SPECPRO DIGEST RULE 80-86
G.R. No. 187879 July 5, 2010
DALISAY E. OCAMPO, VINCE E. OCAMPO, MELINDA CARLA E.
OCAMPO, and LEONARDO E. OCAMPO, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
RENATO M. OCAMPO and ERLINDA M. OCAMPO, Respondents.
NACHURA, J.:
Facts: Petitioners Dalisay et al. are the surviving wife and the children
of Leonardo. Leonardo, together with his siblings Renato and Erlinda
(Respondents), jointly controlled, managed, and administered the
estate of their parents, Spouses Ocampo. Under such circumstance,
Leonardo had been receiving his share consisting of one-third (1/3) of
the total income generated from the properties of the estate.
Subsequently, Leonardo died and he was survived by his wife and the
children (Petitioners Dalisay).
When Leonardo died, respondents took possession, control and
management of the properties to the exclusion of petitioners and the
petitoners no longer received the 1/3 portion of Leonardo. Petitioners
then initiated a petition for intestate proceedings in the RTC.
Respondents, in their counter-petition prayed that they be appointed
as special joint administrators of the estate of their parents.
RTC granted respondents’ counter-petition. Petitioners in their
Comment prayed that, in order to avoid further delay, letters of
administration to serve as joint administrators of the subject estate be
issued to respondents and Dalisay. RTC appointed Dalisay and
Renato as special joint administrators of the estate of the deceased
spouses. But RTC later revoked the appointment of Dalisay as co-
special administratrix and substituted her with Erlinda. Petitioners filed
a Motion to Terminate or Revoke the Special Administration.
RTC granted this and revoked and terminated the appointment of
Renato and Erlinda as joint special administrators and appointed
Melinda as regular administratrix. respondents filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA.
CA ruled that RTC gravely abused its discretion in revoking
respondents’ appointment as joint special administrators, and for
appointing Melinda as regular administratrix without conducting a
formal hearing to determine her competency to assume such role.
Hence, this instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court
Issue: WON it was proper for the RTC to revoke the appointment of
respondents as joint special administrators.
Ruling: Yes. Selection or removal of special administrators is not
governed by the rules regarding the selection or removal of regular
administrator. The probate court may appoint or remove special
administrators based on grounds other than those enumerated in the
Rules at its discretion. Selection or removal of special administrators
is at the discretion of the court as long as the discretion is exercised
without grave abuse, and is based on reason, equity, justice, and legal
principles, interference by higher courts is unwarranted Indeed, even
1
if special administrators had already been appointed, once the probate
court finds the appointees no longer entitled to its confidence, it is
justified in withdrawing the appointment and giving no valid effect
thereto. In this case, the RTC revoked
respondents’ appointment as special administrators for failing to post
their administrators’ bond and to submit an inventory and accounting
as required of them, tantamount to failing to comply with its lawful
orders.
Hence, the revocation of respondents’ appointment as Special
Administrator was proper.
The pertinent provisions relative to the special administration of the
decedents’ estate under the Rules of Court provide—
Rule 80
Sec. 1. Appointment of special administrator. – When there is delay in
granting letters testamentary or of administration by any cause
including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the
court may appoint a special administrator to take possession and
charge of the estate of the deceased until the questions causing the
delay are decided and executors or administrators appointed.29
Sec. 2. Powers and duties of special administrator. – Such special
administrator shall take possession and charge of goods, chattels,
rights, credits, and estate of the deceased and preserve the same for
the executor or administrator afterwards appointed, and for that
purpose may commence and maintain suits as administrator. He may
sell only such perishable and other property as the court orders sold.
A special administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts of the
deceased unless so ordered by the court.30
Rule 81
Sec. 4. Bond of special administrator. – A special administrator before
entering upon the duties of his trust shall give a bond, in such sum as
the court directs, conditioned that he will make and return a true
inventory of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the
deceased which come to his possession or knowledge, and that he will
truly account for such as are received by him when required by the
court, and will deliver the same to the person appointed executor or
administrator, or to such other person as may be authorized to receive
them.
G.R. No. 162934 November 11, 2005
HEIRS OF BELINDA DAHLIA A. CASTILLO, namely, BENA JEAN,
DANIEL, MELCHOR, MICHAEL and DANIBEL, all surnamed
CASTILLO, Petitioners,
vs.
DOLORES LACUATA-GABRIEL, Respondent.
DECISION
 SPECPRO DIGEST RULE 80-86
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Facts: On January 25, 1989, Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel, wife of Lorenzo
B. Almoradie, died in Malabon City, Metro Manila, leaving behind a
sizable inheritance consisting mostly of real estate and shares of
stock.3
A little over a month after Crisanta’s death, her mother, Crisanta
Santiago Vda. de Yanga, commenced an intestate proceeding before
the RTC. She alleged, among others, that to her knowledge, her
daughter died intestate leaving an estate with an estimated net value
of ₱1,500,000.00 and that such estate was being managed by her
wastrel and incompetent son-in-law, Lorenzo, and by two other equally
incompetent persons. She prayed that letters of administration be
issued to her son, Mariano Yanga, Jr., also the brother of the
deceased, and that she be awarded her share of the estate of her
daughter after due hearing.4 However, the RTC appointed Lorenzo as
administrator.
Meantime, the marriage between Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel and Lorenzo
Almoradie was declared void for being bigamous. The RTC then
removed Lorenzo as administrator and appointed Mariano, Jr. in his
stead.
One Belinda Dahlia Y. Almoradie Castillo, claiming to be the only
legitimate child of Lorenzo and Crisanta, filed a motion for intervention,
Roberto Y. Gabriel, the legally adopted son of Crisanta Y. Gabriel, filed
before the RTC of Malabon City a petition for probate of an alleged will
and for the issuance of letters testamentary in his favor. He alleged
that he discovered his mother’s will in which he was instituted as the
sole heir of the testatrix, and designated as alternate executor for the
named executor therein, Francisco S. Yanga, a brother of Crisanta,
who had predeceased the latter.
Belinda Castillo died.
Probate court appointed Roberto Y. Gabriel as special administrator
of his mother’s estate.9
On May 23, 2001, the heirs of Belinda filed a Motion10 praying that they
be substituted as party-litigants in lieu of their late mother Belinda.
Roberto Gabriel died. His widow, Dolores L. Gabriel, filed a
"Manifestation and Motion"11 where she informed the
probate court of her husband’s death and prayed that she be admitted
as substitute in place of her late husband, and be appointed as
administratrix of the estate of Crisanta Gabriel as well.
Heirs of Belinda opposed Dolores’ manifestation and motion. They
averred that Dolores was not Crisanta Gabriel’s next of kin, let alone
the lawful wife of the late Roberto.13
Bena Jean (Heir of Belinda) filed a "Motion for Appointment as
Administrator of the Estate of Crisanta Y. Gabriel"15 praying that she
be appointed administratrix of the estate of her grandmother Crisanta.
2
Dolores opposed the motion of Bena Jean, claiming that the latter has
neither proven her kinship with Crisanta Gabriel nor shown any
particular qualification to act as administratrix of the estate.16
Lower court appointed Dolores as special administratrix upon a bond
of ₱200,000.00. The probate court merely noted the motion for
substitution filed by the heirs of Belinda,
stating that they were "mere strangers to the case" and that their cause
could better be ventilated in a separate proceeding.
The heirs of Belinda moved to reconsider. The probate court denied
the motion for reconsideration filed by Belinda’s heirs. Said heirs then
filed with the CA a petition for certiorari with prayer for a temporary
restraining order or/and preliminary injunction against Dolores and the
probate court.
The appellate court dismissed the petition. It ruled that the probate
court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in appointing Dolores
as special administratrix.
Issue: WON the appointment of respondent as special administratrix
of the estate left by Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel is proper.
Ruling: Yes. The Court has repeatedly held that the appointment of a
special administrator lies in the sound discretion of the probate court.27
A special administrator is a representative of a decedent appointed by
the probate court to care for and preserve his estate until an executor
or general administrator is appointed.28 When appointed, a special
administrator is regarded not as a representative of the agent of the
parties suggesting the appointment, but as the administrator in charge
of the estate, and, in fact, as an officer of the court.29 As such officer,
he is subject to the supervision and control of the probate court and is
expected to work for the best interests of the entire estate, especially
its smooth administration and earliest settlement.30 The principal
object of appointment of temporary administrator is to preserve the
estate until it can pass into hands of person fully authorized to
administer it for the benefit of creditors and heirs.31 In many instances,
the appointment of administrators for the estates of decedents
frequently become involved in protracted litigations, thereby exposing
such estates to great waste and losses unless an authorized agent to
collect the debts and preserve the assets in the interim is appointed.
The occasion for such an appointment, likewise, arises where, for
some cause, such as a pendency of a suit concerning the proof of the
will, regular administration is delayed.32
Section 1, Rule 80 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Appointment of Special Administrator. – When there is delay
in granting letters testamentary or of administration by any cause
including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the
court may appoint a special administrator to take possession and
charge of the estate of the deceased until the questions causing the
delay are decided and executors or administrators appointed.
Under the above rule, the probate court may appoint a special
administrator should there be a delay in granting letters testamentary
or of administration occasioned by any cause including an appeal from
 SPECPRO DIGEST RULE 80-86
the allowance or disallowance of a will. Subject to this qualification, the
appointment of a special administrator lies in the discretion of the
Court. This discretion, however, must be sound, that is, not whimsical,
or contrary to reason, justice, equity or legal principle.
The basis for appointing a special administrator under the Rules is
broad enough to include any cause or reason for the delay in granting
letters testamentary or of administration as where a contest as to the
will is being carried on in the same or in another court, or where there
is an appeal pending as to the proceeding on the removal of an
executor or administrator, or in cases where the parties cannot agree
among themselves. Likewise, when from any cause general
administration cannot be immediately granted, a special administrator
may be appointed to collect and preserve the property of the
deceased.
It is obvious that the phrase "by any cause" includes those incidents
which transpired in the instant case clearly showing that there is a
delay in the probate of the will and that the granting of letters
testamentary will consequently be prolonged necessitating the
immediate appointment of a special administrator.35
As enunciated above, the probate court has ample jurisdiction to
appoint respondent as special administratrix. The deceased Crisanta
Yanga-Gabriel left a document purporting to be her will where her
adopted son, Roberto, was named as the sole heir of all her properties.
However, pending probate of the will, Roberto died leaving his widow,
the respondent herein, as his sole heir. Thus, the respondent has
much stake in Crisanta’s estate in case the latter’s will is allowed
probate. It needs to be emphasized that in the appointment of a special
administrator (which is but temporary and subsists only until a regular
administrator is appointed), the probate court does not determine the
shares in the decedent’s estate, but merely appoints who is entitled to
administer the estate. The issue of heirship is one to be determined in
the decree of distribution, and the findings of the court on the
relationship of the parties in the administration as to be the basis of
distribution.36 Thus, the preference of respondent is sound, that is, not
whimsical, or contrary to reason, justice, equity or legal principle.
G.R. No. L-48585 March 3, 1980
FELICIANO DE GUZMAN, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE TEOFILO GUADIZ, JR., Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch V, Gapan, and JULIAN
VILLEGAS, NATIVIDAD VILLEGAS, GEMINIANO VILLEGAS,
CESAR VILLEGAS, MAXIMO MATIAS, ROSARIO VILLEGAS
MATIAS, ANA MARIE V. MATIAS, and LOURDES V. MATIAS,
respondents.
FACTS:
On March 16, 1977, the petitioner filed a petition with the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch V, Gapan, for the probate of a will
alleged to have been executed by one Catalina Bajacan instituting the
petitioner as sole and universal heir and naming him as executor.
Catalina Bajacan died on February 3, 1977; that on May 10, 1977, the
3
private respondents filed a motion to dismiss and/or opposition
contending, among others, that all the real properties of Catalina
Bajacan are now owned by them by virtue of a Deed of Donation
Intervivos executed on June 19, 1972 by Arcadia Bajacan and Catalina
Bajacan in their favor.
On September 30, 1977, the respondent judge resolved to defer
resolution on the said motion to dismiss until the parties shall have
presented their evidence. Thereafter a motion for the appointment of
a special administrator was filed by the petitioner on September 23,
1977 alleging that the unresolved motion to dismiss would necessarily
delay the probate of the will and the appointment of an executor; that
the decedent's estate consists of eighty (80) hectares of first class
agricultural rice land, more or less, yielding fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) worth of rice harvested twice a year; that somebody
representing the estate should collect and receive the palay harvests
pending the probate of the will. On December 23, 1977, the
respondent judge issued an order denying the motion for appointment
of a special administrator.
On June 5, 1978, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
however the motion was also denied by the respondent judge.
ISSUE:
WON the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying petitioner's
motion for the appointment of a special administrator.
RULING:
YES. Rule 80, Sec. 1, of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Section 1 — Appointment of Special Administrator
— When there is delay in granting letters
testamentary or of administration by any cause
including an appeal from the allowance or
disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a
special administrator to take possession and
charge of the estate of the deceased until the
questions causing the delay are decided and
executors or administrators appointed.
Under the above rule, the probate court may appoint a special
administrator should there be a delay in granting letters testamentary
or of administration occasioned by any cause including an appeal from
the allowance or disallowance of a will. Subject to this qualification, the
appointment of a special administrator lies in the discretion of the
Court. This discretion, however, must be sound, that is, not whimsical,
or Contrary to reason, justice, equity or legal principle.
The basis for appointing a special administrator under the Rules is
broad enough to include any cause or reason for the delay in granting
letters testamentary or of administration as where a contest as to the
will is being carried on in the same or in another court, or where there
is an appeal pending as to the proceeding on the removal of an
executor or administrator, or in cases where the parties cannot agree
 SPECPRO DIGEST RULE 80-86
among themselves. 18 Likewise, when from any cause general
administration cannot be immediately granted, a special administrator
may be appointed to collect and preserve the property of the
deceased.
It is obvious that the phrase "by any cause" includes those incidents
which transpired in the instant case clearly showing that there is a
delay in the probate of the will and that the granting of letters
testamentary will consequently be prolonged necessitating the
immediate appointment of a special administrator. The reasons for the
appointment of a special administrator are: “The reason for the
practice of appointing a special administrator rests in the fact that
estates of decedents frequently become involved in protected
litigation, thereby being exposed to great waste and losses if there is
no authorized agent to collect the debts and preserve the assets in the
interim. The occassion for such an appointment usually arises where,
for some cause, such as a pendency of a suit concerning the proof of
the will, regular administration is delayed. No temporary administration
can be granted where there is an executor in being capable of acting,
however.” “Principal object of appointment of temporary administrator
is to preserve estate until it can pass into hands of person fully
authorized to administer it for benefit of creditors and heirs.”
All the facts which warrant the appointment of a special administrator
in accordance with Rule 80, Sec. 1 of the Revised Rules of Court are
present in the case at bar.
G.R. No. 193161 August 22, 2011
DIOSDADO S. MANUNGAS, Petitioner,
vs.
MARGARITA AVILA LORETO and FLORENCIA AVILA
PARREÑO, Respondents.
FACTS:
Engracia Manungas was the wife of Florentino Manungas. They had
no children. Instead, they adopted Samuel David Avila (Avila) on
August 12, 1968. Florentino Manungas died intestate on May 29,
1977, while Avila predeceased his adoptive mother. Avila was survived
by his wife Sarah Abarte Vda. de Manungas.
Thereafter, Engracia Manungas filed a Motion for Partition of Estate in
the intestate estate proceedings of Florentino Manungas, of which she
was the administratrix. There, she stated that there are no other legal
and compulsory heirs of Florentino Manungas except for herself, Avila
and a Ramon Manungas whom she acknowledged as the natural son
of Florentino Manungas.
Meanwhile, Avila’s widow executed a Waiver of Rights and
Participation, renouncing her rights over the separate property of her
husband in favor of Engracia Manungas. Thereafter, a Decree of Final
Distribution was issued in the intestate estate proceedings of
Florentino Manungas distributing the properties to Engracia Manungas
and Ramon Manungas, the surviving heirs.6
4
The RTC appointed Parreño, the niece of Engracia Manungas, as the
Judicial Guardian of the properties and person of her incompetent
aunt.
Engracia Manungas, through Parreño, then instituted Civil Case No.
5196-96 against the spouses Diosdado Salinas Manungas and
Milagros Pacifico for illegal detainer and damages. In their answer, the
spouses Salinas claimed that Diosdado is the illegitimate son of
Florentino Manungas.
Thereafter, Diosdado instituted a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration over the Estate of Engracia Manungas in his favor
before the RTC, Branch 2 in Tagum City, Davao. He alleged that he,
being an illegitimate son of Florentino Manungas, is an heir of Engracia
Manungas.The petition was opposed by Margarita Avila Loreto
(Loreto) and Parreño alleging that Diosdado was incompetent as an
administrator of the Estate of Manungas claiming that he was not a
Manungas, that he was not an heir of Engracia Manungas.
The RTC issued an Order appointing Parreño as the administrator of
the Estate of Manungas.
Diosdado filed a Motion for Reconsideration and the RTC issued an
Order reversing itself and ordering the revocation of its earlier
appointment of Parreño as the administrator of the Estate of
Manungas while appointing Diosdado as the Special Administrator.
Parreño and Loreto appealed the ruling of the RTC to the CA. The CA
further reinstated Parreño as the special administrator of the estate.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
WON the Court a Quo committed a grave error when it ruled to annul
the appointment of petitioner, Diosdado Manungas as judicial
administrator and reinstating the appointment of Florencia Parreño as
special administrator.
RULING:
NO. The fact that Diosdado is an heir to the estate of Florentino
Manungas does not mean that he is entitled or even qualified to
become the special administrator of the Estate of Manungas.
Jurisprudence teaches us that the appointment of a special
administrator lies within the discretion of the court. In Heirs of Belinda
Dahlia A. Castillo v. Lacuata-Gabriel, 474 SCRA 747 (2005), it was
stated that: It is well settled that the statutory provisions as to the prior
or preferred right of certain persons to the appointment of administrator
under Section 1, Rule 81, as well as the statutory provisions as to
causes for removal of an executor or administrator under section 653
of Act No. 190, now Section 2, Rule 83, do not apply to the selection
or removal of special administrator. x x x As the law does not say
who shall be appointed as special administrator and the
qualifications the appointee must have, the judge or court has
discretion in the selection of the person to be appointed,
discretion which must be sound, that is, not whimsical or
contrary to reason, justice or equity.
 SPECPRO DIGEST RULE 80-86
While the trial court has the discretion to appoint anyone as a special
administrator of the estate, such discretion must be exercised with
reason, guided by the directives of equity, justice and legal principles.
It may, therefore, not be remiss to reiterate that the role of a special
administrator is to preserve the estate until a regular administrator is
appointed. As stated in Sec. 2, Rule 80 of the Rules: Section 2. Powers
and duties of special administrator.—Such special administrator shall
take possession and charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and
estate of the deceased and preserve the same for the executors or
administrator afterwards appointed, and for that purpose may
commence and maintain suits as administrator. He may sell only such
perishable and other property as the court orders sold. A special
administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts of the deceased
unless so ordered by the court. Given this duty on the part of the
special administrator, it would, therefore, be prudent and reasonable
to appoint someone interested in preserving the estate for its eventual
distribution to the heirs. Such choice would ensure that such person
would not expose the estate to losses that would effectively diminish
his or her share. While the court may use its discretion and depart from
such reasoning, still, there is no logical reason to appoint a person who
is a debtor of the estate and otherwise a stranger to the deceased. To
do so would be tantamount to grave abuse of discretion.
To reiterate, the subject of the intestate proceedings is the estate of
Engracia Manungas. It must be remembered that the estate of
Florentino Manungas was already the subject of intestate proceedings
that have long been terminated with the proceeds distributed to the
heirs with the issuance of a Decree of Final Distribution.27 With the
termination of the intestate estate proceedings of Florentino
Manungas, Diosdado, as an illegitimate heir of Florentino Manungas,
is still not an heir of Engracia Manungas and is not entitled to receive
any part of the Estate of Manungas. In fact, Diosdado is a debtor of
the estate and would have no interest in preserving its value. There is
no reason to appoint him as its special administrator.
G.R. No. 150164 November 26, 2002
GLORIOSA V. VALARAO, petitioner, vs. CONRADO C. PASCUAL
and MANUEL C. DIAZ
FACTS:
FELICIDAD C. PASCUAL died at 71, single, left a substantial
inheritance collateral relative who all appear disagreeable to any
sensible partition of the estate.
The division was made in favor of 5 groups:
1. the legitimate children of her late sister Leoncia P.
Villanueva, including petitioner Gloriosa V. Valarao;
2. the legitimate children of her late sister Carmen P. Diaz
including respondent Manuel C. Diaz;
3. the legitimate children of her late brother Macario Pascual;
4. the legitimate children of her late sister Milagros P. de Leon;
and,
5. the decedent's surviving sister Augustia C. Pascual and
brothers Leonardo C. Pascual and Conrado C. Pascual, the
latter being one of respondents herein.
5
Petitioner and Respondent Pascual each filed a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration in their favor, while Respondent
Diaz filed a petition for probate of an alleged holographic will of
Felicidad. Valarao and Pascual became joint administrators.
Probate for holo-will denied, intestate settlement proceeded.
In view of disallowance of the holo-will, petitioner moved for her
appointment as special administratrix, while Diaz moved to be named
as special co-admin.
Valarao was appointed as special-admin and paid bond. Diaz’s MR
was denied.
Respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA,
to reverse and set aside the Orders of the probate court appointing
only petitioner Valarao as special administratrix, and to order the
appointment of respondent Diaz as special co-administrator of the
estate.
CA: reversed the appointment of Valarao as lone special administratrix
but did not rule on Diaz’s prayer for appointment.
The appellate court explained that since the heirs were divided into
two (2) scrappy factions, justice and equity demanded that both
factions be represented in the management of the estate of the
deceased, according to the case of Matias vs Gonzales.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
WoN respondent should be appointed as special co-admin.
HELD:
It’s a No. Petition granted.
Respondents are invoking the case of Matias vs Gonzales. However
the SC ruled that this case do not establish an absolute right
demandable from the probate court to appoint special co-
administrators who would represent the respective interests of
squabbling heirs. Rather, the cases constitute precedents for the
authority of the probate court to designate not just one but also two or
more special co-administrators for a single estate.
Furthermore, the cases of Matias, Corona and Vda. de Dayrit hinge
upon factual circumstances other than the incompatible interests of the
heirs which are glaringly absent from the instant case. In Matias this
Court ordered the appointment of a special co-administrator because
of the applicant's status as the universal heir and executrix designated
in the will, which we considered to be a "special interest" deserving
protection during the pendency of the appeal. Quite significantly, since
the lower court in Matias had already deemed it best to appoint more
than one special administrator, we found grave abuse of discretion in
the act of the lower court in ignoring the applicant's distinctive status
in the selection of another special administrator.
 SPECPRO DIGEST RULE 80-86
G.R. No. 187879 July 5, 2010
DALISAY E. OCAMPO, VINCE E. OCAMPO, MELINDA CARLA E.
OCAMPO, and LEONARDO E. OCAMPO, JR., Petitioners, vs.
RENATO M. OCAMPO and ERLINDA M. OCAMPO, Respondents.
FACTS:
Vicente and Maxima Ocampo died intestate. They own properties in
Laguna and left no debts.
They had three children: Leonardo Ocampo, Renato Ocampo, and
Erlinda Ocampo.
Leonardo died and was survived by his wife and kids (herein
petitioners).
During the lifetime of Leonardo, he took care of the estate of his
parents. Under such circumstance, Leonardo had been receiving his
share consisting of one-third (1/3) of the total income generated from
the properties of the estate. After his death, the respondents took over
and excluded the herein petitioners.
Petitioners moved for an intestate proceeding for the estate of Vicente
and Maxima Ocampo, as well as another proceeding for the estate of
Leonardo. The respondents opposed arguing: no intestate proceeding
for the estate of Leonardo may commence since no intestate
proceeding for the estate of Vicente and Maxima has happened yet.
Respondents contend that petitioners cannot file the two petitions
subsequently.
RTC appointed Dalisay and Renato as Joint Admins and was
requested to post a bond of P200,000.00.
Respondents filed an MR arguing that Dalisay was unfit to be
appointed. Respondents asserted right to be appointed as
administrators being the next of kin of Vicente and Maxima, whereas
Dalisay was a mere daughter-in-law of the decedents and not even a
legal heir by right of representation from her late husband Leonardo.
RTC revoked the appointment of Dalisay considering the fact that
respondents were the nearest of kin of Vicente and Maxima.
Petitioners did not contest.
Petitioners filed a Motion for an Inventory and to Render Account of
the Estate, reiterating that respondents, as joint special admins,
should submit a true inventory of the income and assets of the estate.
Respondents filed a motion for exemption to file Administrators’ Bond
praying that they be allowed to enter their duties as special
administrators without the need to file an administrators’ bond due to
their difficulty in raising the necessary amount.
They alleged that, since petitioners did not contest the appointment of
respondents, it would be to the best interest of all the heirs that the
estate be spared from incurring unnecessary expenses in paying for
the bond premiums.
6
RTC revoked the appointment of Renato on the ground of failure to
pay the bond and Appointed Melinda as regular administratrix.
CA: RTC gravely abused its discretion in revoking respondents’
appointment as joint special administrators without first ruling on their
motion for exemption from bond, and for appointing Melinda as regular
administratrix without conducting a formal hearing to determine her
competency to assume as such.
ISSUE:
WoN Respondents should pay the bond before they may exercise their
duties and responsibilities as admins.
HELD:
Pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 81, the bond secures the performance
of the duties and obligations of an administrator namely:
(1) to administer the estate and pay the debts;
(2) to perform all judicial orders;
(3) to account within one (1) year and at any other time when
required by the probate court; and
(4) to make an inventory within three (3) months.
More specifically, per Section 4 of the same Rule, the bond is
conditioned on the faithful execution of the administration of the
decedent’s estate requiring the special administrator to (1) make and
return a true inventory of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate
of the deceased which come to his possession or knowledge; (2) truly
account for such as received by him when required by the court; and
(3) deliver the same to the person appointed as executor or regular
administrator, or to such other person as may be authorized to receive
them.
Verily, the administration bond is for the benefit of the creditors and
the heirs, as it compels the administrator, whether regular or special,
to perform the trust reposed in, and discharge the obligations
incumbent upon, him. Its object and purpose is to safeguard the
properties of the decedent, and, therefore, the bond should not be
considered as part of the necessary expenses chargeable against the
estate, not being included among the acts constituting the care,
management, and settlement of the estate. Moreover, the ability to
post the bond is in the nature of a qualification for the office of
administration.
G.R. No. L-40517 January 31, 1984
LUZON SURETY COMPANY, INC., plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PASTOR T. QUEBRAR and FRANCISCO KILAYKO, defendants-
appellants.
FACTS:
 SPECPRO DIGEST RULE 80-86
Luzon Surety issued two administrator's bond in behalf of defendant
Quebrar as administrator of 2 estates (Chinsuy and Lipa). In
consideration of the suretyship, wherein the plaintiff-appellee Luzon
Surety Company, Inc. was bound jointly and severally with the
defendant appellant Pastor T. Quebrar, the latter, together with
Francisco Kilayko, executed two indemnity agreements, wherein,
among other things, they agreed, jointly and severally, to pay the
plaintiff-appellee “the sum of Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00) in
advance as premium thereof for every 12 months or fraction thereof,
this. . . or any renewal or substitution thereof is in effect” and to
indemnify plaintiff-appellee against any and all damages, losses,
costs, stamps, taxes, penalties, charges and expenses, whatsoever,
including the 15% of the account involved in any litigation, for
attorney’s fees .
In the years 1954-1955, the defendants paid the premiums and the
documentary stamps. In 1957, the Court approved the project of
partition, while in 1962, Luzon Surety demanded payments of
premiums from 1955 onwards. It was also in the same year when the
court granted the motion of the defendants to have both bonds
cancelled. Hence, plaintiff file a case in the CFI. The court (CFI)
allowed the plaintiff to recover since the bonds were in force and effect
from the filing until 1962. The Court of Appeals certified the case to the
Supreme Court on questions of law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the administrator’s bonds were in force and
effect from and after the year that they were filed and approved by the
court up to 1962, when they were cancelled
HELD: YES.
Under Rule 81 (Sec.1) of the Rules of Court, the administrator is
required to put up a bond for the purpose of indemnifying creditors,
heirs, legatees and the estate. It is conditioned upon the faithful
performance of the administrator's trust. Hence, the surety is then
liable under the administrator's bond.
Even after the approved project of partition, Quebrar as administrator
still had something to do. The administration is for the purpose of
liquidation of the estate and the distribution of the residue among the
heirs and legatees. Liquidation means the determination of all the
assets of the estate and the payment of all debts and expenses. it
appears that there are still debts and expenses to be paid after 1957.
Moreover, the bond stipulated did not provide that it will terminate at
the end of the 1st year if the premium remains unpaid. Hence, it does
not necessarily extinguish or terminate the effectivity of the counter
bond in the absence of an express stipulation to this effect. As such,
as long as the defendant remains the administrator of the estate, the
bond will be held liable and the plaintiff's liabilities subsist being the
co-extensive with the administrator.
G.R. No. 174873. August 26, 2008.*
7
QUASHA ANCHETA PEÑA AND NOLASCO LAW OFFICE FOR
ITS OWN BEHALF, AND REPRESENTING THE HEIRS OF
RAYMOND TRIVIERE, petitioners, vs. LCN CONSTRUCTION
CORP., respondent.
FACTS:
Upon the death of Raymond Triviere, proceedings for the settlement
of his intestate estate were instituted by his widow, Amy Consuelo
Triviere.
Atty. Enrique P. Syquia (Syquia) and Atty. William H. Quasha
(Quasha) of the Quasha Law Office, representing the widow and
children of the late Raymond Triviere were appointed administrators of
the estate of the deceased.
As administrators, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha incurred expenses
for the payment of real estate taxes, security services, and the
preservation and administration of the estate, as well as litigation
expenses. So they filed before the RTC a Motion for Payment of their
litigation expenses. Citing their failure to submit an accounting of the
assets and liabilities of the estate under administration, the RTC
denied the Motion for Payment of Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha.
When Atty. Quasha also passed away, Atty. Redentor Zapata
(Zapata), also of the Quasha Law Office, took over as the counsel of
the Triviere children, and continued to help Atty. Syquia in the
settlement of the estate. According to them, what is being charged are
not professional fees for legal services rendered but payment for
administration of the Estate which has been under the care and
management of the co-administrators for the past fourteen (14) years.
LCN, on the other hand, argued that its claims are still outstanding and
chargeable against the estate of the late Raymond Triviere; thus, no
distribution should be allowed until they have been paid; especially
considering that as of 25 August 2002, the claim of LCN against the
estate of the late Raymond Triviere amounted to P6,016,570.65 as
against the remaining assets of the estate totaling P4,738,558.63,
rendering the latter insolvent.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Quasha Law Office be deemed to
have substituted Atty. Quasha as administrator upon the latter's death.
HELD: No.
When Atty. Quasha passed away in 1996, Atty. Syquia was left as the
sole administrator of the estate of the late Raymond Triviere. The
person of Atty. Quasha was distinct from that of petitioner Quasha Law
Office; and the appointment of Atty. Quasha as administrator of the
estate did not extend to his law office. Neither could petitioner Quasha
Law Office be deemed to have substituted Atty. Quasha as
administrator upon the latter's death for the same would be in violation
of the rules on the appointment and substitution of estate
administrators, particularly, Section 2, Rule 82 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Hence, when Atty. Quasha died, petitioner Quasha Law Office
merely helped in the settlement of the estate as counsel for the
petitioner children of the late Raymond Triviere.
 SPECPRO DIGEST RULE 80-86
Section 2, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court provides in clear and
unequivocal terms the modes for replacing an administrator of an
estate upon the death of an administrator, to wit:
Section 2. Court may remove or accept resignation of
executor or administrator. Proceedings upon death,
resignation, or removal. x x x.
When an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is
removed the remaining executor or administrator may
administer the trust alone, unless the court grants letters
to someone to act with him. If there is no remaining
executor or administrator, administration may be granted to
any suitable person.
The records of the case are wanting in evidence that Quasha Law
Office or any of its lawyers substituted Atty. Quasha as co-
administrator of the estate. None of the documents attached pertain to
the issuance of letters of administration to petitioner Quasha Law
Office or any of its lawyers at any time after the demise of Atty. Quasha
in 1996.
However, petitioner Quasha Law Office, serving as counsel of the
Triviere children from the time of death of Atty. Quasha in 1996, is
entitled to attorney's fees and litigation expenses of P100,000.00, the
same may be collected from the shares of the Triviere children, upon
final distribution of the estate, in consideration of the fact that the
Quasha Law Office, indeed, served as counsel (not anymore as co-
administrator), representing and performing legal services for the
Triviere children in the settlement of the estate of their deceased
father.
G.R. No. 120575. December 16, 1998.*
DR. OLIVIA S. PASCUAL, in her capacity as special administratrix
of the estate of the late DON ANDRES PASCUAL and as executrix
of the testate estate of the late DOÑA ADELA S. PASCUAL,
petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al
FACTS:
Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973 and was
survived by (1) his widow, Doña Adela Soldevilla Pascual; (2) the
children of his full blood brother, Wenceslao Pascual, Sr. (3) the
children of his half blood brother Pedro Pascual (4) the intestate estate
of his full blood brother Eleuterio T. Pascual (4) the intestate estate of
his full blood brother Eleuterio T. Pascual (4) the acknowledged natural
children of his full blood brother Eligio Pascual—Hermes S. Pascual
and Olivia S. Pascual (herein petitioner).
Doña Adela (the surviving spouse) filed with the then Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Pasig, a petition for letters of administration over the
estate of her husband. The CFI appointed her special
administratrix. To assist her with said proceedings, Doña Adela hired,
Atty. Jesus I. Santos, herein private respondent, as her counsel for a
8
fee equivalent to fifteen (15) percent of the gross estate of the
decedent.
The heirs of the decedent later moved for the approval of their
Compromise Agreement, stipulating that three fourths (3/4) of the
estate would go to Doña Adela and one fourth (1/4) to the other heirs
which the Court approved.
While the settlement was still pending, Doña Adela died, leaving a will
which named the petitioner as the sole universal heir. The latter then
filed a petition for the probate of said will.
However, the RTC denied the motion to reiterate hereditary rights,
which was filed by petitioner and her brother. The Court reasoned that,
as illegitimate children of the brother of the decedent, they were barred
from acquiring any hereditary right to her intestate estate under Article
992 of the Civil Code. It ordered that the private respondent’s lien on
the hereditary share of Doña Adela be entered into the records.
Six years after Doña Adela’s death, Judge Padolina rendered a
Decision approving the provisions of their Compromise
Agreement.(1/4 for the heirs and ¾ to Doña Adela).
After said Decision had become final and executory, the private
respondent filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution
insofar as the payment of his attorney’s fees was concerned. Despite
opposition from the petitioner, the motion was granted. Petitioner
moved for the reconsideration and the quashal of the Writ of
Execution, which the RTC denied. Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed
with the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for annulment of the award
of attorney’s fees. Petitioner insistently argues that the RTC Decision,
insofar as it awarded attorney’s fees, was void from the beginning
because the intestate court had lost jurisdiction over the person of
Doña Adela (the attorney’s client) due to her death.
The appellate court dismissed the petition, ruling that the intestate
court had jurisdiction to make the questioned award and that petitioner
had been accorded due process. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
WON the intestate court had lost jurisdiction over the person of Doña
Adela (appointed administrator) due to her death.
Ruling:
NO. The death of Doña Adela did not ipso facto extinguish the
monetary claim of private respondent or require him to refile his claim
with the court hearing the settlement of her testate estate. Had he filed
the claim against Doña Adela personally, the rule would have applied.
However, he did so against the estate of Don Andres.
Thus, where an appointed administrator dies, the applicable rule
is Section 2, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court, which requires the
appointment of a new administrator, viz.:
 SPECPRO DIGEST RULE 80-86
“Sec. 2. Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or
administrator. Proceedings upon death, resignation or removal.—x x x
When an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed, the
remaining executor or administrator may administer the trust alone,
unless the court grants letter to someone to act with him. If there is no
remaining executor or administrator, administration may be granted to
any suitable person.”
Hence, in spite of the death of the appointed administratrix, it was the
duty of the intestate court to determine whether the private
respondent’s claim was allowable as administrative expense—if it was
obtained in reference to the management of the estate; the
performance of legal services which the administratrix herself could
not perform; the prosecution or defense of actions or suits on behalf of
or against the estate; or the discovery, recovery or preservation of
properties of the estate.22 In other words, the intestate court has a
mandate to resolve whether the said claim is a “necessary expense in
the care, management and settlement of the estate.” For the same
reason, the fact that the private respondent’s lien was recorded four
months after the administratrix had died is of no moment.
G.R. No. 183053. October 10, 2012.*
EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III, petitioner, vs. ISABEL COJUANGCO-
SUNTAY, respondent.
Facts:
The decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina) died intestate and
was survived by her spouse, Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico) and five
grandchildren: three legitimate grandchildren, including herein
respondent, Isabel; and two illegitimate grandchildren, including
petitioner Emilio III, all by Federico’s and Cristina’s only child, Emilio
A. Suntay (Emilio I), who predeceased his parents.
More than three years after Cristina’s death, Federico adopted his
illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita.
Respondent Isabel, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), a
petition for the issuance of letters of administration over Cristina’s
estate. Federico, opposed the petition, pointing out that: (1) as the
surviving spouse of the decedent, he should be appointed
administrator of the decedent’s estate; (2) as part owner of the mass
of conjugal properties left by the decedent, he must be accorded
preference in the administration thereof; xxx (4) the enumeration of
heirs in the petition was incomplete as it did not mention the other
children of his son, Emilio III and Nenita;
Federico filed a Motion to Dismiss Isabel’s petition for letters of
administration on the ground that Isabel had no right of representation
to the estate of Cristina, she being an illegitimate grandchild of the
latter as a result of Isabel’s parents’ marriage being declared null and
void. However, in Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, the Court categorically
declared that Isabel and her siblings, having been born of a voidable
marriage as opposed to a void marriage were legitimate children of
Emilio I, who can all represent him in the estate of their legitimate
grandmother, the decedent, Cristina.
9
Undaunted by the set back, Federico nominated Emilio III to
administer the decedent’s estate on his behalf in the event letters of
administration issues to Federico. Consequently, Emilio III filed an
Opposition-In-Intervention, echoing the allegations in his grandfather’s
opposition, alleging that Federico, or in his stead, Emilio III, was better
equipped than respondent to administer and manage the estate of the
decedent, Cristina.
The trial court rendered a decision appointing Emilio III as
administrator of decedent Cristina’s intestate estate.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the
decision of the RTC, revoked the Letters of Administration issued to
Emilio III, and appointed respondent as administratrix of the subject
estate.
On appeal by certiorari, the SC reversed and set aside the ruling
of the appellate court. The court decided to include Emilio III as co-
administrator of Cristina’s estate, giving weight to his interest in
Federico’s estate.
Isabel filed a motion for reconsideration before the SC pleading
for total affirmance of the Court of Appeals’ Decision in favor of her
sole administratorship based on her status as a legitimate grandchild
of Cristina.
Issue:
WON the probate court may appoint or remove special administrators
based on grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules at its
discretion.
Ruling:
YES. In the appointment of administrator of the estate of a deceased
person, the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said
estate of the one to be appointed as administrator.
Given Isabel’s unassailable interest in the estate as one of the
decedent’s legitimate grandchildren and undoubted nearest “next of
kin,” the appointment of Emilio III as co-administrator of the same
estate, cannot be a demandable right. It is a matter left entirely to the
sound discretion of the Court32 and depends on the facts and the
attendant circumstances of the case.
Contrary to the assumption made in the Decision that Emilio III’s
demonstrable interest in the estate makes him a suitable co-
administrator thereof, the evidence reveals that Emilio III has turned
out to be an unsuitable administrator of the estate. Respondent Isabel
points out that after Emilio III’s appointment as administrator of the
subject estate in 2001, he has not looked after the welfare of the
subject estate and has actually acted to the damage and prejudice of
the same.
Bearing in mind that the issuance of letters of administration is simply
a preliminary order to facilitate the settlement of a decedent’s estate,
the Court point out that Emilio III is not without remedies to protect his
interests in the estate of the decedent.
 SPECPRO DIGEST RULE 80-86
Emilio III may likewise avail of the remedy found in Section 2, Rule 82
of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 2. Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or
administrator. Proceedings upon death, resignation, or removal.―If an
executor or administrator neglects to render his account and settle the
estate according to law, or to perform an order or judgment of the court,
or a duty expressly provided by these rules, or absconds, or becomes
insane, or otherwise incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust, the
court may remove him, or, in its discretion, may permit him to resign.
When an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed, the
remaining executor or administrator may administer the trust alone,
unless the court grants letters to someone to act with him. If there is
no remaining executor or administrator, administration may be granted
to any suitable person.
RULE 82
G.R. No. L-26694 December 18, 1973
NELITA MORENO VDA. DE BACALING, petitioner, vs. HECTOR
LAGUNA, HON. VALERION ROVIRA, Judge, Court of First
Instance and HON. JUDGE ROSENDO BALTAZAR, Judge, City
Court of Iloilo, respondents.
ESGUERRA, J.:
FACTS:
 The petitioner and her late husband, Dr. Ramon Bacaling,
with the acquiescence of private respondent Laguda,
constructed a residential house on a portion of the
Laguda’s lot fronting Huevana Street, paying a monthly
rental of P80.00.
 An action for ejectment was filed by Laguda against the
petitioner due to the petitioner’s non-payment of the lease
rentals amounting to P2,160.
o The action was filed against the petitioner in
her capacity as the judicial adminatrix of the
estate of her husband, Dr. Bacaling.
 After a series of legal reverses, the petitioner entered
into a compromise agreement with private respondent
Laguda on July 29, 1964,
 For failure of the petitioner to satisfy the conditions of the
settlement within the 50-day period, private respondent
Laguda moved for execution which the Court granted
 The petitioner moved for reconsideration to quash the writ
of execution and subsequently gave notice that she would
take the case to the Court of Appeals.
 The Respondent countered, alleging that:
o as judicial administratrix as of July 29, 1964, she
was legally authorized to enter into the amicable
settlement which was the basis of the decision
dated July 30, 1964, of the City Court of Iloilo
sought to be executed and,
o THUS, her act was binding upon the present
judicial administrator, Atty. Roberto Dineros,
10
who replaced petitioner upon her discharge as
such on November 28, 196
ISSUE:
 Whether or not the acts of the petitioner as judicial
administratrix prior to her discharge or removal are valid
and binding upon her successor;
RULING:
 YES.
 Under Section 3, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court,
petitioner's lawful acts before the revocation of her letters
of administration or before her removal shall have the
same validity as if there was no such revocation or
removal.
 It is elementary that the effect of revocation of letters
testamentary or of administration is to terminate the
authority of the executor or administrator, but the acts of
the executor or administrator, done in good faith prior to
the revocation of the letters, will be protected, and a
similar protection will be extended to rights acquired under
a previous grant of administration.
 PETITION DISMISSED.
RULE 83
G.R. No. 156407 January 15, 2014
THELMA M. ARANAS, Petitioner, vs.
TERESITA V. MERCADO, FELIMON V. MERCADO, CARMENCITA
M. SUTHERLAND, RICHARD V. MERCADO, MA. TERESITA M.
ANDERSON, and FRANKLIN L. MERCADO, Respondents.
BERSAMIN, J.:
FACTS:
 Emigdio S. Mercado died intestate on January 12, 1991,
survived by his second wife, Teresita V. Mercado and their
five children.
 Petitioner Thelma Aranas, a child of Emigdio filed in the
RTC in Cebu City a petition for the appointment of
Teresita as the administrator of Emigdio’s estate.
 The RTC granted the petition considering that there was
no opposition.
o The letters of administration in favor of Teresita
were issued on September 7, 1992.
 As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the
estate of Emigdio on December 14, 1992 for the
consideration and approval by the RTC.
 She indicated in the inventory that at the time of his death,
Emigdio had "left no real properties but only personal
properties" worth ₱6,675,435.25 in all consisting of:
o cash
o furniture and fixtures
 SPECPRO DIGEST RULE 80-86
o pieces of jewelry valued at
o 44,806 shares of stock of Mervir Realty; and
o 30 shares of stock of Cebu Emerson worth.
 Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that
were excluded from the inventory, Thelma moved that
the RTC direct Teresita to amend the inventory, and to
be examined regarding it. (basta may mga in-exclude
siya na conjugal property)
 Teresita filed a compliance with the order of RTC
supporting her inventory with various documents.
 RTC issued a decision ordering Teresita to re-do her
inventory and include the properties she excluded.
 CA rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner.
ISSUE:
 WON the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion in
directing the inclusion of the propertiesin the estate of
the decedent?

RULING:
 NO!
 The determination of which properties should be
excluded from or included in the inventory of estate
properties was well within the authority and discretion of
the RTC as an intestate court.
o As long as the RTC commits no patent grave
abuse of discretion, its orders must be respected
as part of the regular performance of its judicial
duty.
 Upon issuing the letters of administration, the RTC
becomes duty-bound to direct the preparation and
submission of the inventory of the properties of the estate
and the administrator, has the duty and responsibility to
submit the inventory within three months from the issuance
of letters of administration pursuant to Rule 83 of the
Rules of Court, viz:
o Section 1. Inventory and appraisal to be returned
within three months. – Within three (3) months
after his appointment every executor or
administrator shall return to the court a true
inventory and appraisal of all the real and
personal estate of the deceased which has come
into his possession or knowledge. In the
appraisement of such estate, the court may order
one or more of the inheritance tax appraisers to
give his or their assistance.
 The usage of the word all in Section 1, demands the
inclusion of all the real and personal properties of the
decedent in the inventory.
o However, the word all is qualified by the phrase
which has come into his possession or
knowledge, which signifies that the properties
must be known to the administrator to belong
to the decedent or are in her possession as
the administrator.
 Section 1 allows no exception, for the phrase true inventory
implies that no properties appearing to belong to the
decedent can be excluded from the inventory,
11
regardless of their being in the possession of another
person or entity.
 The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the
inventory and appraisal of the estate of the decedent is "to
aid the court in revising the accounts and determining
the liabilities of the executor or the administrator, and
in making a final and equitable distribution (partition)
of the estate and otherwise to facilitate the administration
of the estate.
 PETITION GRANTED. RTC Decision reinstated.
RULE 83: INVENTORY and APPRAISAL;
PROVISION FOR SUPPORT OF FAMILY
13. Hilado vs. CA, GR No. 164108, May 8, 2009
ALFREDO HILADO, LOPEZ SUGAR CORPORATION, FIRST
FARMERS HOLDING CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE
AMOR A. REYES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 21 and ADMINISTRATRIX JULITA CAMPOS
BENEDICTO, Respondents.
TINGA, J.:
FACTS: ‘The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died
intestate on 15 May 2000. He was survived by his wife (private
respondent Julita), and his only daughter (Francisca).1 At the time
of his death, there were two pending civil cases against Benedicto
involving the petitioners.
The wife filed with the RTC a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor. RTC issued an order appointing her as
administrator of the estate of her deceased husband and issuing
letters of administration in her favor.
Petitioners filed with the RTC a Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti
Cautela praying:
(1) that they be henceforth furnished "copies of all processes
and orders issued" by the intestate court as well as the
pleadings filed by administratrix Benedicto with the said
court.14
(2) that the intestate court set a deadline for the submission
by administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified and
complete inventory of the estate, and upon submission
thereof, order the inheritance tax appraisers of the BIR to
assist in the appraisal of the fair market value of the same.15
(3) petitioners moved that the intestate court set a deadline for
the submission by the administrator of her verified annual
account, and, upon submission thereof, set the date for her
examination under oath with respect thereto, with due
notice to them and other parties interested in the collation,
preservation and disposition of the estate.16
 SPECPRO DIGEST RULE 80-86
The wife opposed disputing that the petitioners do not have the legal
personality to do so.
RTC and CA denied such manifestation/motion. CA dismissed the
petition citing that the claims of petitioners against the decedent were
contingent or expectant, as these were still pending litigation in
separate proceedings before other courts. Hence, this present petition.
ISSUE: WON there is/are relief/s available which obligates the
administrator or executor to submit a true inventory of the decedent’s
estate.
RULING: YES. Section 1 of Rule 83 requires the administrator to
return to the court a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and
personal estate of the deceased within three (3) months from
appointment, while Section 8 of Rule 85 requires the administrator
to render an account of his administration within one (1) year from
receipt of the letters testamentary or of administration.
However, although there are reliefs available to compel an
administrator to perform either duty, but a person whose claim against
the estate is still contingent is not the party entitled to do so. Still,
even if the administrator did delay in the performance of these duties
in the context of dissipating the assets of the estate, there are
protections enforced and available under Rule 88 to protect the
interests of those with contingent claims against the estate.
The petition is DENIED, subject to the qualification that petitioners, as
persons interested in the intestate estate of Roberto Benedicto, are
entitled to such notices and rights as provided for such interested
persons in the Rules on Settlement of Estates of Deceased Persons
under the Rules on Special Proceedings. No pronouncements as to
costs.
14. Heirs of Bang vs. Sy, GR No. 114217 and 150797, Oct 13, 2009
NACHURA, J.:
PARTIES:
a.) Petitioners: Jose, Julian and Oscar are children of the deceased
Sy Bang from his first marriage. Other petitioners include Zenaida and
Ma. Emma who are the wife and child of Jose.
b.) Respondents: Rosauro and eight others are children of Sy Bang
from his second marriage with his surviving spouse respondent Rosita
Ferrera -Sy.
FACTS: Sy Bang died intestate in 1971 and in an out-of-court
conference, the children of both marriages divided upon themselves
the control and management of Sy Bang’s various businesses.
o Certain controversies arose which prompted respondent
Rolando to file a Complaint of Partition against the
petitioners.
o Rosita Ferrera-Sy also filed a motion for payment of widow’s
allowance.
12
o From the time of Sy Bang’s death until the filing of the motion
in 1996, she claimed she was not given any widow’s
allowance. She cited Rule 83(3) of the RoC.
Petitioners argued that Rule 83(3) is granted only during the settlement
of the estate and such “allowance” shall be taken from the “common
mass of property” during liquidation. Since this case is a special civil
action for partition under Rule 69, Rosita is not entitled to any widow’s
allowance.
The Court granted Rosita’s motion for payment of widow’s
allowance.
Petitioners argued that Rosita had already executed a Sinumpaang
Salaysay waiving any claims against the petitioners in exchange of a
parcel of land and 1M pesos. Respondents countered that Rosita was
no longer in full possession of her mental faculties when she signed
the waiver.
Petitioners also argued that under Rule 83(3) a widow’s allowance can
only be paid in an estate proceeding. Even if the case for partition be
considered as estate proceedings, only the trial court hearing the
partition case had exclusive jurisdiction to execute the payment of the
allowance.
In the meantime, Respondents filed a joint petition for the guardianship
of Rosita Ferrer-Sy where Rosauro Sy, who sought to be named
special guardian, filed before the guardianship court a motion to order
the deposit of the widow’s allowance.
o The Court ruled in favor of the deposit of the widow’s
allowance.
o The petitioners all failed to comply with the ruling. They
were all found guilty of contempt of court.
The petitioners, who are now Zenaida and Emma, argued that they
should not be made to pay the allowance as they did not have any
participation in the management of the businesses of Sy Bang.
o Also, the said allowance must come from the estate of Sy
Bang and not from Jose or any of the latter’s heirs.
o They also asked that the Court should equally divide the
liability for the widow’s allowance between the children of the
first and second marriages.
o They also raised the issue of the validity of Rosita’s marriage
to Sy Bang. They claimed that the documents proving such
were falsified.
ISSUE: WON the Guardianship court has exceeded its jurisdiction in
directing the deposit of the widow’s allowance?
RULING: YES. The court hearing the petition for guardianship had
limited jurisdiction. It had no jurisdiction to enforce payment of the
widow’s allowance ordered by this Court.
Reviewing the antecedents, we note that the claim for widow’s
allowance was made before the SC in a case that did not arise from
the guardianship proceedings. The case subject of the SC petition
(Civil Case No. 8578) is still pending before the RTC of Lucena City.
 SPECPRO DIGEST RULE 80-86
Rule 83, Sec. 3, of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 3. Allowance to widow and family. – The widow and
minor or incapacitated children of a deceased person, during
the settlement of the estate, shall receive therefrom, under
the direction of the court, such allowance as are provided by
law.
Correlatively, Article 188 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 188. From the common mass of property support shall
be given to the surviving spouse and to the children during
the liquidation of the inventoried property and until what
belongs to them is delivered; but from this shall be deducted
that amount received for support which exceeds the fruits or
rents pertaining to them.
Obviously, "the court" referred to in Rule 83, Sec. 3, of the Rules of
Court is the court hearing the settlement of the estate. Also crystal
clear is the provision of the law that the widow’s allowance is to be
taken from the common mass of property forming part of the estate of
the decedent.
Thus, as evident from the foregoing provisions, it is the court hearing
the settlement of the estate that should effect the payment of widow’s
allowance considering that the properties of the estate are within its
jurisdiction, to the exclusion of all other courts.
In emphasizing the limited jurisdiction of the guardianship court, this
Court has pronounced that:
Generally, the guardianship court exercising special and limited
jurisdiction cannot actually order the delivery of the property of the
ward found to be embezzled, concealed, or conveyed. In a categorical
language of this Court, only in extreme cases, where property clearly
belongs to the ward or where his title thereto has been already
judicially decided, may the court direct its delivery to the guardian. In
effect, there can only be delivery or return of the embezzled, concealed
or conveyed property of the ward, where the right or title of said ward
is clear and undisputable. However, where title to any property said to
be embezzled, concealed or conveyed is in dispute, x x x the
determination of said title or right whether in favor of the persons said
to have embezzled, concealed or conveyed the property must be
determined in a separate ordinary action and not in a guardianship
proceedings.
Further, this Court has held that the distribution of the residue of the
estate of the deceased incompetent is a function pertaining properly,
not to the guardianship proceedings, but to another proceeding in
which the heirs are at liberty to initiate.
The foregoing premises considered, the Petition in G.R. No. 150797 is
GRANTED, while the Petition in G.R. No. 114217 is DENIED. The
RTC of Lucena City is directed to hear and decide Civil Case No. 8578
with dispatch. The Motion to include Rosalino Sy, Bartolome Sy,
Rolando Sy, and Heirs of Enrique Sy as Likewise Liable for the
Payment of Widow’s Allowance as Heirs of Sy Bang is DENIED. Treble
costs against petitioners.
ESTATE OF RUIZ V. CA
FACTS:
13
 Hilario Ruiz executed a holographic will naming his heirs
his son Edmond and his adopted daughter respondent
Maria, and his three granddaughters Maria Cathryn,
Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline, all children of
Edmond.
 Ruiz died, and the cash component of his estate was
distributed among his heirs. Edmond, as administrator of
the estate, did not take any action for the probate of his
father’s will.
 Four years later, Maria filed with the RTC a petition for
probate. Edmond opposed the petition on the ground that
the will was executed under undue influence.
 One of the properties which were bequeathed to Ruiz’
granddaughters was leased out by Edmond to third
persons.
 Edmond then withdrew his opposition to the probate. The
court admitted the will to probate and ordered the issuance
of letters testamentary to Edmond.
 Petitioner Estate, with Edmond as administrator, filed an
"Ex-Parte Motion for Release of Funds" praying for the
release of the rent payments. Maria opposed, and filed a
Motion for Release of Funds to Certain Heirs praying that
the rent payments be released to the granddaughters.
 The probate court denied the petitioner’s motion and
granted Maria’s motion. It ordered the release of the funds
to Edmond, but only "such amount as may be necessary
to cover the expenses of administration and
allowances for support" of the testator's three
granddaughters.
 The court also released the leased properties to Maria and
the granddaughters.
 CA: affirmed.
ISSUE: WON an allowance may be granted from the funds of the
estate for the support of the testator’s granddaughters.
HELD: NO.
 Sec. 3 of Rule 83 states that “The widow and minor or
incapacitated children of a deceased person, during the
settlement of the estate, shall receive therefrom under the
direction of the court, such allowance as are provided by
law.”
 It is settled that allowances for support under Section 3 of
Rule 83 should not be limited to the "minor or
incapacitated" children of the deceased.
 However, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional
support from the funds of the decedent's estate. The law
clearly limits the allowance to "widow and children" and
does not extend it to the deceased's grandchildren,
regardless of their minority or incapacity. It was error,
therefore, for the appellate court to sustain the probate
court's order granting an allowance to the grandchildren of
the testator pending settlement of his estate.
 SPECPRO DIGEST RULE 80-86
SANTERO V. CA
FACTS:
 Petitioners Princesita Santero-Morales, Frederico Santero,
and Willy Santero are the children of the late Pablo Santero
with Felixberta Pacursa. Respondents were Pablo’s seven
children from Anselma Diaz. Neither of the mothers were
married to Pablo.
 Respondents filed a motion for allowance on the ground of
support. The motion was granted.
 Petitioners opposed, stating that the wards for whom
allowance is sought are no longer schooling and have
attained majority age so that they are no longer under
guardianship. They likewise allege that the administrator
does not have sufficient funds to cover the said allowance.
ISSUE: WON the granting of the allowance was proper.
HELD: YES.
 The controlling provision of law is not Rule 83, Sec. 3 of the
New Rules of Court but Arts. 290 and 188 of the Civil
Code.
o Art. 290.Support is everything that is
indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing
and medical attendance, according to the social
position of the family.
Support also includes the education of the
person entitled to be supported until he
completes his education or training for some
profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the
age of majority.
o Art. 188.From the common mass of property
support shall be given to the surviving spouse
and to the children during the liquidation of the
inventoried property and until what belongs to
them is delivered; but from this shall be deducted
that amount received for support which exceeds
the fruits or rents pertaining to them.
 The fact that the private respondents are of age, gainfully
employed or married is of no moment and should not be
regarded as the determining factor of their right to
allowances under Art. 188. While the Rules of Court limit
allowances to the widow and minor or incapacitated
children of the deceased, the New Civil Code gives the
surviving spouse and his/her children without distinction.
 Since the provision of the Civil Code, a substantive law,
gives the surviving spouse and to the children the right to
receive support during the liquidation of the estate of the
deceased, such right cannot be impaired by Rule 83 Sec. 3
of the Rules of Court which is a procedural rule.
 G.R. No. 178933 September 16, 2009
 RICARDO S. SILVERIO, JR. Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (Fifth Division) and NELIA S.
SILVERIO-DEE, Respondents.
 FACTS: The instant controversy stemmed from the
settlement of estate of the deceased Beatriz Silverio. After
her death, her surviving spouse, Ricardo Silverio, Sr., filed
14
an intestate proceeding for the settlement of her
estate. During the pendency of the case, Ricardo Silverio,
Jr. filed a petition to remove Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. as the
administrator of the subject estate. The RTC issued an
Order granting the petition and removing Ricardo Silverio,
Sr. as administrator of the estate, while appointing Ricardo
Silverio, Jr. as the new administrator. Ricardo Silverio Jr.
filed an Urgent Motion for an Order Prohibiting Any Person
to Occupy/Stay/Use Real Estate Properties Involved in the
Intestate Estate of the Late Beatriz Silverio, Without
Authority from this Honorable Court. RTC granted the same
and also authorized Ricardo Silverio, Jr. to, upon receipt of
the order, immediately exercise his duties as administrator
of the subject estate. In the same order, the RTC also
allowed the sale of various properties of the intestate estate
of the late Beatriz Silverio to partially settle estate taxes,
penalties, interests and other charges due thereon. The writ
of execution was later issued and a Notice to Vacate was
issued ordering private respondent to leave the premises of
the subject property within ten (10) days. Private respondent
filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (With Prayer for
TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction)14with the CA which
the latter granted the same.
 Issue: Whether or not the possession of private respondent
in the subject property disturbs the right of the administrator
to possess and manage the property for the purpose of
settling the estate’s legitimate obligations.
 Held: Yes.
 The alleged authority given by SILVERIO, SR. for Nelia S.
Silverio-Dee to occupy the property, assuming it is not even
antedated as alleged by SILVERIO, JR., is null and void
since the possession of estate property can only be given to
a purported heir by virtue of an Order from this Court (see
Sec. 1 Rule 90, supra; and Sec. 2 Rule 84, Revised Rules
of Court). In fact, the Executor or Administrator shall have
the right to the possession and management of the real as
well as the personal estate of the deceased only when it is
necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of
administration (See Sec. 3 Rule 84, Revised Rules of Court).
With this in mind, it is without an iota of doubt that the
possession by Nelia S. Silverio-Dee of the property in
question has absolutely no legal basis considering that her
occupancy cannot pay the debts and expenses of
administration, not to mention the fact that it will also disturb
the right of the new Administrator to possess and manage
the property for the purpose of settling the estate’s legitimate
obligations.
 G.R. No. 118671 January 29, 1996
 THE ESTATE OF HILARIO M. RUIZ, EDMOND RUIZ,
Executor, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (Former Special Sixth
Division), MARIA PILAR RUIZ-MONTES, MARIA
CATHRYN RUIZ, CANDICE ALBERTINE RUIZ, MARIA
 SPECPRO DIGEST RULE 80-86
ANGELINE RUIZ and THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG,respondents.
 FACTS:
Hilario M. Ruiz executed a holographic will naming as his
heirs his only son, Edmond Ruiz, his adopted daughter,
private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his three
granddaughters,
 On April 12, 1988, Hilario Ruiz died.
 On June 29, 1992, four years after the testator’s death, it
was private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes who filed
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig, a
petition for the probate and approval of Hilario Ruiz’s will and
for the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond Ruiz.
 ISSUE:
 Whether the probate court, after admitting the will to probate
but before payment of the estate’s debts and obligations,
has the authority: (1) to grant an allowance from the funds
of the estate for the support of the testator’s grandchildren;
(2) to order the release of the titles to certain heirs; and (3)
to grant possession of all properties of the estate to the
executor of the will.
 RULING:
 1. No. Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to
provisional support from the funds of the decedent’s estate.
The law clearly limits the allowance to “widow and children”
and does not extend it to the deceased’s grandchildren,
regardless of their minority or incapacity.
 2. No. No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of
the obligations above-mentioned has been made or
provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a
bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the
payment of said obligations within such time as the court
directs.
 3. No. The right of an executor or administrator to the
possession and management of the real and personal
properties of the deceased is not absolute and can only be
exercised “so long as it is necessary for the payment of the
debts and expenses of administration, He cannot unilaterally
assign to himself and possess all his parents’ properties and
the fruits thereof without first submitting an inventory and
appraisal of all real and personal properties of the deceased,
rendering a true account of his administration, the expenses
of administration, the amount of the obligations and estate
tax, all of which are subject to a determination by the court
as to their veracity, propriety and justness.
ALFREDO HILADO, LOPEZ SUGAR CORPORATION, FIRST
FARMERS HOLDING CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE
AMOR A. REYES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 21 and ADMINISTRATRIX JULITA CAMPOS
BENEDICTO, Respondents.
15
Facts:
The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate
on 15 May 2000.
He was survived by his wife, private respondent Julita Campos
Benedicto (administratrix Benedicto), and his only daughter, Francisca
Benedicto-Paulino.
At the time of his death, there were two pending civil cases against
Benedicto involving the petitioners.
The first, Civil Case was with petitioner Alfredo Hilado as one of the
plaintiffs therein. The second with petitioners Lopez Sugar Corporation
and First Farmers Holding Corporation.
Private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filed with the RTC of
Manila a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her
favor.
RTC issued an order appointing private respondent as administrator
of the estate of her deceased husband, and issuing letters of
administration in her favor.
Petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a Manifestation/Motion Ex
Abundanti Cautela, praying that they be furnished with copies of all
processes and orders pertaining to the intestate proceedings.
Private respondent opposed the manifestation/motion, disputing the
personality of petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings of
her husband.
Petitioners also filed other pleadings alleging lapses on the part of
private respondent in her administration of the estate, and assailing
the inventory that had been submitted thus far as unverified,
incomplete and inaccurate.
Manila RTC issued an order denying the manifestation/motion, on the
ground that petitioners are not interested parties within the
contemplation of the Rules of Court to intervene in the intestate
proceedings.
CA denied appeal.
Issue:
WON the petitioners can be considered interested parties for filling
intervention to issuance of the letters of administration.
Held:
NO
Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that
an intervenor "has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the
success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so
 SPECPRO DIGEST RULE 80-86
situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court x x x" While the
language of Section 1, Rule 19 does not literally preclude petitioners
from intervening in the intestate proceedings, case law has
consistently held that the legal interest required of an intervenor
"must be actual and material, direct and immediate, and not
simply contingent and expectant.
Intervention as set forth under Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of
a decedent whose credit is based on a contingent claim.
Claims of respondent were based on tort
However, it appears that the claims against Benedicto were based on
tort. Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict do not fall within the class of
claims to be filed under the notice to creditors required under Rule
86.20These actions, being as they are civil, survive the death of the
decedent and may be commenced against the administrator pursuant
to Section 1, Rule 87.
Evidently, the merits of petitioners’ claims against Benedicto are to be
settled in the civil cases where they were raised, and not in the
intestate proceedings. In the event the claims for damages of
petitioners are granted, they would have the right to enforce the
judgment against the estate.
HOWEVER
Petitioners’ interests in the estate of Benedicto may be inchoate
interests, but they are viable interests nonetheless. We are mindful
that the Rules of Special Proceedings allows not just creditors, but also
"any person interested" or "persons interested in the estate" various
specified capacities to protect their respective interests in the estate.
Anybody with a contingent claim based on a pending action for quasi-
delict against a decedent may be reasonably concerned that by the
time judgment is rendered in their favor, the estate of the decedent
would have already been distributed, or diminished to the extent that
the judgment could no longer be enforced against it.
While there is no general right to intervene on the part of the
petitioners, they may be allowed to seek certain prayers or reliefs from
the intestate court not explicitly provided for under the Rules, if the
prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect their interest in the
estate, and there is no other modality under the Rules by which such
interests can be protected.
SC denied petition but held that petitioners are entitled to such notices
and rights as provided for such interested persons in the Rules on
Settlement of Estates of Deceased Persons under the Rules on
Special Proceedings. No pronouncements as to costs
16
G.R. No. 173946 June 19, 2013
BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND LOLITA G. TOLEDO,Respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against the spouses
Manuel and Lolita Toledo. Respondent filed an Answer in which she
alleged, that her husband and co-defendant, Manuel Toledo (Manuel),
is already dead.
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Substitution, praying that Manuel be
substituted by his children as party-defendants. The trial of the case
then proceeded.
Respondent later on filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
complaint failed to implead an indispensable party (the deceased
Manuel) or a real party in interest; hence, the case must be dismissed
for failure to state a cause of action.
The trial court, denied the motion to dismiss for having been filed out
of time.
Upon appeal CA reversed trial court decision.
Issue:
WON it is required to implead the deceased spouse in the action for
claims against both spouses.
Held:
NO.
RULE 86
SEC. 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed, barred;
exceptions. All claims for money against the decedent, arising from
contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or
contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and judgment for money
against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice;
otherwise, they are barred forever, except that they may be set forth
as counterclaims in any action that the executor or administrator may
bring against the claimants. x x x.
SEC. 6. Solidary obligation of decedent. Where the obligation of the
decedent is solidary with another debtor, the claim shall be filed
 SPECPRO DIGEST RULE 80-86
against the decedent as if he were the only debtor, without prejudice
to the right of the estate to recover contribution from the other debtor.
IN Philippine National Bank v. Asuncion SC ruled that
A cursory perusal of Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court
reveals that nothing therein prevents a creditor from proceeding
against the surviving solidary debtors. Said provision merely
sets up the procedure in enforcing collection in case a creditor
chooses to pursue his claim against the estate of the deceased
solidary debtor. The rule has been set forth that a creditor (in a
solidary obligation) has the option whether to file or not to file a claim
against the estate of the solidary debtor.
In case of the death of one of the solidary debtors, he (the creditor)
may, if he so chooses, proceed against the surviving solidary debtors
without necessity of filing a claim in the estate of the deceased debtors.
It is not mandatory for him to have the case dismissed as against the
surviving debtors and file its claim against the estate of the deceased
solidary debtor, x x x. For to require the creditor to proceed against the
estate, making it a condition precedent for any collection action against
the surviving debtors to prosper, would deprive him of his substantive
rights provided by Article 1216 of the New Civil Code.
Based on the foregoing, the estate of Manuel is not an indispensable
party and the case can proceed as against respondent only. That
petitioner opted to collect from respondent and not from the estate of
Manuel is evidenced by its opposition to respondent’s motion to
dismiss asserting that the case, as against her, should be dismissed
so that petitioner can proceed against the estate of Manuel.
METROBANK v ABSOLUTE MANAGEMENT CORPORATION
GR 170498, January 9, 2013
FACTS:
Sherwood Holdings Corporation, Inc. (SHCI) filed a civil complaint for
sum of money against Absolute Management Corporation (AMC).
 SHCI alleged that it made advance payments to AMC for the
purchase of 27,000 pieces of plywood and 16,500 plyboards
in the sum of P12,277,500.00, covered by Metrobank
Checks. The checks were all crossed, and were all made
payable to AMC. They were given to Chua, AMC’s General
Manager, in 1998.
Chua died in 1999 and a special proceeding for the settlement of his
estate was commenced before the RTC of Pasay City.
 This proceeding was pending at the time AMC filed its
answer with counterclaims and third-party complaint.
SHCI made demands on AMC, after Chua’s death, for allegedly
undelivered items worth P8,331,700.00.
 AMC averred that it had no knowledge of Chua’s
transactions with SHCI and it did not receive any money
from the latter. AMC also asked the RTC to hold
17
Metrobank liable for the subject checks in case it is
adjudged liable to SHCI.
Metrobank filed a motion to dismiss against AMC on the ground that
the latter engaged in prohibited forum shopping.
 According to Metrobank, AMC’s claim against it is the same
claim that it raised against Chua’s estate in Special
Proceedings.
Metrobank filed a motion for leave to admit fourth-party complaint
against Chua’s estate. It alleged that Chua’s estate should
reimburse Metrobank in case it would be held liable in the third-
party complaint filed against it by AMC.
The RTC denied Metrobank’s motion. The CA affirmed the RTC’s
ruling that Metrobank’s fourth-party complaint should have been filed
in Special Proceedings No. 99-0023.
 According to the CA, the relief that Metrobank prayed for
was based on a quasi-contract and was a money claim
categorized as an implied contract that should be filed under
Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
Metrobank argues that Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court should
apply because it impleaded Chua’s estate for reimbursement in the
same transaction upon which it has been sued by AMC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not quasi-contracts are included in claims that should be
filed pursuant to Rule 86, Section 5 of the Rules of Court.
RULING: Yes.
Metrobank’s claim in its fourth-party complaint against Chua’s
estate is based on quasi-contract. It is also a contingent claim
that depends on another event. Both belong to the category of
claims against a deceased person that should be filed under
Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court and, as such, should have
been so filed in Special Proceedings No. 99-0023.
The term quasi-contract is included in the concept “implied contracts”
as used in the Rules of Court. Accordingly, liabilities of the deceased
arising from quasi-contracts should be filed as claims in the settlement
of his estate, as provided in Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
 A quasi-contract involves a juridical relation that the law
creates on the basis of certain voluntary, unilateral and
lawful acts of a person, to avoid unjust enrichment. The Civil
Code provides an enumeration of quasi-contracts, but the
list is not exhaustive and merely provides examples.
Article 2154 embodies the concept “solutio indebiti” which arises when
something is delivered through mistake to a person who has no right
to demand it. It obligates the latter to return what has been received
through mistake.
 Solutio indebiti has two indispensable requisites: first, that
something has been unduly delivered through mistake;
 SPECPRO DIGEST RULE 80-86
and second, that something was received when there was
no right to demand it.
A distinctive character of Metrobank’s fourth-party complaint is its
contingent nature—the claim depends on the possibility that
Metrobank would be adjudged liable to AMC, a future event that may
or may not happen. This characteristic unmistakably marks the
complaint as a contingent one that must be included in the claims
falling under the terms of Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court:
“Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed, barred;
exceptions.—All claims for money against the decedent, arising from
contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due,
or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last
sickness of the decedent, and judgment for money against the
decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice.”
Section 11, Rule 6 applies to ordinary civil actions while Section 5,
Rule 86 specifically applies to money claims against the estate.
 The specific provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 x x x must
therefore prevail over the general provisions of Section 11,
Rule 6 (lex specialis derogat generali).
 The settlement of the estate of deceased persons (where
claims against the deceased should be filed) is primarily
governed by the rules on special proceedings, while the
rules provided for ordinary claims, including Section 11, Rule
6 of the Rules of Court, merely apply suppletorily.
GABRIEL v BILON
GR 146989
FACTS:
The respondents were regular drivers of Gabriel Jeepney. They filed
their separate complaints for illegal dismissal, illegal deductions, and
separation pay against petitioner with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC).
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the respondents ordering Melencio
Gabriel to pay the respondents the total amount of ONE MILLION
THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND PESOS [P1,034,000,] representing
[respondents’] backwages and separation pay.
The petitioner, however, died. Thus the counsel of the petitioner filed
a motion to dismiss for the reason that petitioner passed away.
The NLRC ruled in favor of the petitioner but the CA reversed the said
decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the claim survives.
RULING: Yes.
The respondents’ monetary claim shall be governed by Section 20
(then Section 21), Rule 3 of the Rules of Court which provides:
18
“Action on contractual money claims.—When the action is for recovery
of money arising from contract, express or implied, and the defendant
dies before entry of final judgment in the court in which the action was
pending at the time of such death, it shall not be dismissed but shall
instead be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. A favorable
judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be enforced in the
manner provided in these Rules for prosecuting claims against the
estate of a deceased person.”
In relation to this, Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court states:
“Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed, barred;
exceptions.—All claims for money against the decedent arising from
contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or
contingent, ... and judgment for money against the decedent, must be
filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred
forever, except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any
action that the executor or administrator may bring against the
claimants….”
Thus, in accordance with the above Rules, the money claims of
respondents must be filed against the estate of petitioner Melencio
Gabriel.
G.R. No. 149926 February 23, 2005
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
EDMUND SANTIBAÑEZ and FLORENCE SANTIBAÑEZ
ARIOLA, respondents.
On 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim
M. Santibañez entered into a loan agreement twice3 in the amount of
₱128,000.00 and ₱123,156.00 in which the latter issued promissory
notes payable in five equal annual amortizations (payment of the
purchase price of one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose
Diesel Tractor with accessories, and one (1) unit Howard Rotamotor
Model AR 60K)
in February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will. Testate
proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City. Edmund, as
one of the heirs, was appointed as the special administrator and
together with his sister and they agreed to divide between themselves
and take possession of the three (3) tractors; that is, two (2) tractors
for Edmund and one (1) tractor for Florence. Each of them was to
assume the indebtedness of their late father to FCCC.
Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities9 was executed by
and between FCCC and Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, wherein
the FCCC as the assignor, among others, assigned all its assets and
liabilities to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank.
 SPECPRO DIGEST RULE 80-86
Demand letters10 for the settlement of his account were sent by
petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP) to Edmund, but the
latter failed to heed the same and refused to pay prompting UPB to file
an action against respondents. Only Florence was served with
summons because Edmund was in the United States.
RTC of Makati City dismissed the complaint for lack of merit - - - that
the claim of the petitioner should have been filed with the probate court
before which the testate estate of the late Efraim Santibañez was
pending, as the sum of money being claimed was an obligation
incurred by the said decedent.
The petitioner appealed from the RTC decision and elevated its case
to the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed in toto the decision of RTC.
Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the petitioner can hold the heirs liable on the obligation of
the deceased
HELD:
1. NO. The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the
probate court is mandatory. This requirement is for the purpose of
protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the executor or
administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine
each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which should
be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy
settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the
property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. `The law strictly
requires the prompt presentation and disposition of the claims against
the decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon
as possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue.
The petitioner, purportedly a creditor of the late Efraim Santibañez,
should have thus filed its money claim with the probate court in
accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court --
- All claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract,
express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent,
all claims for funeral expenses for the last sickness of the decedent,
and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within the
time limited in the notice otherwise they are barred forever.
Nothing therein could hold private respondent Florence S. Ariola
accountable for any liability incurred by her late father. The
documentary evidence presented, particularly the promissory notes
19
and the continuing guaranty agreement, were executed and signed
only by the late Efraim Santibañez and his son Edmund. As the
petitioner failed to file its money claim with the probate court, at most,
it may only go after Edmund as co-maker of the decedent under the
said promissory notes and continuing guaranty, however court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the latter.
G.R. No. 171206 September 23, 2013
HEIRS OF THE LATE SPOUSES FLA VIANO MAGLASANG and
SALUD ADAZA-MAGLASANG, namely, OSCAR A. MAGLASANG,
EDGAR A. MAGLASANG, CONCEPCION CHONA A.
MAGLASANG, GLENDA A. MAGLASANG-ARNAIZ, LERMA A.
MAGLASANG, FELMA A. · MAGLASANG, FE DORIS A.
MAGLASANG, LEOLINO A. MAGLASANG, MARGIE LEILA A.
MAGLASANG,MA. MILALIE A. MAGLASANG, SALUD A.
MAGLASANG, and MA. FLASALIE A. MAGLASANG,
REPRESENTING THE ESTATES OF THEIR AFORE-
NAMEDDECEASED PARENTS, Petitioners,
vs.
MANILA BANKING CORPORATION, now substituted by FIRST
SOVEREIGN ASSET MANAGEMENT SPV-AMC, INC.
FSAMI, Respondent.
On 1975, spouses Flaviano and Salud Maglasang (Sps.Maglasang)
obtained a the amounts of ₱209,790.50 and ₱139,805.83 which
became due and demandable, secured by a real estate
mortgage6 executed over seven of their properties7 located in Ormoc
City.
Flaviano Maglasang (Flaviano) died intestate. His widow Salud
Maglasang (Salud) and their surviving children, herein petitioners
Oscar (Oscar), etc appointed11 their brother petitioner Edgar
Maglasang (Edgar) as their attorney-in-fact and they filed a petition for
letters of administration of the intestate estate of Flaviano before the
then Court of First Instance of Leyte, Ormoc City which was granted
by the probate court and appointed Edgar as Administrator.
In view of the issuance of letters of administration, the probate court
issued a Notice to Creditors16 for the filing of money claims against
Flaviano’s estate. Accordingly, as one of the creditors of Flaviano,
respondent notified17 the probate court of its claim in the amount of
₱382,753.19.
During the pendency of the intestate proceedings, Edgar and Oscar
were able to obtain several loans from respondent, secured by
promissory notes18 which they signed.
 SPECPRO DIGEST RULE 80-86
Probate court terminated the proceedings with the surviving heirs
executing an extra-judicial partition of the properties of Flaviano’s
estate. The loan obligations owed by the estate to respondent,
however, remained unsatisfied but the court expressly recognized the
rights of respondent under the mortgage and promissory notes
executed by the Sps. Maglasang
Respondent proceeded to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgage
covering the Sps. Maglasang’s properties and emerged as the highest
bidder at the public auction for the amount of ₱350,000.00 but there
remained a deficiency on Sps. Maglasang’s obligation to respondent.
Respondent filed a suit to recover the deficiency amount of
₱250,601.05 against the estate of Flaviano, his widow Salud and
petitioners.
RTC directed the petitioners to pay respondent, jointly and severally,
the amount of ₱434,742.36 with interest --- that it was shown, by a
preponderance of evidence, that petitioners, after the extra-judicial
foreclosure of all the properties mortgaged, still have an outstanding
obligation
petitioners elevated the case to the CA on appeal (During the
pendency of the appeal, Flaviano’s widow, Salud, passed away). The
CA denied the petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the RTC’s Decision ---
that Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules does not apply to the present case
since the same does not involve a mortgage made by the administrator
over any property belonging to the estate of the decedent. M/R denied.
Hence the present recourse.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules applies to the case at
bar
HELD:
YES.
Claims against deceased persons should be filed during the settlement
proceedings of their estate. Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules (Section
7, Rule86) provides the rule in dealing with secured claims against the
estate --- (read codal)
Jurisprudence breaks down the rule under Section 7, Rule 86 and
explains that the secured creditor has three remedies/options that he
may alternatively adopt for the satisfaction of his indebtedness: (a)
waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of the
mortgagor as an ordinary claim; (b) foreclose the mortgage judicially
20
and prove the deficiency as an ordinary claim; and (c) rely on the
mortgage exclusively, or other security and foreclose the same before
it is barred by prescription, without the right to file a claim for any
deficiency --- that these remedies are distinct, independent and
mutually exclusive from each other; thus, the election of one effectively
bars the exercise of the others.
The plain result of adopting the last mode of foreclosure is that the
creditor waives his right to recover any deficiency from the estate.
In this case, respondent sought to extra-judicially foreclose the
mortgage of the properties previously belonging to Sps. Maglasang
(and now, their estates) and, therefore, availed of the third option. Lest
it be misunderstood, it did not exercise the first option of directly filing
a claim against the estate, as petitioners assert, since it merely
notified52 the probate court of the outstanding amount of its claim
against the estate of Flaviano and that it was currently restructuring
the account.
Court upholds the extra-judicial foreclosure as a valid exercise of
respondent's third option under Section 7, Rule 86. To reiterate,
respondent cannot, however, file any suit to recover any deficiency
amount since it effectively waived its right thereto when it chose to
avail of extra-judicial foreclosure as jurisprudence instructs.
G.R. No. 121597 June 29, 2001
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ALLAN M. CHUA as Special
Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the late ANTONIO M.
CHUA and Mrs. ASUNCION M. CHUA, respondents.
Sps. Anotnio Chua owned a land. Upon Antonio’s death, the probate
court appointed his son, private respondent Allan M. Chua, special
administrator of Antonio’s intestate estate. The court also authorized
Allan to obtain a loan accommodation of five hundred fifty thousand
(P550,000.00) pesos from petitioner Philippine National Bank to be
secured by a real estate mortgage over the above-mentioned parcel
of land.
Allan obtained a loan of P450,000.00 from petitioner PNB evidenced
by a promissory note and to secure the loan, Allan executed a deed of
real estate mortgage on the aforesaid parcel of land.
 SPECPRO DIGEST RULE 80-86
For failure to pay the loan in full, the bank extrajudicially foreclosed the property securing the mortgage in its favor. It follows that in this case
real estate mortgage. During the auction, PNB was the highest no further liability remains on the part of respondents and the late
bidder Since PNB’s total claim as of the date of the auction sale Antonio M. Chua’s estate.
was P679,185.63, the loan had a payable balance of P372,825.63. To
claim this deficiency, PNB instituted an action with the RTC, Balayan,
Batangas against both Mrs. Asuncion M. Chua and Allan Chua in his
capacity as special administrator of his father’s intestate estate.

RTC rendered its decision, ordering the dismissal of PNB’s complaint.

Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45

ISSUE:

whether or not petitioner may no longer pursue by civil action the

recovery of the balance of indebtedness after having foreclosed the
property securing the same

HELD:

YES. SC considered Sec. 7 of Rule 86, appropriately applicable to the

controversy at hand.

Case law now holds that this rule grants to the mortgagee three
distinct, independent and mutually exclusive remedies that can be
alternatively pursued by the mortgage creditor for the satisfaction of
his credit in case the mortgagor dies, among them:

(1) to waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of
the mortgagor as an ordinary claim;

(2) to foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove any deficiency as an

ordinary claim; and

(3) to rely on the mortgage exclusively, foreclosing the same at any

time before it is barred by prescription without right to file a claim for
any deficiency.

The plain result of adopting the last mode of foreclosure is that the
creditor waives his right to recover any deficiency from the estate.

Clearly, in our view, petitioner herein has chosen the mortgage-

creditor’s option of extrajudicially foreclosing the mortgaged property
of the Chuas. This choice now bars any subsequent deficiency claim
against the estate of the deceased, Antonio M. Chua. Petitioner may
no longer avail of the complaint for the recovery of the balance of
indebtedness against said estate, after petitioner foreclosed the

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