INTERNATIONAL CONTAINER TERMINAL SERVICES

v.
CITY OF MANILA,
GR No. 185622, 2018-10-17
Facts:
The Court of Tax Appeals Second Division found that the City of Manila committed direct double taxation when it imposed a
local business tax under Section 21 (A) of Manila Ordinance No. 7794, as amended by Section 1(G) of Ordinance No. 7807,
in addition to the business tax already imposed under Section 18 of Manila Ordinance No. 7794, as amended.[7] It ordered
a partial refund of P6,224,250.00, representing the erroneously paid business taxes for the third quarter of taxable year
1999. However, it did not order the City of Manila to refund the business taxes paid by International Container subsequent
to the first three (3) quarters of 1999.[8]
While the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was pending, the City of Manila continued to impose the business tax
under Section 21 (A), in addition to the business tax under Section 18, on International Container so that it would be issued
business permits. On June 17, 2003, International Container sent a letter[16] addressed to the City Treasurer of Manila,
reiterating its protest to the business tax under Section 21 (A) and requesting for a refund of its payments in the amount of
P27,800,674.36 "in accordance with Section 196 of the Local Government Code,"[17] which states: Section 196. Claim for
Refund of Tax Credit. — No case or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any tax, fee, or charge
erroneously or illegally collected until a written claim for refund or credit has been filed with the local treasurer. No case or
proceeding shall be entertained in any court after the expiration of two (2) years from the date of the payment of such tax,
fee, or charge, or from the date the taxpayer is entitled to a refund or credit.
International Container filed a Petition for Review[23] against the City of Manila, its City Treasurer, its Resident Auditor, and
its City Council (the City of Manila and its Officials) before the Court of Tax Appeals, docketed as C.T.A. AC No. 11. It prayed
that the Court of Tax Appeals set aside the Regional Trial Court February 28, 2005 Decision, and order the City of Manila
and its Officials to refund the business taxes assessed, demanded, and collected under Section 21 (A) in the amount of
P39,268,772.41. This amount corresponded to the periods from 1999 to the first quarter of 2004 plus any and all
subsequent payments until the case would have been finally decided. Finally, it prayed that the Court of Tax Appeals order
the City of Manila and its Officials to desist from imposing and collecting the business tax under Section 21 (A), and to pay
attorney's fees.

Issues:
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over petitioner International Container Terminal Services, Inc.'s
claims for refund from the fourth quarter of 1999 onwards, despite its non-payment of additional docket fees to the
Regional Trial Court;
Whether or not Section 195 or Section 196 of the Local Government Code govern petitioner International Container
Terminal Services, Inc.'s claims for refund from the fourth quarter of 1999 onwards.
Whether or not petitioner International Container Terminal Services, Inc. complied with the requirements that would
entitle it to the refund it claims.
Ruling:
It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee,
that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory
pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable
time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered
filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a
reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the
prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same
has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It
shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the
additional fee
The application of Section 195 is triggered by an assessment made by the local treasurer or his duly authorized
representative for nonpayment of the correct taxes, fees or charges. Should the taxpayer find the assessment to be
erroneous or excessive, he may contest it by filing a written protest before the local treasurer within the reglementary
period of sixty (60) days from receipt of the notice; otherwise, the assessment shall become conclusive. The local treasurer
has sixty (60) days to decide said protest. In case of denial of the protest or inaction by the local treasurer, the taxpayer may
appeal with the court of competent jurisdiction; otherwise, the assessment becomes conclusive and unappealable.

The application of Section 196 may be invoked by a taxpayer who claims to have erroneously paid a tax, fee or charge, or
that such tax, fee or charge had been illegally collected from him. The provision requires the taxpayer to first file a written
claim for refund before bringing a suit in court which must be initiated within two years from the date of payment. By
necessary implication, the administrative remedy of claim for refund with the local treasurer must be initiated also within
such two-year prescriptive period but before the judicial action. However, Section 196 does not expressly provide a specific
period within which the local treasurer must decide the written claim for refund or credit. It is, therefore, possible for a
taxpayer to submit an administrative claim for refund very early in the two-year period and initiate the judicial claim
already near the end of such two-year period due to an extended inaction by the local treasurer. In this instance, the
taxpayer cannot be required to await the decision of the local treasurer any longer, otherwise, his judicial action shall be
barred by prescription. Additionally, Section 196 does not expressly mention an assessment made by the local treasurer.
This simply means that its applicability does not depend upon the existence of an assessment notice.
Principles:
Rule is clear and simple. In case where the party does not deliberately intend to defraud the court in payment of docket
fees, and manifests its willingness to abide by the rules by paying additional docket fees when required by the court, the
liberal doctrine enunciated in Sun Insurance and not the strict regulations set in Manchester will apply.[91]

The assailed August 4, 2009 Resolution cited Vargas v. Caminas on the non-applicability of the Tijam doctrine where the
issue of jurisdiction was, in fact, raised before the trial court rendered its decision. Thus the Resolution explained:

The inequity resulting from the abrogation of the whole proceedings at this late stage when the decision subsequently
rendered was adverse to the father and sons is precisely the evil being avoided by the equitable principle of estoppelIn this
case, respondents failed to explain why they belatedly raised the issue of insufficient payment of docket fees before the
Court of Tax Appeals En Banc in 2008, even though the issue arose as early as 2003, when petitioner filed its Amended and
Supplemental Petition. As such, they are now estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court due to
petitioner's insufficient payment of docket fees.

it is well settled that any additional docket fees shall constitute a lien on the judgment that may be awarded.
PETRON CORPORATION
vs.
MAYOR TOBIAS M. TIANGCO
G.R. No. 158881, April 16, 2008

FACTS:

Petron maintains a depot or bulk plant at the Navotas Fishport Complex, and through that depot, it has engaged in the
selling of diesel fuels to vessels used in commercial fishing in and around Manila Bay.

Petron received a letter from the office of Navotas Mayor, respondent Toby Tiangco, wherein the corporation was assessed
taxes relative to the figures covering sale of diesel, stating the total amount due of P6,259,087.62, a figure derived from the
gross sales of the depot from 1997 to 2001. The computation sheets that were attached to the letter made reference to
Ordinance 92-03, or the New Navotas Revenue Code (Navotas Revenue Code), though such enactment was not cited in the
letter itself. Petron filed with the Malabon RTC a Complaint for Cancellation of Assessment for Deficiency Taxes with Prayer
for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Preliminary Injunction. The RTC rendered its Decision
dismissing Petron’s complaint and ordering the payment of the assessed amount.

Particularly, the controversy hinges on the correct interpretation of Section 133(h) of the LGC, and the applicability of
Article 232 (h) of the IRR.

Section 133(h) of the LGC reads as follows: Sec. 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units.
– Unless otherwise provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and Barangays
shall not extend to the levy of the following:

(h) Excise taxes on articles enumerated under the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, and taxes, fees or charges
on petroleum products;

ISSUE:

Whether or not a local government unit is empowered under the Local Government Code to impose business taxes on
persons or entities engaged in the sale of petroleum products.

RULING:

Section 133 prescribes the limitations on the capacity of local government units to exercise their taxing powers
otherwise granted to them under the LGC. Apparently, paragraph (h) of the Section mentions two kinds of taxes which
cannot be imposed by local government units, namely: excise taxes on articles enumerated under the NIRC; and taxes, fees
or charges on petroleum products.

The power of a municipality to impose business taxes is provided for in Section 143 of the LGC. Under the provision, a
municipality is authorized to impose business taxes on a whole host of business activities. Suffice it to say, unless there is
another provision of law which states otherwise, Section 143, broad in scope as it is, would undoubtedly cover the business
of selling diesel fuels, or any other petroleum product for that matter.

Section 133(h) provides two kinds of taxes which cannot be imposed by Local Government Units: excise taxes on articles
enumerated under the NIRC, as amended; and taxes, fees or charges on petroleum products. There is no doubt that
among the excise taxes on articles enumerated under the NIRC are those levied on petroleum products, per Section 148 of
the NIRC.
The power of a municipality to impose business taxes derives from Section 143 of the Code that specifically enumerates
several types of business on which it may impose taxes, including manufacturers, wholesalers, distributors, dealers of any
article of commerce of whatever nature; those engaged in the export or commerce of essential commodities; retailers;
contractors and other independent contractors; banks and financial institutions; and peddlers engaged in the sale of any
merchandise or article of commerce. This obviously broad power is further supplemented by paragraph (h) of Section 143
which authorizes the sanggunian to impose taxes on any other businesses not otherwise specified under Section 143 which
the sanggunian concerned may deem proper to tax.

Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, assures that each local government unit shall have the power to create its
own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees and charges, though the power is subject to such guidelines and
limitations as the Congress may provide. There is no doubt that following the 1987 Constitution and the Code, the fiscal
autonomy of local government units has received greater affirmation than ever. Previous decisions that have been skeptical
of the viability, if not the wisdom of reposing fiscal autonomy to local government units have fallen by the wayside.

Respondents cite our declaration in City Government of San Pablo v. Reyes that following the 1987 Constitution the rule
thenceforth in interpreting statutory provisions on municipal fiscal powers, doubts will have to be resolved in favor of
municipal corporations. Such policy is also echoed in Section 5(a) of the Code, which states that any provision on a power of
a local government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be
resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower local government unit. But somewhat conversely, Section 5(b)
then proceeds to assert that [i]n case of doubt, any tax ordinance or revenue measure shall be construed strictly against the
local government unit enacting it, and liberally in favor of the taxpayer. And this latter qualification has to be respected as a
constitutionally authorized limitation which Congress has seen fit to provide. Evidently, local fiscal autonomy should not
necessarily translate into abject deference to the power of local government units to impose taxes.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon City in Civil Case No. 3380-MN is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the subject assessment for deficiency taxes on petitioner is ordered CANCELLED. The
Temporary Restraining Order dated 4 August 2003 is hereby made PERMANENT.
FIRST HOLDINGS CO.

vs

Batangas City

300 SCRA 661

FACTS:

Petitioner is a grantee of a pipeline concession under Republic Act No. 387, as amended, to contract, install and operate oil
pipelines. The original pipeline concession was granted in 1967 and renewed by the Energy Regulatory Board in 1992. Some
time in January 1995, petitioner applied for a mayor’s permit with the office of the mayor of Batangas City. However,
before the mayor’s permit could be issued, the respondent city treasurer required petitioner to pay a local tax based on its
gross receipts for the fiscal year 1993 pursuant to the local government code. The respondent city treasurer assessed a
business tax on the petitioner amounting to Php956,076.04 payable in four installments based on the gross receipts for
products pumped at GPS-1 for the fiscal year 1993 which amounted to Php181,151. In order not to hamper its operations,
petitioner paid the tax under protest in the amount of Php239,019.01 for the first quarter of 1993.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is exempt from paying the alleged business tax as a common carrier.

HELD:

Yes. The definition of common carrier in the civil code makes no distinctions as to the means of transporting, as long as it’s
by land, water or air. It does not provide that the transportation of the passengers or goods should be by motor vehicle. In
fact, in the United States, oil pipe line operations are considered common carriers.

Under the petroleum act of the Philippines (RA 387), petitioner is considered a common carrier. In BIR Ruling no. 069-83,
the Bureau of Internal Revenue otherwise considers the petitioners as a common carrier. There is no doubt that petitioner
is a common carrier and, therefore, exempt from the business tax as provided for in section 133 (j) of the local
government code, to wit:

Sec 133. Common limitations on the taxing power of local government units – Unless otherwise provided herein, the
exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays shall not extend to the levy of the
following:

Taxes on gross receipts of transportation contractors and persons engaged in the transportation of passengers or freight
by hire and common carriers by air, land, or water except as provided in this code.

It is clear that the legislative intent in excluding from the taxing power of the local government unit the imposition of
business tax against common carriers is to prevent duplication of the so-called common carriers’s tax.

Petitioner is already paying 3% common carrier’s tax on its gross sales/earnings under the NIRC. To tax petitioner again on
its gross receipts in its transportation of petroleum business would defeat the purpose of the local government code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1995
in CA-G.R. SP No. 36801 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE
Land Transportation Office (LTO)
vs
City of Butuan
G.R. No. 131512 January 20, 2000

FACTS:

The Sangguniang Panglungsod (SP) of Butuan on August 16, 1992 passed an ordinance entitled “An Ordinance Regulating
the Operation of Tricycles for hire, providing mechanism for the issuance of Franchise, Registration and Permit, and
imposing Penalties for Violations thereof and for other purposes.” The ordinance provided for, among other things, the
payment of franchise fees, fees for registration of the vehicle, and fees for the issuance of a permit for the driving thereof.
The City of Butuan asserts that Sec. 129 and Sec.133 of the Local Government Code is their basis for said ordinance and
that, said provisions authorize LGUs to collect registration fees or charges along with, in its view, the corresponding
issuance of all kinds of licenses or permits for the driving of tricycles. LTO explains that one of the functions of the National
Government, that , indeed has been transferred to LGUs is the franchising authority over tricycles-for-hire of the LTFRB but
NOT the authority of the LTO to register all motor vehicles and to issue to qualified persons of licenses to drive such
vehicles.

ISSUE:

Whether or not under the present set-up the power of the LTO to register, tricycles in particular, as well as to issue licenses
for the driving thereof has likewise devolved to Local Government Units.

HELD:

No, said powers [to register and issue licenses] remain under LTO’s exclusive jurisdiction, (pursuant to Art. 3 Sec. 4(d) [1],
10 of RA 4136-Land Transportation and Traffic Code), These functions of the LTO are essentially regulatory in nature,
exercised pursuant to the police power of the State, whose basic objectives are to achieve road safety by insuring the road
worthiness of these motor vehicles and the competence of drivers prescribed by R.A. 413. Under the Local Government
Code, certain functions of the DOTC were transferred to the LGUs, particularly in "SEC. 458 (a)[3-VI]. LGU’s now have the
power to regulate the operation of tricycles for hire and grant franchises thereof but they are still subject to the
guidelines prescribed by the Department of Transportation and Communications. To regulate means to fix, establish or
control, to adjust by rule, method or established mode.
PHILIPPINE BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION
VS.
COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF TAX APPEALS, AND COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
G.R. No. 119122, August 8, 2000

FACTS:

The PBA received an assessment letter from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) for the payment of deficiency amusement tax.
The PBA contested the assessment by filing a protest with the CIR who denied the same. The PBA then filed a petition for review with the
Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), in which they held against the PBA. The PBA filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals which was also denied.

ISSUES:

Whether the amusement tax on admission tickets to PBA games is a national tax.

Whether the cession of advertising and streamer spaces to Vintage Enterprises, Inc. subject to amusement tax.

RULING:

YES. The Local Tax Code does not provide for professional basketball games but rather in PD 1959. Was further embraced in
PD 1959, which amended PD 1456 thus: "SECTION 44. Section 268 of this Code, as amended, is hereby further amended to
read as follows:

'Sec. 268. Amusement taxes. — There shall be collected from the proprietor, lessee or operator of cockpits, cabarets, night
or day clubs, boxing exhibitions, professional basketball games, Jai-Alai, race tracks and bowling alleys, a tax equivalent to...
is required to pay an amusement tax equivalent to fifteen per centum (15%) of their gross receipts to the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, which payment is a national tax. The said payment of amusement tax is in lieu of all other percentage
taxes of whatever nature and description.

YES. For the purpose of the amusement tax, the term gross receipts' embraces all the receipts of the proprietor, lessee or
operator of the amusement place. The definition of gross receipts is broad enough to embrace the cession of advertising
and streamer spaces as the same embraces all the receipts of the proprietor, lessee or operator of the amusement place.
The law being clear, there is no need for an extended interpretation.
Manila International Airport Authority
vs
Court of Appeals
495 SCRA 591, July 20, 2006

FACTS:
Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) is the operator of the Ninoy International Airport located at Paranaque City.
The Officers of Paranaque City sent notices to MIAA due to real estate tax delinquency. MIAA then settled some of the
amount. When MIAA failed to settle the entire amount, the officers of Paranaque city threatened to levy and subject to
auction the land and buildings of MIAA, which they did. MIAA sought for a Temporary Restraining Order from the CA but
failed to do so within the 60 days reglementary period, so the petition was dismissed. MIAA then sought for the TRO with
the Supreme Court a day before the public auction, MIAA was granted with the TRO but unfortunately the TRO was
received by the Paranaque City officers 3 hours after the public auction. MIAA claims that although the charter provides
that the title of the land and building are with MIAA still the ownership is with the Republic of the Philippines. MIAA also
contends that it is an instrumentality of the government and as such exempted from real estate tax. That the land and
buildings of MIAA are of public dominion therefore cannot be subjected to levy and auction sale. On the other hand, the
officers of Paranaque City claim that MIAA is a government owned and controlled corporation therefore not exempted to
real estate tax.
ISSUES:
Whether or not MIAA is an instrumentality of the government and not a government owned and controlled corporation
and as such exempted from tax.
Whether or not the land and buildings of MIAA are part of the public dominion and thus cannot be the subject of levy and
auction sale.

RULING:
Under the Local government code, government owned and controlled corporations are not exempted from real estate tax.
MIAA is not a government owned and controlled corporation, for to become one MIAA should either be a stock or non
stock corporation.
MIAA is not a stock corporation for its capital is not divided into shares. It is not a non stock corporation since it has no
members. MIAA is an instrumentality of the government vested with corporate powers and government functions.
Under the civil code, property may either be under public dominion or private ownership.
Those under public dominion are owned by the State and are utilized for public use, public service and for the
development of national wealth. The ports included in the public dominion pertain either to seaports or airports. When
properties under public dominion cease to be for public use and service, they form part of the patrimonial property of the
State.
The court held that the land and buildings of MIAA are part of the public dominion. Since the airport is devoted for public
use, for the domestic and international travel and transportation. Even if MIAA charge fees, this is for support of its
operation and for regulation and does not change the character of the land and buildings of MIAA as part of the public
dominion. As part of the public dominion the land and buildings of MIAA are outside the commerce of man. To subject
them to levy and public auction is contrary to public policy. Unless the President issues a proclamation withdrawing the
airport land and buildings from public use, these properties remain to be of public dominion and are inalienable. As long as
the land and buildings are for public use the ownership is with the Republic of the Philippines.
City of Iriga
vs.
Camarines Sur III Electric Cooperative, Inc. Supreme Court
G.R. No. 192945 promulgated September 5, 2012

FACTS:
Respondent Camarines Sur III Electric Cooperative, Inc. (CASURECO), an electric cooperative organized under Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 269 and registered with the National Electrification Administration (NEA), is engaged in the business of
electric power distribution to various end-users and consumers within the City of Iriga and the municipalities of Nabua,
Bato, Baao, Buhi, Bula and Balatan of the Province of Camarines Sur (or the Rinconada area). Petitioner City of Iriga
assessed CASURECO deficiency franchise tax and RPT covering the periods 1998 to 2003 and 1995 to 2003, respectively.
CASURECO refused to pay and argued that as an electric cooperative provisionally registered with the Cooperative
Development Authority (CDA), it is exempt from the payment of local taxes. Petitioner filed a collection complaint against
CASURECO with the RTC, which ruled that the city’s right to assess RPT for 1995 - 1999 had already prescribed. The RTC also
ruled that CASURECO is liable for franchise taxes for 2000 – 2003 based on its gross receipts from Iriga City and the
Rinconada area, on the ground that the “situs of taxation is the place where the privilege is exercised.” On appeal, the Court
of Appeals (CA) reversed the e RTC on the ground that CASURECO is a non-profit entity which does not fall within the
purview of businesses enjoying a franchise.
ISSUES:
Whether or not an electric cooperative registered under PD 269 but not under RA 693817 is liable for the payment of local
franchise taxes.
Whether or not the situs of taxation is the place where the franchise holder exercises its franchise regardless of the place
where its services or products are delivered.
HELD:
YES, they are liable for local franchise tax. PD 269, which took effect on August 6, 1973, granted electric cooperatives
registered with the NEA, like CASURECO III, several tax privileges, one of which is exemption from the payment of "all
national government, local government and municipal taxes and fees, including franchise, filing, recordation, license or
permit fees or taxes.
On January 1, 1992, the LGC took effect, and Section 193 thereof withdrew tax exemptions or incentives previously enjoyed
by "all persons, whether natural or juridical, including government-owned or controlled corporations, except local water
districts, cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6938, non-stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions."
Therefore, CASURECO III can no longer invoke PD 269 to evade payment of local taxes. Moreover, its provisional
registration with the CDA which granted it exemption for the payment of local taxes was extended only until May 4, 1992.
Thereafter, it can no longer claim any exemption from the payment of local taxes, including the subject franchise tax.
Indisputably, petitioner has the power to impose local taxes.

In National Power Corporation v. City of Cabanatuan, the Court declared that "a franchise tax is „a tax on the privilege of
transacting business in the state and exercising corporate franchises granted by the state." It is not levied on the
corporation simply for existing as a corporation, upon its property or its income, but on its exercise of the rights or
privileges granted to it by the government. "It is within this context that the phrase „tax on businesses enjoying a franchise‟
in Section 137 of the LGC should be interpreted and understood."

Thus, to be liable for local franchise tax, the following requisites should concur: (1) that one has a "franchise" in the sense of
a secondary or special franchise; and (2) that it is exercising its rights or privileges under this franchise within the territory of
the pertinent local government unit
No. CASURECO should have filed its appeal with the CTA, which has exclusive jurisdiction to review decisions, orders or
resolutions of the RTCs in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by the RTCs in the exercise of their original or
appellate jurisdiction.
LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, Petitioner,

vs.

HON. MAURICIO B. AMBANLOC, in his capacity as the Provincial Treasurer of Benguet, Respondent.

G.R. No. 180639 June 29, 2010

FACTS:
The national government issued to petitioner Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company (Lepanto) a mining lease contract
covering, among others, its "TIKEM" leased mining claim at Sitio Nayak, Barrio Palasan (Suyoc), Municipality of Mankayan,
Benguet. The contract granted Lepanto the right to extract and use for its purposes all mineral deposits within the
boundary lines of its mining claim. The Mines and Geo-sciences Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) advised Lepanto that, under its contract, it did not have to get a permit to extract and use sand and
gravel from within the mining claim for its operational and infrastructure needs. Based on this advice, Lepanto proceeded
to extract and remove sand, gravel, and other earth materials from the mining site.
Respondent Mauricio Ambanloc, the provincial treasurer of Benguet, sent a demand letter to Lepanto, asking it to pay the
province ₱1,901,893.22 as sand and gravel tax, for the quarry materials that it extracted from its mining site from 1997 to
2000. Lepanto sent a letter-protest to the provincial treasurer, but the latter denied the same, insisting on payment.
The RTC ruled that Lepanto was liable for the amount assessed, with interest at the rate of 2 percent per month from the
time the tax should have been paid.
The Second Division affirmed the ruling of the RTC with the modification that the interest of 2 percent per month shall not
exceed 36 months,
Three justices of the CTA voted to affirm the decision but three justices dissented. Because the needed vote of four
members could not be obtained, the En Banc dismissed the appeal.

ISSUES:
Whether or not Lepanto is liable for the tax imposed by the Province of Benguet on the sand and gravel that it extracted
from within the area of its mining claim and used exclusively in its mining operations.

HELD:
The provincial revenue code provides that the subject tax had to be paid prior to the issuance of the permit to extract sand
and gravel. Its Article D, Section 2, enumerates four kinds of permits: commercial, industrial, special, and gratuitous. Special
permits covered only personal use of the extracted materials and did not allow the permites to sell materials coming
from his concession. Among applicants for permits, however, only gratuitous permits were exempt from the sand and
gravel tax. It follows that persons who applied for special permits needed to pay the tax, even though they did not extract
materials for commercial purposes. Thus, the tax needed to be paid regardless of the applicability of the administrative and
reportorial requirements of that revenue code.
PELIZLOY REALTY CORPORATION
vs
THE PROVINCE OF BENGUET
G.R. No. 183137, 10 April 2013.

FACTS:
Petitioner Pelizloy Realty Corporation owns Palm Grove Resort in Tuba, Benguet, which has facilities like swimming pools, a spa and function
halls.

In 2005, the Provincial Board of Benguet approved its Revenue Code of 2005. Section 59, the tax ordinance levied a 10% amusement tax on gross
receipts from admissions to "resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots."
Pelizloy's posits that amusement tax is an ultra vires act. Thus, it filed an appeal/petition before the Secretary of Justice. Upon the Secretary’s
failure to decide on the appeal within sixty days, Pelizloy filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and Injunction before the RTC.
Pelizloy argued that the imposition was in violation of the limitation on the taxing powers of local government units under Section 133 (i) of the
Local Government Code, which provides that the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays shall not extend
to the levy of percentage or value-added tax (VAT) on sales, barters or exchanges or similar transactions on goods or services except as otherwise
provided.
ISSUE:

Whether or not provinces are authorized to impose amusement taxes on admission fees to resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs,
and tourist spots for being "amusement places" under the LGC.

HELD:
NO, because amusement taxes are percentage taxes. However, provinces are not barred from levying amusement taxes
even if amusement taxes are a form of percentage taxes. The levying of percentage taxes is prohibited "except as otherwise
provided" by the LGC. Section 140 provides such exception. Section 140 expressly allows for the imposition by provinces of
amusement taxes on "the proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, boxing stadia, and
other places of amusement." Thus, the determination of whether amusement taxes may be levied on admissions to these places
hinges on whether the phrase ‘other places of amusement’ encompasses resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and
tourist spots
Under the principle of ejusdem generis, "where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of
the same class or where the latter follow the former, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include, or to be rest ricted to
persons, things or cases akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned."
The New Oxford American Dictionary, ‘show’ means "a spectacle or display of something, typically an impressive one"; while
‘performance’ means "an act of staging or presenting a play, a concert, or other form of entertainment." As such, the ordinary
definitions of the words ‘show’ and ‘performance’ denote not only visual engagement.
It is clear that resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots are not primarily venues for their
proprietors or operators to actively display, stage or present shows and/or performances.
CITY MAYOR
vs.
RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 171033 August 3, 2010 PERALTA

FACTS:
The spouses Naval obtained a loan from respondent Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC), secured by a real estate
mortgage over certain properties covered by TCT Nos. N-167986, N-167987, and N-167988. These properties were later
foreclosed and the sold at public auction with RCBC as the highest bidder. Certificates of Sale were issued in favor of RCBC
and registered on February 10, 2004. Meanwhile, an auction sale over the said properties was conducted by petitioner City
Treasurer of Quezon City due to tax delinquencies over the same. RCBC tendered payment for all of the assessed tax
delinquencies, interest, and charges with the Office of the City Treasurer and for the subsequent issuance of the certificate
of redemption in its favor but the same were denied on the ground that the tender of payment was made beyond the
redemption period as set forth under Section 261 of R.A. 7160.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the period of redemption in a realty tax sale in Quezon City has to be reckoned from the date of annotation
of the certificate of sale pursuant to par. 7, section 14 of Quezon City tax Ordinance No. SP-91-93 or from the date of sale
pursuant to section 261 of R.A. 7160

RULING:
Section 261 of R.A. No. 7160 (Local Government Code) provides for a period of 1 year from the date of sale within which
the right to redeem the property should be exercised. While City Ordinance No. SP-91, S-93, otherwise known as the
Quezon City Revenue Code of 1993, provides that the right to redeem should be exercised within 1 year from the date of
the annotation of the sale of the property at the proper registry.
To harmonize the provisions of the two laws, Section 14 (a), Paragraph 7 of City Ordinance No. SP-91, S-93 should be
construed as to define the phrase "1 year from the date of sale" as appearing in Section 261 of R.A. No. 7160, to mean "1
year from the date of the annotation of the sale of the property at the proper registry." Consequently, the counting of the 1
year redemption period of property sold at public auction for its tax delinquency should be counted from the date of
annotation of the certificate of sale in the proper Register of Deeds. Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, RCBC’s
tender of payment was well within the redemption period.
Hon. Franklin Drilon
Vs.
Mayor Alfredo Lim
G.R. No. 112497 August 4, 1994

FACTS:
The Secretary of Justice had, on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer, declared Ordinance No. 7794,
otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the
enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy. In a petition for
certiorari filed by the City of Manila, the Regional Trial Court of Manila revoked the Secretary's resolution and sustained the
ordinance, holding inter alia that the procedural requirements had been observed. More importantly, it declared Section
187 of the Local Government Code as unconstitutional because of its vesture in 37 the Secretary of Justice of the power of
control over local governments in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution and of the specific
provision therein conferring on the President of the Philippines only the power of supervision over local governments.
ISSUE:
On appeal to the Secretary of Justice on matters of real property tax, what rules should be observed?
HELD:
The procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of the
Local Government Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof;
Provided, further, That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be
raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision
within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the effect
of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein:
Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the
Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent
jurisdiction. Section 187 of the Local Government Code authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the
constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he
alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of
the local government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not
replace it with his own version of what the Code should be. He did not pronounce the ordinance unwise or unreasonable as
a basis for its annulment. He did not say that in his judgment it was a bad law. What he found only was that it was illegal. All
he did in reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners were performing their functions in accordance with
law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city
government under the Local Government Code. As the Supreme Court sees it that was an act not of control but of mere
supervision.
Team Pacific Corporation
v.
Daza
G.R. No. 167732. July 11, 2012.

FACTS:
Team Pacific Corporation (TPC), a domestic corporation engaged in the business of assembling and exporting
semiconductor devices, conducts its business at the FTI Complex in the then Municipality of Taguig. It appears that since the
start of its operations in 1999, TPC had been paying local business taxes assessed at 1/2 rate pursuant to Section 75 (c) of
the Taguig Revenue Code (TRC). When it renewed its business license in 2004, however, TPC’s business tax for the first
quarter of the same year was computed by Josephine Daza, in her capacity as then Municipal Treasurer of Taguig, by
applying the full value of the rates provided under Section 75 of the TRC, instead of the 1/2 rate provided under paragraph
(c) because, according to her, Section 75 (c) of the TRC applies only to exporters of essential commodities – e.g., (1) rice and
corn; (2) wheat or cassava flour, meat, dairy products, locally manufactured, processed or preserved food, sugar, salt and
other agricultural, marine, and fresh water products, whether in their original state or not; (3) cooking oil and cooking gas;
(4) laundry soap, detergents, and medicine; (5) agricultural implements, equipment and post- harvest facilities, fertilizers,
pesticides, insecticides, herbicides and other farm inputs; (6) poultry feeds and other animal feeds; (7) school supplies; and
(8) cement. Constrained to pay the assessed business tax on January 19, 2004 in view of its being a precondition for the
renewal of its business permit, TPC filed on the same day a written protest with Daza, insisting on the 1/2 rate on which its
business tax was previously assessed. Subsequent to its demand for the refund and/or issuance of a tax credit for the sum
of P104,054.88 which it considered as an overpayment of its business taxes for the same year, TPC filed s Rule 65 petition
for certiorari before a Regional Trial Court (RTC).
HELD:
Whether or not TPC availed of the correct remedy against Daza’s illegal assessment when it filed its petition for certiorari
before the RTC?
HELD:
No. The rule is settled that, as a special civil action, certiorari is available only if the following essential requisites concur: (1)
it must be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board,
or officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction; and, (3) there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Judicial
function entails the power to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to
determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. Quasi-judicial function, on the other hand, refers
to the action and discretion of public administrative officers or bodies, which are required to investigate facts or ascertain
the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise
discretion of a judicial nature. Gauged from the foregoing definitions, Daza cannot be said to be performing a judicial or
quasi-judicial function in assessing TPC’s business tax and/or effectively denying its protest as then Municipal Treasurer of
Taguig. For this reason, Daza’s actions are not the proper subjects of a Rule 65 petition for certiorari which is the
appropriate remedy in cases where a the tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions acted
without or in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in law. Narrow in scope and inflexible in character, certiorari is an extraordinary remedy
designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. It is likewise considered mutually exclusive
with appeal like the one provided by Article 195 of the Local Government Code for a local treasurer’s denial of or inaction
on a protest.