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Constitutional Law I
Atty. Baribal-Co
Case Digests Compilation
Coverage: THE DOCTRINE OF STATE
IMMUNITY, ARTICLE II -FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES, and
FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE
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Table of Contents:
1. MERRITT vs. GOVERNMENT OF
THE PHILIPPINES
2. PEOPLE vs. LAGMAN AND SOSA
3. KURODA vs. JALANDONI
4. ICHONG vs. HERNANDEZ
5. DECS vs. San Diego
6. Philippines vs. SECRETARY OF
AGRARIAN REFORM
THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY
SECTION 3, ARTICLE XVI, 1987
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
MERRITT vs. GOVERNMENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES
(G.R. NO. L-11154, MARCH 21, 1916)
TRENT, J.
FACTS: Merritt, while riding his motorcycle
was hit by an ambulance owned by the
Philippine General Hospital. A driver
employed by the hospital drove it. In order
for Merritt to sue the Philippine
government, Act No. 2457 was enacted by
the Philippine Legislature authorizing
Merritt to bring suit against the Government
of the Philippine Islands and authorizing the
Attorney-General of said Islands to appear
in said suit. A suit was then filed before the
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CFI of Manila, which fixed the responsibility
for the collision solely on the ambulance
driver and determined the amount of
damages to be awarded to Merritt. Both
parties appealed from the decision, plaintiff
Merritt as to the amount of damages and
defendant in rendering the amount against
the government.
ISSUE: Whether or not defendant,
Government of the Philippines, waived its
immunity from suit as well as conceded its
liability to the plaintiff when it enacted Act
No. 2457
HELD: NO. By consenting to be sued, a
state simply waives its immunity from suit.
It does not thereby concede its liability to
the plaintiff, or create any cause of action
in his favor, or extend its liability to any
cause not previously recognized. It merely
gives a remedy to enforce a pre-existing
liability and submit itself to the jurisdiction
of the court, subject to its right to interpose
any lawful defense. The Government of the
Philippines Islands is only liable, for the acts
of its agents, officers and employees when
they act as special agents. A special agent
is one who receives a definite and fixed
order or commission, foreign to the exercise
of the duties of his office if he is a special
official. The special agent acts in
representation of the state and being bound
to act as an agent thereof, he executes the
trust confided to him. This concept does not
apply to any executive agent who is an
employee of the acting administration and
who on his own responsibility performs the
functions which are inherent in and
naturally pertain to his office and which are
regulated by law and the regulations. The
responsibility of the state is limited to that
which it contracts through a special agent,
duly empowered by a definite order or
commission to perform some act or charged
with some definite purpose which gives rise
to the claim, and not where the claim is
based on acts or omissions imputable to a
public official charged with some
administrative or technical office who can
be held to the proper responsibility in the
manner laid down by the law of civil
responsibility. The chauffeur of the
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ambulance of the General Hospital was not
such an agent.
ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
PEOPLE VS. LAGMAN AND ZOSA
66 PHIL 13, 1938
FACTS: Tranquilino Lagman and Primitivo
de Sosa are charged with and convicted of
refusal to register for military training as
required by the above-mentioned statute.
On appeal, Zosa argued that he was
fatherless and had a mother and eight
brothers to support, while Lagman alleged
that he had a father to support, had no
military leanings, and did not wish to kill or
be killed; and both claimed that the statute
was unconstitutional.
ISSUE: Whether or not the National
Defense Law is valid, under which the
accused were sentenced.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed
their conviction, holding that the law in
question was based on the afore-cited
constitutional principle. The National
Defense Law, in so far as it establishes
compulsory military service, does not go
against this constitutional provision but is,
on the contrary, in faithful compliance
therewith. The duty of the Government to
defend the State cannot be performed
except through an army. To leave the
organization of an army to the will of the
citizens would be to make this duty of the
Government excusable should there be no
sufficient men who volunteer to enlist
therein. The right of the Government to
require compulsory military service is a
consequence of its duty to defend the State
and is reciprocal with its duty to defend the
life, liberty, and property of the citizen.
ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
KURODA VS. JALANDONI
83 PHIL. 171
FACTS: Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a
Lieutenant-General of the Japanese
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Imperial Army and Commanding General of
the Japanese Imperial Forces in the
Philippines during a period covering 1943
and 1944, who is now charged before a
Military Commission with having unlawfully
disregarded and failed "to discharge his
duties as such commander to control the
operations of members of his command,
permitting them to commit brutal atrocities
and other high crimes against
noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the
Imperial Japanese Forces, in violation of the
laws and customs of war" — comes before
this Court seeking to establish the illegality
of EO No. 68, which established a National
War Crimes Offices and provides that
persons accused as war criminals shall be
tried by military commission; and to
permanently prohibit respondents from
proceeding with the case of petitioner.
Kuroda argues that EO No. 68 is illegal on
the ground that it violates not only the
provisions of our constitutional law but also
our local laws, to say nothing of the fact
(that) the Philippines is not a signatory nor
an adherent to the Hague Convention on
Rules and Regulations covering Land
Warfare and, therefore, petitioner is
charged of `crimes' not based on law,
national and international. Hence,
petitioner argues — "That in view of the fact
that this commission has been empanelled
by virtue of an unconstitutional law and an
illegal order, this commission is without
jurisdiction to try herein petitioner."
ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippines can
adopt the rules and regulations laid down
on The Hague and Geneva Conventions
notwithstanding that it is not a signatory
thereto and whether it can create a Military
Commission to try violations of the Hague
Convention?
HELD: Yes. Executive Order No. 68,
establishing a National War Crimes Office
and prescribing rules and regulations
governing the trial of accused war
criminals, was issued by the President of
the Philippines on the 29th day of July,
1947. This Court holds that this order is
valid and constitutional. Article 2 of our
Constitution provides in its section 3, that
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"The Philippines renounces war as an
instrument of national policy, and adopts
the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the
nation." In accordance with the generally
accepted principles of international law of
the present day, including the Hague
Convention, the Geneva Convention and
significant precedents of international
jurisprudence established by the United
Nations, all those persons, military or
civilian, who have been guilty of planning,
preparing or waging a war of aggression
and of the commission of crimes and
offenses consequential and incidental
thereto, in violation of the laws and customs
of war, of humanity and civilization, are
held accountable therefor. Consequently, in
the promulgation and enforcement of
Executive Order No. 68, the President of the
Philippines has acted in conformity with the
generally accepted principles and policies
of international law which are part of our
Constitution. The promulgation of said
executive order is an exercise by the
President of his powers as Commander in
Chief of all our armed forces, as upheld by
this Court in the case of Yamashita vs. Styer
L-129, 42 Off. Gaz., 654) 1 when we said
"War is not ended simply because hostilities
have ceased. After cessation of armed
hostilities, incidents of war may remain
pending which should be disposed of as in
time of war. `An important incident to a
conduct of war is the adoption of measures
by the military command not only to repel
and defeat the enemies but to seize and
subject to disciplinary measures those
enemies who in their attempt to thwart or
impede our military effort have violated the
law of war.' (Ex parte Quirin, 317 U. S., 1;
63 Sup. Ct., 2.) Indeed, the power to create
a military commission for the trial and
punishment of war criminals is an aspect of
waging war. And, in the language of a
writer, a military commission `has
jurisdiction so long as a technical state of
war continues. This includes the period of
an armistice, or military occupation, up to
the effective date of a treaty of peace, and
may extend beyond, by treaty agreement.'
(Cowls, Trial of War Criminals by Military
Tribunals, American Bar Association
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Journal, June, 1944.)" Consequently, the
President as Commander in Chief is fully
empowered to consummate this unfinished
aspect of war, namely, the trial and
punishment of war criminals, through the
issuance and enforcement of Executive
Order No. 68. Petitioner argues that
respondent Military Commission has no
jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts
committed in violation of the Hague
Convention and the Geneva Convention
because the Philippines is not a signatory to
the first and signed the second only in
1947. It cannot be denied that the rules and
regulations of the Hague and Geneva
conventions form part of and are wholly
based on the generally accepted principles
of international law. In fact, these rules and
principles were accepted by the two
belligerent nations, the United States and
Japan, who were signatories to the two
Conventions. Such rules and principles,
therefore, form part of the law of our
nation even if the Philippines was not a
signatory to the conventions
embodying them, for our Constitution
has been deliberately general and
extensive in its scope and is not
confined to the recognition of rules and
principles of international law as
contained in treaties to which our
government may have been or shall be
a signatory. Furthermore, when the
crimes charged against petitioner were
allegedly committed, the Philippines was
under the sovereignty of the United States,
and thus we were equally bound together
with the United States and with Japan, to
the rights and obligations contained in the
treaties between the belligerent countries.
These rights and obligations were not
erased by our assumption of full
sovereignty. If at all, our emergence as a
free state entitles us to enforce the right, on
our own, of trying and punishing those who
committed crimes against our people.
FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE
STATE
1. ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ
101 PHIL. 1155
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FACTS: Petitioner filed a suit to invalidate
the Retail Trade Nationalization Law, on the
premise that it violated several treaties
which under the rule of pacta sunt
servanda, a generally accepted principle of
international law, should be observed by
the Court in good faith.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Retail Trade
Nationalization Law is unconstitutional for it
is in conflict with treaties which are
generally accepted principles of
international law.
HELD: The Supreme Court said it saw no
conflict. The reason given by the Court was
that the Retail Trade National Law was
passed in the exercise of the police power
which cannot be bargained away through
the medium of a treaty or a contract. The
law in question was enacted to remedy a
real actual threat and danger to national
economy posed by alien dominance and
control of the retail business and free
citizens and country from such dominance
and control; that the enactment clearly falls
within the scope of the police power of the
State, thru which and by which it protects
its own personality and insures its security
and future. Resuming what we have set
forth above we hold that the disputed law
was enacted to remedy a real actual threat
and danger to national economy posed by
alien dominance and control of the retail
business and free citizens and country from
such dominance and control; that the
enactment clearly falls within the scope of
the police power of the state, through which
and by which it protects its own personality
and insures its security and future; that the
law does not violate the equal protection
clause of the Constitution because sufficient
grounds exist for the distinction between
alien and citizen in the exercise of
occupation regulated, nor the due process
of the law clause; because the law is
prospective in operation and recognizes the
privilege of aliens already engaged in the
occupation and reasonably protects their
privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of
the law to carry out its objectives appear to
us to be plainly evident - as a matter of fact
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it seems not only appropriate but actually
necessary - and that in any case such
matter falls within the prerogative of the
legislature, with whose power and
discretion the judicial department of the
Government may not interfere; that the
provisions of the law are clearly embraced
in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity
and has not misled the legislature of the
segment of the population affected; and
that it cannot be said to be void for
supposed conflict with treaty obligations
because no treaty has actually been
entered into on the subject and the police
power may not be curtailed or surrendered
by any treaty or any other conventional
agreement.
2. DECS v San Diego
180 SCRA 233, Cruz, J.
FACTS: The petitioner disqualified the
private respondent who had actually taken
and failed four times the National Medical
Admission Test fromtaking it again under its
regulation. But the private respondent
contends that he is still entitled and hence,
applied to take a fifth examination based on
constitutional grounds: right to academic
freedom and quality education, due process
and equal protection. He filed a petition for
mandamus. The respondent judge declared
the said rule invalid and granted the
petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the three flunk rule
is a valid exercise of police
power.
HELD: Yes. The police power is validly
exercised if (a) the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require the interference of
the State, and (b) the means employed are
reasonably necessary to the attainment of
the object sought to be accomplished and
not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
Thus, the subject of the challenged
regulation is certainly within the ambit
of the police power. It is the right and
indeed the responsibility of the State to
insure that the medical profession is
not infiltrated by incompetents to
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whom patients may unwarily entrust
their lives and health. While every person
is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does
not have a constitutional right to be a
doctor. The private respondent has failed
the NMAT five times and this is sufficed to
say that he must yield to the challenged
rule and give way to those better prepared.
The Court upheld the constitutionality of the
NMAT as a measure intended to limit the
admission to medical schools only to those
who have initially proved their competence
and preparation for a medical education.
The decision of the respondent judge is
reversed.
3. ASSOCIATION OF SMALL
LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., et. Al
vs.
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF
AGRARIAN REFORM
own in excess of the maximum area
allowed, there is definitely taking
under the power of eminent domain for
which payment of just compensation is
imperative. The taking contemplated is
not a mere limitation of the use of the
land. What is required is the surrender
of the title to and the physical
possession of the said excess and all
beneficial rights accruing to the owner
in favor of the farmer beneficiary. This
is definitely an exercise not of the
police power but of the power of
eminent domain. Wherefore, the Court
holds the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6657,
P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos.
228 and 229. However, the title to all
expropriated properties shall be transferred
to the State only upon full payment of
compensation to their respective owners.

G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989

FACTS: In these consolidated cases,

petitioners primarily assail the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No.
27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O.
Nos. 228 and 229 arguing that no private
property shall be taken for public
use without just compensation. The
respondent invokes the police power
of the State.

ISSUE: Whether or not the taking of

property under the said laws is a valid
exercise of police power or of the power of
eminent domain.

HELD: It is an exercise of the power of

eminent domain. The cases present no
knotty complication insofar as the question
of compensable taking is concerned. To the
extent that the measures under
challenge merely prescribe retention
limits for landowners, there is an
exercise of the police power for the
regulation of private property in
accordance with the Constitution. But
where, to carry out such regulation, it
becomes necessary to deprive such
owners of whatever lands they may

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