Philippine British Assurance v. Intermediate Appellate Court to pay the said amount.

pay the said amount. Petitioner Bank appealed saying that PCHC had no
jurisdiction because the checks involved were non-negotiable checks.
G.R. No. L-72005 (May 29, 1987)
ISSUE:
FACTS:
W/N PCHC had jurisdiction over checks which are non-negotiable.
Sycwin Coating& Wires Inc, filed a complaint for a collection of money
against Varian Industrial Corporation. During the pendency, Respondent HELD:
attached some of the properties of Varian Industrial Corp upon the posting of
Yes. As provided in the articles of incorporation of PCHC, its operation
a supersedes bond. The latter in turn posted a counter bond through Petitioner
extends to “clearing checks and other clearing items.” Clearly, the term
so the attached properties were released. Sycwin filed a petition for execution
“checks” refer to checks in general use in commercial and business activities,
pending appeal against the properties of Varian, which was granted. However,
including nonnegotiable checks. No doubt non-negotiable checks are within
the writ of execution was returned unsatisfied as Varian failed to deliver the
the ambit of PCHC’s jurisdiction. There should be no distinction in the
previously attached personal properties upon demand. Sycwin prayed that
application of a statute where none is indicated for courts are not authorized to
Petitioner Corporation be ordered to pay the value of its bond which was
distinguish where the law makes no distinction. They should instead
granted.
administer the law not as they think it ought to be but as they find it and without
ISSUE: regard to consequences.
W/N the counter bond issued was valid. Alfredo Ramos v. Court of Appeals
HELD: G.R. No. L-41295 (December 4, 1989)
The counter bond was issued in accordance with Sec. 5, Rule 57 of the Rules FACTS:
of Court. Neither the rules nor provisions of the counter bond limited its
The municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan sued Ramos et al for the recovery of
application toa final and executory judgment. It applies to the payment of any
its 74-hectare fishpond. Atty. Angel Cruz, a private lawyer and head of the
judgment that may be recovered by Plaintiff. The only logical conclusion is
Cruz, Durian and Academia law firm, volunteered himself and his firm to serve
that an execution of any judgment including one pending appeal if returned
as counsel for the municipality. He stipulated in the complaint that the
unsatisfied may be charged against such counter bond. The rule therefore, is
municipality is obliged to pay them not less than 20% of the amount to be
that the counter bond to life attachment shall be charged with the payment of
recovered. Petitioners move to disqualify said private law firm as counsel on
any judgment that is returned unsatisfied. It covers not only a final and
the ground that it is illegal for the municipality to hire a private counsel.
executory judgment but also the execution of a judgment of pending appeal.
ISSUE:
Banco de Oro Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Equitable Banking
Corporation W/N it is legal for the municipality to hire a private counsel in filing a case.
G.R. No. 74917 (January 20, 1988) HELD:
FACTS: No. Under section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code, the provincial
fiscal shall represent the province and any municipality or municipal thereof
Respondent Bank filed a case against Petitioner Bank for reimbursement of
in any court. Furthermore, under section 3 of the Local Autonomy Act, the
P45,982.23 as a consequence of six crossed Manager’s checks which turned
municipal attorney shall act as legal counsel for the municipality and perform
out to have forged and/or unauthorized endorsements appearing at the back of
such duties and exercise such powers as may be assigned to them by the
each check. Philippine Clearing House Corp. (PCHC) ordered Petitioner Bank
council. The municipality’s interest would be best protected if the municipal
attorney handles its litigation. These laws are implemented as well so as not to
burden the municipality with the expense of hiring a private lawyer.
People v. Nazario
G.R. No. L-44143 (August 31, 1988)
FACTS:
Accused was charged with violating a municipal ordinance requiring him to
pay municipal taxes worth P362.52 as a fishpond operator in spite of repeated
demands. Sec. 1 Ordinance No. 4 Series of 1995 provides: “Any owner or
manager of fishponds in places within the territorial limits of Pagbilao,
Quezon, shall pay a municipal tax in the amount of P3.00 per hectare of
fishpond on part thereof per annum.” He admits to the non-payment of the
taxes but contends that the ordinance is unconstitutional, or assuming its
constitutionality that it does not apply to him as he is a lessee not an owner or
manager.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the ordinance is null and void because it is ambiguous and uncertain.
2. W/N the ordinance applies to Accused.
HELD:
No, the ordinance is constitutional. In no way, may the ordinance at bar be said
to be tainted with vagueness. It is unmistakable from the above provision that
the Accused falls within the coverage. As the actual operator of the fishponds,
he comes within the term “manager”. While it appears that the National
Government is the owner of the fishpond, the Government never shared in the
profits they generated. It is therefore, logical that Accused alone shoulders the
burden of the taxes under the ordinance. And obviously, the word owner
cannot be construed to include the Government because of the ancient
principle that the government is immune from taxes.
Manila Lodge No. 176 v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No.L-41001 and G.R. No.L-41012 (September 30, 1976)
FACTS:
The Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1306 which authorized the City
of Manila to reclaim a portion of Manila Bay. The reclaimed area was to form
part of the Luneta extension. The act provided that the reclaimed area shall be
the property of the City of Manila, and the city is authorized to set aside a tract
of the reclaimed land for a hotel site and to lease or to sell the same. Later, the
City of Manila conveyed a portion of the reclaimed area to Petitioner. Then
Petitioner sold the land, together with all the improvements, to the Tarlac
Development Corporation (TDC).
ISSUE:
W/N the subject property was patrimonial property of the City of Manila.
HELD:
The petitions were denied for lack of merit. The court found it necessary to
analyze all the provisions of Act No. 1360, as amended, in order to unravel the
legislative intent. The grant made by Act No. 1360 of the reclaimed land to the
City of Manila is a grant of a “public” nature. Such grants have always been
strictly construed against the grantee because it is a gratuitous donation of
public money or resources, which resulted in an unfair advantage to the
grantee. In the case at bar, the area reclaimed would be filled at the expense of
the Insular Government and without cost to the City of Manila. Hence, the
letter of the statute should be narrowed to exclude matters which, if included,
would defeat the policy of legislation.
Baranda v. Gustillo
G.R. No. L-81163 (September 26, 1988)
FACTS:
Both parties claim that they own a parcel of land, Lot No. 4517. The Court,
after discovering that private respondent’s TCT was fraudulently acquired,
ordered a writ of possession against them and issued a resolution denying with
finality a motion for reconsideration filed by Private Respondents. Another
group filed a separate civil case against Petitioners and applied for lis pendens
on the TCT of said lot, which the court found out to be privies of the Private
Respondents tasked to delay the implementation of the final decisions of the
Court.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the pendency of the appeal in subsequent civil case with the Court of
Appeals prevents the court from canceling the notice of lis pendens in the
certificate of titles of petitioners which were earlier declared valid and
subsisting by this Court.
2. What is the nature of the duty of the Register of Deeds to annotate or annul
the notice of lis pendens in a Torrens Certificate of Title?
HELD:
1. Respondent Judge abused his discretion in sustaining the Acting Register of
Deed’s stand. He forgot the 1st par of Sec. 77 of P.D. 1529 which provides:
Cancellation of lis pendens – “Before the final judgment, a notice of lis
pendens may be cancelled upon order of the Court after proper showing that
… it is necessary to protect the rights of those who caused it to be registered.
…”
2. Sec 10 of PD 1529 states that, “It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds
to immediately register an instrument presented for registration …. If the
instrument cannot be registered, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof
and inform the presenter of such denial in writing, stating the ground therefore,
and advising him of his rights to appeal by consulta.”
Tanada v. Tuvera
G.R. No. L-63915 (December 29, 1986)
FACTS:
Due process was invoked by the Petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a
number of Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been published as
required by law. The government argued that while publication was necessary
as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise provided” as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their
approval.
ISSUE:
W/N the clause “otherwise provided” in Article 2 of Civil Code pertains to the
necessity of publication.
HELD:
No, the clause “otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to
the requirement of publication per se, which cannot in any event be omitted.
Publication in full should be indispensable. Without such notice or publication,
there would be no basis for the application of the maxim “ignorantia Legis non
excusat”. The court, therefore, declares that presidential issuances of general
application which have not been published shall have no force and effect, and
the court ordered that the unpublished decrees be published in the Official
Gazette immediately.
Caltex (Phil.), Inc. v. Palomar
G.R. No. 19650 (September 29, 1966)
FACTS:
Petitioner conceived the “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest” where participants
have to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump can dispense
during a specific period of time. There was no fee or consideration required to
be paid, nor any purchase of any Caltex products to be made in order to join
the contest. Foreseeing the extensive use of mail for advertising and
communications, Caltex requested clearance for Respondent Postmaster
General but was denied citing said contest is a “gift enterprise” deemed as a
non-mailable matter under the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law.
Hence, Petitioner filed a petition for declaratory relief.
ISSUE:
W/N the “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest” falls under the term “gift enterprise”
which is banned by the Postal Law.
HELD:
No, said contest is not a gift enterprise. The word “lottery” is defined as a game
of chance where the elements of which are (1) consideration, (2) chance, and
(3) prize. The term “gift enterprise” and “scheme” in the provision of the Postal
Law making unmailable “any lottery, gift, enterprise, or scheme for the
distribution of money or any real or personal property by lot, chance, or
drawing of any kind” means such enterprise as will require consideration as an
element. The intent of the prohibition is to suppress the tendency to inflame
the gambling spirit and to corrupt public morals. There being no element of
consideration in said contest, the spirit of the law is preserved.
Mutuc vs. COMELEC
G.R. NO. L-32717November 26, 1970
FACTS:
The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) prohibited petitioner Amelito
Mutuc, a candidate for the position of a delegate to the Constitutional
Convention, from using “jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound
systems and loud speakers” on 22 October 1970. Petitioner impugned the
act of respondent as violates of his right to free speech. Respondent however
contended that the prohibition was premised on a provision of the
Constitutional Convention Act, which made it unlawful for candidates “to
purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral
propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature),
flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats,
matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin.” It was
its contention that the jingle proposed to be used by petitioner is the
recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore a tangible propaganda
material, under the phrase “and the like.”
ISSUE:
Whether “jingles” falls down on the prohibited electoral propaganda gadgets
of R.A. No. 6132.
RULING:
For respondent Commission, the last three words sufficed to justify such an
order. We view the matter differently. What was done cannot merit our
approval under the well-known principle of ejusdem generis, the general
words following any enumeration being applicable only to things of the same
kind or class as those specifically referred to. It is quite apparent that what was
contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to
as means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate
responsible for distribution.
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. Social Security Commission
G.R. No. L-15045 (January 20, 1961)
FACTS:
Petitioner filed with Respondent Commission a request that “Catholic
Charities, and all religious and charitable institutions and/or organizations,
which are directly or indirectly, wholly or partially, operated by the Roman
Archbishop of Manila” be exempted from compulsory coverage of RA 1161,
otherwise known as the Social Security Law of 1954. Petitioner contends that
the term “employer” as defined in the law should— following the principle of
ejusdem generis--- be limited to those who carry on “undertakings or activities
which have the element of profit or gain, or which are pursued for profit or
gain,” because the phrase “activity of any kind” in the definition is preceded
by the words “any trade, business, industry, undertaking.
ISSUE:
W/N the rule of ejusdem generis can be applied in this case.
HELD:
No. The rule of ejusdem generis applies only where there is uncertainty. It is
not controlling where the plain purpose and intent of the Legislature would
thereby be hindered and defeated. The definition of the term “employer” is
sufficiently comprehensive as to include religious and charitable institutions
or entities not organized for profit. This is made more evident by the fact that
it contains an exception in which said institutions or entities are not included.