More or Less Ambition in the Doha Round?
Modeling the Development Impact of Recent
Proposals Quelle ambition pour la négociation de Doha ? Un modèle de
l’impact des dernières propositions sur le développement.
Antoine Bouet, Simon Mevel and David Orden1
What is at stake in the stand-
off between the United States,
Europe and developing countries
over agriculture in the World
Trade Organization’s (WTO) Doha
Development Round of trade talks?
What impact would an agreement
based on greater or lesser levels
of ambition have on developing
countries, whose economies
depend heavily on agriculture? Trade
liberalization is a potential stimulus
for growth in poor countries and the
Doha Round was launched with the
objective of drawing these countries
more fully into the global trade
system. Yet, two years after the WTO
talks broke down in Cancún, reform
of the heavily and diversely protected
and subsidized developed-country
agricultural sectors remains a major
impediment to progress, despite
reforms undertaken during the last 15
years. The December 2005 Hong Kong
ministerial showed little finality in the
negotiations, even though members
agreed to eliminate agricultural
export subsidies in 2013 and that less
developed countries (LDCs) will gain
free access to OECD markets for at
least 97 per cent of agricultural and
manufacturing tariff lines.
Whether a final Doha Round trade
agreement will eventually produce
something substantially more positive
40 ★ EuroChoices 5(2) © The Agricultural Ecomomics Society and the European Association of Agricultural Economists 2006
5-2_06bouet.indd 40
Mehr oder weniger Ehrgeiz in der Doha-Runde? Eine
Modellierung der Auswirkungen auf die Entwicklung der neuesten
Vorschläge
for developing countries is open computable general equilibrium model
to question. Using the MIRAGE of the global economy (see Box 1) we
Box 1. The MIRAGE Model
The MIRAGE model was developed at the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et
d’Informations Internationales (CEPII) in Paris. It is a multi-sector, multi-
region model devoted to trade policy analysis. The model has a sequential
dynamic annual setup with labour and capital accumulation over time. Fixed
technology or technological change can be adopted (our model is based on
fixed technology). We report results for 2019. This is a 14-year horizon after
we anticipate initiation of reforms assumed to take place over 5 years in
developed countries and 10 years among developing countries. In the model
reported herein, unskilled labour is imperfectly mobile between agricultural
and non-agricultural activities, reflecting the costs and time-delays in rural–
urban labour migration. Reforms in the services sectors are not modeled.
Further research will be needed to illuminate the effects of these reforms in a
general equilibrium framework.
Our analysis within MIRAGE utilizes the latest Global Trade Analysis Project
(GTAP) country-disaggregated database (GTAP 6). Tariffs come from the
detailed MacMaps HS-6 dataset. Tariff reductions are applied on ‘bound’
duties (maximum levels countries can apply under WTO rules) at a high
disaggregation (about 5,200 products), then the results are aggregated to the
level of the sectors included in the model. This approach allows tariff ‘binding
overhangs’ (difference between the maximum tariffs that countries can apply
under WTO rules (bound duties) and the actually applied tariffs of the WTO
members) to be taken into account, and are often quite large in developing
countries. The MacMap-HS6 dataset also includes all the regional agreements
and preferential schemes prevailing in 2001, which allows the modeling
exercise to reflect losses of preferential access.
The MIRAGE model is currently in use at CEPII, the European Union’s Trade
Unit (Brussels, Belgium), the UN Economic Commission for Africa (Addis-
Ababa, Ethiopia), and the International Food Policy Research Institute
(Washington DC, USA). MIRAGE has been the basis for many peer-reviewed
publications and presentations at international conferences. Full descriptions
of MIRAGE and the GTAP and MacMap data are available at the CEPII and GTAP
web sites (www.cepii.fr and www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu).
06/07/2006 11:54:22
 compare possible scenarios for the exports to the rest of the world, each
Doha outcome, taking real numbers measured relative to the world average. Die Ergebnisse
from the proposals put on the table
Among the developing countries, some
für diese beiden
by the European Union (EU) and
the United States (US). The results
face high tariffs on their exports (for Doha-Szenarien
from these scenarios demonstrate
example, Argentina, Brazil, Malawi, zeigen auf, wie viel bei
Uruguay, and Zimbabwe). Differences
the high stakes of this negotiation
among countries arise from differences
dieser Verhandlung
given the positions articulated by
in the products they export and auf dem Spiel steht
key WTO members. A global reform
outcome based on the most ambitious
differences in the destinations of their ... eine erfolgrei-
exports. Many developing countries
components of the US and EU
impose relatively high tariffs on their
che Runde könnte
negotiating proposals could deliver
imports, so their tariff average often sowohl auf globaler
noticeably more benefits than an
unambitious outcome, although clearly
exceeds the world average. Ebene als auch für die
less than full trade liberalization. The third point is illustrated in Figure Entwicklungsländer
2. In terms of agricultural trade, tatsächlich von Vorteil
Heterogeneity among both large net food importers and
developing countries substantial food exporters exist among
sein.
middle-income countries (MICs) and
Both developed and developing
LDCs. The net trade positions are
countries are heterogeneous in like Brazil, Argentina, or Thailand,
crucial since global trade liberalization
terms of their own trade policies, the but it will cause a deterioration of
is expected to increase world
trade barriers they face, and their net terms of trade (the ratio of a country’s
agricultural prices, as production
agricultural trade positions. The first export prices to its import prices) for
contracts and consumption expands
two points are illustrated in Figure 1 food-importing developing countries
in response to lower tariffs and
through a comparison of the duties like Venezuela, Bangladesh or the
subsidies in most countries. This will
applied by each country on their Philippines.
be beneficial for developing countries
imports versus the duties faced on their

Figure 1. Applied protection on their imports and faced on exports of countries in 2001
16.0%

Malawi

12.0%
Applied duty on exports relative to world average

Uruguay

Zimbabwe
Argentina
8.0%

Brazil

Australia/NZ

4.0%
Colombia Thailand Tanzania

India

USA EU Mozambique China Tunisia

0.0%
-10.0% 0.0% 10.0% Morocco 20.0% 30.0%
Chile Zambia
Singapore Peru Bangladesh

Canada
Malaysia
Madagascar Philippines
Venezuela
Mexico
-4.0%
Applied duty on imports relative to world average

© The Agricultural Ecomomics Society and the European Association of Agricultural Economists 2006 EuroChoices 5(2) ★ 41

5-2_06bouet.indd 41 06/07/2006 11:55:02

 Figure 2. Agricultural trade balance of selected developing countries in 2005 (billion US dollars)

Developing Asia
Singapore
Venezuela
Bangladesh
Philippines
China

Tunisia
Mozambique
Zambia
Morocco
Madagascar
Uganda
Tanzania
Malawi
Uruguay
Peru
Zimbabwe
Colombia
Viet Nam
India
Malaysia
South African Customs Union
Indonesia
Chile
Thailand
Argentina
Brazil

-4.0 -2.0 0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0 12.0 14.0

US and EU agricultural subsidizing agriculture, which stifles
protection and subsidies trade opportunities. The US and EU
follow somewhat different regimes.
Criticism has been directed at
The US has relatively low tariffs, but
developed countries for protecting and
its domestic agricultural support was
increased in the most recent (2002)
farm bill which expires in 2007. The
US provides relatively less preferential
access than does the EU for selected
developing-country trade partners. The

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 EU, in contrast, has higher agricultural
(but similarly low industrial) tariffs and
has recently realigned its agricultural
support, which remains quite high,
toward policy instruments that are less
trade distorting than in the past. In
these US–EU policy differences lie the
seeds of different approaches to the
trade negotiations.
Similarities and differences in
the US and EU proposals
The Doha Round negotiations may
reach a final agreement on agriculture
and other provisions of a trade deal in
2006, but the outcome is still far from
certain in the spring. No proposal was
complete even after the Hong Kong
ministerial. The US and EU proposals
have some broad commonalities, such
as progressive tariff and domestic-
support cuts and the elimination of
export subsidies. But the specifics of
the proposals deviate on matters such
as rates of reduction of tariffs and
domestic support and the number of
sensitive or special products (the latter
for developing countries only) that
will be subject to lesser disciplines.
In terms of an ambitious agenda for
agricultural trade liberalization, strong
points of the US proposal include
sharper reductions in bound tariff
Les résultats
obtenus avec chacun
des deux scénarios
montrent l’ampleur de
l’enjeu … un accord
à la fin des négocia-
tions pourrait permettre
de vrais gains, aussi
bien pour les pays en
développement que
pour le monde en
général.
© The Agricultural Ecomomics Society and the European Association of Agricultural Economists 2006
5-2_06bouet.indd 43
rates and a lower cap on maximum with strong trade liberalization
allowable tariffs; few sensitive or components from the US and EU
special products; and moderately proposals and contrast this with a less
tough bindings on domestic support ambitious outcome drawn from the
that encourage decoupling of lower-end elements (see Box 2).
subsidies from production. Strong
On market access, our ambitious
points of the EU proposal in terms of
proposal includes most elements of
trade liberalization lie in the call for
the US formula. The US proposal prior
free access of LDCs to OECD markets,
to the Hong Kong meeting called for
a specific initiative for cotton to help
cuts of 85–90 per cent in agricultural
West Africa, and a push for lower
tariffs above 60 per cent for developed
industrial tariffs worldwide.
countries and lesser cuts in three
bands of lower initial tariffs, while the
What difference will the Doha EU called for less ambitious cuts (60
outcome make?
per cent in agricultural tariffs above 90
What difference will the Doha per cent for developed countries and
Round’s outcome make to global similarly less ambitious cuts for lower
trade and welfare and to developing initial tariff bands). Both proposals
countries in particular? To examine allow lesser cuts by developing
this question using numbers from countries. The ambitious scenario
the negotiating table, we define a adds to the US tariff formula the EU
relatively ambitious reform scenario proposal for free access by LDCs to
Box 2. Overview of two scenarios
AMBITIOUS SCENARIO
Tariffs:
• US tariff formula for agriculture.
• Tariff caps in agriculture (developed countries, 100 per cent; developing
countries, 150 per cent).
• US sensitive/special products clause (1 per cent).
• Swiss formula cuts for manufacturing tariffs (developed-country coefficient,
8 per cent; MIC coefficient, 20 per cent; LDC coefficient, 30 per cent).
• EU proposal of free OECD access for LDCs.
Domestic support levels cut by 20 per cent.
Export subsidies eliminated.
UNAMBITIOUS SCENARIO
Tariffs:
• EU tariff formula for agriculture.
• No agricultural tariff caps.
• EU sensitive/special products clause (8 per cent).
• Swiss formula cuts for manufacturing tariffs (developed-country
coefficient, 10 per cent; MIC coefficient, 30 per cent).
• LDCs do not reduce their import duties.
• Additional free OECD access for LDCs, but exceptions for Japan and South
Korea (rice) and the US (sugar, textile and apparel).
Domestic support levels unchanged.
Export subsidies eliminated.
EuroChoices 5(2) ★ 43
06/07/2006 11:55:07

OECD markets, imposes tariff caps in
agriculture, and defines an exception
regime for sensitive/special products
of only 1 per cent of agricultural
tariff lines per country. Applied trade-
distorting domestic agricultural
support is cut by 20 per cent. Strong
manufacturing tariff reductions
are imposed on developed and
developing countries (including LDCs)
using a ‘Swiss formula’ that reduces
higher tariffs fastest until the rates
among products converge to a given
level (lower for developed countries
than for MICs or LDCs).
In contrast to the ambitious scenario,
our unambitious scenario adopts the
EU formula for less deep tiered tariff
cuts for agriculture by developed
countries (with corresponding smaller
cuts for MICs and no cut for LDCs).
The unambitious scenario does not
impose any cap on agricultural tariffs,
and adds fewer liberalizing elements on
Table 1: Global results of alternative liberalization scenarios
Scenario
Full liberalization
Ambitious Doha outcome
Compared with full liberalization
Unambitious Doha outcome
Compared with full liberalization
44 ★ EuroChoices 5(2) © The Agricultural Ecomomics Society and the European Association of Agricultural Economists 2006
5-2_06bouet.indd 44
sensitive/special products (exceptions
for 8 per cent of tariff lines), the tariff-
reduction Swiss formula for industry
(higher tariff targets for developed
countries and MICs and no cuts by
LDCs), and free OECD access for LDCs
only with some exceptions retained. No
cuts are assumed in applied domestic
agricultural support of developed
countries.
Our application of the MIRAGE model
to assess the effects of an ambitious
versus unambitious Doha outcome
focuses on the heterogeneity among
developing countries and the
relatively high levels of protection
within agriculture and textiles and
apparel. Of 41 regions identified
in the model, 33 are developing
countries or groups of countries.
Among the 18 sectors considered, 10
are agricultural and the textiles and
apparel sectors are separated from
other manufacturing.
World protection World trade
(per cent decrease) (per cent increase)
–5.4 12.0
–1.9 2.8
(35 per cent) (23 per cent)
–1.2 1.6
(22 per cent) (13 per cent)
Results for the ambitious versus
unambitious Doha outcomes
Summary results for our ambitious
and unambitious scenarios are shown
in Tables 1, 2 and 3 and Figure 3.
As a benchmark, we also report the
outcomes of a MIRAGE simulation of
full global trade liberalization.
With full liberalization (which includes
elimination of border protection,
domestic support and export subsidies
in agriculture and industry) world
protection (averaging 5.4 per cent as
measured by a weighted aggregate
statistic) is eliminated. World trade
expands by 12.0 per cent, and the
total annual real income (welfare)
gain worldwide is US$158 billion (in
constant 2001 dollar value, 0.5 per cent
of expected world income without a
Doha agreement). This is less income
gain than reported in October 2005 by
the World Bank (US$287 billion) mainly
because we use more conservative
‘trade elasticities’ (production and
consumption responses to shifting
prices). Although not shown in the
table, full liberalization is slightly
progressive in the sense that the
share of welfare gains for developing
countries as a group (21.3 per cent)
is greater than their initial share of
world income (19.4 per cent). But
results differ widely among individual
countries, and even the aggregate gain
is small for the LDCs.
The unambitious scenario leads to
global real-income gains of US$38.3
billion, just 24 per cent of the
gain from full liberalization. World
protection measured by the weighted
Real income
gain in billion US dollars
158
76.7
(49 per cent)
38.3
(24 per cent)
06/07/2006 11:55:09
 The results
for the two Doha
scenarios demonstrate
the high stakes of
this negotiation…a
successful round
could deliver real gains
both globally and for
developing
countries.

aggregate statistic declines by 1.2

per cent. This is 22 per cent of the
of these income and trade gains come tariffs and the limited number of
decline (to zero protection) with full
from lower agricultural protection sensitive products.
liberalization. World trade expands by
in wealthy countries, whereas little
just 1.6 per cent. The impact of the two scenarios on
reduction in applied agricultural
market access of selected countries is
In comparison to unambitious protection occurs among developing
illustrated in Figure 3. The ambitious
liberalization, a substantially greater countries in the ambitious scenario.
scenario implies a much larger
movement is observed under the The gain in world real income is
liberalization in those rich countries
ambitious scenario. Global welfare proportionally much larger than
where protection is initially highest
increases by US$76.7 billion, 49 the reduction in average protection
and unevenly distributed (the rest of
per cent of the gain from full because the ambitious scenario
OECD, developed Asia, and the EU).
liberalization. World protection falls reduces the dispersion of tariffs
The binding overhang phenomenon
by 1.9 per cent, which is 35 per cent among products in rich countries, due
(see Box 1) is so large in developing
of the effect of full liberalization, and to the caps imposed on agricultural
countries that even the ambitious
trade expands by 2.8 per cent. Most
scenario has a mitigated impact in
agricultural protection except in India
Figure 3. Agricultural protection before and after a potential Doha agreement
and Morocco.
(Applied duties)
The heterogeneity among developing
0.6
countries is illustrated by divergence
in the real-income effects of the
0.5
alternative liberalization scenarios.
0.4
In terms of individual developing
MICs that might benefit from trade
0.3 liberalization, the unambitious scenario
delivers very little real-income gain
0.2 for two reasons. First, these countries
gain little from improved terms of
0.1
trade in world markets despite the
somewhat reduced protection among
0
Australia/New Zealand

Developed Asia

wealthy countries. Second, they

European Union

Rest of OECD

Zambia
Malawi
Bangladesh
USA

China

India

Morocco
Argentina

Brazil

gain little from ‘allocation efficiency’

(realignment of resource use within
their economies) largely because
they make so few changes to their
Initial protection (2005) After ambitious scenario After unambitious scenario

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 Table 2: Effects of liberalization on real income of selected developing countries Both terms-of-trade gains (or losses)
and allocation efficiency gains are
Gain or loss as per cent of base level
Full Ambitious Unambitious larger under the ambitious scenario
Country liberalization scenario scenario than under the unambitious scenario,
Middle-income countries (MICs) but they remain less than in the case
Argentina 1.2 0.3 0.2 of full liberalization.
Brazil 0.8 0.3 0.1
Caribbean economies 0.7 0.4 0.2 While overall global gains are largest
Chile 0.7 0.2 0.1 for full liberalization, distributional
China –0.1 0.4 0.4 trade-offs among countries are
India 0.3 0.4 0.3 evident from the results for the three
Thailand 4.9 1.4 0.7
scenarios. In the case of Bangladesh
Venezuela –0.5 –0.3 –0.3
for example, full liberalization has a
Viet Nam 3.3 0.7 0.5
negative effect as it entails complete
Zimbabwe 3.1 0.7 0.3
Least-developed countries (LDCs) elimination of its preferential access
Bangladesh –0.5 2.3 0.3 to Europe in the textile and apparel
Madagascar –0.3 2.6 –0.1 sectors, while world prices rise for its
Malawi 11.9 5.1 5.0 agricultural imports. Bangladesh does
Mozambique –0.2 1.4 0.0 better under the ambitious scenario
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa 0.0 1.2 0.0 where it gains preferential duty-free
Tanzania 0.7 0.2 0.2
access for its textile and apparel
Uganda 0.5 0.2 0.2
products to all OECD markets, but it
Zambia –0.6 –0.2 –0.1
does not achieve these gains under
the unambitious scenario. Zambia
own policies. Were they to make such Under the ambitious scenario, is also a net importer of agricultural
changes, it would reduce consumer developing countries gain more from commodities while it mostly exports
prices, which would increase domestic trade reform. Among the MICs, gains copper which faces low tariffs
consumption and economic activity. in real income tend to be about one- throughout the world. For Zambia,
Furthermore, own-liberalization would half of those under full liberalization. losses due to higher world agricultural
expand domestic competitiveness
due to reduced prices of intermediate
consumption and capital goods and
to increased competitive pressure.
The same results occur for the
LDCs that might gain from trade
liberalization—terms-of-trade gains
and allocation efficiency gains are very
small under the unambitious scenario.
Other developing countries (both
MICs and LDCs) face smaller potential
gains, or net losses, from full global
liberalization because they are net food
importers or export products (such
as coffee, cocoa or oil) which already
benefit from excellent market access,
or have been conceded preferential
access to EU (e.g., EBA, Cotonou)
or US (e.g., AGOA) which would be
eroded by multilateral reductions in
protection. Effects on these countries
are also dampened in the unambitious
scenario (see Table 2).

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 Table 3. Effects of liberalization on production in selected countries and regions

Full trade liberalization Ambitious Unambitious

Non Agro-food production

Non Agro-food production

Non Agro-food production

Agro-food production

Agro-food production

Agro-food production
(vol) – %

(vol) – %

(vol) – %

(vol) – %

(vol) – %

(vol) – %
Region

Australia/New Zealand 27.7 –1.9 –14.2 1.0 4.4 –0.3

High Developed Asia –11.1 0.7 –6.0 0.3 –1.2 0.1
income European Union –4.3 0.3 –3.0 0.3 –1.8 0.1
countries Rest of OECD –17.4 0.5 –10.3 0.6 0.7 0.1
US 1.6 –0.2 1.4 –0.1 0.8 –0.1
Argentina 9.0 –1.4 2.9 –0.3 1.3 –0.1
Brazil 17.2 –1.8 6.5 –0.7 2.2 –0.2
Chile 7.6 –0.9 1.8 –0.3 1.1 –0.2
China 0.6 0.3 1.1 –0.1 0.7 0.0
Developing Asia –8.0 1.9 –0.8 0.5 0.2 0.2
India –5.6 3.9 0.4 0.9 0.5 0.5
Middle Malaysia 60.8 0.8 3.0 1.9 –0.1 1.7
Morocco –1.7 1.4 0.4 0.2 1.0 0.0
income
Peru 1.0 0.2 0.5 –0.1 0.3 –0.1
countries Philippines –1.5 2.6 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1
South African Customs Union 8.1 –0.4 3.6 –0.2 1.5 0.0
Thailand 14.2 2.7 4.0 1.1 0.1 1.1
Tunisia 3.3 1.5 2.5 0.0 –0.5 0.0
Venezuela –1.0 –0.4 1.0 –0.1 0.6 0.1
Viet Nam –5.6 6.7 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.5
Zimbabwe 13.6 –4.7 3.7 –1.2 1.2 –0.3
Bangladesh –1.6 3.5 12.5 –2.4 0.4 0.1
Madagascar 1.4 –2.9 14.3 –6.7 2.2 –2.0
Low Malawi 21.8 –7.6 14.3 –5.2 13.6 –4.8
Mozambique 1.3 0.0 11.0 –2.8 4.4 –0.8
income
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa –4.5 –0.1 8.2 –1.8 1.0 –0.5
countries Tanzania 0.8 –0.3 0.9 –0.3 0.9 –0.3
Uganda 0.2 –0.2 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.0
Zambia –0.2 1.2 2.4 –0.7 2.2 –0.7

prices dominate the welfare effects
under all three scenarios. In contrast,
Malawi’s gains are impressive under
all three scenarios and largest with
full liberalization due to it being an
agricultural exporter and its economic
size (trade reform often has magnified
impacts in small countries).
Trade liberalization also has a
substantial impact on the pattern
of production among countries
(see Table 3). In the case of full
trade liberalization, the increases of
agricultural and food (agro-food)
production are large in Australia/New
Zealand, Argentina, Brazil, Thailand,
Malaysia (particularly due to increased
exports of rice to the Developed Asia
region and of wheat to India), and not agreed upon in December 2005,
Malawi. Conversely the contraction of and we compared those outcomes
agro-food production in Developed with the estimated effects of full
Asia, Rest of OECD, Developing global trade liberalization.
Asia and to a lesser extent in the EU
The results for the two Doha
explains why forces resisting trade
scenarios demonstrate the high
liberalization are so strong. Impacts on
stakes of this negotiation given
production are smaller under the Doha
the positions articulated by the
scenarios and depend on the level of
countries involved. A successful
ambition.
round could deliver real gains both
globally and for developing countries.
The stakes are high
However the magnitude of those
We have presented an analysis of an gains depends on the shape of the
ambitious versus an unambitious agreement. A reform outcome based
Doha Round outcome. Our on the most ambitious components
simulations are based on negotiating of the negotiating proposals of
proposals from the run-up to the the US and EU delivers noticeably
Hong Kong ministerial meeting but greater benefits than an unambitious

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5-2_06bouet.indd 47 06/07/2006 11:55:14

 outcome based on the lower-
end elements of their proposals.
The details matter in the differing
proposals, such as the tariff and
domestic support reduction formulae,
tariff caps, and number of sensitive
and special products. Negotiating
commitment and diligence are
needed in 2006 to avoid a hollow
Doha outcome given the technical
character of these details.

Developing countries are

heterogeneous in terms of their
own policies, the trade barriers they
face, and their net agricultural trade.
Overall, developing countries gain
most—and might achieve the best
deal in the negotiations—when
they join in the reform process for
a global trade agreement. Attention
is needed in the case of some of the
LDCs and other poor countries that
may face declining terms of trade due
to higher world agricultural prices
or eroding preferences. In addition,
many developing countries can
achieve the full benefits of trade only
with substantial attention to broad
development needs that will enhance
their competitiveness (transportation
infrastructure, insurance and credit
markets, as well as relevant political
and social concerns). This too needs
to be part of a successful Doha Round Further Reading
outcome. ■ Anderson, K. and Martin, W. (eds.) (2005). Trade Reform and the Doha Agenda,
Washington DC: The World Bank.
Note ■ Bouët, A., Bureau, J.-C., Decreux, Y. and Jean, S. (2005). Multilateral agricultural
trade liberalization: The contrasting fortunes of developing countries in the Doha
1 Round, The World Economy, 28(9): 1329–1354.
This article is a revised version
of a presentation made at ■ Bouët, A., Mevel, S. and Orden, D. (2005). More or Less Ambition? Modeling the
Development Impact of US–EU Agricultural Proposals in the Doha Round., IFPRI
a luncheon seminar of the brief, Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute.
German Marshall Fund of the ■ Fontagne, L., Guerin, J.-L. and Jean, S. (2005). Market access liberalization in the
United States, December 1, Doha Round: Scenarios and assessment, The World Economy, 28(8): 1073–1094.
2005, in Washington, D.C. and ■ Francois, J., Van Meijl, H. and Van Tongeren, F. (2005). Trade liberalization in the
Doha development round, Economic Policy, 20(42): 349–391.
in several sessions in Hong
Kong during the WTO meetings Antoine Bouet, David Orden, and Simon Mevel, International Food Policy Research
at which a somewhat more Institute, Washington, D.C., USA.
ambitious reform scenario was Email: a.bouet@cgiar.org; d.orden@cgiar.org; s.mevel@cgiar.org
analyzed.

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 summary
More or Less
Ambition in the Doha
Round? Modeling the
Development Impact of
Recent Proposals
We analyse the impact on developing
countries, whose economies depend
heavily on agriculture, of a WTO Doha
Development Round agreement based on
greater or lesser levels of ambition. We
present the results of an ambitious versus an
unambitious Doha Round outcome, using
the MIRAGE model of the global economy,
with a special focus on developing countries.
Our simulations are based on negotiating
proposals from the run-up to the Hong
Kong ministerial meeting but not agreed
upon in December 2005. We compare those
outcomes with the estimated effects of full
global trade liberalization. The results for
the two Doha scenarios demonstrate the
high stakes of this negotiation given the
positions of EU, US and the G-20 coalition. A
successful round could deliver real gains both
globally and for developing countries, but
the magnitude of those gains depends on the
shape of the agreement. A reform outcome
based on the most ambitious components of
the negotiating proposals of the US and EU
delivers noticeably greater benefits than an
unambitious outcome. Developing countries
are exposed to very contrasting fortunes.
The details matter in the differing proposals,
such as the tariff and domestic support
reduction formulae, tariff caps, and number
of sensitive and special products. Negotiating
commitment and diligence are needed in
2006 to avoid a hollow Doha outcome given
the technical character of these details.
Quelle ambition pour
la négociation de
Doha ? Un modèle de
l’impact des dernières
propositions sur le
développement.
On se propose d’analyser
l’impact sur les pays en voie de
développement, dont les économies
dépendent plus ou moins de l’agriculture,
de différentes variantes possibles, plus ou
moins ambitieuses, de l’accord final sur
le cycle de Doha pour le développement
discuté à l’OMC. A l’aide du modèle
MIRAGE de l’économie mondiale, et en
s’intéressant spécialement aux pays en
voie de développement, on oppose un
scenario « ambitieux » pour les résultats des
négociations à un autre « conservateur ».
Nos simulations sont basées sur les
propositions de négociation telles qu’elles
ont été présentées, mais non adoptées, à
la conférence ministérielle de Hong-Kong
en décembre 2005. Ces propositions sont
confrontées à ce qu’on aurait pu obtenir
d’une libéralisation totale. Les résultats
montrent l’importance de l’enjeu, étant
donné les positions de l’UE, des Etats-
Unis, et du G20. Une issue heureuse de la
négociation pourrait conduire à de vrais gains
tant pour le monde dans son ensemble que
pour les pays en voie de développement,
mais l’ampleur de ces gains dépend de la
façon dont se ferait l’accord. La version
« ambitieuse » de l’accord donnerait des
gains sensiblement plus élevés que celle
basée sur les principes plus conservateurs.
Les pays en voie de développement, dans ce
cadre, subissent des fortunes diverses. Les
détails des différentes propositions, tels que
les formules adoptées pour la réduction des
tarifs et la mesure des soutiens internes, les
tarifs plafonds, et le nombre de produits
Mehr oder weniger
Ehrgeiz in der
Doha-Runde? Eine
Modellierung der
Auswirkungen auf
die Entwicklung der
neuesten Vorschläge
Wir analysieren die Auswirkungen
eines mehr oder weniger
ehrgeizigen Abschlusses der WTO-Doha-
Entwicklungsrunde auf Entwicklungsländer,
deren Wirtschaft stark von der Landwirtschaft
abhängt. Wir zeigen den Vergleich eines
ambitionierten Ergebnisses mit einem
weniger ambitionierten Ergebnis der
Doha-Runde unter Verwendung des
MIRAGE-Modells der Weltwirtschaft auf und
konzentrieren uns dabei besonders auf die
Entwicklungsländer. Unsere Simulationen
beruhen auf Verhandlungsvorschlägen
von der Vorbereitungszeit bis zum
Ministertreffen in Hongkong. Diese
Vorschläge wurden jedoch im Dezember
2005 nicht angenommen. Wir vergleichen
diese Ergebnisse mit den geschätzten
Auswirkungen einer vollständigen globalen
Handelsliberalisierung. Die Ergebnisse
dieser beiden Doha-Szenarien zeigen auf,
was im Hinblick auf die Positionen von
EU, USA und G-20-Koalition auf dem Spiel
steht. Eine erfolgreiche Runde könnte
sowohl auf globaler Ebene als auch für die
Entwicklungsländer tatsächlich von Vorteil
sein; die Bedeutung dieser Vorteile hängt
jedoch von der Art des Abkommens ab.
Das Ergebnis einer Reform, welches auf
den ambitioniertesten Komponenten der
Verhandlungsvorschläge von USA und EU
beruht, führt zu deutlich größeren Vorteilen
als ein weniger ambitioniertes Ergebnis.
Die Wirkungen für die Entwicklungsländer
sind sehr gegensätzlich. Die Details der
unterschiedlichen Vorschläge spielen
eine große Rolle, wie z.B. die Formeln

summary
sensibles et spéciaux, ne sont pas dépourvus
d’importance. Etant donné le caractère très
technique de ces détails, il faudra mobiliser
efforts et diligence en 2006 pour éviter de
terminer la négociation par un accord par
trop creux.
zur Zollreduktion und zum Abbau der
inländischen Stützung, die Zollobergrenzen,
sowie die Anzahl der sensitiven und
besonderen Produkte. Auf Grund der
technischen Zusammenhänge bei diesen
Einzelheiten sind bei den Verhandlungen im
Jahr 2006 Engagement und Einsatzbereitschaft
gefragt, um ein bedeutungsleeres Doha-
Ergebnis zu vermeiden.

© The Agricultural Ecomomics Society and the European Association of Agricultural Economists 2006 EuroChoices 5(2) ★ 49

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