Mancur Olson

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Mancur Olson

Born January 22, 1932

Grand Forks, North Dakota

Died February 19, 1998 (aged 66)

College Park, Maryland[1]

Nationality United States

Institution University of Maryland

Princeton University

Field Institutional economics

School or New institutional economics

tradition

Alma mater Harvard University (PhD)

University of Oxford (MA)

North Dakota State (BA)

Mancur Lloyd Olson Jr. (/ˈmænsər/[2] or /ˈmæŋkər ˈoʊlsən/; January 22, 1932 – February 19,
1998) was an American economist and social scientist who taught economics at the University of
Maryland, College Park. His most influential contributions were in institutional economics, and in
the role which private property, taxation, public goods, collective action, and contract rights play
in economic development.

Contents

 1Education and career

 2Legacy
o 2.1Academic work
o 2.2Policy work
 3Selected works
o 3.1Books
o 3.2Articles
 4See also
 5References
 6External links

Education and career[edit]

Olson graduated from North Dakota State University, and was a Rhodes Scholar at University
College, Oxford before he earned a PhD in economics from Harvard in 1963.
His first job was as an assistant professor at Princeton University. Afterwards, he served as
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare for two years in Washington,
D.C. In 1969 he left government and joined the economics department of the University of
Maryland, College Park, where he remained until his death.[1]

Legacy[edit]
Academic work[edit]
In his first book, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (1965),
he theorized that what stimulates people to act in groups is incentive; members of large groups
do not act in accordance with a common interest unless motivated by personal gain (economic,
social, etc.). While small groups can act on shared objectives, large groups will not work towards
shared objectives unless their individual members are sufficiently motivated.[3]
In 1982, he expanded the scope of his earlier work in an attempt to explain The Rise and Decline
of Nations (1982). He argues that groups such as cotton-farmers, steel-producers, and labor
unions have an incentive to form lobby groups and influence policies in their favor. These policies
will tend to be protectionist, which will hurt economic growth; but because the benefits of such
policies are concentrated, and their costs are diffused throughout the whole population, there will
be little public resistance to them. As distributional coalitions accumulate, nations burdened by
them will fall into economic decline. His work influenced the formulation of the Calmfors–Driffill
hypothesis of collective bargaining.[4]
In his final book, Power and Prosperity (2000), Olson distinguished between the economic
effects of different types of government, in particular, tyranny, anarchy, and democracy. Olson
argued that under anarchy, a "roving bandit" only has the incentive to steal and destroy, whilst a
"stationary bandit"—a tyrant—has an incentive to encourage some degree of economic success
as he expects to remain in power long enough to benefit from that success. A stationary bandit
thereby begins to take on the governmental function of protecting citizens and their property
against roving bandits. In the move from roving to stationary bandits, Olson sees the seeds
of civilization, paving the way, eventually for democracy, which by giving power to those who
align with the wishes of the population, improves incentives for good government.[5] Olson's work
on the roving vs. stationary bandits is influential in analysis of the political and economic order
structured in warlord states and societies.
Policy work[edit]
To help bring his ideas to the attention of policymakers, Olson founded the Center for Institutional
Reform in the Informal Sector ("IRIS Center"), funded by USAID (United States Agency for
International Development). Based at the University of Maryland, the Center sought to supply an
intellectual foundation for legal and economic reform projects carried out by USAID in formerly
communist states that were attempting to make the transition to market-driven democratic
governments governed by the rule of law. It was particularly active in East and Central Europe
and the former Soviet Union.
The Center also became actively involved in projects in South America, Africa, and Asia, where it
became a proponent of judicial independence. It sponsored the first conference on corruption in
francophone Africa in the 1990s, when it was a very sensitive subject. The IRIS Center continued
to operate after Olson's death, but was eventually folded into other programs at the University of
Maryland.
To honor Olson's many contributions, the American Political Science Association established the
Olson Award for the best PhD dissertation in Political Economy.[6] In 2013 the University of
Maryland announced the creation of a new endowed professorship—the Mancur Olson Professor
of Economics.[7] Maryland Professor of Economics Peter Murrell was the first Mancur Olson
Professor.

Selected works[edit]
Books[edit]

 The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of

Groups. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
1965. ISBN 0-674-53751-3.
 The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation,
and Social Rigidities. New Haven: Yale University Press.
1982. ISBN 978-0300030792.
 Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist
Dictatorships. New York: Basic Books. 2000. ISBN 0-465-
05195-2.
Articles[edit]

 "Towards a Mature Social Science". International Studies

Quarterly. 27 (1): 29–37. March
1983. doi:10.2307/2600617. JSTOR 2600617.
 "Space, Agriculture, and Organization". American Journal of
Agricultural Economics. Agricultural & Applied Economics
Association. 67 (5): 928–937. December
1985. doi:10.2307/1241349. JSTOR 1241349.
 "The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible
Hand and the Use of Force". Journal of Economic
Literature. 34 (1): 72–96. March 1996. (with Martin C. McGuire)
 "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development" (PDF). American
Political Science Review. 87 (3): 567–576. September
1993. doi:10.2307/2938736.

See also[edit]
  John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy (1871) Book V,
ch IX §12

References[edit]
1. ^ Jump up to:a b Peter Passell (February 24, 1998). "Mancur Olson,
66, a Professor and Author of Economics Books". New York
Times.
2. ^ The Economic Journal, Vol. 109, No. 456, Features (Jun., 1999),
p. F445.
3. ^ Mancur Olson Jr., 1965, 2nd ed., 1971. The Logic of Collective
Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Harvard
University Press, Description, Table of Contents, and preview.
4. ^ Mancur Olson, 1982. The Rise and Decline of Nations:
Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities, Yale
University Press, 1982. Description, chapter-preview links, and
review quotes.
5. ^ Mancur Olson, 2000. Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing
Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships, Oxford University
Press. Description and chapter-preview links. Foreign
Affairs review.
6. ^ Organized Section 25: Mancur Olson Best Dissertation Award
7. ^ "Archived copy". Archived from the original on 2013-12-02.
Retrieved 2013-05-18.

External links[edit]
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Categories:
 1932 births
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