Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
Profession
Noel Cox
and
Tom Odhiambo Ojienda
Published by The World Bank and the Law Society of Kenya
ISBN XX
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TABLE OF CONTENTS:
PREFACE...................................................................................................6
FORWARD.................................................................................................7
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY........................................................................8
ACRONYMS............................................................................................21
I SCOPE OF REPORT........................................................................22
1.1 Regulation of entry into the Legal Profession...................................22
1.2 Maintenance of a disciplinary system................................................23
1.3 Specific Objective (Scope of Work)...................................................23
II TECHNICAL TASKS......................................................................24
III INTRODUCTION........................................................................25
IV THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF THE DISCIPLINARY
BODIES....................................................................................................27
4.1 Theoretical background......................................................................27
4.2 Kenyan situation................................................................................37
V COMPARATIVE STUDY................................................................43
5.1 AUSTRALIA.....................................................................................46
5.1.1 Regulatory authorities........................................................................47
5.1.2 Disciplinary authorities......................................................................47
5.1.3 The Court’s “inherent jurisdiction”....................................................48
5.1.4 Solicitors and barristers......................................................................48
5.1.5 Professional associations....................................................................48
5.2 CANADA...........................................................................................52
5.2.1 Federal system....................................................................................52
5.2.2 Nova Scotia legal profession..............................................................52
5.2.3 Ontario legal profession.....................................................................52
5.2.4 Investigative role................................................................................53
5.2.5 Right of review...................................................................................53
5.2.6 Adjudicative role................................................................................53
5.3 ENGLAND AND WALES.................................................................55
5.3.1 Barristers............................................................................................55
5.3.2 Solicitors............................................................................................56
5.3.3 Investigative role................................................................................58
5.3.4 Adjudicative role................................................................................60
5.4 NEW ZEALAND...............................................................................61
5.4.1 Complaints about bills.......................................................................63
5.4.2 Other avenues.....................................................................................63
5.4.3 New system from 2007/2008.............................................................64
5.5 SOUTH AFRICA...............................................................................67
5.5.1 Attorneys............................................................................................67
5.5.2 Advocates...........................................................................................68
5.6 TANZANIA.......................................................................................70
5.6.1 Advocates...........................................................................................70
5.7 UGANDA..........................................................................................71
5.7.1 Advocates...........................................................................................71
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5.8.1 Specific jurisdictions..........................................................................73
5.8.2 Over-arching conclusions...................................................................74
VI DISCIPLINARY STRUCTURES................................................76
6.1 Review the policy, legal and administrative framework for
addressing advocates (including those in public service), the ethical
issues in place today and the feasibility of previous consultancy
recommendations in view of the passage of time..........................................76
6.2 Admission..........................................................................................79
6.3 Legal education..................................................................................80
6.4 Intervention and account monitoring.................................................82
6.5 Conclusion.........................................................................................83
VII THE ADVOCATES COMPLAINTS COMMISSION.................84
7.1 Introduction........................................................................................84
7.2 Historical background........................................................................84
7.3 Institutional and operational framework of the Advocates
Complaints Commission................................................................................87
7.4 The role of the Commission...............................................................95
7.5 The Advocates (Complaints Commission) (Structure and
Procedure) Rules 2003.................................................................................100
7.6 The administration of the Commission............................................102
7.7 The procedure for dealing with complaints.....................................107
7.8 Possible limitation of the role of the Commission...........................109
7.9 A Review of the shortcomings of the Advocates Complaints
Commission..................................................................................................110
7.10 Duplication of Functions and Responsibilities.................................111
7.11 The independence of the Advocates Complaints Commission
113
7.12 Lack of Proper Rules of Procedure..................................................116
7.13 Lack of Representation of the Law Society of Kenya.....................117
7.14 The Legality Principle under Criminal Law....................................118
7.15 A Legal Profession Ombudsman......................................................118
VIII THE DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE.......................................120
8.1 Review the structure and administration of the advocates
Disciplinary Committee and propose reforms in the light of
international best practices...........................................................................120
8.1.1 Establishment...................................................................................120
8.1.2 Standing before the committee........................................................124
8.1.3 Mandate, Powers and Jurisdiction...................................................125
8.1.4 Power to Receive and Determine Complaints.................................126
8.1.5 Jurisdiction to determine Costs/Fees................................................128
8.1.6 Orders of the Committee and Enforcement.....................................130
8.1.7 Findings of the Committee and Appeal............................................131
8.1.8 Where there is an appeal by the Advocate to the High Court..........132
8.1.9 Final Order.......................................................................................132
8.1.10 Power to Recommend Restoration...................................................133
8.1.11 Others: Disciplinary Powers as to Clerks........................................133
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8.1.12 Rules of Procedure...........................................................................134
8.2 Propose specific ways to convert the Disciplinary Committee
into an efficient and affective tribunal providing justice to the
aggrieved and the profession in a fair and expeditious manner...................135
IX THE REGIONAL ETHICS COMMITTEES AND THE
DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE............................................................141
9.1 Propose ways of harmonizing the work of the Advocates
Disciplinary Committee with that of The Law Society of Kenya
regional ethics panels...................................................................................141
X ADVOCATES’ PRACTICE RULES AND CODE OF CONDUCT
144
10.1 Review and propose amendments to the pending proposals for
the amendment of the advocates’ practice rules and code of conduct to
enhance the ethical conduct of advocates....................................................144
10.1.1 Current Advocates’ Practice Rules and Code of Conduct................144
10.1.2 Digest of Professional Conduct and Etiquette.................................148
10.1.3 Proposed amendments to the Advocates’ Practice Rules and
Code of Conduct..........................................................................................176
XI CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS........................189
11.1 CONCLUSIONS..............................................................................189
11.2 RECOMMENDATIONS.................................................................191
11.3 REVIEW STRATEGY.....................................................................201
XII ANNEXES..................................................................................202
12.1 TERMS OF REFERENCE..............................................................202
12.2 REPORT OF THE WORKSHOP ON CAPACITY BUILDING
OF THE ADVOCATES COMPLAINTS COMMISSION AND THE
DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE – 12th May 2007, Imperial Hotel,
Kisumu.........................................................................................................209
12.3 REPORT OF THE WORKSHOP ON CAPACITY BUILDING
OF THE ADVOCATES COMPLAINTS COMMISSION AND THE
DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE – 26th May 2007, Sarova Whitesands
Beach Resort, Mombasa..............................................................................233
12.4 REPORT OF THE WORKSHOP ON CAPACITY BUILDING
OF THE ADVOCATES COMPLAINTS COMMISSION AND THE
DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE – 2nd June 2007, Sarova Stanley
Hotel, Nairobi...............................................................................................252
12.5 NOTE ON AUTHORS.....................................................................269
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY...................................................................270
INDEX....................................................................................................276
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PREFACE:
In the early part of 2007 The Law Society of Kenya, through the
Governance, Justice, Law and Order Sector Reform Programme
(“GJLOS”) of Kenya, undertook a review of the disciplinary machinery
of the legal profession. This work, conducted by a team of consultants,
was intended, inter alia, to review progress since the 2002 “Review of
the Effectiveness of the Disciplinary Committee of The Law Society of
Kenya and the Complaints Commission” by Mr. Mark Stobbs of the
International Bar Association. This book is the result.
One of the major challenges facing the world today is the relative
fragility of democracy, transparency, and the rule of law in many
countries. This report, though intended for the benefit of Kenya, is a rich
resource for other countries that might wish to review the disciplinary
mechanisms for their legal professions, or other learned professions.
Noel Cox
6
FORWARD:
Dear Madam,
yours sincerely,
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Executive Summary
1. The Governance, Justice, Law and Order Sector Reform Programme
(“GJLOS”) of Kenya has as one of its objectives addressing the
shortcomings in the formal justice system, and facilitating the
implementation of reforms to strengthen institutions within the
sector. The Ministry of Justice has identified a number of priorities
in relation to the legal profession. These priorities include fighting
corruption, promoting judicial reform, promoting legal reform,
improving access to justice, and improving legal education,
including continuing legal education. One aspect of this programme
is ensuring that the ethical and disciplinary procedures of the legal
profession are sufficiently robust to meet international standards of
impartiality and effectiveness.
2. This Report examines the current state of the disciplinary procedures
for advocates in Kenya, in the context of a comparison with the
practise in several other countries. As a learned profession at the
heart of society, the legal profession must adhere to high ethical
standards. International best practise provides guidance as to how
this might be achieved, though there are no prescriptive
requirements. This process does not make any assumptions as to
whether the state of the legal profession in Kenya is more or less
corrupt or prone to malpractice than what might be deemed the
international norm. There is little empirical evidence available on
this question. It is sufficient that there are certain international
standards to which legal professions are customarily assessed with
respect to their disciplinary processes.
3. The Report was written after reviewing the legislative, policy and
administrative structures in which the disciplinary system is based,
and included consideration of broader aspects such as the advocates’
practice rules and code of conduct, the regional ethics committees of
The Law Society of Kenya, and the ethics content of the Advocates
Training Programme. As the context of the review is to benchmark
Kenyan practice with international best practice documentary
analysis coupled with observation of process and discussion with
stakeholders provided the necessary empirical evidence. This was
then analysed in the light of current best practice for the maintenance
of professional ethics.
4. The Report comprises a report on a comparison of disciplinary
processes in a number of other countries, followed by a review of the
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disciplinary procedures at present operating in Kenya. This involves
the Advocates Complaints Commission and the Disciplinary
Committee, as well as the regional ethics committees of The Law
Society of Kenya. This second section includes a number of
recommendations for change. The final section includes a review of
the present code of professional conduct and a proposed draft
expansion of this.
5. The present system in general is comparable with that operating in
other countries. However, there is considerable room for
improvement in both the Advocates Complaints Commission and the
Disciplinary Committee. The former is not operating as effectively
as it should, largely through under-funding, but also because its
administrative processes are unsuited to dealing with the large
number of complaints it receives. Various recommendations are
made to correct this problem. The key recommendations are the
introduction of a computerised case-management system, and the
appointment of additional staff.
6. One objective of this Report was to assess the relevance of the 2002
report entitled, “Review of the Effectiveness of the Disciplinary
Committee of The Law Society of Kenya and the Complaints
Commission” by Mr. Mark Stobbs of the International Bar
Association.1 Although that report is now some five years old most
of the recommendations it contained remain valid, and have not been
overtaken by events.
7. Abolition of either the Advocates Complaints Commission or the
Disciplinary Committee would not be in the best interests of the
legal profession or the country. Nor would amalgamation of these
bodies be consistent with international best practice.
8. The regional ethics committees are a worthwhile contribution to the
disciplinary machinery, but are insufficiently robust to replace either
the Advocates Complaints Commission or the Disciplinary
Committee. Recommendations to strengthen their role, particularly
as a filter mechanism, have been included.
9. The Disciplinary Committee is not effective. It does not provide a
sufficiently robust sanction for errant advocates. Among the
recommendations for correcting this situation are changes to the
membership and the procedure of the Committee.
1
Law Society of Kenya/International Bar Association, “Review of the
Effectiveness of the Disciplinary Committee and the Complaints
Commission” (the Stobbs Report) (Law Society of Kenya, Nairobi,
2002).
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10. The current code of ethics for the legal profession is insufficiently
broad and detailed to meet the international standard for best
practice. A more comprehensive draft code is suggested as a starting
point for the development of a new code – a process which must
involve the legal profession and elements of the wider community.
Summary of Recommendations
11. The following 83 recommendations are made:
Recommendation 1: It is recommended that the Advocates Act be
amended to ensure that the Advocates Complaints Commission has
jurisdiction over former practitioners, subject to the qualification that the
conduct complained of must relate to their practise as advocates, and not
to any judicial, prosecutorial or other role they may previous or
subsequently have held (para 222).
Recommendation 2: It is recommended that affidavits and references in
support of applicants for admission be required in all cases. References
in support of applicants should be from two people of standing in the
community (not being close relatives), and from an advocate in
possession of a current practising certificate and against whom there is
no outstanding complaint before the Law Society, Advocates Complaints
Commission or Disciplinary Committee (para 229).
Recommendation 3: It is recommended that the Law Society continues
to work closely with the Council of Legal Education to ensure that the
Advocates Training Programme (“ATP”) provides the best model of
training, particularly as it relates to professional ethics and etiquette, and
account keeping (para 235).
Recommendation 4: It is recommended that the operation of the ATP be
reviewed by the Council of Legal Education after the first year in which
it is offered to ensure that the objectives are being met (para 236).
Recommendation 5: It is recommended that professional ethics be
included in any compulsory continuing legal education requirements for
advocates, both junior and the more experienced (para 239).
Recommendation 6: It is recommended that the Law Society conduct
regular audits of advocates’ accounts, using their own accountant, or an
independent auditor reporting to the Society, for the purpose, and that
this be provided for by regulations under the Advocates Act (para 242).
Recommendation 7: It is recommended that an advocates fidelity fund
be instituted, funded from a percentage of the practising certificate fee,
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for the compensation of clients for losses due to the malpractice of
advocates (para 244).
Recommendation 8: It is recommended that the term of office for
commissioners of the Advocates Complaints Commission should be two
years, renewable, and that they should be provided with security of
tenure (para 260).
Recommendation 9: It is recommended that consideration be given to
defining misconduct more formally, not so as to restrict its scope, but so
as to clarify the distinction between professional misconduct and
inadequate professional services (para 292).
Recommendation 10: It is recommended that consideration be given to
defining inadequate professional services more formally, as part of a
revision of the Advocates (Practice) Rules (para 295).
Recommendation 11: It is recommended that the Advocates Complaints
Commission and Disciplinary Committee be clearly empowered to
investigate and prosecute and to try former advocates for their actions
while advocates (para 298).
Recommendation 12: It is recommended that, on the authority of s 54(3)
of the Advocates Act, the Attorney-General should, in consultation with
the Law Society, make comprehensive rules of procedure to guide the
operations of the Advocates Complaints Commission. This means that
the discretion of the Commissioners to make their own rules of
procedure, as envisaged by Rule 11 of the Advocates (Complaints
Commission) (Structure and Procedure) Rules 2003, should be reduced
(para 307).
Recommendation 13: It is recommended that there be a minimum of
three Commissioners in the Advocates Complaints Commission, as the
workload of the Commission is sufficient to justify at least this number
of judicially-qualified officers or others of comparable seniority (para
309).
Recommendation 14: It is recommended that further legally-qualified
staff be employed by the Advocates Complaints Commission (para 312).
Recommendation 15: It is recommended that investment be made in
adequate office space and filing facilities, and technical support
equipment such as photocopiers, scanners, and printers, for the
Commission (para 316).
Recommendation 16: It is recommended that formal training for
prosecutors in prosecution techniques be entrusted to a second
Commissioner with suitable prosecutorial and management experience
(para 317).
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Recommendation 17: It is recommended that a number of more senior
State Counsel be appointed to the staff of the Advocates Complaints
Commission (para 319).
Recommendation 18: It is recommended that the Advocates Complaints
Commission and Disciplinary Committee computer-based case
management systems be integrated as far as practical – subject to the
same (joint) tendering process (para 322).
Recommendation 19: It is recommended that the offices of the
Commission remain in Nairobi until it can be clearly shown that the
advantages of decentralisation outweigh the additional costs and
management complexities of decentralisation (para 326).
Recommendation 20: It is understood that Swahili translations of the
Advocates Complaints Commission publicity materials and forms are to
be provided, and it is recommended that this be done as a matter of
urgency (para 331).
Recommendation 21: It is recommended that all complainants to the
Advocates Complaints Commission be required to pay a small filing fee,
and that the Commission be empowered to make an award of costs
against a complainant in exceptional circumstances where the complaint
is deemed to be frivolous and vexatious (para 335).
Recommendation 22: It is recommended that no complaint be accepted
by the Advocates Complaints Commission after more than six years
after the cause of action arose (para 335336).
Recommendation 23: It is recommended that consideration be given to
having the legislation reflect more accurately the fact that complaints are
not merely referred to the Disciplinary Committee by the Advocates
Complaints Commission but are prosecuted by the Commission before
the Committee (para 337).
Recommendation 24: In conformity with the view expressed in the
Stobbs Report, it is recommended that the Commission lose the ability
to make determinations, and confine its role to investigation and
prosecution, with a supporting mediation and conciliation role (para
339).
Recommendation 25: It is recommended that the Commission lose the
power to examine witnesses on oath, as this role should be restricted to
the Disciplinary Committee, and the power to tax bills of cost (para 339)
Recommendation 26: It is recommended that the Ethics and Compliance
Committee confine its role to the regular and systematic review of the
advocates’ practice rules and code of conduct, and that it consequently
relinquish the dispute resolution role (para 351).
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Recommendation 27: Due to the limited resources of the Law Society it
is recommended that the Society investigate complaints and prosecute
only in exceptional circumstances, thus allowing it to concentrate upon
regulatory and representational functions (para 363).
Recommendation 28: To ensure that the independence of the Advocates
Complaints Commission is buttressed, and its legitimacy enhanced, it is
recommended that the Commissioners should be appointed by the
President on the recommendation of the Law Society of Kenya (para
368).
Recommendation 29: In addition, the determination of the remuneration
of the Commissioners by way of salary, allowance, pension or gratuity
should be removed from the presidency. As in the case of the
Disciplinary Committee, the remuneration of the Commissioners should
be determined by the Attorney-General in consultation with the
Treasury. This is so recommended (para 369).
Recommendation 30: It is recommended that the Advocates Complaints
Commission should be made independent of the Office of the Attorney-
General, as a stand-alone agency, with its own independent budget (para
370).
Recommendation 31: It is recommended that to ensure that the
Advocates Complaints Commission gets the staff it requires to maintain
and preserve its independence, integrity and efficiency, the Chairman of
the Advocates Complaints Commission should be empowered to select
his or her own staff (para 371).
Recommendation 32: It is recommended that the Advocates (Complaints
Commission) (Structure and Procedure) Rules be amended to include
specific provisions for the conduct of the Commission’s proceedings
(para 373).
Recommendation 33: It is recommended that Advocates Complaints
Commission be renamed the Advocates Investigation Commission (para
377).
Recommendation 34: To counter the defect inherent in s 53(3A) of the
Advocates Act, that is, the failure to stipulate the sentence for the
offence created therein, it is recommended that the Act should be
amended to stipulate the sentence to be meted out to a person convicted
of the offence. Consequently, the defect will be cured (para 380).
Recommendation 35: It is recommended that an independent Legal
Profession Ombudsman be appointed, by the Attorney-General, with the
tasks described (para 382).
13
Recommendation 36: It is recommended that the term for advocate
members of the Disciplinary Committee be two years, with a right of
renewal (para 387).
Recommendation 37: Although it is good practice to include lay
members in the Disciplinary Committee, it is recommended that care is
taken to ensure both that appropriate people are selected, and that they
and the advocate members of the Committee understand their respective
roles (para 388).
Recommendation 38: The lay members are full members of the
Committee, and should be involved in the deliberate and decision-
making processes. An induction process is recommended (para 388).
Recommendation 39: The Advocates Act currently allows for the
possibility of a Disciplinary Committee sitting with solely lay members.
It is recommended that this possibility be removed (para 392).
Recommendation 40: It is recommended that there should be at least one
lay and one advocate member present at each hearing of the Disciplinary
Committee, and at least three in total (para 392393).
Recommendation 41: It is recommended that the number of advocates in
the Disciplinary Committee be increased to nine, and that three of these
must be of at least twenty years standing (para 394).
Recommendation 42: The co-option of advocates is important even if
the permanent membership of the Committee is increased, and it is
recommended that the recommendation with respect to co-option be
implemented (para 396).
Recommendation 43: It is recommended that the Attorney-General and
Solicitor-General be excluded from the membership of the Disciplinary
Committee (para 397).
Recommendation 44: It is recommended that the Attorney-General
appoint the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Disciplinary
Committee (both to be advocates or judicial officers) on the
recommendation of Judicial Services Commission, and that these should
be appointments in lieu of the Law Officers. There should continue to be
representatives of the Attorney-General and Solicitor-General (para
397).
Recommendation 45: It is recommended that the Chairman or Deputy,
but not both, should be a judge, but that this not necessarily be a
statutory requirement (para 399).
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Recommendation 46: It is recommended that the Stobbs Report
recommendation with respect to including more junior advocates not be
implemented at this time (para 400).
Recommendation 47: The Secretary to The Law Society of Kenya is
also Secretary to the Disciplinary Committee. While the Disciplinary
Committee remains an organ of the law society a close linkage is
appropriate. However, as recommended in the Stobbs Report, it is
recommended that the Secretary should cease to be Secretary of the
Committee (para 401).
Recommendation 48: Once a matter has been listed for hearing before
the Committee, the requirements of service must be pursuant to the Civil
Procedure Rules (para 412).
Recommendation 49: An order of the High Court against an advocate
may be appealed against by the aggrieved advocate to the Court of
Appeal of Kenya. It is recommended that the right of appeal be extended
to all parties (para 425).
Recommendation 50: There is a provision for direct referral of
complaints to the Disciplinary Committee by the Advocates Complaints
Commission. This is apparently rarely used as the Disciplinary
Committee will usually refer these back to the Commission if it is
realised that full investigations were not carried out. It is recommended
that this provision be abolished, as the time of the Disciplinary
Committee should not be occupied in considering charges which have
not been fully investigated (para 436).
Recommendation 51: The recommendation of the Stobbs Report was
that the Committee should have the option to hear cases under a
summary procedure to enable the simpler, less serious cases to be heard
speedily. It is recommended that a summary procedure of this sort be
implemented (para 440).
Recommendation 52: The Stobbs Report recommended the appointment
of a Directions Officer with similar functions to a Master in the court.
This officer would deal with uncontroversial and administrative matters
and set timetables and make other orders to ensure that a case is ready
for hearing. It is recommended that this recommendation be
implemented (para 443).
Recommendation 53: There was uncertainty as to whether the
Disciplinary Committee had the power to summon witnesses. It is
recommended that it be given this power (para 444).
Recommendation 54: Recommendation 17 of the Stobbs Report called
for a procedure for dealing with advocates who fall ill prior to hearings.
15
It is recommended that this is implemented, including a procedure for
dealing with advocates who wilfully absent themselves from the
Disciplinary Committee in an effort to frustrate its operation (para 444).
Recommendation 55: It is recommended that recommendation 35 of the
Stobbs Report, that the rules should contain sanctions to encourage
advocates to prosecute appeals expeditiously and to penalise frivolous
appeals, should be implemented (para 446).
Recommendation 56: It is recommended that the implementation of the
computer-based case management system recommended by the Stobbs
Report (recommendations 2 and 24) should proceed as a matter of
urgency (para 448).
Recommendation 57: It is recommended that any software and hardware
acquired for the case management system be subject to a pilot study, in
parallel with the existing manual system, so that the members and
secretariat of the Disciplinary Committee, Advocates Complaints
Commission and Law Society of Kenya can become familiar with its
operation and its effectiveness is assured (para 448).
Recommendation 58: The Stobbs Report recommended
(recommendation 3) that the computerised case-management system
should be built to a carefully considered specification and be subject to
tender (recommendation 3). It is recommended that this is best practice
and should be followed (para 450).
Recommendation 59: It is recommended that consideration should be
given to imposing a higher level of fines as a matter of practice (para
452).
Recommendation 60: Recommendation 35 of the Stobbs Report was that
for consistency, the Committee, in consultation with the Commission
and the Chief Justice, should prepare guidelines setting out its policy on
sentencing. It is recommended that guidelines be prepared, with the
qualification that these would be for guidance merely, and not
prescriptive (para 452).
Recommendation 61: It is recommended that the judiciary should be
notified promptly of any advocate who has been suspended from
practice or struck off the Roll of Advocates, and that those so suspended
or struck off not be permitted to continue practice through membership
of a firm (para 454).
Recommendation 62: To render the process of notifying the judiciary of
those advocates who have been struck off the Roll by the Disciplinary
Committee more effective, and to enable the Law Society to maintain
the most up-to-date record of its membership, currently practising
16
advocates, and those who have been struck off – or suspended – it is
recommended that the Law Society acquire a computer database to
record this information (para 455).
Recommendation 63: It is recommended that the prosecutorial powers of
the Law Society over those persons purporting to be advocates be
revived (para 456).
Recommendation 64: It is recommended that the powers of the
Disciplinary Committee be extended to include making orders for
supervision of practise by senior named advocate or advocates (para
457).
Recommendation 65: It is recommended that the Discipline Committee
publish the names of advocates against whom a final judgement has
been entered (para 458).
Recommendation 66: It is recommended that hearings should also be
publicised in the general press, to allow members of the public and of
the news media to be present if they so wish (para 459).
Recommendation 67: Although The Law Society of Kenya has actively
sought to collect fines from convicted advocates, it is clear that further
investment in enforcement processes is warranted, and this is
recommended (para 460).
Recommendation 68: It is recommended that the Disciplinary
Committee be assigned an independent budget and dedicated staff (para
461).
Recommendation 69: It is recommended that the Disciplinary
Committee be able to travel on circuit and hear cases away from Nairobi
(para 462).
Recommendation 70: It is recommended that Disciplinary Committee be
renamed the Advocates Disciplinary Tribunal (para 463).
Recommendation 71: It is recommended that the Ethics and Compliance
Committee should be composed of five members from each branch of
The Law Society of Kenya, and sit quarterly in on circuit in each of the
branches (para 469).
Recommendation 72: It is recommended that the members of the Ethics
and Compliance Committee should be advocates of at least five years
standing, and that the conveners should be advocates of at least ten years
standing (para 471).
Recommendation 73: It is recommended that consideration be given to
encouraging the regional ethics panels to act as de facto agents of the
17
Commission. They could act as repositories for complaints, which
would then be passed to the Commission in Nairobi. But, perhaps more
importantly, they can provide in the provinces the type of mediation and
alternative dispute resolution function carried out in Nairobi by the
Commission (para 472).
Recommendation 74: It is recommended that the responsibility of the
ethics committees should include handling disputes between advocates
(para 473).
Recommendation 75: In order to strengthen the ethics committees and
allow them to operate in concert with the Advocates Complaints
Commission, it is recommended that rules of procedure for the
committees be adopted (para 474).
Recommendation 76: It is recommended that the regional ethics
committees be provided with simple information sheets, outlining for
inquirers the role of the committees, the Law Society, the Advocates
Complaints Commission and the Disciplinary Committee (para 475).
Recommendation 77: It is recommended that the Law Society provide
all advocates with copies of the current Advocates (Practice) Rules when
they are sent their next practising certificate, and that any amendments
are also sent, by the Law Society, to all advocates in practise whenever
these amendments are enacted (para 478).
Recommendation 78: The Advocates (Practice) Rules are comparatively
brief, with 14 rules – 12 of them substantive rules. It is recommended
that consideration be given to consolidating the Advocates (Accounts)
Rules, the Advocates (Accountant’s Certificate) Rules, and the
Advocate’s (Deposit Interest) Rules into one single set of Rules. The
Advocates (Practice) Rules should remain separate, and all should be
subject to comprehensive review to ensure that they reflect
contemporary good practice (para 487).
Recommendation 79: Rule 14 of the Advocates (Practice) Rules
provides that “The Council of the Law Society of Kenya shall have
power to waive in writing any of the provisions of these Rules in any
particular case”. It is recommended that this be qualified (para 489).
Recommendation 80: It is recommended that this rule be amended to
read “The Council of the Law Society of Kenya shall have power to
waive in writing any of the provisions of these Rules in any particular
case where it is just and proper to do so” (para 489).
Recommendation 81: It is recommended that certain general ethical
requirements be included in the Advocates (Practice) Rules (para 492).
18
Recommendation 82: The draft code of ethics is offered as a starting
point for debate, and it is recommended that the views of the profession
be sought with respect to the specific content of the code (para 495).
Recommendation 83: It is recommended that only one set of enforceable
rules exist, either the Advocates (Practice) Rules – as amended in para
494 or otherwise – or the proposed Rules of Professional Practise
Conduct and Etiquette of the Council of the Law Society of Kenya (in
para 484, as modified) (para 496).
REVIEW STRATEGY
12. The Law Society of Kenya has primary responsibility for the
maintenance of professional standards in the legal profession.
Following acceptance of this Report it is proposed that the following
action takes place:
19
Commission and Disciplinary Committee, and Law Society
of Kenya;
20
ACRONYMS
21
I SCOPE OF REPORT
14. The Governance, Justice, Law and Order Sector Reform Programme
has as one of its objectives the addressing of shortcomings in the
formal justice system, and facilitating the implementation of reforms
to strengthen institutions within the sector. The Ministry of Justice
has identified a number of priorities in relation to the legal
profession. These priorities include fighting corruption, promoting
judicial reform, promoting legal reform, improving access to justice,
and improving legal education, including continuing legal education.
One aspect of this programme is ensuring that the ethical and
disciplinary procedures of the legal profession are sufficiently robust
to meet international standards of impartiality and effectiveness. It is
important to ensure the quality, accountability, transparency and
independence of the legal profession in Kenya.
15. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (The
World Bank), by Institutional Development Fund Letter-Agreement
of 12th October 2004, granted the Government of Kenya US$256,000
to strengthen standards and ethics in the legal profession, and the
Continuing Legal Education programme.
16. The World Bank/IDF Grant No. TF 054290 Capacity building for the
Legal Profession, Component A: Capacity building of the Advocates
Complaints Commission and the Disciplinary Committee is the
specific aspect of this programme that is reflected in this Report.
17. Part of the GJLOS programme, the narrower context of this review
is the formal role played by the organs of The Law Society of Kenya
charged with the maintenance of professional ethical standards; the
Disciplinary Committee and the Advocates Complaints Commission.
2
Advocates Act (Cap 16 of the Laws of Kenya) s 15.
22
1.2 Maintenance of a disciplinary system
19. Every advocate is subject to the jurisdiction of the Disciplinary
Committee3 that is established by s 59 of the Advocates Act, Chapter
16 of the Laws of Kenya and mandated to deal with offences or
misconduct by an advocate. The Law Society of Kenya acts as the
secretariat of the Disciplinary Committee and the Secretary of the
Society is the secretary of the Committee. Members of the
Disciplinary Committee are elected from the membership of The
Law Society of Kenya and the Society is therefore involved in the
regulation of its own members.
20. Through its Institutional Development Fund the World Bank has
undertaken to assist the legal profession through The Law Society of
Kenya in fulfilling its mandate to strengthen the skills and
professional conduct of the members of the legal profession in the
delivery of legal services to the government and the larger public in
all matters relating to the administration of justice in Kenya. This
grant will further enhance the work already undertaken on this
programme and assist the Law Society to improve the regulation of
the membership and provide Kenyan lawyers, through The Law
Society of Kenya, with the knowledge, techniques and best practices
required to ensure that the Advocates Complaints Commission and
the Disciplinary Committee can adequately apply and enforce the
standards provided in the Advocates Act.
3
Advocates Act (Cap 16 of the Laws of Kenya) s 55.
23
awareness amongst advocates of the regulations to improve
professional legal standards and ethics.
24. The International Consultant shall work in concert with the other
consultants to facilitate one (1) national workshop to determine
policies and draft rules for professional legal standards and ethics for
the legal profession, which will result in the adoption of regulations
to improve the delivery, ownership and sustainability of Professional
Legal Standards and Ethics in Kenya.
25. In carrying out the above-noted tasks, the Consultant shall refer to
the recommendations made by Mr. Mark Stobbs of the International
Bar Association in his report entitled, “Review of the Effectiveness
of the Disciplinary Committee of The Law Society of Kenya and the
Complaints Commission.” The Consultant shall aim to incorporate
those Recommendations in the course of his or her research, and
implement the Recommendations within the Report, including a
proposal for legislative reform.
II TECHNICAL TASKS
The technical tasks covered by this report include the following:
26. Preparation of a report on a comparative study of the enforcement of
ethical standards used by Commonwealth Countries. The study
should include the United Kingdom, South Africa and Australia and
any other countries Professor Noel Cox deemed relevant.
27. Presentation of the findings of the report at a national workshop to
discuss the existing framework for enforcement of professional
ethics and to develop a strategy for the review of the framework by
the Bar. The role of the Kenyan Bar in the adoption, implementation
and enforcement of professional ethics was also to be discussed and
comparative models compared with the purpose of adopting best
practices.
28. A study of the existing capacity in Kenya’s legal profession to
enforce ethical standards within the profession.
29. Facilitation of three local chapter workshops to discuss the existing
framework for the enforcement of professional ethics.
30. Facilitation of one national workshop to discuss the existing
framework for enforcement of professional ethics and to develop a
strategy for the review of the framework by the Bar.
24
III INTRODUCTION
31. In the course of preparing this Report many people involved in one
way or another with the disciplinary processes were interviewed.
The International Consultant was in Kenya 2 nd-14th April, and 24th
May-3rd June 2007. As well as observing a sitting of the Disciplinary
Committee, he met, inter alia, the following:
25
33. The Report comprises a report on a comparison of disciplinary
processes in a number of other countries, followed by a review of the
disciplinary procedures at present operating in Kenya. This involves
the Advocates Complaints Commission and the Disciplinary
Committee, as well as the regional ethics committees of The Law
Society of Kenya. This second section includes a number of
recommendations for changes. The final section includes a review of
the present codes of professional conduct and a proposed draft
expansion of these.
34. The scope and depth of this report was limited by the comparatively
short time-frame in which it was written. For this reason the
comparative study did not delve deeply to an assessment of the
effectiveness of each jurisdiction reviewed – this would have
required a considerable investment in time and effort. The focus was
therefore on the identification of structural similarities and
differences, and a review of legislative and regulatory provisions and
procedures.
35. Similarly, in conformity with the terms of reference to the
Consultants the review of the disciplinary machinery in Kenya
concentrated upon recommending improvements to the existing two
principal organs, rather than a wholesale restructuring. However, as
is shown in the body of this report, the general structure is consistent
with international practice, and no convincing case has been shown
for the abolition of either the Advocates Complaints Commission or
Disciplinary Committee, or indeed of the amalgamation of the two
bodies.
36. The assistance of The Law Society of Kenya, the World Bank, the
Disciplinary Committee, the Advocates Complaints Commission and
other institutions and individuals is acknowledged, particularly Dr.
Nightingale Rukuba-Ngaiza, the World Bank Task Team Leader.
26
IV THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF THE DISCIPLINARY
BODIES
4
George D. Finlayson, “Self Governance and the Legal Profession –
Can it Continue?” (1985) 4 Advocates’ Society Journal 11.
5
P.L.O. Lumumba, “The State of Legal Education in Kenya Today: A
critical Analysis”. Paper presented at the Conference of the Law Society
of Kenya under the theme; Lawyers at the Cross-roads: Defining the
Future of the Legal Profession, 15th September 2000.
6
Roscoe Pound, The Lawyer from Antiquity to Modern Times (West
Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn, 1953).
7
Benna Lutta, “The Role of the East African Lawyer” in Kivutha
Kibwana (ed), Human Rights and Democracy in East Africa: The
Constitutional Implication of East Africa Co-operation (East Africa Law
Society, 1997), pp. 16-32.
27
40. Consequently, to perform the said functions in the spirit of public
service, a high ethical and professional standard must be maintained
within the rank and file of the legal profession. The lawyer must
consequently, amongst others things, be of high integrity, probity,
honesty and competent. Like in any other profession, members of
the legal profession must shun those things which are likely to bring
the profession into disrepute. They must exhibit a great sense of
integrity, and, must give proper professional service. As
professionals, therefore, they should be viewed as a bulwark of
society, and not an obstacle to progress.
41. Of necessity, lawyers should identify themselves in a positive and
practical manner with the aspirations and efforts of the people they
serve. They should shirk complacency and constantly engage in the
reappraisal of values and methodologies. By so doing, lawyers will
be able to establish and justify their worth in society.
42. It is impossible to eliminate poverty, corruption and other major
evils of society without an efficient and effectively functioning legal
profession.
43. The need for lawyers to maintain a professional and ethical standard
becomes even more imperative when it is considered that they have
historically been regarded as constituting or belonging to a
profession. Western society traditionally restricted the term
“professional” to persons engaging in three activities: law, medicine
and the church though present day society have tended to add
accounting, architecture and engineering (and certain others) to the
list of professions. The notion that lawyers constitute a profession
holds sway in Kenya, as in the rest of the world.
44. As a profession, therefore, it is generally accepted that the members
thereof must adhere to a professional and ethical standard. Thus,
according to Professor J.B. Ojwang and D.R. Salter, “the often large
body of professionals invariably necessitates the establishment of
regulatory legislation; the adoption of controlling practices; the
fostering of certain norms and mores of professional culture; etc.” 8
This opinion is supported by Honourable Justice Professor Dr. G.W.
Kanyeihamba, who asserts as follows:
8
J.B. Ojwang & D.R. Salter, “The Legal Profession in Kenya” (1990)
34(1) Journal of Africa Law 9-26.
28
intimately affect the human being in its welfare, living and
health, namely the medical profession, the legal profession
and religion. The first controls a person’s health, the second
affects one’s existence, living and property and the third
affects and controls one’s will and spiritual wealth.9
45. In a similar vein O’Connor J. in Shapero v. Kentucky Bar
Association10 clearly put the position in the following words:
46. Yet it need not be over emphasized that lawyers have rarely been the
darlings of society, and this is discernible from many an epitaph
hardly complimentary of lawyers. Shakespeare’s “The first thing we
do, let’s kill all the lawyers”12 is but one of the oldest of many barbs
at the expense of lawyers, though in that case, although it belied the
author’s hostility to the profession, it also revealed an important
truth: the surest way to chaos and tyranny even then was to remove
the guardians of independent thinking.
47. The legal profession has existed for over two thousand years. From
the Greek city-states and the Roman Empire to present day, legal
advocates have played a vital and active role in the formulation and
administration of laws. Because of their role in society and their
close involvement in the administration of law, lawyers are subject
to special standards, regulation, and liability. Sometimes called legal
9
G.W. Kanyeihamba, “The Legal Profession, the Judiciary and Justice,”
Address at the Jurist of the Year Award Ceremony, 10 th December 2003,
the International Commission of Jurists (Kenya Section).
10
(1988) 486 VS 466.
11
Ibid at pp 488-489.
12
Dick’s advice in Henry VI.
29
ethics, sometimes professional responsibility, the topic is perhaps
most comprehensively described as the law governing lawyers.
48. It is a commonplace that legal professions will be self-governing or
at least co-regulating. This is partly because of their important role in
the legal system, but also because they constitute a learned
profession. At its broadest a profession may be seen as distinct from
a mere trade or occupation, and as such entitled to different
treatment before the law; different, but not necessarily privileged.
With great privileges come great responsibilities.
49. There is considerable international literature on professions, and
their regulation, and an important sub-set on the legal profession.
The 1979 British Royal Commission on legal services identified
what it thought were five main distinctive features of a profession.
Each profession has:
13
(1979) vol 1 at para 28, 30.
30
51. Sociological studies of professions have traditionally focused on
listing those activities which are accepted as professions in an
attempt to differentiate profession from non-profession. An
alternative approach holds that the ability to obtain and retain
professional status is closely related to concrete occupational
strategies and to wider social forces and arrangements of power.
Such an approach leads to a consideration of the social meaning of
occupational tasks (perhaps an easier task with the lawyer or doctor
than the architect), the resources behind the emergence and the
continuation of professionalism, and the social consequences of
professionalism.14 Sociologists sought to demonstrate that governing
bodies were unrepresentative and ineffective regulators; professions
lacked the expertise they claimed; admission criteria had little
relevance to the actual work of the professions; ethical rules were
motivated by economic self-interest and failed to ensure
competence; and professionals repeatedly betrayed clients.15
52. Producers of a service who succeed in constructing a marketable
commodity only become an occupation. To become a profession
they must seek social exclusivity. The consumer must acknowledge
the value of the producers’ services, and must be convinced that they
cannot produce the services themselves.16 Structural functionalists
argue that this is not a conscious, self-interested strategy, but is
simply the means by which society ensures that consumers receive
quality services. Quality is maintained through controls on entry.17
To promote competition the free-market advocates would reduce the
controls on entry into professions, ignoring the fact that this is a
means of maintaining standards in the public interest. If it were
indeed true that professional status is for the benefit of the
professional, then one would require strong evidence of some
countervailing public benefit to justify any monopoly.18
53. The American Bar Association’s Commission on Professionalism
identified a profession with the placing of the interests of others
ahead of one’s own. In the case of the lawyer, the interests of the
client must be placed ahead of those of the lawyer. The lawyer must
also give precedence to the interests of the Courts and of the justice
system, as well as to those of third parties and of society as a whole.
14
Douglas Klegon, “The Sociology of the Professions: an emerging
perspective” (1978) 5 Sociology of Work and Occupation 259.
15
Richard Abel, The Legal Profession in England and Wales (1988) 7.
16
Ibid, 10.
17
Ibid, 12.
18
Rt. Hon. Mr. Justice McKay, “Professions at risk” [1993] New
Zealand Law Journal 104.
31
The hallmarks of a profession are integrity and service. 19 Since
service is a primary objective, the monetary reward must be
relegated to second place. Thus rendering legal assistance to
impecunious criminal defendants is a professional duty.20
54. A profession will tend to be concerned with personal confidence of
the client in the technical competence of practitioners, and the
confidence of the public at large in the integrity and ethical conduct
of the profession as a whole.21 This has certain implications for the
way in which professional misconduct is defined, and how it is
handled. For example, while a disciplinary tribunal must have
sufficient professional standing to be taken seriously by the legal
profession, it must also seek to attract widespread public support for
its actions.
55. Because standards cover conduct and competence, both technically
and ethically, control must be exercised over both entry into the
profession and conduct within it. It follows that by membership
practitioners may be subject to sanctions for acts or omissions which
do not violate the criminal or civil law. 22 Only statutory regulation
can ensure that the disciplinary sanctions are effective. Thus it is
normal for legal professions to be subject to binding codes of
conduct and punishable for infringing these codes, whether or not
their action also constitutes a civil wrong or a criminal offence under
the general law.
56. Controls over the conduct of members of the legal profession
include personal remedies in tort, contract or equity; the criminal
law; an educational standard for entry; procedural and substantive
requirements for admission to the bar; restrictions as to the right of
entry into private practice; procedural and substantive requirements
for issuing a practising certificate; continuing requirement of
physical and mental fitness; provision of taxation of bills of costs;
provision for strict control over trust accounts; requirements of
membership of law societies (who have disciplinary procedures and
19
Rt. Hon. Mr. Justice McKay, “Professions at risk” [1993] New
Zealand Law Journal 104.
20
Darvell v. Auckland Legal Services Subcommittee [1993] 1 New
Zealand Law Reports 111 at 120 per Williams J.
21
Royal Commission of Inquiry into Civil Rights (1968-71) (McRuer
Report) Ontario No 1 Vol 3 at para 1161.
22
W. R. Flaus, “Discipline within the New Zealand Legal Profession”
(1973) 6 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 337 at 338.
32
sanctions).23 A lawyer could not rely on their private involvement to
opt out of any professional duty owed to the client.24
57. Some of these controls belong to the wider law, but some are
specific and reflect the fact that members of the profession
voluntarily submit to higher standards of conduct than those required
by ordinary citizens, and thereby render themselves liable for
professional misconduct in addition to any penalty which the
common or statute law may impose.25
58. To ensure that all those interested in the maintenance of professional
conduct at the highest possible standard by the best possible measure
to be satisfied, one must look to the system currently operating in
disciplinary matters and compare it with a theoretical but attainable
ideal as to how the disciplinary system of the profession should be
designed; who should exercise its powers and by what procedures;
and what powers should be conferred and how should the conditions
for the exercise of the powers be defined.26
59. To understand the role of statutory regulation of the professions it
must be understood that the learned professions are bound together
in a common discipline which creates a spirit of fraternity,
scholarship and public service. The free market economic approach
widely adopted by governments world-wide does not rest upon the
same intellectual and public service basis. Business typically calls
for skill, not learning, and the objective is profit, not service.
60. The premise for the statutory regulation of professions is that it is
necessary for a profession to have the power of control and
discipline to suppress dishonourable or improper practices among its
members and thereby maintain professional standards. Self-
regulation without statutory authority is possible, but unlikely to be
truly effective.
61. In the 1980s movement towards economic liberalisation in many
countries led to the role of professions being re-examined. This
included a widespread assumption that the only need for
occupational regulation was to provide information. The whole issue
23
W. R. Flaus, “Discipline within the New Zealand Legal Profession”
(1973) 6 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 337, 339.
24
Sims v. Craig Bell and Bond [1991] 3 New Zealand Law Reports 535
(CA).
25
Ranjith Abeysuriya, “The Legal Profession” in “Selected extracts from
papers given at the [LAWASIA 1993 Colombo] conference” [1993] New
Zealand Law Journal 414.
26
W. R. Flaus, “Discipline within the New Zealand Legal Profession”
(1973) 6 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 337, at 339.
33
was then reduced to one of minimising the cost of obtaining
information. The alternatives proposed were government-imposed
arrangements such as occupational licensing, and voluntary private
arrangements such as trade associations. Fortunately this free market
approach to professions is no longer in favour internationally, nor
did it ever have more than a marginal effect on the legal professions
of Commonwealth countries.
62. If professional rules and ethics and their enforcement ceased to be
the concern of professional bodies, professions would become
merely voluntary associations, no longer having responsibility for
admission standards, ethical standards and professional discipline.
The obsession with economics and the free market, the general lack
of understanding of the way in which professional bodies operate,
and the belief that self-interest has been the motivation for
professional bodies could lead to the demise of the professions as
they are recognised internationally.27 Even the legal profession
would not be safe from the pressure to “de-regulate”.
63. The right of a profession to self-discipline is not automatic, though
in the case of the legal profession it is based on long and historic
tradition and has received legislative recognition. The granting of
self-government is a delegation of legislative and judicial functions
and can only be justified as a safeguard to the public interest. 28 On
the other hand, these professional associations act as a counter-
weight to an increasingly monolithic state.29 A balance must be
struck between government interests, non-government interests and
professional interests.30 This is particularly true with respect to the
provision of disciplinary procedures, and codes of conduct and
ethics.
64. The traditional justification for giving powers of self-regulation to
any body is that the members of that body are best qualified to
ensure that proper standards of competence and ethics are set and
maintained. This is generally true, but the risk is that the powers may
be exercised in the interests of the profession or occupation rather
than in the interests of the public. 31 This requires safeguards to be
27
Rt. Hon. Mr. Justice McKay, “Professions at risk” [1993] New
Zealand Law Journal 104, at 106-7.
28
Royal Commission of Inquiry into Civil Rights (1968-71) (McRuer
Report) Ontario, No 1 Vol 3 at para 1162.
29
Richard Abel, The Legal Profession in England and Wales (1988) 7, at
5.
30
S. Ross, “The Solicitors (Amendment) Act 1974 (UK): Its relevance to
Australia” (1975) 49 Australian Law Journal 268 at 272.
31
Public and Administrative Law Reform Committee, Working Paper
relating to the disciplinary and complaints procedure of the legal
34
integrated into the system, safeguards which commonly require a
degree of lay involvement and/or that processes occur in public
(subject to certain matters which should be kept confidential) and are
thus subject to public scrutiny. It may be that the public rarely avails
itself of this privilege, but it should be preserved regardless.
65. For a profession to justify any powers or privileges which it may
receive, it must be able to show that it is not selfishly concerned for
its own interest but has regard for that of the public. It must show
itself worthy of the power of domestic discipline which is conferred
upon it. For this reason lay members should generally be appointed
to the governing bodies of all self-governing professions and
occupations. Non-legal professional bodies have a long tradition of
lay members.32 For the bodies to be dominated by lay members
however would be a perversion of the reason for including non-
professionals. Recently there have been some legal professions
where the number of lay members almost equals the numbers of
lawyers on disciplinary bodies. This is perhaps going a little too far
in this direction, as it threatens to undervalue the principle that
members of a profession are best qualified to ensure that proper
standards of competence and ethics are set and maintained.
66. Public involvement in the proceedings of disciplinary bodies is
based on the purpose of enabling the public interest to be
represented, and will help to assure the public that its interests are in
fact being represented. It has the further effect of making the
profession more responsive to the public. Without lay observers
being present the public can only trust that the organised profession
will be sensitive to its needs, and sufficiently responsible to
endeavour to meet those needs.33
67. Commentators have often expressed the belief that lawyers are
concerned to protect themselves and that law societies exist solely
for the benefit of members of the legal profession.34 The professions
themselves must be alert to this perception, and do all they can to
respond to it, without harming their professional integrity.
68. The legal profession has every right to be looked up to as comprising
the learned, enlightened and honourable sector of society.
profession (1977) 3.
32
Brian Abel-Smith and Robert Stevens, Lawyers and the Courts
(Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1967) 192.
33
Brian Abel-Smith and Robert Stevens, Lawyers and the Courts
(Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1967) 6.
34
Public and Administrative Law Reform Committee, Working Paper
relating to the disciplinary and complaints procedure of the legal
profession (1977) 7.
35
Accordingly, it behoves every member of the profession to conduct
themselves in such a way as not to jeopardise that respected position.
A practitioner must be learned in the law, diligent in the pursuit of
their professional conduct, and scrupulously honourable and proper
in their professional activities.35 The first line of defence then is not
the disciplinary tribunals, or even the law schools, but the
practitioners themselves. They must be diligent in guarding the
integrity of the profession, through watching their own conduct and
that of professional colleagues.
69. To quote the words of Sir Shridath Ramphal, QC, former Secretary-
General of the Commonwealth:
The law itself may be flawed; from time to time it will be;
but so long as lawyers worship at the altar of “justice” there
is hope for social redemption. It is only when (we) as lawyers
become votaries of the legal order that justice is endangered
and we ourselves cease to be worthy of society’s esteem …36
70. The traditional view has been that a member of a profession was not
only subject to the general law in the same way as any other citizen,
but was also subject to the additional requirements imposed by the
ethics of the profession.37 Because this is an additional sanction
arising from a breach of professional standards, it is appropriately
dealt with by the judgment of professional peers.38
71. General principles for the disciplinary arrangements of professional
bodies (not specifically the legal profession) include:
36
grounds for suspension, cancellation of registration or
membership or any other punishment must be appropriate to
professional or occupational activities; and
72. It will be seen, therefore, that there are certain norms which are
common to the legal professions of a wide variety of countries.
Because all legal professions are primarily domestic in focus they
reflect national peculiarities. All utilise some means of enforcing
minimum ethical standards distinct from the standards required by
the law of all providers of services. There has yet to be a truly
international standard of legal professional ethics, though progress
has been made in this direction. 40 We can however learn much from
examining the regulation processes of comparable countries. In this
case these are a number of Commonwealth common law countries
and jurisdictions.
37
there is a growing tendency to degrade the legal profession
and the public are taking note of it, hence the statements we
hear often to the effect that there are “too many lawyers”!41
74. East Africa, and Kenya in particular, is not different to other parts of
the world in respect of the need for professional ethics in the legal
profession. The existence of special codes of conduct, and the
maintenance and enforcement of these codes of professional ethics,
are accepted as part of the normal background environment to the
legal profession. By all accounts Kenya has a serious corruption
problem;42 it is inevitable that this affects the legal profession as well
as other sectors of society. But equally an effective system for
ensuring minimum standards of legal professional ethics is essential.
It is clear from the number of complaints which continue to be made
to the Advocates Complaints Commission and heard by the
Disciplinary Committee that professional misconduct remains a
significant problem.
75. Law may not be the only means of combating corruption but it is the
principal way in a country founded on the rule of law. According to
Dr. Nihal Jayawickrama, the former Executive Director of
Transparency International, in a developing country or a country in
transition, with weak governance institutions, corruption is likely to
corrode the entire system.43 The legal profession has a pivotal role in
the operation of institutions, not least in the provision of judicial
personnel, but also in the administration of the laws, civil and
criminal. The profession itself must therefore be held accountable for
the conduct of its members. Where this alone is insufficient
41
Benna Lutta, “The Role of the East African Lawyer” in Kivutha
Kibwana (ed), Human Rights and Democracy in East Africa: The
Constitutional Implication of East Africa Co-operation (East Africa Law
Society, 1997), pp. 16-32.
Although it is beyond the terms of reference of the Report, on the
question of the number of lawyers it may be instructive to note that on a
population basis the number of lawyers in Kenya is only half of the
number in South Africa, and less than a tenth of the number in Canada.
It is not believed that there is a study which shows that a country
benefits from more lawyers, indeed while the reverse is probably not
correct, it is possibly that a larger number of lawyers are a reflection of
more economic activity. It should be observed however that the Japanese
Government, in the early 2000s, adopted a deliberate policy of
increasing the number of lawyers from 20,000 to 50,000.
42
See for instance the Transparency International annual reports.
43
“A Holistic Approach to Combating Corruption” (1999) 25 Common
Wealth Bulletin 665-668.
38
partnership with governmental, usually independent or quasi-
independent bodies, is appropriate.
76. The International Commission of Jurists has observed that:
39
of the corrupt transactions or the proceeds or instruments of
crime.45
40
The formulation of codes of conduct and statutory regulations has
spoken eloquently of the responsibility the profession feels towards
those whom its members serve. In Kenya, in addition to regulations
embodied under the Advocates Act (Cap 16 Laws of Kenya), the
Law Society has put in place a Digest of Professional Conduct and
Etiquette (2000). The Digest is intended to give guidance to
advocates concerning their professional conduct and the etiquette of
the profession. The Digest is read in conjunction with the Advocates
(Practice) Rules, the Advocates (Accounts) Rules and the Advocates
(Accountant’s Certificate) Rules which have been promulgated
under the Advocates Act.
81. Central to the regulation of the legal profession is the question of the
lawyers’ disciplinary mechanism. The consumers of legal service
must have recourse to a remedy when they have a complaint against
a member of the profession. The existence of codes of conduct does
in not themselves guarantee the observance of the code. Therefore,
there must be a body to enforce the standards, wherever found. The
body must be responsible for dealing with errant advocates, and
must be seen to do so effectively and dispassionately.
82. In recognition of this need, the Advocates Act Cap 16 Laws of
Kenya establishes the Advocates Complaints Commission and the
Disciplinary Committee as the primary regulatory and disciplinary
bodies within the legal profession. These two bodies are generally
charged with the duty of ensuring that professional and ethical
standards are maintained and upheld. Complaints against advocates
or a firm of advocates are received and determined by these two
bodies.
83. The Advocates Complaints Commission (an independent body of the
Attorney-General’s Office) and the Disciplinary Committee of The
Law Society of Kenya are the national organs primarily charged with
maintaining professional ethical standards in the legal profession.
The role of the regional ethics panels (which are sub-committees of
the Law Society and independent of the formal disciplinary process)
must also be considered. Although the specific mandate of this
Report is to review the first two bodies, with the intention of
identifying shortcomings and making recommendations for
improvement, it is necessary to consider the broader institutional
setting in which they are placed, in order to understand their role and
operation. At its broadest context the Law Society represents,
through these tribunals, the regulatory body of a profession, with the
implications that arise from this. However, the Advocates
Complaints Commission is a state body rather than a professional
association. Thus professional ethics in Kenya are entrusted to both
the profession and the government.
41
42
V COMPARATIVE STUDY
86. The intrinsic value underlying this approach is that lawyers and
judges provide the first line of defence against human rights
violations and are vulnerable to pressure and attacks for the
47
For the role of a barrister see Ziems v. Prothonotary of Supreme Court
of New South Wales (1957) 97 Commonwealth Law Reports 279, 298;
64 Australian Law Reports 620 (High Court of Australia).
48
Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the
Treatment of Offenders, United Nations Basic Principles on the Role of
Lawyers (United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,
Geneva, 1990).
43
discharge of their professional duties. The legal profession is today
the only profession which is singled out for protection by the
international community, through the United Nations, in the form of
endorsing minimum standards of guarantees which member states
are obliged to provide in their domestic legislation. The United
Nations also protects human rights defenders.49
87. For most practical purposes human rights abuses and political
pressure are not central to the role of the lawyer. The lawyer-client
role is of greater moment, and it is this, and the lawyer-lawyer and
lawyer-court relationships which are governed by most codes of
ethics and conduct. Failure to adhere to the highest standards of
conduct, whether or not this also constitutes a civil wrong or
criminal offence, renders the lawyer liable to potential action for
professional misconduct. Because of the norm of self (or
co-)regulation in most but not all cases the disciplinary apparatus is
run by the relevant law society, with or without involvement from
the state, and has investigative and adjudicative aspects. Mediation
and conciliation may also form a part of the process.
88. Our terms of reference required this comparative study to include
United Kingdom, South Africa and Australia. I have added Canada,
New Zealand, Tanzania and Uganda to the study. It will be noted that
in the case of only two of these countries can it be said that there is a
single national legal profession. In the United Kingdom the
profession is distinct in England and Wales, Northern Ireland, and
Scotland. The example of England and Wales is used (and
arrangements for both barristers and solicitors are considered,
although the emphasis is upon the latter). In South Africa the
provincial law societies are responsible for the attorneys’ profession
and the advocates are distinct. In Australia each state has a separate
legal system. In some there is a division between barristers and
solicitors, in others there is not.
89. Canada was added because it has a relatively complex and
sophisticated disciplinary system. New Zealand is included because
it is a unitary common law legal profession, which is currently
implementing a new disciplinary system. Tanzania and Uganda are
included to provide a regional comparison.
90. In Canada – allowing also for the civil law-based system in Quebec
– the provinces have their own rules, and the standard is generally
that of a unified profession of barrister and solicitor. In New Zealand
49
General Assembly Resolution A/RES/53/144, Declaration on the
Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society
to Promote and Promote and Protect Universally Recognised Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (General Assembly, 8th March 1999).
44
alone there is only one national system, although even there a
function division exists among the barristers and solicitors, with
some choosing to practise solely as barristers. This does not,
however, affect the disciplinary apparatus in any significant way, and
so the profession may, like Kenya, be regarded as unified and
fused.50
91. These different models have certain implications for the way in
which ethical standards are set and maintained by the legal
profession. The following analysis considers each of the models
existing in the selected countries and jurisdictions.
50
We may discount the position of notary, since only advocates may be
appointed to this office. Thus, although it is distinct from that of
advocate, it does not constitute a truly separate profession.
45
5.1 AUSTRALIA
46
disciplinary matters and are also responsible for admission
procedures and the like. While statutory authorities and professional
associations can and do issue reprimands and impose minor
penalties, serious conduct matters are determined by the courts. The
courts also hear appeals and can review professional associations’
decisions.
97. The balance in these co-regulatory frameworks between government
authorities and professional associations varies from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction and reflects local conditions. Nonetheless, there is a
general tendency towards investing more regulatory power in
independent statutory authorities. This is consistent with recent
Commonwealth practise.
98. The complaint-handling and disciplinary system in most Australian
jurisdictions is three-tiered. The bodies that regulate the legal
profession in each jurisdiction tend to be divided between those with
regulatory powers and those with disciplinary powers. The
distinction is not always clear however. Some regulatory authorities
also have disciplinary powers, and some disciplinary authorities also
have regulatory powers. In general, however, it is useful to
distinguish them as follows:
47
5.1.3 The Court’s “inherent jurisdiction”
101. When a lawyer is admitted to practise, their name is entered
on the Roll of Legal Practitioners of the Supreme Court in their State
or Territory: they become an “officer of the Court”. As such, they are
subject to the “inherent jurisdiction” of that Court. In other words,
the Supreme Courts retain inherent jurisdiction over the regulation of
lawyers in Australia. This means there is always a right of appeal to
the Supreme Courts as well as the ability to bring actions at first
instance in the Supreme Court in certain circumstances.
51
J. R. Forbes, The Divided Legal Profession in Australia: history,
rationalisation and rationale (Law Book Co, Sydney, 1979). It is to be
noted that the term advocate, when used generically, refers to the
barrister or court lawyer. This is to be distinguished from the use of the
term advocate in jurisdictions which have, like Kenya, a fused
profession.
48
Bar Association. A law society usually has some regulatory
responsibility for the solicitors in its jurisdiction; likewise, a bar
association for its barristers. However, in some jurisdictions, such as
South Australia, the Northern Territory, and the Australian Capital
Territory, the legal profession is “fused”. This means that the same
professional association (the law society) has responsibility for
solicitors and barristers. If a bar association exists in these states and
territories it will have only representational functions, not regulatory
or disciplinary.
105. Professional associations in Australia receive no government
funding. They are financed by the interest that accrues on Trust
Accounts held by lawyers and by contributions from practitioners.
These contributions may include the involuntary contributions
derived from disciplinary hearings.
106. With respect to the details of the disciplinary provisions, the
example of New South Wales will be taken as typical. The Legal
Profession Act 2004 requires that a complaint regarding the conduct
of a legal practitioner must be made in writing to the Office of the
Legal Services Commissioner. The Legal Profession Act 2004 came
into effect on 1 October 2005 and applies to all complaints lodged
after that date. The Legal Profession Act 1987 continues to apply to
all complaints lodged prior to that date.
107. The Office of the Legal Services Commissioner (“OLSC”)
receives all complaints about solicitors and barristers (and licensed
conveyancers) in New South Wales. The OLSC also oversees the
investigation of complaints about the conduct of practitioners and
plays a major role in resolving consumer disputes.
108. The OLSC works as part of a co-regulatory system, together
with the Law Society of New South Wales (the professional body for
solicitors) and the New South Wales Bar Association (the
professional body for barristers) to resolve disputes and investigate
complaints about professional conduct. The OLSC is however
independent of the professional associations.
109. The OLSC was established as a result of a Report in
February 1993 by the New South Wales Law Reform Commission
“Scrutiny of the Legal Profession – Complaints Against Lawyers”. It
was created by an amendment to the Legal Profession Act 1987, and
the OLSC commenced operation on 1 July 1994. The OLSC is an
independent statutory body and the decisions of its head, the Legal
Services Commissioner, can only be challenged through the normal
process of administrative law. The Legal Services Commissioner
reports to Parliament annually through the Attorney-General.
49
110. The OLSC’s main role is to ensure that legal practitioners
abide by their ethical and other professional obligations when
providing services to the public. The OLSC can take disciplinary
action against legal practitioners and help resolve problems between
practitioners and other members of the community.
111. The OLSC cannot
50
disciplinary matters per se, although they may also include
investigation and mediation functions.
51
5.2 CANADA
52
Law Society Act c L-8 Revised Statutes of Ontario 1990.
52
120. Barristers and Solicitors are separate professions,53 but the
majority are admitted as both, and there is one professional
association.
53
Barristers Act c B-3 Revised Statutes of Ontario 1990; Solicitors Act c
S-15 Revised Statutes of Ontario 1990. Every Barrister and Solicitor is
ex officio a notary public and Commissioner for Oaths, though not all
notaries are legally trained; c N-6 Revised Statutes of Ontario 1990.
53
124. The Management Tribunals schedule hearings, allowing the
Hearing Panel, and the Appeal Panel, to concentrate on substantive
trials, and appeals, respectively, and not occupy their time with
procedural issues such as status hearings.
125. The Canadian arrangements, as typified by Ontario and Nova
Scotia, leave the primary investigatory function in the hands of the
profession, through its professional association. This includes
mediation and alternative disputes resolutions processes. If this fails
recourse is had to the Hearings Panels and the equivalents in other
provinces. These are also to be seen primarily as organs of the
professional associations, but also include lay members.
54
5.3 ENGLAND AND WALES
5.3.1 Barristers
127. As in many jurisdictions elsewhere in the common law world
– and indeed in most civil law systems – the legal profession in
England and Wales is divided into two distinct professions (three, if
notaries are included54), barristers and solicitors.55 Unlike in Canada,
Australia and New Zealand, however, where a varying degree of
fusion has occurred, in England and Wales barristers and solicitors
remain completely separate.
128. Barristers were admitted, controlled and could be disbarred
by their governing body, the Inns of Court,56 although professional
rules were formulated by the Attorney-General, as professional head
of the bar, until the establishment of the Bar Council in 1893.57
54
Noel Cox, “The Notary Public – the third arm of the legal profession”
(2000) 6 New Zealand Business Law Quarterly 321-335.
55
There was a division of the English legal profession for as long as
there has been a profession; Sir John Baker, “Counsellors and Barristers:
an historical Study” (1969) Cambridge Law Journal 205.
56
A brief note on terminology is needed to avoid confusion. The court
lawyers of the ecclesiastical and admiralty courts were the advocates,
admitted by the Dean of the Arches, on behalf of the Archbishop of
Canterbury. The barristers, of the Common Law and Chancery courts
have succeeded the advocates, after that order declined. The advocates
were admitted to all the courts 1857 by statute (Matrimonial Causes Act
1857 (UK), Court of Probate Act 1857 (UK)). The barristers, serjeants,
attorneys, and solicitors were admitted to the admiralty courts in 1859
by statute (An Act to enable Serjeants, Barristers-at-Law, Attorneys, and
Solicitors to practise in the High Court of Admiralty (UK)). It was
settled in practice after 1858 that barristers were entitled to practice in
the ecclesiastical courts.
57
Richard Abel, The Legal Profession in England and Wales (1988) 133.
55
129. Until the end of the nineteenth century the circuit messes
shared with the Inns the role of disciplining barristers. Despite this,
the first account of barristers’ etiquette only appeared in 1875, and it
took until 1980 before the Senate of the Inns of Court published a
Code of Conduct for the Bar of England and Wales.
130. Efforts to centralise and institutionalise the disciplinary
process in the 1860’s failed, and only in 1896 were the judges
allowed to hear appeals from benchers in disciplinary matters. The
Bar Council never acquired the power to discipline, but it did hear
complaints and referred a few of them to the Inns of Court. Shortly
after this, the Senate was established, which assumed jurisdiction in
disciplinary matters.
131. A committee appointed by the chairman of the Bar Council
which reported on 12 September 1994 recommended that a
Barristers Complaints Bureau be established, along with a new
advocacy code and three years compulsory continuing education for
newly admitted counsel. The existing disciplinary tribunals would
remain.58
132. The barristers’ profession in England and Wales is primarily
self-regulating. Since, however, with the division between barrister
and solicitor barristers do not have direct access to clients’ money,
and indeed must act under instruction from a solicitor, the position of
barristers is quite different from that of solicitors, or of Kenyan
advocates.
5.3.2 Solicitors
133. The regulation of the legal profession dates from the earliest
years of the development of law as a distinct profession. As early as
the fifteenth century fees charged by attorneys59 were regulated by
the Courts, and by the beginning of the eighteenth century
regulations covered most aspects of any possible litigation. In the
early nineteenth century the then newly-established Law Society
obtained important changes which made it easier to remove
58
The Times (London), 13 September 1994; Bar Council, A Blueprint
for the Bar (1994).
59
The attorneys were the common lawyers, who practised in the Courts
of King’s Bench and Common Pleas. The solicitors were the
practitioners in the Court of Chancery. The proctors, who were licensed
by the Archbishop of Canterbury, were found in the ecclesiastical and
admiralty courts. In 1873 all solicitors, attorneys and proctors became
solicitors of the Supreme Court; Supreme Court Act 1873 (UK).
56
dishonest and undesirable practitioners. Although the Solicitors Act
1749 had already allowed their disbarring for misconduct the
absence of an effective professional association had until the
nineteenth century meant that these provisions were ineffective. The
new measures included the creation of the office of National
Registrar (1839),60 with the maintenance of the roll given to the
Society in 1843.61
134. Till 1933 the rules governing the conduct of English
solicitors were found exclusively in case law, ironic enough given
that solicitors, attorneys and proctors were not court lawyers per se.
The Attorney-General, as head of the bar, made rules for the
barristers, but the solicitors had no equivalent law officer. The
Solicitors Act 1933 made the Council of the Law Society responsible
for making practice rules for the regulation of solicitors.62
135. In the case In re the Justices of the Court of Common Pleas
at Antigua,63 Lord Wynford said:
60
Solicitors Act 1839 (UK).
61
Solicitors Act 1843 (UK) s 2.
62
Juliet Greenaway, History of the New Zealand Legal Profession
(1989) LLB(Hons) dissertation University of Auckland, at 37.
63
(1830) 12 English Reports 321.
57
disciplinary body empowered to achieve this. The use of legislation
was seen as the only way this might be done effectively.
137. In England and Wales the solicitors’ profession is regulated
primarily by the Law Society, but as we have seen, from at least the
nineteenth century this has been backed by statutory provisions.
More recently two developments may be noted. The first is the
involvement of lay members in disciplinary proceedings – and even
investigations – and the other is the division between representative
and regulatory functions. These have been required by government
in order to ensure that members of the public are protected, and that
the profession operates to the highest standards of professional
ethics, and are seen by the public to so operate.
138. In 2004 a Consultation Paper on the Review of the
Regulatory Framework for Legal Services in England and Wales
noted that in the United Kingdom five of the legal professional
bodies (the Law Society, Bar Council, Institute of Legal Executives,
Chartered Institute of Patent Agents and the Institute of Trade Mark
Attorneys) combine both regulatory and representative functions. It
questioned whether this existence of hybrid roles should continue.
Representative functions include providing services and support for
members; regulation includes setting the parameters within which
members work. These are distinct, and as a result of the paper the
functions were separated.
64
Legal Complaints Service website,
<http://www.legalcomplaints.org.uk/financial-compensation/distress-
and-inconvenience.page#howmuch>.
58
body review the latter again. They also have the power to award
individual complainants up to £5,000 compensation (in the case of
the Law Society £15,000 from 1st January 2006). The Ombudsman
also has the power to investigate the original complaint but to date
this has been used infrequently.
141. In their concurrent role as Legal Services Complaints
Commissioner (“LSCC”) they examine the Law Society’s capability
to handle complaints made about its members efficiently and
effectively. The LSCC has the power to levy very substantial
financial penalties (up to £1 million) if the Law Society of England
and Wales fails to provide adequate plans or deliver improvements in
accordance with those plans in its complaints-handling function.
142. The Solicitors Regulation Authority of the Law Society of
England and Wales, established in 2007, has a number of roles,
including taking regulatory action. It also refers prosecutions to the
independent Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal. The Legal Complaints
Service and Solicitors Regulation Authority may together be deemed
to be broadly the equivalent to the Advocates Complaints
Commission, and the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal is broadly
equivalent to the Disciplinary Committee of the Law Society of
Kenya. Just over half of the members of the Solicitors Regulation
Authority are solicitors, with the rest being lay persons.
143. In England and Wales an amendment to the Solicitors Act in
197465 provided for one or more lay observers to be appointed by the
Lord Chancellor, to examine any written allegation by or on behalf
of a member of the public concerning Law Society treatment of a
complaint about a solicitor or employee of a solicitor. This was as a
consequence of considerable political pressure.66 The Observer
receives general directions from the Lord Chancellor, to whom they
report annually.
65
Solicitors (Amendment) Act 1974 (UK) ss 5, 7, 11.
66
S. Ross, “The Solicitors (Amendment) Act 1974 (UK): Its relevance to
Australia” (1975) 49 Australian Law Journal 268, at 270.
59
145. The Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal conducts the actual trial
of solicitors charged with disciplinary offences. Officers of the
Solicitors Regulation Authority prosecute, after a complaint has been
investigated by the Legal Complaints Service. The vast majority of
prosecutions are brought by the Law Society. It may award fines of
up to £5,000, and strike off or suspend solicitors.
146. The disciplinary arrangements in England and Wales have
recently strengthened the division between representative and
regulatory functions, and increased lay involvement in the process at
all of the complaints investigation, regulatory (including
prosecutorial) and disciplinary levels.
60
5.4 NEW ZEALAND
61
149. A complaint about the conduct of a lawyer was normally
addressed to the district law society covering the area in which the
lawyer practised. The district law society would investigate the
complaint and will let the complainant know what action, if any, it
decided to take. Because the district law societies varied
significantly in size – Auckland was by far the largest – the ability of
individual societies to fully investigate complaints varied.
150. If the district law society thought the matter was serious (that
is, it raised a question of professional misconduct rather than a civil
dispute between lawyer and client), it could lay a charge against the
lawyer with either the District Disciplinary Tribunal or the New
Zealand Law Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal. The district law
societies were thus investigative and prosecutorial authorities.
151. Not all complaints resulted in charges before a tribunal. In
some cases the matter was resolved before a hearing was necessary.
152. Sometimes the person making the complaint might not be
satisfied with the decision of a district law society’s decision or
mediation. If the complainant was not satisfied with the district law
society’s treatment of their complaint they could write to the Lay
Observer for the region setting out their allegation about the
handling of the complaint.
153. The Lay Observer was a government-appointed non-lawyer,
whose task was to examine such allegations. The Lay Observer
would get all the relevant information from the complainant, the
district law society and the lawyer concerned and would send the
complainant a written report of the results of his or her examination.
154. He or she might make recommendations to the district law
society and, if so, the district law society was required to then tell the
Lay Observer what, if any, action it took on those recommendations.
If the Lay Observer was not satisfied with the district law society’s
response he or she might request the district law society to refer the
report or recommendation to the New Zealand Law Society for
review, and the district law society was required to do so.
155. Prosecutions before the District Disciplinary Tribunals and
the New Zealand Law Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal were
conducted by the district law societies. Both tribunals included lay
members.
156. The District Disciplinary Tribunal or the New Zealand Law
Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal had considerable powers to deal
with lawyers they find guilty of disciplinary charges: they could
censure, fine or restrict the practice of lawyers and the New Zealand
62
tribunal could strike a lawyer off the roll of barristers and solicitors.
Applications for striking-off could also be made direct to the High
Court, though this avenue was rarely taken except by a district law
society, and then only in exceptional situations.
63
5.4.3 New system from 2007/2008
162. The Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 (NZ) introduced a
new regulatory and disciplinary system. Part 7 of the Act (ss 120-
272) comprises a significant proportion of the new, very lengthy and
complex, statutory provisions for the legal profession.
163. The New Zealand Law Society is now be the sole
compulsory membership association of lawyers (excepting the very
small class of conveyancers), and is required to establish a
complaints service.
164. There will be one or more Lawyers Standards Committees,
as part of the New Zealand Law Society complaints service.
Members of the Committees will be appointed by the law society,
and there are to be at least three members, one at least of whom must
be a lay member. The role of the Committee is to investigate
complaints against lawyers or their employees (and to make its own
inquiries where necessary), to promote the resolution of disputes
through negotiation, conciliation and mediation, and to prosecute in
the Disciplinary Tribunal. The law society or a Standards Committee
may (and it is expected that they will) appoint investigators.
165. In the event of an agreed settlement, the Standards
Committee may make an order that all or some of the terms of an
agreed settlement between the person to whom a complaint relates
and the complainant are to have effect, by consent, as all or part of a
final determination of the complaint.
166. The Standards Committee may issue a determination that a
practitioner – or former practitioner – is guilty of unsatisfactory
conduct, or that the matter is to be referred to the Disciplinary
Tribunal. In the event of a finding of unsatisfactory conduct, the
Standards Committee may make an order censuring or reprimanding
the person to whom a complaint relates, order the person to whom a
complaint relates to apologise to the complainant, pay compensation
or reduce their fees, and rectify any error or omission. There is also
provision for a fine of up to NZ$15,000 (Kshs 750,000), and
additional orders covering, inter alia, compulsory training or
education, inspection of practice, and the award of costs to the law
society. The Standards Committee may also intervene in the
management of a practice. Thus the Lawyers Standards Committee
is investigative, prosecutorial, and to a limited extent also
disciplinary, in function.
64
167. The Legal Complaints Review Officer is a non-lawyer
appointed by the Minister after consulting the Law Society – though
the first appointee is Dr Duncan Webb, a legal academic and
barrister (who has relinquished his practising certificate and his chair
at the University of Canterbury). The function of the Legal
Complaints Review Officer is to review decisions of the Lawyers
Standards Committee. Such reviews are to be conducted in private.
The Legal Complaints Review Officer may him or herself lay a
prosecution before the Disciplinary Tribunal, or direct a Standards
Committee to do so. The law society pays the government the cost of
operating the Office of Legal Complaints Review Officer.
168. The Disciplinary Tribunal (in full the New Zealand Lawyers
and Conveyancers Disciplinary Tribunal) is to hear applications for
suspension, and other charges. It comprises a chairman, deputy
chairman (both legally experienced but not currently practising
lawyers), 7 to 15 lay members, 7 to 15 lawyers and 3 to 5
conveyancers. The chairman and deputy chairman and all lay
members are appointed by the Governor-General on the advice of
the Minister. The lawyers and conveyancers are appointed by their
respective professional associations.
169. The Tribunal may sit in divisions, with at least five members,
and apart from the chair, half must be lay and half lawyers or
conveyancers as appropriate. Hearings are in public. Since the
system is only being established now it is unknown whether the
workload of the Tribunal will require it to sit in divisions.
170. The Tribunal may order a fine of up to NZ$30,000 (Kshs
1.5m), payable to the law society. Every person commits an offence
and is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding
NZ$5,000 (Kshs 250,000), who wilfully obstructs the Tribunal, or
intimidates or insults its members. Failure to attend hearings, or to
provide documents requested, can result in a fine of NZ$25,000
(Kshs 1.25m).
171. Appeal against the decisions of the Tribunal lies to the High
Court, and then to the Court of Appeal. The Law Society must
reimburse the government for the cost of a hearing.
172. Prior to a hearing of a case the Tribunal may make an order,
at the request of the Standards Committee, suspending a lawyer from
practising until the matter has been determined.
173. The High Court retains its inherent power to strike off the
roll and discipline lawyers as officers of the Court. As in other
jurisdictions these powers are comparatively rarely used.
65
174. The new arrangements are based on centralised self-
regulation, but moderated by the requirement for lay participation.
They are unusual in that they effectively have the one agency which
has investigative, prosecutorial and disciplinary functions. The
Lawyers Standards Committees investigate complaints, attempt to
resolve disputes, and prosecute offenders. They also have limited
powers to punish, and their decisions are subject to appeal to the
Legal Complaints Review Officer, a non-lawyer. The New Zealand
Lawyers and Conveyancers Disciplinary Tribunal deals only with
the more serious offences.
175. Although these Committees are part of the New Zealand Law
Society’s complaints service – the old District Disciplinary Tribunals
has been abolished – the new Committees will be based in the
districts. Whereas there was a distinction between the investigative
and prosecutorial role of the District Law Society’s officers and the
disciplinary role of the District Disciplinary Tribunals, in the new
system these roles have effectively been combined. This is a
departure from the approach adopted in most other jurisdictions
reviewed, and its likely effectiveness is unknown. Because the
district law societies – apart from Auckland – have disappeared,
local committees are associated with branches of the New Zealand
Law Society.
66
5.5 SOUTH AFRICA
5.5.1 Attorneys
176. The Law Society of South Africa (LSSA) is the umbrella
body of the attorneys’ profession in South Africa. Complaints against
attorneys are conducted by the Provincial Law Society where the
attorney is registered, and is completely outside the ambit of the
LSSA. The Cape Law Society (the Law Society of the Cape of Good
Hope) is here taken as typical. The Cape Law Society supervises
compliance with the provisions of the Act relating to annual audits of
trust accounts and investigates any irregularities, qualifications or
failure to comply with the Society’s audit requirements the Society.
177. The Cape Law Society investigates complaints about the
conduct of attorneys by putting the complaint to the attorney, by
calling for a full report and by considering the complaint, with the
report, to determine whether the attorney has contravened rules
governing professional conduct.
178. Where the professional conduct rule has been contravened,
the Society refers the matter to the Disciplinary Committee, which
considers the matter and makes recommendations to Council. The
recommendations may result in a resolution by Council to impose a
reprimand or fine, to proceed to a full disciplinary inquiry or
application to court to suspend or strike the attorney from the Roll.
179. The Committee is empowered to consider and investigate
any complaint made against any member at the instance of
whomsoever, including any complaint made at the instance of the
Council mero motu; and to authorise the Director to render to any
complainant such assistance in connection with the lodgement of his
complaint as may be reasonably necessary or desirable.
180. Where a case of unprofessional or dishonourable or
unworthy conduct on the part of the member is established, the
Committee is to notify the Council of its opinion and the facts upon
which such opinion is based. At the same time, and having
considered the member’s disciplinary record, it is to make a
recommendation to the Council that the Council do either of two
things. These are to determine the complaint summarily, without a
hearing, in which event it will at the same time make a
recommendation to the Council as to whether the Council should
impose a punishment provided for in the Act. In such an event, it is
required to indicate what punishment the Council should impose or
67
whether the Council should apply for the striking off such member
from the roll of attorneys or for his or her suspension from practice.
181. The second option is to hold a formal enquiry into the
complaint. In this event it shall refer the complaint to a Disciplinary
Enquiry Committee with an instruction that the committee hold a
formal enquiry into the complaint.
182. Members of both Committees are appointed by the Council
on an annual basis. Both a Disciplinary Committee and a
Disciplinary Enquiry Committee consist of as many practising
members and other persons as the Council may from time to time
resolve. Lay members are appointed.
183. The Disciplinary Enquiry Committee is required, as a general
rule (though subject to exceptions) to preserve the confidential
nature of all its enquiry proceedings.
5.5.2 Advocates
184. The General Council of the Bar (“GCB”) can seek to have
advocates struck off the roll, by petitioning the High Court, 71 for
breaching the Uniform Rules of Professional Ethics of the General
Council of the Bar of South Africa. An advocate who fails to adhere
to those standards to a degree that satisfies a court that he or she is
unfit to continue to practise is liable to be suspended from practise or
to have his or her name struck from the roll of advocates.72
185. The GCB is a federal body representing the organized
advocates’ profession in South Africa, and has ten constituent
societies of practising advocates, or Bars. Advocates are bound by
the codes of ethics of their own bar association. These are enforced
by the Bar Council. An advocate who transgresses the law or the
code of conduct may be expelled from the profession by way of an
application to the High Court. The Council of the GCB may on its
own initiative, or whenever requested by a constituent Bar to do so,
recommend rules of professional etiquette and practice for adoption
by all constituent Bars or a constituent Bar.
186. The Council of the GCB has the power to hear and decide
appeals by members of constituent Bars from decisions of those Bars
in any disciplinary proceedings in respect of those members save
where the decision concerned is one to approach the Supreme Court
71
See General Council of the Bar of South Africa v. Van der Spuy 1999
(1) SA 577 (T).
72
Section 7(1)(d) of the Admission of Advocates Act 74 of 1964.
68
to take disciplinary proceedings against that member. The appeal
shall be heard by a committee consisting of at least three members,
appointed by the Chair and which may include himself. The
committee thus appointed determines the procedure to be followed
and makes it known to the parties. The committee may, together with
any ruling given in an appeal, make any order in regard to costs
which in the circumstances may be just and equitable. Pretoria Bar
Association (Pretoria Society of Advocates) is an example of the
constituent societies.
187. The standard South African model may be regarded as being
self-regulation by the professional associations, with the Council of
the relevant law society being involved, and the investigative and
determinative functions exercised by organs of the society. In
common with other systems the conduct of inquiries is dealt with in
more than one body, with several tiers operating.
69
5.6 TANZANIA
5.6.1 Advocates
188. The Tanganyika Law Society was established by law, and is
comprised of all lawyers called to the Bar in Tanzania. There is a
separate Zanzibar Law Society, with a small membership.
189. Any person enrolled as an advocate under the Advocates Act,
Chapter 341 of the Laws of Tanzania (R.E.2002) and listed as a
member of the Tanganyika Law Society, established pursuant to the
Tanganyika Law Society Act Chapter 307 of the Laws of Tanzania
(R.E 2002) can practice law as an Advocate and shall be subject to
the disciplinary rules and etiquette as promulgated under the said
laws, and subject to the Ethics Committee of the Law Society and
the Advocates Disciplinary Committee established under the
Advocates Act CAP 341.
190. Although it has a statutory basis, the professional association
is one of few in Africa that have no legal capacity to disbar any
errant member. Most of the complaints involve failure to represent
clients in court, receiving money through intimidation, conspiracy
with the other party in cases against their clients and forgery. The
Tanzanian model may be characterised as self-regulation, but in the
absence of power to strike off advocates its effectiveness is limited
when compared, for instance, with South Africa.
70
5.7 UGANDA
5.7.1 Advocates
191. The Uganda Law Society (ULS) is a corporate body
established by the Uganda Law Society Act (Cap.276) with
perpetual succession and a common seal. The Uganda Law Society
has a membership of over 1,200 advocates spread across the country.
The Council of the Law Society has an Ethics and Professional
Conduct Committee.
192. The Law Council was established under the Advocates Act,
1970 (as amended). It is chaired by a Judge of the Courts of
Judicature and its membership includes –
71
Chairperson of the Law Council, appointed by the Law Council. The
Secretary of the Law Council provides prosecuting counsel.
195. The Disciplinary Committee may be regarded as an example
of co-regulation, as it is an independent statutory body. It can be seen
as self-regulation only in the limited sense that it is largely
comprised of lawyers; the representational functions of the Law
Society are separate. It is also relatively unusual in having no lay
member. The separation of investigatory and disciplinary functions
is also not fully developed, since it is an organ of the Law Council,
which prosecutes cases before the Committee.
72
5.8 IN CONCLUSION
73
New Zealand Lawyers and Conveyancers Disciplinary Tribunal will
deal only with the more serious offences.
200. The standard South African model may be regarded as being
self-regulation by the professional associations, with the Council of
the relevant law society being involved, and the investigative and
determinative functions exercised by organs of the society. In
common with other systems, the conduct of inquiries is dealt with in
more than one body, with several tiers operating.
201. Tanzania may be categorised as self-regulation. The Ethics
Committee of the Law Society and the Advocates Disciplinary
Committee are established under the Advocates Act.
202. Uganda is an example where the one statutory body, the
Disciplinary Committee of the Law Council, has responsibility for
disciplining members. It does not include laymen, nor is it part of the
professional association. Prosecution is by state counsel in the Law
Council, so investigatory, prosecutorial and adjudication functions
are not fully separated.
74
and, therefore, permits the system to be independent, responsive to
consumers and free from capture, and the perception thereof. A
feature of a new system could be a single gateway for consumers
into the complaints system. A disadvantage could be that it removes
responsibility from the professions and may be seen as allowing
them to disown ownership of, or the ability to learn from,
complaints.
206. Leaving responsibility with the professions, subject to
appropriate oversight, keeps the professional bodies involved in
dealing with their own complaints and allows the peer pressure
driver on standards to continue; but it suffers from a real or
perceived lack of independence; and preserves a number of possible
avenues for the consumer to follow to achieve redress.
207. Internationally, it is usual for the costs of a complaints
system to be borne by the providers of the service (and not the public
purse). A regulatory framework will have to be funded sufficiently to
enable it to function properly and in a timely fashion but without
imposing an undue burden on those required to fund it. In some
cases, particularly where the disciplinary system is immature,
government funding may be necessary, but it is not ideal in the long-
term. The cost of dealing with complaints against providers of
services is likely to be passed back to the consumer by the provider
by way of increased fees or charges.
208. These international examples may be seen as indicating what
is common practice, and the direction in which reforms to
disciplinary processes for the legal profession has been taking.
Because details do vary it is not practical to identify in tabular form
the various models that have been examined. What is important is
the dynamic structure – division of responsibility and function, lay
participation, and self-regulation and co-regulation. In the light of
these comparisons the next part of the Report will examine the
current system in Kenya.
75
VI DISCIPLINARY STRUCTURES
76
investigate complaints against advocates, and may – though in
practise rarely does – prosecute them before the Disciplinary
Committee. The legislative powers of the Law Society with respect
to disciplinary matters appear to be generally adequate, subject to the
need to develop rules of intervention and account monitoring (which
will be discussed later).
215. Every advocate is subject to the jurisdiction of the
Disciplinary Committee73 which is established by the Advocates Act,
Chapter 16 of the Laws of Kenya and mandated to deal with
offences or misconduct by an advocate.
216. The legislative framework for the formal disciplinary
machinery is relatively complex (and should be simplified), but in
simple terms the Disciplinary Committee is established under s 57(1)
of the Advocates Act. Its powers are broadly sufficient, and its role
fairly clear. In its actual operation difficulties are apparent – which
will be discussed in due course.
217. The Disciplinary Committee generally adheres to
international good practise with respect to its structure and
membership. Its legislative powers and responsibilities are generally
adequate to deal with its core goal. The deficiencies which exist
relate more specifically to the administrative framework in which it
operates, and the way in which it has been used.
218. The Disciplinary Committee should be seen as the tribunal of
last resort – and should not be concerned with matters which might
properly be regarded as administrative in nature, nor with what are
solely or largely financial disputes.
219. The Advocates Complaints Commission is established under
s 53 of the Advocates Act. Unlike the Disciplinary Committee,
which is effectively an organ of the Law Society, the Commission is
a department of the Office of the Attorney-General (State Law
Office). Again its powers are adequate, and its role clear. Although
the operation of the Commission would appear to be more efficient
than that of the Committee, more work is needed – as will be
discussed later.
220. Ethical standards depend upon a number of factors, some of
which are inherently beyond the control of the legal profession. An
additional complexity, noted in the Stobbs Report (paras 116-117),
included the “low level of knowledge in Kenya about legal rights
and procedures” and “a slow, complex judicial procedure dealing
with such actions”. That report also identified a lack of sufficient
73
Advocates Act (Cap 16 of the Laws of Kenya) s 55.
77
work for the number of practising advocates, and consequently
economic pressure on advocates (para 117). These factors may well
be some of the underlying causes of complaints.
221. In any system there will always be some errant legal
practitioners; it must be the aim of any system to minimise the
number and ensure that misconduct is punished. This is so regardless
of the level of understanding of the law by the general public, or the
efficiency of the judiciary as a whole. This may compel a greater
degree of co-regulation (rather than self-regulation) than would
otherwise be desirable.
222. One potential difficulty is with respect to the treatment of
non-advocates. Employees of advocates are covered by the present
system. At present the Disciplinary Committee has jurisdiction over
all past and present advocates who remain on the Roll, while the
Advocates Complaints Commission has only jurisdiction over
currently practising advocates. It is recommended that the Advocates
Act be amended to ensure that the Advocates Complaints
Commission has jurisdiction over former practitioners (such as those
who have retired), subject to the qualification that the conduct
complained of must relate to their practise as advocates, and not to
any judicial, prosecutorial or other role they may previously or
subsequently have held (Recommendation 1).
223. Advocates in public service are in a somewhat different
position to those in private practice. One difference, referred to
above, is that they are not the responsibility of the Advocates
Complaints Commission; they could however potentially be
disciplined by the Disciplinary Committee, if prosecution were to be
brought by the Law Society. This does not appear, however, to
happen in practice. Nor is the Disciplinary Committee – at least as
presently constituted and run – necessarily the best tribunal for this
purpose.
224. Section 2 of the Public Officer Ethics Act (Act No. 4 of
2003) defines “Public Officer” as an officer, employee or member of
any government department or service. These do of course include
many advocates in public service. They and their public officer
colleagues are bound by the Code of Conduct and Ethics instituted
under the Act.74 Failure to adhere to the Code renders a miscreant
liable to the sanction of the relevant Commission (inter alia, the
Judicial Service Commission for judges, magistrates, and public
officers in the judiciary, and the Public Service Commission for most
74
s 34.
78
others), which is empowered to “take whatever disciplinary action it
considers appropriate”.75
225. The Public Officer Ethics Act provides an appropriate
measure of enforcement of ethical standards for advocates and para-
legal personnel in public office. Advocates, as members of the legal
profession, should however continue to remain liable for misconduct
in the same way as lawyers in private practice. Since the nature of
legal work in public office differs markedly, so that some closely
resembles private practice while others are quite dissimilar (and thus
the code of ethics for advocates might not be a useful measure), it is
appropriate for parallel disciplinary provisions to remain.
226. As well as ensuring that advocates at one end of their career
do not escape being held to account by retirement, it is also
important to ensure that a proper check is kept upon admission to the
legal profession; indeed this is an even more important matter.
227. All advocates owe a duty of professional conduct to their
colleagues and to the general public. This can be reinforced (though
not of course guaranteed) by ensuring that only appropriate persons
are admitted to practice; that legal education (both academic and
professional or vocational) is robust and adequately inculcates
ethical principles; and that post-admission continuing legal
education is effective. Post-admission supervision of practise by the
profession must also be adequate to detect misconduct where (for
whatever reason) clients and colleagues do not take action.
6.2 Admission
228. The procedures for the admission of advocates, while closely
related to the requirements of legal education, are distinct. Apart
from completing the requisite academic and professional training, a
would-be advocate must be a fit and proper person. There is no
certain way or ascertaining whether an applicant is such a person.
However, it is incumbent on the Law Society, as the professional
association for advocates, to implement a system to check that
applicants are fit and proper persons.
229. Every person who is duly qualified to be admitted as an
advocate is required by law to file a petition requesting admittance.
The Law Society of Kenya is required to review such a petition and
has a right to be heard with regards to the person’s admission.
Therefore the Society is able to advice against the admission of a
person as an advocate if it feels that the individual lacks moral
75
s 35(1)(a).
79
fitness.76 It is recommended that affidavits and references in support
of applicants for admission be required in all cases. References in
support of applicants should be from two people of standing in the
community (not being close relatives), and from an advocate in
possession of a current practising certificate and against whom there
is no outstanding complaint before the Law Society, Advocates
Complaints Commission or Disciplinary Committee
(Recommendation 2).
76
Advocates Act (Cap 16 of the Laws of Kenya) s 15.
77
No 12 of 1995.
80
lawyer in society, to such detailed but important aspects as advocates
remuneration, and the rights, obligations and privileges of an
advocate.
234. There is also a unit on legal practice management, an area
which itself is often an underlying cause of professional misconduct.
Financial training is particularly important, as poor accounting
practises contribute to many instances of malpractice.
235. It is recommended that the Law Society continues to work
closely with the Council of Legal Education to ensure that the ATP
provides the best model of training, particularly as it relates to
professional ethics and etiquette, and account keeping
(Recommendation 3).
236. It is also recommended that the operation of the ATP be
reviewed by the Council of Legal Education after the first year in
which it is offered to ensure that the objectives are being met
(Recommendation 4).
237. The Report of the Ministerial Task Force on the
Development of a Policy and Legal Framework for Legal Education
in Kenya 200578 (“the 2005 Report”) was critical of the standard of
legal education; it is expected that the new ATP will mark a new and
more satisfactory era for the legal profession.
238. It is noted that the recommendations of the 2005 Report
included eleven suggested core courses at diploma and degree level
(recommendations 11 and 12). These did not include ethics.
Professional ethics was however suggested for inclusion in Bar
courses, and this has been accepted and implemented in the new
ATP. It is recommended that consideration be given to including
professional ethics as a core subject in diploma and degree level
courses. This would not constitute duplication of coverage, as the
focus at undergraduate level should be different. But ethical
standards must be inculcated at the earliest possible stage, and
leaving this until the Bar course may be too late.
239. The admission of foreign-qualified advocates to practice in
Kenya exposes the country to the varying standards of ethical
education and adherence found abroad. It has been observed that
there has been a sharp fall in standards of advocacy and professional
ethics among Kenyan lawyers who have been admitted to practice
78
Report of the Ministerial Task Force on the Development of a Policy
and Legal Framework for Legal Education in Kenya 2005 (Nairobi,
2005) para 36.
81
on the strength of qualifications acquired abroad. 79 The numbers of
such lawyers appears to have increased in recent years.
240. For the above reason, as well as from general principles, it is
important that continuing legal education includes an ethical
standards component. The Joint Meeting of the Council of the Law
Society and the Committee on Continuing Legal Education of the
Law Society on 27th October 2005 proposed that three subjects be
mandatory elements of the continuing legal education programme:
latest developments in civil and criminal procedure; practice
management; and professional responsibility which includes legal
ethics, professionalism and the prevention of malpractice. It is
recommended that professional ethics be included in any
compulsory continuing legal education requirements for advocates,
both junior and the more experienced (Recommendation 5).
79
Ibid.; Venkat Iyer, Continuing Legal Education for Kenyan Advocates:
A Review of Existing Provision (The Law Society of Kenya, Nairobi,
2007) 24.
82
245. The Advocates Complaints Commission may investigate the
accounts of an advocate against whom a complaint has been made
and for that purpose may order such advocate to produce all relevant
books and documents to the Commission or to an accountant
engaged by the Commission in that behalf.80 However it is
appropriate for the profession itself to also have this role and for the
Law Society to be so empowered.
6.5 Conclusion
246. Apart from complaints from clients, and from fellow
advocates, professional misconduct may be discovered through the
use of periodic or systematic inspections of the accounts and other
records of firms.
247. Although neither the Advocates Complaints Commission, nor
the Disciplinary Committee – or indeed the regional ethics
committees – are without faults, the existing disciplinary structure of
the legal profession of Kenya is capable of improvement without
abolition of any of these major elements. The necessity for
disciplinary apparatus of some sort is reflected in the ubiquitous
existence of such systems in comparable common law jurisdictions.
80
Section 53(6E) Advocates Act (Cap 16 Laws of Kenya) introduced by
Statute Law (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act No. 2 of 2002.
83
VII THE ADVOCATES COMPLAINTS COMMISSION
7.1 Introduction
248. This part of the Report encompasses a review of the role of
the Advocates Complaints Commission vis-à-vis the autonomy and
independence of the profession and makes proposals relating thereto.
81
See, for instance, Lord Cooke of Thorndon (ed.), Portrait of a
Profession (Reed, Wellington, 1969).
84
Specifically, the Advocates’ Committee was given certain
responsibilities in the field of discipline. The Advocates’ Committee
consisted of the Attorney-General, the Solicitor-General, and three
advocates from the Law Society. Any one could make a complaint to
the Advocates’ Committee concerning the conduct of an advocate.
The complainant and the advocate complained of were heard by the
Advocates’ Committee, which submitted a report to the court,
together with all the evidence, if it considered that there was a prima
facie case to answer.82 The court of course had always had an
inherent jurisdiction over advocates, though lacking mechanisms,
independent of the professional association, and now the Advocates’
Committee, to review advocates’ conduct.
252. In 1986, the Advocates Act was amended by Act No. 18 of
that year. The procedure for discipline was laid down in part X
therein. Section 62 allowed for complaints to be lodged against
advocates for professional misconduct. The complaint was to be
filed to the Board of Inquiry, appointed by the Council of the Law
Society and comprising of three advocates. The Board could: –
85
conviction, possible sanctions were specified in s 62(b). 88 There was
also a right of appeal to the High Court and thence to the Court of
Appeal.
254. In essence, the regime created under Act No. 18 of 1986 was
a self-regulation mechanism sponsored by The Law Society of
Kenya. The Board of Inquiry was not only exclusively appointed by
the Council of the Law Society but its membership was also
exclusively constituted of advocates. There were no provisions for
representation of the Government, non-Law Society groups, or the
public.
255. Although self-regulation of this type was not unknown
elsewhere, for some time such independence has been generally
subject to limitations of one sort or another. Consequently, this
regime was attended with doubts and uncertainty and the ability of
the Law Society of Kenya to discipline its members increasingly
became suspect over time. Whatever disciplinary machinery existed
for self-regulation of Law Society members conduct had largely
broken down. It was feared that The Law Society of Kenya could no
longer effectively protect and assist the public in all matters
touching, ancillary or incidental to the law. The Boards of Inquiry
which had been established to deal with complaints against
advocates could not cope with the said complaints. This affected
public confidence in the legal profession, and the profession itself
recognised the need for this to change. Eventually calls for the
formation of a better and stronger disciplinary mechanism to
regulate and oversee the discipline of members of the legal
profession were acted upon.
256. The Advocates Complaints Commission was established in
1989 by Act No. 18 of that year which made fundamental
amendments to the Advocates Act. At present, therefore, it is the
Advocates Complaints Commission (and the Disciplinary
Committee) that is mainly concerned with the discipline of
advocates in Kenya. As will be seen hereunder, the provisions
regarding the Advocates Complaints Commission were further
enhanced in the year 2002 when the Statute Law (Miscellaneous
Amendments) Act No. 289 was passed into law. It is this regime
establishing the Advocates Complaints Commission with which this
Report is concerned.
88
See, Act No.9 of 1989.
89
Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 49 (Acts No. 3).
86
7.3 Institutional and operational framework of the Advocates
Complaints Commission
257. Provisions regarding the Advocates Complaints Commission
are to be found under Part X of the Advocates Act as amended by the
aforementioned Act No. 18 of 1989. Section 53(1) thereof
establishes the Commission with the sole purpose of enquiring into
complaints against any advocate, firm of advocates, or any member
or employees thereof.90
258. The Commission falls under the State Law Office (or the
Attorney General’s chambers). Its vision is to inspire a greater public
confidence in the administration of justice through efficient and
effective handling of complaints with sustained cooperation of the
members of the profession themselves. It is committed to the
eradication of incompetence and dishonesty and to the improvement
of professional ethics and services among advocates in Kenya
259. The Commission consists of such a commissioner or
commissioners as shall be appointed by the President. 91 If a single
commissioner is appointed under the Act, he or she must be qualified
to be appointed as a judge of the High Court under Chapter IV of the
Constitution.92 If more than one commissioner is appointed then one
of them must be qualified as aforementioned. 93 In 2004 the Attorney-
General made rules under s 54(3) of the Advocates Act for the
operations of the Complaint’s Commission and provided for the
position of a Chairman.
260. The term of office of commissioners is three years at present.
It is recommended that the term of office for commissioners should
be two years, renewable, and they should be provided with security
of tenure (Recommendation 8). Appointments should be on the
nomination of the Law Society of Kenya, the Minister of Justice and
Constitutional Affairs, and the Attorney-General.
261. The Act also provides for the appointment by the Attorney-
General of a Secretary to the Commission. 94 In addition, the
Attorney-General is obliged to provide such public officers as are
necessary for the proper and efficient exercise of the duties and
90
Section 53(1) Advocates Act, (Cap 16 Laws of Kenya).
91
Ibid. Currently the Chairman is Joseph King’arui, and the
Commissioner (formerly Secretary and Chief State Counsel) is Mrs.
Esther Aduma.
92
Section 53(2) Advocates Act, (Cap 16 Laws of Kenya).
93
Ibid.
94
Section 54(1) Advocates Act, (Cap 16 Laws of Kenya).
87
functions of the Commission.95 The Commission operates from
Nairobi where all the complaints are handled. The Commission has a
total of twenty-nine staff comprising of 2 Commissioners, 7 State
Counsel and 14 support staff.
262. The Commission rightly views its primary duties as ensuring
that advocates conduct themselves properly and that standards of
legal services rendered to the public are improved and maintained. In
practical terms, the Commission is mainly responsible for and
perform the following functions:
95
Section 54(2) Advocates Act (Cap 16 Laws of Kenya).
96
Section 53(3) Advocates Act, (Cap 16 Laws of Kenya).
97
Section 53(3A) Advocates Act (Cap 16 Laws of Kenya).
88
7.3.2 Investigation of Complaints
265. It is the duty of the Commission to receive and consider a
complaint made by any person, regarding the conduct of any
advocate, firm of advocates, or any member or employee thereof.98
Indeed the role of the Commission in other respects stems from this
investigatory duty.
266. If it appears to the Commission that there is substance in the
complaint but that it does not constitute a disciplinary offence it shall
forthwith notify the person or firm against whom the complaint has
been made of the particulars of the complaint.99 Such person or firm
is then called upon to answer the complaint within such reasonable
period as shall be specified by the Commission in such
notification.100
267. After the expiration of the period specified in the
notification, the Commission then proceeds to investigate the
matter.101 For this purpose (that is, investigation) the Commission
has the powers to:
summon witnesses;
require the production of such documents as it may deem
necessary;
examine witnesses on oath; and
generally take such steps as it may consider proper and
necessary for purpose of its inquiry.102
98
Section 53(4) Advocates Act (Cap 16 Laws of Kenya).
99
Section 53(4)(c) Advocates Act (Cap 16 Laws of Kenya).
100
Ibid.
101
Section 53(4)(d) Advocates Act (Cap 16 Laws of Kenya).
102
Ibid.
103
Section 53(6D) Advocates Act (Cap 16 Laws of Kenya) introduced
by Statute Law (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act No. 2 of 2002.
104
Ibid.
89
269. It may also investigate the accounts of an advocate against
whom a complaint has been made and for that purpose may order
such advocate to produce all relevant books and documents to the
Commission or to an accountant engaged by the Commission in that
behalf.105
270. After hearing submissions made to it by or on behalf of the
complainant and the person or firm against whom the complaint has
been made, the Commission makes such an order as it shall in the
circumstances of the case consider just and expedient. 106 The scope
of this power will be discussed later.
271. In this regard (the remedies available from the Commission),
the Commission has from 2002 had the power to award, by order,
compensation or reimbursement not exceeding one hundred
thousand shillings (Ksh. 100,000) to a complainant who has suffered
loss or damage by reason of the advocate’s conduct. 107 Hitherto, the
compensation or reimbursement was limited at a maximum of ten
thousand shillings (Ksh. 10,000), a sum that was increased to a
maximum of hundred thousand shillings (Ksh. 100,000) by the
Statute Law (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act No. 2 of 2002.
272. Where the commission makes an order awarding
compensation or reimbursement to the complainant, such an order
must be registered with the Court and shall thereupon be enforceable
in the same manner as an order of the Court to the like effect. 108 It is
vital to note that under the Act the “Court” refers to the High Court,
and that this definition is used throughout this Report.
273. In addition to awarding compensation or reimbursement, the
Commission may order the surrender of all funds or property which
an advocate does not dispute in a matter relating to the surrender of
funds or property by an advocate to a client. 109 However, this is not
applicable where the complainant has filed a civil suit against the
advocate in respect of the same funds or property.110 In essence the
Act recognises the principle of res judicata.
105
Section 53(6E) advocates Act (Cap 16 Laws of Kenya) introduced by
Statute Law (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act No. 2 of 2002.
106
Section 53(4)(d) Advocates Act (Cap 16 Laws of Kenya).
107
Section 53(6) Advocates Act (Cap 16 Laws of Kenya) as amended by
Statute Law (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act No. 2 of 2002.
108
Section 53(6A) advocates Act (Cap 16 Laws of Kenya) introduced by
Statute Law (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act No. 2 of 2002.
109
Section 53(6B) advocates Act (Cap 16 Laws of Kenya) introduced by
Statute Law (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act No. 2 of 2002.
110
Ibid.
90
274. The Commission may also issue a warrant for the levy of the
amount of any sum ordered to be paid on the immovable and
movable property of the person or firm by whom the compensation
is ordered to be paid by distress and sale under warrant, and such
warrant shall be enforced as if it was a warrant issued by the
Court.111
275. The Act provides that appeals from the Commission lie to the
High Court and that the determination of any such appeal by the
High Court shall be final.112 Where an aggrieved party does not
prefer an appeal to the High Court, he may apply to the Disciplinary
Committee for a review of the order.
111
Section 53(7) Advocates Act (Cap 16 Laws of Kenya).
112
Section 53(6C) Advocates Act (Cap 16 Laws of Kenya).
113
Section 53(4)(b) Advocates Act (Cap 16 Laws of Kenya).
114
Section 53(4)(e) Advocates Act (Cap 16 Laws of Kenya).
115
Ibid.
91
promote reconciliation and encourage and facilitate an amicable
settlement between the parties to the complaint.116
116
Section 53(5) Advocates Act (Cap 16 Laws of Kenya).
117
Section 53(9) Advocates Act (Cap 16 Laws of Kenya).
118
Ibid.
92
NATURE OF COMPLAINT NO. OF COMPLAINTS
Failure to account 9
Delay 6
Overcharging 2
Withholding funds 35
Conduct unbecoming of an 3
advocate
TOTAL 84
Abandoned 38
Settled 9
Advocates deceased 6
Closed as no misconduct 39
disclosed
Withdrawn 5
93
Sub judice 1
TOTAL 100
Advocates suspended 3
Advocates fined 31
Advocates acquitted 20
Advocates deceased 3
TOTAL 86
94
first instance (for complaints which have substance but which do not
constitute a disciplinary offence), it also acts as prosecutor in cases
brought to the Disciplinary Committee. It also has a mediation role,
and endeavours to promote reconciliation by acting as an arbitrator
between advocates and their clients.
286. Its declared mission is to eradicate dishonesty and
incompetence in the legal profession in Kenya. To achieve this aim
its objective is to restore public confidence in the legal profession by
ensuring that advocates provide honest and quality services to their
clients.
287. The Commission deals with two categories of complaints,
inadequate professional services and professional misconduct. While
the former category may appear to extend somewhat beyond the
ambit of professional discipline, it is appropriate and is comparable
with practise elsewhere (such as “unsatisfactory conduct” in New
Zealand).
288. The Commission’s own publicity material outlines thirteen
examples of inadequate professional services and professional
misconduct. These are (and the list is said to not be exhaustive):
failure to account for/withholding funds; failure to keep clients
informed; issuing cheques which are subsequently dishonoured;
failure to honour professional undertakings; delay; failure to reply to
correspondence or other communications from professional
colleagues or the Commission; failure to comply with instructions
from clients or acting contrary to instructions; failure to release files
or documents; overcharging or failure to advise the client on costs;
failure to attend court; conflict of interest; and demanding legal fees
from a person who is not a client.
289. The list also includes “any other behaviour which may
amount to professional misconduct”. This is defined broadly as
including any disgraceful or dishonourable conduct incompatible
with the status of an advocate. Although there is an unfortunate
element of vagueness about this definition this is probably
unavoidable. It is better to ensure that the Commission – and the
Disciplinary Committee – has jurisdiction to act, rather than
otherwise.
290. Where it felt that misconduct should be defined the following
recent definition, from the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006
(NZ) might be a useful starting point. This states (s 8) that
95
law firm,—
(a) means conduct of the lawyer or incorporated law firm
that occurs at a time when he or she or it is providing
regulated services and is conduct—
(i) that would reasonably be regarded by lawyers of
good standing as disgraceful or dishonourable; or
(ii) that consists of a wilful or reckless contravention
of any provision of this Act or of any regulations
or practice rules made under this Act that apply to
the lawyer or incorporated law firm or of any
other Act relating to the provision of regulated
services; or
(iii) that consists of a wilful or reckless failure on the
part of the lawyer, or, in the case of an incorporated
law firm, on the part of a lawyer who is
actively involved in the provision by the incorporated
law firm of regulated services, to comply
with a condition or restriction to which a practising
certificate held by the lawyer, or the lawyer so
actively involved, is subject; or
(iv) that consists of the charging of grossly excessive
costs for legal work carried out by the lawyer or
incorporated law firm; and
(b) includes—
(i) conduct of the lawyer or incorporated law firm
that is misconduct under subsection (2) or subsection
(3); and
(ii) conduct of the lawyer or incorporated law firm
which is unconnected with the provision of regulated
services by the lawyer or incorporated law
firm but which would justify a finding that the
lawyer or incorporated law firm is not a fit and
proper person or is otherwise unsuited to engage
in practice as a lawyer or an incorporated law
firm.
(2) A lawyer or an incorporated law firm is guilty of misconduct
if, at a time when he or she or it is providing regulated
services, and without the consent of the High Court or of the
Disciplinary Tribunal, the lawyer or incorporated law firm
knowingly employs, or permits to act as a clerk or otherwise,
in relation to the provision of regulated services, any person
who, to the knowledge of the lawyer or incorporated law
firm,—
(a) is under suspension from practice as a barrister or as a
solicitor or as a conveyancing practitioner; or
(b) has had his or her name struck off the roll of barristers
96
and solicitors of the High Court; or
(c) has had his or her registration as a conveyancing
practitioner
cancelled by an order made under this Act; or
(d) is disqualified, by an order made under section
242(1)(h), from employment in connection with a
practitioner’s
or incorporated firm’s practice.
(3) A person is guilty of misconduct if that person, being a
lawyer
or an incorporated law firm, shares, with any person other than
another lawyer or incorporated law firm, the income from any
business involving the provision of regulated services to the
public.
(4) Despite subsection (3), a lawyer or an incorporated law firm
is
not guilty of misconduct under that subsection by reason only
of sharing with a patent attorney (in the circumstances, and in
accordance with any conditions, prescribed by the practice
rules) the income from any business involving the provision
of regulated services to the public.
(5) Despite subsection (3), neither an incorporated law firm nor a
lawyer who is actively involved in the provision by an
incorporated
law firm of regulated services is guilty of misconduct
under that subsection by reason only of the incorporated law
firm making a distribution to shareholders of that firm.
291. As can be seen, the key elements are that the conduct must be
committed while practising as a lawyer, and that it must be such as
would reasonably be regarded by lawyers of good standing as
disgraceful or dishonourable; or amount to wilful or reckless
contravention of any provision of the [Advocates] Act or regulations
made under it; or wilful or reckless failure to comply with a
condition or restriction in a practising certificate; or consists of the
charging of grossly excessive costs; or knowingly employs, or
permits to act as a clerk or otherwise, any person who, to the
knowledge of the lawyer is under suspension from practice or has
had his or her name struck off the roll of advocates.
292. It is recommended that consideration be given to defining
misconduct more formally (perhaps along the lines suggested
above), not so as to restrict its scope, but so as to clarify the
distinction between professional misconduct and inadequate
professional services (Recommendation 9). Attempting to provide
97
precise definitions may be self-defeating, as has been observed
elsewhere:
293. The Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 (NZ) also defines
“unsatisfactory conduct” (the equivalent to inadequate professional
services). This is defined as follows (in s 12):
98
services (not being a contravention that amounts to
misconduct under section 7); or
(d) conduct consisting of a failure on the part of the lawyer,
or, in the case of an incorporated law firm, on the part of
a lawyer who is actively involved in the provision by
the incorporated law firm of regulated services, to comply
with a condition or restriction to which a practising
certificate held by the lawyer, or the lawyer so actively
involved, is subject (not being a failure that amounts to
misconduct under section 7).
99
298. The Commission will not investigate complaints about the
actions of judicial officers and prosecutors. This is appropriate, as
judicial officers and prosecutors are not per se, members of the legal
profession, and their roles are quite distinct, so the disciplinary
processes for such officers should be distinct. However, there may
be scope for the investigation of former advocates (who may now,
for instance, be judicial officers) for professional misconduct
offences committed while acting as advocates or in the employ of
advocates. It would be inappropriate for advocates to avoid
responsibility for their actions when acting as advocates simply
because they have since retired from practice. It is recommended
that the Commission and Committee be clearly empowered to
investigate and prosecute and to try former advocates for their
actions while advocates (Recommendation 11).
120
Legal Notice No. 213 of 2003.
121
Rule 2, The Advocates (Complaints Commission) (Structure and
Procedure) Rules, 2003.
122
Rule 3, The Advocates (Complaints Commission) (Structure and
Procedure) Rules, 2003.
123
Rule 4, The Advocates (Complaints Commission) (Structure and
Procedure) Rules, 2003.
100
Commission may at any time, and shall, within fourteen days of the
receipt of a written request signed by at least two Commissioners,
convene a special meeting of the Commission.124
303. The meetings of the Commission are presided over by the
chairman and in his absence at any meeting, the Commissioners
present are required to elect one of their number to preside over such
a meeting.125 Once duly elected to preside over a meeting, such a
person shall, with respect to that meeting and the business transacted
thereat, have all the powers of the chairman.126
304. The quorum for a meeting of the Commission is fixed at two
Commissioners. The decision of the Commission on any matter is by
a majority of the votes of the members present and voting, and, in
the event of an equality of votes, then the chairman or the person
presiding shall have a casting vote.
305. It is mandatory upon any Commissioner who, either directly
or indirectly, has an interest in any matter before the Commission,
and is present at a meeting of the Commission at which the matter is
the subject of consideration, to disclose that fact.127 He must do this
at the meeting and as soon as reasonably practicable after the
commencement of the meeting of the Commission.128 Thereafter,
such a Commissioner shall not take part in the consideration or
discussion of, or vote on, any questions with respect to that matter or
be counted in the quorum of the meeting during consideration of the
matter.129 Further, such a disclosure of interest must be recorded in
the minutes at which it is made.130
306. Finally, the Commission may determine its own procedure
including the procedure for the attendance of other persons at its
meetings, and may make standing orders for that purpose.131
124
Rule 5, The Advocates (Complaints Commission) (Structure and
Procedure) Rules, 2003.
125
Rule 6, The Advocates (Complaints Commission) (Structure and
Procedure) Rules, 2003.
126
Ibid.
127
Rule 9(1), The Advocates (Complaints Commission) (Structure and
Procedure) Rules, 2003.
128
Ibid.
129
Ibid.
130
Rule 9(2), The Advocates (Complaints Commission) (Structure and
Procedure) Rules, 2003.
131
Rule 11, The Advocates (Complaints Commission) (Structure and
Procedure) Rules, 2003.
101
307. It is recommended that, on the authority of s 54(3) of the
Advocates Act, the Attorney-General should, in consultation with the
Law Society, make comprehensive rules of procedure to guide the
operations of the Advocates Complaints Commission. This means
that the discretion of the Commissioners to make their own rules of
procedure, as envisaged by Rule 11 of the Advocates (Complaints
Commission) (Structure and Procedure) Rules 2003, should be
reduced (Recommendation 12). In particular, the rules of procedure
should incorporate measures to ensure that the initial assessment of a
complaint speedily determines whether or not the complaint is above
the threshold below which it should be rejected as insubstantial, and
the complainant advised to utilise the Law Society’s regional ethics
committees alternative dispute resolution services.
102
311. There would appear to still be insufficient experienced staff
to enable the Commission to undertake its role effectively. The
summary of findings of the Stobbs Report commenced with the
finding that the “two principal disciplinary bodies, the Complaints
Commission and the Disciplinary Committee, are under-funded,
under-resourced and with management systems that are no longer
able to cope with the volume of complaints”. It would appear that,
although much progress has been made, further investment is
required.
312. It is understood that there are currently some 28 staff,
including 2 Commissioners, 11 state counsel and 15 support staff, in
addition to two vacancies.132 This remains less than the ideal
numbers anticipated by the Stobbs Report as being required, and it is
recommended that further legally-qualified staff be employed
(Recommendation 14).
313. On the basis of the assumptions in the Stobbs Report, of an
initial investigation caseload of 150 to 200 complaints per year for
an individual, and 30-40 prosecutions for those charged with that
role, some 8 investigators and 5 prosecutors are required. The
Commission itself estimates that the optimal establishment of the
Commission is 91, including a Chairman and three commissioners,
and 33 state counsel.133
314. The size of the complaints backlog and the Stobbs Report
assumption of the number of complaints which can be dealt with by
one State Counsel suggests that it could require as much as 90 man-
years to clear the backlog given the present size of the Commission.
This is completely unacceptable. Even if all the recommendations
contained in this Report are implemented it remains uncertain that
this backlog, which is a serious embarrassment, can be significantly
reduced.
315. The priority for any new Commissioners and senior State
Counsel should be to reduce the backlog, by careful evaluation of all
current files. These will, in any event, have to be systematically
132
The Chairman, one Commissioner, a Senior Principal State Counsel,
2 Principal State Counsel, 2 Senior State Counsel, 3 State Counsel I, 3
State Counsel II, a Records Management Officer III, 3 Senior Clerical
Officers, a Personal Secretary, a Shorthand Typist I, a Shorthand Typist,
3 Copy Typist I, a Copy Typist II, a Senior Driver, and 3 Drivers (list as
of 30th May 2007). The two vacancies are of crucial importance, being
the Secretary to the Commission, and the Deputy Chief State Counsel.
133
A Chief State Counsel, Deputy Chief State Counsel, 2 Senior
Principal State Counsel, 4 Principal State Counsel, 10 Senior State
Counsel, 15 State Counsel II/I.
103
incorporated into the new case management system, and it is
recommended that all pre-existing cases be subject to a rigorous
assessment by senior State Counsel. Those which are effectively
“stale” should be closed after advising the complainant of this
decision – allowing complainants to lay a fresh complaint if they
wish, thereby reviving the original complaint.
316. Experience, and a sound case-management system, are as
important – perhaps more so – than the mere question of the number
of investigators and prosecutors. Office space is currently inadequate
for the scale of the operation, and this inhibits the preservation of
confidentiality that is necessary for the Commissions work. It is
recommended that investment be made in adequate office space and
filing facilities, and technical support equipment such as
photocopiers, scanners, and printers (Recommendation 15).
Increased off-site archiving of closed files would assist. The filing
system is currently entrusted to a relatively junior person (a Records
Management Officer III), and further investment in this field is
necessary.
317. Although formal training for prosecutors in prosecution
techniques was recommended by the Stobbs Report
(recommendation 11) it would appear that this is still lacking. It is
recommended that formal training for prosecutors in prosecution
techniques be entrusted to a second Commissioner with suitable
prosecutorial and management experience (Recommendation 16).
318. The introduction of internal administrative measures,
including computers and client satisfaction questionnaires, would
appear to have improved the efficiency of the Commission. Further
work is however required. In particular, the relatively low status and
seniority of State Counsel may hamper the ability of the
Commission to investigate adequately, and prosecute effectively.
319. Recommendation 12 of the Stobbs Report was that more
senior advocates should be recruited to the Commission to deal with
the more complex and difficult complaints. For reasons which may
be structural rather than merely financial the seniority of State
Counsel in the Commission is still not commensurate with the
importance of their role. Rather than being seen as a career
backwater for government lawyers, appointment to the Commission
should be seen as important and prestigious as any in the public
service. Prosecutors before the Disciplinary Committee are in one
sense like prosecutors in any court (indeed a lower court since the
penalties are essentially only economic) – but as the accused are
lawyers, the prosecutors must seek to preserve the integrity of the
legal profession by prosecuting expeditiously, rigorously and
104
effectively. It is recommended that a number of more senior State
Counsel be appointed to the staff of the Advocates Complaints
Commission (Recommendation 17). This should also serve to reduce
the risk – which is impossible to quantity – of State Counsel being
reluctant to investigate or prosecute more senior advocates.
320. The use of computers for both typing and for recordkeeping
and case management is essential, and will result in cost-savings
over time. The computerised case management system for the
Disciplinary Committee (see the later discussion of the Committee)
should be coupled with a similar arrangement in the Advocates
Complaints Commission. Such a system will enable deadlines to be
set and met in a timely manner, by automatically generating
reminders, and expediting the production of letters and other
documents. It will also reduce the chance of complaints being
misplaced, or otherwise not followed up in a timely manner.
321. As with the Disciplinary Committee, it is essential that
adequate staff training is provided for the most effective use of these
systems. The introduction of this system – for which Mark Stobbs
was advised in 2002 there were funds allocated – is a matter of high
priority. Quality and completeness is however critical for the system
to be cost-effective. Thus it should be designed to, inter alia,
facilitate the effective prosecution of cases by State Counsel even
where they have not been dealing with the specific file. Paragraph 53
of the Stobbs Report outlines some of the minimum attributes of the
system. These should also include a reporting facility, to make
possible the production of real-time reports on the entire workload of
the Commission. The production of annual reports could thus be
largely automated, and it would be possible to produce quarterly
reports which were regularly on time.
322. The Stobbs Report anticipated that the Commission’s
computer case-management system should be compatible with any
system acquired for the Disciplinary Committee and, if possible, the
two should be implemented in tandem. It is further recommended
that the Advocates Complaints Commission and Disciplinary
Committee computer-based case management systems be integrated
as far as practical – subject to the same (joint) tendering process
(Recommendation 18). Internal firewalls can be used to isolate
information which is exclusively intended for the Disciplinary
Committee or for the Advocates Complaints Commission.
323. The introduction of a computer-based case management
system, the appointment of additional (senior) State Counsel, and the
implementation of systematic in-house or out-sourced prosecutorial
training are important steps. But they should be in conjunction with
105
a review of the case management process (which should be reflected
in the arrangement of the case management system).
324. Another challenge that faces the Advocates Complaints
Commission is its centralization in Nairobi. The Act does not
provide for the establishment of the Commission in various parts of
the Country. Consequently, the Commission is largely inaccessible to
complainants and advocates outside Nairobi. The cost of travelling
to the Commission especially by complainants, a majority of who
are already bearing the brunt of poverty, is highly prohibitive.
325. The Commission, which currently sits only in Nairobi, ought
at some time in the future to be decentralized with the aim of
bringing it closer to the people who require its services. The
consequence of this is that the Commission should be established at
various strategic areas in the country. In the alternative, the
Commission may, on a rotational basis, move across the country for
purposes of hearing and determining complaints. One or other of
these initiatives should be done in the medium-term, once the other
recommended improvements have been implemented.
326. It is understood that there have been plans to decentralize the
services to the provinces but this has not been affected due to what
are described as logistical problems. The Commission has however
begun programmes for its decentralization with Eldoret and
Mombasa being its pilot projects. In view of the fact that a
disproportionate number of complaints arise against advocates
outside Nairobi it is desirable that the Commission have a permanent
presence in the provinces, or at least have a presence on circuit.
However, it is essential that this not have an adverse affect on the
operational efficiency of the Commission.
327. It is recommended that the offices of the Commission remain
in Nairobi until it can be clearly shown that the advantages of
decentralisation outweigh the additional costs and management
complexities of decentralisation, and that the Commission is
functioning efficiently (Recommendation 19).
328. This recommendation is to be understood in conjunction with
Recommendation 72 that the regional ethics committees act as de
facto agents of the Commission (para 472). Decentralisation should
also occur once the operation of the Commission is sufficiently
robust and the backlog of complaints cleared or at least significantly
reduced. Any branch office should comprise at least one senior state
counsel, and should be able to conduct on-site preliminary inquiries.
The implementation of the computer-based case management system
would enable the head office to closely monitor the operation of
branch offices, and remove the need for local commissioners.
106
329. The Stobbs Report identified certain timelines as good
practice: 14 days from receipt of a complaint to the first action being
taken; letters answered and action taken on their contents within 10
days of receipt; follow-up letters despatched no more than four
weeks; and four weeks for conciliation. All of these times, and other
appropriate milestones can and should be incorporated in the
Commission’s case management system, and similar facilities should
be available to the Disciplinary Committee. It should be noted that
the targets set by the Legal Services Complaints Commissioner and
contained in The Law Society of England and Wales’ Plan for the
period 1st April 2007 to 31st March 2008 includes 93% of complaints
acknowledged within five working days of receipt, 88% of
complaints to receive a substantive response within 45 days of
receipt, and 67% of cases to be closed within three months.
107
just and expedient. This latter function is inconsistent with an
investigatory role – and could be justified as a regulatory function if
the Commission were part of the Law Society. As it stands however
this is a regulatory or disciplinary role which would be better placed
with the Law Society or Disciplinary Committee. We will return to
this when considering possible limitations on the role of the
Commission.
334. There appears to be a relatively high proportion of
complaints which do not disclose ostensible professional misconduct
and inadequate professional services, and a significant number of
complaints which are abandoned. Without examining the files in
detail it is impossible to be sure whether there are any conclusions
which can be drawn from these observations. It is possible that many
complaints are made in the absence of a professional misconduct or
inadequate professional services because clients are dissatisfied with
the result of legal action in which they are engaged. But it is also
possible that some complaints have been abandoned due to the
excessive backlog of complaints and the resultant delays in resolving
them.
335. It appears that many complaints are indeed frivolous in
nature. While these are not proceeded with after the preliminary
investigation, it is desirable to consider further measures to deter
such complaints. It is recommended that all complainants be
required to pay a small filing fee, and that the Commission be
empowered to make an award of costs against a complainant in
exceptional circumstances where the complaint is deemed to be
frivolous and vexatious (Recommendation 21).
336. It is recommended that no complaint be accepted by the
Advocates Complaints Commission after more than six years after
the cause of action arose (Recommendation 22).
337. If a complaint is seen to disclose a disciplinary offence the
matter is referred to the Disciplinary Committee. In practice this
means that the Commission will prosecute the advocate before the
Committee. It is recommended that consideration be given to having
the legislation reflect more accurately the fact that complaints are
not merely referred to the Disciplinary Committee by the Advocates
Complaints Commission but are prosecuted by the Commission
before the Committee (Recommendation 23).
108
7.8 Possible limitation of the role of the Commission
338. Though both the Advocates Complaints Commission and the
Disciplinary Committee deal with complaints against advocates, the
Disciplinary Committee deals with more serious cases, particularly
those that disclose professional misconduct. In practice, complaints
are addressed to the Advocates Complaints Commission in the first
instance and dealt with at that level. The Ministry of Justice and
Constitutional Affairs also receives complaints against advocates,
which it always refers to the Commission. Where any complaints
disclose a disciplinary offence, the Commission prosecutes these
before the Disciplinary Committee. It is nonetheless possible for a
complainant to directly refer a matter to the Disciplinary Committee,
bypassing the Commission (or indeed the Law Society).
339. Since the Commission is primarily an investigatory body, its
adjudicative function (as distinct from mediation) would appear to
be inappropriate. It is inconsistent with an investigatory role. If the
Commission were part of the Law Society it could be justified as a
regulatory function (though exercisable by a different agency within
the Law Society). In conformity with the view expressed in the
Stobbs Report, it is recommended that the Commission lose the
ability to make determinations, and confine its role to investigation
and prosecution, with a supporting mediation and conciliation role
(Recommendation 24). This will reduce the potential for a conflict of
interest, and clarify responsibilities, as well as free the resources of
the Commission to address its core role. It is recommended that the
Commission lose the power to examine witnesses on oath, as this
role should be restricted to the Disciplinary Committee, and the
power to tax bills of cost (Recommendation 25).
109
required to do so. This aspect of the Commission’s powers will be
discussed later.
341. However, and despite the intervention by the Statute Law
(Miscellaneous Amendments) Act No. 2, there are shortcomings that
are still inherent in the institutional and operational framework of the
Commission. Consequently, the application and enforcement of the
standards provided in the Advocates Act by the Commission is still
minimal or wanting.
342. At the very least, the Commission faces the following
structural challenges that impedes it from adequately and
successfully discharging its duties.
343. But more importantly, are the shortcomings that relate to the
legislative constitution of the Advocates Complaints Commission. A
critical look at Part X of the Advocates Act reveals, amongst others,
the following loopholes:
110
always thin and vague. Though attempts have made to deal with this
issue, the problem has persisted over the years.
345. The Complaints Commission is pursuant to s 53(4) of the
Advocates Act required to receive and consider a complaint made by
any person regarding the conduct of any advocate, firm of advocates,
or any member or employee thereof. On the other hand, the
Disciplinary Committee is required under s 60(1) of the Advocates
Act to receive, from any person, a complaint against an advocate of
professional misconduct, which expression includes disgraceful or
dishonourable conduct incompatible with the status of an advocate.
346. This distinction is on the face of it insufficient for the
mandates of these two bodies are capable of very wide
interpretations. For this reason, the Commission and the Committee
find themselves dealing with the matters of similar nature thus
leading to duplicity of functions and responsibilities. In particular,
though the Complaints Commission is mandated to deal with
complaints that do not disclose any disciplinary offence, there is
nothing in the Act that bars the Disciplinary Committee from
receiving and determining such complaints.
347. This problem is further compounded by the fact that both the
Complaints Commission and the Disciplinary Committee are forums
of first instance. Thus the choice of forum discretionally lies with the
complainant. The result is that complaints are lodged in either of the
two defeating the logic of having the Complaints Commission which
traditionally have assumed the role of scrutinising complaints and
sending meritorious ones to the Disciplinary Committee. One might
ask why it is necessary to have the Complaints Commission when
the Disciplinary Committee can after all receive and determine
complaints of whatever nature? The answer of course is concerned
with the investigative function of the Commission.
348. If after hearing from the advocate concerned, the Law
Society is of the opinion that the complaint is not valid, the
complainant is informed in writing that his or her complaint lacks
merit. If the Law Society is of the view that the complaint is
genuine, the complaint is forwarded to the Compliance and Ethics
Committee; a committee of The Law Society of Kenya. The
Compliance and Ethics Committee acts as a mediator between the
two parties; it encourages the parties to settle the dispute and the
process is intended to preserve the good relationship that has been
there prior to the complaint.
349. If the Ethics and Compliance Committee is not able to
resolve the dispute successfully, the Committee normally writes to
the Law Society recommending that the dispute be forwarded to the
111
Disciplinary Committee for hearing and determination. This may
also be the result if an advocate fails to respond to correspondence
from the Law Society.
350. The Ethics and Compliance Committee is effectively acting
as a filtering mechanism in the same way that the Advocates
Complaints Commission uses mediation and conciliation. While this
does potentially reduce the number of complaints which reach the
Committee, it may also be unduly complicating the process, by
duplicating a function already undertaken by the Commission.
351. Again, the issue of duplicity of functions and responsibilities
arises. In receiving complaints, scrutinising attachments thereon,
requiring the advocate to respond to the complaint, mediating over
the dispute and referring complaints to the Disciplinary Committee,
the Law Society is simply doing what the Complaints Commission
has been required to do. The functions and responsibilities of the
Commission are thus apparently usurped and its relevance is
consequently put to question. It is recommended that the Ethics and
Compliance Committee confine its role to the regular and systematic
review of the advocates’ practice rules and code of conduct, and that
it consequently relinquish the dispute resolution role
(Recommendation 26).
112
to be autonomous and independent of the professional association, as
well as contributing to its accountability.
355. This would appear, on one level, to conflict with the notion
that a profession should be self-governing. Indeed it is, but the right
of self-government is not absolute, and the extent of the limitation
upon this will vary over time and from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
Certain factors suggest that a greater degree of limitation may be
needed; where, for instance, the legal profession is comparatively
fragmented, greater state involvement may be required. Where the
role of lawyers and the legal system is less well understand greater
lay involvement in the system may, paradoxically, be necessary.
356. The Law Society is an independent representative,
regulatory, and complaints handling body. As the governing body of
a learned profession, the Law Society is privileged to provide its
own disciplinary machinery. This machinery should be autonomous
and independent of wider judiciary and legal system; but also
adhering to the highest ethical and professional standards.
357. Although the Law Society itself does investigate and
prosecute complaints made against advocates, the Advocates
Complaints Commission is the body primarily responsible for this. It
is charged with investigating complaints and bringing them to the
attention of the Disciplinary Committee. Its role is crucial to the
effective operation of the disciplinary system, and thus of the
maintenance of professional ethics.
358. The Advocates Complaints Commission is not however an
organ of the Law Society. Rather it is a department in the Office of
the Attorney-General, established under the Advocates Act134 in 1989
and operational since 1990, “for the purpose of inquiring into
complaints against any advocate, firm of advocates or any member
or employee hereof”. It deals with the majority of complaints,
although some are made to the Law Society and others directly to
the Disciplinary Committee.135 It is wholly funded by the
Government of Kenya, and no charges are made for its services.
359. Commonwealth practice would suggest that the investigatory
and prosecutorial organ of the legal profession has usually – though
not invariably – been a part of the lawyers’ professional association.
There have been calls from some quarters for the abolition of the
Commission, particularly because it was seen as having been
134
Advocates Act (Cap 16 of the Laws of Kenya) s 53.
135
Under the Advocates Act (Cap 16 of the Laws of Kenya) s 60 a
complaint against an advocate for professional misconduct may be made
directly to the Disciplinary Committee by any person.
113
established as part of the political dynamics of the time, as a political
move by the Government.
360. It is however equally important for the investigative body to
retain independence from the representative functions of the law
society, as well as from the disciplinary functions of dedicated
tribunals. This is achieved by removing the majority of investigative
and prosecutorial work from the Law Society. This is also consistent
with growing international practice.
361. Complaints against solicitors in England and Wales are
investigated by the Legal Complaints Service, established 2006
following the separation of the representative, regulatory, and
complaints handling functions of the Law Society. It has equal
numbers of legal and non-legal members. Dissatisfied complainants
can refer their complaint to the Legal Services Ombudsman. This
could be a model for the Kenyan system – provided sufficient
funding was provided. At present it seems unlikely that The Law
Society of Kenya could itself fund a complaints service, and the
present arrangements should continue.
362. Recommendation 66 of the Stobbs Report was that there
should be a single agency to deal with the investigation and
prosecution of advocates, and that (recommendation 69) the
complaints agency should be run by The Law Society of Kenya –
subject to the willingness of the latter to undertake the role, and
prepared to fund it. It is not here recommended that the Law Society
assume this responsibility; at least not until it is clear that the
Disciplinary Committee is operating effectively. It is also probable
that transferring responsibility to the Law Society would be coupled
with a transfer of financial responsibility – as the professional
disciplinary apparatus of the legal profession should ideally be self-
funding. Such a move would be premature at this time.
363. Due to the limited resources of the Law Society it is
recommended that the Society investigate complaints and prosecute
only in exceptional circumstances, thus allowing it to concentrate
upon regulatory and representational functions (Recommendation
27). An example of the type of exceptional circumstances could
include an advocate who was a politician, and who was involved in
abuse of office, which would reflect upon the profession as a whole
but would not necessarily attract a complaint in the ordinary course
of events.
364. To give the Advocates Complaints Commission more
relevance and counter the problem of duplicity, the Commission
should be designated to be the forum of first instance to specifically
receive complaints. The choice of forum that currently lies at the
114
discretion of the complainant should be whittled down. This is also
means that in the event that a complainant lodges his/her complaint
in the Disciplinary Committee the same should, without the
Disciplinary Committee looking into its merits, be referred to the
Complaints Commission for assessment of its merits.
365. The commissioner or commissioners constituting the
Commission are appointed exclusively by the President. The Act
does not envisage that such commissioner or commissioners shall be
appointed by the President on the advice of any other body. Neither
the advice nor the consultation of the Law Society of Kenya or the
Judicial Service Commission or Parliament is sought in making the
appointment.
366. The product of such a system of appointment is that the
commissioner or commissioners so appointed may feel obliged to
owe their allegiance to the President – or may be perceived to so
owe their allegiance. Their independence is consequently
undermined. The Commission therefore becomes amenable to
manipulation, or to a perception of manipulation, which may be little
less serious. In a country where Presidential appointees have
historically been known to defer to the wishes (stated or anticipated)
of their appointer, this is a serious limitation on the perception of the
independence of the Advocates Complaints Commission. Yet for the
Commission to gain the confidence of both the complainants and the
advocates/firm of advocates who appear before it, it must be or at
least seen to be independent.
367. Ideally the independence of the Advocates Complaints
Commission could be achieved by a combination of factors. These
would include the inclusion of lay members – to ensure
independence from the Law Society – and possibly the removal of
the Commission from the Office of the Attorney-General.
368. To ensure that the independence of the Complaints
Commission is buttressed, and its legitimacy enhanced, it is
recommended that the Commissioners should be appointed by the
President on the recommendation of the Law Society of Kenya
(Recommendation 28).
369. In addition, the determination of the remuneration of the
Commissioners by way of salary, allowance, pension or gratuity
should be removed from the presidency. As in the case of the
Disciplinary Committee, the remuneration of the Commissioners
should be determined by the Attorney-General in consultation with
the Treasury. This is so recommended (Recommendation 29).
115
370. At present the Commission does not have an independent
budget. It is dependent upon a share of the budget of the State Law
Office. This renders the Commission potentially subject to influence
from other elements in the Attorney-General’s Office. For reasons of
independence and transparency the Commission should have an
independent budget. It is recommended that the Commission should
be made independent of the Office of the Attorney-General, as a
stand-alone agency, with its own independent budget
(Recommendation 30). This is less because of the desirability for
independence – for it is not recommended that the Law Society take
it over – but to facilitate the administrative changes recommended
below (and principally to assist the Commission to attract more
senior and experienced State Counsel).
371. It is recommended that to ensure that the Advocates
Complaints Commission gets the staff it requires to maintain and
preserve its independence, integrity and efficiency, the Chairman of
the Commission should be empowered to select his or her own staff
(Recommendation 31).
116
7.13 Lack of Representation of the Law Society of Kenya
374. As already seen above, the Commission consists of
commissioner or commissioners appointed by the President. It is
also comprised of a secretary and public officers all of whom are
appointed by the Attorney-General. Unlike the Disciplinary
Committee, the Commission lacks representation of the Law Society
of Kenya which is the body charged with the role of representing the
interests of advocates in Kenya in addition to maintaining and
improving the standards of conduct of the legal profession.
375. It therefore lacks legitimacy especially among the persons it
seeks to regulate yet legitimacy is central to its success. Legitimacy
shapes the perception of a people towards an institution. It creates a
sense of goodwill and persons are therefore willing to subject
themselves before the institution. The Advocates Complaints
Commission has not yet received the full support and goodwill of
advocates in Kenya, in part because it is perceived to be lacking in
terms of legitimacy.
376. It is recommended that the Judicial Service Commission
consult the Law Society before recommending to the President the
name of a candidate for appointment as a commissioner.
377. The workshop at Kisumu suggested that the Advocates
Complaints Commission be renamed the Advocates Enquiry
Commission. This style is however insufficiently accurate as it
suggests a non-legal process is involved. The commission’s work
would be impeded by adopting a name which suggested that its work
was informal. It is recommended that Advocates Complaints
Commission be renamed the Advocates Investigation Commission
(Recommendation 33).
117
of a criminal offence unless the crime is stipulated in written law and
the sentence stated therein. The amendment fails this fundamental
test. It is recommended that this provision be repealed, or adequately
limited. It is to be questioned whether such a criminal sanction is
effective, and it may be taken to suggest a degree of frustration with
advocates, or even of desperation.
380. To counter the defect inherent in s 53(3A) of the Advocates
Act, that is, the failure to stipulate the sentence for the offence
created therein, it is recommended that the Act should be amended to
stipulate the sentence to be meted out to a person convicted of the
offence. Consequently, the defect will be cured (Recommendation
34).
118
c. To monitor the performance of the system for the
maintenance of professional ethics and make
recommendations to the Attorney-General and to the Law
Society from time-to-time with respect to improvements.
119
VIII THE DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE
8.1.1 Establishment
384. The Disciplinary Committee is established under s 57 of the
Advocates Act (Cap 16, Laws of Kenya) to adjudicate upon alleged
breaches of rules of professional conduct by advocates and
advocates’ clerks in Kenya. The Committee comprises the Attorney-
General; the Solicitor-General or a person deputed by the Attorney-
General; six advocates136 and three other persons, not being
advocates appointed by the Attorney-General on the
recommendation of the Law Society of Kenya.137 The Secretary of
136
These are elected under The Law Society of Kenya Act (Cap 18)
Laws of Kenya, The Law Society of Kenya (General) Regulations, Part
IV.
120
the Society shall be the Secretary of the Committee.138 In practice,
the Deputy Secretary of the Society may represent the Secretary in
the Committee’s proceedings.
385. The Disciplinary Committee may constitute itself into a
tribunal of either three or five members to determine a complaint or
matter where it appears such a tribunal is unavailable or
inconvenient to determine the matter or complaint.139 This has
enabled the Committee to deal with the backlog of cases, since it can
be constituted into two or more tribunals at any time. When the
Committee sits as a tribunal to consider a case, and an adjournment
ensues, the subsequent hearing must have all the members presiding
in the case, otherwise it is not deemed as fully constituted. When it is
not constituted as a tribunal, all its members sit in the proceedings.
The Committee (or tribunal) is chaired a person deputed by the
Attorney General, who shall preside at all meetings at which he is
present,140 and sits in Nairobi.
386. The advocates may not be Chairman, Vice-Chairman or
Secretary of the Law Society (who are covered by s 58), and all must
be advocates of at least 10 years standing. One advocate shall be an
advocate who does not ordinarily practise in Nairobi. There are thus
eight professional (assuming that the person deputed by the
Attorney-General are so qualified) and three lay members. In
practice there are ten members, as the Attorney-General does not
normally attend.
387. The Committee is chaired by the Attorney-General (when
present), the Solicitor-General, or in their absence, a person deputed
by the Attorney-General. The advocate members are elected for three
year terms and are eligible for re-election. It is recommended that
the term for advocate members of the Disciplinary Committee be
two years, with a right of renewal (Recommendation 36).
137
Additionally, under s 58 of the Act, the Committee may require the
chairman or vice-chairman of the Society or both to sit as an additional
member or members of the Committee to constitute the tribunal where
appropriate.
138
In the absence or inability of the Secretary, the Committee may
appoint an advocate to ct as such secretary for the duration of such
absence or inability.
139
Section 58(1) of the Advocates Act.
140
Section 58(2) of the Act provides that the Attorney-General or
Solicitor-General, or in the absence of the Attorney-General or the
Solicitor-General the person deputed by the Attorney-General under s
57(1)(b) shall chair such meeting, and in the absence of both, the
tribunal shall appoint a chairperson from among its members.
121
388. The non-advocate members have served since 2002. It would
appear that their presence does little to enhance the effectiveness of
the Disciplinary Committee. Although it is good practice to include
lay members in the Disciplinary Committee, it is recommended that
care is taken to ensure both that appropriate people are selected, and
that they and the advocate members of the Committee understand
their respective roles (Recommendation 37). It is suggested that
serving or past members of disciplinary bodies of other professions
be included especially.
389. The lay members are full members of the Committee, and
should be involved in the deliberate and decision-making processes.
An induction process is recommended (Recommendation 38).
390. The lay members are not currently being utilised in an
effective manner, and rather than leading to public confidence in the
Committee it may actually be harming professional confidence in it.
Their effectiveness is also hampered by the nature of much of the
work of the Committee, since they are not well placed to be actively
involved in the procedural matters which occupy much of the
Committee’s time. If the status hearings and other procedural
functions of the Committee are reduced in line with later
recommendations in this Report then the lay members should be able
to play a more meaningful role. Although they have not been a
success to date it is not recommended that they be removed, as has
been suggested elsewhere. This is because there remain sound
reasons for the inclusion of lay members, and they can make a
worthwhile contribution to the Committee’s work.
391. The Solicitors Regulation Authority of the Law Society of
England and Wales, established in 2007, has a number of roles,
including taking regulatory action. It also refers prosecutions to the
independent Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal. The Solicitors
Regulation Authority may be deemed to be broadly the equivalent to
the Advocates Complaints Commission, and the Solicitors
Disciplinary Tribunal to the Disciplinary Committee. Just over half
of the members of the Solicitors Regulation Authority are solicitors,
with the rest being lay. This model is becoming more common, with
international best practice seeing the increased use of lay members.
392. The Advocates Act currently allows for the possibility of a
Disciplinary Committee sitting with solely lay members. It is
recommended that this possibility be removed (Recommendation
39).
393. It is also recommended that there should be at least one lay
and one advocate member present at each hearing of the Disciplinary
Committee, and at least three in total (Recommendation 40). The
122
same members need not be present at every stage of a particular
hearing. The procedure for the selection of members to attend each
sitting ought also to be clarified.
394. It is recommended that the number of advocates in the
Disciplinary Committee be increased to nine, and that three of these
must be of at least twenty years standing (Recommendation 41).
395. The Stobbs Report recommended that the Committee should
have power to co-opt advocates; that membership should be open to
advocates of 5 years standing or more and that two elected places
should be reserved for individuals of between 5 and 10 years’
standing; and that a greater number of lay representatives are likely
to be needed (recommendations 20-22).
396. The co-option of advocates is important even if the
permanent membership of the Committee is increased, and it is
recommended that the recommendation with respect to co-option be
implemented (Recommendation 42). The current membership of the
Committee is insufficient, given that the Attorney-General and
Solicitor-General do not in practice sit, and the Committee meets
regularly, twice a week, on Mondays in the morning and Thursdays
in the afternoon.
397. It is therefore recommended that the Attorney-General and
Solicitor-General be excluded from membership (Recommendation
43). This is not to suggest that the present holders141 of these high
offices do or at any time have acted less than with the highest
propriety. However best practice suggests that these office-holders
should not be members of a judicial or quasi-judicial body.
398. It is recommended that the Attorney-General appoint the
Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Disciplinary Committee
(both to be advocates or judicial officers) on the advice of the
Judicial Services Commission, and that these be appointments in lieu
of the Law Officers. There should continue to be representatives of
the Attorney-General and Solicitor-General (Recommendation 44).
399. Recommendation 58 of the Stobbs Report was that
consideration should be given to giving the judges representation
(possibly as chairman) on the Disciplinary Committee. It is
recommended that the Chairman or Deputy, but not both, should be a
judge, but that this not necessarily be a statutory requirement
(Recommendation 45).
At the time this Report was written, the Hon. S. Amos Wako, EGH
141
123
400. It is recommended that the Stobbs Report recommendation
with respect to including more junior advocates not be implemented
at this time (Recommendation 46). Members of the Disciplinary
Committee are required at times to deal with advocates of
considerable experience and standing in the community. More junior
advocates on the Committee may be placed at a disadvantage and be
unable to robustly hear such cases. Senior advocates appearing
before the Committee often view it as lacking legitimacy due to the
relative youth of some Committee members.
401. The Secretary to The Law Society of Kenya is also Secretary
to the Disciplinary Committee. While the Disciplinary Committee
remains an organ of the law society a close linkage is appropriate.
However, as recommended in the Stobbs Report (para 159), it is
recommended that the Secretary should cease to be Secretary of the
Committee (Recommendation 47).
402. This linkage is particularly problematic while it remains
possible for the Law Society to investigate complaints and prosecute
advocates before the Committee, even though this is not the normal
course of events. If all investigations and prosecutions were dealt
with by the Advocates Complaints Commission then the Secretary of
the Law Society might remain Secretary of the Committee. Good
practice would however suggest that the positions should be
separated, whilst still allowing the secretariat of the Law Society
responsibility for the operation of the Committee. Consideration
should be given to appointing a Deputy Secretary (Ethics), who
would have specific responsibility for this role.
142
Established under s 13 of the Law Society of Kenya Act (Cap 18)
Laws of Kenya.
143
Section 53(4)(b) of the Advocates Act.
124
by or on behalf of an advocate seeking to procure the
removal of his/her name from the Roll.144
404. The vast majority of complaints to the Committee are
referrals by the Council and the Commission, which then prosecute
the cases. In each of these cases, the persons with the standing and
the advocate against whom the complaint is lodged are parties to the
proceedings, and may be represented by an advocate, 145 in some
cases appointed by the Council, where the complainant or applicant
does not have one.146
125
application, the Committee may make an order that the name of such
advocate be removed from the Roll and may make such other order
in relation to the case as it may deem fit.
407. The disciplinary mandate of the Committee also extends to
advocate’s clerks. The object of this is to uphold ethical standards
within this cadre of personnel who provide vital support to advocates
and by the nature of their work interact with clients and confidential
information relating thereto. The Council of the Law Society is thus
mandated to move the Committee to make orders in relation to the
employment, retention or remuneration of any person who are
deemed unfit to be advocates’ clerks.151
408. To discharge its mandate, the Committee’s procedures are
deemed to be judicial/legal proceedings.152 Accordingly, the
Committee may administer oaths or affirmations, whereas the
complainant and the advocate to whom a complaint relates, and an
applicant making any application to the Committee, may take out a
summons for discovery of documents or to give evidence in
accordance with evidentiary principles applicable in trials.153
151
Section 72.
152
Section 58(5). This is reflected in the procedures of the Committee.
See the Advocates (Disciplinary Committee) Rules, L.N. 458/1990.
153
Section 58(4).
154
Although there are no express powers vested in the Committee to do
this, in practice, most lay complaints are referred to the Commission.
126
At any stage of any proceedings, refer the case to the Council
of the Law Society as appropriate155 or otherwise allow or
refuse the withdrawal of any application;156
Make orders, upon consideration of adduced evidence, that
the advocate to whom the complaint relates
be admonished; or
be suspended from practice for a specified period
not exceeding five years; or
that the name of such advocate be struck off the
Roll; or
pay a fine not exceeding one million shillings, or
such combination of the above orders as the
Committee thinks fit; or
pay to the aggrieved person compensation or
reimbursement not exceeding five million
shillings;157 or
pay to the complainant such sum as it finds to be
due from the advocate, where the complainant has
not filed a civil suit against the advocate in
respect of the sum in dispute.158
155
Rule 19 of the Committee Rules.
156
Rule 20, Committee Rules.
157
Section 60(4).
158
Section 60(9).
159
Section 60(3) and Rule 11 of the Committee Rules.
160
Section 61(1).
161
Rule 11, Committee Rules.
127
Make any such order as to payment by any party (including
the complainant) of any costs or witness expenses and of the
expenses of the Committee in connection with the hearing of
any complaint as it may deem appropriate.162
162
Section 60(5).
163
Section 3 of the Judicature Act (Cap 8) Laws of Kenya. See the
Stobbs Report.
164
This is usually done by the Advocates Complaints Commission or the
Council of the Society.
165
Section 60(6).
128
Where the complaint relates to fees and costs, the Committee
may adjourn the complaint pending taxation,166 or make its
own estimate of the costs due to the advocate and make
orders accordingly.167 Such determination shall be deemed to
be a determination of the High Court.168
Where the Committee deems that the professional services
provided by an advocate or firm in connection with any
matter in which such advocate or firm of advocates had been
instructed by the a complainant were not of the quality that
could reasonably have been expected of an advocate or firm,
it may do one or more the following things as it deems
appropriate
determine that the costs to which the advocate or firm of advocates
shall be entitled shall be limited to such amount as may be specified
in its determination;
a. direct the advocate to comply, or to secure compliance, with
the requirement to refund, remit or waive the whole or part of
any advocate’s costs or fee or amount already paid by or on
behalf of the client; or
b. direct the advocate or firm of advocates to secure the
rectification of any error, omission or other deficiency arising
out of their fault; or
c. direct the advocate to take at their own expense, such other
action in the interests of the client as it may specify.169
414. The provisions on costs and fees are particularly drastic and
wide, and the Committee is required to use its discretion
judiciously,170 considering that there are other avenues for remedies
in such cases of for civil liability in tort or contract.
166
That is, if a bill of costs has been filed in Court by the advocate
respondent.
167
Section 60(7).
168
Section 60(8).
169
Section 60A(2).
170
Section 60(4).
129
filing, give a notice to all other parties in writing of the filing of the
order.171
416. Where no appeal has been filed, the party in favour of whom
the order is made may apply for leave to enforce such order as
decree, and the order may be executed in the manner as an order of
the High Court to the like effect and, if it is an order for of money,
may be enforced on the immovable and movable property of the
advocate in accordance with the Civil Procedure Rules.172
417. The Committee has powers to issue a warrant for the levy of
the amount of any sum ordered to be paid on the immovable and
movable property of the advocate by distress and sale under warrant
and such warrant is enforceable as if it were a warrant issued by the
High Court173 The Committee is empowered to entertain applications
in respect of non-compliance with its orders, notice or direction.174
418. Although the orders of the Committee are to be enforced as
though they are orders of a court of law, in practice, the enforcement
of orders of the Committee has been very weak. There are cases
where advocates have ignored orders of the Committee. 175 The
Secretariat of the Committee (normally personnel from the Law
Society of Kenya) is tasked with this role, but has not managed the
same efficiently for want of capacity. 176 The introduction of a
computerised case-management system should facilitate more
rigorous enforcement of the orders of the Committee.
171
Section 60(1).
172
Section 60(11).
173
Section 60(12).
174
Section 77 read together with s 60.
175
See Stobbs Report, p. 19.
176
The Society has declined in recent years to grant any defaulting
advocate a practicing certificate.
130
against such order to the High Court, or take an action for judicial
review.177
420. It would be impractical to limit the right of judicial review of
decisions of the Disciplinary Committee. This is a right enjoyed by
other persons in analogous situations. It appears however that such
action may have a seriously deleterious effect upon the operation of
the disciplinary system. The Chief Justice is therefore invited to
remind the judiciary that the professional standing of advocates is a
matter which the judiciary should take careful cognisance, and bear
in mind the importance of a well-regulated legal profession.
421. Where there is a finding that discloses a breach of trust by an
advocate under s 80 of the Advocates Act, the Committee shall
report such finding to the Attorney-General, who may then institute
proceedings.178 Note in this regard needs to be made that the
Committee does not have the powers to institute such criminal
proceedings, since s 26(3)(a) of the Constitution of Kenya provides
that only the Attorney General shall institute and undertake criminal
proceedings against any person before any court (other than a courts-
martial) in respect of any offence alleged to have been committed by
that person.
131
make such order as to the payment by any person of costs, or
otherwise in relation to the appeal, as it may think fit.
425. Such decision or order of the High Court may be appealed
against by the aggrieved advocate to the Court of Appeal of
Kenya.180 It needs noting that although the right of appeal has been
expressly prescribed for an aggrieved advocate, such is not the case
for other parties such as the complainant. This defies the principle of
equality, which requires that all parties to a dispute be afforded equal
rights to seize dispute settlement mechanisms and appeal therefrom.
It is recommended that the right of appeal be extended to all parties
(Recommendation 49).
180
Section 67.
181
Section 68(1).
182
Section 69(1).
183
Under s 68(3) of the Act, such is also required to be sent to any
professional body outside Kenya where the advocate is a member.
184
Section 69(2).
132
8.1.10 Power to Recommend Restoration
428. The Chief Justice is empowered, either suo motu or upon
recommendation of the Committee, to order the Registrar to restore
on the Roll any advocate whose name had been removed from or
struck off the Roll.185
133
allegations of the misconduct by the advocate, or in the case of an
advocate’s clerk, the misconduct or offence against which the clerk
had been convicted. Applications are lodged with the Secretariat of
the Committee/ Tribunal, based at the Law Society of Kenya. In
practice, the Committee sets a date to determine the existence of a
prima facie case against the respondent, and the Secretary shall give
written notice thereof (and the application/copy of affidavit of
complaint) to the parties not less than twenty-one days before the
date fixed for the hearing.189 The notice shall contain the charges of
alleged professional misconduct and shall also require the addressee
to furnish the Committee with list documents to be adduced at the
hearing.190
432. The Committee may then proceed to hear and determine the
complaint or application. At the hearing, a party may be represented
by an advocate or may appear in person. In the event of a respondent
(as is in many cases of advocates falling ill during the hearing) or
applicant failing to appear at the hearing the Committee may dispose
of the case in absentia.191 Parties may adduce evidence, call
witnesses,192 admit, prove or disclose documents, 193 or amend the
application,194 whereas the Committee may adjourn the
proceedings,195 or proceed to full hearing. Evidence before the
Committee is given on oath and it has power to accept affidavit
evidence.196
433. Upon the hearing or determination of any complaint or
application, the Committee may find professional misconduct or
inadequate professional services and impose sanctions, or in the case
of an application in respect of an advocate’s clerk, make orders as to
the employment, retention or remuneration of such clerk. 197 The
Committee may, additionally make orders regarding costs of
proceedings as it deems fit. The findings and transcripts of the
proceedings are produced and made available after the hearing.
434. It follows that the Committee’s procedures and evidentiary
rules are broadly congruent with those of the High Court, although
strict rules of evidence and procedure are not applied. Moreover, the
189
Rule 4(2).
190
Rules 13 and 14.
191
Rule 17.
192
Rule 32 empowers the Committee to summon witnesses.
193
Rule 30.
194
Rule 23.
195
Rule 21.
196
Rule 18.
197
Sections 60, 60A and 72, read together with Rule 24 of the Advocates
(Disciplinary Committee) Rules.
134
Committee may dispense with any requirements of these rules where
it appears to the committee to be just or expedient so to do.198
198
Rule 28.
135
440. Most matters heard during the hearing attended during the
writing of this Report were procedural rather than substantive,
effectively status hearings. This is not a good use of the Committees
time, nor does it contribute to enhancing its reputation and standing.
Recommendation 15 of the Stobbs Report was that the Committee
should have the option to hear cases under a summary procedure to
enable the simpler, less serious cases to be heard speedily. It is
recommended that a summary procedure of this sort be implemented
(Recommendation 51).
441. The Stobbs Report concluded that (para 33) that the
Committee had been able to deal with less than 20% of the cases
referred to it in the previous eleven years. This is a matter for serious
concern. There are approximately 1,000 pending cases, three
hundred of which are serious cases.
442. Since it is recommended elsewhere that the Commission
cease to exercise an adjudicative function, the Committee must be
equipped to handle an increased number of cases. This can be
achieved by implementing the above recommendations with respect
to the procedure of the Committee.
443. The Stobbs Report also recommended (number 16) the
appointment of a Directions Officer with similar functions to a
Master in the court. This officer would deal with uncontroversial and
administrative matters and set timetables and make other orders to
ensure that a case is ready for hearing. It is recommended that this
recommendation be implemented, in part to speed the process of the
Committee itself, but also to ensure that the lay members may play a
more effectively part (Recommendation 52). It is also necessary to
ensure that the Committee is taken seriously as a trial court, and not
be regarded as a merely administrative body.
444. There was uncertainty as to whether the Disciplinary
Committee had the power to summon witnesses. It is recommended
that it be given this power (Recommendation 53).
445. Recommendation 17 of the Stobbs Report called for a
procedure for dealing with advocates who fall ill prior to hearings. It
is recommended that this is implemented, including a procedure for
dealing with advocates who wilfully absent themselves from the
Disciplinary Committee in an effort to frustrate its operation
(Recommendation 54).
446. It is recommended that recommendation 35 of the Stobbs
Report, that the rules should contain sanctions to encourage
advocates to prosecute appeals expeditiously and to penalise
frivolous appeals, should be implemented (Recommendation 55).
136
447. The Stobbs Report concluded that the Disciplinary
Committee’s procedures were cumbersome and in need of urgent
reform to provide a coherent case management system and reduce
the substantial delays that exist. It would appear that, largely due to
Committee sitting more regularly than previously, the unacceptably
large backlog of cases has been cleared. The Committee secretariat
also does a reasonable job of managing the files. However, more
fundamental issues remain. One of these is the amount of time
occupied with procedural matters. Another is the absence of a proper
case management system.
448. Record keeping seemed to be fairly basic. It was generally
adequate, but it is recommended that the implementation of the
computer-based case management system recommended by the
Stobbs Report (recommendations 2 and 24) should proceed as a
matter of urgency (Recommendation 56).
449. It is recommended that any software and hardware acquired
for the case management system be subject to a pilot study, in
parallel with the existing manual system, so that the members and
secretariat of the Disciplinary Committee, Advocates Complaints
Commission and Law Society of Kenya can become familiar with its
operation and its effectiveness is assured (Recommendation 57).
450. The Stobbs Report recommended (recommendation 3) that
the computerised case-management system should be built to a
carefully considered specification and be subject to tender
(recommendation 3). It is recommended that this is best practice and
should be followed (Recommendation 58). It is understood that
arrangements have been set in train, or will be shortly, for the
commissioning of the requisite programme.
451. The powers of the Disciplinary Committee, upon finding
proven a charge of professional misconduct, include making any or
all of the following orders in respect of the advocate: admonition;
suspension from practice for a specified period not exceeding 5
years; that the name of the advocate be struck off the Roll of
Advocates; a fine not exceeding Ksh. 1,000,000; compensation or
reimbursement not exceeding Ksh. 5,000,000.
452. The evidence seen suggests that in most cases the penalties
actually imposed are significantly less than the maximum allowed.
In one instance, which may be taken as typical, an advocate found
guilty of failure to account for over Ksh. 1,000,000 was fined Ksh.
10,000. It is recommended that consideration should be given to
imposing a higher level of fines as a matter of practice
(Recommendation 59).
137
453. It was suggested at the workshop at Kisumu that offences
should be stratified and classified and sentence be stipulated for each
group of offences or offence. This however is inconsistent with the
general fluidity of ethical rules, which are especially fluid and
unpredictable. The formal stipulation of penalties is unhelpful, and
with the more precise definition of misconduct which is
recommended is unnecessary. Recommendation 35 of the Stobbs
Report was that for consistency, the Committee, in consultation with
the Commission and the Chief Justice, should prepare guidelines
setting out its policy on sentencing. It is recommended that
guidelines be prepared, with the qualification that these would be for
guidance merely, and not prescriptive (Recommendation 60).
454. Relationship with courts needs to be clarified. It is common
practice for there to be concurrent jurisdiction between professional
disciplinary bodies and the courts, with respect to the discipline of
legal practitioners. However, it would appear that better
communications are required between the Disciplinary Committee
and the judiciary. In particular, it is recommended that the judiciary
should be notified promptly of any advocate who has been
suspended from practice or struck off the Roll of Advocates, and that
those so suspended or struck off not be permitted to continue
practice through membership of a firm (Recommendation 61).
455. To render this more effective, and to enable the Law Society
to maintain the most up-to-date record of its membership, currently
practising advocates, and those who have been struck off – or
suspended – it is recommended that the Law Society acquire a
computer database to record this information (Recommendation 62).
456. It is also recommended that the prosecutorial powers of the
Law Society over those persons purporting to be advocates be
revived (Recommendation 63).
457. It is recommended that the powers of the Disciplinary
Committee be extended to include making orders for supervision of
practise by senior named advocate or advocates (Recommendation
64).
458. It is understood that a gazette notice will be published
containing the names of all those persons licensed to practice law.
This is an important initiative. However, additional efforts are
required. It is recommended that the names of advocates who have
been disbarred, or otherwise disciplined, should be published in a
manner accessible to the general public (Recommendation 65).
Rather than damage the reputation of the legal profession, this will
enhance the reputation of the profession as a whole for impartiality
and adherence to the highest ethical standards.
138
459. It is recommended that hearings should also be publicised in
the general press, to allow members of the public and of the news
media to be present if they so wish (Recommendation 66). It may be
rather a cliché, but justice not only needs to be done, but needs to be
seen to be done. The legal profession itself should lead in this regard.
It is a disservice to the profession to seek to avoid publicity; every
legal profession, in every country, has members who are guilty of
misconduct. The openness with which the prosecution and
punishment of these malefactors is conducted is a sure way to
persuade the general public that the legal profession is setting a high
standard. Criminal courts conduct their trials in public and the names
of the accused and publicised regardless of the possibility of
acquittal or a conviction being overturned on appeal.
460. Although The Law Society of Kenya has actively sought to
collect fines from convicted advocates, it is clear that further
investment in enforcement processes is warranted, and this is
recommended (Recommendation 67).
461. The Committee lacks complete autonomy especially in terms
of finance. The Committee has no autonomous fund. It can neither
collect funds nor hold any funds in trust for complainants before it.
Presently the members of the Committee receive attendance fees
from the Advocates Complaints Commission. It is recommended that
the Disciplinary Committee be assigned an independent budget and
dedicated staff (recommendation 68). This could be funded from a
percentage of practising fees of advocates.
462. The Committee is centralized in Nairobi and many advocates
and complainants find it difficult to get access to the Committee.
However, as with the Advocates Complaints Commission it is not
recommended that the Disciplinary Committee have more than one
base. However, it is recommended that the Disciplinary Committee
be able to travel on circuit and hear cases away from Nairobi
(recommendation 69).
463. It is recommended that Disciplinary Committee be renamed
the Advocates Disciplinary Tribunal (Recommendation 70). The
intention is to emphasise the relative importance of this body,
particularly in relation to the regional ethics committees, and its
judicial character.
139
IX THE REGIONAL ETHICS COMMITTEES AND THE
DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE
140
468. For the above reason the regional ethics committees can be
seen as complementary to formal disciplinary action. The members
of the committee must therefore be alert to the true “victim”, and not
allow their concern for the client or other complainant to obscure
their higher obligation. They are also complementary to the work of
the Advocates Complaints Commission, which is perhaps where
there is the greatest scope for overlap.
469. The relationship between the ethics panels and the Advocates
Complaints Commission needs to be clarified, since the latter also
has mediation functions.
470. It is recommended that the Ethics and Compliance
Committee should be composed of five members from each branch
of The Law Society of Kenya, and sit quarterly in on circuit in each
of the branches (Recommendation 71). Generally the committee
should sit in the provincial capital.
471. It is further recommended that the members of the Ethics and
Compliance Committee should be advocates of at least five years
standing, and that the conveners should be advocates of at least ten
years standing (Recommendation 72).
472. It is recommended elsewhere that the Advocates Complaints
Commission remain in Nairobi until it can be clearly shown that the
advantages of decentralisation outweigh the additional costs and
management complexities of decentralisation, and that the
Commission is functioning efficiently. However, because this
renders the Commission less accessible to complainants it is
recommended that consideration be given to encouraging the
regional ethics panels to act as de facto agents of the Commission.
They could act as depositories for complaints, which would then be
passed to the Commission in Nairobi. But, perhaps more
importantly, they can provide in the provinces the type of mediation
and alternative dispute resolution function carried out in Nairobi by
the Commission (Recommendation 73). Formal complaints may still
be made direct to the Commission, or via the regional ethics
committees.
473. One of the difficulties facing the legal profession is
communications between lawyers, and between lawyers and the
public. This can be improved by giving the Law Society a more
active role. It is recommended that the responsibility of the ethics
committees should include handling disputes between advocates
(Recommendation 74). These may be enacted under the authority of
ss 4(1) and 81(1)(a) of the Advocates Act.
141
474. In order to strengthen the ethics committees and allow them
to operate in concert with the Advocates Complaints Commission, it
is recommended that rules of procedure for the committees be
adopted (Recommendation 75).
475. It is recommended that the regional ethics committees be
provided with simple information sheets, outlining for inquirers the
role of the committees, the Law Society, the Advocates Complaints
Commission and the Disciplinary Committee (Recommendation 76).
In particular, it should emphasise that the committees exist for
dispute resolution, and that the Advocates Complaints Commission
and the Disciplinary Committee are concerned with questions of
misconduct and inadequate professional services which are of a
more serious nature.
142
X ADVOCATES’ PRACTICE RULES AND CODE OF CONDUCT
143
1. These Rules may be cited as the Advocates (Practice)
Rules.
144
5. No advocate employed by an unqualified person shall
draw documents or render other legal service to his employer
for which fees are charged directly or indirectly by his
employer to any other person and retained by that employer.
145
proper professional remuneration in respect thereof.
146
appropriate, to the description “Advocates”, as the case may
be;
12. No advocate shall practise under any name other than his
own name or the name of a past or present member or
members of the firm.
147
482. Although these are “private” rules in that they are not formal
law (unlike the Advocates (Practice) Rules), they are a digest of
opinions of the Council of The Law Society of Kenya. As such they
are invaluable as a guide to what has been identified, in the past, as
good practice. In a few instances they also provide an indication of
the likely interpretation of the Advocates (Practice) Rules
themselves. They are, in this respect, a glossary on the Rules, though
most of the rules in the Digest range rather further than the
Advocates (Practice) Rules.
483. These opinions are valuable and the Law Society should be
encouraged to continue to update them as and when questions of
conduct and etiquette are brought to the attention of the Council of
the Law Society. As this is a digest of opinions it is not intended to
be comprehensive. The Rules – and especially the Advocates
(Practice) Rules – should however be both comprehensive and
reflect international good practice.
484. The Council of the Law Society of Kenya has proposed
Rules of Professional Practise Conduct and Etiquette, for enactment
pursuant to Section 83 of the Advocates Act (Chapter 16 Laws of
Kenya) with the approval of the Chief Justice. The Rules are as
follows:
The Council of the Law Society of Kenya for the better regulation
and conduct of Professional practice, conduct and discipline of the
members of the Law Society in the discharge of their duties as
Advocates pursuant to and by virtue of the authority conferred upon
it by Section 83 of the Advocates Act and with the approval of the
Chief Justice hereby makes the following Rules:
PART 1
148
UNPROFESSIONAL, DISHONOURABLE OR UNWORTHY
CONDUCT
These are:-
(a) Touting.
(b) Advertising.
(e) Champerty.
149
(i) Tendering or offering in response to advertisement, circulars
or similar invitations, either directly or indirectly, for the
performance of any work or business proper to the calling of
an advocate or commonly associated therewith.
(n) Levying any charges or accepting any fee which is less than
the minimum charge or fee prescribed in the Remuneration
of Advocates Order.
150
(r) Failure to reply promptly to correspondence.
PART II
For the guidance of its members, the Council of the Law Society
issues the following guidelines of the proper conduct and etiquette
expected of the members.
151
encouraged and the person making them should be
protected.
152
circumstances should the advocate reveal the
confidences of his client.
(a) The conduct of the advocate before the court and with
other advocates should be characterised by candour
and fairness and the Advocate should in court inform
the presiding judge of subsisting decided cases even
where the decision is against his client. The Advocate
is however entitled to distinguish any such case.
153
(c) It is unprofessional and dishonourable to deal other
than candidly with the facts in taking the statements
of witnesses in drawing affidavits and other
documents and in the presentation of causes.
5. Courtroom Decorum
154
(b) It is the paramount duty of defending counsel to
ensure that the accused person is never left
unrepresented at any stage of the trial. In any event
the advocate must notify the court and his client at the
earliest possible opportunity of his inability to attend
court. Advocates should contact the court either
personally or by telephone, or telegram if there is not
sufficient time for letters to reach the court.
155
honourable means to present every defence that the
law of the land permits, to the end that no person may
be deprived of life or liberty, but through the due
process of law.
156
confidence, but the matter should be left to the
determination of the client. An advocate should
decline association as colleague if it is objectionable
to the original counsel, but if the advocate first
retained is relieved, another may come into the case.
157
An advocate should endeavour to obtain full knowledge of
his clients cause before advising therein, and he is bound to
give a candid opinion of the merits and probable result of
pending or contemplated litigation. The miscarriages to
which justice is subject, by reason of surprises and
disappointments in evidence and witnesses, and through
mistakes and errors of courts, even though only occasional,
admonish advocates to beware of bold and confident
assurances to clients, especially where the employment may
depend upon such assurance. Whenever the controversy will
admit of fair settlement, the client should be advised to avoid
or end the litigation.
158
law. The office of an advocate does not permit, much
less does it demand of him for any client, violation of
law or any manner of fraud or chicanery. He must
obey his own conscience and not that of his client.
159
An advocate should not ignore known customs or practice of
the Bar or of a particular court, even when the law permits
without giving timely notice to the opposing counsel. As far
as possible, important agreements affecting the rights of
clients, should be reduced to writing, but it is dishonourable
to avoid performance of an agreement fairly made, merely
because it is not reduced to writing as required by rules of
court.
160
(a) An advocate should thoroughly investigate and
marshal the facts. Subject to the rule dealing with
communications with the opposite party, he may
properly interview any witness or prospective witness
for the opposing side in any civil or criminal action
without the consent of the opposing counsel or party.
He should avoid any suggestion calculated to induce
any witness to suppress evidence or deviate from the
truth. He should avoid taking any action calculated to
secrete a witness. However, except when legally
required, it is not his duty to take affirmative action to
disclose any evidence or the identity of any witness.
161
unsuitable by reason of their moral character or insufficient
qualification. The advocate should strive at all times not
only to uphold the honour and to maintain the dignity of the
profession but also to improve the law and the administration
of justice.
162
competent adjudication, he is free and is entitled to advise as
to its validity and as to what he conscientiously believes to be
its just meaning and extent. Above all an advocate finds his
highest honour in a deserved reputation for fidelity to private
trust and to public duty as an honest man and as a patriotic
and loyal citizen.
163
the client without the client’s knowledge and consent,
and eve though there are other available sources of
such information. An advocate should not continue
employment when he discovers that this obligation
prevents the performance of his full duty to his
former or his new client.
164
in presenting frivolous defences, or if he deliberately
disregards an agreement or obligation as to fees or expenses,
the advocate may be warranted in withdrawing on due notice
to the client allowing him time to employ another advocate,
so also when an advocate discovers that his client has no case
and the client is determined to continue it, or even if the
advocate finds himself incapable of conducting the case
effectively. Other instances as they arise may justify
withdrawal. Upon withdrawing from a case after a retainer
has been paid, the advocate should refund such part of the
retainer as has not been clearly earned.
165
(e) The advocate must satisfy himself that any
recommendation by the employer was made only at
the express request of the intending client, and that he
must explain that the employee is free to instruct any
advocate of his choice or such advocate whom he
may wish to instruct. Only on being satisfied that
there is not, would the advocate be justified in
accepting instructions.
166
(i) the receipt of fees as a director of a limited
liability company, provided that the recipient
of such fees shall not appear as an advocate
for his company.
167
procuring his photograph to be published in
connection with causes in which the Advocate has
been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their
conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the
importance, of the advocate’s position and all other
like self-aggrandizement, offend the traditions and
lower the dignity of the profession and are
reprehensible but, the customary use of simple
professional cards is not improper.
168
Solicitor or Lawyer for use in any commercial
advertisement except as provided by these rules.
169
37. Aiding the unauthorised practice of law
40. Retainers
170
done at a fixed fee in each case irrespective of the
circumstances of such case.
41. Acquiring interest in litigation
42. Expense
171
(iv) the customary charges of the profession for
similar services.
172
47. Intermediaries
49. Partnership
173
to violate any law, custom, or rule of court
locally applicable. Care should be taken to
avoid any misleading name or representation
which would create a false impression as to
the professional position of the members.
174
particular year, the fees should be paid within one
month of the enrolment.
485. As can be seen these rules are more comprehensive than the
Advocates (Practice) Rules, and also bear some resemblance to the
Digest of Professional Conduct and Etiquette, which they would
presumably replace. The Rules of Professional Practise Conduct and
Etiquette would, however, be formally enforceable in a way that the
current Digest of Professional Conduct and Etiquette is not.
175
488. The Advocates (Practice) Rules are comparatively brief, with
14 rules – 12 of them substantive rules. It is recommended that
consideration be given to consolidating the Advocates (Accounts)
Rules, the Advocates (Accountant’s Certificate) Rules, and the
Advocate’s (Deposit Interest) Rules into one single set of Rules. The
Advocates (Practice) Rules should remain separate, and all should be
subject to comprehensive review to ensure that they reflect
contemporary good practice (Recommendation 78).
489. Rule 14 provides that “The Council of the Law Society of
Kenya shall have power to waive in writing any of the provisions of
these Rules in any particular case”. It is recommended that this be
qualified (Recommendation 79). The Advocates (Practice) Rules are
subordinate legislation, and it is not good practice to confer on a
body, private or public, power to exempt individuals from the
operation of the law. Clearly there may be instances where
exemptions are appropriate; however these should be limited.
490. It is recommended that this rule be amended to read “The
Council of the Law Society of Kenya shall have power to waive in
writing any of the provisions of these Rules in any particular
exceptional case where it is just and proper to do so”
(Recommendation 80).
491. The current code of ethics has been described as “woefully
sketchy and inadequate …” and as “not comprehensively deal[ing]
with modern day problems of practice”.199 They should be expanded
in scope, ideally borrowing from international examples of good
practice as well as from the existing Law Society of Kenya Digest of
Professional Conduct and Ethics.
492. If the Advocates (Practice) Rules are to be retained and
altered, rather than replaced (as by the proposed Rules of
Professional Practise Conduct and Etiquette), it is recommended that
certain general ethical requirements be included in the Advocates
(Practice) Rules (Recommendation 81). The International Code of
Ethics of the International Bar Association is a suitable model. This
Code is a re-statement of much of what is to be found in national
codes of ethics and is a guide as to what the International Bar
Association considers to be a desirable course of conduct by all
lawyers.
493. It is suggested that the International Code of Ethics should be
incorporated into the Advocates (Practice) Rules as far as possible,
199
Rautta Athiambo, “Professional Ethics and the Legal Profession: A
Presentation prepared for the CLE Induction Programme, Nairobi, 14
February 2004”.
176
and be in addition to the twelve current substantive rules. They
would constitute the bare minimum standard for an ethics code.
However, consideration should be given to a more comprehensive
revision of the Advocates (Practice) Rules, as, for instance, the
adoption of the Rules of Professional Practise Conduct and Etiquette
as modified to incorporate the International Code of Ethics.
494. The following is a consolidation of the Advocates (Practice)
Rules and the rules borrowed and modified from the International
Code of Ethics of the International Bar Association, with certain
additional rules to make the code more comprehensive. Some of
these rules are taken from codes of ethics in Tanzania and Uganda,
where relevant and appropriate. It is also renamed:
177
(iii) would not of itself have the potential to create a conflict
of interest on the part of an advocate.
6. No advocate may agree to share with any person not being
an Advocate or other duly qualified legal agent practising in
another country his profit costs in respect of any business
whether contentious or non-contentious;
178
11. Every advocate has a professional duty to honour an
undertaking, written or oral, given in the course of legal
proceedings or in the course of practice; and this rule applies
whether the undertaking is given by the advocate personally
or by a partner or employee in the course of the practice.
12. Advertisements to or any other communications with any
person relating to the services of an advocate or of a firm of
advocates must be consistent with the maintenance of proper
professional standards. In offering services direct to members
of the public other than by normal advertising channels, an
advocate must ensure that approaches to persons who are not
existing clients, are made in a manner which does not bring
the profession into disrepute. Approaches must be made in
accordance with proper professional standards and not in a
way that is intrusive, offensive, or inappropriate.
179
arises from solicitation in respect of the cause of any such
claim.
17. No advocate shall practise under any name other than his
own name or the name of a past or present member or
members of the firm.
180
demand before action, or in respect of professional services
connected with the demand.
181
28. Except where the law or custom otherwise requires, any
oral or written communication between advocates shall in
principle be accorded a confidential character, unless certain
promises or acknowledgements are made therein on behalf of
a client.
29. An advocate should never consent to handle a case
unless: (a) the client gives direct instructions, or (b) the case
is assigned by a competent body or forwarded by another
advocate, or (c) instructions are given in any other manner
permissible under the relevant rules or regulations.
30. Advocates shall at all times give clients a candid opinion
on any case. They shall render assistance with scrupulous
care and diligence. This applies also if they are assigned as
counsel for an indigent person. Advocates should only
withdraw from a case during its course for good cause, and if
possible in such a manner that the client’s interests are not
adversely affected. The loyal defence of a client’s case may
never cause advocates to be other than perfectly candid,
subject to any right or privilege to the contrary which clients
choose them to exercise, or knowingly go against any law.
31. Advocates shall, when in the client’s interest, endeavour
to reach a solution by settlement out of court rather than start
legal proceedings. Advocates should never stir up litigation.
32. An advocate must make all reasonable efforts to ensure
that legal processes are used for their proper purposes only
and that their use is not likely to cause unnecessary
embarrassment, distress or inconvenience to another person’s
reputation, interests or occupation.
33. Advocates should not acquire a financial interest in the
subject matter of a case which they are conducting. Neither
should they, directly or indirectly, acquire property about
which litigation is pending before the Court in which they
practice.
34. Advocates should never represent conflicting interests in
litigation. In non-litigation matters advocates should do so
only after having disclosed all conflicts or possible conflicts
of interest to all parties concerned and only with their
consent. This Rule also applies to all advocates in a firm.
35. Advocates should never disclose, unless lawfully ordered
to do so by the Court or as required by statute, what has been
communicated to them in their capacity as advocates even
182
after they have ceased to be the client’s counsel. This duty
extends to their partners, to junior advocates assisting them
and to their employees.
36. An advocate may not, without the specific consent of a
client, give any interview or make any public statement
relating to the client or the affairs of the client, whether or
not the client is involved in a matter of public knowledge.
37. In pecuniary matters advocates shall be most punctual
and diligent. They should never mingle funds of others with
their own and they should at all times be able to refund
money they hold for others. They shall not retain money they
receive for their clients for longer than is absolutely
necessary.
38. Advocates may require that a deposit is made to cover
their expenses, but the deposit should be in accordance with
the estimated amount of their charges and the probable
expenses and labour required.
39. No advocate may appear as such before any court or
tribunal to any matter in which he has reason to believe that
he may be required as a witness to give evidence, whether
verbally or by declaration or affidavit; and if, while
appearing in any matter, it becomes apparent that he will be
required as a witness to give evidence whether verbally or by
declaration or affidavit, he shall not continue to appear:
Provided that this rule does not prevent an advocate from
giving evidence whether verbally or by declaration or
affidavit on formal or non-contentious matter of fact in any
matter in which he acts or appears.
183
42. If any advocate becomes aware that any person has,
before the Court, sworn a false affidavit or given false
evidence, he shall inform the Court of his discovery.
43. An advocate conducting a case or matter shall not allow a
Court to be misled by remaining silent about a matter within
his knowledge which a reasonable person would realise, if
made known to the Court, would affect its proceedings,
decision or judgment.
44. An advocate shall not, in order to benefit his client’s case
in any way, intimidate or otherwise induce a witness who he
knows has been or is likely to be called by the opposite party
or cause such a witness to be so intimidated or induced from
departing from the truth or abstaining from giving evidence.
45. An advocate shall not knowingly fail to discover a
relevant document.
46. An advocate must exercise care in court about naming
persons not involved in the proceeding, and must refrain
particularly from making scandalous or unnecessary
allegations against such persons.
47. An advocate must not attack a person’s reputation
without good cause.
48. Advocates shall always maintain due respect towards the
Court. Advocates shall without fear defend the interests of
their clients and without regard to any unpleasant
consequences to themselves or any other person. Advocates
shall never knowingly give the Court incorrect information,
or advice which is to their knowledge contrary to the law.
49. Advocates shall never forget that they should put first not
only their right to compensation for their services, but the
interests of their clients and the exigencies of the
administration of justice. The advocate’s right to ask for a
deposit or to demand payment of out-of-pocket expenses and
commitments, failing payment of which they may withdraw
from the case or refuse to handle it, should never be
exercised at a moment at which the client may be unable to
find other assistance in time to prevent irreparable damage
being done.
184
to the client, the time and labour involved and all other
personal and factual circumstances of the case. An advocate
shall charge a client no more than a fee which is fair and
reasonable for the work done, having regard to the interests
of both client and advocate.
54. On a plea of not guilty counsel for the defence has a duty
to see that the prosecution discharges the appropriate onus to
prove the guilt of the accused, and to put before the court any
proper defence in accordance with the client’s instructions.
185
56. Counsel must not in the course of making submissions or
cross-examining a witness say or lead a witness to say
anything that might mislead the court. In particular, counsel
must not make any statement to the court or put any
proposition to a witness that is not supported by reasonable
instructions, or that lacks factual foundation by reference to
the information available to the court.
186
to the specific content of the code (Recommendation 82).
Consideration ought also to be given to combining the Advocates
(Practice) Rules and the Digest of Professional Conduct and Ethics
into one document, in which the (formal) Rules could be
accompanied by a commentary and guide. The proposed draft Rules
of Professional Practise Conduct and Etiquette would in effect
achieve this, and could replace both the Advocates (Practice) Rules
and the Digest of Professional Conduct and Ethics. However,
although the Rules of Professional Practise Conduct and Etiquette
closely follow the Digest of Professional Conduct and Ethics in
content it is less generic than the proposed Advocates (Practice)
Rules in para 494.
496. Complexity due to multiple sources of guidance, formal and
informal, is not conductive to compliance. It is recommended that
only one set of enforceable rules exist, either the Advocates
(Practice) Rules – as amended in para 494 or otherwise – or the
proposed Rules of Professional Practise Conduct and Etiquette of the
Council of the Law Society of Kenya (in para 484, as modified)
(Recommendation 83).
187
XI CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
11.1 CONCLUSIONS
498. The Governance, Justice, Law and Order Sector Reform
Programme has as one of its objectives the addressing of
shortcomings in the formal justice system, and facilitating the
implementation of reforms to strengthen institutions within the
sector. The Ministry of Justice has identified a number of priorities
in relation to the legal profession. These priorities include fighting
corruption, promoting judicial reform, promoting legal reform,
improving access to justice, and improving legal education,
including continuing legal education. One aspect of this programme
is ensuring that the ethical and disciplinary procedures of the legal
profession are sufficiently robust to meet international standards of
impartiality and effectiveness.
499. This Report examines the current state of the disciplinary
procedures for advocates in Kenya, in the context of a comparison
with the practise in several other countries. As a learned profession
at the heart of society the legal profession must adhere to high
ethical standards. International best practise provides guidance as to
how this might be achieved, though there are no prescriptive
requirements. This process does not make any assumptions as to
whether the state of the legal profession in Kenya is more or less
corrupt that what might be deemed the international norm. There is
little empirical evidence available on this question. It is sufficient
that there are international standards to which legal professions are
customarily assessed with respect to their disciplinary processes.
500. The Report was written after reviewing the legislative, policy
and administrative structures in which the disciplinary system is
based, and included consideration of broader aspects such as the
advocates’ practice rules and code of conduct, the regional ethics
committees of The Law Society of Kenya, and the ethics content of
the Advocates Training Programme. As the context of the review is
to benchmark Kenyan practice with international best practice
documentary analysis coupled with observation of process and
discussion with stakeholders provided the necessary empirical
evidence.
501. The Report comprises a report on a comparison of
disciplinary processes in a number of other countries, followed by a
review of the disciplinary procedures at present operating in Kenya.
This involves the Advocates Complaints Commission and the
Disciplinary Committee, as well as the regional ethics committees of
188
The Law Society of Kenya. This second section includes a number
of recommendations for changes. The final section includes a review
of the present code of professional conduct and a proposed draft
expansion of this.
502. The present system in general is comparable with that
operating in other countries. However, there is considerable room for
improvement in both the Advocates Complaints Commission and the
Disciplinary Committee. The former is not operating as effectively
as it should, largely through under-funding, but also because its
administrative processes are unsuited to dealing with the large
number of complaints it receives. Various recommendations are
made to correct this problem. The key recommendations are the
introduction of a computerised case-management system, and the
appointment of additional staff.
503. The Disciplinary Committee is not effective. It does not
provide a sufficiently robust sanction for errant advocates. Among
the recommendations for correcting this situation are changes to the
membership and the procedure of the Committee.
504. The current code of ethics for the legal profession is
insufficiently broad to meet the international standard for best
practice. A more comprehensive draft code is suggested as a starting
point for the development of a new code – a process which must
involve the legal profession and elements of the wider community.
189
11.2 RECOMMENDATIONS
190
years, renewable, and that they should be provided with security of
tenure (para 260).
Recommendation 9: It is recommended that consideration be given to
defining misconduct more formally, not so as to restrict its scope, but so
as to clarify the distinction between professional misconduct and
inadequate professional services (para 292).
Recommendation 10: It is recommended that consideration be given to
defining inadequate professional services more formally, as part of a
revision of the Advocates (Practice) Rules (para 295).
Recommendation 11: It is recommended that the Advocates Complaints
Commission and Disciplinary Committee be clearly empowered to
investigate and prosecute and to try former advocates for their actions
while advocates (para 298).
Recommendation 12: It is recommended that, on the authority of s 54(3)
of the Advocates Act, the Attorney-General should, in consultation with
the Law Society, make comprehensive rules of procedure to guide the
operations of the Advocates Complaints Commission. This means that
the discretion of the Commissioners to make their own rules of
procedure, as envisaged by Rule 11 of the Advocates (Complaints
Commission) (Structure and Procedure) Rules 2003, should be reduced
(para 307).
Recommendation 13: It is recommended that there be a minimum of
three Commissioners in the Advocates Complaints Commission, as the
workload of the Commission is sufficient to justify at least this number
of judicially-qualified officers or others of comparable seniority (para
309).
Recommendation 14: It is recommended that further legally-qualified
staff be employed by the Advocates Complaints Commission (para 312).
Recommendation 15: It is recommended that investment be made in
adequate office space and filing facilities, and technical support
equipment such as photocopiers, scanners, and printers, for the
Commission (para 316).
Recommendation 16: It is recommended that formal training for
prosecutors in prosecution techniques be entrusted to a second
Commissioner with suitable prosecutorial and management experience
(para 317).
Recommendation 17: It is recommended that a number of more senior
State Counsel be appointed to the staff of the Advocates Complaints
Commission (para 319).
191
Recommendation 18: It is recommended that the Advocates Complaints
Commission and Disciplinary Committee computer-based case
management systems be integrated as far as practical – subject to the
same (joint) tendering process (para 322).
Recommendation 19: It is recommended that the offices of the
Commission remain in Nairobi until it can be clearly shown that the
advantages of decentralisation outweigh the additional costs and
management complexities of decentralisation (para 326).
Recommendation 20: It is understood that Swahili translations of the
Advocates Complaints Commission publicity materials and forms are to
be provided, and it is recommended that this be done as a matter of
urgency (para 331).
Recommendation 21: It is recommended that all complainants to the
Advocates Complaints Commission be required to pay a small filing fee,
and that the Commission be empowered to make an award of costs
against a complainant in exceptional circumstances where the complaint
is deemed to be frivolous and vexatious (Para 335).
Recommendation 22: It is recommended that no complaint be accepted
by the Advocates Complaints Commission after more than six years
after the cause of action arose (para 335336).
Recommendation 23: It is recommended that consideration be given to
having the legislation reflect more accurately the fact that complaints are
not merely referred to the Disciplinary Committee by the Advocates
Complaints Commission but are prosecuted by the Commission before
the Committee (para 337).
Recommendation 24: In conformity with the view expressed in the
Stobbs Report, it is recommended that the Commission lose the ability
to make determinations, and confine its role to investigation and
prosecution, with a supporting mediation and conciliation role (para
339).
Recommendation 25: It is recommended that the Commission lose the
power to examine witnesses on oath, as this role should be restricted to
the Disciplinary Committee, and the power to tax bills of cost (para 339)
Recommendation 26: It is recommended that the Ethics and Compliance
Committee confine its role to the regular and systematic review of the
advocates’ practice rules and code of conduct, and that it consequently
relinquish the dispute resolution role (para 351).
Recommendation 27: Due to the limited resources of the Law Society it
is recommended that the Society investigate complaints and prosecute
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only in exceptional circumstances, thus allowing it to concentrate upon
regulatory and representational functions (para 363).
Recommendation 28: To ensure that the independence of the Advocates
Complaints Commission is buttressed, and its legitimacy enhanced, it is
recommended that the Commissioners should be appointed by the
President on the recommendation of the Law Society of Kenya (para
368).
Recommendation 29: In addition, the determination of the remuneration
of the Commissioners by way of salary, allowance, pension or gratuity
should be removed from the presidency. As in the case of the
Disciplinary Committee, the remuneration of the Commissioners should
be determined by the Attorney-General in consultation with the
Treasury. This is so recommended (para 369).
Recommendation 30: It is recommended that the Advocates Complaints
Commission should be made independent of the Office of the Attorney-
General, as a stand-alone agency, with its own independent budget (para
370).
Recommendation 31: It is recommended that to ensure that the
Advocates Complaints Commission gets the staff it requires to maintain
and preserve its independence, integrity and efficiency, the Chairman of
the Advocates Complaints Commission should be empowered to select
his or her own staff (para 371).
Recommendation 32: It is recommended that the Advocates (Complaints
Commission) (Structure and Procedure) Rules be amended to include
specific provisions for the conduct of the Commission’s proceedings
(para 373).
Recommendation 33: It is recommended that Advocates Complaints
Commission be renamed the Advocates Investigation Commission (para
377).
Recommendation 34: To counter the defect inherent in s 53(3A) of the
Advocates Act, that is, the failure to stipulate the sentence for the
offence created therein, it is recommended that the Act should be
amended to stipulate the sentence to be meted out to a person convicted
of the offence. Consequently, the defect will be cured (para 380).
Recommendation 35: It is recommended that an independent Legal
Profession Ombudsman be appointed, by the Attorney-General, with the
tasks described (para 382).
Recommendation 36: It is recommended that the term for advocate
members of the Disciplinary Committee be two years, with a right of
renewal (para 387).
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Recommendation 37: Although it is good practice to include lay
members in the Disciplinary Committee, it is recommended that care is
taken to ensure both that appropriate people are selected, and that they
and the advocate members of the Committee understand their respective
roles (para 388).
Recommendation 38: The lay members are full members of the
Committee, and should be involved in the deliberate and decision-
making processes. An induction process is recommended (para 388).
Recommendation 39: The Advocates Act currently allows for the
possibility of a Disciplinary Committee sitting with solely lay members.
It is recommended that this possibility be removed (para 392).
Recommendation 40: It is recommended that there should be at least one
lay and one advocate member present at each hearing of the Disciplinary
Committee, and at least three in total (para 392393).
Recommendation 41: It is recommended that the number of advocates in
the Disciplinary Committee be increased to nine, and that three of these
must be of at least twenty years standing (para 394).
Recommendation 42: The co-option of advocates is important even if
the permanent membership of the Committee is increased, and it is
recommended that the recommendation with respect to co-option be
implemented (para 396).
Recommendation 43: It is recommended that the Attorney-General and
Solicitor-General be excluded from the membership of the Disciplinary
Committee (para 397).
Recommendation 44: It is recommended that the Attorney-General
appoint the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Disciplinary
Committee (both to be advocates or judicial officers) on the
recommendation of Judicial Services Commission, and that these should
be appointments in lieu of the Law Officers. There should continue to be
representatives of the Attorney-General and Solicitor-General (para
397).
Recommendation 45: It is recommended that the Chairman or Deputy,
but not both, should be a judge, but that this not necessarily be a
statutory requirement (para 399).
Recommendation 46: It is recommended that the Stobbs Report
recommendation with respect to including more junior advocates not be
implemented at this time (para 400).
Recommendation 47: The Secretary to The Law Society of Kenya is
also Secretary to the Disciplinary Committee. While the Disciplinary
194
Committee remains an organ of the law society a close linkage is
appropriate. However, as recommended in the Stobbs Report, it is
recommended that the Secretary should cease to be Secretary of the
Committee (para 401).
Recommendation 48: Once a matter has been listed for hearing before
the Committee, the requirements of service must be pursuant to the Civil
Procedure Rules (para 412).
Recommendation 49: An order of the High Court against an advocate
may be appealed against by the aggrieved advocate to the Court of
Appeal of Kenya. It is recommended that the right of appeal be extended
to all parties (para 425).
Recommendation 50: There is a provision for direct referral of
complaints to the Disciplinary Committee by the Advocates Complaints
Commission. This is apparently rarely used as the Disciplinary
Committee will usually refer these back to the Commission if it is
realised that full investigations were not carried out. It is recommended
that this provision be abolished, as the time of the Disciplinary
Committee should not be occupied in considering charges which have
not been fully investigated (para 436).
Recommendation 51: The recommendation of the Stobbs Report was
that the Committee should have the option to hear cases under a
summary procedure to enable the simpler, less serious cases to be heard
speedily. It is recommended that a summary procedure of this sort be
implemented (para 440).
Recommendation 52: The Stobbs Report recommended the appointment
of a Directions Officer with similar functions to a Master in the court.
This officer would deal with uncontroversial and administrative matters
and set timetables and make other orders to ensure that a case is ready
for hearing. It is recommended that this recommendation be
implemented (para 443).
Recommendation 53: There was uncertainty as to whether the
Disciplinary Committee had the power to summon witnesses. It is
recommended that it be given this power (para 444).
Recommendation 54: Recommendation 17 of the Stobbs Report called
for a procedure for dealing with advocates who fall ill prior to hearings.
It is recommended that this is implemented, including a procedure for
dealing with advocates who wilfully absent themselves from the
Disciplinary Committee in an effort to frustrate its operation (para 444).
Recommendation 55: It is recommended that recommendation 35 of the
Stobbs Report, that the rules should contain sanctions to encourage
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advocates to prosecute appeals expeditiously and to penalise frivolous
appeals, should be implemented (para 446).
Recommendation 56: It is recommended that the implementation of the
computer-based case management system recommended by the Stobbs
Report (recommendations 2 and 24) should proceed as a matter of
urgency (para 448).
Recommendation 57: It is recommended that any software and hardware
acquired for the case management system be subject to a pilot study, in
parallel with the existing manual system, so that the members and
secretariat of the Disciplinary Committee, Advocates Complaints
Commission and Law Society of Kenya can become familiar with its
operation and its effectiveness is assured (para 448).
Recommendation 58: The Stobbs Report recommended
(recommendation 3) that the computerised case-management system
should be built to a carefully considered specification and be subject to
tender (recommendation 3). It is recommended that this is best practice
and should be followed (para 450).
Recommendation 59: It is recommended that consideration should be
given to imposing a higher level of fines as a matter of practice (para
452).
Recommendation 60: Recommendation 35 of the Stobbs Report was that
for consistency, the Committee, in consultation with the Commission
and the Chief Justice, should prepare guidelines setting out its policy on
sentencing. It is recommended that guidelines be prepared, with the
qualification that these would be for guidance merely, and not
prescriptive (para 452).
Recommendation 61: It is recommended that the judiciary should be
notified promptly of any advocate who has been suspended from
practice or struck off the Roll of Advocates, and that those so suspended
or struck off not be permitted to continue practice through membership
of a firm (para 454).
Recommendation 62: To render the process of notifying the judiciary of
those advocates who have been struck off the Roll by the Disciplinary
Committee more effective, and to enable the Law Society to maintain
the most up-to-date record of its membership, currently practising
advocates, and those who have been struck off – or suspended – it is
recommended that the Law Society acquire a computer database to
record this information (para 455).
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Recommendation 63: It is recommended that the prosecutorial powers of
the Law Society over those persons purporting to be advocates be
revived (para 456).
Recommendation 64: It is recommended that the powers of the
Disciplinary Committee be extended to include making orders for
supervision of practise by senior named advocate or advocates (para
457).
Recommendation 65: It is recommended that the Discipline Committee
publish the names of advocates against whom a final judgement has
been entered (para 458).
Recommendation 66: It is recommended that hearings should also be
publicised in the general press, to allow members of the public and of
the news media to be present if they so wish (para 459).
Recommendation 67: Although The Law Society of Kenya has actively
sought to collect fines from convicted advocates, it is clear that further
investment in enforcement processes is warranted, and this is
recommended (para 460).
Recommendation 68: It is recommended that the Disciplinary
Committee be assigned an independent budget and dedicated staff (para
461).
Recommendation 69: It is recommended that the Disciplinary
Committee be able to travel on circuit and hear cases away from Nairobi
(para 462).
Recommendation 70: It is recommended that Disciplinary Committee be
renamed the Advocates Disciplinary Tribunal (para 463).
Recommendation 71: It is recommended that the Ethics and Compliance
Committee should be composed of five members from each branch of
The Law Society of Kenya, and sit quarterly in on circuit in each of the
branches (para 469).
Recommendation 72: It is recommended that the members of the Ethics
and Compliance Committee should be advocates of at least five years
standing, and that the conveners should be advocates of at least ten years
standing (para 471).
Recommendation 73: It is recommended that consideration be given to
encouraging the regional ethics panels to act as de facto agents of the
Commission. They could act as repositories for complaints, which
would then be passed to the Commission in Nairobi. But, perhaps more
importantly, they can provide in the provinces the type of mediation and
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alternative dispute resolution function carried out in Nairobi by the
Commission (para 472).
Recommendation 74: It is recommended that the responsibility of the
ethics committees should include handling disputes between advocates
(para 473).
Recommendation 75: In order to strengthen the ethics committees and
allow them to operate in concert with the Advocates Complaints
Commission, it is recommended that rules of procedure for the
committees be adopted (para 474).
Recommendation 76: It is recommended that the regional ethics
committees be provided with simple information sheets, outlining for
inquirers the role of the committees, the Law Society, the Advocates
Complaints Commission and the Disciplinary Committee (para 475).
Recommendation 77: It is recommended that the Law Society provide
all advocates with copies of the current Advocates (Practice) Rules when
they are sent their next practising certificate, and that any amendments
are also sent, by the Law Society, to all advocates in practise whenever
these amendments are enacted (para 478).
Recommendation 78: The Advocates (Practice) Rules are comparatively
brief, with 14 rules – 12 of them substantive rules. It is recommended
that consideration be given to consolidating the Advocates (Accounts)
Rules, the Advocates (Accountant’s Certificate) Rules, and the
Advocate’s (Deposit Interest) Rules into one single set of Rules. The
Advocates (Practice) Rules should remain separate, and all should be
subject to comprehensive review to ensure that they reflect
contemporary good practice (para 487).
Recommendation 79: Rule 14 of the Advocates (Practice) Rules
provides that “The Council of the Law Society of Kenya shall have
power to waive in writing any of the provisions of these Rules in any
particular case”. It is recommended that this be qualified (para 489).
Recommendation 80: It is recommended that this rule be amended to
read “The Council of the Law Society of Kenya shall have power to
waive in writing any of the provisions of these Rules in any particular
case where it is just and proper to do so” (para 489).
Recommendation 81: It is recommended that certain general ethical
requirements be included in the Advocates (Practice) Rules (para 492).
Recommendation 82: The draft code of ethics is offered as a starting
point for debate, and it is recommended that the views of the profession
be sought with respect to the specific content of the code (para 495).
198
Recommendation 83: It is recommended that only one set of enforceable
rules exist, either the Advocates (Practice) Rules – as amended in para
494 or otherwise – or the proposed Rules of Professional Practise
Conduct and Etiquette of the Council of the Law Society of Kenya (in
para 484, as modified) (para 496).
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11.3 REVIEW STRATEGY
200
XII ANNEXES
1. Background
The Government of Kenya, through the Ministry of Justice and
Constitutional Affairs, has embarked on the implementation of the
Governance, Justice, Law and Order Sector Reform Programme (GJLOS),
whose objective is to address shortcomings in the formal justice system and
facilitate the implementation of reforms to strengthen institutions within the
sector. GJLOS was born of the Expanded Legal Sector Reform Programme,
whose precursor, the Legal Sector Reform Programme recommended the
improvement of training and professional standards of those in legal
practice. Through the GJLOS, the Ministry of Justice has identified a
number of priorities in relation to the legal profession, which priorities
include fighting corruption, promoting judicial reform, promoting legal
reform, improving access to justice, improving legal education, including
continuing legal education. In each of these areas, the legal profession can
play an important role in enhancing the legal and judicial reform process in
Kenya.
In order for the legal profession to be an effective actor in the legal and
judicial reform process, it is essential that the legal profession undergo an
internal evaluation process of each of the roles it is mandated to play, and to
identify areas in which it could improve the quality, accountability,
transparency and independence of the legal profession in Kenya.
The role played by the Law Society of Kenya in regulating the profession is
multiple and consists of:
(a) Regulation of entry into the Legal Profession
Every person who is duly qualified to be admitted as an advocate is required
by law to file a petition requesting admittance. The Law Society of Kenya
has the mandate to review such a petition and has a right to be heard with
regards to the person’s admission. Therefore the Society is able to advice
against the admission of a person as an advocate if it feels that the
individual lacks moral fitness.200
201
Every advocate is subject to the jurisdiction of the Disciplinary
Committee201 which is established by the Advocates Act, Chapter 16 of the
Laws of Kenya and mandated to deal with offences or misconduct by an
advocate. The Law Society of Kenya acts as the Secretariat of the
Disciplinary Committee and the Secretary of the Society is the secretary of
the Committee. Members of the Disciplinary Committee are elected from
the membership of the Law Society of Kenya and the Society is therefore
involved in the regulation of its own members.
The Disciplinary Committee receives complaints of professional misconduct
against advocates and prosecutes advocates if the complaint is merited. The
Disciplinary Committee has statutory powers to admonish, suspend, fine or
strike off an advocate’s name from the Roll if the advocate is found guilty of
professional misconduct.
The Advocates Complaints Commission, also established under the same
Act, receives complaints in relation to advocates from the public, and
investigates them where necessary. Once the Complaints Commission
establishes that the complaint constitutes a disciplinary offence, it refers the
matter to the Disciplinary Committee for the appropriate action.
While the Law Society serves the role of the registrar to the Disciplinary
Committee and the regulator of the legal profession, the Complaints
Commission is the main prosecutor of cases filed against members of the
legal profession.
In 2002 the Law Society of Kenya and the International Bar Association
commissioned Mr. Mark Stobbs, the then Head of professional standards
and legal services department of the Bar Council of England and Wales, to
undertake a review of the effectiveness of the Disciplinary Committee of the
Law Society of Kenya, and the Complaints Commission.
The report reviewed the legal provisions governing the system for looking
into complaints against advocates in Kenya, the existing institutions and
made a number of general recommendations for improvements to the
system. It also reviewed the wider factors that gave rise to complaints and
suggested ways in which some of the difficulties could be addressed. It also
reviewed in general the issues concerning self-regulation against co-
regulation, reviewed the costs and considered an action plan implementing
the recommendations. The Society reviewed the report and implemented a
large number of the recommendations that were made.
Significant improvement of the processes of the Disciplinary Committee is
evident following the recommendations of Mr. Mark Stobbs. However, the
Disciplinary Committee and the Complaints Commission still face a lot of
201
Advocates Act (Cap 16 of the Laws of Kenya) section 55.
202
challenges that we believe if properly reviewed can be addressed to make
both these statutory bodies more efficient and effective.
The World Bank through its Institutional Development Fund has undertaken
to assist the legal profession through the Law Society of Kenya in fulfilling
its mandate to strengthen the skills and professional conduct of the members
of the legal profession in the delivery of legal services to the Government
and the larger public in all matters relating to the administration of justice in
Kenya. This grant will further enhance the work already undertaken on this
programme and assist the Law Society to improve the regulation of the
membership and provide Kenyan lawyers, through the Law Society of
Kenya, with the knowledge, techniques and best practices required to ensure
that the Advocates Complaints Commission and the Disciplinary Committee
can adequately apply and enforce the standards provided in the Advocates
Act.
Professor Noel Cox shall therefore prepare a comparative study of relevant
commonwealth models of enforcement of ethical standards of the Legal
Profession and of assessing the level of professional ethics in the Kenyan
Legal fraternity. Professor Noel Cox will facilitate local chapter and national
workshops to asses the existing framework on professional ethics and to
develop a strategy for the review of the framework for the legal profession.
Professor Noel Cox will also work with a fellow International Professor
Noel Cox, contracted for under this Grant, in capacity-building activities for
members of the Advocates Complaints Commission and the Disciplinary
Committee with a twinning partner to be identified and contracted for
separately under the Grant.
2. Global Objective
To provide Kenyan lawyers, through the Law Society of Kenya, with the
knowledge, techniques and best practices required to ensure that the
Advocates Complaints Commission and the Disciplinary Committee can
adequately apply and enforce standards provided in the Advocates Act.
203
4. Technical Tasks
The tasks to be performed by the Consultants shall be, but no limited to:
(a) Preparation of a report on a comparative study of the
enforcement of ethical standards used by Commonwealth
Countries. The study should include the United Kingdom, South
Africa and Australia and any other countries Professor Noel Cox
deems relevant.
(b) Presentation of the findings of the report at a national workshop
to discuss the existing framework for enforcement of
professional ethics and to develop a strategy for the review of the
framework by the Bar. The role of the Kenyan Bar in the
adoption, implementation and enforcement of professional ethics
will also be discussed and comparative models will be compared
with the purpose of adopting best practices.
(c) A study of the existing capacity in Kenya’s legal profession to
enforce ethical standards within the profession.
(d) Facilitation of five local chapter workshops to discuss the
existing framework for the enforcement of professional ethics.
(e) Facilitation of one national workshop to discuss the existing
framework for enforcement of professional ethics and to develop
a strategy for the review of the framework by the Bar. The role of
the Kenyan Bar in the adoption, implementation and
enforcement of professional ethics will also be discussed and
comparative models will be compared with the purpose of
adopting best practices.
(f) The International Consultant will be expected to liaise with the
two local consultants in the undertaking of the above mentioned
work.
5. Expected Outputs
The main outputs of the consultancy will include the following:
a. A comparative study of the enforcement of ethical standards used by
other Commonwealth Countries will provide the Law Society of
Kenya with a resource of best practices from other Bar Associations
and assist the Society in reviewing its current system. A report, both
in hard and soft copy on a comparative study of the enforcement of
204
ethical standards used by other Commonwealth Countries will be the
indicator that this activity has been undertaken.
b. A presentation of the comparative study at a National Workshop will
provide the Law Society with an opportunity to review the best
practices of other Bar Associations and market possible change
strategies and systems to the membership. A presentation at the
National Workshop on a comparative study on the enforcement of
ethical standards used in Commonwealth Countries will be the
indicator that this activity has been undertaken.
c. An assessment of Kenya’s legal profession’s capacity to enforce
ethical standards will provide the Society with the relevant
information required to revamp the different structures in a bid to
making them more efficient and effective. A report, both in hard and
soft copy, on the assessment of the existing capacity of Kenya’s legal
profession to enforce ethical standards within the profession will be
the indicator that this activity was carried out.
d. Facilitation of three (3) local chapter workshops and one (1) national
workshop to assess the existing framework on professional ethics, to
develop a strategy for review of the framework, to discuss the role of
the Kenya Bar in adoption, implementation and enforcement of
professional ethics will enable the legal profession to improve its
level of professionalism. A report, both in hard and soft copy,
comprising recommendations of the workshops will be an indicator
that this activity was carried out.
6. Time Frame
The Consultants will be expected to follow the following time frame
i. Submission of draft report on evaluation of framework for
enforcement of professional ethics and standards twenty one days
(21) after the signing of the consultancy agreement.
ii. Meeting to review the draft report on Evaluation of framework for
enforcement of professional ethics and standards fourteen days (14)
after the signing of the consultancy agreement.
iii. Submission of draft report on the comparative study thirty days (30)
after the meeting to review the draft report.
iv. Meeting to review the draft report on the comparative study
fourteen days (14) after submission of draft
205
v. Facilitation and presentation at three local chapter workshops as
detailed in the attached Work Plan.
vi. Presentations of the comparative study at a national workshop – not
later than sixty days (60) the signing of the consultancy agreement.
vii. Submission of draft report on local and National workshops seven
days (7) after the completion of the said workshops.
viii. Meeting to review the draft report above, (vii), seven (7)
days after submission of the reports.
ix. Facilitation and participation of the study tour as detailed in the
attached Work Plan.
x. Submission of final report on the assessment of the existing
capacity of Kenya’s legal profession to enforce ethical standards
within the profession – not later than ninety days (90) after signing
the consultancy agreement.
The Consultant will be paid as outlined in the main contract of agreement.
QUALIFICATIONS
To qualify for this consultancy the Consultants satisfied the following
criteria:
1) An experienced lawyer or professional regulator with over five
years experience, preferably with a mix of experience in
professional regulatory work as well as in supportive activities to
improve both individual practitioners and their institutions.
2) An appreciation for the variety of forms of professional regulation
and profession development.
3) Familiarity with a variety of professional regulatory structures,
approaches, and procedures.
4) Knowledge of different legal systems and regimes.
5) Knowledge of professional ethics, professional conduct and
regulatory processes for lawyer malfeasance.
6) An understanding of the structures for the delivery of legal services.
7) An understanding of comparative legal systems.
8) An ability to work in a new setting and to adapt to and accept local
cultural norms.
206
9) Ability to travel.
REPORTING ARRANGEMENTS
The Consultants will be accountable to the Secretary of the Law Society of
Kenya who will carry out the overall monitoring of the consultancy, advise
the Consultants and make all major decisions on the alteration of the
consultancy agreement, project time frame and any other substantial issues.
The Consultants will liaise with the Compliance and Ethics Director of the
Law Society of Kenya on routine requests.
207
12.2 REPORT OF THE WORKSHOP ON CAPACITY BUILDING
OF THE ADVOCATES COMPLAINTS COMMISSION AND
THE DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE – 12th May 2007, Imperial
Hotel, Kisumu
208
1.0. SESSION 1: OPENING SESSION
The participants having gone through the registration process and duly
registered, the workshop commenced at around 10:00 A.M. with a word of
prayer. The participants then observed a one minute silence in honour and
remembrance of the one hundred and fourteen (114) passengers who
perished in Duoula, Cameroon, following the tragic crash of the Kenya
Airways aeroplane on Saturday 5th May 2007. The participants were drawn
from western Kenya region including from such towns as Kericho, Kisii,
Bungoma, Kitale, Eldoret, Kakamega, and Kisumu (see Appendix I for the
list of participants).
She distinguished the said Component A with its twin Component B of the
Grant, which aims at strengthening the capacity of the legal profession by
improving the Continuing Legal Education (CLE) programme. The Local
Consultants under Component B are Dr. Elizabeth Muli, a senior lecturer at
School of Law, Moi University, and Rautta Athiambo of Rautta & Co.
Advocates, Nairobi. These two consultants are expected to assess the current
framework for professional development of lawyers.
Mr. James Aggrey Mwamu, the Chairman of the West Kenya Law Society
and Council Member of the Law Society of Kenya then made introductory
remarks. He warmly welcomed the participants to the workshop in
particular and to Kisumu City in general. He asked the members to be open
and candid in discussing the issues that the Workshop was posed to address.
209
Noting that the world had become hostile to lawyers and that indeed some
of the allegations levelled against lawyers were true, he challenged the
participants to consider whether the profession was treading on the right
path. He regretted that in Kenya, it was only the legal profession that had
allowed those who had failed in other professions to invade it. He therefore
called upon the participants in particular and lawyers in general to protect,
defend and promote the traditional nobility of the profession.
To conclude the opening session, Mr. Tom Ojienda made an opening speech
in his capacity as the President of the East Africa Law Society (EALS). He
210
thanked the participants for their cooperation during his tenure as the
chairman of the LSK and proceeded to note that he will continue to serve
them faithfully as the President of the EALS. He observed that it was the
expectation of the Consultants that the Worksop would generate viable
recommendations that would help strengthen the capacity of the Advocates
Complaints Commission, the Disciplinary Committee and the LSK in
dealing with disciplinary issues. This marked the end of the opening session
whereupon the participants broke shortly for tea/coffee break.
211
2.2. Functions of the Complaints Commission
212
2.4. Advocates (Complaints Commission) (Structure and
Procedure) Rules 2003
Professor Githu Muigai facilitated the third session which was designed to
make an assessment or overview of the capacity of the Disciplinary
Committee. His presentation was largely informed by his experience as the
chairman of the Disciplinary Committee. He began by attempting to dispel
the notions that advocates usually hold against the Disciplinary Committee.
He noted that the Committee does not purport to be self-righteous but more
often than not it tries to understand the situation and the practical
circumstances leading to the complaint. He therefore emphasized that
advocates and the Committee should be in partnership so as strengthen the
disciplinary process. In any event, the errant advocates are usually very few
as compared to the entire numbers of advocates in the country who carry out
their professional duties honestly and competently.
213
Upon his election as the Chairman of the Committee, Professor Muigai tried
to revamp the operations of the Committee by bringing up all the cases that
initially lay in the shelves and clogged the disciplinary system. It was
realized, amongst others, that many complaints had either been abandoned
or the advocates against whom the complaints had been made had long
ceased to practice or had passed away. Currently, the Committee strives to
ensure that only the cases that merit determination are scheduled for
hearing. Indeed, noted Professor Muigai, out of twenty complaints, eight or
so are usually dismissed. This is sometimes done even without any reference
to the advocate against whom the complaint has been made. This ensures
that one is not subjected to the stigma of having appeared before the
Committee.
It was noted that it is advocates against whom complaints have been made,
more often than not, who delay the determination of complaints by the
Committee. They appear before the Committee represented by their
colleagues who take the earliest opportunity to raise preliminary objections
against the complaint and seek for its dismissal. In such, circumstances, the
Committee usually seeks to put aside matters of jurisprudence so as to deal
with the substance of justice. If the complaint in question, for example,
concerns a sum of money that the advocate allegedly received on behalf of
the client, and he/she does not dispute the same, he is usually asked to
deposit that amount with the LSK pending the determination of the
complaint.
Several weaknesses of the Committee were pointed at this stage. First, the
Committee is centralized in Nairobi and many advocates and complainants
find it difficult to access the Committee. Secondly, aged or senior advocates
appearing before the Committee usually view the Committee with contempt
and as lacking legitimacy to adjudicate over the complaint in view of the
Commissioners’ young age. Thirdly, the Committee lacks complete
214
autonomy especially in terms of finance. The Committee has no
autonomous fund. It can neither collect funds nor hold any funds in trust for
complainants before it. Fourthly, the lay men who sit in the Committee
contribute very little, if any, to the efficiency or operations of the
Committee.
215
– Make any such order as to payment by any party (including
the complainant) of any costs or witness expenses and of the
expenses of the Committee
– Admonish an advocate
– Suspend an advocate from practice for a specified period not
exceeding five years
– Order that the name of an advocate be struck off the roll
– Order an advocate to pay a fine not exceeding Ksh.
1,000,000
– Order the compensation or reimbursement of an aggrieved
person not exceeding Ksh. 5,000,000
216
Mr. Joseph Kingarui, the Chairman of the Complaints Commission, sought
to make some clarifications before the plenary session would kick off in full
swing. This, he said, would help dispel some of the questions that were most
likely to crop up in the discussions. First, he noted that in his visits to the
provinces as the chair of the Commission, he had come to the conclusion
that the legal profession is facing hostility from the general public. Many
Kenyans expressed their disappointment or dissatisfaction with the legal
profession. Secondly, he lamented that many advocates against whom
complaints are made, never reply to the correspondence sent to them by the
Commission. This had the import of delaying the disciplinary process.
Thirdly, he spoke of what he referred to as advocates holding their clients
ransom i.e. asking a client to pay a certain amount of money failure to
which the advocate would not attend court on behalf of the client. This
usually takes place on the eve or some few days before the case comes up
before the court. He advised that if the client is not paying the advocate’s
fees then the best option is to withdraw from representing the client rather
than holding him ransom every time the case comes up before the court. On
a fourth note, he noted that some advocates have allegedly bribed or
‘pocketed’ some of the junior officers of the Commission and as a result,
complaints against them never see the light of day. In this regard, he asked
the participants to desist from such corrupt behaviours. Finally, he clarified
that the Commission had established preliminary enquiries so as to ensure
that only merited complaints were dealt with.
It was opined by one Mr. Onsongo Obwoge (advocate, Kisumu) that the
structure and composition of the Commission should be done away with. He
lamented that he had in the recent past received a letter from the
Commission in a matter which he was not concerned with. Further, he
complained that the letter had been posted to the wrong address. He noted
that lack of enough commissioners at the Commission was not sufficient
reason to absolve the Commission from such an error. If the problem was
the few numbers of the commissioners, he noted, the cure lied in appointing
more commissioners. In addition, he asserted that the Commission dealt
with non-issues. He cited the example of a case where a client had filed a
complaint before the Commission alleging that the advocate in question had
transferred a matter from the High Court to the subordinate court without
his consent.
217
In short response to Mr. Obwoge’s concerns, the chairman of the
Commission noted that the workshop was not the proper forum for one to
respond to a correspondence sent to him/her by the Commission. He stated
that what the Commission needs is not more commissioners as suggested,
but more officers to carry out the day to day operations of the Commission.
He also stated that the Commission had begun programmes for its
decentralization with Eldoret and Mombasa being its pilot projects.
The Chairman of the North Rift Law Society, Mr. Lelan (advocate, Eldoret),
questioned the constitutionality of the Commission in view of the
Commission’s role as an investigator and a prosecutor of complaints. He
inquired whether they are provisions for dealing with petty offenders before
the Disciplinary Committee. He suggested that in order to reduce backlog of
cases, there is a need to decentralize the operations of the Commission.
The chairman of the Disciplinary Committee was asked by one Mr. Siganga
to state how many cases were pending before the Disciplinary Committee.
Mr. Siganga also commented that to address the question of failing to
account, there was need to require advocates to file certificate of accounts
periodically and more frequently than is the case currently. He stated that
requiring advocates to file the said certificates only when they are applying
to be notaries public or commissioners of oath was not sufficient. He also
stated that there was need for a supervision mechanism that would ensure
that compliance with orders is achieved. As at now, he lamented, there is
high failure of supervision of compliance with orders of the Commission,
the Committee and the Ethics and Compliance Committee.
218
profession has failed to regulate itself and as a consequence, forces from
outside are trying to regulate it.
The plenary session ended at around 1:30 p.m. whereupon the participants
were divided into three groups for purposes of the next session which
involved group work.
As already stated above, the participants were divided into three groups. The
first group was tasked to discuss and make recommendations on the changes
that they wished should be made in the operation of the Advocates
Complaints Commission. In doing this, they were guided by a brief manual
prepared for that purpose. In essence the group was meant to make
suggestions in reference to the composition, jurisdiction, location, funding,
enforcement, existence and autonomy of the Commission. The second and
the third group dealt with the Disciplinary Committee and the Ethics and
Compliance Committee respectively. They were similarly required to
comment on the above mentioned factors in regard to the institution in their
area of discussion.
219
After the discussions which were carried out in the individual groups, the
participants broke off for lunch. It is after the lunch break that the various
groups made presentations of the outcome of their discussions. A summary
of the recommendations is reflected in the table below.
220
Jurisdiction-receiving and investigating complaints
regarding an advocate; firm of
advocates; and their employees
-power to summon witnesses
-power to order production of documents
-not to hear the witnesses on oath (this
role should be the preserve of the
Disciplinary Committee)
-not to tax advocates bills of costs
-no power to execute award/judgment
-such necessary power to take such steps
as may be necessary for investigation of
complaints
-power to prosecute complaints before
the Disciplinary Committee
Location -located at provincial headquarters but
with provision for circuit hearings where
necessary
Funding From the consolidated fund
Enforcement -power to enforce personal service
-reconciliation to be encouraged
Existence -not to be called Advocates Complaints
Commission but Advocates Enquiry
Commission
-it should not exist in the Attorney-
General’s chambers but at the Law
Society of Kenya premises
-the issue of complaint against an
advocate not to be used as a bar to
appoint such an advocate to a public
office. it should only be a bar after
determination by the Disciplinary
Tribunal and upon conviction
Autonomy
221
GROUP Disciplinary Composition -the provision for lay members should
2 Committee be repealed
-retain representation of the Attorney-
General and the Solicitor-General
-increase number of advocates in the
Committee to nine
-of the nine advocates, three of them
must have practiced for more than
twenty (20) years
-the other advocates must have practised
for ten (10) years
-serve for one term of two years with an
option for renewal
-there should be rotational retirement of
the advocates to ensure continuity
Jurisdiction -the current scope of jurisdiction should
be retained
-once a matter has been listed for
hearing before the Committee, the
requirements of service must be pursuant
to the Civil Procedure Rules
-the Committee has very wide
discretionary powers on sentencing.
therefore, the offences should be
stratified and classified and sentence be
stipulated for each group of offence or
each offence
-a draft schedule of the offences and
their stipulated sentences be circulated to
lawyers for comment before enactment
-the Committee should only deal with
cases that have been referred to it by the
Commission
Location -the Committee’s headquarters should be
based in Nairobi
-the Committee should also sit in
recognised LSK branches
Funding -from the consolidated fund
-LSK membership contributions
-donor funding
-fines
Enforcement -direct enforcement
-issue decrees
222
Autonomy-the Committee should run on its own
budget (i.e. be accorded its own vote
from the Consolidated fund)
-the AG and the Solicitor General should
not chair the sessions of the Committee
-the Committee should run a bank
account in its own name
Existence -must exist
GROUP Ethics and Composition -should be composed of five members
3 Compliance from each LSK branch
Committee -it should be gender sensitive
Capacity - one must have practised for ten (10)
years
-be of unblemished character
-serve for a term of two years with the
option of renewal
-provision for rotational retirement
Jurisdiction -mediation and conciliation is very
limited. It should be empowered to
receive complaints at the local levels
-mandate should be extended to handling
disputes between advocates
-should carry out public education on
ethics and ethics committee
Location -circuit sittings to be held on quarterly
basis in the LSK branches
Funding -funded solely by the LSK
-complainants to pay filing fees
-provisions for honoraria and
reimbursement of expenditure
Enforcement -no enforcement
Existence -desirable and should be strengthened
Autonomy -the issue of autonomy does not arise
because it is a creature of the LSK
223
Muigai who further noted that such persons should apply for their names to
be struck off the roll as the law provides for such applications. It was also
noted that if the person in question was a judge, then further problems
would arise because if such a judge was aggrieved by the decision of the
Committee he/she was entitled to appeal to the High Court. Would it then be
proper for a judge of the High Court appeal to the same court for redress?
The workshop ended with closing remarks from Mr. Aggrey Mumma, Mr.
Eric Omogeni and Miss Betty Nyabuto. Mr. Omogeni gave the vote of
thanks to the World Bank for funding the initiative; Mr. Joseph Kingarui the
Chairman of the Advocates Complaints Commission; Miss Wairagu from
the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs; the facilitators of the
Workshop, Professor Githu Muigai and Mr. Tom Ojienda; and the
participants. He invited the participants for the Commonwealth Lawyers
Conference to be held in Nairobi later in the year. He announced that each
of the participants had been awarded two (2) CLE points for participating in
the Workshop. Lastly, he handed a cheque of Ksh. 290,000 from the LSK to
the Treasurer of the West Kenya Law Society branch. The participants were
224
duly reimbursed their mileage expenses to and from Kisumu and the
workshop came to an end at around 1645hrs.
225
APPENDIX I
The President of East Africa Law Society, the Chairman Law Society, and
Council Members, Brothers and Sisters, welcome to Port Florence, the only
millennium city in the country.
The theme for today is discipline, standard and ethics. The legal profession
is noble profession and has stood the test of time for years. However, as we
approach the 21st Century, one big question we need to ask ourselves, “are
we really a noble profession?” The world has become hostile to lawyers.
The call us thieves, fraudsters and conmen. A lot of these terms are really
malicious but we need to ask ourselves whether they are far from the truth.
Indeed, many clients owe advocates a lot of money and although we have a
mechanism for recovery of money in civil matters but in criminal cases it is
most difficult.
The duty that this places on advocates is faithfulness, best ability, integrity
and interests of fellow citizens. We have a duty to the court, the country,
systems and public, clients, the profession and ourselves. Can we safely say
we have passed the test of integrity, competency and conflict of interests?
It is only in the legal profession that we have allowed people who have
failed in other profession to invade our profession and literally take over. We
have allowed journeymen, pseudo lawyers, tricksters to take over the
profession.
People who have totally no vision for justice, rule of law but have come into
the legal profession believing that there is a lot of money in legal practice
and if this profession collapses then we are to blame. We must protect that
we have.
226
Brothers and sisters, this profession is ours to destroy or to build. Are we
prepared to destroy it?
We must candidly speak about ourselves and tackle the serious problems of
misconduct and unethical behaviour.
Finally, I believe we are now bold enough to deal with discipline of lawyers.
We do not need complaints commission.
227
APPENDIX II
12 TH MAY 2007
Questions:
1) What changes would you wish to see made in the operations of the
institutions;
a) Composition
b) Jurisdiction
c) Location
d) Funding
e) Enforcement
f) Existence
g) Autonomy
1. Complaints Commission
2. Disciplinary Committee
3. Ethics Committee
228
APPENDIX III
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
NAME
1 MOGIRE KEFA OMBUHI PARTICIPANT
2 NYAMBATI GIDEON M. PARTICIPANT
3 JOSEPH SONYE ONDARI PARTICIPANT
4 SAGWE SAMSON MAUTI PARTICIPANT
5 VINCENT OBONDI NYAKUNDI PARTICIPANT
6 MARTIN T. NYAINGIRI MOMANYI PARTICIPANT
7 BEAUTTAH A. SIGANGA PARTICIPANT
8 GIDEON MUTAI PARTICIPANT
9 PETER KIRENGA PARTICIPANT
10 ZABLON ATULO PARTICIPANT
11 ANNE ABONG'O OMOLLO PARTICIPANT
12 GEOFFREY O. YOGO PARTICIPANT
13 PETER O. OKO PARTICIPANT
14 MOURICE C. OUMA PARTICIPANT
15 OCHARO KEDIRA PARTICIPANT
16 ONDIEKI SAMWEL KEROSI PARTICIPANT
17 CYRUS ONSERIO MINDA PARTICIPANT
18 GRACE AWINO PARTICIPANT
19 GEORGE O. MOGAKA PARTICIPANT
20 GEORGE N. AWINO PARTICIPANT
21 EVANS M. MOCHAMA PARTICIPANT
22 CHARLES S. KWEYU PARTICIPANT
23 JOSEPH MUSOMBA PARTICIPANT
24 KERARIO MARWA PARTICIPANT
25 ALBERT MUDEYI PARTICIPANT
26 OGUTTU JOSEPH MBOYA PARTICIPANT
27 JOHN MANDERE NYANDORO PARTICIPANT
28 ALEX OMAYA PARTICIPANT
29 AMOS OGUTU OYUKO PARTICIPANT
30 MUSA NANDWA PARTICIPANT
31 ERICK GEKONDE OMARIBA PARTICIPANT
32 ANZIYA A. LABAN PARTICIPANT
33 DENIS ODERO OKOYO PARTICIPANT
34 SAM M. ONYANGO PARTICIPANT
35 KEPHA OCHIENG ONYISO PARTICIPANT
36 MILDRED MUNYEKENYE PARTICIPANT
37 OYE ASHIOYA PARTICIPANT
38 ALWANG'A JOSIAH MUSUMI PARTICIPANT
39 JAMES AJIGO PARTICIPANT
229
40 ELIZABETH A. AYOO PARTICIPANT
41 NGOCHO MARY MUTHONI PARTICIPANT
42 KENNEDY O. OWITI PARTICIPANT
43 ISAAC MEROKA OYUGI PARTICIPANT
44 JOSEPH SHEM ELUNG'ATA PARTICIPANT
45 ALOYS OBUNGA ABOGE PARTICIPANT
46 JOHNSON MASINDE PARTICIPANT
47 H. K. ONYANDO PARTICIPANT
48 L. E. NANZUSHI PARTICIPANT
49 P. W. WANYAMA PARTICIPANT
50 HERBERT NYAMURONGI PARTICIPANT
51 SENISTER KHALWALE PARTICIPANT
52 BRIAN PRATT AYODO PARTICIPANT
53 M. KIVEU PARTICIPANT
54 E. M. MASHETI PARTICIPANT
55 KOWINDOH K. O. OUMA PARTICIPANT
56 OKUTTA W. OUMA PARTICIPANT
57 NEWTON INGOSI PARTICIPANT
58 BETTY MALOBA PARTICIPANT
59 ORONI P. ETTANG PARTICIPANT
60 SAMSON B. MBECHE PARTICIPANT
61 ERASTUS M. ORINA PARTICIPANT
62 TOM OJIENDA CONSULTANT
63 NJOGA ROBERT OUMA PARTICIPANT
64 BRUCE O. ODENY PARTICIPANT
65 A. OIRO OBARA PARTICIPANT
66 JAMES OBIERO PARTICIPANT
67 CHARLES O. NYAMWANGE PARTICIPANT
68 GEORGE A. MONGARE PARTICIPANT
69 MOGENI O. ERICK CHAIRMAN, LSK
70 OTIENO C. O. AYAYO PARTICIPANT
71 BEN NYANGA ADUOL PARTICIPANT
72 AMOS W. ORENGE PARTICIPANT
73 BIGOGO ONDERI PARTICIPANT
74 HENRY KABURI PARTICIPANT
75 DUKE S. ONYARI PARTICIPANT
76 PATRICK OCHIENG PARTICIPANT
77 GIDEON ODONGO PARTICIPANT
78 JOHN ODHIAMBO AKINYI PARTICIPANT
79 NYOLEI MICAH PARTICIPANT
80 BOGONKO ELIZAPHAN MOGAYA PARTICIPANT
81 BOAZ OTANGA OTIENO PARTICIPANT
82 ONSONGO WYCLIFFE OBWOGE PARTICIPANT
83 STEPHEN O. OMWEGA PARTICIPANT
230
84 PETER ONYANGO DANIEL PARTICIPANT
85 JOSEPH KING'ARUI PARTICIPANT
CEO/SECRETARY,
86 BETTY NYABUTO LSK
87 CHARLES MOGIRE AYIENDA PARTICIPANT
88 ERIC NTABO PARTICIPANT
89 PHILEMON OCHWANG'I PARTICIPANT
90 J. N. ONG'ELE PARTICIPANT
91 PAULINE N. SEWE PARTICIPANT
92 CAROLINE B. OMOLO PARTICIPANT
93 JACQUELINE INGITIAH PARTICIPANT
94 DANIEL AKWALA PARTICIPANT
95 GEORGE S. NYAKUNDI PARTICIPANT
96 AGGREY KIDIAVAI PARTICIPANT
97 MITCHELL MENEZES PARTICIPANT
98 JAMES NAMATSI PARTICIPANT
99 DAVE L. SIGANGA PARTICIPANT
100 LYNET ATIENO OLEL PARTICIPANT
101 WAMBUA MERCY PARTICIPANT
102 GERALD O. KIMANGA PARTICIPANT
103 S. SIMON LILAN PARTICIPANT
104 NYIGEI MAUREEN PARTICIPANT
105 KULECHO KWOBA PARTICIPANT
106 WAMBUA MUSEMBI PARTICIPANT
107 D. N. IKUA PARTICIPANT
108 E. M. JUMA PARTICIPANT
109 PATRICK J. O. OTIENO PARTICIPANT
110 OKAL JUDITH AUMA PARTICIPANT
111 ABUTA TOM PARTICIPANT
112 JAVAN J. MUKAVALE PARTICIPANT
COUNCIL
113 MWAMU J. A. MEMBER, LSK
114 RAYOLE OLEL PARTICIPANT
115 JOCELYN RIRO KIMETTO PARTICIPANT
116 LENARD N. OMBACHI PARTICIPANT
117 BENSON ONDIMU MASESE PARTICIPANT
118 MOSES J. A. ORENGO PARTICIPANT
119 FREDRICK MAUBE PARTICIPANT
120 E. K. NG'ENO PARTICIPANT
121 G. V. ODUNGA PARTICIPANT
122 DICK ANYUL PARTICIPANT
123 JUDE RAGOT PARTICIPANT
124 SIELE SIGIRA PARTICIPANT
125 GEORGE MAENGWE PARTICIPANT
126 MORRIS ONYINO PARTICIPANT
231
127 FRANCIS OMONDI PARTICIPANT
128 SHEM SANYA BALONGO PARTICIPANT
129 DENNIS MANONO NYAUNDO PARTICIPANT
130 NAMWANGE C. BICHANGA PARTICIPANT
131 LUGADIRU K. EDWIN PARTICIPANT
132 A. B. L. MIUSIEGA PARTICIPANT
133 WESLEY GICHABA PARTICIPANT
134 NYAWIRA O. CARILUS PARTICIPANT
135 LYNETTE OMOLLO PARTICIPANT
136 GILBERT O. GUSO PARTICIPANT
137 EVANS AYIEMA PARTICIPANT
138 INNOCENT N. MUMA PARTICIPANT
232
12.3 REPORT OF THE WORKSHOP ON CAPACITY BUILDING
OF THE ADVOCATES COMPLAINTS COMMISSION AND
THE DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE – 26th May 2007, Sarova
Whitesands Beach Resort, Mombasa
233
1.0. SESSION 1: OPENING SESSION
The opening session was preceded by the arrival and registration of the
participants who were drawn from Mombasa, Malindi and other towns
within the Coast region. Thereafter, Mr. Justus Munyithya, the Vice
Chairman of the Law Society of Kenya (LSK) made introductory remarks.
He welcomed the participants and laid out a general outline of the purposes
for which the workshop was convened.
The Secretary/Chief Executive Officer of the LSK, Ms. Betty Nyabuto, then
gave the project summary. She explained that the workshop is aimed at
generating ideas for the review of the enforcement of ethical standards of
the legal profession in Kenya. The workshop falls under a World Bank
funded Grant on Capacity Building of the Advocates Complaints
Commission and the Disciplinary Committee which is premised on the need
to assess and review the existing framework for the enforcement of
professional ethics.
Falling under this session too, was Mr. Eric Omogeni’s welcome remarks.
Mr. Omogeni who is chairman of the LSK, noted amongst other things, that
there are no mechanisms for passing sentence against advocates found
guilty of professional misconduct and/or unprofessional conduct. He thus
opined that such a sentencing mechanism should be put in place so as to
guide the disciplinary bodies. He also noted that the Ethics and Compliance
Committee constituted by the LSK is not anchored in the Advocates Act
(Cap 16 Laws of Kenya). He suggested that there is a need to consider and
entrench the Committee in the Act. As a final note, he observed that there is
a need to assess the advocate’s competence to compete in the now
modernizing and globalizing world. He challenged advocates to brace
themselves to meet the challenges that come with cross-border legal practice
in particular and globalization in general.
234
for each complaint brought before the Commission, the Commission now
institutes preliminary enquiries to establish whether a complaint merits
further action or not. It is only after the preliminary enquiry that a file can
be opened by the Commission. He noted that there are several challenges
that impede the success of the Commission some of which are:
Mr. Ojienda facilitated the third session whose main purpose was to make
an assessment/overview of the capacity of the Advocates Complaints
Commission. He noted the following questions, inter alia, ought to be
addressed in reviewing the capacity of the Commission:
235
TOPIC FEATURES
General Introduction -established under section 53 Advocates Act
(Cap 16)
-it is a department of the Attorney-General’s
Chambers (State Law Office)
-sole purpose is enquiring into complaints
against any advocate, firm of advocates, or any
member or employee thereof (section 53(1)
Advocates Act)
-it consists of such a commissioner or
commissioners as shall be appointed by the
President
-if a single commissioner is appointed he must
be qualified to be appointed as a judge of the
High Court of Kenya under chapter IV of the
Constitution
-if several commissioners are appointed, one
commissioner shall be qualified to be appointed
as a judge of the High Court
-Attorney-General appoints a secretary to the
Commission and provides such other public
officers as are necessary for the functioning of
the Commission
- section 53(3A) provides that it is an offence to
fail or refuse to assist the Commission when
required to do so
Functions of the -generally to ensure that advocates conduct
Complaints themselves properly and that standards of legal
Commission services are rendered to the public are improved
and maintained
-the Commission receives and considers
complaints made by any person, regarding the
conduct of any advocate, firm of advocates, or
any member or employee thereof
-reject a complaint if it appears that there is no
substance in the complaint
-refer the matter to the Disciplinary Committee,
where it appears that there is substance in the
complaint but that the matter constitutes or
appears to constitute a disciplinary offence
-where there is a substance to the complaint but
it does not constitute a disciplinary offence, the
Commission is to notify the person or firm
against whom the complaint has been made, of
the particulars of the complaint and require them
236
to answer to the complaint within a reasonable
period
-the Commission will then proceed to investigate
the matter upon the expiration of the period
specified above, and it will summon witnesses to
produce evidence as it deems necessary and after
hearing submissions from both parties, the
complainant and the person/firm complained
against, make an award it considers just and
proper in the circumstances
-advise the complainant appropriately, where
there is substance to the complaint, but the
circumstances do not disclose a disciplinary
offence that can be dealt with by the Disciplinary
Committee, or the Commission itself should not
deal with, but the proper remedy would be to
refer the matter to the courts
-promote reconciliation and encourage and
facilitate amicable settlement between parties if
the complaint is not a serious or of an aggravated
nature
-prosecutes offences before the Committee
Powers of the -reject or dismiss any complaint that holds or
Complaints appears to hold no substance
Commission -power to summon witnesses
-examine witnesses on oath
-order an advocate to produce a detailed fee note
for the purposes of taxation of the bill of costs
-assess an advocate’s fee in case he declines to
produce a detailed fee note to the Commission
-investigates the accounts of an advocate and
order the advocate to produce all relevant books
and documents to the Commission or an
accountant engaged by the Commission
-make such order as it considers just and
expedient in the circumstances of the case
-power to award, by order, compensation or
reimbursement not exceeding to Kshs. 100,000
to a complainant
-this order shall be registered with the courts and
shall be enforceable in the same manner as order
of the court
-order the surrender of all funds or property
which an advocate does not dispute in a matter
relating to the surrender of funds or property by
an advocate to a client
237
-issue a warrant for the levy of the amount of any
sum ordered to be paid on the immovable and
movable property
-generally take such steps as it may consider
proper and necessary for the purpose of its
inquiry
238
effect from January 2008. Under the new programme, a total of nine (9)
courses will be taken at the School of Law by all students without exception
and regardless of which institution they undertook their undergraduate
studies.
Ms. Pamela Tutui expressed the concern that there is a lack proper training
at the university level. She reiterated that there is need for standardization of
payment to pupils. In addition, she commented that it should be made
mandatory that the Advocates Complaints Commission be composed of at
least two (2) advocates of longstanding in actual practice. Mr. Monari
echoed that pupils should be paid and that advocates must accept that there
is a problem in the profession and they should, therefore, consider how to
deal with the problem. He observed that the Ethics and Compliance
239
Committee was created as a political tool to protect advocates who did not
want to face the Complaints Commission and the Disciplinary Committee.
Mr. John Tuta, the representative from the Ministry of Justice and
Constitutional Affairs (MOJCA), stated that there is a need to consider the
place of the MOJCA in the disciplinary process. Further, he noted that a
challenge lies in the analysing the twin institutions (the Advocates
Complaints Commission and the Disciplinary Committee) to see if it is
necessary to enhance or reduce their powers. Another question, he observed,
involves the role of the LSK and the Kenya School of Law in ensuring that
pupils attending law school are guaranteed pupillage.
Mr. Tom Ojienda dispelled the notion that the Ethics and Compliance
Committee was created for political purposes and clarified that the
Committee was to the contrary established in good faith to help promote
conciliation and reconciliation permitted under sections 4 and 81 of the LSK
Act (Cap 18) and the Advocates Act (Cap 16) respectively.
240
5.0. SESSION 5: AN ASSESSMENT/OVERVIEW OF THE
CAPACITY OF THE DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE
TOPIC FEATURES
General -established under section 57 of the Advocates Act
Introduction -adjudicates upon alleged breaches of rules of
professional conduct by advocates and advocates’ clerks
-comprises of the AG, Solicitor General, or other person
deputed by the Attorney-General; six advocates (elected
by the Law Society); and three non-advocates appointed
by the AG on the recommendation of the LSK
-the secretary of the Law Society is also the secretary of
the Committee
-the members are to elected at different times so that the
expiry dates of their different terms fall at different times
-the Committee may constitute itself into a tribunal of
either three or five members to determine a complaint and
may require the chair or vice-chair of the Society or both
or any other member of the Council of the Society to sit
as an additional member of the Committee to constitute
the tribunal
-complaints may be made by any person though the
majority are brought by the Complaints Commission,
who will then prosecute
-proceedings of the Committee are deemed to be
judicial/legal proceedings
Powers of the -any complaint against an advocate for professional
Disciplinary misconduct may be made to the Disciplinary Committee
Committee -the Committee then gives the advocate against whom the
241
complaint has been made a chance to appear before it and
inspect any relevant documents not less than seven days
before the hearing date
-after hearing the complaint and considering the evidence
adduced, the Committee may either:
Refer any matter to the Complaints Commission
Refer the case to the Council of the Law Society
Allow or refuse the withdrawal of any application
Dismiss summarily such complaint where it
appears that the same is frivolous or vexatious or
does not disclose a prima facie case
Make a formal order discharging an advocate
where the complaint against him has been
dismissed summarily
Make any such order as to payment by any party
(including the complainant) of any costs or
witness expenses and of the expenses of the
Committee
Admonish an advocate
Suspend an advocate from practice for a specified
period not exceeding five years
Order an advocate to pay a fine not exceeding
Ksh. 1,000,000
Order that the name of an advocate be struck off
the roll
Order the compensation or reimbursement of an
aggrieved person not exceeding Ksh. 5,000,000
Jurisdiction to -order an advocate to produce before the Committee a
Determine detailed fee note
Costs/Fees -determine the fee payable to the advocate when she/he
fails to produce a detailed fee note before the Committee
-adjourn the complaint pending taxation
-make estimates of the costs due to the advocate and
order accordingly
-determine that the costs to which the advocate or firm of
advocates shall be entitled to be limited to such amount as
may be prescribed in its determination
-direct an advocate to comply, or to secure compliance,
with the requirement to refund, remit or waive the whole
or part of any advocate’s costs or fee or amount already
paid or on behalf of the client
-direct the advocates or firm of advocates to secure the
rectification of any error, omission or other deficiency
arising out of their fault
-direct the advocate to take at their own expense, such
242
other action in the interest of the client as it may specify
Professor Noel Cox and Mr. Tom Ojienda jointly facilitated the sixth session
which sought to highlight the enforcement of ethical standards in other
jurisdictions notably Tanzania, Uganda, Australia, Canada, England and
Wales, New Zealand, and South Africa.
243
society’s complaints and discipline process, governed by the rules of
practice and procedure. In essence the model of regulation here is self-
regulation. Several primary agencies conduct formal hearings of disciplinary
causes including the Hearings Management Tribunal, Hearing Panel, Appeal
Panel and Appeal Management Tribunal. Review of Decisions is conducted
by an independent Complaints Resolution Commissioner.
In South Africa, the Law Society of South Africa (LSSA) is the umbrella
body of the attorney’s profession. Complaints against attorneys are heard by
the Provincial Law Society, where the attorney is registered. This is
completely outside the ambit of the LSSA. The Cape Law Society, for
instance, investigates and refers cases to the Disciplinary Committee, which
makes recommendations to the Council. The Council imposes a fine,
reprimand, inquires, or apply to the court to suspend or strike the attorney
from the roll. Formal inquiries are conducted by the Disciplinary enquiry
Committee (appointed by the Council, and including lay members).
Hearings are private and confidential.
In Uganda, the governing body of the legal profession is the Uganda Law
Society. The Advocates Disciplinary Committee is charged with the duty to
hear any complaints made against advocates. The complaint against an
advocate can be made either directly by the complainant to the Committee
or by the Law Council or Law Society. After considering a complaint and
determining that a prima facie case has been established, the committee
fixes a date of hearing of the complaint and serves the parties with a copy of
the complaint. The committee can hear proceedings in the absence of a party
who was served but fails to appear on the hearing day. The Committee can
however, order a re-hearing where the part who failed to appear so applies,
but only upon proof that failure to appear was due to a reasonable cause.
The participants were divided into three groups to deal with the three
disciplinary bodies i.e. the Advocates Complaints Commission, the
Disciplinary Committee and the Ethics and Compliance Committee. Each of
these groups was required to make recommendation on their body of
specialty as regards its composition, jurisdiction, funding, location,
enforcement, autonomy and existence. Table 3 below makes a summary of
the recommendations of each of the groups.
244
GROUP Advocates composition -a minimum of three (3) and a maximum
1 Complaints of six (6) commissioners
Commission -the LSK should nominate at least two
(2) commissioners
-one (1) nominee by the Attorney-
General
-one (1) nominee by the Minister for
Justice and Constitutional Affairs
-one (1) nominee by the Civil Society
-one (1) nominee by the Business
Society
-the president to appoint the
commissioners with the approval of
Parliament
Jurisdiction -extended to punish vexatious and
frivolous complainants
Location -secretariat to remain in Nairobi but
sittings of the Commission be
decentralized to the Provincial level
-secretariat be set up in the provinces
where there is a large number of lawyers
or where need arises
Funding -the LSK to contribute towards running
of the Commission
-Government to continue funding the
Commission but outsourcing should also
be increased
Enforcement -enforcement rules should be formulated
setting out rules for execution of the
Commission’s decisions
Existence -it is important that the Commission
continues to exist
Autonomy -separate the Commission the Office of
the Attorney-General
-the Commission should get funds from
the exchequer directly
245
GROUP Disciplinary Composition -three Committee members should form
2 Committee a quorum provided at least one of them
is an advocate
-no council members should sit in the
tribunal to avoid manipulation
-the composition of a panel which
commences to hear a complaint should
conclude the matter
-though the lay men play virtually no
role in the Committee they should be
retained for public relations
Jurisdiction -what constitute a complaint is not
defined. It is thus entirely left for the
Committee to determine what is a
complaint for determination
-rules be promulgated to permit the
Committee to handle matters summarily
Location -the Committee should be decentralized
i.e. it should conduct circuit hearings
across the country
Funding -be provided for by the exchequer
-the Law Society should facilitate the
accommodation and travelling of the
Committee members during circuit
hearings
-at least three (3) Committee members
should be on permanent basis and
remunerable
Enforcement -the Committee should be empowered to
enable it enforce its own orders
Existence -to continue existing
Autonomy -need to make the body more
autonomous by making it financially
self-sustaining
GROUP Ethics and Composition -the convenor should be an advocate of
3 Compliance not less than ten (10) years standing
Committee while the others should be advocates of
not less than five years standing
-before local committees are constituted,
the advocates in that area/region should
be consulted
Jurisdiction -the local committees should have
jurisdiction within the region/area where
it is constituted
Funding -the LSK to provide the funding
246
Enforcement -the committees to apply alternative
dispute resolution (ADR) principles
-once an ADR award has been made it
should be referred to the Disciplinary
Committee for summary action
Existence -to exist and should be publicised i.e. the
public should be sensitized about the
existence of the ethics and compliance
committees
Location -situated in major towns
Autonomy -not required
247
APPENDIX I
Questions:
1) What changes would you wish to see made in the operations of the
institutions;
a) Composition
b) Jurisdiction
c) Location
d) Funding
e) Enforcement
f) Existence
g) Autonomy
248
APPENDIX II
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
NAME Designation
Mombasa
1 Justus Munyithya Council Member, LSK
Chairman, LSK Mombasa
2 Joel O. Obura Branch
3 Jayant Shah Participant
4 Obara J. Participant
5 Samuel Odhiambo Participant
6 Pamela Tutui Participant
7 Geoffrey Were Participant
8 Samuel Ouma Participant
9 Faith Vanani Participant
10 Samson Okong'o Participant
11 Maurice Mkan Participant
12 Michael Sangoro Participant
13 Hezron Gekonde Participant
14 Wamuti Ndegwa Participant
15 Justus Mulwa Participant
16 Shitakha Tom Participant
17 Martin Walela Participant
18 Henry Muranje Participant
19 Anne Ngugi Participant
20 Priscah Obura Participant
21 Mercy Ngugi Participant
22 Patricia Langat Participant
23 Denis Omari Participant
24 Bosire Jared Participant
25 Abed O. Abed Participant
26 Cecilia Mango Participant
27 Michael Mwanyale Participant
28 Timami Lewa Participant
29 Mwahunga Mtana Participant
30 Edward Gichana Participant
31 Caroline Odhiang Participant
32 Manase Ananda Participant
33 Veronica Maina Participant
34 Caroline Katunja Participant
Malindi
249
35 Alfred Omwancha Participant
36 Samson Gekanana Participant
37 Martin Walela Participant
38 Henry Muranje Participant
39 Jared Machuka Getembe Participant
40 Anthony Okuto Participant
41 Ananda Manase Participant
Kilifi
42 Henry Kazungu Luganje Participant
Voi
43 Charles Kioko Participant
44 Onesmus Mwinzi Participant
Migori
45 Rodgers Abisai Participant
Meru
46 Florence Kajuju Participant
Kisumu
47 James Mwamu Participant
Eldoret
48 Roseline Odede Participant
Nakuru
49 Tom Ojienda Consultant
50 Benard Akango Participant
Nairobi
51 Nightingale Rukuba-Ngaiza Project Team Leader
52 Professor Noel Cox Consultant
53 Professor Kulundu Bitonye Speaker
54 Eric Mogeni Chairman, LSK
55 Evans Monari Council Member, LSK
56 Florence Mwangangi Council Member, LSK
57 Lilian Renee Omondi Council Member, LSK
58 Kenneth Akide Council Member, LSK
59 Kanyi Kimondo Council Member, LSK
60 Betty S. Nyabuto CEO/Secretary, LSK
Chairman, Complaints
61 Joseph King'arui Commission
250
Convenor, Ethics & Compliance
62 John Mutungi Committee
63 John Tuta Legal Officer, MOJCA
64 Stephen Mwenesi Participant
65 Osoro K. Omwoyo Particpant
66 Hassan Omar Participant
67 Antony Kuria Participant
Secretariat
68 Preston Kithome
69 Angela King'oo
251
12.4 REPORT OF THE WORKSHOP ON CAPACITY BUILDING
OF THE ADVOCATES COMPLAINTS COMMISSION AND
THE DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE – 2nd June 2007, Sarova
Stanley Hotel, Nairobi
252
1.0. SESSION 1: INTRODUCTION AND PROJECT
SUMMARY
The Project, duly funded by the World Bank, is part of the initiative of the
Government of Kenya, through the Ministry of Justice, to implement the
Governance, Justice, Law and Order Sector Reform Program (GJLOS),
whose objective is to address shortcomings in the formal justice system and
facilitate the implementation of reforms to strengthen institutions within the
sector. the legal profession is thus an effective actor in the legal and judicial
reform process and consequently, it is essential that it undergoes an internal
evaluation process of each of the roles it is mandated to play, and to identify
areas in which it could improve its quality, accountability, transparency and
independence.
It is in this light that the World Bank through its International Development
Fund has provided the LSK with an opportunity to assess the existing
framework for the enforcement of professional ethics, as well as to allow the
Disciplinary Committee and Complaints Commission to benefit from best
practices and successful techniques adopted by other commonwealth
jurisdictions. Professor Noel Cox and Mr. Tom Ojienda have been
contracted as International Consultant and Local Consultant respectively to
assess the Disciplinary Committee and the Complaints Commission and to
provide the LSK with a concise review of the shortcomings of these two
institutions and provide ways and means to improve them.
253
Miss Betty Nyabuto’s address was immediately followed by welcome
remarks by Mr. Eric Omogeni, the Chairman of the LSK. He welcomed the
participants and explained too, that the Workshop was the final under the
Consultancy on Capacity Building of the Complaints Commission and the
Disciplinary Committee. He underlined that the workshop was convened to
get the input of lawyers on the way the two institutions involved in the
advocates’ disciplinary process should operate and to ultimately regain the
public’s fast waning confidence on the legal profession.
He also noted that the LSK desires that the lawyers take ownership of the
final product that will result from the consultancy and the workshops. In
2001, he recalled, a similar consultative and participatory process led to the
introduction of the Continued Legal Education (CLE) and the amendments
to the Advocates Act (Cap 16) with the effect of buttressing the powers of
the Advocates Complaints Commission.
Finally, Mr. Omogeni noted that gone are the days that the LSK assumed the
role of the official opposition party in the country. He stated that the legal
profession is universally recognised as providing the first line of defence on
human rights abuse and erosion of the rule of law. As such, the profession’s
independence in accordance with the United Nations’ standards is
paramount. He thanked the participants for coming for the workshop,
254
wished them fruitful deliberations and declared the workshop officially
opened at 09:56 a.m.
Miss Betty Nyabuto introduced Professor Noel Cox who facilitated this
session that was aimed at making an assessment or overview of the capacity
of the Advocates Complaints Commission. Professor Noel Cox took the
participants through the strengths and weaknesses of the Complaints
Commission in a bid to show the changes that may be effected to ensure that
the Commission works well in its contemporary role. Whilst appreciating
that no system of disciplinary process is perfect, he stated that the challenge
is in finding the most efficient disciplinary process. He highlighted, amongst
others, the following weaknesses of the Commission.
255
though one may not like the contents of a letter from the
Commission, as an advocate he is obliged to respond.
Professor Cox then invited Mr. Ojienda to facilitate a discussion arising out
of the review of the capacity of the Complaints Commission. Mr. Ojienda,
noting that the powers of the Commission had been met with resistance,
invited Mr. Joseph King’arui to demystify the roles and mandate of the
Commission.
In addition, Mr. King’arui stated that Commission exists for the good of the
legal profession. The Commission does not invite people to make
complaints but receives complaints. He sought to rectify the misconception
that the Commission always commences proceedings against an advocate
when a complaint is made. To the contrary, the Commission institutes
preliminary enquiries to establish whether a complaint has merit or not.
Only when a complaint has merit does the Commission take further action.
The greatest problem that the Commission faces, he observed, is the failure
of the advocates to respond to correspondence from the Commission.
He also advised the participants to employ the use of customer care in their
offices. This will ensure that the clients are well aware of the situation of
their cases. He also invited them to report any malpractice in the
Commission which the advocates might be aware of. As a parting shot, he
256
observed that it is unfortunate that the “bad” lawyers rarely attend such
workshops.
Following Mr. King’arui’s presentation, the floor was opened for discussion
by the participants. Mr. Nyang’au, the first speaker, started by commenting
that the existence of the Commission is desirable, for if it were not there
some advocates would have been killed by their clients. He then raised five
issues pertinent to the operations of the Commission. First, he stated that the
Commission’s letterhead is printed in red colour which, in his view, is not a
desirable colour. He thus invited the Commission’s chairman to consider
changing the colour of the Commission’s letterhead. The Chairman of the
Commission responded that the issue was already under consideration.
Secondly, he observed that the language used in the letters sent to advocates
by the Commission always puts the advocates on their defence. The
language used always connote that the advocate is guilty of the complaint
contained therein.
Thirdly, he observed that some of the complaints are always raised long
after the alleged offence was committed or omitted. As such, the advocate in
question may have closed the files, destroyed the evidence or even died. In
any event, owing to the fact that the alleged offence was committed or
omitted, it will take the advocate in question quite a lengthy time to trace the
file yet he/she is only given twenty-one (21) days to reply to the complaint.
He therefore suggested that a time limitation for filing a complaint before
the Commission should be put in place to counter such problems. Fourthly,
he noted that the practice of requiring a reference from the Commission
before an advocate is appointed to a public office is erroneous. This is
particularly so when an advocate has a complaint pending before the
Commission and consequently cannot be appointed to a public office yet the
complaint has not been determined to establish whether the advocate is
guilty or not. This means that such an advocate is condemned unheard.
A second speaker lamented that despite the fact he had severally written to
the Commission about a case in which an advocate for the purchaser did not
forward the purchase money to him being the Vendor’s advocate, the
Commission has failed to reply or address the issue. He stated that his client
was now seriously threatening to consult the outlawed the Mungiki sect to
257
deal with him. In response Mr. King’arui whilst stating clearly that the
workshop was not the forum to raise such issues, he invited the advocate to
submit the reference number of the file for him and/or the Commission to
take action.
A third speaker sought to know the period within which a complaint found
to be frivolous is closed. In response, Mr. King’arui stated that like other
Governmental officers, the Commission’s staff was under performance
contracts and the Service Charter which requires them to complete their
tasks within a stipulated time frame.
Once again Miss Betty Nyabuto introduced Professor Cox who was
responsible for giving a review/overview of the capacity of the Disciplinary
Committee. He commenced by noting that unlike the Advocates Complaints
Commission whose main role is investigatory in nature, the Disciplinary
Committee’s role is to adjudicate over complaints. On the composition or
constitution of the Committee, he noted that there are significant numbers of
advocates who are the representatives of the legal profession. There are also
258
three lay members who sit in the Committee including the representatives
from the Attorney General’s chambers.
The Committee may hear and determine any complaint. Professor Cox
Observed that this power may raise questions as to what exactly constitutes
a complaint. There is therefore a need to succinctly define a “complaint.”
On the power of the Committee to order the punishment of an advocate,
Professor Cox observed that some punishments envisaged by the Advocates
Act (Cap 16) are theoretical in nature. This is because in its life, the
Committee has never employed the use of such punishments. The power of
the Committee, for example, to direct an advocate an error, has rarely been
used if at all by the Committee. Further, the Act stipulates that the
Committee may admonish an advocate without stating exactly what
admonishing means. In this regard, observed the Professor, the public do not
appreciate admonishment as a proper or adequate punishment or serious
sanction.
Other issues raised by Mr. Ojienda include the role and the rationale of the
secretary of the LSK as the secretary of the Committee; the power of the
Committee over advocates’ clerks which it has rarely used if at all; criteria
for sentencing; and the lack of rules for taxation of advocates’ bill of costs.
Mr. Ojienda cited the example of Uganda where the Committee sits as a
panel and holds a preliminary enquiry to establish if a complaint has merit
259
for a formal charge to be instituted against an advocate. He also invited the
participants to think over whether the open door policy which allows the
presence of the media and the public during the Committee’s hearings is
desirable.
260
Mr. Tom Mutei who is currently sitting in the Disciplinary Committee
explained that it is possible for an advocate to be severally struck off the roll
of advocates when several complaints are brought against him/her. For each
of these complaints, the Committee may strike the advocate off the roll if he
is found guilty and striking him/her off the roll is deemed the best
punishment. He noted that though there is a tendency for advocates to raise
preliminary objections during the hearing of complaints before the
Commission, the panellists usually tend to look into the real issued for
determination before the Committee.
Mr. George Kimondo, who has served in the Disciplinary Committee for
three years and currently sitting in the Committee, asserted that the lay
persons do not significantly contribute to the operations of the Committee.
In most circumstances, they do not comprehend the proceedings. He also
stressed that the Committee’s lacks a sentencing guideline. On swearing of
affidavits by the Commissioners, Mr. Kimondo noted that in most cases the
Commission fails to trace the complainant so as to be cross-examined to
verify the contents of the affidavits compelling the Commission to withdraw
the complaint or the Committee strikes out the complaint. He thus
emphasized that the law should be reviewed to make it obligatory for the
complainants to swear the affidavits on their own. On execution of the
Committee’s decisions, he conceded that there are no monitory mechanisms
and stated that the onus lies on the LSK to set up such a mechanism. Finally,
he confirmed that the Committee has never made any
261
4.0. SESSION 4: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ETHICS
ENFORCEMENT SYSTEMS
262
the Law Society of England and Wales takes regulatory action and refers
prosecutions to Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal. The Solicitors Disciplinary
Tribunal is independent of the Law Society, but funded by it. Three
members inclusive of one lay person hear each case.
263
5.0. SESSION 5: PLENARY AND GROUP DISCUSSION
264
GROUP Disciplinary Composition -the three lay men should be removed
2 Committee from the composition of the Committee
- the Attorney-General should only be a
member not a chairman of the
Committee
-the number of advocates should be
increased
-the chairman of the Committee should
be an advocate
Jurisdiction -professional misconduct and
unprofessional conduct should be
defined
-section 60 of the Advocates Act should
be amended to replace “any person”
with “the complainant”
-the parallel jurisdiction between the
Commission and the Committee should
be addressed
-decisions of the Committee should be
gazetted or publicised through the media
Location -decentralize the Committee to be in line
with the LSK chapters
Funding -funding be provided by the Ministry of
Justice
Enforcement -monitoring should be done by the LSK
and the courts
-enhance the capacity of LSK to monitor
enforcement through provision of
resources
Existence -it is relevant and provides self-
regulation for the profession
Autonomy -the Committee should be given
complete autonomy
-the powers of the Attorney-General in
the Committee should be removed
GROUP Ethics and Composition -a committee member should have seven
3 Compliance years experience in private practice
Committee -the committee members should be
proposed by the local chapters
Jurisdiction -the committees should not have
jurisdiction if a complaint is pending
before either the Complaints
Commission or the Disciplinary
Committee
-should be restricted
265
Funding -funding to be provided by the LSK
-LSK should establish secretariat for
each of the committees
-a poor man’s box should be established
to assist poor complainants
Enforcement -enforcement be effected through the
LSK e.g. by referring a matter to the
Disciplinary Committee where
appropriate
Existence -its existence is appropriate
Location -the current location under the LSK
chapters is appropriate
Autonomy -semi-autonomous
Professor Noel Cox reiterated that the purpose of the three workshops held
in Kisumu. Mombasa and Nairobi was to get the views or the opinion of the
lawyers concerning the disciplinary process. He said that so in general terms
the views received from the members was generally consistent with the draft
report prepared by the consultants prior to the commencement of the
workshops. He noted that the code of ethics currently guiding the legal
profession in Kenya is inadequate as compared to the international norms.
He finally concluded by saying that it is ultimately the profession’s role to
chart its own code of ethics and conduct and that the success of the
disciplinary process depends on the participation of all the members of the
profession.
Miss Nyabuto confirmed that the consultants under Component B had made
visits to the LSK local chapters to collect views from members and were
expected to deliver the results of the visits during the national workshop.
266
She also informed the participants that the consultants will develop a pilot
training syllabus which will be circulated to all LSK members for approval.
She invited the participants to register for the Commonwealth Lawyer’s
Conference to held in Nairobi in September and the Annual LSK retreat.
The country to be visited this year for the retreat is Mauritius. She thanked
the Chairman of the Complaints Commission, Mr. Joseph King’arui, the
LSK chairman, Mr. Eric Mogeni, the LSK Council members and Branch
officials and all participants for their contribution during the workshop. All
participants were awarded two CLE units and reimbursed their travel
allowances. The workshop was finally closed at 15:59 p.m.
267
APPENDIX I
NATIONAL WORKSHOP-NAIROBI
STANDARDS & ETHICS
Questions:
2) What changes would you wish to see made in the operations of the
institutions;
a) Composition
b) Jurisdiction
c) Location
d) Funding
e) Enforcement
f) Existence
g) Autonomy
268
12.5 NOTE ON AUTHORS
269
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270
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275
INDEX
accounts, 10, 32, 63, 67, 82, 83, 135, 136, 138, 142, 143, 191,
90, 191 192, 193, 194, 196, 197, 199,
admission to practise, 10, 22, 31, 203, 204
32, 34, 46, 47, 58, 79, 80, 191, Advocates Training Programme,
202 8, 10, 25, 80, 189, 191, 270
Advocate’s (Deposit Interest) advocates’ practice rules and code
Rules, 18, 144, 177, 199 of conduct, 8, 12, 25, 112, 120,
Advocates (Accountant’s 144, 189, 193
Certificate) Rules, 18, 41, 125, American Bar Association, 31
144, 177, 199, 270 Attorney-General, 11, 13, 14, 41,
Advocates (Accounts) Rules, 18, 49, 56, 57, 77, 85, 87, 92, 100,
41, 125, 144, 149, 177, 199, 101, 102, 114, 116, 117, 118,
270 119, 120, 121, 123, 128, 131,
Advocates (Complaints 192, 194, 195
Commission) (Structure and Barristers Complaints Bureau, 56
Procedure) Rules, 11, 13, 100, Board of Inquiry, 85, 86
101, 102, 117, 192, 194 Canadian Bar Association, 52
Advocates (Complaints Cape Law Society, 67
Commission) (structure and case management system, 12, 16,
Procedure) Rules 2003, 100 104, 105, 106, 107, 137, 193,
Advocates (Complaints 197
Commission) (Structure and Chartered Institute of Patent
Procedure) Rules 2003, 11, Agents, 58
100, 102, 192 Chief Justice, 16, 133, 138, 176,
Advocates (Practice) Rules, 11, 197
18, 41, 99, 125, 144, 145, 149, Code of Conduct and Ethics, 78
177, 178, 188, 192, 199 Code of Conduct for the Bar of
Advocates Act, 10, 11, 13, 14, 22, England and Wales, 56
23, 41, 68, 77, 78, 80, 83, 84, code of ethics, 19, 177, 199
85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, Commission on Professionalism,
94, 100, 102, 110, 111, 114, 31
118, 120, 121, 122, 124, 125, Commissioners, Advocates
126, 128, 131, 144, 191, 192, Complaints Commission, 11,
194, 195, 202, 203, 204, 270 13, 88, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104,
Advocates Complaints 116, 192, 194
Commission, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, Committee on Continuing Legal
16, 18, 22, 23, 25, 41, 59, 76, Education, 82
77, 80, 83, 84, 86, 87, 102, 105, complaints, 10, 41, 47, 49, 50, 53,
106, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64, 67, 68, 80,
113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 83, 85, 86, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92,
119, 122, 124, 125, 126, 128, 102, 104, 107, 108, 109, 111,
276
112, 114, 115, 119, 121, 125, Institute of Legal Executives, 58
126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 132, Institute of Trade Mark Attorneys,
134, 135, 136, 191, 203 58
Complaints Resolution Judicial Service Commission, 78
Commissioner, 53, 119 Judicial Services Commission, 14,
Consultation Paper on the Review 123, 195
of the Regulatory Framework Law Council of Australia, 46
for Legal Services in England Law Society of England and
and Wales, 58 Wales, 59, 107, 122
continuing legal education, 8, 10, Law Society of Kenya, The, 6, 7,
22, 79, 82, 189, 191, 202 8, 9, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 22, 23,
Council of Legal Education, 10, 24, 25, 27, 41, 76, 79, 84, 86,
80, 81, 191, 271 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 120,
Criminal Bar Association of New 121, 124, 130, 134, 138, 139,
Zealand, 61 141, 144, 148, 149, 177, 179,
Digest of Professional Conduct 187, 189, 194, 195, 197, 198,
and Etiquette, 41, 144, 148, 272 199, 202, 203, 204, 205, 208,
Directions Officer, 15, 137, 196 272, 273, 274
Disciplinary Committee, 6, 9, 10, Law Society of New South Wales,
11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 49
22, 23, 24, 25, 41, 59, 67, 68, Law Society of South Africa, 67
76, 77, 80, 85, 86, 88, 91, 92, Law Society of Upper Canada, 52
94, 95, 98, 103, 105, 106, 107, Lawyers and Conveyancers Act
108, 109, 111, 112, 113, 114, 2006 (NZ), 61, 64, 96, 98
115, 116, 117, 118, 120, 121, Lawyers Standards Committees,
122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 134, 64, 66, 73
135, 136, 137, 138, 140, 141, lay members, 14, 35, 54, 58, 62,
143, 144, 191, 192, 193, 194, 65, 73, 113, 116, 121, 122, 137,
195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 203, 195
204, 270, 272, 274 Lay Observer, 62
Disciplinary Enquiry Committee, Legal Complaints Review Officer,
68 65, 66, 73
District Disciplinary Tribunal, 62 Legal Complaints Service, 58, 59,
Ethics and Compliance 60, 73, 114
Committee, 12, 112, 193 Legal Ombudsman Victoria, 47
former practitioners, 10, 78, 191 Legal Profession Act 1987
frivolous appeals, 16, 137, 197 (NSW), 49
General Council of the Bar, 68, Legal Profession Act 2004
272 (NSW), 49
Governance, Justice, Law and Legal Profession Ombudsman,
Order Sector Reform 13, 118, 119, 194
Programme, 6, 8, 22, 189 Legal Services Division of the
inadequate professional services, Administrative Decisions
11, 91, 95, 98, 99, 108, 135, Tribunal, 50
143, 176, 192 Legal Services Ombudsman, 53,
Inns of Court, 55, 56, 57 59, 73, 114, 119
277
Lord Chancellor, 59 regulatory function, 13, 28, 41,
Master of the Rolls, 60 42, 46, 47, 49, 50, 52, 58, 59,
Ministry of Justice, 202 60, 61, 64, 73, 75, 108, 109,
National Practice Model Laws 113, 114, 115, 122, 194, 207
Project, 46 representational function, 13, 49,
New South Wales Bar 115, 194
Association, 49 Roll of Advocates, 10, 16, 78,
New Zealand Bar Association, 61 138, 139, 191, 197
New Zealand Law Practitioners Royal Commission on legal
Disciplinary Tribunal, 62, 98 services, 30
New Zealand Law Society, 61, Rules of Professional Conduct for
62, 63, 64, 66, 98, 274 Barristers and Solicitors, 61, 98
New Zealand Lawyers and Solicitor-General, 14, 85, 120,
Conveyancers Disciplinary 121, 123, 195
Tribunal, 65, 66, 74 Solicitors Regulation Authority,
Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society, 59, 60, 73, 113, 122
52 Solicitors Trust Account
Office of the Legal Services Regulations, 98
Commissioner, 47, 49, 50 Solicitors’ Fidelity Guarantee
practising certificate, 10, 18, 32, Fund, 63
80, 97, 99, 144, 178, 191, 199 State Law Office, 77, 87
professional misconduct, 11, 32, Statute Law (Miscellaneous
33, 44, 61, 62, 63, 81, 82, 83, Amendments) Act No. 2 of
85, 91, 95, 98, 99, 100, 108, 2002, 83, 89, 90, 110, 118
109, 111, 114, 124, 125, 126, Stobbs Report, 12, 15, 16, 76, 77,
134, 135, 136, 138, 141, 144, 100, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107,
176, 192, 203 108, 109, 114, 123, 124, 136,
Public Officer Ethics Act, 78, 271, 137, 138, 144, 193, 195, 196,
274 197
Public Service Commission, 78 Treasury, 13, 116, 194
regional ethics committees, 8, 18, Uniform Rules of Professional
25, 76, 102, 120, 140, 142, 143, Ethics of the General Council
189, 199 of the Bar of South Africa, 68
278