ABAY JR. vs.

PEOPLE

DOCTRINE: Settled is the rule that when the extrajudicial admission of a conspirator is confirmed at the
trial, it ceases to be hearsay. It becomes instead a judicial admission, being a testimony of an eyewitness
admissible in evidence against those it implicates.

FACTS: Petitioners were charged with the crime of Highway Robbery/Brigandage.

The prosecution presented the following witnesses: Thelma Andrade, Gloria Tolentino and Ramoncito
Aban.

Thelma Andrade, a conductress of the Kapalaran Bus Line, testified that in the evening of February 17,
1994, the bus she was on was held-up. She said that Ramoncito Aban took from her, at gunpoint, the
fares she collected from the passengers of the bus. She also identified Rustico Abay, Jr. and Ernesto
Ricalde as two of the other companions of Aban.

Gloria Tolentino, a passenger of the bus, testified that someone shouted "hold-up" and ordered them to
bow their heads. She obeyed the order but once in a while she would raise her head. According to
Tolentino, the man seated beside her, Ariston Reyes, took her money and pieces of jewelry and handed
them over to Reynaldo Darilag. She also identified Rustico Abay, Jr. as one of the companions of the
robbers.

Ramoncito Aban, the last witness, testified that on February 22, 1994, Camacho and Espeleta, who were
both prison guards of the New Bilibid Prison (NBP), took him and his companions, Ricalde, Abay, Jr.,
Punzalan, Darilag, Reyes, Perello and Pascual, on board the owner-type jeepney of Camacho to stage a
hold-up. He said they held-up a Kapalaran bus and it was Punzalan and Darilag who took the money and
other belongings of the passengers in the bus. He further testified that the February 22, 1994 hold-up was
the fourth staged by their group. According to Aban, the other hold-ups were carried out on February 11,
13 and 17, and all four hold-ups were staged by the same persons.

Wherefore, this Court hereby renders judgment convicting accused.

ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming on the basis of the testimonies of said three
witnesses the conviction of petitioners Abay, Jr. and Darilag

HELD: No. At the outset, we note that it was not Aban’s extrajudicial confession but his court testimony
reiterating his declarations in his extrajudicial admission, pointing to petitioners as his co-participants,
which was instrumental in convicting petitioners of the crime charged. Settled is the rule that when the
extrajudicial admission of a conspirator is confirmed at the trial, it ceases to be hearsay. It becomes
instead a judicial admission, being a testimony of an eyewitness admissible in evidence against those it
implicates. Here, the extrajudicial confession of Aban was affirmed by him in open court during the trial.
Thus, such confession already partook of judicial testimony which is admissible in evidence against the
petitioners.

The Court find petitioners’ allegations untenable. The testimonies given by Andrade, Tolentino and Aban
corroborate each other. Their testimonies agree on the essential facts and substantially corroborate a
consistent and coherent whole. The failure of Tolentino to point to Punzalan in court does not dent her
credibility as a witness. It must be noted that it took years before Tolentino was placed on the witness
stand. As to the allegation that the testimony of Andrade and Tolentino are incredible because they were
not able to identify all the accused deserves scant consideration. During the robbery, they were told to
bow their heads and hence, they were only able to raise their heads from time to time. It is but logical that
the witnesses would not be able to identify all of the accused.

PEOPLE vs. QUIDATO JR.

DOCTRINE: Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which provides that "[t]he act or declaration of a
conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-
conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration."

The inapplicability of this provision is clearly apparent. The confessions were made after the conspiracy
had ended and after the consummation of the crime. Hence, it cannot be said that the execution of the
affidavits were acts or declarations made during the conspiracy's existence.

FACTS: Accused-appellant's case was tried jointly with the murder case filed against his co-accused
Reynaldo Malita and Eddie Malita who, however, withdrew their "not guilty" plea during the trial and were
accordingly sentenced. Thus, only accused-appellant's case was tried on the merits.

The prosecution, in offering its version of the facts, presented as its witnesses accused-appellant's
brother Leo Quidato, appellant's wife Gina Quidato, as well as Patrolman Lucrecio Mara. Likewise, the
prosecution offered in evidence affidavits containing the extra-judicial confessions of Eddie Malita and
Reynaldo Malita. The two brothers were, however, not presented by the prosecution on the witness
stand. Instead, it presented Atty. Jonathan Jocom to prove that the two were assisted by counsel when
they made their confessions. Similarly, the prosecution presented MTC Judge George Omelio who
attested to the due and voluntary execution of the sworn statements by the Malita brothers.

The court finds the accused, Bernardo Quidato, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt as a co-principal in
the offense of Parricide.

ISSUE: Whether trial court erred in giving credence to the extrajudicial confessions of the Malita brothers
in clear violation of the constitutional rights of the accused-appellant to confront witnesses

HELD: Yes. Accused-appellant must be acquitted.

In indicting accused-appellant, the prosecution relied heavily on the affidavits executed by Reynaldo and
Eddie. The two brothers were, however, not presented on the witness stand to testify on their extra-
judicial confessions. The failure to present the two gives these affidavits the character of hearsay. It is
hornbook doctrine that unless the affiants themselves take the witness stand to affirm the averments in
their affidavits, the affidavits must be excluded from the judicial proceeding, being inadmissible
hearsay. The voluntary admissions of an accused made extrajudicially are not admissible in evidence
against his co-accused when the latter had not been given an opportunity to hear him testify and cross-
examine him.

The Solicitor General, in advocating the admissibility of the sworn statements of the Malita brothers, cites
Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which provides that "[t]he act or declaration of a conspirator
relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator
after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration." The inapplicability of this
provision is clearly apparent. The confessions were made after the conspiracy had ended and after the
consummation of the crime. Hence, it cannot be said that the execution of the affidavits were acts or
declarations made during the conspiracy's existence.