Day 16 – Aggravating Circumstances
, J p: Direct appeal to this Court in view of the capital punishment imposed
9.1 Taking advantage of public position
EN BANC [G.R. No. L-30956. Nov 23, 1971.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. FLORENCIO ORDIALES
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; TREACHERY; PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR EVEN
WHEN ATTACK WAS FRONTAL. — The sudden and unexpected shooting of the victim with a carbine
constituted treachery. Authorities are clear that even when an attack or aggression is made face to face,
treachery or alevosia is nevertheless present when the attack is sudden and unexpected to the point of
incapacitating the victim to repel or escape it.
2. ID.; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES; ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH,
ABSORBED IN TREACHERY AND INHERENT IN THE SAME. — It is true that the deceased
had two companions while accused-appellant was alone, but superiority in number does
not necessarily mean superiority in strength. These three men were all seated and
unarmed, and their movement was impeded by the table at which they sat. Their
positions even gave accused-appellant more advantage especially since he carried two
firearms, a carbine and a revolver. However, as correctly held by the lower court, abuse
of superior strength is absorbed in treachery and is inherent in the same.
3. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; WITNESSES; CREDIBILITY THEREOF GENERALLY ACCEPTED BY
APPELLATE COURTS. — The rule is settled in this jurisdiction that appellate courts seldom disturb a trial court's
appreciation of the credibility of witnesses, in view of its opportunity to observe the demeanor and conduct of
the witnesses while testifying on the witness stand; and that said appreciation of the court below will generally
be accepted and acted upon favorably by the appellate courts, unless there is a material circumstance which
consequently might affect the result of the case.
4. CRIMINAL LAW; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE; ABUSE OF PUBLIC POSITION
NOT APPRECIATED IN CASE AT BAR. — For abuse of public position under Art. 14,
paragraph 1, RPC, to be appreciated, it is not only necessary that the person committing
the crime be a public official; he must also use the influence, prestige or ascendency which
such office gives him as a means by which he realized his purpose. The essence of the
matter is presented in the inquiry, "Did the accused abuse his office in order to commit
the crime?" It is not shown that accused-appellant took advantage of his position as
confidential agent of Mayor Claudio in shooting the victim, or that he used his influence,
prestige or ascendency" in killing the deceased. Accused-appellant could have shot
Bayona without having occupied the said position. Thus, in the absence of proof that
advantage was taken by accused-appellant of his being a confidential agent, the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of public position could not be properly appreciated
against him.
5. ID.; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; EVIDENT PREMEDITATION; ABSENCE OF DIRECT EVIDENCE OF
PLANNING OR PREPARATION NEGATIVES THE SAME. — The aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation
has not likewise been proven beyond reasonable doubt. The mere fact that accused-appellant killed Bayona does
not necessarily prove in itself that the former hatched a plan to kill the latter. As there was no direct evidence of
the planning or preparation, the court's conclusion may not be endorsed, since it is not enough that premeditation
be suspected or surmised, but the criminal intent must be evidenced by notorious outward acts evincing the
determination to commit the crime.
6. ID.; JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; SELF-DEFENSE, REQUIREMENTS THEREOF CITED. — As regards
the plea of self-defense under Art. 11, paragraph 1, of the RPC, the rule is that the same must be proved by clear
and convincing evidence. The three concurring requisites should be present, namely, (a)(unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel the aggression; and (c) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the accused.
DECISION
REYES, J.B.L.
against accused-appellant, Florencio Ordiales, by the CFI of Rizal, Branch VII, Pasay City,
in its Criminal Case No. 8114-P. The dispositive portion of the said court's decision follows:
"WHEREFORE, this Court after having thus considered very carefully the
evidence of the prosecution and the defense, both testimonial and documentary, and the
exhaustive Memorandum of the Defense, finds accused FLORENCIO ORDIALES guilty
beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder, punishable under Art. 248 of the RPC, committed with the
aggravating and the mitigating circumstances above mentioned, and hereby sentences
him to suffer the penalty of death in the manner provided by law, to indemnify the heirs
of the deceased Vicente Bayona in the amount of P12,000.00 and to pay the costs."
The Amended Information charged accused-appellant Florencio Ordiales of the
crime of murder committed as follows:
"That on or about the 4th day of Nov, 1968, in Pasay City, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, Florencio Ordiales y
Abaro, being then a Confidential Agent of the City Mayor, Pasay City, duly appointed and
qualified as such, taking advantage of his public position, with deliberate intent to kill, and
with evident premeditation, and treachery aforethought suddenly and unexpectedly, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot for several
times on the vital parts of the body, unarmed, Vicente Bayona, with a carbine the herein
accused was then provided with, which treacherous acts, tended to directly and specially
insure its execution, without risk to himself, from the defense that Vicente Bayona may
make, thereby inflicting upon the latter several mortal wounds, which caused his
instantaneous death.
That at the time of the commission of this offense the accused-
Florencio Ordiales y Abaro was provided with a motor vehicle, which he took advantage
of, to facilitate his escape from the scene of the crime.
All contrary to law, with qualifying circumstance of alevosia, and the aggravating
circumstances of (1) his public position, (2) evident premeditation, and (3) the use of a
motor vehicle."
The evidence for the prosecution shows that on 4 Nov 1968, at 5:30 in the
afternoon, Vicente Bayona, with two companions, Daniel Brown, Jr., and Rolando Cruz,
were at the airconditioned room of Nad's restaurant, Libertad Street, Pasay. While they
were starting to drink pepsi-cola and gin, accused-appellant Florencio Ordiales entered,
asking Vicente Bayona, "Sino ba ang minumura mo?" immediately firing at the latter a
U.S. carbine, caliber .30, in rapid succession. The victim was unable to answer because he
was hit. Accused-appellant then put down his firearm to look at Bayona, after which he
left the restaurant and boarded a yellow jeep parked outside. Two other persons were in
the said jeep by the names of Bayani and Masakay.
Daniel Brown, Jr., ran away after the first shot, while the victim's other
companion, Rolando Cruz, was literally frozen with fear in his seat. Vicente Bayona died
of multiple gunshot wounds at 6:10 that same afternoon upon arrival at San Juan de Dios
Hospital, Pasay. The assailant shot him at a distance of 2 1/2 yards, more or less. The
slaying is admitted by the accused. The defense's own version of the incident was that
accused-appellant saw Lt. Delfin Hernandez at the lobby of the Pasay City Hall in the
morning of 4 Nov 1968. The former asked the latter if he could have his carbine M-1
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converted to an automatic one or M-2. Since the accused-appellant did not have the
carbine with him at the time, they agreed to meet at Nad's restaurant at 5:30 that
afternoon so he could deliver the carbine.
At past five of the said afternoon, accused-appellant went to the Nad's
restaurant to keep the appointment. While accused-appellant was looking for a place to
sit in the airconditioned room, Vicente Bayona whistled at him, motioning him to come
near. As soon as accused-appellant approached Bayona, the latter said, "Tell the mayor
that next year he will lose." Accused-appellant answered, "Huwag naman ganon. Bakit
hindi kayo magkasundo. Dati kayo magkasama." Vicente Bayona, however, shouted,
"Bastat sabihin mo talo na siya sa isang taon!" Accused-appellant shouted back, saying,
"Why don't you tell him? You are sending me to tell him!"
Vicente Bayona suddenly stood up with hands on waist and was able to
approach accused-appellant, holding the barrel of the latter's carbine. The victim's two
companions also rushed at accused-appellant whereupon, the latter stepped backward
and fired at Bayona. The said companions ran away after Bayona was fired upon.
Accused-appellant left the restaurant after Bayona fell and took a taxi at Taft
Avenue near Pasay Commercial Center with the intention of surrendering to the mayor.
In the corner of Malibay, accused-appellant met Francisco Villa (who was going to be
appointed Chief of Police of Pasay City later), so he stopped and told him that he shot
somebody and that he was going to surrender. Villa, however, advised him to surrender
instead to the NBI. Accused-appellant, accompanied by Mr. Villa, then proceeded to
Bankal to see NBI agent Mr. Aragon. Mr. Aragon, who arrived in his house later was told
what happened. He, in turn, accompanied accused-appellant to the NBI where the latter
surrendered to one Mr. Bayani with the carbine used in the shooting.
The Court a quo found the aggravating circumstances of (a) abuse of official
position, (b) evident premeditation, and (c) use of superior force. However, it considered
the use of superior force as absorbed by the qualifying circumstance of treachery. The
said-court also found the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, offsetting one
of the two remaining aggravating circumstances. Hence, the death penalty was imposed.
The use of motor vehicle which was likewise alleged in the Amended Information was not
appreciated by the court a quo for the reason that the jeep was not used as a means to
commit the murder.
The following are assigned as errors in accused-appellants brief: The lower court erred in:
1. Convicting accused-appellant of the crime of murder qualified by treachery;
2. Giving full credence to the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution
which are full of serious and material contradictions, inconsistencies and manifestly false
assertions;
3. Sentencing accused-appellant to suffer the penalty of death;
4. Finding that the aggravating circumstances of (1) abuse of official position and
(2) evident premeditation are present in the commission of the offense;
5. Not acquitting accused-appellant of the crime charged on the ground of self-
defense; and
6. Not acquitting accused-appellant on the ground of reasonable doubt.
There is nothing on record to warrant a reversal of the court a quo's finding that
treachery attended the killing of the deceased. The sudden and unexpected shooting of
the victim with a carbine constituted treachery. Authorities are clear that even when an
attack or aggression is made face to face, treachery or alevosia is nevertheless present
when the attack
is sudden and unexpected to the point of incapacitating the victim to repel or escape
it. Accused-appellant's account as to what precipitated the shooting could not be
believed. The Statement, "Tell the mayor that next year he will lose," or "Basta sabihin
mo talo na siya sa isang taon", could not be attributed to the deceased, who, being an
avid campaigner of local mayoralty candidates, at least from Mayor Cuneta's time up to
the election of Mayor Jovito Claudio, certainly could not have ignored that 1969 was not
a mayoralty election year. On the other hand, it is admitted by the prosecution that the
deceased and his twin brother, Reynaldo, had repeatedly slandered the incumbent
mayor, since the latter disregarded the promise to make Reynaldo the chief of his
confidential agents stating that the promise was merely a joke. In fact, on the afternoon
before the shooting and when the brothers met at Shanghai restaurant, Pasay City, the
victim told Reynaldo that he slandered the mayor again because the mayor refused to
sign something which the victim asked him to sign. The version of the prosecution that it
was accused-appellant who first confronted the victim with, "Sino ba ang minumura mo?"
becomes more believably in the light of what happened, and specially since it is not
disputed that accused-appellant was present at least in one of those occasions when the
mayor was
slandered. Defense witness Pedrito Caballes impliedly so admitted by quoting Vicente
Bayona as saying to accused-appellant before he was shot, "huwag mo akong
pakialaman." Finally, prosecution witnesses Daniel Brown, Jr., and Rolando Cruz
corroborated each other in quoting accused-appellant as having said, "Sino ba ang
minumura mo?" as against the lone denial of accused-appellant.
It is true that the deceased had two companions while accused-appellant was
alone, but superiority in number does not necessarily mean superiority in
strength. 4 These three men were all seated and unarmed, and their movement was
impeded by the table at which they sat. Their positions even gave accused-appellant more
advantage especially since he carried two firearms, a carbine and a revolver. However, as
correctly held by the lower court, abuse of superior strength is absorbed in treachery and
is inherent in the same. 5
It is accused-appellant's contention, and error was assigned in this regard, that
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses should not be given full credence because
of alleged serious and material contradictions, inconsistencies and manifestly false
assertions. Our review of the evidence demonstrates that the contractions were not on
material points. The rule is settled in third jurisdiction that appellate courts seldom
disturb a trial court's appreciation of the credibility of witnesses, in view of its opportunity
to observe the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses while testifying on the witness
stand; and that said appreciation of the court below will generally be accepted and acted
upon favorably by the appellate courts, unless there is a material circumstance which
consequently might affect the result of the case.6 As already noted earlier, the exception
does not obtain this case, hence, the finding of treachery is sustained.
We come next to the question of whether the aggravating circumstances of
abuse of public position and evident pre-meditation really attended the commission of
the crime as found by the court a quo. For abuse of public position under Art. 14(1),
RPC, to be appreciated, it is not only necessary that the person committing the crime be
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a public official; he must also use the influence, prestige or ascendency which such office
gives him as a means by which he realized his purpose. The essence of the matter is
presented in the inquiry, "Did the accused abuse his office in order to commit the
crime?" It is not shown that accused-appellant took advantage of his position as
confidential agent of Mayor Claudio in shooting the victim, or that he used his "influence,
prestige or ascendency" in killing the deceased. Accused-appellant could have shot by
Bayona without having occupied the said position. Thus, in the absence of proof that
advantage was taken by accused-appellant of his being a confidential agent, the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of public position could not be properly appreciated
against him. The Solicitor General also concedes this. The court a quo's finding that the
said aggravating circumstance is present can not, therefore, be sustained.
The aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation has not likewise been
proven beyond reasonable doubt. The mere fact that accused-appellant killed Bayona
does not necessarily prove in itself that the former hatched a plan to kill the latter. As
there was no direct evidence of the planning or preparation, the court's conclusion may
not be endorsed, since it is not enough that premeditation be suspected or surmised, but
the criminal intent must be evidenced by notorious outward acts evincing the
determination to commit the crime. Much less is there a showing of opportunity for
reflection and the persistence in the criminal intent that characterize the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation. The court a quo therefore erred in appreciating
the said aggravating circumstance against accused-appellant. The Solicitor General
likewise concedes this finding.
As regards the plea of self-defense under Art. 11, paragraph 1, of the RPC, the
rule is that the same must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. The three
concurring requisites should be present, namely, (a) unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to necessity of the means
employed to; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused.
We find no proof of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. He was seated
and unarmed. This Court finds it hard to believe that he suddenly stood up with hands at
his waist, which allegedly led accused-appellant to think that the former would draw a
gun. The victim, fully aware that he was not armed, and knowing that his adversary carried
a carbine, would not bluff at so great a risk. We find it still harder to believe that the victim
arose and approached or rushed at accused-appellant, and suddenly held the barrel of
the latter's carbine without first being shot at, for the reasons that (a) a table obstructed
his way; (b) accused-appellant was at least 2 1/2 yards away from the victim, which
distance could not have been easily and quickly traversed from where the alleged
aggressor was seated, considering the obstruction; and (c) according to his own version,
accused-appellant already warned that he would shoot if the victim approached him. It
would have been foolhardy and suicidal for the victim to act in the manner that accused-
appellant would like this Court to believe, knowing that the accused-appellant was poised
to shoot if the victim should make a move to approach him, and this holds likewise of the
victim's companions, who were not themselves armed. Yet, accused-appellant would like
Us to believe that he shot the victim only after the latter held the barrel of the gun and
only after he had first stepped backward. The statement of Daniel Brown, Jr., that the
victim fell from his seat to the cement floor like "a burning candle", belies further the
claim of accused-appellant that the deceased was shot only after he approached accused-
appellant. Under the circumstances, accused-appellant's plea of self-defense cannot be
sustained, since he was himself the aggressor.
We are convinced that the guilt of accused-appellant has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt. However. the death penalty should be reduced in the absence of the
aggravating circumstances of abuse of public position and evident premeditation which
were erroneously found by the court a quo.
Under Article 248 of the RPC, the penalty for murder is reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death. There being only one mitigating circumstance, that of
voluntary surrender, and no aggravating circumstance to offset the same, the imposable
penalty is the minimum pursuant to Art. 64(2) of the same Code, which is the maximum
period of reclusion temporal under Art. 248, supra. The Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act
4103, as amended by Act 4225) applies in view of the nature of the penalty. Under this
law, the judgment sentencing the accused to a prison term provides for a minimum within
the range of the penalty
next lower in degree to be fixed in any of its periods in the discretion of the court. Under
Article 61(3) of RPC when the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of one or two
indivisible penalties and the maximum period of another divisible penalty, as in this case,
the penalty next lower in degree shall be composed of the medium and minimum periods
of the proper divisible penalty and the maximum of that immediately following in said
respective scale. The penalty next lower in degree in the instant case therefore ranges
from the maximum of prision mayor to the medium degree of reclusion temporal.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the decision appealed from is accordingly
modified, sentencing accused-appellant to suffer an imprisonment of 14 years, 8 months
and 1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as
maximum. Said decision is affirmed in all other respects. Costs against appellant.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 19603. Dec 29, 1922.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. CATALINO TEVES
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; FALSIFICATION OF DOCUMENT; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE; TAKING
ADVANTAGE OF OFFICIAL POSITION. — The taking advantage of official position being a
necessary element of the form of falsification defined and penalized in Art. 300 of the
Penal Code, it cannot be taken into consideration as an aggravating circumstance under
that article.
2. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; INFORMATION CHARGING MORE THAN ONE OFFENSE; WAIVER BY FAILURE
TO DEMUR. — Where an information charges more than one offense, the defendant's failure to demur or object
in time constitutes a waiver of the right secured him by Sec. 21 of General Order No. 58 to have only one offense
charged in each information. (U. S. vs. Balaba, 37 Phil., 260.)
DECISION
OSTRAND, J p: The defendant is accused of the crime of falsification of public documents,
the information alleging:
"That on or about the period between Jan. 1st and Apr. 30th, 1921, in the
municipality of Dumaguete, Oriental Negros, P. I., and within the jurisdiction of this court
the said accused being the warden of the provincial prison of this province did at that time
and place willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit the crime of falsification of public
3
documents by making an untruthful statement of facts and by simulating the intervention
of persons who had not intervened in various public documents, to wit: In the provincial
voucher No. 350 of Feb. 1921; in the provincial voucher No. 724 of March, 1921; and in
the provincial voucher No. 1075 of April, 1921; stating therein facts which were not true,
by means of which falsification the accused made it appear and simulated that he had
purchased from a Chinese person, Tan Juanco, of Dumaguete on the aforesaid dates and
place and under the provincial voucher No. 350, 1,170 liters of rice-corn at P0.13 per liter
and 122 gantas of beans at P0.75 a ganta, for the amount of P236.10; under provincial
voucher No. 724, 150 liters of rice-corn at P0.13 a liter, 75 gantas of beans at P0.75 a
ganta, 65 kilos of dry fish at P0.73 a kilo, and two sacks of sugar at P6.90 a sack, for the
sum of P254.12; and under the provincial voucher No. 1075, 138 gantas of beans at P0.70
a ganta, 85 kilos of dry fish at P0.66 a kilo and a sack of salt at P4 a sack, for the sum of
P155.85; when as a matter of fact the aforesaid accused had bought from said Tan Juanco
only 114 gantas of rice-corn on Jan 8, 1921, for the sum of P80; that by means of said
falsification the accused succeeded in collecting from the Gov’t P566.07 more than he
was entitled to, manifestly contrary to law."
As will be seen the information charges three separate offenses but the
defendant did not demur to it, or object, and under the doctrine established in the case
of US vs. Balaba, he must be considered to have waived the right secured to him under
section 21 of General Order No. 58. the trial court found him guilty of all three counts and,
taking into consideration the aggravating circumstance of having taken advantage of his
position as a public functionary, sentenced him to suffer 10 years and one day of prision
mayor and to pay a fine of 250 pesetas for each offense; to indemnify the provincial
treasury of Oriental Negros in the sum of P566.07, to be perpetually disqualified for public
office and to pay the costs. From this judgment he appeals and presents six assignments
of error.
The first assignment is to the effect that the trial court erred in taking into
consideration the aggravating circumstance that advantage was taken by the defendant
of his public position. This point is well taken; the defendant was convicted under Art. 300
of the Penal Code which prescribes the penalty of prision mayor and a fine for "any public
officer, employee or notary who, by taking advantage of his official position, shall be
guilty of falsification of a document." The taking advantage of official position being a
necessary element of the crime, it cannot, of course, also be taken into consideration as
an aggravating circumstance. The penalty imposed by the court below must, accordingly,
be reduced to that of the medium of prision mayor, there being no aggravating or
extenuating circumstance.
The second error assigned is that the court erred in convicting the accused of
three separate offenses in the same judgment, the penalty imposed thus resulting
disproportionate to the crime. This assignment is without merit; in the case of US vs.
Balaba,
supra, this court held (quoting syllabus): "The accused having made no objection to the
information on the ground that it charged more than one offense, the prosecution
properly submitted evidence as to the commission of each and all of the offenses charged;
and the court properly entered judgment of conviction of each and all of these offenses
which were established by the introduction of competent evidence at the trial, and
should, thereupon, have imposed the prescribed penalties for each and all of the offenses
of which the accused was convicted in accord with the provisions of Art. 87 of the Penal
Code."
The penalty which we must impose upon the defendant may seem severe, but
it is that prescribed by law and its measure does not lie within the discretion of the court;
for his relief by way of a reduction of the penalty, recourse must be had to a petition for
executive clemency.
The remaining assignments of error relate to the admissibility of certain docs
offered by the prosecution and objected to by the defense principally on the ground that
they were not properly certified or authenticated. Standing alone, the docs might be of
doubtful admissibility, but taken in connection with the oral evidence they were, in our
opinion, properly admitted.
With the sole modification that the term of imprisonment imposed by the lower
court be reduced from ten years and one day to eight years and one day of prision mayor
for each of the three offenses charged in the information, the judgment appealed from is
affirmed, with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.
9.2 Contempt or insult to public authorities
9.3 Disregard of rank, age, or sex and dwelling of offended party
EN BANC [G.R. No. L-2159. Sep 19, 1951.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BONIFACIO VALERIANO, ET AL.,
BONIFACIO VALERIANO, BENJAMIN CRUZ, DAVID DE LA CRUZ, and FAUSTINO CRUZ,
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; ROBBERY IN BAND; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES;
UNLICENSED FIREARM. —" When any of the arms used in the commission of the offense
(robbery in band) be an unlicensed firearm, the penalty to be imposed upon all the
malefactors shall be the maximum of the corresponding penalty . . ." (Art. 296, RPC, as
amended by section 3, Republic Act 12). It is error therefore, to consider as ordinary
aggravating circumstance the use of unlicensed firearms in the commission of robbery in
band.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; EVIDENT PREMEDITATION. — Evident premeditation is not considered as an
aggravating circumstances in the crime of robbery because the same is inherent in the crime especially
where it is committed by various persons; they must have an agreement, they have to meditate and reflect
on the manner of carrying out the crime and they have to act coordinately in order to succeed. But in the
crime of robbery with homicide, if there is evident premeditation to kill besides stealing, it is considered
as an aggravating circumstances. In the instant case, it has been proven that the accused, on various
occasions before committing the crime, planned and decided not only to steal but also to kill the victim,
who is a Judge of the CFI. Hence, there is no present evident premeditation as an aggravating
circumstances.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; INSULT AND DISREGARD OF RESPECT DUE OFFENDED PARTY. — According to the
evidence, the defendants wanted to kill the Judge specially because he was strict as a Judge; their purpose
was to eliminate Judge B of the Court of First Instance so that he could not try three Huks who at that time
were about to be tried by said Judge. Held: The aggravating circumstances of insult or disregard of the
respect due the offended party on account of his rank is present.
4. ID.; PENALTY FOR ROBBERY IN BAND WITH HOMICIDE. — as the crime
committed by the defendants is robbery in band with homicide, the penalty provided for
by article 294, of the RPC, is reclusion perpetua to death, and in accordance with RA 12,
the penalty to be imposed upon them is the maximum penalty, that is, death, even
without the concurrence of any aggravating circumstances.
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 5. ID.; PENALTY; MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER AND ADMISSION OF
GUILT. — The voluntary surrender and spontaneous and insistent admission of guilt by one of the accused in spite
of repeated admonition to him by the trial court that he could be sentenced to death by such admission
demonstrate an avowal of the wrong committed or a true act of contrition. Because of this circumstance, and as
there are no sufficient votes for the imposition of death, the penalty next lower in degree, that is reclusion
perpetua,should be imposed upon him.
DECISION
PER CURIAM, p:
This is an appeal interposed by Bonifacio Valeriano, David de la Cruz, Benjamin
Cruz and Faustino Cruz from two decisions rendered by His Honor, Judge Castelo of the
CFI of Rizal.
David de la Cruz was sentenced to reclusion perpetua and the remaining three
to death. The four were further sentenced to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of Judge
Basilio Bautista, the sum of P2,000; those of Crispin Bautista, P2,000; those of Jesus
Alejandrino, P2,000; those of Emiliano Magsisi, P2,000; and those of Bernabe Diosomito,
P2,000; to indemnify, jointly and severally, the family of Judge Bautista in the sum of
P1,320, the value of the unrecovered stolen articles; and to pay their aliquot part of the
costs.
The facts proven are as follows:
Some two weeks before Sep 7, 1947, Faustino Cruz, through the efforts of his
brother Benjamin Cruz who had accompanied him, contacted Ipeng Bulag in the house of
Turang Putol's brother located in the barrio of Iba, Meycauayan, Bulacan, where various
Huks were gathered, among them being Magno Carpio, Pamboy, Celo,
Bonifacio Valeriano, Rufino Pascual, Ador, Tony of Malabon and others. Ipeng Bulag was
the Commanding Officer of Huk Base Squadron No. 96 of Bulacan, while the others were
members. Benjamin Cruz belonged to the Cacarong Huk Organization of Pandi, Bulacan.
Ipeng Bulag and Faustino Cruz entered a room and after a secret conference joined the
others. Thereafter, Ipeng Bulag instructed Pamboy to look for Moro and all the tough boys
of the Squadron and bring them to Iba to be employed in robbing the house of Judge
Bautista, telling them later that they would break into the house of Judge Bautista for the
purpose of robbing and killing him; that they should eliminate him for being too harsh
against the Huks and because Seda, Salasa and Flor were about to be tried by him; and
that they needed his wealth to support their comrades in the mountains. None of those
present objected; indeed, all agreed. And in order to conceal their plan, they called it
"Operation Malabon" in their conversations. On Aug 30, 1947, Faustino Cruz was
informed in his house by Benjamin Cruz that Ipeng Bulag was prepared to carry out the
robbery in Malabon but he did not have means of transportation which Faustino Cruz,
however, promised to supply.
In the morning of Sep 6, 1947, by order of Faustino Cruz, Antonio Halcon
borrowed from Damian Laki a jeep bearing Plate No. 8- 670 which he drove to the house
of Elena de la Cruz, aunt of Benjamin Cruz, located at No. 1886 Rajabago Street,
Gagalangin, Tondo,
Manila, where Benjamin Cruz was waiting for him. After eating, at the behest of Benjamin
Cruz, the latter, Halcon and Juan de Guzman left Gagalangin in the jeep. Juan de Guzman
was dropped at Polo and Halcon and Benjamin Cruz proceeded to Meycauayan to deliver
the jeep to Ipeng Bulag. Ipeng Bulag informed Benjamin Cruz that "Operation Malabon"
would be carried out as planned by Faustino Cruz, Ipeng Bulag, Pamboy and Magno.
Tony of Malabon and Benjamin Cruz, after looking over the house and yard of
Judge Bautista on Friday previous to the robbery, prepared a sketch thereof to serve as
guide. This sketch was taken personally by Tony to Ipeng Bulag in Meycauayan.
At past seven o'clock on the night of Sep 7, as agreed upon, Ipeng Bulag,
Pamboy, Celo, Magno Carpio, Bonifacio Valeriano, Enteng, Benjamin Cruz, Gregorio
Orian, David de la
Cruz and others, all armed, left barrio Iba, Meycawayan, aboard the jeep No. 8-670 and
headed for Pinagkabalian river via Malinta. Due to illness, Moro could not take part. After
crossing the river in a banca manned by a boy named Onofre Javier, they proceeded to
the house of Judge Bautista in barrio Hulong Duhat, Malabon, Rizal. Benjamin Cruz posted
himself at the Dampalit bridge with orders to fire two shots in the air to announce the
coming of police help; two stood guard at the gate of the yard; one posted himself at an
alley alongside the yard; Bonifacio Valeriano approached the persons who were listening
to the radio program under a nipa shed located at the side of the house and ordered them
to raise their hands. Pamboy and Magno, with their guns ready, entered the dining room
which was in the ground floor of the house, and ordered Judge Bautista and his son Crispin
to raise their hands and thereafter to leave the dining room and go to the house of Santos
Bautista, situated about 20 meters away from the house of the Judge in the same yard,
the malefactors following closely with their guns trained at them. They asked for Santos
Bautista and his wife answered that he was out. Doubting the truth of this answer, one of
the malefactors went up the house but did not find Santos Bautista therein. Whereupon
Pamboy and Magno led Crispin and the Judge to the latter's house, but before going up,
Pamboy took the ring of Crispin. Upon reaching the bedroom of Judge
Bautista, one of the malefactors broke the door of the wardrobe with the butt of his gun.
They thereupon scattered the contents of the wardrobe on the floor and took the articles
to be mentioned hereafter. They then shot Judge Bautista and Crispin at close range.
Santos Bautista, another son of the Judge who had just arrived in a house where
mah-jong was played, located about 50 meters away from his, upon being informed by
Artemio Roxas that his father's house was being robbed, immediately went to the
municipal building to report.
Upon seeing the policemen arriving, Benjamin Cruz fired two shots in the air to
warn his companions and ran away, throwing his revolver into the Dampalit River.
The policemen who arrived in a jeep at once alighted therefrom and proceeded
to the yard where the malefactors, who were deployed at strategic positions, received
them with a volley of gunfire. Sergeant Bernabe Diosomito and policemen Jesus
Alejandrino and Emiliano Magsisi fell upon being shot. The assailants forthwith fled.
Shortly thereafter, other policemen arrived in a jeep with Santos Bautista, who
found his father already dead and bathed in his own blood. Santos went to the clinic of
Dr. Moises Santos where his brother Crispin (riddled with bullets) was taken, from which
he transferred him immediately to the PGH where he died 2 days thereafter.
Sergeant Bernabe Diosomito was found by the policemen in the second jeep,
prostrate and dead, and policemen Jesus Alejandrino and Emiliano Magsisi were so
mortally wounded that they soon died.
Five gunshot wounds were found by Dr. Enrique V. de los Santos in the cadaver
of Basilio Bautista, namely: first, a wound of entrance on the right side of the back, at the
level of the 10th rib, making an exit wound on the right chest, at the level of the 4th rib;
5
second, another wound of entrance at the right infra-scapular region, making an exit
wound on the right chest, at the level of the 4th intercostal space; third, another wound
of entrance on the left scapular region, making an exit wound on the sternum, at the level
of the 5th rib; fourth, another wound of entrance on the left chest, lateral aspect, along
the posterior axillary line, making an exit wound on the right side of the back, at the level
of the 7th rib; and lastly, a wound of entrance on the left arm, lateral aspect, making an
exit wound on the left arm, medial aspect.
In the cadaver of Crispin Bautista, the following wounds were found by the same
doctor: first, a wound of entrance on the left side of the epigastric region; second, another
wound of entrance of the supero-lateral portion of the anterior aspect of the right chest;
third, another wound of entrance on the supero-lateral portion of the anterior aspect of
the right side of the chest; fourth, another wound of entrance on the upper portion of the
lateral aspect of the left side of the neck, making a wound of exit on the right infra-
mandibular region below the jawbone; fifth, another wound of entrance on the left cheek,
making a wound of exit on the
right infra-mandibular region; and lastly, a wound of entrance on the antero-medial
aspect of the upper third left arm.
The same doctor found in the cadaver of Sergeant Bernabe Diosomito a gunshot
wound of entrance on the infra-clavicular region, making an exit wound on the right chest
along the posterior axillary line.
In the cadaver of policeman Jesus Alejandrino, Dr. Pedro P. Solis found the ff.
gunshot wounds: first, a wound of entrance on the right side of the sternal region, at the
level of the third rib, making an exit wound on the posterior aspect of the chest at the
inter-scapular region, at the level of the 5th thoracic vertebra; and another wound of
entrance on the anterior aspect of the chest on the left mammary region, making an exit
wound on the posterior aspect of the chest in the inter-scapular area at the level of the
4th rib.
The following gunshot wounds were found by the same doctor in the cadaver of
policeman Emiliano Magsisi: first, a wound of entrance on the supero-lateral portion of
the chest at the right infra-clavicular region; and another wound of entrance on the
supero-lateral portion of the chest at the right infra-clavicular region.
The widow of Judge Bautista and his children noted the following articles
missing: a handbag of the wife of Crispin Bautista containing P500; a wallet of Crispin
containing P200; a wallet of Judge Bautista containing P300 and his Elgin watch valued at
P120; and 10 woolen blankets valued at P200.
Assistant Provincial Fiscal Apolinario Sogueco found on the scene of the crime,
besides the cadaver of Judge Bautista, articles scattered on the floor, one Thompson sub-
machine gun (Exh. "LL") with its broken butt (Exh. "LL-1"), 4 shells (Exh. "SS"), 2 slugs (Exh.
"SS-1"), and the cadavers of Sergeant Diosomito and Policemen Jesus Alejandrino and
Emiliano Magsisi. The butt of the Thompson sub-machine gun was undoubtedly used to
break the door of the wardrobe.
Lt. Col. Macario Asistio of the Military Police Command also went to the place
to conduct an investigation and immediately put his soldiers and agents in action. In the
house of Gregoria de Jesus located in barrio Sulucan, Malabon, they arrested
Bonifacio Valeriano who had sought refuge there by representing that he was not a bad
person and that the Huks were after him. Col. Asistio found Valeriano's face and wrists
tainted with mercurochrome. His khaki pants and sinamay shirt, still wet, were hidden in
a corner of the house. Valerianoadmitted that they were his. Asked about the condition
of his face, he said that he had applied medicine to it after being maltreated by the Huks;
but upon the removal of the mercurochrome, his face was found with neither contusions
nor wounds.
Bonifacio Valeriano was taken to the house of Judge Bautista with his khaki
pants and sinamay shirt, and he was there identified by Gregorio Cruz as the very person
who, at the point of his rifle, ordered those listening to the radio program to raise their
hands, he was recognized because the handkerchief covering the lower part of his face
fell, and he was then wearing the khaki pants (Exh. "AA-1") and the sinamay shirt (Exh.
"AA") which he later hid in a corner of the house where he sought refuge.
The alleged maltreatment claimed to have been received from the Huks having
been found to be untrue when his face showed no injury whatsoever after the
mercurochrome had been removed, and, upon the other hand, having been identified by
Gregorio Cruz, Bonifacio Valeriano finally had to confess that he participated in the
robbery in the house of Judge Bautista. He was accordingly taken to the Military Police
Command headquarters at the BBB building at Polo, Bulacan.
Upon arrival at the headquarters, Valeriano was searched and a gold ring with
the initial C, the same ring which Pamboy took from Crispin before going up the house,
was found in his pocket. When asked about the ring, he said that Pamboy entrusted it to
him until the next day. Undoubtedly, convinced that it was futile to tell more lies, he
named his companions in the robbery, and it was at this juncture that statement Exhibit
"II" was taken and sworn to the next day, Sep 8, 1947, before Ricardo Robles, Justice of
the Peace of Malabon.
By order of Col. M. Asistio, a platoon of soldiers of the Philippine Army under
the command of Lt. Amadeo L. Cruz was dispatched to Meycawayan to arrest all the
companions of Valeriano, using as guide Valeriano, who had offered his services.
Accompanied by the Chief of Police of Meycawayan, Lt. Cruz went to the house
of Bonifacio Valeriano in barrio Libtong where they met his mother
whom Valeriano implored: "Nanay, bendicionan ninyo ako sapagka't ito na ang talagang
kapalaran ko. (Mother, bless me, for this is my fate.)" Whereupon they went to the house
of Rufino Pascual in barrio Muralla and, finding only Pascual's mother, Valeriano said to
her: "You thought that your son was working in the quarry, when in fact he was with us
in Malabon when we attacked the house of Judge Bautista." They then proceeded to the
house of Gregorio Orlan in barrio Iba, but found nobody there; however, they found a .45
caliber grease gun with several rounds of ammunition and papers belonging to the Huks.
From here they went to the house of Vicente Milan, alias Enteng, in barrio Malahatan;
Vicente was out but they found a letter addressed to his sweetheart mentioning
"Operation Malabon." There- after, they returned to the headquarters at the BBB
building.
On August 25, 1944, Edgardo Cruz, son of Faustino Cruz, was killed by the
guerrillas of barrio Hulong Duhat. Faustino harbored the belief that Judge Bautista had
something to do with the death of his son, because he was the head of the guerrillas in
the locality. Faustino Cruz filed charges against him with the Japanese Military Police.
Because of these charges, Judge Bautista was called for investigation by Victor Alfonso,
6
Jr. inspector of the constabulary detachment then stationed in Malabon. For lack of
sufficient evidence, Alfonso, Jr. released Judge Bautista.
After liberation, Faustino Cruz was arrested by the CIC. Again Faustino Cruz
thought that Judge Bautista had a part in his arrest, so that, upon his release, he made a
vow to make money and wreak vengeance on the Judge and his family.
On Apr 15, 1947, Faustino Cruz invited Ricardo Cruz to the Wah Nam restaurant
and, while they were eating, he implored Ricardo to execute an affidavit regarding the
death of his son Edgardo. Ricardo was one of those who arrested Edgardo by order of
their chief Alberto Lazaro. After the meal he was taken to the law office of Atty. Jose S.
Esteban where Faustino Cruz wanted Ricardo to declare that Judge Bautista had
something to do with the death of his son (Exh. 2.) Since Ricardo Cruz refused, Faustino
said: "All right, never mind, when he (referring to Judge Bautista) holds a meeting as a
candidate for governor, I will have him kidnapped." As he also failed to get the help of
Alberto Lazaro in the plan to accuse Judge Bautista, Faustino Cruz thought of utilizing
Ipeng Bulag, the commanding officer of a Huk organization. Whereupon he instructed his
brother Benjamin Cruz to look for said Ipeng. Having contacted him, Benjamin transmitted
the wish of his brother Faustino of killing and robbing Judge Bautista. The interview, as
hereinbefore stated, took place in the house of Turang Putol's brother where various Huks
were gathered. It did not take long to persuade Ipeng Bulag; he accepted the proposition
willingly because he had instructions from the Huk Supremo to eliminate Judge Bautista,
who was too harsh against the Huks appearing in his court in Pampanga and who would
soon try Seda, Salasa and Flor, besides, there was necessity to seize his wealth for the
support of the men in the mountains. These were the motives of the crime.
In synthesis, Faustino — seized with the obsession that his son Edgardo had
been killed by the guerrillas upon order of Judge Bautista — wanted revenge. He
endeavored to enlist the help of the Huks and he succeeded. From Meycawayan to the
barrio of Judge Bautista is a long stretch. The executors of the plan needed a rapid means
of transportation. Faustino Cruz, thru Antonio Halcon, furnished it. Ipeng Bulag, David de
la Cruz, Benjamin Cruz, Bonifacio Valeriano and the others already named were able not
only to kill Judge Bautista and rob him of various articles valued at P1,320, but also his son
Crispin, a sergeant and two munici-
pal policemen who came to the rescue. And although Faustino Cruz was not present in
the perpetration of the felony, nevertheless, he is as much a co-principal and responsible
as the others who committed it personally. The agreement reached in Iba, Meycauayan,
by Faustino Cruz and Ipeng Bulag to rob and kill Judge Bautista, made known to the others
gathered, and approved by all, is a conspiracy that makes every participant responsible.
It is not indispensable that a co-conspirator should take a direct part in every act and
should know the part which every one has to play. Conspiracy is the common design to
commit a felony; it is not participation in all the details of the execution of the crime. All
those who in one way or another help and cooperate in the consummation of a felony
previously planned are co-principals.
The defense assigns various errors which in substance may be narrowed down
to the following: That the trial court erred in giving credence to the evidence of the
prosecution and in admitting, instead of rejecting, the confessions of the accused David
de la Cruz, Benjamin Cruz, Bonifacio Valeriano and Faustino Cruz. We will take up the
defense of each accused.
Upon arraignment, David de la Cruz pleaded guilty; and although he had been
informed repeatedly by the presiding judge that, if the allegations of the information were
proven, he would be sentenced to death, he still pleaded guilty. David de la Cruz
presented himself to Capt. Serdeña in Meycawayan in order that the latter might
accompany him in surrendering to the Secretary of the Interior, Hon. Jose C. Zulueta; he
admitted before Secretary Zulueta having participated in robbing and killing Judge
Bautista; Secretary Zulueta ordered Capt. Serdeña to take David de la Cruz to the military
police authorities, with a letter (Exh. "BB"), so that the latter might take down his
statement. When he appeared on Sep 19 before Jose Lim, Clerk of the People's Court, to
swear to his statement (Exh. "MM"), he was in such perfect physical condition that he did
not even insinuate having been maltreated. Why should they have to maltreat him after
he had voluntarily surrendered to the authorities and admitted his participation in the
robbery and homicide perpetrated in the house of Judge Bautista? His allegation that he
signed his statement (Exh. "MM") because he was maltreated does not deserve serious
consideration: it is incompatible with his conduct before the Secretary of the Interior,
before Clerk Lim, and before the immense crowd present in open court.
Upon arraignment at the beginning of the trial, Bonifacio Valeriano pleaded
guilty; but upon repeated advertence on the part of the trial judge that he could be
sentenced to death if the allegations of the information were proven, he finally pleaded
not guilty. BonifacioValeriano was the one who accompanied the platoon of soldiers
headed by Lt. Cruz to the houses in Meycawayan of his companions in the robbery, and
upon meeting his mother, repentant perhaps of the wrong he had committed, he said in
Tagalog: "Inay, ipagdasal ninyo ako sapagka't ito ang suerte ko." By his confession, the
Military Police Command learned the names of his companions in the robbery. If he had
in fact been maltreated, he would have denounced it to the persons before whom he had
sworn his confessions, to newspapermen Jose P. Bautista of the Manila Times and Jesus
P. Bigornia of the Manila Daily Bulletin, and to the trial court upon arraignment in open
session. It was the best opportunity for him to reveal everything. Valeriano then insisted
that he had been forced by his companions to take part in the crime. If he later declared
that he signed his sworn confessions because he had been tortured, either somebody
must have coached him or he must have believed that by doing so he would be acquitted.
Valeriano set up three defenses: first, that he was a victim of the Huks; secondly,
that he was forced by his companions to take part in the robbery in the house of Judge
Bautista; and thirdly, that he was maltreated. An accused, who with such facility concocts
three defenses all inconsistent with his previous conduct, does not deserve any credence
whatsoever.
Benjamin Cruz, testifying on his behalf, declared that on the night of Sept. 7 he
was talking to Platerio Aquino about candidacies, after which they separated. Thereafter,
he heard
gunshots and learned that it was a robbery in the house of Judge Bautista; he went to the
house of his sister-in-law Emilia Santiago; he ordered his children to lie down and as there
was no place for him there, he went to the house in front of Antonio Lazaro's store where
he slept. In this house, he was arrested. He signed the sworn confessions (Exhibits "HH",
"HH-1", and "HH-2" ) because he had been tortured by agents Dimaano, Rios and others,
who kicked and boxed him and "thrust" their revolvers at him. As he could no longer bear
7
the maltreatment, he told them to write down whatever they wanted and he would sign
everything; and he signed Exhibits
"HH-3" and "HH-4" because he was again maltreated. If he had in fact said that he was
ready to sign everything, why should it be necessary for the agents to maltreat him two
times more when he had already signed the documents presented to him and had or
promised to sign whatever they wanted? The alleged subsequent maltreatments were
unnecessary.
Exhibit "HH-4-a", found in the yard of Judge Bautista after the event, is a sketch
of the yard prepared by Tony of Malabon with the aid of the accused. In the trial Benjamin
Cruz denied having participated in the preparation of said exhibit. The trial court, desiring
to verify whether or not the accused had participated in its preparation, dictated to him
some words to be written in Exhibit "XX". The trial Judge said in his decision:
"The Court suspecting that Benjamin Cruz had something to do with the
preparation of document Exhibit 'HH-4-a' ordered the defendant to take dictation from
the Court. Without being noticed by the defendant, the Court read a portion of the
handwriting on Exhibit 'HH-4-a': 'two dogs, police dogs', and other words appearing
therein, and Benjamin Cruz wrote on paper marked Exhibit 'XX' the words '2 dogs' with
the word 'two' in figure and the words 'police dogs' as 'foolish dogs' which are exactly the
same as those appearing in Exhibit 'HH-4-a', although the accused tried to change the
appearance of his handwriting by writing big letters on Exhibit 'XX'. This circumstance
made this Court to believe that Benjamin Cruz was the same person who prepared Exhibit
'HH-4-a' and which was used by the robbers in carrying out their plot to rob and kill judge
Bautista." (Page 108, Record.) (See also page 474, Set I, t.s.n.; Exh. "XX".)
We do not find any reason to alter this conclusion of his Honor, the trial Judge.
It is strange that Benjamin Cruz did not reveal the alleged maltreatment to the
persons before whom he swore his confessions, and did not show the signs or marks on
his body left by the points of the revolvers with which he was hit; it is odd that he would
conceal that which he had been made to suffer and would reveal it only after hearing the
evidence of his guilt.
Faustino Cruz, testifying on his behalf, said that he is from Malabon, Rizal, but
on Feb 2, 1944, he transferred to Maypajo, Caloocan, and in Sep of the same year, he
moved to Batangas, with the intention never to return because on his birthday he was
informed by Marcelo de la Cruz that the guerrillas would kill him for having, at times, gone
in company with agents Manipon and Gonzales, and since then he never returned to
Malabon. While he was in Maypajo, his son Edgardo was killed by Alberto Lazaro, chief of
the guerrillas, and his companions; when he ordered the arrest of the guilty parties and
in the exhumation of the remains of his son, he was accompanied by two trucks of
Constabulary soldiers; they were able to arrest Gregorio Santiago, the owner of the house
where his son Edgardo was killed, Benjamin Cordero, Alberto Lazaro, Alfredo Nuñez,
Dominador de la Cruz and others, seven in all. While Alberto Lazaro was detained, he told
Faustino that he only complied with the orders of his chief Fiscal Bautista (the deceased
Judge Bautista was then Fiscal); but from the investigations made by Major Torillo of the
Constabulary, Alberto Lazaro was the master mind of the death of Edgardo, for which
reason he released Fiscal Bautista.
After liberation, Faustino's intention was to file charges with the CIC, but it
turned out that it was he who was accused by Alberto Lazaro, for which reason he was
detained in Batangas for 17 days. He requested Don Tomas de Jesus to help him prosecute
those who killed his son Edgardo, one of whom was Ricardo Cruz, but he did not propose
to accuse him because he wanted to use him as witness for the government. Tomas de
Jesus was able to take along Ricardo Cruz to the Life Hotel where Faustino was staying,
but as he was busy, he invited Ricardo to the Panciteria Wah Nam; Faustino was then with
Antonio Halcon, and in order that the latter might not hear his conversation with Ricardo
and so that Halcon might leave, he said something to him which he could no longer
remember. After eating, they went to the law office of Attys. Sison, Aruego and Esteban,
the last being the lawyer who prepared the sworn statement of Ricardo (Exhibit 2). Since
1946, Faustino Cruz had known Antonio Halcon in Batangas, Batangas. The latter, after
leaving his work in a depot of the U. S. Army, devoted his time to repairing jeeps and used
to go to the store of Faustino Cruz to buy spare parts needed by his customers, and the
accused usually gave him tips for such purposes. When Antonio Halcon had jeeps to
repair, he would do it in the camarin of Faustino Cruz in Batangas, Batangas, and would
purchase the spare parts from his store. If he could not finish the work, Halcon usually ate
his lunch or supper in the house of Faustino and sometimes slept there instead of
returning to San Jose, Batangas, where he resided. Halcon went into the business of
repairing jeeps before Christmas of 1946, and the relations of both had become so
intimate that Halcon at times helped Faustino in the latter's business of buying and selling
bananas.
The accused Faustino Cruz ordered his brothers and Antonio to plant bananas in
his land situated in San Juan, which lasted several weeks, during which they consumed
half a cavan of rice. From 1947 Benjamin Cruz and Antonio Halcon, for more than 50
times, had sold bananas in Blumentritt, Manila, when they could not sell all their stock in
Batangas. When he acquired his land in San Juan in exchange for his house, Faustino came
to know Damian Laki and his son Guillermo Laki, and he and Antonio lodged in the house
of the latter.
From the early morning of Sept 6, 1947, according to him, to three o'clock in the
afternoon, he sold his bananas to his customers. After that, he left for Batangas; he
learned of the robbery in the house of Judge Bautista in the morning of Monday when he
came to Manila because he read it in a newspaper in Biñan where he ate his breakfast.
When he learned from the newspaper that his brother Benjamin Cruz had
implicated him in the crime, he went to consult a lawyer in Manila as to what to do, but
the said lawyer could not assure him that he would not be hurt if he surrendered, so he
returned to his home in Batangas; but as he was informed upon his arrival that he was
sought by some persons, he went to the house of Juan Cantos, his compadre, whom he
requested to let him live in Juan's house in Tabangao-Dao, a barrio located on top of a
mountain about 8 kilometers away from the town. Juan Cantos introduced him to his
brother Basilio, who was the real owner of the house. Impatient, Faustino went to Bauan
where he boarded a bus for Manila via Tagaytay, telling Halcon that he was going to barrio
Kuta and not to Manila; Faustino Cruz and Antonio Halcon were arrested in the house of
Basilio Cantos early in the morning of Oct 9, 1947, and, both handcuffed, were brought to
Manila. Faustino Cruz was taken to the BBB building by Cesar Dimaano, Sanchez, Ben
Bautista and a fat policeman. Because he refused to tell the truth, he was maltreated by
the three policemen who boxed and kicked him; he was threatened to be thrown into the
river and shot if he did not confess, showing to him a newspaper containing the picture
8
of Simeon Laurel. As he refused to own his guilt, the fat policeman pushed him towards
Minguing, Daring and a Mexican named Pablo who tortured him with the intention to kill
him. When he fell to the floor on his back, Daring hit him with the butt of his revolver. Not
content with this Minguing took a riffle and with its butt hit him on the stomach; the
Mexican also hit him on the stomach, and he fell to the floor unconscious. Upon regaining
consciousness, he asked for water and, after drinking, he said: "Go ahead, do what you
like and I would sign it "
From accused Faustino's own testimony, it can be seen that, due to his
advantageous financial condition, he used to give orders and tips to Halcon. It is not
strange, therefore, that the accused Faustino might have really instructed Antonio to
borrow the jeep of Damian Laki which Antonio had just finished repairing in order to bring
the same to Meycawayan. Faustino denied this fact. If he had not received instructions
from Faustino, what interest did Antonio have in bringing the jeep to Gagalangin for
delivery to Benjamin and then to Ipeng Bulag in Meycawayan? Antonio had no relation
whatsoever with Ipeng Bulag; but the evidence shows that the accused Faustino was
interested in wreaking vengeance on Judge Bautista for the death of Edgardo; he had an
agreement with Ipeng Bulag to carry out the "Operacion sa Malabon" and on Aug. 30 he
promised to furnish him transportation. Faustino Cruz, not Antonio, was the one
interested in having the jeep brought to Meycawayan so as to provide Ipeng Bulag and
his companions with transportation in order to rob and kill Judge Bautista. That Faustino
Cruz had a controlling influence over Antonio Halcon is shown by the fact that when the
latter wanted to return to Manila from the house of Basilio Cantos where they had been
hiding, Faustino told him not to do so because his presence in Manila would "serve as a
fuse to his life", meaning thereby that the presence of Antonio Halcon would lead to the
discovery of the whereabouts of Faustino and the participation which he had in the crime.
This conversation was overheard by the owner of the house, Basilio Cantos. Antonio
agreed to stay.
There is another important detail which compels us to conclude that it was not
Antonio Halcon who was interested in sending the jeep to Meycawayan: On leaving the
house where he used to live in Gagalangin, Faustino instructed his niece to tell Antonio
upon arrival that he (Faustino) was in the Capitol Hotel. Antonio went to said hotel and
Faustino instructed him to go to Batangas, giving him 5 pesos for this purpose, to inform
Damian Laki that the jeep was lost. This is the verbatim declaration of Faustino: "On the
afternoon of Sept 9, Tony (Antonio Halcon) left for Batangas and I gave him five pesos for
his transportation with the instruction to report the loss of the jeep to its owner and
whatever would be the answer Tony should come back to Manila to report to me so that
I would know what to do with the jeep." This reveals his special interest in the jeep; it is
the key to the crime; it is the revealing instrument. We have to conclude that Faustino
ordered Antonio to borrow the jeep, otherwise he would not have taken the trouble and
expense of sending Antonio to Batangas.
The statement of Guillermo Laki when he testified for the defense that he did
not lend the jeep, is of no consequence; it does not affect nor impair the testimony of
Antonio. Undoubtedly, for fear of being implicated, the owner was constrained to declare
as he did.
Faustino Cruz testified that he did not know Ipeng Bulag; that he had not been
to Meycawayan; that he did not commission Benjamin to talk to Ipeng Bulag. All these
denials cannot prevail over the positive proofs appearing in the record.
If he was in fact maltreated, specially with blows from revolver and rifle butts,
some marks would have been left on his body. The accused did not say anything about
these blows to Justice of the Peace Robles when he swore to his confession before him,
nor to Col. Asistio who sent for him in his office for investigation. In fact Faustino told him
that he had nothing more to add to or suppress from his confession.
Before Benjamin revealed the participation of Faustino Cruz, the latter
transferred to the Capitol Hotel from the house in Gagalangin (where he used to lodge
when he came to Manila), and, instead of using his true name, he registered under the
name, "Mr. Reyes", from 8:30 p.m. of Sep 9 to 11:25 a.m. of the next day (Exh. "5-P"); and
under the same false name, he again registered at the same hotel at 8:30 in the evening
of Sep 10 until 8:20 a.m. of the next day (Exh. "5-Q"); then he went to hide with Antonio
in the house of Basilio Cantos, atop a mountain in Batangas; he objected to Antonio's
desire to return to Manila so that his whereabouts would not be discovered, and he did
not want to remain alone in his hiding place; he came to Manila, incognito, via Tagaytay,
making Antonio believe that he was going only to barrio Kuta. This conduct reveals an
uneasy conscience. The spectre of the crime did not leave him in peace.
The defense set up by each and everyone of the accused does not impair in the
least the evidence adduced by the prosecution. We are of the opinion that the court a
quo did not err in not giving credence to the evidence for the defense.
The trial court erred in considering as ordinary aggravating circumstance the use
of unlicensed firearms. Article 296 of the RPC, as amended by Section 3 of Republic Act
No. 12, reads: "When more than three armed malefactors take part in the commission of
a robbery, it shall be deemed to have been committed by a band. When any of the arms
used in the commission of the offense be anunlicensed firearm, the penalty to be imposed
upon all the malefactors shall be the maximum of the corresponding penalty provided by
law, without prejudice to the criminal liability for illegal possession of such unlicensed
firearm."
Art. 295 of the RPC, as amended by Section 2, of Republic Act No. 12, reads: "If
the offenses mentioned in the next preceding article shall be committed in an uninhabited
place or by a band, or by attacking a train, car, vehicle, vessel or craft, or by entering any
compartment thereof or, in any manner, taking the persons therein by surprise in the
respective conveyances, the offender shall be punished by the maximum period of the
proper penalties."
Evident premeditation is not considered as an aggravating circumstance in
crimes of robbery because the same is inherent in the crime specially where it is
committed by various persons; they must have an agreement, they have to meditate and
reflect on the manner of carrying out the crime and they have to act coordinately in order
to succeed. (Decisions of the SC of Spain of Oct 12, 1885 and Dec 7, 1885; U. S. vs.
Matinong, 22 Phil. 439; People vs. Mantawar, * 45 Off. Gaz., Supp. 9, 437.) But in the
crime of robbery with homicide, if there is evident premeditation to kill besides stealing,
it is considered as an aggravating circumstances. (Decisions of the SC of Spain of Sep 1,
1877 and March 1, 1880.) In the instant case, it has been proven that the accused, on
9
various occasions before committing the crime, planned and decided not only to steal but
also to kill Judge Bautista. Hence, there is present evident premeditation.
The aggravating circumstance of insult or disregard of the respect due the
offended party on account of his rank is present, because, according to the evidence, the
accused wanted to kill Judge Bautista specially because he was strict as Judge; their
purpose was to eliminate, not Basilio Bautista, but Judge Bautista of the CFI of Pampanga,
so that he could not try Seda, Salasa and Flor. The SC of Spain in its decision of June 9,
1877, held that the aggravating circumstance of insult or disregard of the respect due the
offended party on account of his rank was present in a case where the accused killed the
deceased because of resentment they harbored against him as Municipal Judge. The same
doctrine was laid down in its decision of Jan 24, 1881.
Dwelling should be considered as another aggravating circumstance in this case.
The pretension of the defense that it has not been proven that jeep No. 8-670
was used in the robbery, is not well taken. The evidence on record is abundant to this
effect. The use of motor vehicle is an aggravating circumstance provided for in Art. 14(20)
of the RPC.
After the hearing of the case, the brothers Benjamin and Faustino Cruz
presented a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. "Annex A",
"Annex B", "Annex C" and "Annex D" have been attached to the motion as appendices.
"Annex A" is a sworn statement of Bonifacio Valeriano, in which Valeriano says that one
of his companions
in the robbery at the house of Judge Bautista was Benjamin Cruz who had escaped from
the provincial jail of Malolos, and not Benjamin Cruz, the brother of Faustino Cruz. "Annex
C" is a carbon copy of the petition sent by Bonifacio Valeriano to the President of the PH
praying that he be granted amnesty, alleging that the crime committed by him is covered
by the Amnesty Proclamation. In said letter Bonifacio Valeriano states that the brothers
Benjamin and Faustino Cruz, of Malabon, have nothing to do with the robbery and killing
of Judge Bautista. The letter is not sworn. “Annex
B" is a carbon copy of a letter addressed to Atty. Basilio Catimbang by the provincial
warden of Bulacan, in which it is said that a prisoner by the name of Benjamin Cruz y
Sanchez alias Emen had escaped from jail. "Annex D" is a sketch of the yard and premises
of the house of Judge Bautista.
There is no doubt that the Benjamin Cruz who escaped from jail is not the same Benjamin
Cruz who is accused in this case. If the statements of Bonifacio Valeriano appearing in
"Annex A" and sworn to on Jan 21, 1950, and "Annex C" are true, the accused Benjamin
Cruz and Faustino Cruz are entitled to a new trial. But Bonifacio Valeriano changes his
statements with the same ease as the chameleon changes its color: he concocted three
defenses, as we have already shown in the discussion of his defense. The three defenses
are incompatible with his confession (Exh. II) signed before the Justice of the Peace of
Malabon on Sep 8, 1947. Said confession was corroborated in its essential parts by
Bonifacio Valeriano in his statements to the newspapermen Jose P. Bautista of the Manila
Times and Jesus P. Bigornia of the Manila Daily Bulletin who interviewed him. In this
confession (Exh. II) Bonifacio Valeriano clearly states that Benjamin Cruz alias Six by Six
was one of those who had taken part in the robbery, and not Benjamin Cruz y
Sanchez alias Emen. Antonio Halcon also declared that on August 30, 1947, Benjamin Cruz
told his brother Faustino Cruz that Ipeng Bulag and his companions were ready to carry
out "Operation Malabon", but that they needed a vehicle to transport them, Faustino
replied: "I will furnish it." The last fabrication, therefore, of Bonifacio Valeriano that the
one who took part in the robbery is Benjamin Cruz y Sanchez alias Emen and not Benjamin
Cruz, the appellant herein, brother of Faustino, should not be believed.
The crime committed by the accused is robbery in band with homicide. The
penalty provided for by Art. 294 of the RPC is reclusion perpetua to death, and in
accordance with RA 12, the penalty to be imposed upon them is the maximum penalty,
that is, death, even without the concurrence of any aggravating circumstance.
The voluntary surrender and spontaneous and insistent admission of guilt by the
accused David de la Cruz in spite of repeated admonition by the trial court that he could
be sentenced to death by such admission demonstrate an avowal of the wrong committed
or a true act of contrition. Because of this circumstance, there are no sufficient votes for
the imposition of death; consequently, the penalty next lower in degree, that is, reclusion
perpetua should be imposed upon him.
The motion for new trial is denied and the two appealed decisions are hereby
affirmed. The gold ring Exhibit "Z" is ordered returned to the widow of the deceased
Crispin Bautista. So ordered with costs.
FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 127694. May 31, 2000.]
QUIRICO MARI vs. CA and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
SYNOPSIS
Complainant Norma Capintoy and petitioner Quirico Mari were co-employees in
the Department of Agriculture, with office at Digos, Davao del Sur, although complainant
occupied a higher position. On Dec 6, 1991, petitioner borrowed from complainant the
records of his 201 file. However, when he returned the same three days later,
complainant noticed that several papers were missing which included official
communications from the Civil Service Commission and Regional Office,
Department of Agriculture, and a copy of the complaint by the Rural Bank of Digos against
petitioner. Upon instruction of her superior officer, Honorio Lumain, complainant sent a
memorandum to petitioner asking him to explain why his 201 file was returned with
missing documents. Instead of acknowledging receipt of the memorandum, petitioner
confronted complainant and angrily shouted at her: "Putang ina, bullshit, bugo." He
banged a chair in front of complainant and choked her. With the intervention of the
security guard, petitioner was prevailed upon to desist from further injuring complainant.
Complainant filed with the MTC, Digos, Davao del Sur a criminal complaint against
petitioner for slander by deed. After trial, the MTC, Digos, Davao del Sur rendered a
decision finding herein petitioner guilty as charged and crediting in favor of the
prosecution one (1) ordinary aggravating circumstance, the Court also sentenced the
accused to an Indeterminate Sentence of five (5) months and 11 days to 2 years, 11
months and 11 days. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC. Petitioner filed
a petition for review with the Court ofAppeals. The appellate court likewise rendered
decision affirming the judgment a quo convicting petitioner of serious slander by deed,
but modified the penalty to an
indeterminate sentence of one (1) month and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum,
to two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as maximum. Hence, the
present appeal. At issue is whether the CA erred in sustaining the conviction of petitioner
10
for serious slander by deed, assailing the trial court's finding that petitioner shouted SENTENCE LAW. — Notice that the trial court imposed five months of arresto mayor as minimum, exceeding the
range provided by law. However, the minimum fixed by the CA was correct, that is, 1 month and 1 day of arresto
invectives at complainant in the presence of several persons and then choked her.
mayor. The maximum fixed by the trial court of 2 years, 11 months and 11 days was wrong as it exceeded the
The SC affirmed the factual findings of both the trial and the appellate courts. prescribed range because that period is within the maximum of the penalty prescribed by the Code, which could
The Court, however, ruled that the Municipal Trial Court erred in ruling that the crime not be
was aggravated by the fact that the offended party is a woman because there was no imposed in the absence of any aggravating circumstance. The maximum penalty fixed by the CA (two (2) years
and four (4) months of prision correccional) was also wrong because it exceeded the range of the medium
proof of specific fact or circumstance, other than the victim is a woman, showing insult or period of the prescribed penalty.
disregard of sex in order that it may be considered as aggravating circumstance. Hence, 3. ID.; ID.; THE COURT OPTED TO IMPOSE A FINE INSTEAD OF IMPRISONMENT. — It would serve the
such aggravating circumstance was not proved, and indeed, in the circumstances of the ends of justice better if the petitioner were sentenced to pay a fine instead of imprisonment. The offense while
present case may not be considered as aggravating. The Court also noted that the considered serious slander by deed was done in the heat of anger and was in reaction to a perceived provocation.
The penalty for serious slander by deed may be either imprisonment or a fine. We opt to impose a fine.
MTC and the RTC, both of Digos, Davao del Sur, and even the CA erred in the proper
DECISION
application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. According to the Court, the maximum
PARDO, J p:The case before the Court is an appeal from a decision of the CA, the
fixed by the trial court of 2 years, 11 months and 11 days was wrong as it exceeded the
dispositive portion of which reads:
prescribed range because that period is within the maximum of the penalty prescribed by
"WHEREFORE, the conviction of petitioner Quirico Mari for the offense of serious slander
the Code, which could not be imposed in the absence of any aggravating circumstance.
by deed is hereby AFFIRMED, but with a modified penalty of 1 month and 1
The maximum penalty fixed by the CA (2 years and 4 months of prision correccional) was
day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to 2 years and 4 months of prision correctional, as
also wrong because it exceeded the range of the medium period of the prescribed
maximum. "SO ORDERED."
penalty. The Court also opted to impose a fine of P1,000.00 instead ofimprisonment
The facts, as found by the CA, are as follows:
considering that the offense was committed by petitioner in the heat of anger and was in
Complainant Norma Capintoy and petitioner Quirico Mari were co-employees in
reaction to a perceived provocation.
the Department of Agriculture, with office at Digos, Davao del Sur, although complainant
SYLLABUS
occupied a higher position.
1. CRIMINAL LAW; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES; THAT THE ACT BE
On Dec 6, 1991, petitioner borrowed from complainant the records of his 201
COMMITTED WITH INSULT OR IN DISREGARD OF THE RESPECT DUE THE OFFENDED PARTY
file. However, when he returned the same three days later, complainant noticed that
ON ACCOUNT OF HIS SEX; NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR; THERE WAS NO
several papers were missing which included official communications from the Civil Service
PROOF OF SPECIFIC FACT OR CIRCUMSTANCE, OTHER THAN THE VICTIM IS A WOMAN,
Commission and Regional Office, Department of Agriculture, and a copy of the complaint
SHOWING INSULT OR DISREGARD OF SEX IN ORDER THAT IT MAY BE CONSIDERED AS
by the Rural Bank of Digos against petitioner. Upon instruction of her superior officer,
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE. — The municipal trial court found the attendance of an
Honorio Lumain, complainant sent a memorandum to petitioner asking him to explain
"ordinary aggravating circumstance." The court did not state what this aggravating
why his 201 file was returned with missing documents.
circumstance was, as required. True, the amended criminal complaint alleged that the
Instead of acknowledging receipt of the memorandum, petitioner confronted
crime had been aggravated by the fact that the offended party is a woman. However, the
complainant and angrily shouted at her: "Putang ina, bullshit, bugo." He banged a chair
mere fact that the victim is a woman is not per se an aggravating circumstance. There was
in front of complainant and choked her. With the intervention of the security guard,
no finding that the evidence proved that the accused in fact deliberately intended to
petitioner was prevailed upon to desist from further injuring complainant.
offend or insult the sex of the victim, or showed manifest disrespect to the offended
Petitioner's version is that, he borrowed from complainant his service record
woman or displayed some specific insult or disrespect to her womanhood. There was no
and not his 201 file which contained his personal records. The service record which he
proof of specific fact or circumstance, other than the victim is a woman, showing insult or
borrowed did not include the missing documents. Acknowledging that complainant was
disregard of sex in order that it may be considered as aggravating circumstance. Hence,
higher in rank than him, he claimed that it was complainant who provoked him into acting
such aggravating circumstance was not proved, and indeed, in the circumstances of this
the way he did and he was just reacting to the provocation.
case may not be considered as aggravating. Consequently, the trial court erred in
On Jan 7, 1992, complainant filed with the Municipal Trial Court, Digos, Davao
"crediting in favor of the prosecution one (1) ordinary aggravating circumstance." On
del Sur a criminal complaint against petitioner for slander by deed. 2
review, the RTC Judge did not notice the error because it did not make its
On May 20, 1992, complainant filed an amended criminal complaint, adding that
own findings of fact, and followed the line of least resistance by simply adopting the
the crime was aggravated by the fact that the offended party was a woman. 3
trial court's "finding of fact as well as its reasons for making so." Neither did the CA notice
After trial on Sep 22, 1994, the MTC, Digos, Davao del Sur rendered decision, the
the error, even if the Solicitor General in his comment noted that the sentence imposed
dispositive portion of which reads:
on the accused was excessive, meaning that there was no aggravating circumstance
"In the light of the foregoing, the court is of the opinion that the accused is
proved.
2. ID.; SLANDER BY DEED; PENALTIES; THE TRIAL COURT AND THE APPELLATE COURT ON REVIEW
guilty of the offense charged and that private complainant has been slandered and
ERRED IN THE PROPER APPLICATION OF THE INDETERMINATE embarrassed by the accused.

11
 "Finding, therefore, accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charge filed
against him and crediting in favor of the prosecution one (1) ordinary aggravating
circumstance, the Court hereby sentences the accused to an Indeterminate Sentence of 5
months and 11 days to 2 years, 11 months and 11 days and to pay private complainant
the amount of P5,000.00 as moral damages, P5,000.00 PESOS attorney's fees and to
reimburse her the cost of suit.
"Private complainant is, however, ordered to pay the docket fee corresponding
to the damages she is entitled to receive, by virtue of this decision. SO ORDERED.
"Digos, Davao del Sur, Sep 22, 1994." 4
In due time, petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court.
After due proceedings, on Dec 1, 1995, the RTC Davao del Sur, Digos, Branch 19
rendered decision adopting the trial court's findings of fact, and affirming the appealed
decision in toto.
On June 18, 1996, petitioner filed with the CA a petition for review. 6
On July 16, 1996, the CA ordered respondents to file their comment on the
petition, which shall be considered as an answer in the event the petition is given due
course.
On Dec 9, 1996, the CA rendered decision affirming the judgment a
quo convicting petitioner of serious slander by deed, but modifying the penalty to an
indeterminate sentence of 1 month and 1 day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to 2 years
and four (4) months of prision correccional, as maximum.
Hence, this appeal.
At issue is whether the CA erred in sustaining the conviction of petitioner for
serious slander by deed assailing the trial court's finding that petitioner shouted
invectives at complainant in the presence of several persons and then choked her.
Petitioner submits that the prosecution failed to prove that he choked the complainant;
that the choking was an after-thought as shown by inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
The issue raised is factual, which would bar us from reviewing the same in an
appeal via certiorari. The findings of fact of the CA supported by substantial evidence are
conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court. Unless the
case falls under any of the exceptions to the rule, such as diverse factual findings of the
lower courts or the findings are entirely grounded on speculations. Petitioner failed to
prove that the case falls within the exceptions.
However, we regret to note that the MTC, Digos, Davao del Sur, the RTC, Digos, Davao del
Sur and even the CA erred in the proper application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
In the first place, the municipal trial court found the attendance of an "ordinary
aggravating circumstance." The court did not state what this aggravating circumstance
was, as required. True, the amended criminal complaint alleged that the crime had been
aggravated by the fact that the offended party is a woman. However, the mere fact that
the victim is a woman is not per se an aggravating circumstance. There was no finding that
the evidence proved that the accused in fact deliberately intended to offend or insult the
sex of the victim, or showed manifest disrespect to the offended woman or displayed
some specific insult or disrespect to her womanhood. There was no proof of specific fact
or circumstance, other than the victim is a woman, showing insult or disregard of sex in
order that it may be considered as aggravating circumstance. Hence, such aggravating
circumstance was not proved, and indeed, in the circumstances of this case may not be
considered as aggravating. Consequently, the trial court erred in "crediting in favor of the
prosecution 1 ordinary aggravating circumstance." On review, the RTC Judge did not
notice the error because it did not make its own findings of fact, and followed the
line of least resistance by simply adopting the trial court's "finding of fact as well as its
reasons for making so." Neither did the CA notice the error, even if the Solicitor General
in his comment noted that the sentence imposed on the accused was excessive, meaning
that there was no aggravating circumstance proved.
In the second place, in applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the court shall
fix minimum and maximum penalties. If the offense is punished by the RPC, as in this case,
the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate penalty, the maximum
term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be
properly imposed under the rules of the RPC, and the minimum term of which shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense.
The court shall fix the minimum penalty within the number of months or years covered
by the penalty next lower in degree to that prescribed by the Code for the offense without
regard to any modifying circumstance
attendant to the commission of the crime. The court has the unqualified discretion to fix
the term of the minimum penalty. The only limitation is that it must be within the
range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense committed,
without regard to its 3 periods or reference to the degrees into which it may be
subdivided. Then, the court shall fix the maximum period. In doing so, the court shall now
consider the attending circumstances, finding whether any modifying circumstance
attended the commission of the crime. In this case, there was no modifying circumstance,
hence, the max. penalty imposable must be within the range of the medium period of the
penalty prescribed by the Code for the offense. The penalty prescribed by law for serious
slander by deed under Art. 359 of the RPC is arresto mayor maximum to prision
correccional minimum or 4 months and 1 day to 2 years and four (4) months or a fine
ranging from P200.00 to P1,000.00. The penalty next lower in degree is arresto
mayor minimum and medium periods, or 1 month and 1 day to 4 months. Consequently,
the minimum shall be taken from any of its periods, but must be definite, say, 1 month
and 1 day, as minimum. The maximum shall be taken from the medium period of the
prescribed penalty that is within the range of 1 year and 1 day to 1 year and 8
months of prision correccional but also a specific, definite fixed period, say, 1 year and 1
day, as maximum. Notice that the trial court imposed five months of arresto mayor as
minimum, exceeding the range provided by law. However, the minimum fixed by
the CA was correct, that is, 1 month and 1 day of arresto mayor. The maximum fixed by
the trial court of 2 years, 11 months and 11 days was wrong as it exceeded the prescribed
range because that period is within the maximum of the penalty prescribed by the Code,
which could not be imposed in the absence of any aggravating circumstance. The
maximum penalty fixed by the CA (2 years and 4 months of prision correccional) was also
wrong because it exceeded the range of the medium period of the prescribed penalty.
Prescinding from the foregoing, it would serve the ends of justice better if the
petitioner were sentenced to pay a fine instead of imprisonment. The offense while
considered serious slander by deed was done in the heat of anger and was in reaction to
12
a perceived provocation. The penalty for serious slander by deed may be either
imprisonment or a fine. We opt to impose a fine.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby SETS ASIDE the decision of the CA and in lieu
thereof renders judgment finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of serious
slander by deed defined and penalized under Article 359 of the RPC and sentencing him
to pay a fine of P1,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in caseof insolvency. With costs.
SO ORDERED.
9.4 Abuse of confidence and obvious ungratefulness
9.5 Palace of the chief executive or place dedicated to religious worship
SECOND DIVISION
[Adm. Matter No. 384 . February 21, 1946.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NICOLAS JAURIGUE and AVELINA JAURIGUE
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; HOMICIDE; EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES; DEFENSE OF HONOR. — The attempt to
rape a woman constitutes an unlawful aggression sufficient to put her in a state of legitimate defense, inasmuch
as a woman's honor cannot but be esteemed as a right as precious, if not more, than her very existence; and it is
evident that a woman who, thus imperiled, wounds nay kills the offender, should be afforded exemption from
criminal liability, since such killing cannot be considered a crime from the moment it became the only means left
for her to protect her honor from so great an outrage.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — When the deceased sat by the side of defendant and appellant on
the same bench, near the door of the barrio chapel and placed his hand on the upper portion of her right thigh,
without her consent, the said chapel was lighted with electric lights, and there were already several people, about
ten of them, inside the chapel, including her own father and the barrio lieutenant; there was and there could be
no possibility of her being raped. And when she gave A. C. a thrust at the base of the left side of his neck inflicting
upon him a mortal wound 4½ inches deep, causing his death a few moments later, the means employed by her
in the defense of her honor was evidently excessive. Held: That she cannot be legally declared completely exempt
from criminal liability.
3. ID.; ID.; MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES; VOLUNTARY SURRENDER OBFUSCATION. — The fact that
defendant and appellant immediately and voluntarily and unconditionally surrendered to the barrio lieutenant,
admitting having stabbed the deceased, and agreed to go to her house shortly thereafter and to remain there
subject to the order of the said barrio lieutenant, an agent of the authorities, and the further fact that she had
acted in the immediate vindication of a grave offense committed against her a few moments before, and upon
such provocation as to produce passion and obfuscation, or temporary loss of reason and self-control, should be
considered as mitigating circumstances in her favor.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; LACK OF INTENTION TO COMMIT so GRAVE A WRONG AS THAT ACTUALLY COMMITTED.
— It appearing that defendant and appellant merely wanted to punish the offending hand of the deceased with
her knife, as shown by the fact that she inflected upon him only one single wound, the mitigating circumstance
of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong as that actually committed should be considered in her favor.
5. ID.; ID.; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES; COMMISSION OF OFFENSE IN
CONSECRATED PLACE. — The aggravating circumstance that the killing was done in a place
dedicated to religious worship, cannot be legally considered, where there is no evidence
to show that the defendant and appellant had murder in her heart when she entered the
chapel the fatal night.
DECISION
DE JOYA, J p: Nicolas Jaurigue and Avelina Jaurigue were prosecuted in the Court of First
Instance of Tayabas, for the crime of murder, of which Nicolas Jaurigue was acquitted, but
defendant Avelina Jaurigue was found guilty of homicide and sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from seven years, four months and one day of prision
mayor to thirteen years, nine months and eleven days of reclusion temporal, with the
accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased, Amado
Capiña, in the sum of P2,000, and to pay one-half of the costs. She was also credited with
one-half of the period of preventive imprisonment suffered by her.
From said judgment of conviction, defendant Avelina Jaurigue appealed to the
CA for Southern Luzon, and in her brief filed therein on June 10, 1944, claimed —
"(1) That the lower court erred in not holding that said appellant had acted in
the legitimate defense of her donor and that she should be completely absolved of all
criminal responsibility;
"(2) That the lower court erred in not finding in her favor the additional
mitigating circumstances that (a) she did not have the intention to commit so grave a
wrong as that actually committed, and that (b)she voluntarily surrendered to the agents
of the authorities; and
"(3) That the trial court erred in holding that the commission of the alleged
offense was attented by the aggravating circumstance of having been committed in a
sacred place."
The evidence adduced by the parties, at the trial in the court below, has
sufficiently established the following facts:
That both the defendant and appellant Avelina Jaurigue and the deceased
Amado Capiña lived in the barrio of Sta. Isabel, city of San Pablo, Laguna; that for
sometime prior to the stabbing of the deceased by defendant and appellant, in the
evening of Sep 20, 1942, the former had been courting the latter in vain, and that on one
occasion, about one month before that fatal night, Amado Capiña snatched a
handkerchief belonging to her, bearing her nickname "Aveling,: while it was being washed
by her cousin, Josefa Tapay.
On Sep 13, 1942, while Avelina was feeding a dog under her house, Amado
approached her and spoke to her of his love, which she flatly refused, and he thereupon
suddenly embraced and kissed her and touched her breast, on account of which Avelina,
a
resolute and quick- tempered girl, slapped Amado, gave him fist blows and kicked him.
She kept the matter to herself, until the following morning when she informed her mother
about it. Since then, she armed herself with a long fan knife, whenever she went out,
evidently for self-protection.
On Sep 15, 1942, about midnight, Amado climbed up the house of defendant
and appellant, and surreptitiously entered the room where she was sleeping. He felt her
forehead, evidently with the intention of abusing her. She immediately screamed for help,
which awakened her parents and brought them to her side. Amado came out from where
he had hidden under a bed in Avelina's room and kissed the hand of Nicolas Jaurigue, her
father, asking for forgiveness; and when Avelina's mother made an attempt to beat
Amado, her husband prevented her from doing so, stating that Amado probably did not
realize what he was doing. Nicolas Jaurigue sent for the barrio lieutenant, Casimiro
Lozada, and for Amado's parents, the following morning. Amado's parents came to the
house of Nicolas Jaurigue and apologized for the misconduct of their son; and as
Nicolas Jaurigue was then angry, he told them to end the conversation, as he might not
be able to control himself.
In the morning of Sep 20, 1942, Avelina received information that Amado had
been falsely boasting in the neighborhood of having taken liberties with her person and
13
that she had even asked him to elope with her and that if he should not marry her, she
would take poison; and that Avelina again received information of Amado's bragging at
about 5 o'clock in the afternoon of that same day.
At about 8 o'clock in the evening of the same day, Sep 20, 1942,
Nicolas Jaurigue went to the chapel of the Seventh Day Adventists of which he was the
treasurer, in their barrio, just across the provincial road from his house, to attend religious
services, and sat on the front bench facing the altar with the other officials of the
organization and the barrio lieutenant, Casimiro Lozada. Inside the chapel it was quite
bright as there were electric lights.
Defendant and appellant Avelina Jaurigue entered the chapel shortly after the
arrival of her father, also for the purpose of attending religious services, and sat on the
bench next to the last one nearest the door. Amado Capiña was seated on the other side
of the chapel. Upon observing the presence of Avelina Jaurigue, Amado Capiña went to
the bench on which Avelina was sitting and sat by her right side, and, without saying a
word, Amado, with the greatest of impudence, placed his hand on the upper part of her
right thigh. On observing this highly improper and offensive conduct of Amado Capiña,
Avelina Jaurigue, conscious of her personal dignity and honor, pulled out with her right
hand the fan knife marked Exhibit B, which she had in a pocket of her dress, with the
intention of punishing Amado's offending hand. Amado seized Avelina's right hand, but
she quickly grabbed the knife with her left hand and stabbed Amado once at the base of
the left side of the neck, inflicting upon him a wound about 41/2 inches deep, which was
necessarily mortal. Nicolas Jaurigue, who was seated on one of the front benches, saw
Amado bleeding and staggering towards the altar, and upon seeing his daughter still
holding the bloody knife, he approached her and asked: "Why did you do that," and
answering him, Avelina said: "Father, I could not endure anymore." Amado Capiña died
from the wound a few minutes later. Barrio lieutenant Casimiro Lozada, who was also in
the same chapel, approached Avelina and asked her why she did that, and Avelina
surrendered herself, saying: "Kayo na po and bahala sa aquin," meaning: "I hope you will
take care of me." or more correctly, "I place myself at your disposal." Fearing that Amado's
relatives might retaliate, barrio lieutenant Lozada advised Nicolas Jaurigue and herein
defendant and appellant to go home immediately, to close their doors and windows and
not to admit anybody into the house, unless accompanied by him. That father and
daughter went home and locked themselves up, following instructions of the barrio
lieutenant, and waited for the arrival of the municipal authorities; and when three
policemen arrived in their house, at about 10 o'clock that night, and questioned them
about the incident, defendant and appellant immediately surrendered the knife marked
as Exhibit B, and informed said policemen briefly of what had actually happened in the
chapel
and of the previous acts and conduct of the deceased, as already stated above, and went
with said policemen to the police headquarters, where her written statements were
taken, and which were presented as a part of the evidence for the prosecution.
The high conception of womanhood that our people possess, however humble
they may be, is universal. It has been entertained and has existed in all civilized
communities.
A beautiful woman is said to be a jewel; a good woman, a treasure; and that a
virtuous woman represents the only true nobility. And they are the future wives and
mothers of the land Such are the reasons why, in the defense of their honor, when brutally
attacked, women are permitted to make use of all reasonable means available within their
reach, under the circumstances. Criminologists and courts of justice have entertained and
upheld this view.
On the other hand, it is the duty of every man to protect and show loyalty to
womanhood, as in the days of chivalry. There is a country where women freely go out
unescorted and, like the beautiful roses in their public gardens, they always receive the
protection of all. That country is Switzerland.
In the language of Viada, aside from the right to life on which rests the legitimate
defense of our own person, we have the right to property acquired by us, and the right to
honor which is not the least prized of our patrimony.
The attempt to rape a woman constitutes an unlawful aggression sufficient to
put her in a state of legitimate defense, inasmuch as a woman's honor cannot but be
esteemed as a right as precious, if not more, than her very existence; and it is evident that
a woman who, thus imperiled, wounds, may kills the offender, should be afforded
exemption from criminal liability, since such killing cannot be considered a crime from the
moment it became the only means left for her to protect her honor from so great an
outrage.
As long as there is actual danger of being raped, a woman is justified in killing
her aggressor, in the defense of her honor. Thus, where the deceased grabbed the
defendant in a dark night at about 9 o'clock, in an isolated barrio trail, holding her firmly
from behind, without warning and without revealing his identity, and, in the struggle that
followed, touched her private parts, and that she was unable to free herself by means of
her strength alone, she was considered justified in making use of a pocket knife in
repelling what she believed to be an attack upon her honor, and which ended in his death,
since she had no other means of defending herself, and consequently exempt from all
criminal liability (People vs. De la Cruz, 61 Phil., 344).
And a woman, in defense of her honor, was perfectly justified in inflicting
wounds on her assailant with a bolo which she happened to be carrying at the time, even
though her cry for assistance might have been heard by people nearby, when the
deceased tried to assault her in a dark and isolated place, while she was going from her
house to a certain tienda, for the people of making purchases.
In the case, however, in which a sleeping woman was awakened at night by
someone touching her arm, and, believing that some person was attempting to abuse her,
she asked who the intruder was and receiving no reply, attacked and killed the said person
with a pocket knife, if was held that, notwithstanding the woman's belief in the supposed
attempt, it was not sufficient provocation or aggression to justify her completely in using
a deadly weapon. Although she actually believed it to be the beginning of an attempt
against her, she was not completely warranted in making such a deadly assault, as the
injured person, who turned out to be her own brother-in-law returning home with his
wife, did not do any other act which could be considered as an attempt against her honor.
In the instant case, if defendant and appellant had killed Amado Capiña, when
the latter climbed up her house late at night on Sep 15, 1942, and surreptitiously entered
her bedroom, undoubtedly for the purpose of raping her, as indicated by his previous
acts and conduct, instead of merely shouting for help, she could have been perfectly
justified in killing him, as shown by the authorities cited above.
14
 According to the facts established by the evidence and found by the learned trial
court in this case, when the deceased sat by the side of defendant and appellant on the
same bench, near the door of the barrio chapel and placed his hand on the upper portion
of her right thigh, without her consent, the said chapel was lighted with electric lights,
and there were already several people, about ten of them, inside the chapel, including
her own father and the barrio lieutenant and other dignitaries of the organization; and
under the circumstances, there was and there could be no possibility of her being raped.
And when she gave Amado Capiña a thrust at the base of the left side of his neck, inflicting
upon him a mortal wound 41/2 inches deep, causing his death a few moments later, the
means employed by her in the defense of her honor was evidently excessive; and under
the facts and circumstances of the case, she cannot be legally declared completely exempt
from criminal liability.
But the fact that defendant and appellant immediately and voluntarily and
unconditionally surrendered to the barrio lieutenant in said chapel, admitting having
stabbed the deceased, immediately after the incident, and agreed to go to her house
shortly thereafter and to remain there subject to the order of the said barrio lieutenant,
an agent of the authorities (United States vs. Fortaleza, 12 Phil., 472); and the further fact
that she had acted in the immediate vindication of a grave offense committed against her
a few moments before, and upon such provocation as to produce passion and
obfuscation, or temporary loss of reason and self-control, should be considered as
mitigating circumstances in her favor.
Defendant and appellant further claims that she had not intended to kill the
deceased but merely wanted to punish his offending hand with her knife, as shown by the
fact that she inflicted upon him only one single wound. And this is another mitigating
circumstance which should be considered in her favor.
The claim of the prosecution, sustained by the learned trial court, that the
offense was committed by the defendant and appellant, with the aggravating
circumstance that the killing was done in a place dedicated to religious worship, cannot
be legally sustained; as there is no evidence to show that the defendant and appellant
had murder in her heart when she entered the chapel that fatal night. Avelina is not a
criminal by nature. She happened to kill under the greatest provocation. She is a God-
fearing young woman, typical of our country girls, who still possess the consolation of
religious hope in a world where so many others have hopelessly lost the faith of their
elders and now drifting away they know not where.
The questions raised in the second and third assignments of error appear,
therefore, to be well taken; and so is the first assignment of error to a certain degree.
In the mind of the court, there is not the least doubt that, in stabbing to death
the deceased Amado Capiña, in the manner and form and under the circumstances above
indicated, the defendant and appellant committed the crime of homicide, with no
aggravating circumstance whatsoever, but with at least three mitigating circumstances of
a qualified character to be considered in her favor; and, in accordance with the provisions
of article 69 of the RPC, she is entitled to a reduction by one or two degrees in the penalty
to be imposed upon her. And considering the circumstances of the instant case, the
defendant and appellant should be accorded the most liberal consideration possible
under the law.
The law prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal for the crime of homicide;
and if it should be reduced by two degrees, the penalty to be imposed in the instant case
is that of prision correccional; and pursuant to the provisions of section 1 of Act No. 4103
of the Philippine Legislature, known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, herein
defendant and
appellant should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from arresto mayor in
its medium degree, to prision correccional in its medium degree. Consequently, with the
modification of the judgment appealed from, defendant and appellant Avelina Jaurigue is
hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from two months and one day
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years, four months, and one day of prision
correccional, as maximum, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law, to indemnify
the heirs of the deceased Amado Capiña, in the sum of P2,000, and to suffer the
corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, not to exceed 1/3 of the principal penalty, in
case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. Defendant and appellant should also be given
the benefit of 1/2 of her preventive imprisonment, and the knife marked Exhibit B ordered
confiscated. So ordered.
Separate Opinions
HILADO, J., concurring: In past dissenting and concurring opinions my view regarding the
validity or nullity of judicial proceedings in the Japanese-sponsored courts which
functioned in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation has been consistent. I am
not abandoning it. But in deference to the majority who sustain the opposite view, and
because no party litigant herein has raised the question, I have taken part in the
consideration of this case on the merits. And, voting on the merits, I concur in the
foregoing decision penned by Justice De Joya.
9.6 Nighttime, uninhabited place, or band
THIRD DIVISION [G.R. No. 176385. February 26, 2008.]
PEOPLE OF THE PH vs. EMELIO TOLENTINO Y ESTRELLA AND JESUS TRINIDAD Y
MARAVILLA
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J p: For review is the Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00880
which affirmed the Decision of the RTC of Labo, Camarines Norte, Branch 64, finding
appellants Emelio E. Tolentino and Jesus M. Trinidad, guilty of the crime of Murder and
two counts of Frustrated Murder.
On 13 Feb 1998, three separate informations of Murder and two counts of
Frustrated Murder were filed before the RTC against appellants, together with accused
Jimmy Trinidad and Arnel Trinidad. The murder case was docketed as Criminal Case No.
98-0258 while the two frustrated murder cases were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 98-
0260 and No. 98-0270. The accusatory portions of the Informations read:
Criminal Case No. 98-0258
For: Murder
That on or about 11:10 o'clock in the evening, more or less, on the 29th day of
August, 1997, at Purok 7, Barangay San Vicente, Santa Elena, Camarines Norte, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, with intent to kill, conspiring, confederating, and
helping each other to attain a common purpose, with treachery, evident premeditation
15
and abuse of superior strength, while armed with firearms, assault, attack, and use
personal violence upon one JOSITA FERNANDEZ-NOVELO, by then and there shooting the
said victim on her face causing upon the latter serious and mortal wounds which were the
direct and proximate cause of the death of the victim to the damage and prejudice of the
heirs of said victim.
That the commission of the offense is attended by aggravating circumstance of
nighttime purposely sought to facilitate the same and dwelling.
Criminal Case No. 98-0260
For: Frustrated Murder
That on or about 11:10 in the evening of the 29th day of August, 1997, at Purok
7, Barangay San Vicente, Santa Elena, Camarines Norte, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating, and mutually helping each other to attain a common purpose, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, with intent to kill, while armed with
firearms and knife, and with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior
strength, attack, assault, and use personal violence upon one ANTONIO BEA, by then and
there, poking a firearm at said private offended party, tying his hands with a rope and
thereafter, stabbing said victim on different parts of his body, thus causing upon
the latter serious and mortal wounds capable of causing death, hence, performing all the
acts of execution which could have produced the crime of murder as a consequence, but
nonetheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of their (accused) will,
that is, by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said victim which prevented
his death, to the damage and prejudice of herein private complainant.
Criminal Case No. 98-0270
For: Frustrated Murder
That on or about 11:10 o'clock in the evening of August 29, 1997 at the fishpond
at Purok 7, Barangay San Vicente, municipality of Santa Elena, province of Camarines
Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another with intent to kill
with treachery and evident premeditation and while armed with long firearms and 12
gauge shot gun, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault,
kick and strike one ANTONIO NOVELO with a shotgun, hitting him on the different parts
of his body and then shot one said Antonio Novelo but missed, which ordinarily would
cause the death of Antonio Novelo thus performing all the acts of execution which should
have produced the crime of Murder as a consequence, but nonetheless, did not produce
it by reason of causes independent of their will, that is, by the timely and able medical
assistance rendered to said Antonio Novelo, which prevented his death, to his damage
and prejudice. 3
During the arraignment on 13 July 1998, appellants, with the assistance of
counsel de parte, entered their respective pleas of not guilty. 4 Accused Jimmy and Arnel
Trinidad remained at large. Thereafter, a joint trial on the merits of the three criminal
cases ensued.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses and their respective
testimonies: (1) Antonio Bea testified as an eyewitness on the killing of Josita Novelo and
narrated his own near death experience; (2) Ricardo Basila testified that he saw the
accused escorting Antonio Bea whose hands were tied and disclosed that he was also
subjected to violent acts of the accused. He claimed that he later heard a gunshot coming
from Josita Novelo's house; (3) Wilfredo Llarena, a Barangay Captain, testified that several
persons went to his house carrying an injured Antonio Bea and they proceeded to the
hospital. He later reported the incident to the police officers; (4) Antonio Novelo testified
that the accused went to the house of Josita Novelo and attempted to kill him; (5) Dr. Noli
Bayani, the rural health physician of Sta. Elena, Camarines Norte, conducted a post-
mortem examination of the body of Josita Novelo; (6) Belen Avellera testified on the
existence of the medical records of Antonio Bea; (7) SPO2 Nelson Ricierra testified that
Wilfredo Llarena reported to him the stabbing and the killing incidents and that he was a
member of the team who made a follow-up investigation of the report; (8) Rogelio Novelo
testified that Jesus Trinidad used to be his partner in operating a fishpond and that their
partnership turned sour as Jesus Trinidad harvested the yields of the fishpond without his
consent; (9) Dr. Rolando C. Victoria, a Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI, Manila, conducted
an autopsy of the body of Josita Novelo.
As documentary evidence, the prosecution offered the following: Exhibit "A" —
a photograph of the bloody body of Josita Novelo; Exhibit "A-1" — the "x" mark on the
face of Josita Novelo; Exhibit "B" — a photograph showing the victim prostrate on the
ground; Exhibits "C" and "D" — photographs of the house where the incident of killing
took place; Exhibit "E" — the medical certificate of Antonio Bea; Exhibit "F" — the affidavit
of Antonio Bea; Exhibit "G" — the affidavit of Ricardo Basila; Exhibit "H" — the affidavit
of Antonio Novelo; Exhibit "I" — the medical certificate of Antonio Novelo; Exhibit "J" —
the death certificate of Josita Novelo showing the result of the post-mortem examination;
and Exhibit "K" — the NBI autopsy report.
The collective evidence adduced by the prosecution shows that sometime in
January 1997, Rogelio Novelo, the surviving spouse of the deceased-victim Josita Novelo,
and appellant Jesus Trinidad agreed to manage and operate a rented fishpond located at
Baranggay San Vicente, Santa Elena, Camarines Norte. Sometime in April of the same
year, when the fishpond was yielding its first harvest, Rogelio Novelo and his wife Josita
brought the produce to Manila to be sold, while appellant Jesus Trinidad was left to
manage the fishpond. Upon the couple's return, they discovered that all the fish and crabs
in the fishpond had already been harvested and disposed of. Believing that appellant
Trinidad was responsible for the pilferage, Josita demanded from him either the return of
the couple's investment or be allowed to buy appellant Trinidad's share in the
partnership. Appellant chose the latter and was paid by the couple the amount of
P9,700.00 as his share in the partnership. After their partnership with appellant Trinidad
was terminated, the couple proceeded to replenish the fishpond with crab seedlings.
When the crabs were ready for harvest, appellant Jesus Trinidad with appellant
Emelio Tolentino, Jimmy and Arnel Trinidad, without the permission from the couple,
harvested the crabs for their own benefit. The couple confronted appellants and their
cohorts, but the former's protestation was merely ignored by the latter. The couple filed
a complaint before the barangay which was then set for hearing on 30 August 1997. A
few days before the scheduled hearing, Rogelio Novelo took a trip to Manila, leaving his
wife Josita to manage the fishpond.
On 29 August 1997, at around 10:30 p.m., Antonio Bea, one of the complainants
and the caretaker of the couple's fishpond, was inside his house located at Purok 7,
Tinagong Dagat, Barangay San Vicente, Santa Elena, Camarines Norte. 5 He heard
16
someone calling his name from outside his house. Carrying a flashlight, Bea went outside
and focused his flashlight towards the direction of the fishpond watergate
("prensa"). 6 Suddenly, someone whom he recognized to be appellant
Emelio Tolentino grabbed his hand and pulled him out of the house. 7There he saw
appellant Jesus Trinidad, Jimmy Trinidad and Arnel Trinidad. Jesus Trinidad kicked Bea on
the right side of his hip, and tied a rope around his hands behind his back. Then appellant
Emelio Tolentino pulled him by the rope towards the house of a certain Ricardo
Basila. 8 Upon reaching the house of Ricardo Basila, Arnel Trinidad called out the former.
Ricardo Basila, with a flashlight in his hand, went out of his house and focused the
flashlight at the faces of the four perpetrators. Irritated by what Ricardo Basila did,
Emelio Tolentino, Jesus and Arnel Trinidad took turns in kicking Ricardo Basila and
ordered the latter to get inside his house. 9 While inside his house, Ricardo Basila noticed
that Emelio Tolentino was carrying a weapon. 10
The assailants, together with Antonio Bea, proceeded to the house of the
spouses Novelo situated alongside the fishpond which was more or less 100 meters from
Basila's house. 11 When they arrived at the Novelo house, Jesus Trinidad called Josita
Novelo to get out of the house. 12 Josita Novelo went out of the house holding a
light. 13 Jesus Trinidad quickly grabbed Josita Novelo by her mouth and the two of them
went inside the house together with Emelio Tolentino, Jesus Trinidad and Antonio Bea.
From inside the house, Emelio Tolentino and Jesus Trinidad took Antonio Bea to another
door leading outside and chanced upon Antonio Novelo, Rogelio Novelo's
brother. 14Immediately, Jesus Trinidad and Emelio Tolentino kicked Antonio Novelo
causing the latter to fall right into the fishpond and disappear from sight. 15 Antonio Bea
was then tied to the door from the waist down with Emelio Tolentino guarding him. 16 In
that position, Antonio Bea saw Josita Novelo being mauled by Jesus Trinidad and Arnel
Trinidad. All of a sudden, Jesus Trinidad shot Josita Novelo on the left cheek with a
gun. 17 Immediately after, Emelio Tolentino entered the house and slashed the face of
Josita with a jungle bolo. 18 The three assailants untied the binding on Antonio Bea's feet
while leaving the ropes tied behind his back. 19 They left Novelo's house proceeding
towards the fishpond watergate which was about three meters from the house.
Emelio Tolentino led the way, followed by Bea, with Jesus and Arnel Trinidad taking the
rear. Without warning, Emelio Tolentino stabbed Antonio Bea four times in the stomach
with the former's jungle bolo. Antonio Bea fell into the fishpond.
The assailants left the victim and boarded a boat which was operated by Jimmy
Trinidad. Injured and bleeding, Antonio Bea managed to untie his hands and swim across
the river to ask for help. He received help from the people of Purok 7 and was brought to
the house of the Barangay Captain Wilfredo Llarena in a hammock. 20 The barangay
captain then brought the victim to a hospital. From the hospital, Barangay Captain
Wilfredo Llarena, along with some members of the police, went to the house of spouses
Novelo and came upon the dead body of Josita Novelo. 21
Dr. Noli Bayani, the Rural Health Physician of Sta. Elena, Camarines Norte,
conducted an autopsy of the body and found that the cause of Josita Novelo's death was
"[h]ypovolemic shock secondary to gunshot wounds and lacerated wound." 22 Dr.
Rolando C. Victoria, a Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, who
also conducted an autopsy on the body of the deceased, testified that the shotgun wound
at the left side of the face of the victim caused her death. 23
The medical certificate of Antonio Bea shows that the four stab wounds inflicted
on him caused damage to his intestines. 24
On 19 Oct 1999, the prosecution rested its case and made a formal offer of
evidence. 25
On 13 April 2000, appellants through counsel filed a Demurrer to Evidence,
without leave of court. 26 In an order 27 dated 17 May 2000, the RTC denied the
demurrer and submitted the case for decision pursuant to Section 15, Rule 119 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.28 On 31 May 2000, appellants filed a motion for
reconsideration, praying that the order denying their Demurrer to Evidence be recalled
and that they be allowed to present evidence. The RTC denied the said motion. Unfazed,
appellants filed a petition for certiorari before this Court. This Court denied the petition
in a Resolution dated 2 Dec 2002, which became final and executory on 5 February 2003.
As a result, the case was submitted for decision without any evidence proffered by the
defense.
On 30 Nov 2004, the RTC rendered a decision finding appellants guilty of the
crimes charged in Criminal Case No. 98-0258 and Criminal Case No. 98-0260 for murder
and frustrated murder, respectively. The decretal portion of the RTC decision reads:
CRIM. CASE NO. 98-0258
For: MURDER
WHEREFORE, finding accused EMELIO TOLENTINO y ESTRELLA and JESUS
TRINIDAD y MARAVILLA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, they are
hereby sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH. They are also ordered to pay
the heirs of the victim, Josita Novelo, the amount of P75,000.00 by way of civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages and another P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.
CRIM. CASE NO. 98-0260
For: FRUSTRATED MURDER
WHEREFORE, finding accused EMELIO TOLENTINO y ESTRELLA and JESUS
TRINIDAD y MARAVILLA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated
Murder, they are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. They
are also ordered to pay their victim, Antonio Bea the amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. 29
The trial court, however, acquitted appellants of the crime of frustrated murder
allegedly committed against Antonio Novelo in Criminal Case No. 98-0270.
On 10 Dec 2004, appellants filed a Motion For New Trial on the ground that
"errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused have
been committed during the trial." 30 Appellants argued that in the interest of justice and
equity, they should be given the opportunity to testify in their favor considering that they
are meted out by the RTC the supreme penalty of death.
In an Order 31 dated 15 Dec 2004, the RTC denied appellants' motion for new
trial ratiocinating that the error of appellants' counsel during the trial does not amount to
error of law or irregularity which constitutes a valid ground for the granting of a motion
for new trial. It appears that appellants no longer questioned the denial of their motion
for new trial.
The trial court ordered the transmittal of the entire records of the case to this
Court. Thereafter, this Court ordered the referral of the case to the CA conformably with
the ruling in the case of People v. Mateo. 32
17
 The CA, on 8 Nov 2006, promulgated its Decision affirming the judgment of the
trial court convicting the appellants, with modifications on the award of civil liabilities,
thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision dated Nov 23, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 64, of Labo, Camarines Norte finding accused-appellants Emelio Tolentino y
Estrella and Jesus Trinidad y Maravilla GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder in Criminal Case No. 98-0258, and frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 98-0260
is hereby AFFIRMED with the following modifications, to wit:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 98-0258, accused-appellants are hereby sentenced each to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and in addition, to pay the heirs of the victim
Josita Fernandez Novelo the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity for her death;
P50,000 as moral damages and P25,000 representing exemplary damages.
(2) In Criminal Case No. 98-0260, accused-appellants are hereby sentenced each to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment ranging from 8 years of prision mayor (minimum),
as minimum, to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal (minimum) as
maximum. Moreover, they are ordered to pay the victim Antonio Bea the
amount of P25,000 as temperate damages; P30,000 as moral damages, P30,000
as civil indemnity and P25,000 as exemplary damages. 33
Hence, the instant case.
In their brief, the appellants assign the following errors:
I court, he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS TO
PRESENT DEFENSE EVIDENCE AFTER THE DENIAL OF THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY OF THE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY.
III
GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WERE GUILTY OF INFLICTING
INJURY ON ANTONIO BEA, THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THEM GUILTY OF THE
CRIME OF FRUSTRATED MURDER ALTHOUGH THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE THAT
BEA'S WOUNDS WERE MORTAL. 34
Before proceeding to the first and third assignment of errors, the Court deems
it proper to first deal with the second assignment.
Appellants, as earlier mentioned, urge this Court to revisit the issue as to the
propriety of the trial court's Order dated 17 May 2000 denying the Demurrer to Evidence
and preventing them from presenting evidence due to their failure to seek leave of court
prior to the filing of the demurrer to evidence.
It must be pointed out that the issue on the validity of the trial court's order
dated 17 May 2000 was elevated by appellants to this Court via petition for certiorari.
This Court in a Resolution dated 2 Dec 2000, dismissed the said petition, and upheld the
trial court's ruling that appellants are barred from presenting their evidence for failure to
seek leave of court prior to the filing of the demurrer to evidence which was denied by
the lower court. Since the issue of whether or not appellants may be allowed to adduce
evidence despite their failure to file a prior leave of court had already been finally put to
rest, the same has attained finality and constitutes the law of the case. Any attempt to
pass upon anew this final ruling constitutes a crass contravention of elementary rules of
procedure.
Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former
appeal. 35 More specifically, it means that whatever is already irrevocably established as
the controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties in the same case continues
to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts
on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the
court. 36 Indeed, courts must adhere thereto because public policy, judicial orderliness
and economy require such stability in the final judgments of courts or tribunals of
competent jurisdiction. 37
Besides, under Section 15, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, it
is stated that when an accused files a demurrer to evidence without leave of court and
the same is denied, he waives his right to present evidence and submits the case for
judgment on the basis of the evidence of the prosecution, thus:
SEC. 15. Demurrer to evidence. — After the prosecution has rested its case, the
court may dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence: (1) on its own
initiative after giving the prosecution an opportunity to be heard; or (2) on motion of the
accused filed with prior leave of court.
If the Court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce evidence
in his defense. When the accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave of
basis of the evidence for the prosecution.
The filing of a demurrer to evidence without leave of court is an unqualified
waiver of the right to present evidence for the accused. 38The rationale for this rule is
that when the accused moves for dismissal on the ground of insufficiency of evidence of
the prosecution evidence, he does so in the belief that said evidence is insufficient to
convict and, therefore, any need for him to present any evidence is negated. 39 An
accused cannot be allowed to wager on the outcome of judicial proceedings by espousing
inconsistent viewpoints whenever dictated by convenience. 40 The purpose behind the
rule is also to avoid the dilatory practice of filing motions for dismissal as a demurrer to
the evidence and, after denial thereof, the defense would then claim the right to present
its evidence. 41 Thus, when the trial court disallowed the appellants to present evidence
on their behalf, it properly applied Section 15, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Not even the gravity of the penalty for a particular offense can change this
rule. As stressed by this Court:
The filing of the demurrer to evidence without leave of court and its subsequent
denial results in the submission of the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence on
record. Considering that the governing rules on demurrer to evidence is a fundamental
component of criminal procedure, respondent judge had the obligation to observe the
same, regardless of the gravity of the offense charged. It is not for him to grant
concessions to the accused who failed to obtain prior leave of court. The rule is clear that
upon the denial of the demurrer to evidence in this case, the accused, who failed to ask
for leave of court, shall waive the right to present evidence in his behalf. 42
Going back to the first issue, appellants take exception with the trial court's
assessment of the evidence before it and in giving weight and credence to the testimony
of the prosecution witnesses. Appellants maintain that considering the lateness of the
18
hour when the incident took place, and the fact that it was dark, witness Antonio Bea A: He pulled me outside, sir.
could not have seen clearly the faces of his attackers and that of the deceased Josita Q: And what happened next after you were pulled outside your house?
Novelo. Antonio Bea, according to appellants, is incompetent to testify on matters A: I am (sic) telling him I have no fault.
relating to what was done to the late Josita Novelo because he was tied from the waist xxx xxx xxx
down to the door outside the house, thus, he could not have seen what had happened Q: Nang oras na iyon sino pa ang nakita mo kung mayroon man?
inside the house where the deceased was brutally attacked. A: Jesus Trinidad, sir.
Well-entrenched is the rule that the matter of assigning values to declarations Q: Who else if any?
on the witness stand is best and most competently performed by the trial judge who, A: Arnel Trinidad, sir.
unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh such testimony in light of the declarant's Q: What happened after you told them you have (sic) no fault?
demeanor, conduct and position to discriminate between truth and falsehood. 43 Thus, A: He kicked me, sir.
appellate courts will not disturb the credence, or lack of it, accorded by the trial court to Q: Who kicked you in particular?
the testimonies of witnesses, unless it be manifestly shown that the latter court had A: Jesus Trinidad, sir. 45
overlooked or disregarded arbitrarily the facts and circumstances of significance in the Cross-examination:
case. 44 Q: Who was the person who held you?
In the instant case, prosecution witness Antonio Bea steadfastly pointed to A: Emelio Tolentino, sir.
appellants and their companions as the malefactors. Such identification was detailed as Q: How did you recognize him to be Emelio Tolentino?
follows: A: When I focused the light, I saw them because of the light, wearing bonnet and their
Q: Mr. Witness, do you know a certain Jesus Trinidad y Maravilla? faces were exposed to the light.
A: Yes, sir. Q: You said "them", how many were they?
xxx xxx xxx A: Jesus Trinidad, Emelio Tolentino and Arnel Trinidad, sir. 46
Q: A certain Emelio Tolentino y Estrella, do you know a person with such name? The identification of witness Antonio Bea of the perpetrators of the crimes
A: Yes, sir. evinces factual truth of what really occurred on that fateful night. He could not have been
xxx xxx xxx mistaken as to the identity of the appellants since, at that time, he has known them
Q: These persons that I made mention to you since when have you known them? personally for 10 years already. Their faces were illuminated by the flashlight when
A: For almost ten (10) years. witness Antonio Bea focused the same in their direction. Also, Bea's identification of the
Q: And because of that length of time you could not possibly [be] mistaken as to their assailants was corroborated by Ricardo Basila and Antonio Novelo who testified that they
identity? likewise suffered violent acts from the malefactors during the incident.
A: Yes, sir. Although Antonio Bea was tied at the door outside the house of Josita Novelo,
xxx xxx xxx he declared with clarity the circumstances leading to the killing of Josita and his near-
Q: On August 29, 1997 at about 10:30 or 11:00 in the evening thereof, do you recall of death experience, viz:
any unusual incident that happened? Q: . . . Mr. Witness, where were you when you said you went out of the house let's go
A: Yes, sir. back to the situation wherein you entered the house of Josita Novelo in one door
Q: Will you please tell us what is that incident that you recalled? and then you exited on the other and there you said the other two, Jesus
A: There was somebody that called me, sir. Trinidad and Emelio Tolentino saw Antonio Novelo, where you at that time?
xxx xxx xxx A: I was with them sir, because they are holding the other end of the rope.
Q: When you heard somebody called you on that occasion, what did you do? Q: And what did they do to you afterwards?
A: I flash[ed] a light to the Prensa, sir. A: They tied me at the door, sir.
xxx xxx xxx Q: That door where you exited?
Q: . . . [W]hat happened next? A: Yes, sir.
A: Somebody hold (sic) my hand sir. xxx xxx xxx
Q: Did you recognize who held your hand? Q: From the place you were tied did you see Josita Novelo?
A: Yes, sir. A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who? Q: And while you were tied on that occasion what happened to Josita Novelo?
A: Emelio Tolentino. A: They are asking Josita Novelo where was it placed?
xxx xxx xxx Q: Do you know what were they asking?
Q: Mr. Witness, what happened next after Emelio Tolentino held your hand? xxx xxx xxx

19
Q: Did you hear the reply of Josita Novelo, if any? The foregoing testimony can only be told by a person who had really witnessed
A: I cannot hear the reply of Josita Novelo because they are mauling her or "binubugbog the incident and had been subjected to personal violence from the perpetrators, hence,
nila." such testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. Furthermore, Bea's testimony jibed with
Q: Who in particular was mauling Josita Novelo? the physical evidence. The nature of the wound of the deceased was affirmed by the
A: Jesus Trinidad and Arnel Trinidad, sir. medical experts to be a result of a gunshot wound. The location of the wounds found on
Q: What about Emelio Tolentino, what was he doing? Josita Novelo's face as described by witness Bea was consistent with the documentary
A: He is outside guarding me, sir. evidence, i.e., photographs, autopsy result and the physical examination of the corpse of
Q: What happened after Josita Novelo was mauled by these two you mentioned? the
A: Suddenly, Jesus Trinidad shot Josita Novelo. victim. All these tend to dispel any doubt that witness Bea would have concocted the
Q: Did you see where Josita Novelo was hit? whole story. The prosecution successfully established beyond reasonable doubt that the
A: Yes, sir. appellants and their cohorts killed Josita Novelo.
Q: Where was she hit, if you have seen? Anent the third issue, appellants argue that in the stabbing of Antonio Bea, they
A: On the left cheek which exited at the back of her head. should have been liable only for attempted murder and not frustrated murder since the
Q: After they have shot Josita Novelo, what did they do next? prosecution failed to prove, due to its failure to present the attending physician, that the
A: They get (sic) out, sir. injury suffered by the victim was fatal.
xxx xxx xxx A crime is frustrated when the offender has performed all the acts of execution
Q: What about Emelio Tolentino, what did he do if any? which should result in the consummation of the crime.48 The offender has passed the
A: Emelio Tolentino entered the house and then slashed the face of Josita Novelo. subjective phase in the commission of the crime. 49 Subjectively, the crime is complete.
Court: Nothing interrupted the offender while passing through the subjective phase. He did all
Anong ginamit? Nakita mo? that is necessary to consummate the crime. However, the crime was not consummated
A: Jungle bolo. by reason of the intervention of causes independent of the will of the offender. In
Q: Saan? Sa kanan o kaliwa? homicide cases, the offender is said to have performed all the acts of execution if the
A: Sa kaliwa, po. wound inflicted on the victim is mortal and could cause the death of the victim without
xxx xxx xxx medical intervention or attendance.
Q: Now, Mr. Witness, you said that after Josita Novelo was shot by Jesus Trinidad, and In the instant case, the prosecution established that Antonio Bea sustained four
Emelio Tolentino went inside the house and put an X mark on the face of that stab wounds inflicted by Emelio Tolentino which caused damage to the victim's abdomen
dead woman, what happened next? resulting in massive blood loss. The victim was hospitalized for two months because of
A: They untied me, sir. these injuries. 53 In fact, at the trial, the victim showed the scars in his abdomen. All these
Q: And what did they do after untying you? tend to show the seriousness of the wounds suffered by the victim and which would have
A: They passed through the prensa and stabbed me, sir. caused his death had it not been for the timely medical intervention.
Q: Mr. witness, you said you were untied is it (sic) not? The trial court, in assessing the testimonial evidence of the prosecution, made
A: Yes, sir, sa paa lang. this appropriate observation:
xxx xxx xxx In the instant cases, the corroborative testimonies of prosecution witnesses,
Q: So in other words from the time you were untied you walked towards that 'prensa' for Antonio Bea, Ricardo Basila and Antonio Novelo, positively identifying the accused as the
about three (3) meters? perpetrators of the crime satisfactorily persuade the Court. . . . .
A: Yes, sir. xxx xxx xxx
Q: When you walked, who was ahead of you, if any? Witness Antonio Bea testified that accused Jesus Trinidad and
A: Emelio Tolentino, sir. Emelio Tolentino are known to him for almost ten (10) years . . . .
Q: Were your hands still tied? Likewise, witness Antonio Novelo, on cross-examination, testified that he
A: Yes, sir. recognized the accused because their voices are very familiar to him being neighbors and
Q: What about Tolentino who was ahead of you what was he doing? he had known the accused for a long time.
A: He has a jungle bolo sir, and stabbed me. xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx The identification of an accused through his voice is acceptable, particulary if
Q: How many times were you stabbed on that occasion? the witness knows the accused personally.
A: Four times, sir. 47

20
 The sound of the voice of a person is an acceptable means of identification
where it is established that the witness and the accused knew each other personally and
closely for a number of years.
Worth stressing is that the CA affirmed the findings of the RTC. The settled rule
is that when the trial court's findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said
findings are generally conclusive and binding upon this Court. 55 We find no cogent
reason to veer away from their findings.
In an effort to exculpate themselves from the charges, appellants identified
inconsistent statements of witness Bea such as the latter's declaration that he was a
friend of Jesus Trinidad which is contradictory to his earlier testimony the he got mad at
Jesus Trinidad four months prior to the incident. They also make an issue of the statement
of Bea during the cross-examination wherein he made mention that a gun was poked at
him, which declaration is missing in the direct examination.
These inconsistencies are very trivial and insignificant. Minor inconsistencies do
not warrant rejection of the entire testimony nor the reversal of judgment. 56 Accuracy
in accounts had never been applied as a standard to which the credibility of witnesses are
tested since it is undeniable that human memory is fickle and prone to the stresses of
emotions and the passage of time. 57 Witness Bea's inconsistencies rather enhance
truthfulness for it erases suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.
The RTC convicted the appellants of murder in Criminal Case No. 98-0258 for the
killing of Josita Novelo and frustrated murder for the assault of Antonio Bea in Criminal
Case No. 98-0260 by appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery and generic
aggravating circumstances of nighttime and dwelling.
The RTC is correct in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery in the
killing of Josita Novelo and in the stabbing of Antonio Bea.
The essence of treachery is a deliberate and sudden attack, affording the
hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape. Frontal attack
can be treacherous when it is sudden and unexpected and the victim is unarmed. What
is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend
himself/herself or to retaliate.
In the killing of Josita Novelo, the victim was at her home when someone called
her. When the victim went outside, suddenly Jesus Trinidad held her. Thereafter, Jesus
Trinidad and Arnel Trinidad mauled Josita Novelo. Without warning, Jesus Trinidad shot
the helpless victim on the cheek. Said attack was so sudden and unexpected that the
victim had not been given the opportunity to defend herself or repel the aggression. She
was unarmed when she was attacked. Indeed, all these circumstances indicate that the
assault on the victim was treacherous.
The stabbing of Antonio Bea was also attended with treachery. While Bea,
whose hands were tied behind his back, and the assailants were walking along the dike,
Emelio Tolentino unexpectedly stabbed the victim four times. The victim could not put up
a defense as the attack was swift and he was not in the position to repel the same since
his hands were tied.
Also affirmed is the ruling of the RTC appreciating the presence of the generic
aggravating circumstance of dwelling in Criminal Case No. 98-0258. Evidence shows that
Josita Novelo was killed in her own house. When the crime is committed in the dwelling
of the offended party and the latter has not given provocation, dwelling may be
appreciated as an aggravating circumstance. 61 Here, the crime was committed inside the
house of the deceased victim. Dwelling is considered aggravating primarily because of the
sanctity of privacy the law accords to human abode. 62 He who goes to another's house
to hurt him or do him wrong is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere. 63
Dwelling, however, cannot be appreciated in Criminal Case No. 98-0260
considering that the same was not alleged in the information. Under Section 9, Rule 10 of
the Revised Rules of Court, aggravating circumstances must be alleged in the information
and proved otherwise; even if proved but not alleged in the information, the same shall
not be considered by the Court in the imposition of the proper penalty on the accused. 64
The aggravating circumstance of nighttime in both cases was improperly
appreciated by the RTC. Nighttime is considered an aggravating circumstance only when
it is sought to prevent the accused from being recognized or to ensure their escape. There
must be proof that this was intentionally sought to ensure the commission of the crime
and that the perpetrators took advantage of it. Although the crime was committed at
nighttime, there is no evidence that the appellants and their companions took advantage
of nighttime or that nighttime facilitated the commission of the crime.
Proceeding now to the appropriate penalty, in Criminal Case No. 98-0258, it
must be borne in mind that the prosecution successfully established the presence of the
qualifying circumstance of treachery in the killing of Josita Novelo. With this, the crime
committed by the appellants is murder in accordance with Article 248. With the
aggravating circumstance of dwelling and no mitigating circumstance, the penalty
imposed should be in its maximum, which is death.
In view, however, of the passage of RA 9346, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines," which was signed into law on 24 June
2006, the imposition of the death penalty has been prohibited. 66 Thus, the penalty
imposed upon appellants in Criminal case No. 98-0258 should be reduced to reclusion
perpetua, without eligibility of parole under the Indeterminate Sentence Law. 67
As to damages, when death occurs due to a crime, the following may be
recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or
compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorney's fees
and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in proper cases. 68
The RTC awarded P75,000.00 in favor of the heirs of Josita Novelo as civil
indemnity. The CA reduced the award of civil indemnity to P50,000.00. Civil indemnity is
mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the
commission of the crime. Based on current jurisprudence, the RTC award of civil
indemnity ex delicto of P75,000.00 in favor of the heirs of Josita Novelo is in order. 69
The RTC also correctly awarded moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 in
view of the violent death of the victim. This does not require allegation and proof of the
emotional suffering of the heirs. 70 Article 2230 of the Civil Code states that exemplary
damages may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances, as in this case. 71 To deter future similar transgressions, the Court finds
that an award of P25,000.00 for exemplary damages is proper.
In Criminal Case No. 98-060, the RTC imposed upon the appellants the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for the crime of frustrated murder. The CA modified the penalty to
8 years of prision mayor as minimum to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal as
maximum.
21
 Under Art. 61(2) of the RPC, the penalty of frustrated murder is one degree
lower than reclusion perpetua to death, which is reclusion temporal. 72 Reclusion
temporal has a range of 12 years and 1 day to 20 years. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty should be taken from reclusion
temporal, the penalty for the crime taking into account any modifying circumstances in
the commission of the crime. 73 The minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall be
taken from the full range of prision mayor which is one degree lower than reclusion
temporal. Since there is no modifying circumstance in the commission of the frustrated
murder, an indeterminate prison term of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum,
to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum 74 may be considered
reasonable for the frustrated murder under the facts of this case.
As to the award of actual damages, the prosecution failed to present any receipt
to substantiate Antonio Bea's hospitalization expenses. Nonetheless, in light of the fact
that Antonio was actually hospitalized and operated upon, this Court deems it prudent to
award P20,000.00 as temperate damages since it cannot be denied that he suffered
pecuniary loss. The award of civil indemnity in the amount of P30,000.00 is in
order. Moreover, Antonio is also entitled to moral damages which this Court awards in
the amount of P40,000.00. Although there was no testimony on the moral damages that
he sustained, the medical certificate issued by the hospital indicated that Antonio Bea
sustained serious stab injuries inflicted by appellants. It is sufficient basis to award moral
damages as ordinary human experience and common sense dictate that such wounds
inflicted on Antonio Bea would naturally cause physical suffering, fright, serious anxiety,
moral shock, and similar injury. 76 Finally, the award in the amount of P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages is also in order considering that the crime was attended by the
qualifying circumstance of treachery. When a crime is committed with an aggravating
circumstance, either qualifying or generic, an award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages
is justified under Art. 2230 of the New Civil Code. 77 This kind of damage is intended to
serve as deterrent to serious wrong-doings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings and
wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous
conduct. 78
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the CA dated 08 Nov 2006 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
00880 finding appellants guilty of the crime of murder and sentencing them to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case. No. 98-0258, is hereby AFFIRMED with the
modifications:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 98-0258, appellants are ordered to pay jointly and
severally the heirs of the victim Josita Novelo the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 representing exemplary
damages.
(2) In Criminal Case No. 98-0260, for the crime of Frustrated Murder, appellants
are sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty from 6 years and 1 day of prision
mayor as minimum, to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
In addition, appellants are ordered to pay jointly and severally the victim Antonio Bea the
amount of P40,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, P20,000.00 as
temperate damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. SO ORDERED.
EN BANC [G.R. No. L-17530. Oct 30, 1962.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. CAUSIANO ENOT and PABLO VIÑALON
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF INTOXICATION; FACT OF INTOXICATION TO BE
PROVED. — To be available as a ground to lighten the penalty, the fact of intoxication must be proved to the
satisfaction of the court. (People vs. Noble, 77 Phil. 93, 101.)
2. ID.; MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF LACK OF INSTRUCTION; TO WHAT CRIMES IT IS NOT
APPLICABLE. — The mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction is not applicable to crimes of theft or robbery,
much less to the crime of homicides. (U.S. vs. Pascual, 9 Phil. 491; People vs. Melendrez, 59 Phil. 154; People vs.
De la Cruz, 77 Phil. 444; People vs. Mendova, 100 Phil., 811.) No one, however unschooled he may be, is so
ignorant as to know that theft or robbery, or assault upon the person of another, is inherently wrong and a
violation of the law.
3. ID.; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF NOCTURNITY; WHEN NOCTURNITY
IS ABSORBED BY TREACHERY. — Nocturnity should not be taken as an aggravating
circumstance separate and independent of that of treachery, because it forms part of the
peculiar treacherous means and manner adopted to insure the execution of the crime.
(People vs. Balagtas, 68 Phil. 675; People vs. Pardo, 79 Phil. 568; People vs. Bautista, 79
Phil., 652; People vs. Magsilang, 82 Phil. 271).
4. ID.; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY; TAKING ADVANTAGE OF
NIGHTTIME TO COVER UP MOVEMENT. — The crime committed in the case at bar, that
of robbery with multiple homicide and physical injury, is aggravated by treachery, in that
accused took advantage of nighttime to cover up their movements and commenced
attack on their victims at a time when the latter, unaware of their approach and their
intention, were in no position to offer any defense (People vs. Pengzon, 44 Phil., 224, 234;
People vs. Palomo, 43 Off. Gaz. No. 10, 4190).
5. ID.; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF DISREGARD OF SEX AND AGE. — The
commission of the crime was attended by the aggravating circumstance of disregard of
the sex and age of the victims, because the latter, with but one exception, were all
women, one only five years old, another, a minor, and the third, a seven-month old baby
(People vs. Medina, 71 Phil. 383).
DECISION
PER CURIAM p: Review of a decision of the Court of First Instance of Masbate, Hon.
Mariano V. Benedicto, presiding, sentencing each of the accused Causiano Enot and Pablo
Viñalon to undergo the penalty of death for the crime of robbery with multiple homicide
and physical injuries.
The above-named accused, duly assisted by counsel, pleaded guilty to the
charges contained in the information filed against them, which reads as follows.
"That on or about the 8th day of July, 1960, in the barrio of San Jose, Municipality
of Cataiñgan, Province of Masbate, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused conspiring together and helping each
other, with intent of gain and by means of violence and force upon things, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the house of Macario Conje who was then
sleeping with the members of his family and once inside take and carry away one trunk
belonging to Macario Conje which said accused forcibly opened outside the house and
from which they took, stole and carried away therefrom assorted clothings and also one
fighting cock all valued in the total amount of P35.00, to the damage and prejudice of the
said owner in the aforesaid amount; that on the occasion of the said robbery and for the
purpose of enabling them to take, steal and carry away the articles above-mentioned, the
22
herein accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with evident
premeditation and the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity, the use of superior
strength, cruelty, abuse of confidence and treachery — all with intent to kill, attack,
assault and stab with sharp bolos the persons of Macario Conje, Maximina Arreglado,
Monina Conje, a minor Baby Conje, 7 months old and Santiaga Conje, 5 years old and
thereby inflicting upon Macario Conje, Maximina Arreglado and Monina Conje serious
multiple wounds on the different parts of their bodies and upon Baby Conje incise wound
at the middle of the head cutting the skull and brain which injuries directly caused their
instantaneous death; and upon Santiaga Conje incise wound in the left leg below the knee
joint which injury required medical attendance for a period of from 15 to 20 days."
After they had entered their plea of guilty, the accused were asked by the judge
if they understood the information as read to them, and they both answered "Yes, sir".
However, in view of the seriousness of the offense charged and the gravity of the penalty
imposable therefor, the trial judge, instead of immediately pronouncing sentence upon
their plea of guilty, propounded questions to both of them to assure himself.
The examination conducted by the judge himself in open court established the
following facts: The accused Causiano Enot and Pablo Viñalon, having previously planned
to rob the house of Macario Conje located in the barrio of San Jose, Cataingan, Masbate,
went up the said house on the night of July 8, 1960, armed with bolos. Upon gaining
entrance thereto, they found therein Macario Conje, his wife Maximina Arreglado,
Santiaga Conje, 5 years, Monina Conje, a minor, and Baby Conje, 7 months, all of whom
were still awake, with the exception of the last. Of those awake "some were sitting and
some were lying down." Without provocation whatsoever, and in accordance with their
plan to assault the occupants to insure the perpetration of the crime they had conspired
to commit, the accused did then and there attack Macario Conje, Maximina Arreglado,
Monina Conje, Baby Conje, and Santiaga Conje, by stabbing and hacking them with their
bolos and inflicting wounds on their persons, which brought instantaneous death to the
first four named and injury to the left leg just below the knee of Santiaga Conje, which
required 15 to 20 days of medical care. Having thus eliminated possible obstacles to the
accomplishment of their criminal purpose of robbing the victims, the accused then
proceeded to bring outside the house one fighting cock and a trunk belonging to Macario
Conje, which trunk they forcibly opened and took therefrom assorted clothing. All the
things taken by them are valued in the amount of P35.00.
The facts above set forth were voluntarily and spontaneously admitted by the
two accused before the trial judge. When the judge asked them for the second time if
they reiterate their plea of guilty, and if they realized that the court could sentence them
to any penalty provided by law, the accused again answered in the affirmative.
On the basis of the admissions made by the accused, the court found them guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with multiple homicide and physical
injuries, with the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity, superior strength, treachery
and evident premeditation, with only one mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty, and
thereby sentenced them to the penalty of death. Capital punishment having been
imposed, the records of the case were forwarded to this Court for review.
Defendants-appellants do not question the facts as found by the trial judge, but
doubt the propriety of the penalty imposed by him, claiming that at most the penalty to
which they should have been sentenced is reclusion perpetua. They allege that the death
penalty was erroneously imposed because the trial court (1) did not consider intoxication
and lack of instruction or education as mitigating circumstances; (2) considered nocturnity
and abuse of superior strength as distinct and separate from the aggravating
circumstance of treachery; and (3) considered evident premeditation as an aggravating
circumstance.
We have already held that to be available as a means to lighten the penalty, the
fact of intoxication must be proved to the satisfaction of the court. (People vs. Noble, 77
Phil. 93, 101). In the case at bar, defendants-appellants made no offer to show that during
the commission of the crime they were drunk to the point of losing the use of their reason
and self-control. Neither has it been shown that just before they committed the crime
defendants-appellants had in fact been drinking. The extrajudicial confession of Pablo
Viñalon found on page 30 of the record, which counsel for the defense brings to the
attention of this Court to prove that Viñalon was drunk during the commission of the
crime, may not be taken into account, not having been offered as an exhibit. Besides, all
that said confession states is that Viñalon had been drinking tuba together with a certain
Sulpicio Cuadera before he repaired to the house of Macario Conje, without stating the
amount or quantity of liquor they had consumed, upon which the court could base its
finding as to the degree of their intoxication. (Ibid.) Hence the lower court acted Rightly
in not appreciating drunkenness as a mitigating circumstance in their favor.
The benefit of lack of instruction is likewise unavailing to mitigate the crime
committed by defendants-appellants as this circumstance is not applicable to crimes of
theft or robbery, and much less to the crime of homicide, (U.S. vs. Pascual, 9 Phil. 591;
People vs. Melendrez, 59 Phil. 154; People vs. De la Cruz, 77 Phil. 444;
People vs. Mendova, G.R. No. L-7030, Jan. 31, 1957.) Needless to say, no one, however
unschooled he may be, is so ignorant as not to know that theft or robbery, or assault upon
the person of another, is inherently wrong and a violation of the law.
However, nocturnity should not have been taken as an aggravating
circumstance separate and independent of that of treachery, the reason being that
nighttime forms part of the peculiar treacherous means and manner adopted to insure
the execution of the crime. (People vs. Balagtas, 68 Phil. 675, 677; People vs. Parde, 79
Phil. 568, 579; People vs. Bautista, 79 Phil. 652, 657; People vs. Magsilang, 82 Phil. 271,
275.)
The crime committed, that of robbery with multiple homicide and physical
injury, is aggravated by treachery, in that the accused took advantage of nighttime to
cover up their movements and commenced attack on their victims at a time when the
latter, unaware of their approach and their intention, were in no position to offer any
defense (People vs. Pengzon, 44 Phil. 224, 234; People vs. Palomo, 43 Off. Gaz. No. 4190);
by the use of superior strength and disregard of the sex and age of the victims, the latter,
with the exception of Macario Conje, all being women, one only five years old, another, a
minor, and the third, a seven-month old baby (People vs. Medina, 71 Phil. 383); by evident
premeditation, in that prior to the crime, they had conspired to rob the house of Macario
Conje and to assault and attack the occupants thereof if necessary to better accomplish
their purpose (People vs. Galang & Guzman, 73 Phil. 184, 198-200); and by dwelling,
consisting in the violation of the privacy of the home of the deceased Macario Conje and
his family (People vs. Manuel, 44 Phil. 333, 340; People vs.Bautista, 79 Phil. 653, 657;
People vs. Gonzales, 76 Phil. 473, 480).
23
 What has attracted the attention of the Court is the senseless depravity with
which the accused committed the offense. For no conceivable reason, they hacked the
head of the baby in two. The three other victims were defenseless women who offered
no resistance at all; yet disregarding their helplessness, sex and tender age, defendants
stabbed and hacked them to death without mercy.
In view of the plea of guilty and the aggravating circumstances which attended
the commission of the crime, the Court is constrained to affirm, as it hereby affirms, the
death sentence imposed by the trial judge upon each of the accused-appellants.
Considering that the decision of the lower court does not impose any indemnity for the
death of the victims, namely, Macario Conje, Maximina Arreglado, Monina Conje, and
Baby Conje, the defendants-appellants are hereby sentenced to pay jointly and severally
the amount of P6,000.00 to the heirs of each of the victims. Costs against defendants-
appellants. So ordered.
EN BANC [G.R. No. L-2447. March 4, 1950.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PEDRO PULIDO ET
AL., defendants. PEDRO PULIDO, IRINEO BOÑGOG and TITO T. QUINTO,appellants.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE COMMITTED BY A BAND;
EVIDENCE; CONFESSION, WHEN COMPETENT AND ADMISSIBLE. — When the evidence
clearly shows that the written statements made by the accused were given voluntarily
without undue pressure and without any promise of clemency or reward, that they
contain so many details that could have been known only to the three appellants but
which was difficult or even impossible for the military police to invent and include therein,
notwithstanding appellants' claim that said statements were given under duress and to
avoid further torture by the military police, said statements are competent and admissible
evidence.
2. ID.; ID.; EVIDENT PREMEDITATION AS INHERENT IN ROBBERY. — Evident
premeditation is inherent in the of robbery. So to warrant a finding of the attendance of
this aggravating circumstance in the complex crime of robbery with homicide, it must be
liked with considered with the killing.
3. ID.; ID.; TREACHERY AS AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE. — The sudden and unexpected
attack with firearms resulting in the death of the unsuspecting and helpless victims constituted treachery.
4. ID.; ID.; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF CRAFT. — The commission of the
crime is attended by the aggravating circumstance of craft when the victims were lured
into going to Doñgon bridge which at the time was an isolated spot because it was the
end of the road and no one would or could pass there because of the blasted condition
of the southern end thereof.
5. ID.; ID.; COMMITTED IN AN UNINHABITED PLACE. — When the nearest house
to the bridge, the place of the commission of the crime was about 200 yards away up the
mountain side and the said bridge was not accessible because of the trees and other
vegetation that stood between said house and the bridge, to say nothing of the rough
terrain and that said bridge was not visible from the house, it is obvious that the bridge
was purposely sought and chosen by the appellants in order to avoid detection of the
crime and preclude any interference with its commission or any help to the victims.
6. ID.; ID.; PENALTY; ACCUSED AT THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME WAS BELOW
18 YEARS. — When an accused at the time of the commission of the crime is less than
eighteen, the courts has to apply the provisions of article 68, paragraph 2 of the RPC.
DECISION
PER CURIAM, p: Those who go up to Baguio by car may remember or may be familiar with
that stretch of road between the town of Sison and the beginning of the Kennon road that
goes up to Baguio, near the Kennon bridge. For several hundred meters, this road follows
the contour of and hugs the mountains to the right, while to the left is the Bued river,
wide but shallow, part of whose bed is dry during the summer months. On this highway
is to be found the concrete Doñgon bridge, scene of the ghastly crime involved in this
case.
At the beginning of the Pacific War, and when the Japanese landed on Northern
Luzon, in their retreat toward Bataan, the USAFFE forces blasted the southern end of this
bridge which then became impassable until repaired about the end of 1947, or about the
beginning of 1948. In the meantime, people driving up to Baguio from Sison, at a point
still far from said bridge, had to make a detour to the left until they reached the road
running from Rosario to Baguio, then turned to the right, crossed the Kennon bridge and
then turned to the left to go up Kennon road toward the Summer Capital. So, the Doñgon
bridge became an isolated spot. This explanation is deemed necessary in order to
understand the sketch (Exhibit O), trace the route taken by the parties involved in this
case, from the barrio of Artacho, Sison, Pangasinan to Doñgon bridge on the afternoon of
June 12, 1947, as well as establish the nature of said bridge as a secluded and uninhabited
place. Late that afternoon, two women and four men accompanied by one of the
appellants and conspirators, named Irineo Boñgog, all riding in one jeep, were lured into
and held up on this Doñgon bridge. Three of them were killed by gunfire and then
despoiled of their belongings, principally money amounting to P33,000. Later about
midnight Boñgog, because he was not given his share of the loot, and apparently to
simulate innocence, reported the holdup and killing to the police in Sison, but without
revealing the identity of the robbers and killers, much less, his connection with the
conspiracy.
Very early the next day, police authorities from Sison went to Doñgon bridge
where a most gruesome spectacle met their eyes. On the bridge itself was a burned jeep
and under it was the charred body of a man who later was identified as Federico
Sarmiento. Behind the jeep toward the north and on the left embankment of the road
was the dead body of Margarita Surisantos Maneclang and further north below the
embankment or rather on a dry portion of the bed of the river was the dead body of
Leonor Calderon. The three bodies bore several mortal bullet wounds. The nearest house
to the scene of the killing was about 200 meters away up the mountain side to the right.
All these details are graphically shown on the sketch (Exhibit O).
As a result of the investigation of the police authorities, Irineo Boñgog was
suspected as forming part of the gang that effected the holdup and the killing and so was
detained. Pedro Pulido and Crestituto Quinto, alias Tito Quinto, were later
arrested. Pulido was taken to Doñgon bridge where in the presence of Captain Hidalgo
and Lieutenant Perez and two soldiers, all of the Military Police, he re- enacted the holdup
and shooting which resulted in the killing and robbery of the three victims. Still later,
Delfin Gomez and Nicasio Magdaraog were arrested. During their confinement and
24
investigation by the Military Police in Dagupan, prisoners Quinto, Boñgog
and Pulido signed and ratified before the justice of the peace of Dagupan, three
statements (Exhibits G, H, and I), respectively. The five prisoners, and Benjamin
Esuagen alias Ben and Santiago Sipos alias Ago both of whom have never been arrested,
were charged with multiple murder before the justice of the peace court of Sison, which
court after proper proceedings sent the case up to the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan where the provincial fiscal changed the charge to robbery in band with
multiple homicide. This new complaint was preliminarily investigated by the justice of the
peace of the capital of the province who later elevated the case to the Court of First
Instance. In that court, the complaint was further amended, dropping Esuagen and Sipos
as defendants for the reason that they were still at large. Before the trial, upon the
recommendation of the prosecuting attorney, Delfin Gomez was discharged from the
information in order to utilize him as a Government witness.
After trial the lower court presided over by Judge Ceferino de los Santos
acquitted Nicasio Magdaraog, but "declared, the defendants Pedro Pulido, Ireneo
Boñgog, and Tito Quinto guilty as principals beyond reasonable doubt of the crime with
which they are charged in the information and imposes upon them the penalty of death
by electrocution; to return or pay, jointly and severally, the amount of P22,000 to the
heirs of Margarita
Surisantos Maneclang, and the sum of P11,000 to the heirs of Federico Sarmiento; to
indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of each of the victims Margarita Surisantos
Maneclang, Leonor Calderon, and Federico Sarmiento in the sum of P8,000 for each
victim; and, to pay three-fourths of the costs." This case is now here for review.
Piecing the different pieces of the evidence consisting of the testimonies of the
witnesses for the prosecution and the defense, the written statements or admissions
made by the appellants and the other exhibits, like we do in a crossword puzzle, the
resulting picture may be described briefly as follows:
With the establishment of the American Military and Naval Bases in the PH after
liberation, particularly in Northern Luzon, such as Base M in San Fernando, La Union and
the munitions dump at Rosario, same province, through pilferage, sometimes, with the
active connivance of the persons in charge thereof as well as those detailed to guard the
same, explosives, such as dynamite and blasting caps, in large quantities were channeled
from said bases into the hands of civilians, especially fishermen who used them to illegally
catch fish in rivers, particularly in Lingayen Gulf, there developed an illegal traffic in this
prohibited commodity on a more or less large scale, and the business of "buy and sell"
with its inevitable agents and middlemen, with which we have become familiar during the
Japanese occupation flourished anew, but with an innovation or added factor. There
sprang groups of people who because of lack of capital could not engage in the business,
or, spurning the illegal, the profitable traffic in this prohibited article as being too slow or
its profits as insufficient, found and developed a shortcut or easier way of making money
by pretending to have dynamite or blasting caps, luring prospective buyers to a lonely
spot and robbing them of the purchase money carried by them, even killing them in order
to eliminate all chances of detection thru witnesses. This was exactly what happened in
the present case. The three appellants in this case — Pulido, Boñgog, and Quinto and their
associates Esuagen and Sipos, were engaged in this highly profitable but infamous
business or racket off and on during 1947.
About June 10 of the same year, these five men met in the barrio of Artacho,
town of Sison, and decided to renew or to give more impetus to their slackening
business. Pulido, Boñgog, and Quinto were designated to look for prospective buyers of
blasting caps. That same day, the three met Delfin Gomez who was passing by the barrio
of Artacho, Sison on his way to his town, Sual, Pangasinan. Boñgog who was acting as
spokesman for the three asked him if he was interested in blasting caps. Gomez who saw
profit in the business said that he would look for buyers, and to assure a reasonable
margin of profit for himself, he bargained and succeeded in having the price of P8,000 a
box reduced to P7,500. In the afternoon Gomez accompanied by Boñgog went to Dagupan
and contacted Leonor Calderon, an agent who also promised to look for blasting cap
buyers. After staying in her house Gomez and Boñgog returned to Artacho, Sison, in the
morning of the 12th with the assurance of Leonor that later she would follow them with
a buyer. True enough, that same morning Leonor arrived at Artacho, accompanied by a
buyer, Margarita Surisantos Maneclang who had with her P22,000 in bills, some of which
were in large denominations.
In the meantime, and independent of and alien to the plan and measures made
and taken by the three accused and their associates, Nicasio Magdaraog acting as an
agent on his own, had been trying to interest Federico Sarmiento of Urdaneta, Pangasinan
in the purchase of No. 7 blasting caps. But Sarmiento was interested only in No. 10
blasting caps. In going to the town of Rosario where the military munitions dump was
located looking for No. 10 blasting caps, Magdaraog accompanied by Jesus Ostrea, cousin-
in-law of Sarmiento, met Leonor Calderon and learned from her that Boñgog and his
associates had plenty of blasting caps for sale, apparently the kind wanted by Sarmiento.
Ostrea was dispatched to Urdaneta to call his cousin-in-law. Later that afternoon of June
12, 1947, Ostrea arrived at Artacho accompanied by Sarmiento who brought with him
P11,000, with which to buy blasting caps. Pulido who seems to be, if not the mastermind,
at least the most active member of the gang, told the prospective buyers that he
had five cases of blasting caps but which he dared not bring or show in public because of
their prohibited nature. At the beginning, Leonor and Margarita were insisting that they
be shown samples of the blasting caps before they would seriously consider the purchase
thereof. Pulido, pretending to secure samples, left but later returned saying that he did
not succeed in his mission for the reason that the Military Police were confiscating
blasting caps and furthermore, his uncle who was really the owner of the blasting caps
refused to open any of the boxes in order to get samples therefrom. Magdaraog showed
some impatience and said that as long as Pulido and his companions had the stock for
sale, they could very well dispense with seeing samples thereof. The parties — the buyers
Sarmiento and Margarita and their agents Magdaraog and Delfin Gomez and Leonor, on
one side, and the accused represented by Pulido, on the other, finally closed the
deal. Pulido left them ostensibly to secure the mythical five cases of blasting caps and
place them at the disposal of the buyers at a secluded spot secure from the eyes of the
Military Police. He instructed the buyers to follow later and go to Doñgon bridge and once
there, call out his name "Pedro." His associate Boñgog was detailed to accompany the
purchasers. Pulido had gone to make the final arrangements and put the finishing touches
to their dastardly scheme. He rounded up his companions Quinto, Esuagen, and Sipos and
took them to Doñgon bridge to await the arrival of their victims.Pulido and Quinto were
25
provided with a carbine and a garand rifle, respectively, while Sipos carried a Thompson
Submachine gun.
About 6 o'clock that afternoon the party of purchasers left Artacho, Sison, in a
jeep bound for Doñgon bridge. Sarmiento was at the wheel. To his right were the two
women — Margarita and Leonor, and at the extreme end of the front seat was Nicasio
Magdaraog. Seated on the back seat were Jesus Ostrea on the left and to his right was
Gomez. On the right tool box was seated Boñgog.
As stated at the beginning of this decision, the party could not take the direct
road straight to Doñgon bridge because the road from Artacho to that bridge was
impassable; and so they went around to the left until they reached the road from Rosario
to Kennon road, turned to the right and crossed the Kennon bridge. To apprise drivers of
other vehicles who may be coming from the opposite direction, Sarmiento snapped on
his headlights but after leaving the bridge and turning to the right toward Doñgon bridge,
he put out his lights and continued driving up to their destination. On reaching Doñgon
bridge, the party saw that a large branch of an acacia tree, with fresh leaves, had been
placed across the southern end of the bridge so as to bar any further advance of the
vehicle. This, aside from the fact as already stated that the southern end of the bridge had
been blasted. Sarmiento got down from the jeep and walked forward presumably to see
or investigate the condition of the blasted end of the bridge and to look more closely at
the acacia branch laid across it. In order to give way to Boñgog, who went down the jeep
in order to give the signal, Magdaraog had to go down first but later it seems that he
returned to his seat. Boñgog walked forward about seven meters in front of the jeep and
called out the name of Pedro about twice. Almost immediately thereafter, a burst of fire
from at least two guns greeted the party. Sarmiento visibly hit, held up his hands and
retreated but the firing continued and he fell to the ground dead. Magdaraog got down
from the jeep in a hurry and ran northward and was able to escape. The two women also
jumped down from the jeep and scurried northward behind the vehicle in a crouching
position either to avoid the continuous fire or because they had already been hit. Delfin
Gomez before and in the act of jumping down from the jeep and attracted by source of
the fire, distinctly saw Pulido in a kneeling position in front of the jeep and about six
meters away firing a gun in the direction of the jeep. Three meters behind him was Quinto
also firing a long gun whom Gomez also saw and identified. Jesus Ostrea told the court
that he also saw Pulido firing a gun in the position already described but although he saw
a man behind him also in the act of firing, he could not identify said person. Both Gomez
and Ostrea, running northward and away from their assailants were able to escape
by jumping off the road into the ravine and later making for the mountains. During their
flight they both saw the two women crouching and crawling away from the jeep.
Thereafter, Pulido, Quinto, Boñgog, Esuagen and Sipos searched and robbed
their three dead victims — Sarmiento, Leonor and Margarita. Esuagen lifted the body of
Sarmiento, placed it under the jeep and then set fire to the vehicle. The bodies of the two
women were flung down the embankment.
The defense of alibi interposed by appellants Pulido and Quinto was correctly
rejected by the trial court on the ground that even assuming that they were really at the
places where they claim to have been that afternoon of June 12, 1947, they could well
and easily have gone to the scene of the crime to commit it. Moreover,
although Pulido claims that that afternoon he had borrowed a horse from a friend and
ridden it in search of an astray cow, a disinterested witness for the prosecution, who lived
not very far from Doñgon bridge, told the court that shortly before 6:30 that afternoon
he had seen Pulido and Quinto riding on a horse pass near his house.
Boñgog, one of the appellants herein, naturally, could not put up the same
defense of alibi for the reason that he was riding in the same jeep with the persons who
were held up and killed by his co-defendants. But he insists that he merely went to
accompany the party that was supposed to buy blasting caps from Pulido and his
companions at Doñgon bridge. There are several reasons for believing and finding Boñgog
as having taken part in the conspiracy, at least to rob the victims if not also to kill them.
When Boñgog, Pulido, and Quinto tried and succeeded in interesting Delfin Gomez in the
purchase of blasting caps on June 10, 1947, it was he (Boñgog) who acted as spokesman
for the trio. In fact he accompanied Gomez to Dagupan to look for prospective buyers,
and that fateful afternoon of June 12th, it was he who accompanied and acted as a guide
to the party of agents and buyers, and, what is more important, upon their arrival at
Doñgon bridge, it was he who gave the signal for the holdup and, possibly, also for the
firing, by calling out the name of Pedro Pulido twice. If he were an innocent party, merely
asked to accompany the purchasers, without any understanding or connivance with the
robbers and killers, he could very well have called out the name Pedro Pulido from his
seat inside the jeep, but that would have imperiled his life because at the start of the
shooting the assailant's fire was mostly concentrated on the jeep and its occupants. So,
he had to get down from the vehicle which he did. Furthermore, the fact that in spite of
the intense firing from Pulido, Quinto and Sipos, Boñgog received not even a scratch,
while Sarmiento who had also gotten down from the jeep and walked forward and was
standing not far from him, was hit, showed that the firing was not intended for him, and
that it was purposely withheld until he had negotiated a sufficient and safe distance from
the jeep and its passengers. Moreover, his written statement (Exhibit H), definitely links
him with the conspiracy.
In this connection, we shall have to rule upon the admissibility and competence
of the three written statements (Exhibits G, H, and I) of Quinto, Boñgog andPulido,
respectively, for the reason that the three appellants claim that said statements were
given under duress and to avoid further torture by the military police. We have carefully
examined the evidence on this point and we are convinced that all the three statements
were given voluntarily without undue pressure and without any promise of clemency or
reward. With the exception of Pulido, the defendants were unable and failed to show
either to the trial court or to the provincial fiscal or the justice of the peace, anything on
their persons showing any sign or trace of any torture or maltreatment. When they
appeared before justice of the peace Hermitaño to sign and ratify their statements they
made no complaints or remark in this regard. It is true that at the trial Pulido, alleging
manhandling, showed a scar on his forehead, but it was satisfactorily explained by Captain
Hidalgo and Lieutenant Perez to the court. According to them, one day upon returning to
Dagupan from Doñgon bridge where Pulido had re-enacted the commission of the crime,
they were overtaken by a six by six truck and Pulido who was in their jeep and under
custody, jumped from it, almost right in the path of the truck, either to commit suicide or
to escape. Fortunately, the wheels of the truck missed him by a matter of inches. The two
military police privates guarding him in the jeep jumped down and handled him rather
roughly believing that he was trying to escape, and the wound on his forehead may have
26
been caused by said rough handling or by his rolling over and along the road after he
jumped from the running jeep.
It is noteworthy that in none of the three statements (Exhibits G, H, and I) did
the affiants admit having taken part in the killing. Boñgog, although admitting having
taken part in the conspiracy, limited the object thereof to merely holding up the victims
and not to inflict any injuries, much less kill them. Pulido and Quinto, although admitting
having carried a carbine and a Garand rifle, respectively, said that they did not take any
part whatsoever in the killing because although he (Pulido) pressed the trigger of his
carbine three times, it did not fire; and as to Quinto, he said that his Garand rifle was
snatched away from him by Ben Suagen. If there had really been undue pressure,
intimidation, or torture by the Military Police to the extent that the three affiants no
longer had a will of their own and merely followed whatever the police wanted and
indicated, to insure conviction for the killing of the victims, it would have been easy and
convenient to have included in the three affidavits admissions and statements of a
conspiracy not only to rob but also to kill, even actual participation in the actual killing.
But this was not done. Besides, the affidavits contain so many details that could have been
known only to the three appellants but which was difficult or even impossible for the
Military Police to invent and include in the affidavits. Another consideration which should
not be overlooked is that although Delfin Gomez and Nicasio Magdaraog were strongly
suspected by the Military Police as being members of the conspiracy and were in fact
arrested and held by the Military Police, to say nothing of their being included in the
complaint or information, unlike the three appellants, these two did not subscribe any
affidavit linking themselves with the conspiracy. All these circumstances persuade and
convince us that the three statements (Exhibits G, H, and I) were made voluntarily and
are competent and admissible evidence.
The fact that Boñgog reported the robbery to the police authorities of Sison,
may at first blush appear perplexing if not intriguing, and his counsel seizes upon this
circumstance to bolster his argument that Boñgog would not have done this if he were
really guilty. Of course, the perpetrators of a crime, especially one as hideous as that we
have under consideration, do not usually report the matter to the authorities just to be
arrested and punished, unless they have a good defense, such as self-defense in a crime
of homicide or physical injuries. But as the trial court has well observed, Boñgog may have
made the report in order to divert suspicion and lead the authorities to believe that since
he reported the crime, he could not have possibly taken part in it. Another explanation
which the record reveals is that Boñgog, despite his connection with the conspiracy and
his active participation in executing and carrying it out, was, according to him omitted in
the apportionment of the loot, this, although he knew that there was much of it.
Furthermore, in making the report to the police of Sison, he was careful in excluding
himself from any connection with or participation in the commission of the crime. He
pictured himself as an innocent passenger in the jeep, merely requested by the two
women victims to accompany them and act as their guide. To his simple mind, at the time,
in making the report he was leading the authorities away from his trail because he made
himself appear as a mere innocent bystander, but at the same time getting even with his
co-conspirators who had double-crossed him.
As to the identification of Pulido and Quinto, we are satisfied that the two were
seen and sufficiently identified by Gomez while he was seated in the jeep and while
jumping down from it to flee from the firing. According to him, Pulido was not more than
six meters away from the jeep at the time, while Quinto was only about three meters
behind Pulido, both in the act of firing their guns. Ostrea who was sitting beside Gomez
on the back seat also saw these two men in the act of firing. He could identify Pulido, but
not the man behind him. The fact that Ostrea did not identify Quinto, although he could
have done so without much fear of contradiction, speaks well for his sincerity and
truthfulness.
As to whether at the time of the holdup and shooting, it was still clear and bright
for one to see and identify a person several meters away, the evidence reveals that at
about 6:30 p.m. that month of June, although the sun may have been setting or may have
even set, it was still bright. It will be remembered that in driving from Kennon bridge
southward the Doñgon bridge, Sarmiento did not use the lights of the jeep, showing that
there was sufficient light from the sun either direct or reflected from the sky, to permit
safe driving over a mountain road.
It is true, of course, that at the time the three deceased were engaged or were
engaging in illegal traffic, trying to buy a prohibited article. They were not exactly
innocent, law-abiding citizens. At the same time their open, even habitual disregard of
the law could not in any way minimize the enormity or much less justify this cold-blooded
slaughter. There was absolutely no necessity or reason for the killing, at least from the
standpoint of a successful execution of the plan of robbery. It was not necessary to fire a
single shot to bring the jeep to a stop because it was already at a standstill, and besides,
its further progress was blocked not only by the acacia branch purposely laid across the
bridge but also by the blasted condition of the southern end of the said bridge. There was
no necessity for killing the victims because surprised and caught unawares, in all
probability, they would not and could not have offered any resistance against Pulido,
Quinto, Esuagen and Sipos, three of whom were armed with automatic weapons. This,
aside from the fact that Ireneo Boñgog, a co-conspirator was armed with a revolver and
in case of resistance by the victims would assuredly, have helped his co-conspirators. The
only conceivable object for the massacre was to liquidate all possible witnesses to the
robbery. This may be inferred from the fact that after the shooting, one of the accused
remarked that three of the party, obviously referring to Gomez, Ostrea, and Magdaraog
were able to escape; and forthwith, the conspirators dispersed to hunt them down but
because of the ensuing darkness, rough terrain and vegetation, and inasmuch as they had
a head start while the conspirators were busy robbing their dead victims, Gomez, Ostrea
and Magdaraog were able to escape.
The crime committed was that of robbery with homicide. In its commission we
should consider the following circumstances. Sipos, Pulido and Quinto were each carrying
a Thompson Submachine Gun, a carbine and a Garand rifle, respectively, and actually used
them on the victims. Boñgog was carrying a revolver, although he does not appear to have
actually used it. The crime was therefore committed by a band. The trial court found that
the crime was committed with evident premeditation. On this point we have our doubts.
It is settled that evident premeditation is inherent in the crime of robbery. So, to warrant
a finding of the attendance of this aggravating circumstance in the complex crime of
robbery with homicide, it must be linked with and considered with the killing. (U.S. vs.
27
Landasan, 35 Phil., 365.) But there is no evidence that the conspirators previously planned
and agreed to kill the victims. The lower court also found the crime attended by the
aggravating circumstance of treachery. That is correct. The sudden and unexpected attack
with firearms resulting in the death of the unsuspecting and helpless victims constituted
treachery. The commission of the crime was further attended by the aggravating
circumstance of craft. The victims were lured into going to Doñgon bridge which at the
time was an isolated spot because it was the end of the road and no one would or could
pass there because of the blasted condition of the southern end thereof (as shown by
Exhibit O), U.S. vs. Gampoña (36 Phil., 817). The crime was also committed in an
uninhabited place. According to the sergeant of police who made an investigation on the
spot, the nearest house was about 200 yards away up the mountain side (p. 940, t.s.n.),
and from the data that can be gathered from the record, including the sketch (Exhibit O),
Doñgon bridge was not easily accessible because of the trees and other vegetation that
stood between said house and the bridge, to say nothing of the rough terrain. There is
even reason to believe that Doñgon bridge was not visible from the house. It is also
obvious that the bridge was purposely sought
and chosen by the appellants in order to avoid detection of the crime and preclude any
interference with its commission or any help to the victims. There was also the
circumstance that the crime was committed by attacking a vehicle. With the attendance
of all these circumstances, the case comes under the provisions of article 295 of the RPC,
as amended by Republic Act No. 12, section 2, which provides for the imposition of the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death corresponding to the complex crime of robbery
with homicide in its maximum period, namely, death.
We notice, however, that at the time Quinto testified in court in Dec, 1947, he
gave his age as eighteen, and there is no evidence to disprove his claim as to his age. It is,
consequently, obvious that at the time of the commission of the crime in June of the same
year, he was less than eighteen. We therefore have to apply the provisions of article 68,
paragraph 2 of the RPC which provides that upon an offender over fifteen and under
eighteen years of age, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be
imposed. As already stated, the penalty imposed by the law on the crime herein
committed is death. The penalty next lower is reclusion perpetua.
In view of the foregoing, we find the guilt of the appellants to have been
established beyond reasonable doubt. On Crestituto (Tito) Quinto, the penalty of death
imposed by the trial court is hereby reduced to reclusion perpetua. With regard to
Pedro Pulido and Irineo Boñgog, it becomes our painful duty to affirm the death penalty
imposed upon them by the trial court. With this modification, the decision appealed from,
is hereby affirmed with costs.
The penalty of death imposed upon Pulido and Boñgog will be carried out and
executed on a day to be fixed by the trial court, within thirty days after the return of the
record of the case to the said court.
Separate Opinions
MORAN, C.J.: Mr. Justice Ricardo Paras voted for the affirmance of the judgment of the
lower court, but, on account of his being on leave at the time of the promulgation of this
opinion, his signature does not appear herein.
9.7 On occasion of calamity or misfortune
EN BANC [G.R. No. L-26789. April 25, 1969.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DICTO ARPA and MAALUM ARPA
SYLLABUS
1.CRIMINAL LAW; ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE, PENALTY THEREFOR. — Article 294, paragraph 1 of the RPC which
defines the special, single and indivisible crime of robbery with homicide with the use of violence against, or
intimidation of any person, imposes one distinct penalty of reclusion perpetua to death "when by reason or on
occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed,"
2.ID.; ID.; CRIME COMMITTED IN CASE AT BAR. — In the case at bar, upon the accused carrying out their criminal
design to steal the motor banca, one of them, DictoArpa, started firing his revolver to scare the passengers and
fired directly at one of the passengers, hitting him at the right shoulder, and as a result, the three passengers
jumped into the sea and met their death by drowning. Even if we were to concede appellants' contention that
their original criminal design did not clearly comprehend homicide, and that homicide followed the robbery "as
an incident of the latter," still the deaths clearly resulted by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery and the
trial court therefore correctly found them guilty of the crime of robbery with triple homicide.
3.ID.; ID.; CRIME AGGRAVATED BY CIRCUMSTANCE OF UNINHABITED PLACE; ACCUSED
SOUGHT ISOLATION OF THE SEA TO ATTAIN THEIR CRIMINAL OBJECTIVE. — We hold that
the trial court correctly held that the crime committed was attended by the aggravating
circumstance of uninhabited place. The accused, in having boarded at Davao City the
motor banca, together with other passengers bound for Talicud Island, Davao, and
carrying out their criminal design of stealing the said motor banca, once it was in the
middle of the sea and when it developed engine trouble, with one of them firing revolver
shots in order to forestall any resistance, certainly cannot disclaim that they sought the
isolation of the sea to attain their criminal objective without interference.
4.ID.; ID.; CRIME IN CASE AT BAR NOT AGGRAVATED BY ITS COMMISSION ON THE
OCCASION OF A MISFORTUNE; DEVELOPMENT OF ENGINE TROUBLE OF MOTOR BANCA
AT SEA NOT A MISFORTUNE WITHIN CONTEXT OF ART. 14 PAR. 7 OF THE RPC. — The
development of engine trouble of a motor banca at sea is a misfortune, but it does not
come within the context of the phrase "other calamity or misfortune" as used in Art. 14
Par 7, of the RPC, which refers to other conditions of distress similar to those precedingly
enumerated therein, namely, "conflagration, shipwreck, earthquake, epidemic," such as
the chaotic conditions resulting from war or the liberation of the Philippines during the
last World War.
5.ID.; ID.; CRIME IN INSTANT CASE NOT MITIGATED BY LACK OF INTENT TO COMMIT SO GRAVE A WRONG. — In
the present case, the accused embarked on their most reprehensible criminal design of pirating a motor banca at
sea, firing a volley of shots at the passengers notwithstanding the lack of indications of any resistance, thus forcing
them to jump overboard in a desperate act of self preservation only to be swallowed by the sea. The accused
cannot now disclaim their lack of criminal intent and responsibility for the direct, logical and fearsome
consequences of their acts.
6.REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; VOLUNTARY PLEA OF GUILTY; ALL MATERIAL FACTS IN INFORMATION
DEEMED ADMITTED. — The accused who voluntarily pleaded guilty to the information is deemed to have
admitted all the material facts alleged in the information, including the aggravating circumstances therein alleged.
DECISION
TEEHANKEE, J p: Automatic review by this Court of the death penalty imposed by the trial
court on the accused for the crime of Robbery with Triple Homicide.
In the information filed before the Court of First Instance of Davao, the accused,
Dicto Arpa and Maalum Arpa, was charged with the crime of Robbery with Triple
Homicide (Criminal Case No. 9694) alleged to have been committed as follows:
"That on or about February 20, 1966, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, having boarded a
motor banca named "MAMI I," owned by Epimaco Mola, together with other passengers
28
bound for Talicud Island, Davao, and once the motor banca was in the middle of the sea
and when it developed engine trouble, the accused, conspiring together and helping one
another, with intent to steal the motor banca and by means of intimidation, the accused
Dicto Arpa firing his .22 cal. revolver to scare the passengers of the banca, and fired at
one of the passengers, hitting the said passenger at the right shoulder, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously took and carried away the said motor banca "MAMI I," belonging to the
said Epimaco Mola, valued at P2,100.00, to the damage and prejudice of the above-
named owner in the aforementioned amount of P2,100.00 and as a result of the jumping
into the sea of all the passengers of the motor banca, Alfonso Villegas, Bernardo Villegas
and Lourdes Villegas, all passengers of the motor banca were drowned and died."
On the scheduled date of arraignment on March 7, 1966, the accused, through their
counsel de oficio, Atty. Bernardino Bolcan, Jr., manifested their desire to plead guilty only
as to the fact of "the killing of one of the persons mentioned in the
information," 1 denying the killing of the two other persons. The fiscal, however,
manifested that the State could not agree to the accused's offer to plead guilty to only
one homicide, since "the two other persons were lost on the same occasion, . . . because
of the incident. They jumped overboard after the firing at one of the victims, . . ." 2 The
trial judge, Hon. Manases G. Reyes, accordingly did not accept the plea and reset the
arraignment for the next day, informing the accused that as the prosecution was not
agreeable to their qualified plea, they would have to enter into trial.
When the case was called on the following day, the information was read to the accused
in the dialect they understood, and both accused pleaded guilty, their counselde
oficio invoking, in their favor two mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and lack of
intent to commit so grave a wrong. The fiscal objected to the appreciation of the latter
circumstance, remonstrating that "there could be no lack of intent when they
immediately fired at one of the victims point blank with a pistol, that is fatal."
The case was submitted and the trial court rendered thereafter on March 11, 1966 its
decision, crediting the accused with the mitigating circumstance of their voluntary plea of
guilty, but rejecting the claimed mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so
grave a wrong, in view of "the nature and gravity of the offense committed." The trial
court further found two aggravating circumstances against the accused, as follows:
"A perusal of the information reveals the following allegations in the information:
". . . and once the motor banca was in the middle of the sea and when it developed engine
trouble . . ."
"These allegations to the mind of the Court constitute two aggravating circumstances.
The first underlined portion constitutes the aggravating circumstance that the crime was
committed in an uninhabited place. (People vs. Rubia, 52 Phil. 172). And the second
constitutes the aggravating circumstance that the crime is committed on the occasion of
conflagration, shipwreck, earthquake, epidemic or other calamity or misfortune.
"The Court believes that the development of engine trouble in the middle of the sea is a
misfortune which tends to create confusions and apprehensions of the passengers and,
thereby, to commit a crime at such a time the accused manifested greater perversity and
instead of rendering help increased their affliction by taking advantage of the said
misfortune.
As it is, therefore, the accused in the commission of this crime has one mitigating
circumstance in their favor and two aggravating circumstances against them, and off-
setting one another there is still remaining one aggravating circumstance against the
accused."
Consequently, the trial court sentenced each of the accused to the penalty of death and
ordered both of them, jointly and severally, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
Alfonso Villegas, Bernardo Villegas and Lourdes Villegas in the amount of P6,000.00 for
each of them, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency by reason of the
penalty imposed, and to indemnify Epimaco Mola in the sum of P2,100.00, and to pay the
costs proportionately.
For purposes of this review, Atty. Antonio L. Africa was appointed counsel de oficio for
the accused, Upon the latter's request for such counsel. Said counsel urges the reversal
of the death sentence, and the Solicitor-General recommends the affirmance thereof.
Counsel for the accused in a well-prepared brief, assigns the following errors: —
"I.THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED IS ROBBERY
WITH TRIPLE HOMICIDE.
"II.THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED WAS ATTENDED
BY THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF UNINHABITED PLACE AND ON THE OCCASION
OF A MISFORTUNE.
"III.THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE
OF LACK OF INTENT TO COMMIT SO GRAVE A WRONG AS THAT COMMITTED.
"IV.THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING UPON THE ACCUSED THE SUPREME PENALTY
OF DEATH."
The accused, having voluntarily pleaded guilty to the information, come under the firmly
settled doctrine of being deemed to have admitted all the material facts alleged in the
information, including the aggravating circumstances therein alleged. 5
The first error assigned that "if the original criminal design does not clearly comprehend
homicide, (in view of the allegations in the information that the accused's intent was to
steal the motor banca and that accused Dicto Arpa fired his .22 cal. revolver to scare the
passengers of the banca), but homicide follows the robbery as an incident of the latter,
the criminal acts should be viewed as constitutive of two offenses, and not as a single
special offense (of robbery with homicide)" 6 is without merit. Art. 294, paragraph 1 of
the RPC which defines the special, single and indivisible crime of robbery with homicide
with the use of violence against, or intimidation of any person, imposes one distinct
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death "when by reason or on occasion of the robbery,
the crime of homicide shall have been committed." In the case of People vs. Mangulabnan
et al., 7 this Court pointed out that the "English version of the Code is a poor translation
of the prevailing Spanish text of said paragraph, which reads as follows:
"I.o Con la pena de reclusion perpetua a muerte, cuando con motivo o' con ocasion del
robo resultare homicidio."
"We see, therefore, that in order to determine the existence of the crime of robbery with
homicide it is enough that a homicide would result by reason or on the occasion of the
robbery (Decision of the SC of Spain of Nov 26, 1892, and Jan 7, 1878, quoted in 2 Hidalgo's
Penal Code, p. 267 and 259-260, respectively). This High Tribunal speaking of the
accessory character of the circumstances leading to the homicide, has also held that it is
immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident (Decision of Sep 9, 1886;
Oct 22, 1907; April 30, 1910 and July 14, 1917), provided that the homicide be produced
29
by reason or on occasion of the robbery, inasmuch as it is only the result obtained,
without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes, modes or persons
intervening in the commission of the crime, that has to be taken into consideration
(Decision of Jan 12, 1889 — see Cuello Calon's Codigo Penal, pp. 501-502)."
In that case, one of the two unidentified co-participants of the appellant Mangulabnan
climbed up a table and fired at the ceiling, which was conceded to be "an unpremeditated
act that surged on the spur of the moment and possibly without any idea that Vicente
Pacson was hiding therein" that resulted in the killing of said Vicente Pacson, but said
appellant having been shown to have participated in the criminal design to commit the
robbery with his co-defendants was held guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide.
Here, upon the accused carrying out their criminal design to steal the motor banca, one
of them, Dicto Arpa, started firing his revolver to scare the passengers and fired directly
at one of the passengers, hitting him at the right shoulder, and as a result, the three
passengers jumped into the sea and met their death by drowning. Even if we were to
concede appellants' contention that their original criminal design did not clearly
comprehend homicide, and that homicide followed the robbery "as an incident of the
latter," still the deaths clearly resulted by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery and
the trial court therefore correctly found them guilty of the crime of robbery with triple
homicide.
The remaining errors assigned concern the trial court's appreciation and finding of two
aggravating circumstances as against one mitigating circumstance of a voluntary plea of
guilty in the commission of the crime and the mandatory imposition, as a consequence,
of the penalty of death.
We hold that the trial court correctly held that the crime committed was attended by the
aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place. The accused, in having boarded at Davao
City the motor banca, together with other passengers bound for Talicud Island, Davao,
and carrying out their criminal design of stealing the said motor banca, once it was in the
middle of the sea and when it developed engine trouble, with one of them firing revolver
shots in order to forestall any resistance, certainly cannot disclaim that they sought the
isolation of the sea to attain their criminal objective without interference. As held by this
Court in People vs. Rubia, 8 the aggravating circumstance of the crime of homicide having
been committed in an uninhabited place must be considered, where the deed was
committed at sea, where it was difficult for the offended party to receive any help, while
the assailants could easily have escaped punishment, and the purely accidental
circumstance that another banca carrying the eyewitnesses to the crime was also at sea
in the vicinity at the time without the assailants' knowledge is no argument against the
appreciation of said circumstance.
We hold, however, against the trial court's finding of a second aggravating circumstance
in that the crime was committed "on the occasion of a conflagration, shipwreck,
earthquake, epidemic, or other calamity or misfortune." 9 In so holding, the trial Court
reasoned:
"The Court believes that the development of engine trouble in the middle of the sea is a
misfortune which tends to create confusions and apprehensions of the passengers and,
thereby, to commit a crime of such a time the accused manifested greater perversity and
instead of rendering help increased their affliction by taking advantage of the said
misfortune." (Decision, p. 3)
The development of engine trouble at sea is a misfortune, but it does not come within the
context of the phrase "other calamity or misfortune" as used in Article 14, paragraph 7 of
the RPC, which refer to other conditions of distress similar to those precedingly
enumerated therein, namely, "conflagration, shipwreck, earthquake, epidemic," such as
the chaotic conditions resulting from war or the liberation of the Philippines during the
last World War. The reason for the provision of this aggravating circumstance "is found in
the debased form of criminality met in one who, in the midst of a great calamity, instead
of lending aid to the afflicted, adds to their suffering by taking advantage of their
misfortune to despoil them." 10 Clearly, no such condition of great calamity or misfortune
existed when the motor banca developed engine trouble.
It should be added that there is nothing in the record whatever to indicate that the engine
trouble developed was a serious one such as to create confusion and apprehension on
the part of the passengers as perceived by the trial court, and that the same was not easily
repaired; if at all, the indications are to the contrary, for as alleged in the information, the
accused succeeded in stealing the motor banca at sea.
We hold also against the accused's claim of a second mitigating circumstance of lack of
intent to commit so grave a wrong. The trial court correctly held that this circumstance
could not properly be appreciated in favor of the accused "viewed from the nature and
gravity of the offense committed." As previously pointed out by this Court in the case of
People vs. Boyles, 11 the true nature of this circumstance "addresses itself to the
intention of the offender at the particular moment when he executes or commits the
criminal act; not to his intention during the planning stage. Therefore, when, as in the
case under review the original plan was only to rob, but which plan, on account of the
resistance offered by the victim, was compounded into the more serious crime of robbery
with homicide, the plea of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong cannot be rightly
granted." In the present case, the accused embarked on their most reprehensible criminal
design of pirating a motor banca at sea, firing a volley of shots at the passengers
notwithstanding the lack of indications of any resistance, thus forcing them to jump
overboard in a desperate act of self-preservation only to be swallowed by the sea. The
accused cannot now disclaim their lack of criminal intent and responsibility for the direct,
logical and fearsome consequences of their unlawful acts.
As thus established, therefore, the crime committed was Robbery with Triple Homicide,
attended by the aggravating circumstance of the same having been committed in an
uninhabited place which is offset by the accused's voluntary plea of guilty, and the proper
imposable penalty is the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua. (Article 294, paragraph 1 in
relation to Article 63, RPC). The compensatory damages awarded to the heirs of the
victims should properly be increased to P12,000.00 (People vs. Pantoja, G.R. L-18793, Oct.
11, 1968)
It may be noted that even if the accused were to be granted the additional claimed
mitigating circumstance of lack of intent, the said imposable penalty would still be the
same. 12 The question of the fact of death of the two other passengers, since the accused
deny knowledge of the fact of their death, as their counsel in the lower court claimed that
there was no showing of such fact, 13 although both counsels in this Court as well as in
the lower court do not dispute the "judicial admission by the accused appellants of the
fact of killing (death) of one of the persons named in the information" 14 would not affect
the nature of the single and indivisible crime of Robbery with Homicide committed by the
30
accused nor the proper imposable penalty as herein established, since all the homicides
perpetrated by reason or occasion of the robbery are merged in the composite,
integrated whole that constitutes the crime of robbery with homicide.
Nevertheless, we feel constrained to add that in reviewing the records of the case, we
were struck with the paucity of facts and evidence attending the commission of the crime
other than those stated in the information and other circumstances that would aid the
Court in its ordained task of passing en consulta upon the legality and propriety of the
death penalty imposed by the trial court, e.g. the age and education or lack thereof of the
accused, and whether there were other passengers who survived, aside from the three
persons named in the information as having drowned, as well as what the crew did, if
anything, during the commission of the crime. Were it not for the conclusion here reached
of imposing the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua, by virtue of our disallowance of the
additional aggravating circumstance of calamity or misfortune found by the trial court,
we might have been constrained to remand the case for new trial to the court a quo in
order to satisfy ourselves as to the degree of culpability of the accused in relation to the
death penalty imposed, especially since the information did not expressly designate as
such the aggravating circumstances found by the trial court and there was no discussion
nor spelling out thereof whatever in the eight-page transcript of the entire proceedings.
We therefore reiterate the rule of practice recommended since the early cases of
U.S. vs. Talbanos 16 and U.S. vs. Rota, 17 set out in Rule 118, Section 5 of the Rules of
Court, 18 and thereafter suggested in a number of cases, lastly, in the case of
People vs. Bulalake, 19 where this Court said:
"It is of course true that the taking of such evidence is a matter left to the discretion of
the trial court. Nevertheless, inasmuch as judgments of conviction imposing the extreme
penalty of death are subject to review by the SC as law and justice shall dictate, whether
the defendant appeals or not, which automatic review neither the Court nor the accused
could waive or evade it would seem that the proper and prudent course to follow where
the accused enters a plea of 'guilty' to capital offenses specially where he is an ignorant
person with little or no education, is to take testimony not only to satisfy the trial judge
himself but to aid the SC in determining whether the accused really and truly understood
and comprehended the meaning, full significance and consequences of his plea."
WHEREFORE, the decision under review is modified: the accused are imposed the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and ordered, jointly and severally, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased Alfonso Villegas, Bernardo Villegas and Lourdes Villegas in the amount of
P12,000.00 for each of them, and Epimaco Mola in the sum of P2,100.00, and
proportionately, to pay the costs.
9.8 Aid of armed men
EN BANC [G.R. No. L-34089. August 1, 1978.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GAUDENCIO CANDADO y SARTE, REYNALDO SADIE y
MALANA, and MANUEL MAGLALANG y MALDA
SYNOPSIS
Appellants were charged with murder under an amended Information which
alleged conspiracy, evident premeditation, and treachery. In view of their positive
identification by the prosecution witness whose testimony was found by the trial court as
trustworthy and more credible than their denials and alibis, appellants were sentenced
to suffer the penalty of death, indemnify the heirs and pay moral and exemplary damages.
The SC, in affirming the decision appealed from, ruled that the evidence for the
prosecution is sufficient to sustain conviction. However, because of the absence of any
attending circumstance, the penalty for the crime of murder in its medium period which
is reclusion perpetua was imposed.
Decision affirmed with modification.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; ACCUSED; POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION; EFFECT. — Where the accused were
positively identified as among the perpetrators of the crime by the prosecution whose testimony was found by
the trial court as trustworthy and more credible than the denials and alibis of the accused, which alibis were not
established by full, clear and satisfactory evidence, the judgment of conviction will be affirmed.
2. ID.; ALIBI; EVIDENCE; MUST BE POSITIVE AND SATISFACTORY. — Alibi is generally a weak defense
since it is easy to concoct. For this reason, the courts view it with caution and accept it only when proved by
positive, clear and satisfactory evidence. And for alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that defendant was
somewhere else when the crime was committed. It must likewise be demonstrated that it was physically
impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time.
3. ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY; WHEN DEFENSE NOT GIVEN WEIGHT. — The defense of alibi of the accused
cannot be given weight where the factors of distance, time and means of travel do not preclude the possibility
for the accused to be at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. Furthermore, it cannot merit
credence where the corroborative witnesses for the defense have a clear interest in the fate of the accused, being
close relatives and friends, and especially where their presence and participation in the occurrence have been
established by the positive testimonies of eyewitnesses.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; WEIGHT GIVEN BY TRIAL COURT GENERALLY ACCEPTED. — Since the defense of alibi
raises an issue of fact that hinges on credibility, and the credibility of an alibi depends to a great extent on the
credibility of the witnesses who seek to establish it, the relative weight which the trial judge assigns to the
testimony of said witnesses must, unless patently and clearly inconsistent with the evidence on record, be
accepted. For, as is well recognized, his proximate contact with those who take the witness stand places him,
compared to appellate Justices, in a more competent position to discriminate between the true and the false.
5. ID.; EVIDENCE; WITNESSES; CREDIBILITY; WHEN TESTIMONY OF ONE WITNESS SUFFICIENT. — In
the determination of values and credibility of evidence, witnesses are to be weighed and not numbered. The
testimony of only one witness, if credible and positive and if it satisfies the court beyond reasonable doubt, is
sufficient to convict.
6. ID.; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES; TREACHERY; WHEN PRESENT; EFFECT.
— A sudden and unexpected attack under circumstances which render the victim unable
to defend himself by reason of the suddenness and severity of the attack
constitutes alevosia. The circumstance of treachery qualifies the killing as murder.
7. ID.; ID.; ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH; ABSORBED BY TREACHERY. — The
aggravating circumstance of superior strength is absorbed in the qualifying circumstance
of treachery.
8. ID.; ID.; AID OF ARMED MEN WHEN ABSENT. — The generic aggravating
circumstance of "aid of armed men" should not be applied in this case, considering that
appellants, as well as those who cooperated with them in the commission of the crime in
question, acted under the same plan and for the same purpose.
9. ID.; MURDER; PENALTY, IN THE ABSENCE OF MODIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE. — In the absence of
modifying circumstance, the court will impose the prescribed penalty for murder in its medium period, that
is, reclusion perpetua.
10. ID.; CONSPIRACY; WHEN PRESENT. — Conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to am agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide to
commit it. The agreement of which the law speaks is not limited to one which is written
or otherwise expressly or directly made prior to the commission of the crime. It is not
31
necessary that the parties, for an appreciable time prior to the commission of the crime,
had actually come together and agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a
common design. It is enough for it to exist that, at the time the offense was committed,
the participants had the same purpose and were united in its execution; as may be
inferred from the attendant circumstances.
11. ID.; ID.; EVIDENCE; DIRECT PROOF NOT REQUIRED. — While conspiracy to commit a crime must
be established by positive evidence, direct proof is not required. Such kind of proof is seldom available because
of the nature of conspiracy, which is planned in utmost secrecy. Circumstantial evidence, provided it is competent
and convincing, will therefore be sufficient to establish conspiracy.
12. ID.; ID.; LIABILITY OF CONSPIRATORS. — In conspiracy, the act of any of the
conspirators becomes the act of all the others and responsibility for the act will be borne
by them equally regardless of the degree of their respective participation in the execution
of the act. Also, once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators
are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their respective active
participation in the commission of the crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the
conspiracy because in contemplation of law, the act of one is the act of all.
13. ID.; ID.; ID.; BASIS. — The rule that the act of one of the conspirators is the
act of all the others is anchored on the sound principle that when two or more persons
unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether through the physical volition of one, or all,
proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose evil will actively contributes to
the wrongdoing is in law responsible for the whole, the same as though performed by
himself alone.
DECISION
ANTONIO, J p: Automatic review of the decision of Circuit Criminal Court, Seventh Judicial
District, Pasig, Rizal, in its Criminal Case No. CCC-VII-464-P.C., for Murder.
Gaudencio Candado y Sarte, Reynaldo Sadie y Malana and Manuel Maglalang y
Malda were charged with Murder under an Amended Information, alleging that on Sep 1,
1970, the said accused conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one
another without justifiable cause, with deliberate intent to kill and with treachery
aforethought and evident premeditation, hacked and stabbed to death Mario San Juan.
After due trial the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal rendered a decision
convicting said accused as charged and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of
DEATH, with the corresponding accessory penalties, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased, Mario San Juan, in the sum of P12,000.00 jointly and severally, to pay the
amount of P10,000.00 as moral damages and another P10,000.00 as exemplary damages,
and to pay the costs.
The prosecution predicated its case on the testimony of Dario Nalagan, Alberto
Fernandez, Rafael Atizado and Reynaldo Leyva.
Dario Nalagan, a Senior Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of
Investigation, testified that he performed a post mortem examination on the remains of
one Mario San Juan y del Rosario on Sep 3, 1970 at about 11:00 a.m. upon the request of
one Mrs. Felicitas Piñon, a sister of the deceased, and that he submitted Necropsy Report
No. N-70-1523 (Exhibit "A") and the diagram consisting of two (2) pages, showing the
different injuries found on the body of the deceased (Exhibits "A-1" to "A-2").
He further testified that the deceased sustained eighteen (18) stab wounds on
the different parts of the body which could have been caused by a sharp-single-bladed
instrument like a "balisong" or similar instrument and twelve (12) hacking wounds, mostly
found on the head, which could have been caused by either a single-bladed sharp
instrument like a small bolo or a bayonet. He explained that there were at least two (2)
kinds of instruments which were used to inflict the wounds on the deceased and that
there were at least two (2) assailants. In connection with the stab wounds sustained by
the deceased, one was on the right of the anterior chest, two on the left lower chest, and
one on the right lower abdomen, while the remaining stab wounds were found on the
back. The hacking wounds were mostly found on the left side and back of the head, one
near the parietal-occipital region and one in the front cutting the nose and exposing the
bone. Out of the eighteen (18) stab wounds sustained by the deceased, eight (8) were
perforating wounds which practically caused the death of the deceased through
hemorrhage and that either of the eight was fatal enough to cause the death of the victim.
He also opined that it is possible that some of the wounds were sustained by the deceased
while he was standing, and some were sustained when he was already in prone position.
Nalagan identified the signatures appearing on Exhibit "A", aside from his own,
as those of Dr. Brion and Dr. Sunico, also of the National Bureau of Investigation. He
affirmed the authenticity and veracity of the said exhibit, and also Exhibits "A-1" and "A-
2", and acknowledged them as his work by signing the same before the court.
Rafael Atizado, a police sergeant of the Pasay City Police Department, declared
that while on duty in the night of Sep 1, 1970, he received an information from the PGH
that a dead male person had been taken to the said hospital. With Reynaldo Leyva, he
went to the hospital and there he saw a dead person, whom they could not identify, with
several head and body wounds. The following morning, a certain Felicitas San Juan, sister
of the deceased, came to their office to inform them that before the fatal incident in
question, her brother left their house at Protacio Street, accompanied by two
companions, one of whom she identified as Alberto Fernandez. Acting on said
information, the Pasay City Police Department asked this sister of the victim to invite the
two companions of her brother to said office for investigation. On Sep 5, 1970, she arrived
with Alberto Fernandez and Manuel Tawatao. It was on that meeting that Alberto
Fernandez told the police that two of the eight persons in the group who killed the victim
were Gaudencio Candado and Reynaldo Sadie.
Testifying further, Sgt. Atizado stated that Gaudencio Candado and Reynaldo
Sadie were arrested on Sep 5, 1970 and Sep 7, 1970, respectively, and both were
investigated by his office. He also stated that according to his findings, Candado used a
bolo in killing the victim. For further verification, he went to the place of the incident to
conduct further investigation but could not find anybody willing to give any information.
Reynaldo Leyva, an Investigator of the Pasay City Police Dept, substantially
corroborated the testimony of Rafael Atizado, and in addition he declared that he was not
able to find the bolos and knives that were used in the commission of the crime.
The testimony of Alberto Fernandez, 21 years of age, a driver, which is the main
prop of the case of the State, is as follows: On Sep 1, 1970, at about 7:00 PM, he, Mario
San Juan and Manuel Tawatao, a tricycle driver, were walking along Aurora Street, Pasay
City on their way to a bakery to inform another friend, a certain Leo, who was working
therein, about the forthcoming confirmation of a child of Fernandez whom Leo was
supposed to be the godfather. As they were about 5 meters from the bakery, they saw
the group of Gaudencio Candado alias "Godong", Reynaldo Sadie alias "McCoy", Manuel
32
Maglalang alias "Boy Bara", Nardong Bungal, Pamboy and three others drinking wine at
the window sill of the bakery. It was then showering. But apparently apprehensive that
these persons, who already appeared drunk, may inflict harm upon them, they desisted
from entering the bakery and instead attempted to walk away. It was at this juncture
when he heard one of the group say "ayun" and then suddenly somebody hacked the
back of Mario San Juan. Upon looking back, he saw GaudencioCandado, Reynaldo Sadie
and "Boy Bara" holding bolos. He held San Juan in order to help him but the group
continued to attack them. When San Juan was hacked for the second time, he urged his
companions to run away. This they did, but San Juan, who was already wounded,
stumbled and was overtaken at
the corner of Facundo St. by Candado, Sadie, "Boy Bara" and "Nardo". The three
— Candado, Sadie and "Bungal" continued to hack and stab the victim. He and Tawatao,
who were both unarmed, could not do anything while they watched in horror and
frustration, as San Juan was hacked and stabbed by his assailants. Thereafter the
assailants turned their attention on Alberto Fernandez and Manuel Tawatao. The two,
upon seeing the group going after them, ran for their lives. They went to Libertad Street
to look for a mobile patrol but they found none. As it was then raining heavily and the
streets were flooded, they went home. Fernandez told Tawatao to go to the house of the
sister of the deceased to inform her about the fact that befell her brother.
The defense of the accused is alibi. Jaime San Pedro testified that on Sep 1, 1970,
at about 6:00 o'clock p.m. while buying bread in a bakery at Aurora Street, Pasay City, he
noticed a group of eight (8) men, four (4) of whom were drinking wine. He knew some of
them only by their aliases as "Nardong Bungal", "Ding Oxo" and "Bombay". As he was
waiting for his change, he heard a man with two companions standing in the middle of
the street, challenging the group of "Nardong Bungal" to a fight. He saw one of the three
stab "Nardong Bungal" and all of a sudden the four companions of "Nardong Bungal"
chased the three with their bolos and later saw the four overtake and hack and stab the
three men. Sometime later, when he was on his way home, he saw many people staring
at a man lying on the street bathed with blood.
Leon Santos Jr., a patrolman of the Pasay City Police Department, testified that
at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening of August 13, 1970, he was informed that a certain
"Boy Hapon" and Maximo Beneng were trying to stage a riot at Silva Street. On the basis
of that information, he and Pat. Remorin waited for the two but they did not appear. On
Sep 2, 1970, he investigated a certain "Nugnug" who saw the incident of Sep 1, 1970 and
obtained the information that "Boy Hapon" and "Mariong Bawang", together with
another companion, were walking along Aurora Street and that "Nardong Bungal" and
"Edeng" were the only perpetrators of the crime.
Alberto Fernandez, a witness for the prosecution, was presented by the defense
only to state that on Sep 1, 1970, he did not report the matter to the Pasay City Police
and did not at once tell the incident to the sister of the deceased for fear that she might
be shocked.
Gaudencio Candado, one of the accused and a rig driver by occupation, totally
denied his involvement in the crime. He stated that on Sep 1, 1970, he drove his calesa
from past 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon until 9:00 o'clock in the evening plying the Libertad
corner Taft Avenue-Bangkal, Makati route; that he knew Alberto Fernandez for they
formerly belonged to the same gang and it was Fernandez who put the tatoo marks on
his (Candado's) body; that Alberto Fernandez testified against him because he implicated
Fernandez before the CIS as the one who stabbed his friend, Manuel Pasawa, on August
25, 1970.
Reynaldo Sadie also denied any participation in the crime. He declared that on
Sep 1, 1970, at around 8:00 o'clock in the morning, he was in Baclaran; at 1:00 o'clock
p.m. he was in the Municipal Court at Las Piñas as a witness in the killing of one Amor and
at 7:00 p.m., he was in the Pasay City market making sausages with his brother and a
companion named Danny. After finishing his work, he went home to Pinagbarilan, Pasay
City. He knew Alberto Fernandez alias "Boy Hapon" because on August 25, 1970,
Fernandez saw him at Pinagbarilan and accused him (Sadie) of spreading the news that
they were enemies, which he denied. That on this day, Fernandez stabbed Manuel Pasawa
in the elbow and he (Sadie) helped Pasawa get to the hospital. He claimed further that he
did not see Maglalang the whole day of Sep 1, 1970.
Manuel Pasawa, a former driver and admittedly a member of Sputnik gang,
declared that he was stabbed by "Boy Hapon" on August 25, 1970 at Pinagbarilan, Pasay
City and that Reynaldo Sadie brought him to the Philippine General Hospital for
treatment.
Domingo Sadie, meat vendor, attempted to bolster Reynaldo Sadie's alibi that
from 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of Sep 1, 1970 until 8:00 or 9:00 o'clock in the evening,
Sadie helped him in making sausages in the Pasay City market.
Benito Alcaraz, rig driver, was also presented to support
Gaudencio Candado's alibi that the latter drove his rig on Sep 1, 1970 from 3:00 o'clock in
the afternoon up to past 8:00 o'clock in the evening at Libertad Street, Pasay City.
Jose Paredes, patrolman, of Makati, testified that on Sep 1, 1970 at about 10:00
o'clock in the evening, he was on board a Marikina Valley bus bound for Baclaran. While
still in the bus, a group of men who were all armed with pistols and knives, boarded the
bus in front of the Magallanes establishment in Highway 54. When two of the group saw
his cap identifying him as a Makati policeman, they pointed their guns at him and one
pointed a knife at his back. The group then divested the passengers of their money and
watches. His wrist watch and service pistol were taken from him by the holduppers. He
claimed that he was not able to use his gun because he was outnumbered and his pistol
was not loaded. He recognized Alberto Fernandez was one of the robbers because
Fernandez was the one talking to the driver and the last one to alight from the bus. When
he learned that the Quezon City Police arrested a holdupper and given information by the
Pasay City Police, he went to the Pasay City Jail where he identified Alberto Fernandez as
one of the holduppers who held up the Marikina Valley bus. He knew also that "Boy
Hapon" is the alias of Alberto Fernandez.
Manuel Sararana, Police Sergeant of the Makati Police Department, testified
that on Dec 8, 1970, he investigated Alberto Fernandez in connection with the robbery in
band which occurred at 10:00 o'clock in the evening of Sep 1, 1970 in Makati, Rizal.
Manuel Maglalang claimed that he did not know of a person by the name of
Mario San Juan. He also denied participation in the stabbing of San Juan, explaining that
he was in Barrio Lacmit, Arayat, Pampanga, with a friend, Manuel Guese, in the house of
Aling Obing from August 27, 1970 and only returned to Manila on Sep 6, 1970. He,
however, admitted that he has known Alberto Fernandez since 1967; that he and
Fernandez were both members of Sigue-Sigue gang; that he was involved in a robbery
33
case wherein he was sentenced to one year imprisonment; that he did not
know Candado before but he had met Sadie once, only he could not remember when;
that Fernandez pointed to him as one of those responsible for the killing of Mario San
Juan because Fernandez got mad at him when he refused to join the group of Fernandez
in robbing tourists and Fernandez suspected him as the one who reported the matter to
the police; that another reason why Fernandez was mad at him was his resignation as
member and leader of the Sigue-Sigue gang.
Manuel Guese, a friend and provincemate of accused Manuel Maglalang,
testified that he knows the latter, being his friend; that Maglalang stated in their house in
Barrio Lacmit, Arayat, Pampanga, from August 27, 1970 and left for Manila on Sep 6, 1970.
It is not disputed that Mario San Juan died of stab wounds on Sep 1, 1970 at
about 7:30 p.m. and that a post mortem examination performed on his body on Sep 3,
1970 by Dario Nalagan, a Senior Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI, showing that the
deceased sustained eighteen (18) stab wounds which could have been caused by sharp
single-bladed instrument like a "balisong" on different parts of the body and 12 hacking
wounds, which could have been caused by either a single-bladed sharp instrument like a
bolo or bayonet, mostly found on the head, and that anyone of the eight out of the
eighteen stab wounds which perforated the ascending colon, the upper and lower lobe
left lung, the lower lobe of the right lung, the right kidney and right lobe of the liver caused
the death of the deceased through hemorrhage, and
that all these wounds could have been inflicted by no less than two (2) persons.
Since all the appellants put up the common defense of denial and alibi, the issue
is one of credibility. On this point, appellants were positively identified as among the
perpetrators of the crime by Alberto Fernandez. The trial court was convinced of the
trustworthiness and credibility of Fernandez' testimony, We agree with the findings of the
trial court that the evidence for the prosecution is sufficient to sustain a conviction for
the commission of the crime with which the accused were charged. The positive
identification of the three accused as among those who attacked Mario San Juan by
means of bolos and knives by Alberto Fernandez, who himself barely escaped injury by
the skin of his teeth, appears more credible than the denials and alibis of the three
accused, which alibis were not established by full, clear and satisfactory evidence. His
narration of the manner in which the victim was attacked by the appellants finds
corroboration in the testimony of Dario Nalagan of the NBI who testified that the victim
has suffered no less than eighteen (18) stab wounds, twelve (12) hacking wounds and was
attacked by two or more assailants.Cdpr
As repeatedly pronounced by this Court, alibi is generally a weak defense since
it is easy to concoct. For this reason, the courts view it with caution and accept it only
when proved by positive, clear and satisfactory evidence. 1 And for alibi to prosper, it is
not enough to prove that defendant was somewhere else when the crime was committed.
It must likewise be demonstrated that it was physically impossible for him to have been
at the scene of the crime at the time. 2 And since the defense of alibi raises an issue of
fact that hinges on credibility, and the credibility of an alibi depends to a great extent on
the credibility of the witnesses who seek to establish it, the relative weight which the trial
judge assigns to the testimony of said witnesses must, unless patently and clearly
inconsistent with the evidence on record, be accepted. For, as is well recognized, his
proximate contact with those who take the witness stand places him, compared to
appellate Justices, in a more competent position to discriminate between the true and
the false. 3
The defense of alibi of the accused cannot be given weight. The factors of
distance, time and means of travel do not preclude the possibility for the accused to be
at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. Both Gaudencio Candado, who
claimed to be plying the Libertad, Pasay City-Bangkal, Makati route, and Reynaldo Sadie,
who claimed to be at the Pasay city market, could easily have gone to Aurora Street, a
place not so remote. The alibi of Manuel Maglalang that he was in Arayat, Pampanga
when the crime was committed does not, likewise, preclude the probability of his
presence in Pasay City on Sep 1970, considering the distance between Arayat, Pampanga
and Pasay City and the facility of transportation between the two places. Further, the
defense of alibi cannot merit credence where the corroborative witnesses for the defense
have a clear interest in the fate of the accused, being close relatives and friends, and
especially where their presence and participation in the occurrence have been
established by the positive testimonies of eyewitnesses. 4
Counsels for the accused assailed the credibility of the testimony of Alberto
Fernandez for being uncorroborated and claimed that he could not be an eyewitness to
the incident as he was at that time robbing passengers of a Marikina Valley bus along
Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, Makati, Rizal. To support this claim, Pat. Jose Paredes of
the Makati Police, allegedly one of the victims of the robbery, appeared as a witness and
identified Alberto Fernandez as one of those who had robbed him. But the testimony of
this witness does not belie Fernandez allegation that he was an eyewitness to the
incident. The record reveals that the robbery was allegedly perpetrated at 10:00 PM while
the slaying of Mario San Juan was committed at 7:00 o'clock that same evening. Even the
testimony of Jaime San Pedro, a defense witness, strengthens and reinforces Alberto
Fernandez' testimony when he stated that on Sep 1, 1970 at about 6:00 o'clock in the
evening, when he went to a bakery at Aurora Street, Pasay City to buy bread, he noticed
eight (8) persons at the bakery, four (4) of whom were drinking wine; that while he was
waiting for his change, he heard one of the three persons in the middle of the street
challenging the drinking group to a fight; that one of the three stabbed "Nardong Bungal"
and the four (4) chased the three with bolos on their hands; and that on his way home he
was among those who saw a prostrate man on the street bathed with blood. If Alberto
Fernandez was not among the three in the middle of the street, how could he narrate
vividly the sequences of the incident, from the time his group left the house of the victim's
sister up to the time he and Tawatao fled to Libertad Street?
Concerning the uncorroborated testimony of Alberto Fernandez, this Court has
already ruled that in the determination of values and credibility of evidence, witnesses
are to be weighed and not numbered. The testimony of only one witness, if credible and
positive and if it satisfied the court beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient to convict. 5
We find from the circumstances the attendance of treachery in the commission
of the crime. The attack was deliberate as shown by the fact that the accused had
previously armed themselves with bolos and knives. It was sudden and unexpected and
without warning and without giving an opportunity to the victim to defend himself or
repel the initial assault. It is evident from the record that the deceased was hacked and
stabbed while his back was turned toward the accused, as he was then in the act of
running away. Appellants made sure that the victim could not defend himself by
34
surrounding him and inflicting the wounds upon him by turns. We have held in various of law, the act of one is the act of all. The foregoing rule is anchored on the sound principle
cases that a sudden and unexpected attack under circumstances which render the victim that when two or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether through
unable to defend himself by reason of the suddenness and severity of the attack the physical volition of one, or all, proceeding severally or collectively, each individual
constitutes alevosia. The circumstance of treachery qualifies the killing as murder. 6 whose evil will actively contributes to the wrongdoing is in law responsible for the whole,
Counsel for appellants Candado and Maglalang contended that conspiracy has the same as though performed by himself alone. 14
not been proven by positive and convincing evidence and since Alberto Fernandez cannot Appellants also contended that the aggravating circumstance of evident
positively identify the persons who actually inflicted the wounds of the deceased, it was premeditation should not be appreciated in this case. There is an apparent oversight
an error for the trial court to convict the appellants on a mere surmise or conjecture. committed by the appellants on this point. The trial court did not find the attendance of
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to am agreement concerning the this circumstance in its decision.
commission of a crime and decide to commit it. 7 Considering that the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is
The agreement of which the law speaks is not limited to one which is written or absorbed in the qualifying circumstance of treachery, It would be pointless to discuss
otherwise expressly or directly made prior to the commission of the crime. 8 It is not whether or not under the circumstances of the case such aggravating circumstance also
necessary that the parties, for an appreciable time prior to the commission of the crime, exists. cdphil
had actually come together and agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a The generic aggravating circumstance of "aid of armed men" should not be
common design. It is enough for it to exist that, at the time the offense was committed, applied in this case, considering that appellants, as well as those who cooperated with
the participants had the same purpose and were united in its execution; as may be them in the commission of the crime in question, acted under the same plan and for the
inferred from the attendant circumstances. While conspiracy to commit a crime must be same purpose.
established by positive evidence, direct proof is not required. Each kind of proof is seldom There being no other modifying circumstance attendant, as the Solicitor General
available because of the nature of conspiracy, which is planned in utmost secrecy. correctly observed, the lower court should have imposed the prescribed penalty in its
Circumstantial evidence, provided it is competent and convincing, will therefore be medium period, i.e., reclusion perpetua.
sufficient to establish conspiracy. WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with the
The Solicitor General cited the following circumstances as an indication that the modification that appellants are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
accused acted in concert and in pursuance of the same objective: perpetua.
"1. On Sep 1, 1970 at about 7:00 PM, the group of the deceased did not reach
their destination, the bakery located at Aurora St., Pasay City, because they tried to avoid
the group of the defendants who were then drinking at the bakery;
"2. While the deceased's group was turning back, they were spotted by the
defendants who simultaneously said 'ayun-ayun' (tsn, p. 5, Dec. 3, 1970);
"3. When the deceased had turned his hack from defendants' group, he was
hacked on the head (tsn, p. 8, Dec. 28, 1970);
"4. Inspite of the wound, deceased tried to run but the defendants chased him
until he fell down at Facundo St., Pasay City;
"5. Helpless and unarmed, the defendants swarmed on the deceased and 'they
were like Indians because they were going around' (the deceased) (tsn, p. 6, ibid.); and
"6. The deceased sustained eighteen (18) stab wounds and eleven (11) hacking
wounds." (Appellee's Brief, pp. 13-14.)
We are convinced that the foregoing circumstances clearly show that the
appellants, who used bladed weapons and attacked the deceased unexpectedly, had
conspired to commit the crime they were convicted of, thus rendering of no consequence
the fact that not all the wounds inflicted by them one after the other were fatal. 12 In
conspiracy, the act of any of the conspirators becomes the act of all the others and
responsibility for the act will be borne by them equally regardless of the degree of their
respective participation in the execution of the act. 13 Also, once an express or implied
conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the
extent and character of their respective active participation in the commission of the
crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy because in contemplation

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