical process,
like Church and State, proletariat and capitalism, etc. In a more radical
sense, the historicist, these topics are not only immersed in the process,
but their character changes as well; the process is understood not only as
the sum-total of present topics but also as bringing to the fore certain
issues, while others become obsolete or are replaced by new ones.
Whatever the interpretation, the thematic aspect of ideologies in their
descriptive and analytic sense is by definition related to history.
This aspect has some bearing on the solutions proposed and at-
tempted by ideologies, both conceptually and socially. In order to
indicate solutions, we must be aware of the issues that demand a
solution as well as of the normative aspect inherent in identification for
the sake of solution; the shift from solution to a problematic under-
standing presupposes the awareness that what is problematic is so
because of certain norms of human existence and behavior, which have
not found their solution in the existing situation. The obvious example
of this problematic aspect is Marx's identification of poverty with the
impairment of human dignity, thus defining poverty as evil. The ex-
pressions employed in this context indicate an identification between an
empirical and an anti-normative aspect of human existence as it is. The
presupposed norm thus permits evaluative identification of the most
important aspect of human existence, as understood in the ideology.
198 CHAPTER 9
The ensuing step is clearly in the positive direction: once we identify

something as evil, the suggested solution is bound to be its antithesis -
good. Thus overcoming poverty is a realization of a good or the good.
With due modifications, the same structure applies to other ideologies
that have emerged within the historical process, for all ideologies
(though the term is anachronistic) identifying structures of State or
Church were concerned not merely with the historical exposition of the
structures, but also with their problematic aspects and proposed solu-
tions.
Acceptance of the normative component and its application to the
historical process leads to a further conclusion: the distinction between
the norm as such in its broad sense and its application to a particular
historical context or structure. If the principle of good is present, and
also evil as its correlate, good in its totality cannot be applied to a
historical context in its totality. The good contains the components of
friendship, love, benevolence, etc., and cannot be exhausted in over-
coming poverty as an inappropriate subsistence and as subservience of
one human being to another. The good contains in itself freedom,
equality, justice, and so on. A more concrete interpretation of the
components of good may try to show that overcoming evil or realizing
the good is present within the specific historical context, as, for instance,
in the attempt to overcome poverty. But even when we grant this broad
interpretation of the application of the norm to the situation, the
application itself implies limitation of the norm to the situation. It would
be only a vacuous realization of goodness to content ourselves with
benevolence in terms of individual human beings, or with placing
friendship, which is confined to particular people, higher than the
attempt to realize the aspects of good relevant to the broad human
situation. To put it bluntly, it is not enough to be "nice" to people
without attempting to solve their material predicaments. Thus the
reference to norms from the perspective of their realization in the
context is a determination of the norm in its breadth; and, to use
Spinoza's expression, every determination is a negation, and limitation,
or at least a postponement of the total.
Thus despite the difference between levels, i.e., the situation within
the historical process and the norm in its breadth, ideologies represent
an attempt to bring the two levels together. The direction to which
ideologies tend is guided by both the situation and the norm. The
situation points out the problem to be resolved by the guidance implied
in the norm; but it could not serve to direct the guiding principle were it
not identified by human awareness, whether that of an individual or
individuals, or that of the masses, for whom individual exposition acts to
focus the contents of the situation. The awareness that serves a situation
also serves the application of norms to it. Hence we come back to the
conclusion that awareness, which is not a historical event, serves the two
poles of an ideological structure. To put it differently, the historical and
normative aspects appear as interrelated in the structure of ideologies.
Awareness is the instrument, and not the ideology as such. But aware-
ness is not an invented instrument; the very presentness of human
beings in the world makes it present vis-a.-vis the world. We conclude
finally that ideologies presuppose an analysis belonging to a domain that
can be called philosophical anthropology, and are not based solely on
historical identification.
XIII
This exposition leads us to a further understanding of the historical

aspect of ideologies, this time not by identifying the changing situational
aspects of history but by suggesting what can be described as a built-in
dialectic of history. In a previous context we mentioned the "total
ideologies" and expressed certain reservations about them. But a total
ideology cannot be assumed, both because of its topical aspects and
perhaps more because of the character of the historical process. Here
we are referring to what can be termed a dialecti~ of successful realiza-
tion. Let us start with an example from the recent history of the Western
world - the Welfare State, its reality and ideology. The Welfare State
presupposes both analytic and normative elements. The analytic ele-
ment is that some human beings require a solution to their problems, for
they themselves cannot cope with certain aspects of their day-to-day
existence, such as health, education, and economic subsistence. This
aspect of identification is reinforced by the ideological aspect proper,
namely, that it is the task of organized society to provide services to
people. Welfare ideology differs from the philanthropic approach by
tending towards a structure of universal services addressed to every
member of the society, thus releasing even those who had previously
succeeded in resolving problems from the need to do so in their indivi-
dual spheres.
200 CHAPTER 9
When we look at the realization of this ideology, which amounts to

universal service for the sake of welfare, we observe that the services
create an atmosphere of reliance and dependence. The expectation that
services will be granted leads to the conclusion that they will always be
available; human beings are released from the need to work because
their subsistence is guaranteed by the realized principles of the ideology.
The most marked example of this shift from subsistence to welfare is the
reliance on welfare grants even when avenues for work are provided.
Hence day-to-day behavior shifts from self-reliance to reliance on
services. An additional component of this shift is manifested in new
problems caused by the realization of the principle of valuing the quality
of human life. Improved medical attention and higher standards of
health, for instance, increase longevity, thus giving rise to demographic
problems.
The absence of a total prediction vis-a-vis reality, which may be seen
as an outcome of the intervention provided by an ideology, is not to be
attributed to the short-sightedness of the people providing it. The lack
of a total anticipation of the results of realization - an aspect of the
dialectic of realization - is due to the interaction between any interven-
tion in reality and reality as such or, as in this case, historical reality.
The same structure of interaction applies, for instance, to technological
intervention in historical reality. The effects of that intervention cannot
be foreseen, because effects carry with themselves effects of effects, and
so on; they evoke further interventions elicited by what has already
happened due to the preceding intervention. We encounter here a
situation in which the thematic aspect of an ideology, - whether the
ideology refers to the economic process or a religious attitude or
national aspirations - presupposes that people are aware on two levels:
one level preceding the formulation of an ideology, and the other that of
responses to the reality shaped by the intervention that results from the
realization of the ideology. Awareness is a constant or continuous
element of human existence, though its content is at least partially
directed by the facts discerned on the given level of existence. The
presence of awareness and its response to the facts of existence must be
taken into account, precisely because it is a constant feature of the
interaction between people and reality. By way of prediction, ideologies
- or, more precisely, the people entertaining them and aspiring towards
their realization - must be aware of that eternal presence, though
concomitantly they must also take into account that, thematically,
awareness is also a response to the reality shaped by the intervening

actions of the realization of the ideology.
Hence we see that ideologies cannot shape reality totally. Both
structurally and empirically the ideological attitude faces a significant
reflective and moral dilemma. If results have their own direction, which
cannot be foreseen by ideologies - for instance, whether people will
react to the availability of welfare services by lapsing into passivity and
taking advantage of them, or whether they will continue to be active
despite these services. This post factum dilemma does not and probably
should not prevent the realization of the welfare society. The imperative
of providing services to human beings in order to enable them to exist is
a valid one, even if eventually it creates a situation in which well-being
amounts to passivity. Adherence to the imperative must take into
account the additional moral consideration that human activity is being
channeled by the materialized situation towards passivity. The presup-
posed activity is the basis for an on-going intervention in reality, reality
shaped by a previous intervention. Thus activity is regarded, tacitly or
openly, as the other side of the coin of human awareness, since aware-
ness is phenomenologically a mode of activity not confined to reflection
or theory. Hence what is presupposed is not the total reality, precisely
because of the presence of human awareness and its concurrent activity,
or meta-activity, that is, the reflective response to circumstances that are
germane to human passivity. Here we have not only the dialectic of
reality qua outcome of the dialectic of realization, but also a dialectical
layered structure of human awareness, in which one layer, meta-
reflection, may guide in a direction other than that of the mere accep-
tance of circumstances. We become aware of this multi-faceted struc-
ture of reality or historical existence and correlated reflection against
the background of the impact of ideology on human reality.
XIV
At this point another aspect comes to the fore in our attempt to identify
various correlations between historical reality and reflective attitudes in
view of the thematic aspects of ideology. Ideologies first address them-
selves to given historical situations by identifying them. At this point it
does not matter whether identification results in discerning quasi-
constant features of historical reality or whether it consciously satisfies
202 CHAPTER 9
itself by identifying its changing features. For instance, the relationship

between the social structure of human existence and the cosmic position
a
of that existence may be identified either as constant or changing
aspect of reality. One could refer to the gist of the Marxist approach that
the economic substructure is a constant inffastructure of human exis-
tence, since the provision of subsistence is one inescapable component
of existence. Yet even when we grant a possible distinction between
transient and allegedly permanent aspects of human reality, we must be
aware - and this may be another lesson of the empirical impact of
ideologies on the processes of history - that the identification of the
particular factors involved in the infrastructure of economic activity
cannot be detached from the particular factors of the identified infra-
structure. For instance, the economic analysis guiding Marx's theory is
based on the fundamental assumption that subsistence within the pre-
sent structure cannot be guaranteed, because that structme leads to-
wards pauperization. The direction is not identified through elevation of
the infrastructure to a fundamental position, but through an analysis of
the situation in given circumstances. It does not matter whether that
identification was warranted at the time of formulation, or even whether
it was then a particular reading of the structure, based on the presup-
position that pauperization would motivate a change in the economic
circumstances.
Identification of the circumstances is in a sense identification of given
factors of reality; it is of no substantive significance whether the given is
permanent. One outcome of the circumstantial aspects of ideologies is
again dialectical. If, for instance, pauperization is identified as a major
trend of the economic situation and an ideology is formulated for the
sake of eradicating it, that ideology may have a self-defeating outcome.
It calls attention to the problem of pauperization and evokes interven-
tions in the process in order to remove or at least mitigate the problem.
Here again the notion of the welfare society or state is a case in point. It
may be seen as an interventional response to the diagnosis of pauperiza-
tion and to the prognosis that left the remedy to the historical process as
such. Certainly welfare is not a total remedial control of the process.
However, it is part of the historical response, in the partial and imma-
nent sense of the term, to the prediction of the outcome of the process.
This prediction allegedly supplies an ultimate solution to the human
plight, as indicated, for instance, in the well-known proposition about
the shift from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom.
To put it otherwise: the response to situations is not exhausted in the

ideology as previously formulated, nor is it exhausted in the response to
situations shaped by the realization of the ideology. The response is
always present, and is exhibit~d, among other aspects, in the response
to ideologies. There is a chain of responses; there is no way, structurally
speaking, and no justification, morally speaking, to arrest responses on
the already formulated level on which they exhibit themselves at this or
that moment of human reality. Thus we notice the inherent piecemeal
or partial essence of ideologies. They relate to situations that are partial,
and are meant to guide action in the direction of changing the situation
according to an end prescribed by the teleological aspect of the ideol-
ogy. Suppose that there are permanent factors in the historical process,
and that they are economic in their essence. Ideologies are not meant to
identify factors of the process, in the way that historical investigation or
research is supposed to do. Ideologies, because they refer to actions and
goals, must be related to situations. Even when they discern permanent
factors in situations they discern them in a particular shape inherent in
the situation and addressed by ideologies, in order to intervene in the
direction of the desired change. Even philosophical systems are partial,
in spite of the definition of philosophy as an articulation of totality. The
dialectical character of articulations comes into prominence: although
what is intended is total, the formulation can not be total. If this is so for
an intentionality towards totality, it applies a fortiori to ideology, which
by definition addresses the partial, that is, the situational, circum-
stances. One of the paradoxical self-interpretations of ideologies is that
which regards ideologies as if they were not only.attempts to articulate
totality, but achievements of that articulation as well.
We have emphasized the partialness of ideologies with reference to
changing circumstances. But they are partial also in their reference to
norms to be concretely materialized. In other words, there is only a
partial materialization of norms. This applies even to the norm of truth,
which can be defined completely but not applied completely, because of
new data brought into the scope of contemplation or investigation. If
this is so within the scope of the cognitive activity guided by the norm of
truth, then a fortiori it is so vis-a-vis norms guiding actions which by
definition are meant to change existence, not identify it, as is the case
with the activity prompted and guided by the norm of truth. Interven-
tion in a situation is partial and thus limited: the norm can be broad or
even total in its own scope, like the norms of justice, freedom, and
204 CHAPTER 9
equality. But the more specific manifestation of that norm, as for

instance whether freedom amounts to total self-expression or to auto-
nomy in Kant's sense; or to what extent economic conditions promote
or impede equality; or to what extent intervention by socio-political
authorities provides the primary conditions for expression, or inhibits it:
these are partial realizations of the norms, which are relevant for the
encounter between norms and situations and thus for an interaction
between these two aspects of the broad concrete human situation.
Within the realm of the cognitive activity, there is only one norm, that
of truth; but within the realm of action there are many norms. Thus one
norm may have bearing on another, as do freedom and equality. If this
is true for "abstract" norms, it is all the more so true within the
intention towards the realization of norms, since situations, even though
imbued with norms, may not be created by them. 6
When we look at the various aspects of the relationship between
history and ideologies, we are bound to come to the conclusion that the
historical process has its own rhythm. As such it maintains its openness
towards interventions articulated and guided by ideologies, as well as its
openness as an object vis-a-vis cognitive activity. Ideologies must recog-
nize the authority and relevance of cognitive activity, which is not as
such part of them. The broader cognitive activity also leads us to a
conclusion in terms of a more specific relationship between ideologies
and processes on the one hand and norms on the other. From this point
of view ideologies are a sort of a mediating link between situations and
norms. A mediating link cannot be fully determined by one of the poles
between which it mediates. Hence the recognition of the validity of
ideologies is pari passu a recognition of their partialness, and thus of
their changing validity both in terms of reference to situations and in
terms of the concrete formulation of the guiding norms. 7 One of the
possible fallacies of ideology - and that fallacy is not only possible but
also a lesson derived from the history of ideologies - is that, to para-
phrase Whitehead, of misplaced totalities.
In their structure and content ideologies are a conjunction of interpre-
tations and demands. The historical situation in the broad sense is
interpreted in order to discern the h~lfd core that calls for and makes
possible a change if human beings respond to the interpretation while
attempting to apply or to materialize those aspects of the ideology that
contain guidance towards change. The very formulation of an ideology
is therefore directed towards the situation on the one hand and towards
the prospective or potential agents of the change on the other. An

ideology does not remain within the boundaries of interpretations, since
the horizon of the future opens the vista towards change as a vehicle of
realization. But change cannot replace interpretation - as Marx sug-
gested in his last thesis on Feuerbach; change presupposes interpreta-
tion. Moreover, once the change has occurred interpretation steps in to
identify the change and its contents as well as to prepare for a possible
change to come. Change, because guided, presupposes interpretation.
Since the realm is that of history, and not of nature, interpretation
cannot exhaust the full spectrum of the responses vis-a-vis the realm of
history. Hence, referring again to Marx, all social life, as historical,
cannot be essentially practical (the Eighth Thesis). It can be practical
only because it derives its guidance from interpretation. It is practical
but as such not only so.
The various aspects of history come back here, as it were, in a most
manifest way. 8
NOTES
CHAPTER 1
1 G.W.F. Hegel, Phiinomenologie des Geistes, ed. by G. Lasson (Leipzig: Meiner 1921),
p.520.
2 See the Vorlesungen uber die Geschichte der Philosophie, in Glockner's edition of
Hegel's, Siimtliche Werke (Stuttgart: Fromman 1928), Vol. XIX;3, pp. 19, 103, 104.
Clearly we approach here the basic antinomy or ambiguity in Hegel with reference to the
relation between time and essence. See the present author's From Substance to Subject,
Studies in Hegel (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1974).
3 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Die Deutsche Ideologie, in V. Adoratsky's Historisch-
Kritische Gesamtausgabe (Berlin: 1932), Vol. 115, p. 10.
4 Ibid., p. 17
5 See 'Uber Denken und Sprechen,' in Leitzmann's edition of Wilhelm von Humboldt's
Werke (Berlin, 1908), Vol. VIII2, p. 581. See the present author's: Humboldt's Prole-
gomena to Philosophy of Language, Cultural Hermeneutics, Vol. II, 1974, pp.
6 Compare the present author's book, On the Human Subject, Studies in the Phenomenol-
ogy of Ethics and Politics, (Springfield, III: Charles C. Thomas 1965), pp. 30-51.
7 M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, (Halle a.d.S., Max Niemeyer 1927), p. 17. Reference is
made to this book only, and not to subsequent statements by Heidegger in what is
considered his second period of philosophizing. In that period historicity acquires a cosmic
meaning. On the topic of history consult: Karl Lowith, M. Heidegger and F. Rosenzweig.
'A Postscript to Being and Time', incl. in: Nature, History and Existentialism, and Other
Essays in the Philosophy of History, Edited with a Critical Introduction by Arnold Levison
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press 1966) pp. 51-78.
B Sein und Zeit., p. 386.
9 Ibid., pp. 327ff.
10 Ibid., pp. 346ff.
13 On the position of time see the present author's Between Past and Present, An Essay on
History (New Haven: Yale University Press 1958). Consult also Paul Weiss, History:
Written and Lived (Carbondale, III.: Southern lIIinois University Press 1962), pp. 141ff.,
197ff., 217ff. On various problems dealt with in contemporary philosophy of history see
the present author's: Philosophy, History and Politics - Studies in Contemporary English
Philosophy of History (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1976). Some of the systematic
aspects are explored in: Reflection and Action (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff 1985).
CHAPTER 2
1 Cf. Eduard Meyer, 'Zur Theorie und Methodik er Geschichte', in Kleine Schriften,
(Halle/Salle: Niemeyer 1924), Vol. I, p. 3.

2 J.G. Droysen, Historik; Vorlesungen uber Enzyklopiidie und Methodologie der Ge-
schichte, hrsg. von Rudolf Hubner, (Miinchen: R. Oldenbourg Verlag 1958), p. 357.
207
208 NOTES
3 Ibid., p. 5.
4 Samuel Alexander: The Historicity of Things, incl. in: Philosophy and History, edited
by R. Klibansky and H.J. Paton, (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1936), p. 15.
5 Consult the present author's: From Substance to Subject, Studies in Hegel, (The Hague:
Nijhoff Publishers 1974). We shall come back to the notion of the "cunning of Reason" in
our subsequent analysis of the concept of progress.
6 M. Schlick, 'Naturphilosophie,' in Die Philosophie in ihren Einzelgebieten, edited by
M. Dessoir, (Berlin: 1m Verlag Ulstein 1925), p. 422.
7 Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, A 182, translated by N. Kemp Smith,
(Toronto: st. Martin's Press, New York, MacMillan 1965), p. 212.

B H. Cohen, Logik der rein en Erkenntnis, (Berlin: Bruno Cassirer 1914), p. 43.
9 R.G. Collingwood, An Essay on Metaphysics, (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1940), p. 275.

10 E. Brunner, 'Das Einmalige und der Existenzcharakter,' Bliitter fur Deutsche Philoso-
phie III (1929-30), 270.
11 See H. Bergmann, 'Der Begrift der Verursachung und das Problem der individuellen
Kausalitat; Logos V (1914--1915), 77-111.

12 See the subsequent discussion of the position of individuals.
13 See Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften, in Dilthey's
Gesammelte Schriften, (Leipzig and Berlin: Verlag von B.G. Teubner 1927), Vol. VII,
pp.85-86.
14 Ibid., pp. 118,137; see also Die Geistige Welt, in Gesammelte Schriften, op. cit., Vol. V,
p.265.
15 Der Aufbau etc., ibid., p. 154. The currently popular hermeneutics follows by and large
the line of thought explicated here.
16 See his Logik der reinen Erkenntnis, op. cit., p. 76, and the Ethik des reinen Willens,
(Berlin: Bruno Cassirer 1921), mainly pp. 1-84. The distinction between the meaning of
the ethical principle and the sphere of its realization has some bearing within the ethical
discourse on the topic of ethical relativism. Consult the present author's: 'On Ethical
Relativism,' The Journal of Value Inquiry XI (1977), 81-103.
17 H. Rickert, Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung, (Tiibingen and
Leipzig: J.C.B. Mohr 1902), pp. 251,255.

18 Compare the present author's: Between Past and Present, An Essay on History, (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1958), Second edition, Kennikat Press, Port Washington
N.Y.lLondon 1973, pp. 135ft.
CHAPTER 3
1 See: 'Race and History', by Claude Levi-Strauss, included in: Race and Science, (New
York: Columbia University Press 1969), pp. 246-247.
2 J.B. Bury, The Idea of Progress, (New York: MacMillan 1932), pp. 21-22; in his
footsteps, sec e.g., c.L. Becker, The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philoso-
phers, (New Haven: Yale University Press 1952), p. 130; cf. also J. Baillie, The Belief in
Progress, (London: Oxford University Press 1951).
3 Gershom Scholem, Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism, (New York: Schocken, 1961),
pp. 273--274.
NOTES 209
4 R. Eucken, Beitriige zur Einfiihrung in die Geschichte der Philosophie, (Leipzig, Diirr
1906), p. 36.
5 'Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit', in Herder's Werke, ed. Heinrich
Diintzer, (Berlin: G. Hempel n.d.), XI/3, pp. 199-200.
6 On the other hand, the suggestion that there is a simple and continuous connection
between Christian belief in the moral progress of humanity and the idea of progress is
exaggerated, notwithstanding the view put forward by Alois Dempf in Die Krisis des
Fortschrittsglaubens, (Wien: Herder 1947), p. 5.
7 O. Cullmann, Christ and Time: the Primitive Christian Conception of Time and History,
transl. F.V. Filson, (London: S.C.M. Press 1951), pp. 52-53.

8 On Paracelsus, cf. Eucken, op. cit., and A. Grotenfelt, Geschichtliche Wertmassstiibe in
der Geschichtsphilosophie bei Historikern und im Volksbewusstsein, (Leipzig: B.G. Eub-
ner 1905), p. 28.
9 Novum Organum I, LXXXIV, in The Philosophical Works of Francis Bacon, ed. 1.M.
Robertson, (London: Routledge 1905), p. 282.
10 From the 'Preface to the Treatise on Vacuum', in Blaise Pascal, Thoughts, Letters,
Minor Works, ed. C.W. Eliot, (New York: P. Collier 1910), pp. 445-447, passim.
11 Ibid., p. 449.
12 See R. Flint, History of the Philosophy of History, (Edinburgh and London: William
Blackwood and Son 1893), pp. 214-215.
13 M.l.A.N. Condorcet, Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progres de ['esprit humain,
(Paris: Bibliotheque Nationale 1876), I, pp. 19-20.
14 In his analysis 'Of the Typic of Pure Practical ludgment.' See Lewis White Beck's
translation of the Critique of Practical Reason, (New York: Liberal Arts Press 1956),
pp. 70ff.
15 M.1.A.N. Condorcet, Esquisse, II, p. 58.
16 See his 'Second Discours, Sur les progres successifs de I'esprit humain', in Oeuvres de
TUrgot, ed. E. Dair, (Paris: Guillaumain 1844), II, p. 597.
17 'Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbiirgerlicher Absicht', in Immanuel Kants
Siimmtliche Werke, ed. G. Hartenstein (Leipzig: Voss 1867), IV, p. 146.
18 Pascal, 'Preface to the Treatise on Vacuum,' p. 449.
19 M.l.A.N. Condorcet, Esquisse, loco cit.
20 Reftexionen Kants zur Anthropologie, ed. B. Erdmann, (Leipzig: Fues 1882), Reftexion
676.
21 'Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht', in Immanuel Kants Sammtliche Werke, ed.
G. Hartenstein, VII, 649.
22 De rerum originatione radicali, quoted by A.a. Lovejoy in The Great Chain of Being,
A Study of the History of an Idea, (New York: Harper & Brothers 1960) p. 257.
23 Ibid., p. 259. In the treatise Apokatastasis panton (quoted by M. Ettlinger, Leibniz als
Geschichtsphilosoph (Miinchen: K6seI1921), 31-32). Leibniz posits linear and continuous
time (as opposed to cyclical time). From the viewpoint of progress, the importance of this
assumption lies in its implication that humanity will never remain in the same state,
because it does not befit the divine harmony to touch a false chord repeatedly. If only for
natural reasons of congruence, it should be assumed that things will necessarily progress
toward the highest good, gradually and at times even by leaps.
24 Kant, 'Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbiirgerlicher Absicht,' Worke, ed.
G. Hartenstein, IV, p. 144.
210 NOTES
The topic is central to Kant's attempt to find a kind of harmony between the sphere of
ethics as that of practical reason and that of empirical behavior. The issue is analysed in
the present author's: Practice and Realization, Studies in Kant, (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff 1979).
25 We face here the broader issue of historical prediction and its impact, including its
paradoxical counterproductive results. This issue has been dealt with in the previously
mentioned study, Between Past and Present: An Essay on History.
26 See Hegel's Enzyklopaedie der Wissenschaften, § 209, Zusatz. We follow here: 'The
Logic of Hegel' translated from The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences by William
Wallace, 2nd edition, revised and augmented (Oxford: Th6 University Press 1959),
p.350.
27 The Idea of History, (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1946), p. 329. On the assumptions of the
idea of progress, d. also Morris Ginsberg, 'The Idea of Progress: A Reevaluation,' in

Evolution and Progress, (London: W. Heinemann 1961), pp. 1-55. On the empirical
aspects of historical progress consult: Raymond Aron. Progress and Disillusion: The
Dialectics of Modern Society (London: Penguin Books 1972). On the historical transfor-
mations of the concept of progress consult: Robert Nisbet. History of the Idea of Progress.
(New York: Basic Books 1980).
CHAPTER 4
1 See Edmund Husser!, Erfahrung und Urteil, Untersuchungen zur Genealogie der Logik,
ausgearbeitet und herausgegeben von Ludwig Landgrebe (Prague: Academia 1939), pp.
235ff.
2 R.G. Collingwood, The Idea of History, edited byT.M. Knox (Oxford: Clarendon Press
1946) pp. 213ff. See also: R.G. Collingwood, An Essay on Metaphysics (Oxford: Claren-
don Press 1940) pp. 292ff. Compare the discussion in Allan Donagan, The Later Philo-
sophy of R. G. Collingwood (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1962) pp. 192ff.
3 J.L. Austin, 'A Plea for Excuses,' included in Philosophical Papers (Oxford: Clarendon
Press 1961), p. 127.
4 John Rawls, 'Two Concepts of Rules,' The Philosophical Review LXIV (1955), 3ff. See
also: Thomas Morawetz, 'The Concept of a Practice,' Philosophical Studies 24 (1973),

209ff.
5 Max Scheler, Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik, ein Versuch der
Grundlegung eines ethischen Personalismus, (Bern: Franke Verlag, 1954), p. 398.
6 Michael Oakeshott, Experience and Its Modes (Cambridge: The University Press, 1933),
pp. 296,297,298,273, 118.
7 Several surveys of the contemporary literature on action are available. Consult, for
instance, Glenn Langford: Human Action, (London: Macmillan 1971) and the extensive
bibliography appearing at the end of the book.
8 Toward a General Theory of Action, Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils (eds.) (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press 1951), p. 193.

9 Der SinnhafteAufbau der sozialen Welt, eine Einleitung in die verstehende Soziologie, by
Alfred Schutz (Wien: Verlag von Julius Springer, 1932), pp. 236ff.
NOTES 211
10Arthur C. Danto, 'Basic Action,' included in: Readings in the Theory of Action, ed. by
Norman S. Care and Charles Landesman, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1968),
p.95.
11 G.E.M. Anscombe: 'Intention,' included in: The Philosophy of Action, ed. by Alan R.
White (Oxford: The University Press, 1968), p. 147.

12 We follow here Max Weber's Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft in its English translation, The
Theory of Social and Economic Organization, translated from the German by A.R.
Henderson and Talcott Parsons, revised and edited with an introduction by Talcott
Parsons (London: William Hodge and Company Ltd. 1947), p. 102.
13 We refer here to the first chapter of the present book.
CHAPTER 5
1 Thomas Carlyle, On Heroes and Hero-worship, and the Heroic in History (London:
G. Routledge, n.d.), p. 1.
2 See the Vorlesungen uba die Philosophie der Geschichte, in Glockner's edition of
Hegel's Siimtliche Werke, Vol. XI (Stuttgart: Fromann 1928), p. 60.
3 Carlyle, op. cit., p. 107.
4 G. Plekhanov, 'The Role of the Individual in History,' in Theories of History, edited
with Introductions and Commentary by P. Gardiner (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press 1959),
p. 155.
5 Ibid., p. 155.
6 Ibid., p. 156.
7 Ibid., pp. 157-158.
8 Ibid., p. 159.
9 Ibid., p. 159.
10 Ibid., p. 160.
11 Ibid., p. 162.
12 The Prince and The Discourses by Niccolo Machiavelli, with an introduction by Max
Lerner (New York: Modern Library 1940), p. 382.
13 Ibid., p. 441.
14 Ibid., p. 383.
15 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, translated with notes by T.M. Knox, (Oxford: Clarendon
Press 1942), p. 295.
16 Edward Hallett Carr cites this passage from Hegel in What is History? (New York:
Knopf 1962), p. 68. Surprisingly, he skips over the important opening statement in which,
as we have seen, Hegel alludes to the choice actualized by the great man.
17 See the present author's: On the Human Subject, Studies in the Phenomenology of
Ethics and Politics, (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas Publisher 1966), pp. 30ff., as well
as: Spirit and Man, An Essay on Being and Value, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1963),
pp. 3ff.
18 William James, 'Great Men and Their Environment,' in The Will to Believe and Other
Essays in Popular Philosophy (New York: 1956), p. 219.
19 Cf. J.G. Droysen, Historik, Vo'rlesungen uber Enzyklopiidie und Methodologie der
212 NOTES
Geschichte, R. Heibner, ed. (Miinchen and Berlin: 1943), p. 25. See Sidney Hook: The
Hero in History, A Study in Limitation and Possibility (New York: The Humanities Press
1950), especially Chs. 8 and 9 . Consult also the present author's Between Past and Present,
An Essay on History, pp. 135ff., as well as Spirit and Man, An Essay on Being and Value,
pp. 3ff.
CHAPTER 6
1 See F.H. Bradley, 'The Vulgar Notions of Responsibility in Connexion with the
Theories of Free-Will and Necessity,' included in: Ethical Studies (first published in 1876)
(Oxford: Clarendon Press 1%2), pp. Iff. Consult on Bradley: Jonathan Glover, Responsi-
bility (New York: The Humanities Press 1970), p. 13fL
2 Compare: Two Aspects of the Ethical Situation,' in the author's Humanism in the
Contemporary Era (The Hague: Mouton & Co. 1963), pp. 87ff. Alfred Schutz speaks
about equivocation in the notion of responsibility - in terms of "responsible for" and
"responsible to someone." See his 'Some Equivocations of the Notion of Responsibility,'
incl. in: Determinism and Freedom in the Age of Modern Science, ed. Sidney Hook (New
York University Press, New York: 1958), pp. 206ff.
3 On the legal aspects, consult Hans Binder, Die Urteilsfiihigkeit in psychologischer,
psychiatrischer und juristischer Sicht (Ziirich: 1964), pp. 9, 10, 16, 23.
4 See J. Glover, op. cit.
5 Bernard Williams: Problems of the Self, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1973.
Also: Moral Luck, Philosophical Papers, 1973-1980, Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge 1981.
CHAPTER 7
1 'Die Grenznutzlehre und das psychophysische Grundgesetz,' Gesammelte Aufsiitze zur
Wissenschaftslehre, lC.B. Mohr (Tiibingen: Siebek, 1922), pp. 366ff.

2 'Die 'Objektivitat' sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis,' Gesam-
melte Aufsiitze zur Wissenschaftslehre, p. 175.
3 Wissenschaft als Beruf, ibid., p. 531.
4 "Die 'Objektivitat"', ibid., p. 151.
5 Ibid.
6 'Der Sinn der 'Wertfreiheit' der sozioiogischen und 'Okonomischen Wissenschaften,'
ibid., p. 492.
7 Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B 575 (Kemp-Smith's transl. p. 473 (New York: St. Martin's
Press. Toronto: Macmillan, 1929.)
8 Prolegomena § 53.
9 Gunnar Myrdal, Objectivity in Social Resear~ (New York: 1969) p. 55. On Weber
consult: Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press
1957), pp. 35ff.
10 Claude Levi-Strauss, The Scope of Anthropology, tr. Sherry Ortneran and Robert A.
NOTES 213
Pane (London: 1967), pp. 46, 32.

11 On the empirical expressions of alienation, see: Economic Failure, Alienation and
Extremism by Michael Aiken, Louis A. Ferman and Harold L. Sheppard, (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 1968), pp. 8, 142.
12 Consult Charles Taylor, 'Neutrality in Political Science,' included in Philosophy,
Politics and Society, Third Series, A collection edited by Peter Laslett and W.G. Runci-
man, (Oxford: 1969), pp. 26ft.
13 Compare the author's 'Relevance examined,' Ethics, April 1972. On values and
evaluations consult: Alexander Pfiinder, Ethik Ethische Wertlehre und ethische Sol/ens-
lehre in kurzer Darstellung, aus dem Nachlass, herausgegeben von Peter Schwankl
(Miinchen: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1973), pp. 141ft.
CHAPTER 8
1 The theme is that of George Gurvitch's book, The Spectrum of Social Time, translated
and edited by Myrtle Korenbaum, assisted by Philip Bosserman (Dordrecht: Reidel,
1964). The present analysis does not relate the mUltiplicity of times to socrl strata or
organizations. G.H. Mead's Philosophy of the Present deals with the posItion of the
present in general, bestowing on it the central position within the dimensions of time. The
emphasis in our exposition is on the pace of the present, and not on its ontological
position. On the aspect of acceleration, other than within the experience of time, see Max
Patterson; 'Acceleration in Evolution Before Human Times', Journal of Biological
Structures 1 (1978), 201ft. The book by Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann: The
Social Construction of Reality, A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge (London: Allen
Lane, 1971) relates rapid social change to "the pluralistic situation" which is subversive to
traditional reality.
2 My friend Professor Werblowsky called my attention to the work of Ernst Benz;
'Akzeleration der Zeit als geschichtliches und heilsgeschichtliches Problem,' Akademie
der Wissenschaften und Literatur, Mainz, Abhandlungen der Geistes- und Sozialwissen-
schaftlichen Klasse, Jhrg. 1977, Nr. 2. Benz analyzes the aspect of acceleration mainly in
the context of eschatological expectations in the sense of "time is running short," and does
not raise questions related to categorial contexts of historical time. He refers to aspects of
revolution (pp. 48ft.). From the point of view directing the present exploration we can say
that the velocity of the present time is not necessarily related to the momentum of
revolutions, but rather to the interaction between events and the response to them. See
Stephen Kern, The Culture of Time and Space 1880--1918 (London: Weidenfeld and
Nicolson, 1983).
3 See Irving Hallowell, Temporal Orientation in Western Civilization and in a Preliterate
Society,' American Anthropologist XXXIX (1937), 647ft.
4 J. Huizinga, 'Die gegenwiirtige Kulturkrise verglichen mit friiheren,' Schriften zur
Zeitkritik, iibersetzt von Werner Kaegi (Ziirich-Bruxelles: Occident-Verlag, Pantheon-
Verlag, 1948) pp. 17ft.
5 Harold D. Lasswell, The Future of World Communication: Quality and Style of Life
(Honolulu: East-West Communication Institute), 1972, p. 3.
6 Karl Jaspers' well-known Die geistige Situation der Zeit (Leipzig: Walter de Gruyter &
214 NOTES
Co.) appeared in 1933, that is to say, prior to the changes characteristic of the contempo-
rary situation and the sense of velocity related to them. Jaspers said that what man can do
refers to the short range. He is given tasks but not any continuity of his existence. That
which has past (das Gewesene) no longer holds good, but only that which is present. (das
Gegenwartige). See ibid., p. 40.
7 Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Zusatz zu & 138. Hegel's Philosophy of Right,
translated with Notes by T.M. Knox (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1943), p. 255.
CHAPTER 9
1 On the positions and limitations of the historical approach, consult Leo Strauss: Natural
Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 1953.
2 Hegel's presentation, the "spirit of an epoch," is brought together with "the spirit of a
people." The most explicit statement is contained in: System und Geschichte der Philoso-
phie, ed. by Johannes Hoffmeister (Leipzig: Meiner 1944) pp. 38ff., 148ff.
3 Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge,
with a preface by Louis Wirth (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1960), pp. 70-71; p. 76.
Clifford Geerth's 'Ideology as a Cultural System' is to some extent a continuation of
Mannheim's view. Cf. The Interpretation of Cultures, Selected Essays (New York: Basic
Books, 1973) pp. 193ff.
4 Probably the most instructive presentation of Marx's theory is expressed in
'Ekonomisch-Philosophische Manuscripte,' included in Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels Ge-
samtausgabe 1,3 (Berlin: Marx-Engels Verlag, 1931).
5 Joachim Ritter: Hegel und die Jranzosische Revolution Heft 63 (K61n und Opladen:
Arbeitsgemeinschaft fur Forschung des Landes Nordheim - Westfalia, 1957).
6 On the transformation of the concept of ideology consult, Helmuth Plessner, 'Abwand-
lungen des Ideologiegedankens,' in Zwischen Philosophie und Gesellschaft (Bern:
Francke Verlag, 1953) pp. 218ff.
7 Zwi Lamm in 'Ideologies in a Hierarchical Order: A Neglected Theory,' in Science and
Public Policy, February, 1984, pp. 40ff., deals with the theories of George Walford and
Harold Walsby. The hierarchical order is a typology of ideologies according to their
central themes.
8 See David McLellan, Ideology, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1986. The
book contains a Bibliography.
INDEX OF NAMES
Aiken, Michael 213 Engels, Friedrich 207

Alexander, Samuel 208
Ancombe, G.E.M. 211 Feuerbach, Ludwig 205
Aristotle 71, 146
Aron, Rayrnondo 210 Hegel, Georg W.F. 2f., 32, 33, 61,
Athens 71 69f., 99f., 105-106, 143, 172, 180,
Austin, J.L. 82, 84, 210 183, 184, 185, 189, 207, 210, 211, 214
Heidegger, Martin 15f., 21f., 79, 207
Bacon, Francis 59, 209 Herder, J.G. 56,209
Bach, J.S. 71 Hitler, Adolf 83
Baillie, J. 208 Hollowell, Irving 213
Becker, c.L. 208 Hook, Sidney 212
Beethoven, Ludwig von 71 Huizinga, Johannes 164f.,213
Benz, Ernst 213 Humboldt, Wilhelm von 11,207
Berger, Peter L. 213 Husser!, Edmund 80, 210
Bergman, S.H. 208
Berlin, Isiah 148 James, William 24, 116
Binder, Hans 212 Jaspers, Karl 213
Bradley, F.H. 130,212 Jean Paul 160
Brandeis, Louis 148 Jefferson, Thomas 175
Brunner, E. 208
Bury, J.B. 55,56,208 Kant, Immanuel 27,37,39,56, 61f.,
121, 124f., 143, 144, 145, 146, 184,
Caesar 81f. 188f., 204, 208, 209, 210, 212
Carlyle, Thomas 97f.,211 Kern, Stephen 213
Carr, Edward Hallett 211
Collingwood, KG. 71, 81fl., 208, 210 Lamm, Zwi 214
Columbus 162 Lamprecht, Karl 97, 98
Cohen, Hermann 48-49,208 Langford, Glenn 210
Condorcet, M.J.A.N. 61f., 209 Laswell, Harold D. 172,213
Cullman, Oscar 57l.,209 Leibniz, Gottfried W. 65, 209
Leonardo da Vinci 104, 107
Dante Alighieri 100, 108 Uvi-Strauss, Claude 146, 208, 212
Danto, Arthur C. 88, 211 Lovejoy, A.G. 209
Dempf, Alois 209 LOwith, Karl 207
Destut de Tracy, Antoine L.c. 175f. Luckmann, Thomas 213
Dewey, John 88 Luther, Martin 100, 114
Dilthey, Wilhelm 45-47, 208
Donagan, Allan 210 Machiavelli, Niccolo 211
Droysen, J.G. 207,211 Mannheim, Karl 176f.,214
Duns Scotus 78 Marquise de Pompadour 102
215
216 INDEX OF NAMES
Marx, Karl2f., 97f., 132f., 175f., 207, Rawls, John 82f., 210
214 Rickert, Heinrich 50,208
Mead, G.H. 213 Ritter, Joachim 214
Meyer, Edward 207 Rome 71
Michalangelo, Buonarrotti 104, 105, Rosenzweig, Franz 207
107 Rousseau, Jean Jacques 100, 184
Morawetz, Thomas 210 Russia 40,43
Myrdall, Gunnar 145, 212
Sartre, Jean Paul 149
Napoleon 34,36,40-41,51, 103, 107 Scheler, Max 85,210
Nisbert, Robert 210 Schlick, Moritz 208
Nietsche, Friedrich 29 Scholem, Gershom 55,208
Schutz, Alfred 212
Oakeshott, Michael 86, 210 Shakespeare, William 161
Socrates 4
Paracelsus, Aurelous 56, 209 Spinoza, B. 120f., 198
Pascal, Blaise 6Of., 209 Stern, William 93
Patterson, Max 213 Strauss, Leo 212, 214
Perelman, Chaim 153
Persians 40 Taylor, Charles 213
Pfander, Alexander 213 Turgot, Anne R.J. 62,209
Philo 57
Planck, Max 32 Weber, Max 35,40, 89f., 14lf., 210,
Plato 71, 108 211,212
Plekhanov, G. 97f., 211 Weiss, Paul 207
Plessner, Helmuth 214 Werblowsky, R.Z. 213
Whitehead, Alfred North 204
Raphael, Samti 104, 107, 108 Williams, Bernard 132, 212
INDEX OF SUBJECTS
absolute 52 collective independence 182

absolute essence 3f. Communist Poland 195
accumulation 52f. consent 83f.
achievement 169f. consumption 167
actions 79f., 161f. Continental Europe 164
acts passim continuity 38f.
actualization 8f., 105t. creation 56
alienation 151f., 193,213 creativity 2f.
America 162, 164, 173 crystallization 19f., lIOf.
arnOT [ati 133 culture 52f., 141f.
animals 7 'Cunning of Reason' 33,43, 69f., 100,
answerability 131 105,208
anticipation 13f. CUTSUS If.
anti-egocentric 9lf.
apartheid 68 ltapassim
a priori 28f. I. ead Sea Scrolls 154
art 61,117,164 death 12f.
authenticity 14t., 173 decision 41-42
authority 59f. decolonization 162f.
autobiography 47 deeds 7St.
awareness passim demand 135f.
democratic state 2
becoming passim depersonalization 75, 11 It. , 133
Being 12f. desires 142f.
Bible 146 determination 96f., 17Sf.
biography 44f. determinism 20, 123t., 138f.
biological stratum 21, 34, 95 detours 5, 6
Buddhism 140, 143, 145 dialectics 12, 176f., 199f.
dialectics of realization 74f.
Catholic Churches 114 directedness 84f.
causa ut 82t. dissociation 132
causal efficacy 7f. discovery of continents 164
causality 40, 43f. duration passim
change passim duty 63
Christian Church 146
Christian tradition 57t. economics 7,113,164,167, 175f.
Christianity 154, 209 effort 170f.
Churches 195, 196 egalitarianism 170
circularity 92 empiricism 175f.
Civil War 162 endurance 33f.
coercion 128f. epochs 163f.
collective creation 22 equality 182, 193
217
218 INDEX OF SUBJECTS
equilibrium ISH. ideologies 175f.

eschaton 156f. identification 130t.
ethics 48f., 188f. immediacy 168, 173f.
eudaimonia 171 imperative 128f.
evaluation 117f., 135f. impersonal 14t.
events passim impressions 172t.
evil 197f. improvement 53f.
experience 46f. incest taboo 166f.
expression 112f. individuals 44, 81f., 94t.
externality 3f. infrastructure 88t.
instanteneous gratification 168, 171
final cause 8f. institution 80f.
finitude 124f., 156 intelligence 150
Fortune 105 intention 84f.
frankness 148 intentionality passim
freedom 193f. intersubjective 85f.
French Revolution 188 interests 183f.
function 130f. internality 3f.
future passim interpretation passim
intervention 181
generation 2H., 160f. introspection 42f., 138
German music 164 'is' 144f.
German people 83f. Italian art 104
German philosophy 164 Italian Renaissance 107
Gestalt 11, 26, 30, 36, 89, 106, 108,
191 Jemeinigkeit 13f.
goals H., 85f. Jews 157
God 55f. Jewish mysticism 55f.
good 198 justification 180
'great individuals' 15f.
Greek literature 164 'Know Thyself 3f.
Kulturmensch 141
hedonism 170
hermeneutics 208 language 22f., 113f.
heroes 8lf. laws 25f., 123f.
historia rerum gestarum 92, 134 legal reasoning 131
historical consciousness passim legislation 188f.
'historical hours' 114f. liberation 194
historical materialism 175 liberty 164
historicity 12f. 'Life' 45f.
historiography 134 Lisbon earthquake 43
holiness 66 literature 47,100, llot., 117
human dignity 197
human perspective 6f. manifestation 3f.
humanities 46 mankind If.
hypostasis 6, 187, 190 mass media 166f., 172f.
INDEX OF SUBJECTS 219
materialism 7f. potentiality 8f.

means 7f. prayer 90
measures 142f. praxis 7f., 80, 205
mediation 3f., 11, 173f. present passim
metaphysical deduction 27f. prediction 200
monography 47f. printing 164
morphe 116 process passim
productivity 164
Nachwelt 87 products 167
nationalism 192f. progress 4, 53f.
natural sciences 138f. projections 187f.
nature 4,56 proletariat 86
Nazi period 83f. property 169
necessity 9, 120 Protestantism 145
Neptune 39 Providence 55f.
psychiatric condition 132
obedience 167 public realm 20f.
observing 172
occurences passim ratio 54f.
one-sidedness lI5f. rationality 189
openness 87f. real, reality 26f.
'ought' 135f., 144f. realization 74f.
reason 144f.
parliament 154 reciprocity 113f.
partial contents 76f. redemption 143
partialness 203 reflection passim
passions 141 regularity 6lf.
passivity 201 relatedness 124f.
past passim relationism 186
pauperization 202 relative 52
people 35f., 86 relativism 73, 143f., 178f.
periodization 163f. relativity 143f.
personal existence 14f. religion 7, 73, 90, 100, 178f.
personality 146 Renaissance 104
phenomenology 174 Renaissance thinkers 56
philanthropy 199 repetition 4
philosophers 60 res gestae 92, 134
philosophical anthropology 199 respect 148f.
philosophy 4,47, 73, 100, 110f., 117, response %f., 16Of.
203 responsibility 44, 94f., I28f., 156
pivotal events 165 result 170f.
planning 10 revolution 83, 162
poeiesis 80 rights 169f.
politics 34
possibility, possibilities 13f., 39f., 115f. science 54f., 164
post-Nazi period I57f. schools 8Sf.
220 INDEX OF SUBJECTS
self-consciousness 3f. transcendence 18

self-defeating prophecies 68 transcendental 48f.
self-externalization 4 transcendental deduction 28f.
self-fulfilling prophecies 68 transition 19f.
self-identity 94f. trans-individuality 85f.
self-knowledge 3f. transpersonal 15f.
sensualism l75f. trust 131
services 199f. truth 14lf., 147f.
significance 14lf.
socialism 194 Oberbau 184
social sciences 137f. universalization 170
society 97f., 177f. universality 143
Socratic maxim 152 universe l09f., 164
Spirit 3ff. Unterbau 184
stability 159f. USSR 197
state 196f. utopia 177f.
state of affairs 80f.
steam engine 164 value, values 135f.
'strahlende Werte' 93 values plurality 143f.
subjects 26f. velocity 159f.
subjective 144 verbal communication 101
subjectivism 174 verification 180
substantive contents 93f. Verstehen 45f.
subsistence 190f. Vietnam War 172
substratum 30f. vogues 167f.
success 169f. Volkssele 86
succession passim Vorwelt 87
technical efficiency 164 warfare 164

technology 54f., 165f., 200 Welfare State 199f.
te/os 58 well-being 201
Teutonic myth 67 West 197
Teutonic race 157f. Western Civilization 53
theoria 146 will 4, 86, 126
theory 6ff. work of art 111
Theory of Relativity 99 World War II 162f.
Third World 192
Tikkun 55 youth 168
totality 203
traditional society 168f. Zeitgeist 160f., 183f.

Rotenstreich Time and Meaning in History 1987

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Rotenstreich Time and Meaning in History 1987

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TIME AND MEANING IN HISTORY

BOSTON STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

ROBERT S. COHEN, Boston University

Editorial Advisory Board

ADOLF GRUNBAUM, University of Pittsburgh

D. REIDEL PUBLISHING COMPANY

Rotenstreich, Nathan, 1914-

(Boston studies in the philosophy of science; v. 101)

Published by D. Reidel Publishing Company,

Sold and distributed in the U.S.A. and Canada

In all other countries, sold and distributed

All Rights Reserved

Editorial Preface Vll

Chapter 1: The Status of History 1

INDEX OF NAMES 215

INDEX OF SUBJECTS 217

There are several characteristics of Nathan Rotenstreich's work which

Nathan Rotenstreich is Ahad Ha'am Professor of Philosophy at the

June 1987 ROBERT S. COHEN

The present book approaches the domain and the phenomenon of

I wish to thank Professor Robert S. Cohen for his continued interest in

Jerusalem, 1987 N.R.

THE STATUS OF HISTORY

Our concern in the present analysis is the question of history, with

most prominent. History is more than a series of occurrences, since

Underlying the various philosophical approaches to the problem of the

Hegel's approach to thy problem is based on his conception of history as

Thyself," is fulfilled. 2 The implication is that history serves as a field for

dynamics of reflection. Freedom exhibits essentially the self-referential

property. Only because history is there, and identified as such, does

In contrast to Hegel's approach to the problem of history, and as a

have developed from an intra-historical starting point. Marx does not

of the historical process on a hidden spiritual treasure which it reveals,

cal deScription of human existence is of man as a historical being, while

without being determined by economic factors. Marx's shift towards

when we cling to the distinction between an efficient and a final cause,

momentarily arrest its incessant activity, in order to grasp the im-

future in this sense. Were he not to assume this connection between

whether Heidegger's concern with historicity amounts to a concern with

and non-authentic seems to be inapplicable to the sphere of history, in

tion of intentionality is being interpreted as synonymous with anticipa-

transcending of the present moment - "the here and now". That

Our approach to the problem involves abandoning the attempt to

in terms of its final or efficient cause, but to analyze the historical

be formulated as follows: Whereas man-made crystallizations such as

have already observed that transcending the present moment is the

The methodical and thematic fruitfulness of an approach to the problem

historical consciousness, qua relatedness to time as an open structure,

Let us comment on the impact of these two experiences from a broader

genealogical dependence in its primary sense relates to the attitude of

THE SUBJECT AND PROCESS

We began our exploration with the awareness of time by concrete

interpretation and time, no subsumption of events under "laws" can do

To pursue this cntlque, we must ascertain again the distinguishing

be unreal, since it lacks a present aspect ex hypothesi - and thus that

Whether the subject occupies a position in the conceptual structure of

(a) The metaphysical deduction of concepts: There is no fixed reservoir

development, however, epistemological thought adopted a different

(b) The descriptive method: It is equally futile to adduce the givenness of

subject of events, rather than a nexus or process of events; the events

A. The substratum. Historical research starts from a datum in the

datum must be conceived of as an expression, attribute, or effect of an

Hence we must seek, not the methodical-transcendental assumption

nor possible to unify diverse phenomena, because their diversity is due-