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War is expensive:
Maaubos ung money for war. "The economy here is collapsing, and there is
nothing anyone can do about it," said a Western diplomat who has
monitored the Yugoslav economy for years. "I'm convinced it is going to
come apart in a big way."
Ljubomir Madzar, a Belgrade economist, said "the international community, the
awareness that peace is necessary and the cost of the war" would influence Serbia's
decision on whether to accept the United Nations plan to deploy peacekeeping forces
in Yugoslavia. "The costs of the war far outweigh the gains," he said.
Whoever wins occupies that certain country.
Gain instead of loss.
In the 1980s the Yugoslav economy entered a period of continuous crisis. Between 1979
and 1985 the Yugoslav dinar plunged from 15 to 1,370 to the U.S. dollar, half of the
income from exports was used to service the debt, while real net personal income
declined by 19.5%. Unemployment rose to 1.3 million job-seekers, and internal debt was
estimated at $40 billion.[34]
Yugoslavia took on a number of International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans and
subsequently fell into heavy debt. By 1981, it had incurred $18.9 billion in foreign
debt.[29] However, Yugoslavia’s main concern was unemployment. In 1980 the
unemployment rate was at 13,8%,[28] not counting around 1 million workers employed
abroad.[31] Deteriorating living conditions during the 1980s caused the Yugoslavian
unemployment rate to reach 17 percent, while another 20 percent were underemployed.
60% of the unemployed were under the age of 25.[16] By 1988 emigrant remittances to
Yugoslavia totalled over $4.5 billion (USD), and by 1989 remittances were $6.2 billion
(USD), which amounted to over 19% of the world's total.[35][36] In 1988 Yugoslavia owed
$21 billion to Western countries.[37]
The collapse of the Yugoslav economy was partially caused by its non-aligned stance that
had resulted in access to loans from both superpower blocs.[38] This contact with
the United States and the West opened up Yugoslav markets sooner than in the rest
of Central and Eastern Europe. In 1989, before the fall of the Berlin Wall, Yugoslav
federal Prime Minister Ante Marković went to Washington to meet with President
George H. W. Bush, to negotiate a new financial aid package. In return for assistance,
Yugoslavia agreed to even more sweeping economic reforms, which included a
new devalued currency, another wage freeze, sharp cuts in government spending, and the
elimination of socially owned, worker-managed companies.[39] The Belgrade
nomenclature, with the assistance of western advisers, had laid the groundwork for
Marković's mission by implementing beforehand many of the required reforms, including
a major liberalization of foreign investment legislation.
This was in part muted by the spectacular draining of the banking system, caused by the
rising inflation, in which millions of people were effectively forgiven debts or even
allowed to make fortunes on perfectly legal bank-milking schemes[citation needed]. The banks
adjusted their interest rates to the inflation, but this could not be applied to loan contracts
made earlier which stipulated fixed interest rates. Debt repayments for privately owned
housing, which was massively built during the prosperous 1970s, became ridiculously
small and as a result banks suffered huge losses. Indexation was introduced to take
inflation into account, but the resourceful population continued to drain the system
through other schemes, many of them having to do with personal cheques.[citation needed]
Personal cheques were widely used in Yugoslavia in pre-inflation times. Cheques, which
were considered legal tender, were accepted by all businesses. They were processed by
hand and mailed by regular post, so there was no way to ensure real-time accounting. The
banks therefore continued to deduct money from current accounts on the date they
received the cheque, and not on the date it was issued. When inflation rose to triple and
then quadruple digits, this allowed another widespread form of cost reduction or outright
milking of the system. Bills from remote places would arrive six months late, causing
losses to businesses. Since banks maintained no-fee mutual customer service, people
would travel to small banks in rural areas on the other end of the country and cash in
several cheques. They would then exchange the money for foreign currency,
usually German mark and wait for the cheque to arrive. They would then convert a part
of the foreign currency amount and repay their debt, greatly reduced by inflation.
Companies, struggling to pay their work-force, adopted similar tactics.[citation needed]
New legislation was gradually introduced to remedy the situation, but the government
mostly tried to fight the crisis by issuing more currency, which only fuelled the inflation
further. Power-mongering in big industrial companies led to several large bankruptcies
(mostly of large factories), which only increased the public perception that the economy
is in a deep crisis. After several failed attempts to fight the inflation with various
schemes, and due to mass strikes caused by austerity wage freezes, the government
of Branko Mikulić was replaced by a new government in March 1989, headed by Ante
Marković, a pragmatic reformist. He spent a year introducing new business legislation,
which quietly dropped most of the associated labour theory and introduced private
ownership of businesses.[40] The institutional changes culminated in eighteen new laws
that declared an end to the self-management system and associated labor.[41] While public
companies were allowed to be partially privatised, mostly through investment, the
concepts of social ownership and worker councils were still retained.[citation needed]
By the end of 1989 inflation reached 1,000%.[42] On New Year's Eve 1989, Ante
Marković introduced his program of economic reforms. Ten thousand Dinars became one
"New Dinar", pegged to the German Mark at the rate of 7 New Dinars for one
Mark.[43] The sudden end of inflation brought some relief to the banking system.
Ownership and exchange of foreign currency was deregulated which, combined with a
realistic exchange rate, attracted foreign currency to the banks. However, by the late
1980s, it was becoming increasingly clear that the federal government was effectively
losing the power to implement its programme.[44]