1. Allied Banking Corp. V. Lim Sio Wan (2008)G.R. No.

133179, March 27, 2008

FACTS: Lim Sio Wan deposited with Allied Banking Corporation (Allied) a money market placement of
P 1,152,597.35 fora term of 31 days. December 5, 1983: a person claiming to be Lim Sio Wan called up
Cristina So, an officer of Allied, andinstructed the latter to pre-terminate Lim Sio Wan’s money market
placement, to issue a manager’s check representingthe proceeds of the placement, and to give the check to
Deborah Dee Santos who would pick up the check. Lim Sio Wandescribed the appearance of Santos.
Santos arrived at the bank and signed the application form for a manager’s check tobe issued. The bank
issued Manager’s Check representing the proceeds of Lim Sio Wan’s money market placement in thename
of Lim Sio Wan, and Upon the presentment of the check, Allied funded the check even without
checking theauthenticity.
ISSUE: W/N Allied should be solely liable to Lim Sio
Wan.HELD: YES. CA affirmed. Modified Producers Bank to reimburse Allied and Metrobank. Art. 1953.
A person who receives a loan of money or any other fungible thing acquires the ownership thereof, and is
bound to pay to the creditor an equal amount of the same kind and quality. Given the relative participation
of Allied and Metrobank to the instant case, both banks cannot be adjudged as equally liable. Hence, the
60:40 ratio of the liabilities of Allied and Metrobank, as ruled by the CA, must be upheld.
2. FLORES V. LINDO (G.R. NO. 183984; APRIL 13, 2011)
CASE DIGEST: ARTURO SARTE FLORES, Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES ENRICO L. LINDO, JR.
and EDNA C. LINDO, Respondents.

Mortgage of property within the community or the conjugal partnership is void if done without the
consent of the other spouse. Nevertheless, the execution of special powers of attorney perfects the
contract of mortgage. In other words, the SPA cures the defect of the mortgage.

FACTS: On the 31st day of October in the year 1995, the woman was able to obtain a loan secured by a
Real Estate Mortgage over a real proper under her and his husband's name but without the consent of the
former. Partial payments were made by her through checks but the same were dishonored. As a result, the
creditor filed a complaint against her for foreclosure of the mortgage with damages.

The second-level court dismissed the case as the mortgage was, in the eyes of the court a quo, void for
having been executed without the necessary consent of the husband, despite the SPA executed later by the
husband for the wife. It must be noted that the SPA was executed only a few days after the wife entered
into the contract of loan with mortgage.

The second-level court however ruled that the subsequent execution of the SPA cannot be made to
retroact to the date of the execution of the real estate mortgage.

ISSUE: Did the court commit any error in dismissing the case for foreclosure against the wife for the
mortgage entered into without the husband's consent despite the fact that a subsequent SPA was executed
in her favor?
RULING: Yes, the court acted in error.

The execution of the SPA can be considered as acceptance of the mortgage by the other spouse that
perfected the contract or continuing offer.

Both Article 96 and Article 124 of the Family Code provide that the powers of the administration do not
include disposition or encumbrance without the written consent of the other spouse. Any disposition or
encumbrance without the written consent shall be void. However, both provisions also state that “the
transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third
person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse x x x before
the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.”
3. Hing vs. Choachuy
Article 25 & 26
Case Digest: Hing vs. Choachuy
FACTS:
Sometime in April 2005, Aldo Development & Resources, Inc. (owned by Choachuy’s) filed a case for
Injunction and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order against the
Hing’s. The latter claimed that the Hing’s constructed a fence without a valid permit and that it would
destroy the walls of their building. The court denied the application for lack of evidence. So in order to get
evidences for the case, on June 2005, Choachuy illegally set-up two video surveillance cameras facing the
Hing’s property. Their employees even took pictures of the said construction of the fence. The Hing’s then
filed a case against the Choachuy’s for violating their right to privacy. On October 2005, the RTC issued a
order granting the application of the Hing’s for TRO and directed the Choachuy’s to remove the two video
surveillance cameras they installed. The Choachuy’s appealed the case to the Court of Appeals and the
RTC’s decision was annulled and set aside. The Hing’s then raised the case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the installation of two video surveillance cameras of Choachuy’s violated the
Hing’s right to privacy.

HELD:

Such act of the Choachuy’s violated the right of privacy of the Hing’s under Article 26(1) prohibiting the
“prying into the privacy of another’s residence.” Although it is a business office and not a residence, the
owner has the right to exclude the public or deny them access.
5. LEDESMA V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-54598 April 15, 1988
Jose B. Ledesma, petitioner
vs.
Court of Appeals and Spouses Pacifico Delmo and Sancha Delmo (as private respondents), respondents
FACTS:
The late Violeta Delmo was then elected as the treasurer of an organization named Student Leadership
Club in West Visayas College. In her capacity, Delmo extended loans from the funds of the club to some
of the students of the schools. The petitioner claimed that her actions were against school regulations
and therefore the latter dropped Delmo from the membership of the club and stripped her off of any
awards or citation she is entitled from the school. Respondent Delmo asked for a reconsideration of the
decision but the petitioner denied it. Therefore, the former appealed to the Office of the Director of the
Bureau of Public Schools.
On April 13, 1966, the Director of the Bureau of Public Schools rendered a decision that directs
the petitioner to give the honors to Delmo but the petitioner refused to obey the directives and let the
Delmo graduated as a plain student instead of being awarded as Magna Cum Laude.
Later, Ms Delmo, a minor, was joined by her parents and filed a case for damages against the petitioner
before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo.
The trial court after hearing rendered judgment against the petitioner and in favor of the spouses Delmo.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the CFI.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s findings that petitioner is liable for
damages under Article 27 of the New Civil Code.
RULINGS:
No. The Court of Appeals did not made a mistake in affirming the trial court’s findings that petitioner was
liable for damages under Article 27 of the New Civil Code.
Article 27 of the Civil Code provides that “Any person suffering material or moral loss because a
public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his duty may file an action
for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action
that may be taken.”
In the instant case, the action of Court of Appeals was correct in affirming the trial court’s
findings that petitioner was liable for damages under Article 27 of this Code. It is because it cannot be
disputed that Violeta Delmo went through a painful ordeal which was brought about by the petitioner’s
neglect of duty and callousness. Thus, moral damages were incurred.
The court found no reason why the findings of the trial and appellate courts should be reversed.
Therefore, the Supreme Court ruled against the petitioner and in favor of the respondents.
 6. GEORGE (CULHI) HAMBON, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND VALENTINO U. CARANTES, respondents.
G.R. No. 122150 March 17, 2003
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Facts:
Petitioner George (Culhi) Hambon filed herein filed a complaint for damages against respondent for the
injuries and expenses he sustained sustained after the truck driven by the respondent bumped him on the
night of December 9, 1985.

However, the criminal case (Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence) filed previously against
the respondent was dismissed by the court for petitioner’s lack of interest and that the dismissal was with
respect to both criminal and civil liabilities of respondent.

After trial, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision, dated December 18, 1991, ruling that the civil case
was not barred by the dismissal of the criminal case, and that petitioner is entitled to damages.

Respondent alleges that the dismissal of criminal case includes that of the civil action.

The Court of Appeals, in its decision promulgated on March 8, 1995, reversed and set aside the decision of
the trial court, and dismissed petitioner’s complaint for damages on the grounds that the Hambon failed to
file the civil case. Hence, it is impliedly instituted with the Criminal case. The dismissal of the criminal
case also includes the dismissal of the civil case.

According to the appellate court, since the petitioner did not make any reservation to institute a separate
civil action for damages, it was impliedly instituted with the criminal case, and the dismissal of the criminal
case carried with it the dismissal of the suit for damages, notwithstanding the fact that the dismissal was
provisional as it amounted to an acquittal and had the effect of an adjudication on the merits.

Issue:
Whether or not a civil case for damages based on an independent civil action falling under articles 32, 33,
34 and 2176 of the new civil code be duly dismissed for failure to make reservation to file a separate civil
action in a criminal case filed arising from the same act or omission of the accused pursuant to Rule 111,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the failure to make reservation being due to the fact that the criminal case
was dismissed before the prosecution started to present evidence for failure of the private complainant to
appear despite notice.

Held:
Civil actions to recover liability arising from crime (ex delicto) and under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of
the Civil Code (quasi-delict) are deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless waived,
reserved or previously instituted.
The Court expounded that it clearly requires that a reservation must be made to institute separately all civil
actions for the recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will be deemed to have been instituted with the
criminal case. In other words, the right of the injured party to sue separately for the recovery of the civil
liability whether arising from crimes (ex delicto) or from quasi-delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code
must be reserved otherwise they will be deemed instituted with the criminal action.
Contrary to private respondent’s contention, the requirement that before a separate civil action may be
brought it must be reserved does not impair, diminish or defeat substantive rights, but only regulates their
exercise in the general interest of procedure. The requirement is merely procedural in nature. For that matter
the Revised Penal Code, by providing in Art. 100 that any person criminally liable is also civilly liable,
gives the offended party the right to bring a separate civil action, yet no one has ever questioned the rule
that such action must be reserved before it may be brought separately.

Thus, herein petitioner Hambon should have reserved his right to separately institute the civil action for
damages in Criminal Case No. 2049. Having failed to do so, Civil Case No. 1761-R for damages
subsequently filed by him without prior reservation should be dismissed. With the dismissal of Criminal
Case No. 2049, whatever civil action for the recovery of civil liability that was impliedly instituted therein
was likewise dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, and the
decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 8, 1995, is AFFIRMED in toto.