Remedial Law Review I - Atty.
Custodio
AY 2019 - 2020 (1st sem) ASUNCION, BONIFACIO, CAPILA, CHUA, CRUZ, GAON, GARCIA, INTIA, LAGO, MARTINEZ, OBNAMIA, PERNES, REPOSAR, STA. ANA, TABALINGCOS, TEMPORAL
RESPONSIVE PLEADINGS
1. Marcos-Araneta vs. CA (GR. No. 154096)
[amendment of complaint and responsive pleading were discussed together]
Facts:
1. Irene Marcos-Araneta alleged Benedicto and his associates held 65% shares of
stocks of FEMII and UEC for her benefit. Benedicto Group refused to oblige to her
demand of reconveyance.
2. Irene instituted before the RTC two similar complaints for conveyance of shares of
stock, accounting and receivership against the Benedicto Group.
a. The first, covered the UEC shares… The second, 65% of FEMII shares…
3. Benedicto filed a MTD. - RTC Granted. Both complaints were dismissed, stating that
these partly constituted "real action", and that Irene did not actually reside in Ilocos
Norte, thus, venue was improperly laid.
4. Irene filed a MR. While MR was pending, Irene filed a Motion (to Admit Amended
Complaint), attaching therewith a copy of the Amended Complaint, in which the names
of Daniel Rubio, Orlando G. Reslin, and Jose G. Reslin made additional plaintiffs.
a. The added plaintiffs, all from Ilocos Norte, were Irene's new trustees. (she
wanted to cure venue defect) The amended complaint stated the same
cause of action but sought the reconveyance of the FEMII shares only.
b. Motion for Reconsideration - RTC Denied.
Motion to Admit Amended Complaint- RTC Granted.
5. Benedicto filed a MTD the amended complaint - RTC Denied.
a. Benedicto alleged there was no complaint to amend in the first place as the
original complaints were dismissed with finality earlier when the court
denied Irene's MR dismissing the original complaints.
b. RTC: there was actually no need to act on Irene's motion to admit, it being
her right as plaintiff to amend her complaints absent any responsive
pleading thereto. And, filing of the amended complaint ipso facto
superseded the original complaints, the dismissal of which, had not yet
become final at the time of the filing of the amended complaint.
6. Benedicto went CA to nullify the following RTC orders: the first, admitting the
amended complaint; the second, denying their motion to dismiss the amended
complaint; and the third, denying their MR of the second issuance. - CA Granted.
Issue: W/N the amended complaint in the RTC should be dismissed because (of the argument
that) at the time it was filed, there was no more original complaint to amend - NO.
Held:
1. CA held the flaw in the RTC's act of admitting the amended complaint lies in the fact
that the filing of the amended complaint on July 17, 2000 came after the RTC had
ordered with finality the dismissal of the original complaints.
2. Plaintiff may amend his complaint once as a matter of right, i.e., without leave of court,
before any responsive pleading is filed or served.
a. Responsive pleadings are those which seek affirmative relief and/or set up
defenses, like an answer.
b. A motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading.
3. RTC did not err in admitting Irene’s amended complaint, Benedicta not having yet
answered the original complaints when the amended complaint was filed.
a. At that moment, Irene, by force of said Sec. 2 of Rule 10, had, as a matter
of right, the option of amending her underlying reconveyance complaints.
b. RTC’s duty to admit the amended complaint was purely ministerial. She
should not have even filed a motion to admit her amended complaint.
4. It may be argued that the original complaints had been dismissed through the June
29, 2000 RTC order.
a. However, the finality of such dismissal order had not set in when Irene filed
the amended complaint on July 17, 2000, she having meanwhile
seasonably sought reconsideration thereof.
b. Irene's MR was only resolved on August 25, 2000. Thus, when Irene filed
the amended complaint on July 17, 2000, the order of dismissal was not yet
final, implying that there was strictly no legal impediment to her amending
her original complaints.
2. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A. vs. Dow Chemical Co. (GR. No. 179232) | August 23, 2012|
DOCTRINE:​two requisites for a court to allow an omitted counterclaim or cross-claim by
amendment: (1) there was oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or when justice
requires; and (2) the amendment is made before judgment
FACTS:
· August 11, 1995, a joint complaint for damages based on quasi-delict was filed before the
RTC of Panabo City, Davao by 1,185 individuals against Del Monte, Dow Chemical Corporations
and other companies alleging that the companies were negligent in the manufacture, distribution
and sale or in not informing the users of the hazardous effects of the chemical they used. It was
amended to implead other plaintiffs and dropped 4 defendants. The remaining defendants filed
their Answer with Counterclaim.
· On September 2, 1997, the Dow/Occidental defendants jointly moved for the dismissal of
the complaint against them, as well as their counterclaim against the plaintiffs. They alleged that
they have already entered into a compromise agreement.
· The Chiquita defendants, on even date, filed their Motion for Leave to Admit Amended
Answer with Counterclaims and Cross-claims, citing inadvertence, oversight, and excusable
neglect as grounds for amendment. DOLE also filed a Motion to Admit Amended Answer with
Cross Claim.
· The parties thereafter filed numerous oppositions/motions to the pleadings filed by each.
Replies and comments were likewise filed in response thereto.
· Del Monte filed motion to dismiss alleging the Amended Joint Complaint be dismissed
entirely with prejudice because the claimants had been paid, waived, abandoned and extinguish
their rights in effect of their compromise agreement with the claimants.
· RTC granted and left to the cognizance of the court the case for cross claim among
defendants filed by DOLE, Del Monte and Chiquita
· The Dow/Occidental defendants filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. The CA ruled that
the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it admitted the cross-claims against the
Dow/Occidental defendants without any qualificationThe CA also held that the dismissal of the
complaint as regards the Dow/Occidental defendants in the civil case did not carry with it the
dismissal of the cross-claims filed against said defendants.
· Hence, consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45
ISSUES:
1. WON THE DISMISSAL OF THE CIVIL CASE CASE AGAINST THE DOW/OCCIDENTAL
DEFENDANTS CARRY WITH IT THE DISMISSAL OF CROSS CLAIMS AGAINST THEM
2. WON THE REQUEST FORADMISSION BY DOW/CCIDENTAL IS PROPER?
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Remedial Law Review I - Atty. Custodio
AY 2019 - 2020 (1st sem) ASUNCION, BONIFACIO, CAPILA, CHUA, CRUZ, GAON, GARCIA, INTIA, LAGO, MARTINEZ, OBNAMIA, PERNES, REPOSAR, STA. ANA, TABALINGCOS, TEMPORAL
· Section 10, Rule 11 of the ​1997 Rules of Civil Procedure​, as amended, provides:
o SEC. 10. ​Omitted counterclaim or cross-claim. — When a pleader fails to set up a
counterclaim or a cross-claim through oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or when
justice requires, he may, by leave of court, set up the counterclaim or cross-claim by amendment
before judgment.
· Based on the above-quoted provision, there are two requisites for a court to allow an
omitted counterclaim or cross-claim by amendment: (1) there was oversight, inadvertence, or
excusable neglect, or when justice requires; and (2) the amendment is made before judgment.
· The CA correctly held that there is basis for allowing the cross-claims of the Dole, Del
Monte and Chiquita defendants against the Dow/Occidental defendants as they complied with
the rules. It is undisputed that the Dole, Del Monte and Chiquita defendants sought to amend
their answers to include their cross-claims before judgment. More importantly, justice requires
that they be allowed to do so in consonance with the policy against multiplicity of suits.
· We further agree with the appellate court when it ruled that the dismissal of the complaint
against the Dow/Occidental defendants does not carry with it the dismissal of the cross-claims
against them. The ruling in ​Ruiz, Jr. v. Court of Appeals ​26 that the dismissal of the complaint
divested the cross-claimants of whatever appealable interest they might have had before, and
made the cross-claim itself no longer viable, is not applicable in the instant case because in
Ruiz​, the dismissal of the complaint was based on the ground that it lacked merit. In the case at
bar, the dismissal of the complaint against the Dow/Occidental defendants resulted from the
settlement with the plaintiffs, which is in effect an admission of liability on the part of the
Dow/Occidental defendants. As held in ​Bañez v. Court of Appeals:​
§ A third-party complaint is indeed similar to a cross-claim, except only with respect to the
persons against whom they are directed. However, the ruling in ​Ruiz cannot be successfully
invoked by petitioners. In ​Ruiz we declared that the dismissal of the main action rendered the
cross-claim no longer viable only because the main action was categorically dismissed for lack
of cause of action. Hence, since defendants could no longer be held liable under the main
complaint, no reason existed for them anymore to sue their co-party under the cross-claim.
§ In sharp contrast thereto, the termination of the main action between PESALA and PNB-RB
was not due to any finding that it was bereft of any basis. On the contrary, further proceedings
were rendered unnecessary only because defendant (third-party plaintiff) PNB-RB, to avoid a
protracted litigation, voluntarily admitted liability in the amount of P20,226,685.00. Hence, the
termination of the main action between PESALA and PNB-RB could not have rendered lifeless
the third-party complaint filed against petitioners, as it did the cross-claim in ​Ruiz, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals​, since it involved a finding of liability on the part of PNB-RB even if it be by compromise.
o And as correctly observed by the CA, the plaintiffs are seeking to hold all defendant
companies solidarily liable. Thus, even with the compromise agreements entered into by the
Dow/Occidental, Del Monte and Chiquita defendants with majority of the plaintiffs below, the civil
case was not dismissed nor the amount of damages sought by plaintiffs therein reduced.
Therefore, the remaining defendants can still be made liable by plaintiffs for the full amount. If
that happens, the remaining defendants can still proceed with their cross-claims against the
compromising defendants, including the Dow/Occidental defendants, for their respective shares.
ICHcTD
o We also uphold the appellate court's ruling that the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it
admitted the cross-claims against the Dow/Occidental defendants without any qualification. The
Del Monte and Chiquita defendants' cross-claims against the Dow/Occidental defendants cannot
extend to the plaintiffs with whom they had settled, but only with respect to those plaintiffs who
refused to enter into a compromise agreement with them, that is, with respect only to James
Bagas and Dante Bautista for the Chiquita defendants and the 16 plaintiffs for the Del Monte
defendants. Simply put, as the compromising plaintiffs can no longer hold the Del Monte and
Chiquita defendants liable, there is no more reason for the latter to sue the Dow/Occidental
defendants as far as the compromising plaintiffs are concerned under the cross-claim.
o With respect to the Dole defendants, however, as the Dole defendants did not enter into a
compromise agreement with any of the plaintiffs, their cross-claims against the Dow/Occidental,
Del Monte and Chiquita defendants should be admitted in its totality.
o As to the Request for Admission served by the Dow/Occidental defendants, this Court finds
that the issue on its propriety has been rendered moot by the compromising plaintiffs' motion for
execution and the subsequent issuance of the writ of execution by the RTC on April 23, 2003.
The Request for Admission was seeking the compromising plaintiffs' admission that they have
received the payments as agreed upon in the compromise agreement. However, in the plaintiffs'
Motion for Execution dated December 26, 2002, they alleged that the compromising defendants
still have not complied with the terms and conditions of the compromise agreements, thereby
forcing said plaintiffs to file the motion. Thus, the admission sought by the Dow/Occidental
defendants has already been impliedly responded to by a denial of receipt of payment under the
compromise agreement. With said denial, the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
not resolving the Request for Admission. It is incumbent upon the Dow/Occidental defendants to
prove that payments have been made to the compromising plaintiffs.
3. ​[G.R. No. L-15808. April 23, 1963.]
FAUSTA AGCANAS, JUAN MIGUEL, JUANITA MIGUEL, assisted by her husband ULPIANO
PASION, assisted by her husband JUAN PASCUAL, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. BRUNO
MERCADO, and ANTONIO DASALLA, defendants-appellants.
DOCTRINE: A responsive pleading having been filed, amendments to the complaint may,
therefore, be made only by leave of court and no longer as a matter of right.
FALLO: “​The order of default issued and the decision rendered by the trial court are set aside
and the case is remanded for further proceedings, pursuant to the Rules. Costs against
plaintiffs- appellees.”
FACTS:
November 25, 1956: ​plaintiffs filed this action to recover portions of a parcel of land ​in Isabela,
and damages.
December 4, 1956: ​defendants filed a motion for a bill of particulars, with notice of hearing on
December 8, but since the motion was actually received in court only on December 12 the court
set it for hearing on December 22.
December 17: however, ​defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, with a prayer that
consideration of their motion for a bill of particulars be held in abeyance pending resolution of
their motion to dismiss.
December 22, 1956: the date set by the court for the hearing of the motion for a bill of particulars
and by defendants for the hearing of their motion to dismiss, the court issued an order
postponing "consideration" of both motions to December 29.
March 7, 1957: the court denied the motion to dismiss and ordered defendants "to answer the
complaint within the reglementary period provided for by the Rules of Court."
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Remedial Law Review I - Atty. Custodio
AY 2019 - 2020 (1st sem) ASUNCION, BONIFACIO, CAPILA, CHUA, CRUZ, GAON, GARCIA, INTIA, LAGO, MARTINEZ, OBNAMIA, PERNES, REPOSAR, STA. ANA, TABALINGCOS, TEMPORAL
October 29, 1957: Hearing of the case on the merits was set and notice of which was duly
received by defendants.
October 17, 1957: Defendants not having filed their answer, plaintiffs, moved to have them
declared in default. On the same day the court issued the order of default, together with another
order commissioning the clerk of court to receive plaintiffs' evidence.
October 21, 1957: defendants moved to cancel the hearing scheduled for October 29, on two
grounds, one of which was that their motion for a bill of particulars had not yet been resolved.
October 26, 1957: When defendants arrived in court they learned that an order of default had
been issued, so they immediately filed a motion asking that the same be set aside, that their
pending motion for a bill of particulars be resolved and that they be given a reasonable period
thereafter within which to file their answer to the complaint.
December 13, 1957: the court denied the motion and rendered its decision in favor of plaintiffs
January 4, 1958: it denied defendants' motion for reconsideration
January 24: defendants filed their record on appeal (to this Court from the order of December
13, 1957), but as they subsequently filed a petition for relief from the judgment by default, they
asked that consideration and approval of their record on appeal be held in abeyance until said
petition had been resolved. The request was granted.
Defendant's petition for relief, which was filed on January 28, 1958, was denied on March 21, as
was also, on September 20, 1958, their motion for reconsideration of the order of denial.
October 4, 1958: the court denied likewise their motion for a writ of preliminary injunction to
restrain execution of the judgment by default. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE: W/N upon denial of a defendants' motion to dismiss the reglementary period within
which to file an answer resumes running even though the motion for a bill of particulars of the
same defendants is still pending and unresolved.
RULING: NO.
Both a motion to dismiss and a motion for a bill of particulars interrupt the time to file a
responsive pleading.
In the case of a motion to dismiss, the period starts running again as soon as the movant
receives a copy of the order of denial.
In the case of a motion for a bill of particulars, the suspended period shall continue to run upon
service on the movant of the bill of particulars, if the motion is granted, or of the notice of its
denial, but in any event he shall have not less than five days within which to file his responsive
pleading.
When appellants filed a motion to dismiss, they requested that resolution of their previous
motion for a bill of particulars be held in abeyance.
This was but practical, because if the court had granted the motion to dismiss there would have
been no need for a bill of particulars.
Resolution of the motion for the purpose was necessary only in the event that court should deny,
as it did, the motion to dismiss, in which case the period to file an answer remained suspended
until the motion for a bill of particulars is denied or, it is granted, until the bill is served on the
moving party.
The lower court deemed appellants to have "tacitly waived their right to push through the hearing
of the motion for bill of particulars," because of their failure to set it for hearing or to ask the clerk
of court to calendar it after denial of the motion to dismiss.
Appellants did set the motion for hearing on December 8, 1956, although it was not heard on
that day because it arrived in court only on December 12.
Thereafter they did not have to reset it, as the clerk of court scheduled it for hearing on
December 22, 1956. And on that day the court issued an order that "the consideration of the
motion to dismiss, as well as the bill of particulars, is hereby postponed to December 29, 1956."
As to whether or not both motions were actually heard on December 29 does not appear of
record. But heard or not, the motions should be considered submitted, and it was the clear duty
of the court to resolve the motion for a bill of particulars, as it did the motion to dismiss.
No action having been taken thereon until the present, the period to answer has not yet expired.
The lower court, therefore, erred in declaring appellants in default and in taking all the
subsequent actions it did in the case.
G.R. No. 143264, April 23, 2012
LISAM ENTERPRISES, INC. represented by LOLITA A. SORIANO, and LOLITA A. SORIANO,
Petitioners, vs. BANCO DE ORO UNIBANK, INC. (formerly PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL
INTERNATIONAL BANK),* LILIAN S. SORIANO, ESTATE OF LEANDRO A. SORIANO, JR.,
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LEGASPI CITY, and JESUS L. SARTE, Respondents.
DOCTRINE: A responsive pleading having been filed, amendments to the complaint may,
therefore, be made only by leave of court and no longer as a matter of right.
FACTS: On August 13, 1999, petitioners filed a Complaint against respondents for Annulment of
Mortgage with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order & Preliminary Injunction with Damages
with the RTC of Legaspi City. Petitioner Lolita A. Soriano alleged that she is a stockholder of
petitioner Lisam Enterprises, Inc. (LEI) and a member of its Board of Directors, designated as its
Corporate Secretary.
LEI acquired a lot in Legaspi. Sorianos acquired a loan from PCIB in their personal capacity for
P20m and as security, the Sorianos as president and treasurer but without authority, falsified a
Board Resolution and executed a Real Estate Mortgage.
After service of summons, TRO and Injunction were issued by the RTC.
On September 25, 1999, Sorianos filed an Answer. On September 28, PCIB filed a Motion to
Dismiss the Complaint on grounds of lack of legal capacity to sue, failure to state a cause of
action, and litis pendencia.
On November 11, 1999, the RTC issued the first assailed Resolution dismissing petitioners'
Complaint. Petitioners then filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said Resolution. While awaiting
resolution of the motion for reconsideration, petitioners also filed, on January 4, 2000, a Motion
to Admit Amended Complaint. RTC denied both.
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Remedial Law Review I - Atty. Custodio
AY 2019 - 2020 (1st sem) ASUNCION, BONIFACIO, CAPILA, CHUA, CRUZ, GAON, GARCIA, INTIA, LAGO, MARTINEZ, OBNAMIA, PERNES, REPOSAR, STA. ANA, TABALINGCOS, TEMPORAL
Hence, Petition for Review under Rule 45.
ISSUE:Whether or not an amendment to the complaint may still be filed after a responsive
pleading is filed
HELD: YES. that respondents Lilian S. Soriano and the Estate of Leandro A. Soriano, Jr. already
filed their Answer, to petitioners' complaint, and the claims being asserted were made against
said parties. A responsive pleading (Answer) having been filed, amendments to the complaint
may, therefore, be made only by leave of court and no longer as a matter of right.
PETITION IS DISMISSED.
4. Heirs of Paciano Yabao vs. Van Der Kolk (GR. No. 207266)
FACTS:
1. Sometime in 1996, Paz Lentejas Van Der Kolk asserted claim of ownership and
allowed a person to possess the property originally belonging to the Heirs of Pacianao
Yabao.
2. Despite repeated demands of the heirs of Yabao for the defendant to vacate the
premises usurped and occupied by her, she refused and still continue to refuse, to
leave the said premises
3. The Heirs of Paciano Yabao, represented by Remedios Chan, filed a complaint for
ownership and possession against Paz Lentejas Van der Kolk (filed March 8,2001)
4. Copies of the summons and the complaint were served upon the attorney-in-fact of
Van der Kolk, ​Ma. Narcisa Fabregaras-Ventures​, whom she authorized to institute and
defend all actions for the protection of her rights and interests over her properties,
including the subject lot, ​by virtue of a special power of attorney​ executed in 1999
5. It was noted in the Sheriff's Return of Service that Van der Kolk was in the
Netherlands at the time of the service
6. Van der Kolk filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint anchored on the following
grounds (filed April 2,2001):
a. lack of jurisdiction by the MTCC over her person due to defective service of
summons - alleged that the service of summons should have been made in
accordance with Section 15, Rule 14 (Extraterritorial Service) because she
was not actually residing in the Philippines;
b. lack of cause of action.
c. Shecontended that the predecessors-in-interest of the Heirs of Yabao had
executed a joint affidavit wherein they renounced their hereditary rights over
the subject lot and declared that Faustina Yabao, mother of Van der Kolk,
as its true owner
7. The Heirs of Yabao filed their opposition to the said motion and moved to declare Van
der Kolk in default contending that the motion to dismiss was filed beyond the 15-day
reglementary period and no answer had been filed.
8. MTCC denied the motion to dismiss, holding that there was proper service of
summons. It also denied the motion to declare defendant in default, stating that the
motion to dismiss was seasonably filed.
9. Atty. Felidito Dacut, filed a Manifestation with Motion praying that he be relieved as
her counsel because she never contacted him about the case. The Heirs of Yabao still
reiterated their motion to declare Van der Kolk in default during the hearing because
no answer had yet been filed.
10. In 2005, Van der Kolk, through her new counsel, Atty. Tibo filed her Answer to the
complaint which was appended to the Motion for Allowance to Belatedly File
Defendant's Answer
11. MTCC then declared Van der Kolk in default giving the reason that her non-filing of an
answer within the fresh 10-day period was deliberately calculated to delay the early
termination of the case and resolving the case on the merits taking into account ​only
the allegations of the complaint. MTCC declared the heirs of Yabao as the owners of
the lot
12. Van der Kolk filed an appeal before the RTC
13. Counsel for Van der Kolk received the notice of the RTC Clerk of Court requiring her
to file a memorandum on appeal within 15 days from such receipt or until November 6,
2007
14. On November 5, 2007, Atty. Tibo moved for additional time of 30 days from November
6, 2007 alleging that he could not seasonably file the said pleading due to heavy
pressures of work. The memorandum was filed on November 21, 2007.
15. The Heirs of Yabao filed a Motion to Dismiss the appeal, citing the failure of Van der
Kolk to file the appeal memorandum.
16. RTC issued the Order dismissing the appeal for failure of Van der Kolk to file the
memorandum on appeal
17. MR was also denied, which prompted Van der Kolk to file an appeal before the CA
18. CA granted the petition "on grounds not raised herein but disclosed by the records”. It
declared that the MTCC should have required the Heirs of Yabao to present evidence
ex parte, after it had declared Van der Kolk in default, to prove the allegations in the
complaint.
ISSUE: WON MTCC correctly held Van der Kolk in default and ruled the case based only on the
allegations in the complaint? NO FOR BOTH
FALLO: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
HELD:
1. The MTCC erred when it granted the reliefs prayed by the Heirs of Yabao because
the same were not warranted by the allegations in the complaint.
2. The Court notes that the allegations pertinent to the petitioners' cause of action,
particularly on their claim of ownership and right to possession over the property, were
not supported by any document annexed to the complaint. Mere assertions, as what
the petitioners proffered, do not suffice
3. Accordingly, the petitioners' entitlement to their claims was not proven by
preponderance of evidence. As correctly pointed out by the CA​, the MTCC should
have, after it declared Van der Kolk in default, directed the Heirs of Yabao to adduce
evidence to substantiate the allegations in their complaint
4. The MTCC should have admitted Van der Kolk's answer, which was appended to her
motion for allowance to belatedly file answer of declaring her in default. Record shows
that the MTCC rendered the judgment of default only on December 4, 2006 and thus,
it slept on Van der Kolk's said motion for 1 year and nine months, just as it also slept
on the petitioners' motion to declare her in default for almost two years.
5. It is within the sound discretion of the trial court to permit the defendant to file his
answer and to be heard on the merits even after the reglementary period for filing the
answer expires. ​The rule is that the defendant's answer should be admitted where it is
filed before a declaration of default and no prejudice is caused to the plaintiff​. In this
case, Van der Kolk filed the answer beyond the reglementary period but before she
was declared in default, and there was no showing that she intended to delay the
prompt disposition of the case. Consequently, her Answer should have been admitted.
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Remedial Law Review I - Atty. Custodio
AY 2019 - 2020 (1st sem) ASUNCION, BONIFACIO, CAPILA, CHUA, CRUZ, GAON, GARCIA, INTIA, LAGO, MARTINEZ, OBNAMIA, PERNES, REPOSAR, STA. ANA, TABALINGCOS, TEMPORAL
5. Guyamin vs. Flores (GR. No. 202189) ● RULE: Responsive Answer should be filed within 15 days from receipt of Complaint or
initiatory pleading
PARTIES INVOLVED: ● ​IN THIS CASE: The filing of Guyanin’s Answer prior to Flores’ Motion to declare them
in default and reply, do not erase the fact that Guyanin’s Answer is late
● JACINTO FLORES AND MAXIMO FLORES: Party who instituted a Complaint for - Flores’ reply filed thereafter is, like the belated answer, a mere scrap of
Recovery of Possession of Property paper, as it proceeds from a belatedly filed Answer.
● RODANTE GUYANIN: Relative of Flores who occupies the subject lot by tolerance - As to rendition of decision before presentation of evidence, the Supreme
Court ruled that it was proper for the RTC to admit the evidence presented
by Flores even if there was no formal offer of evidence since the pieces of
HOW THE CASE STARTED
evidence were identified during the ex parte hearing and marked as Exhibits
A to F.
● Flores instituted a ​Complaint for Recovery of Possession against Guyanin before - In addition, SC pointed out the Guyanin’s act of failure to attach a copy of
RTC Trece Martires. They alleged that: their Answer to the Complaint to show the he has a substantial defense
- They are the registered owner of a parcel of land against Flores is an ingenious scheme that the Court censures.
- Guyanin is their relative who for many years have been occupying the
subject property by mere tolerance of Flores’ parents (the original owner
- Guyanin has been reminded to vacate the premises because Flores
decided to sell the property
- Flores made several attempts to settle the matter through conciliation but it
all failed
● Summons and copy of Complaint were served upon Guyanin through Eileen, who
refused to sign and acknowledge receipt.
● Later on, Flores filed ​Motion the Declare Defendants in Default for failure of Guyanin
to file his answer despite service of summons
● It took almost 8 months before Guyanin filed their ​Answer with Motion to Dismiss
● In response, Flores filed their ​Reply to Answer​, arguing that:
- Guyanin’s Answer was belatedly filed, so they should be declared in default
- For this reason, Flores prayed that the Answer be stricken off the record
● RULING OF RTC ON MOTION TO DECLARE GUYANIN IN DEFAULT: Guyanin was
declared in default so Flores was allowed to present evidence ex parte
- GROUND: For failure to file their responsive answer within the reglementary
period of 15 days
● RULING OF RTC ON THE MERITS OF THE CASE: ​Guyanin is ordered to vacate the
property and deliver its possession to Flores
● ARGUMENTS OF GUYANIN WHEN HE FILED AN APPEAL BEFORE CA:
- Case should be dismissed for failure of Flores to give notice or demand to
vacate and observe conciliation process
- Based on the complaint, Flores merely reminded them to vacate but no
actual demand to vacate has been given
● RULING OF CA:​ Affirmed RTC Ruling. Guyanin is ordered to vacate the property
- There was a demand to vacate given. Although the complaint used
“reminding” instead of “demanding”, it shall still be construed as demand to
vacate.
- The Order of Default issued by RTC is proper since it took more than 8
months after receiving the summons that Guyanin filed his Answer

​ISSUE: WON it is proper to declare Guyanin in default for failure to file an Answer (responsive
pleading) within the reglementary period. [YES]

​HELD:​ It is proper to declare Guyanin in default.