Agra

RA 1199

Section 3. Agricultural Tenancy Defined. - Agricultural tenancy is the physical possession by

a person of land devoted to agriculture belonging to, or legally possessed by, another for the
purpose of production through the labor of the former and of the members of his immediate farm
household, in consideration of which the former agrees to share the harvest with the latter, or to
pay a price certain or ascertainable, either in produce or in money, or in both.

Section 5. Definitions of Terms. - As used in this Act:

(a) A tenant shall mean a person who, himself and with the aid available from within his
immediate farm household, cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed by, another, with
the latter's consent for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder
under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain or ascertainable
in produce or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system.

(b) A landholder shall mean a person, natural or juridical, who, either as owner, lessee,
usufructuary, or legal possessor, lets or grants to another the use or cultivation of his land for
a consideration either in shares under the share tenancy system, or a price certain or
ascertainable under the leasehold tenancy system.

CHAPTER I
AGRICULTURAL LEASEHOLD SYSTEM

Section 4. Abolition of Agricultural Share Tenancy - Agricultural share tenancy, as herein

defined, is hereby declared to be contrary to public policy and shall be abolished: Provided, That
existing share tenancy contracts may continue in force and effect in any region or locality, to be
governed in the meantime by the pertinent provisions of Republic Act Numbered Eleven
hundred and ninety-nine, as amended, until the end of the agricultural year when the National
Land Reform Council proclaims that all the government machineries and agencies in that region
or locality relating to leasehold envisioned in this Code are operating, unless such contracts
provide for a shorter period or the tenant sooner exercise his option to elect the leasehold
system: Provided, further, That in order not to jeopardize international commitments, lands
devoted to crops covered by marketing allotments shall be made the subject of a separate
proclamation that adequate provisions, such as the organization of cooperatives, marketing
agreements, or other similar workable arrangements, have been made to insure efficient
management on all matters requiring synchronization of the agricultural with the processing
phases of such crops: Provided, furthermore, That where the agricultural share tenancy contract
has ceased to be operative by virtue of this Code, or where such a tenancy contract has been
entered into in violation of the provisions of this Code and is, therefore, null and void, and the
tenant continues in possession of the land for cultivation, there shall be presumed to exist a
leasehold relationship under the provisions of this Code, without prejudice to the right of the
landowner and the former tenant to enter into any other lawful contract in relation to the land
formerly under tenancy contract, as long as in the interim the security of tenure of the former
tenant under Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred and ninety-nine, as amended, and as
provided in this Code, is not impaired: Provided, finally, That if a lawful leasehold tenancy
contract was entered into prior to the effectivity of this Code, the rights and obligations arising
therefrom shall continue to subsist until modified by the parties in accordance with the
provisions of this Code.

Section 5. Establishment of Agricultural Leasehold Relation - The agricultural leasehold relation

shall be established by operation of law in accordance with Section four of this Code and, in
other cases, either orally or in writing, expressly or impliedly.

Section 6. Parties to Agricultural Leasehold Relation - The agricultural leasehold relation shall
be limited to the person who furnishes the landholding, either as owner, civil law lessee,
usufructuary, or legal possessor, and the person who personally cultivates the same.

Section 7. Tenure of Agricultural Leasehold Relation - The agricultural leasehold relation once
established shall confer upon the agricultural lessee the right to continue working on the
landholding until such leasehold relation is extinguished. The agricultural lessee shall be entitled
to security of tenure on his landholding and cannot be ejected therefrom unless authorized by
the Court for causes herein provided.

Section 8. Extinguishment of Agricultural Leasehold Relation - The agricultural leasehold

relation established under this Code shall be extinguished by:

(1) Abandonment of the landholding without the knowledge of the agricultural lessor;

(2) Voluntary surrender of the landholding by the agricultural lessee, written notice of
which shall be served three months in advance; or

(3) Absence of the persons under Section nine to succeed to the lessee, in the event of
death or permanent incapacity of the lessee.

Section 9. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Death or Incapacity of the

Parties - In case of death or permanent incapacity of the agricultural lessee to work his
landholding, the leasehold shall continue between the agricultural lessor and the person who
can cultivate the landholding personally, chosen by the agricultural lessor within one month from
such death or permanent incapacity, from among the following: (a) the surviving spouse; (b) the
eldest direct descendant by consanguinity; or (c) the next eldest descendant or descendants in
the order of their age: Provided, That in case the death or permanent incapacity of the
agricultural lessee occurs during the agricultural year, such choice shall be exercised at the end
of that agricultural year: Provided, further, That in the event the agricultural lessor fails to
exercise his choice within the periods herein provided, the priority shall be in accordance with
the order herein established.

In case of death or permanent incapacity of the agricultural lessor, the leasehold shall bind his
legal heirs.

Section 10. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Expiration of Period, etc. - The
agricultural leasehold relation under this Code shall not be extinguished by mere expiration of
the term or period in a leasehold contract nor by the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal
possession of the landholding. In case the agricultural lessor sells, alienates or transfers the
legal possession of the landholding, the purchaser or transferee thereof shall be subrogated to
the rights and substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor.
Section 11. Lessee's Right of Pre-emption - In case the agricultural lessor decides to sell the
landholding, the agricultural lessee shall have the preferential right to buy the same under
reasonable terms and conditions: Provided, That the entire landholding offered for sale must be
pre-empted by the Land Authority if the landowner so desires, unless the majority of the lessees
object to such acquisition: Provided, further, That where there are two or more agricultural
lessees, each shall be entitled to said preferential right only to the extent of the area actually
cultivated by him. The right of pre-emption under this Section may be exercised within ninety
days from notice in writing which shall be served by the owner on all lessees affected.

Section 12. Lessee's Right of Redemption - In case the landholding is sold to a third person
without the knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter shall have the right to redeem the
same at a reasonable price and consideration: Provided, That the entire landholding sold must
be redeemed: Provided, further, That where these are two or more agricultural lessees, each
shall be entitled to said right of redemption only to the extent of the area actually cultivated by
him. The right of redemption under this Section may be exercised within two years from the
registration of the sale, and shall have priority over any other right of legal redemption.

Section 13. Affidavit Required in Sale of Land Subject to Right of Pre-emption - No deed of sale
of agricultural land under cultivation by an agricultural lessee or lessees shall be recorded in the
Registry of Property unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given the
written notice required in Section eleven of this Chapter or that the land is not worked by an
agricultural lessee.

Section 14. Right of Pre-emption and Redemption Not Applicable to Land to be Converted into
Residential, Industrial and Similar Purposes - The right of pre-emption and redemption granted
under Sections eleven and twelve of this Chapter cannot be exercised over landholdings
suitably located which the owner bought or holds for conversion into residential, commercial,
industrial or other similar non-agricultural purposes: Provided, however, That the conversion be
in good faith and is substantially carried out within one year from the date of sale. Should the
owner fail to comply with the above condition, the agricultural lessee shall have the right to
repurchase under reasonable terms and conditions said landholding from said owner within one
year after the aforementioned period for conversion has expired: Provided, however, That the
tenure of one year shall cease to run from the time the agricultural lessee petitions the Land
Authority to acquire the land under the provisions of paragraph 11 of Section fifty-one.

Section 15. Agricultural Leasehold Contract in General - The agricultural lessor and the
agricultural lessee shall be free to enter into any kind of terms, conditions or stipulations in a
leasehold contract, as long as they are not contrary to law, morals or public policy. A term,
condition or stipulation in an agricultural leasehold contract is considered contrary to law, morals
or public policy:

(1) If the agricultural lessee is required to pay a rental in excess of that which is
hereinafter provided for in this Chapter;

(2) If the agricultural lessee is required to pay a consideration in excess of the fair rental
value as defined herein, for the use of work animals and/or farm implements belonging
to the agricultural lessor or to any other person; or

(3) If it is imposed as a condition in the agricultural leasehold contract: (a) that the
agricultural lessee is required to rent work animals or to hire farm implements from the
 agricultural lessor or a third person, or to make use of any store or services operated by
the agricultural lessor or a third person; or (b) that the agricultural lessee is required to
perform any work or render any service other than his duties and obligations provided in
this Chapter with or without compensation; or (c) that the agricultural lessee is required
to answer for any fine, deductions and/or assessments.

Any contract by which the agricultural lessee is required to accept a loan or to make payment
therefor in kind shall also be contrary to law, morals or public policy.

Section 16. Nature and Continuity of Conditions of Leasehold Contract - In the absence of any
agreement as to the period, the terms and conditions of a leasehold contract shall continue until
modified by the parties: Provided, That in no case shall any modification of its terms and
conditions prejudice the right of the agricultural lessee to the security of his tenure on the
landholding: Provided, further, That in case of a contract with a period an agricultural lessor may
not, upon the expiration of the period increase the rental except in accordance with the
provisions of Section thirty-four.

Section 17. Form and Registration of Contract - Should the parties decide to reduce their
agreement into writing, the agricultural leasehold contract shall be drawn in quadruplicate in a
language or dialect known to the agricultural lessee and signed or thumb-marked both by the
agricultural lessee personally and by the agricultural lessor or his authorized representative,
before two witnesses, to be chosen by each party. If the agricultural lessee does not know how
to read, the contents of the document shall be read and explained to him by his witness. The
contracting parties shall acknowledge the execution of the contract before the justice of the
peace of the municipality where the land is situated. No fees or stamps of any kind shall be
required in the preparation and acknowledgment of the instrument. Each of the contracting
parties shall retain a copy of the contract. The justice of the peace shall cause the third copy to
be delivered to the municipal treasurer of the municipality where the land is located and the
fourth copy to the Office of the Agrarian Counsel.

Except in case of mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or fraud, an agricultural

contract reduced in writing and registered as hereinafter provided, shall be conclusive between
the contracting parties, if not denounced or impugned within thirty days after its registration.

Section 18. Registration of Leasehold Contract - The municipal treasurer shall, upon receipt of
his copy of the contract, require the agricultural lessee and agricultural lessor to present their
respective copies of the contract, and shall cause to be annotated thereon the date, time and
place of registration as well as its entry or registration number.

Section 19. Registry of Agricultural Leasehold Contracts - The Municipal Treasurer of the
municipality wherein the land is situated shall keep a record of all such contracts drawn and
executed within his jurisdiction, to be known as "Registry of Agricultural Leasehold Contracts".
He shall keep this registry together with a copy of each contract entered therein, and make
annotations on said registry of all subsequent acts relative to each contract, such as its renewal,
novation, cancellation, etc. No registration fees or documentary stamps shall be required in the
registration of said contracts or of any subsequent acts relative thereto.

Section 20. Memorandum of Loans - No obligation to pay money on account of loans including
interest thereon obtained by the agricultural lessee from the agricultural lessor or his
representative shall be enforceable unless the same or a memorandum thereof be in writing in a
language or dialect known to the agricultural lessee, and signed or thumb-marked by him, or by
his agent.

Section 21. Exemption from Lien and/or Execution - The following shall be exempt from lien
and/or execution against the agricultural lessee:

(1) Twenty-five per centum of the entire produce of the land under cultivation; and

(2) Work animals and farm implements belonging to the agricultural lessee: Provided,
That their value does not exceed one thousand pesos. But no article or species of
property mentioned in this Section shall be exempt from execution issued upon a
judgment recovered for its price or upon a judgment of foreclosure of a mortgage
thereon.

Section 22. Use of Accepted Standards of Weights and Measures - In all transactions entered
into between the agricultural lessee and the agricultural lessor concerning agricultural products
the official or, upon agreement of the parties, the accepted standards of weights and measures
shall be used.

Section 23. Rights of Agricultural Lessee in General - It shall be the right of the agricultural
lessee:

(1) To have possession and peaceful enjoyment of the land;

(2) To manage and work on the land in a manner and method of cultivation and harvest
which conform to proven farm practices;

(3) To mechanize all or any phase of his farm work; and

(4) To deal with millers and processors and attend to the issuance of quedans and
warehouse receipts for the produce due him.

Section 24. Right to a Home Lot - The agricultural lessee shall have the right to continue in the
exclusive possession and enjoyment of any home lot he may have occupied upon the effectivity
of this Code, which shall be considered as included in the leasehold.

Section 25. Right to be Indemnified for Labor - The agricultural lessee shall have the right to be
indemnified for the cost and expenses incurred in the cultivation, planting or harvesting and
other expenses incidental to the improvement of his crop in case he surrenders or abandons his
landholding for just cause or is ejected therefrom. In addition, he has the right to be indemnified
for one-half of the necessary and useful improvements made by him on the landholding:
Provided, That these improvements are tangible and have not yet lost their utility at the time of
surrender and/or abandonment of the landholding, at which time their value shall be determined
for the purpose of the indemnity for improvements.

Section 26. Obligations of the Lessee - It shall be the obligation of the agricultural lessee:
 (1) To cultivate and take care of the farm, growing crops, and other improvements on the
landholding as a good father of a family and perform all the work therein in accordance
with proven farm practices;

(2) To inform the agricultural lessor within a reasonable time of any trespass committed
by third persons upon the farm, without prejudice to his direct action against the
trespasser;

(3) To take reasonable care of the work animals and farm implements delivered to him
by the agricultural lessor and see that they are not used for purposes other than those
intended or used by another without the knowledge and consent of the agricultural
lessor: Provided, however, That if said work animals get lost or die, or said farm
implements get lost or are destroyed, through the negligence of the agricultural lessee,
he shall be held responsible and made answerable therefor to the extent of the value of
the work animals and/or farm implements at the time of the loss, death or destruction;

(4) To keep his farm and growing crops attended to during the work season. In case of
unjustified abandonment or neglect of his farm, any or all of his expected produce may,
upon order of the Court, be forfeited in favor of the agricultural lessor to the extent of the
damage caused thereby;

(5) To notify the agricultural lessor at least three days before the date of harvesting or,
whenever applicable, of threshing; and

(6) To pay the lease rental to the agricultural lessor when it falls due.

Section 27. Prohibitions to Agricultural Lessee - It shall be unlawful for the agricultural lessee:

(1) To contract to work additional landholdings belonging to a different agricultural lessor

or to acquire and personally cultivate an economic family-size farm, without the
knowledge and consent of the agricultural lessor with whom he had entered first into
household, if the first landholding is of sufficient size to make him and the members of
his immediate farm household fully occupied in its cultivation; or

(2) To employ a sub-lessee on his landholding: Provided, however, That in case of

illness or temporary incapacity he may employ laborers whose services on his
landholding shall be on his account.

Section 28. Termination of Leasehold by Agricultural Lessee During Agricultural Year - The
agricultural lessee may terminate the leasehold during the agricultural year for any of the
following causes:

(1) Cruel, inhuman or offensive, treatment of the agricultural lessee or any member of
his immediate farm household by the agricultural lessor or his representative with the
knowledge and consent of the lessor;

(2) Non-compliance on the part of the agricultural lessor with any of the obligations
imposed upon him by the provisions of this Code or by his contact with the agricultural
lessee;
 (3) Compulsion of the agricultural lessee or any member of his immediate farm
household by the agricultural lessor to do any work or render any service not in any way
connected with farm work or even without compulsion if no compensation is paid;

(4) Commission of a crime by the agricultural lessor or his representative against the
agricultural lessee or any member of his immediate farm household; or

(5) Voluntary surrender due to circumstances more advantageous to him and his family.

Section 29. Rights of the Agricultural Lessor - It shall be the right of the agricultural lessor:

(1) To inspect and observe the extent of compliance with the terms and conditions of
their contract and the provisions of this Chapter;

(2) To propose a change in the use of the landholding to other agricultural purposes, or
in the kind of crops to be planted: Provided, That in case of disagreement as to the
proposed change, the same shall be settled by the Court according to the best interest
of the parties concerned: Provided, further, That in no case shall an agricultural lessee
be ejected as a consequence of the conversion of the land to some other agricultural
purpose or because of a change in the crop to be planted;

(3) To require the agricultural lessee, taking into consideration his financial capacity and
the credit facilities available to him, to adopt in his farm proven farm practices necessary
to the conservation of the land, improvement of its fertility and increase of its
productivity: Provided, That in case of disagreement as to what proven farm practice the
lessee shall adopt, the same shall be settled by the Court according to the best interest
of the parties concerned; and

(4) To mortgage expected rentals.

Section 30. Obligations of the Agricultural Lessor - It shall be the obligation of the agricultural
lessor:

(1) To keep the agricultural lessee in peaceful possession and cultivation of his
landholding; and

(2) To keep intact such permanent useful improvements existing on the landholding at
the start of the leasehold relation as irrigation and drainage system and marketing
allotments, which in the case of sugar quotas shall refer both to domestic and export
quotas, provisions of existing laws to the contrary notwithstanding.

Section 31. Prohibitions to the Agricultural Lessor - It shall be unlawful for the agricultural
lessor:

(1) To dispossess the agricultural lessee of his landholding except upon authorization by
the Court under Section thirty-six. Should the agricultural lessee be dispossessed of his
landholding without authorization from the Court, the agricultural lessor shall be liable for
damages suffered by the agricultural lessee in addition to the fine or imprisonment
prescribed in this Code for unauthorized dispossession;
 (2) To require the agricultural lessee to assume, directly or indirectly, the payment of the
taxes or part thereof levied by the government on the landholding;

(3) To require the agricultural lessee to assume, directly or indirectly, any part of the rent,
"canon" or other consideration which the agricultural lessor is under obligation to pay to
third persons for the use of the land;

(4) To deal with millers or processors without written authorization of the lessee in cases
where the crop has to be sold in processed form before payment of the rental; or

(5) To discourage, directly or indirectly, the formation, maintenance or growth of unions

or organizations of agricultural lessees in his landholding, or to initiate, dominate, assist
or interfere in the formation or administration of any such union or organization.

Section 32. Cost of Irrigation System - The cost of construction of a permanent irrigation
system, including distributory canals, may be borne exclusively by the agricultural lessor who
shall be entitled to an increase in rental proportionate to the resultant increase in production:
Provided, That if the agricultural lessor refuses to bear the expenses of construction the
agricultural lessee or lessees may shoulder the same, in which case the former shall not be
entitled to an increase in rental and shall, upon the termination of the relationship, pay the
lessee or his heir the reasonable value of the improvement at the time of the termination:
Provided, further, That if the irrigation system constructed does not work, it shall not be
considered as an improvement within the meaning of this Section.

Section 33. Manner, Time and Place of Rental Payment - The consideration for the lease of the
land shall be paid in an amount certain in money or in produce, or both, payable at the place
agreed upon by the parties immediately after threshing or processing if the consideration is in
kind, or within a reasonable time thereafter, if not in kind.

In no case shall the agricultural lessor require the agricultural lessee to file a bond, make a
deposit or pay the rental in advance, in money or in kind or in both, but a special and
preferential lien is hereby created in favor of the agricultural lessor over such portion of the
gross harvest necessary for the payment of the rental due in his favor.

Section 34. Consideration for the Lease of Riceland and Lands Devoted to Other Crops - The
consideration for the lease of riceland and lands devoted to other crops shall not be more than
the equivalent of twenty-five per centum of the average normal harvest during the three
agricultural years immediately preceding the date the leasehold was established after deducting
the amount used for seeds and the cost of harvesting, threshing, loading, hauling and
processing, whichever are applicable: Provided, That if the land has been cultivated for a period
of less than three years, the initial consideration shall be based on the average normal harvest
during the preceding years when the land was actually cultivated, or on the harvest of the first
year in the case of newly-cultivated lands, if that harvest is normal: Provided, further, That after
the lapse of the first three normal harvests, the final consideration shall be based on the
average normal harvest during these three preceding agricultural years: Provided, furthermore,
That in the absence of any agreement between the parties as to the rental, the maximum
allowed herein shall apply: Provided, finally, That if capital improvements are introduced on the
farm not by the lessee to increase its productivity, the rental shall be increased proportionately
to the consequent increase in production due to said improvements. In case of disagreement,
the Court shall determine the reasonable increase in rental.
Section 35. Exemption from Leasehold of Other Kinds of Lands - Notwithstanding the
provisions of the preceding Sections, in the case of fishponds, saltbeds, and lands principally
planted to citrus, coconuts, cacao, coffee, durian, and other similar permanent trees at the time
of the approval of this Code, the consideration, as well as the tenancy system prevailing, shall
be governed by the provisions of Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred and ninety-nine, as
amended.

Section 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions - Notwithstanding any agreement as to the

period or future surrender, of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and
possession of his landholding except when his dispossession has been authorized by the Court
in a judgment that is final and executory if after due hearing it is shown that:

(1) The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of his immediate family will personally
cultivate the landholding or will convert the landholding, if suitably located, into
residential, factory, hospital or school site or other useful non-agricultural purposes:
Provided; That the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance compensation
equivalent to five years rental on his landholding in addition to his rights under Sections
twenty-five and thirty-four, except when the land owned and leased by the agricultural
lessor, is not more than five hectares, in which case instead of disturbance
compensation the lessee may be entitled to an advanced notice of at least one
agricultural year before ejectment proceedings are filed against him: Provided, further,
That should the landholder not cultivate the land himself for three years or fail to
substantially carry out such conversion within one year after the dispossession of the
tenant, it shall be presumed that he acted in bad faith and the tenant shall have the right
to demand possession of the land and recover damages for any loss incurred by him
because of said dispossessions.

(2) The agricultural lessee failed to substantially comply with any of the terms and
conditions of the contract or any of the provisions of this Code unless his failure is
caused by fortuitous event or force majeure;

(3) The agricultural lessee planted crops or used the landholding for a purpose other
than what had been previously agreed upon;

(4) The agricultural lessee failed to adopt proven farm practices as determined under
paragraph 3 of Section twenty-nine;

(5) The land or other substantial permanent improvement thereon is substantially

damaged or destroyed or has unreasonably deteriorated through the fault or negligence
of the agricultural lessee;

(6) The agricultural lessee does not pay the lease rental when it falls due: Provided, That
if the non-payment of the rental shall be due to crop failure to the extent of seventy-five
per centum as a result of a fortuitous event, the non-payment shall not be a ground for
dispossession, although the obligation to pay the rental due that particular crop is not
thereby extinguished; or

(7) The lessee employed a sub-lessee on his landholding in violation of the terms of
paragraph 2 of Section twenty-seven.
Section 37. Burden of Proof - The burden of proof to show the existence of a lawful cause for
the ejectment of an agricultural lessee shall rest upon the agricultural lessor.

Section 38. Statute of Limitations - An action to enforce any cause of action under this Code
shall be barred if not commenced within three years after such cause of action accrued.

G.R. No. 78214 Case Digest

G.R. No. 78214, December 5, 1988
Yolanda Caballes
vs Dept. Agrarian Reform, Hon. Heherson Alvarez and Bienvenido
Abajon
Ponente: Sarmiento

Facts:
The landholding subject of the controversy is consists of 60 sqm
was acquired by spouses Arturo and Yolanda Caballes by virute of
a Deed of Sale executed by Andrea Alicaba Millenes, this land is
situated in Lawaan Talisay, Cebu. Before the sale of the
property to Caballes, Bienvenido Abajon constructed his house on
a protion of the land, paying monthly rental to Andrea Millenes.
Abjon was likewise allowed to plant thereon, and they have
agreed that the produce thereon would be shred by them 50-50.

When the property was sold, Caballes told Abajon that they will
put up a poultry on the land and they intended to build it close
to Abajon's house and they pursuaded Abajon to transfer his
dwelling to the opposite portion of the land. Abajon offered to
pay renta; to the new owners, but they refuse and later demanded
for Abajon to vacate. Abajon refused to leave.

DAR concluded that Abajon was a tenant of the former owner,

Andrea.

Issue: Whether Abajon is a tenant under the new owners.

Ruling:
Abajon is not a tenant for it only occupied a miniscule portion
of the land which cannot be interpreted as economic-family size
farm under the definition of RA 3844.

The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are:

1. The parties are the landowner and the tenant;

2. The subject is agricultural land;
3. There is consent;
4. The purpose is agricultural production;
5. There is personal cultivation; and
6. There is sharing of harvests.

All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy

relationship between the parties. The absence of one does not
make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof,
or a planter thereon, a de jure tenant. This is so because
unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant,
he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by
the Land Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy
laws.

Therefore, the fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to

establish a tenancy relationship. Certainly, it is not unusual
for a landowner to accept some of the produce of his land from
someone who plants certain crops thereon. This is a typical and
laudable provinciano trait of sharing or patikim, a native way
of expressing gratitude for favor received. This, however, does
not automatically make the tiller-sharer a tenant thereof
especially when the area tilled is only 60, or even 500, square
meters and located in an urban area and in. the heart of an
industrial or commercial zone at that. Tenancy status arises
only if an occupant of a parcel of land has been given its
possession for the primary purpose of agricultural production.
The circumstances of this case indicate that the private
respondent's status is more of a caretaker who was allowed by
the owner out of benevolence or compassion to live in the
premises and to have a garden of some sort at its south western
side rather than a tenant of the said portion.

Anent the second assignment of error, the petitioner argues that

since Abajon, is not an agricultural tenant, the criminal case
for malicious mischief filed against him should be declared as
proper for trial so that proceedings in the lower court can
resume.

G.R. No. 70736 Case Digest

G.R. No. 70736, March 16, 1987
Bonifacio Hilario and Eduarda Buencamino Hilario
vs Hon. IAC and Salvador Baltazar
Ponente: Gutierrez

Facts:
January 1981, Salvador Baltazar filed a verified complaint with
Courts of Agrarian Relation-Bulacan alleging that since January
1955 he had been continuous possession as a share tenant of a
parcel of land in Bulacan which was previously owned by Socorro
Vda. de Balagtas. Thereafter, the spouses Hilario began to
threaten him to desist from entering and cultivating the land.

Baltazar claims that he became sa tenant of Socorro by virtue of

a kasunduan executed in 1979. After the death of Socorro, he
allegedly gave the share pertaining to the daughter of Socorro
Corazon Pengzon. It was only in December 1980 that Baltazar knew
that portion of the land was already owned by the Hilarios.

The Hilarios, aver that they acquired the land from the PNB
after it had been foreclosed. CAR ruled that the land in
question is not an agricultural land but a plain "bakuran".
Hence, Baltazar is not a tenant.

CA however remanded the case to the lower court for further

proceesings on the ground that the findings of CAR were not
supported by substantial evidence. In compliance, CAR admitted
additional evidence.

Again, CAR declared Baltazar as non-tenant. Baltazar appealed

with IAC, IAC set aside the decision of the CAR and entitling
Baltazar security of tenure on the land. Spouse Hilario then
petition for review.

Issue: Whether Baltazar is a tenant.

Ruling:

The evidence presented is more than sufficient to justify the

conclusion that Baltazar is not a tenant of the landholding. (a)
The kasunduan refers to 2-hectare land, while the landholding is
only 4000 sqm. (b) When Socorro died, no new contract was
executed. (c) Corazon did not receive any rental or share from
the produce of the land.

Corazon Pengson further explained that she did not receive any share from the produce of the
land from 1964 up to the filing of the case and she would not have accepted any share from the
produce of the land because she knew pretty well that she was no longer the owner of the lot
since 1974 when it was foreclosed by the bank and later on purchased by the spouses Hilarios.

We note the CAR's finding:

Tenancy relationship is indivisible. The two-hectare land subject of plaintiff's

alleged contract with Socorro Balagtas having been parcelled into seven (7) and
possession thereof relinquished/surrendered in 1965 results in the termination of
plaintiff's tenancy relationship with the previous owner/landholder. Such being the
case, he cannot now claim that the landholding in question consisting of 4,000
square meters, more or less, is being cultivated by him under the old contract.
 The owner thereof Corazon Pengson has no tenancy relationship with him
(plaintiff). (p. 25, Rollo)

From the foregoing, it is clear that Coraz•n Pengson did not give her consent to Baltazar to
work on her land consisting of only 1,740 square meters. We agree with the CAR when it said:

The law accords the landholder the right to initially choose his tenant to work on
his land. For this reason, tenancy relationship can only be created with the
consent of the true and lawful landholder through lawful means and not by
imposition or usurpation. So the mere cultivation of the land by usurper cannot
confer upon him any legal right to work the land as tenant and enjoy the
protection of security of tenure of the law (Spouses Tiongson v. Court of Appeals,
130 SCRA 482) (Ibid)

And in the case of Tuazon v. Court of Appeals (118 SCRA 484), this Court had the occasion to
explain:

xxx xxx xxx

... Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged
tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship. The intent of the parties,
the understanding when the farmer is installed, and, as in this case, their written
agreements, provided these are complied with and are not contrary to law, are
even more important."

G.R. No. 95318 June 11, 1991

LOURDES PEÑA QUA, assisted by her husband, JAMES QUA, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (SECOND DIVISION), CARMEN CARILLO, EDUARDO
CARILLO, JOSEPHINE CARILLO, REBECCA CARILLO, MARIA CEPRES, CECILIO
CEPRES and SALVADOR CARILLO, JR., respondents.

Brotamonte Law Office for petitioner.

Isabel E. Florin for private respondents

GANCAYCO, J.:

This case deals with the issue of whether or not private respondents possess the status of
agricultural tenants entitled to, among others, the use and possession of a home lot.

Respondent Court of Appeals,1 in denying due course to the petition for certiorari filed by
petitioner, stated the antecedents of this case in the lower courts as follows:

. . . [O]n July 17, 1986, petitioner Lourdes Peña Qua filed a complaint for ejectment with
damages against private respondents claiming that she is the owner of a parcel of
 residential land, Lot No. 2099 of the Malinao Cadastre, situated at Poblacion, Tinapi,
Malinao, Albay, with an area of 346 square meters, which is registered in her name
under TCT T-70368; that inside the land in question is an auto repair shop and three
houses, all owned by private respondents; and that said respondents' stay in the land
was by mere tolerance and they are in fact nothing but squatters who settled on the land
without any agreement between her (sic), paying no rents to her nor realty taxes to the
government.

In their answer, private respondent Carmen Carillo, surviving spouse of the late Salvador
Carillo (and [respectively the] mother and mother-in-law of the other [private]
respondents), alleged that the lot in question is a farm lot [home lot] because she and
her late husband were tenants of the same including the two other lots adjoining the lot
in question, Lots No. 2060 and 2446, which also belong to petitioner; that as tenants,
they could not just be ejected without cause; that it was not petitioner who instituted
them as tenants in the land in question but the former owner, Leovigildo Peña who
permitted the construction of the auto repair shop, the house of Carmen Carillo and the
other two houses.

After trial, the Municipal Court [found private respondents to be mere squatters and]
rendered judgment2ordering . . . [them] to vacate and remove their houses and [the] auto
repair shop from the lot in question and to pay the petitioner attorney's fees and a
monthly rental of P200.00.

On appeal to respondent [Regional Trial] Court, the judgment was modified by ordering
the case dismissed [insofar as] Carmen Carillo [was concerned being qualified as an
agricultural tenant and] declaring that the home lot and her house standing thereon
should be respected.3

Believing that even private respondent Carmen Carillo does not qualify as an agricultural tenant,
petitioner pursues her cause before this forum citing only one ground for the entertainment of
her petition, to wit:

THAT PUBLIC RESPONDENT [Court of Appeal] COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AND ACTED CONTRARY TO THE ADMITTED FACTS AND
APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE, AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION, FOR
DENYING DUE COURSE TO THE PETITIONER'S CRY FOR JUSTICE AND FOR
DISMISSING THE PETITION.4

The Court agrees and finds that respondent Court of Appeals committed a grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the petition for review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court, the
same being replete with inconsistencies and unfounded conclusions. Because of this
jurisdictional issue raised by petitioner, the Court hereby treats this petition as a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.5

The Regional Trial Court6 made the following observations:

The land in question is a measly three hundred forty six (346) square meters and
adjoining another two (2) lots which are separately titled having two thousand four
hundred thirteen (2,413) square meters and eight thousand two hundred ninety eight
(8,298) square meters –– the three (3) lots having a total area of eleven thousand fifty
 seven (11,057) square meters, more or less, or over a hectare of land owned by the
plaintiff or by her predecessors-in-interest.

In the 346 square meters lot stand (sic) four (4) structures, [to wit]: an auto repair shop, a
house of [private respondent] Carmen Carillo and two (2) other houses owned or
occupied by the rest of the [private respondents] . . .; in other words, the [private
respondents] almost converted the entire area as their home lot for their personal
aggrandizement, believing that they are all tenants of the [petitioner].

Claimed, the defendants planted five hundred (500) coconut trees and only fifty (50)
coconut trees survived in the land in question and/or in the entire area of the three lots.
Such an evidence (sic) is very untruthful, unless it is a seed bed for coconut trees as the
area is so limited. But found standing in the area in question or in the entire three (3) lots
are only seven (7) coconut trees, the harvest of which is [allegedly] 2/3 share for the
[petitioner] and the 1/3 share for the [private respondents]. The share, if ever there
was/were, could not even suffice [to pay] the amount of taxes of the land (sic) paid
religiously by the [petitioner] yearly.7 (Emphasis supplied.)

It is clear from the foregoing that the source of livelihood of private respondents is not derived
from the lots they are allegedly tenanting. This conclusion is further supported by private
respondent Carmen Carillo's assertion that the auto repair shop was constructed with the
consent of petitioner's predecessor-in-interest for whom her husband served as a driver-
mechanic.8

From private respondents' manner of caring for the lots, it is also apparent that making the same
agriculturally viable was not the main purpose of their occupancy, or else they should have
immediately replanted coconut trees in place of those that did not survive. Indeed, the location
of their auto repair shop being near the poblacion and along the highway, private respondents
chose to neglect the cultivation and propagation of coconuts, having earned, through the
automobile repair shop, more than enough not only for their livelihood but also for the
construction of two other dwelling houses thereon. It is also intimated by the Regional Trial
Court that there is no direct evidence to confirm that the parties herein observed the sharing
scheme allegedly set-up between private respondents and petitioner's predecessor-in-interest.

Notwithstanding the foregoing indicia of a non-agricultural tenancy relationship, however, the

Regional Trial Court decided in favor of private respondent Carmen Carillo and ruled, thus:

In View of the Foregoing, and Premises considered, the Court renders judgment:

1. Ordering defendants, namely: Eduardo Carillo, Josephine P. Carillo, Rebecca Carillo,

Maria Cepres, Cecilio Cepres and Salvador Carillo, Jr., to vacate and remove their two
(2) houses and the auto repair shop from the premises in question, and restoring the
area to the lawful owner, the herein plaintiff;

2. Ordering said six defendants to pay the plaintiff jointly and severally the amount of
Four Thousand (P4,000.00) Pesos as attorney's fees and litigation expenses;

3. Ordering said six defendants to pay plaintiff the sum of One Hundred Seventy One
Pesos and Thirty Six Centavos (P171.36) monthly, for the use of the area in question,
commencing July 17, 1986 the date the plaintiff filed this action in Court, up to the time
 the defendants vacate the area in question and restore the same to the plaintiff
peacefully.

4. And ordering said six (6) defendants to pay the costs proportionately.

The case against defendant, Carmen Carillon is hereby ordered DISMISSED. The home
lot and where her house stands is respected. And without pronouncement as to its costs
(sic).

IT IS SO ORDERED.9 (Emphasis supplied.)

Without explaining why, the Regional Trial Court chose not to believe the findings of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court and instead, adopted the recommendation of the Regional Director
for Region V, acting for the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, without making
separate findings and arriving at an independent conclusion as to the nature of the relationship
between the parties in this case. This is evident in the following excerpt of the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court:

The dispositive part of the Resolution of this Civil Case No. T-1317 for Ejectment with
Damages, Referral Case No. 880054 states and is quoted verbatim:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we are constrained to issue the following

resolutions:

1) Certifying this case as NOT PROPER FOR TRIAL in as far as the home lot
and house built thereon by the spouses Carmen Carillo (sic);

2) Advising the plaintiff to institute proper cause of action in as far as the auto
repair shop and the two (2) houses erected on her landholdings by the children of
tenant-farmer Salvador Carillo since they appear as not the lawful tenants thereat.

SO RESOLVED.

xxx xxx xxx

From the foregoing dispositive part of the resolution penned down by the Regional
Director, it defines and explains the status of each of the defendants.10

Time and again, the Court has ruled that, as regards relations between litigants in land cases,
the findings and conclusions of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, being preliminary in nature,
are not in any way binding on the trial courts11 which must endeavor to arrive at their own
independent conclusions.

Had the Regional Trial Court hearkened to this doctrine, proceeded to so conduct its own
investigation and examined the facts of this case, a contrary conclusion would have been
reached, and the findings of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, sustained, particularly when the
circumstances obtaining in this case are examined in the light of the essential requisites set by
law for the existence of a tenancy relationship, thus: (1) the parties are the landowner and the
tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) the purpose is agricultural production; and (4)
there is consideration.12 It is also understood that (5) there is consent to the tenant to work on
the land, that (6) there is personal cultivation by him and that the consideration consists of
sharing the harvest.13

It is contended by petitioner that the parcel of land occupied by private respondents, Lot No.
2099, with an area of only 346 square meters is residential in nature, being situated near
the poblacion of Malinao, Albay, and as evidenced by the tax declaration obtained by petitioner
to this effect. Indeed, the municipal trial court judge ordered the ejectment of the private
1âwphi 1

respondents on this basis. On the other hand, private respondents aver that the lot is
agricultural being bounded by two other agricultural lands planted to coconuts titled in the name
of petitioner and all three parcels being cultivated by them.

The Court is not prepared to affirm the residential status of the land merely on the basis of the
tax declaration, in the absence of further showing that all the requirements for conversion of the
use of land from agricultural to residential prevailing at the start of the controversy in this case
have been fully satisfied.14

Be that as it may and recognizing the consent to the presence of private respondents on the
property as given by petitioner's predecessor-in-interest, the situation obtaining in this case still
lacks, as discussed earlier, three of the afore-enumerated requisites, namely: agricultural
production, personal cultivation and sharing of harvests.

The Court reiterates the ruling in Tiongson v. Court of Appeals,15 that

All these requisites are necessary in order to create tenancy relationship between the
parties and the absence of one or more requisites do (sic) not make the alleged tenant
a de facto tenant as contradistinguished from a de jure tenant. This is so because unless
a person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of
tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under existing
tenancy laws.

Under the foregoing, private respondent Carmen Carillo is not entitled to be considered an
agricultural tenant. Therefore, she may be not allowed the use of a home lot, a privilege granted
by Section 35 of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended, in relation to Section 22 (3) of Republic
Act No. 1199, as amended,16 only to persons satisfying the qualifications of agricultural tenants
of coconut lands.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals is

hereby SET ASIDE and a new one is issued REINSTATING the decision of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Malinao-Tiwi, Albay, Fifth Judicial Region dated 19 August 1987. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur

G.R. No. L-44570 May 30, 1986

MANUEL GUERRERO and MARIA GUERRERO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and APOLINARIO BENITEZ, respondents.

A.D. Guerrero for petitioners.

Bureau of Legal Assistance for private respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Whether or not a tenancy relationship exists between the parties Manuel Guerrero, et al and
Apolinario Benitez, et al. as to determine their respective rights and obligations to one another is
the issue in this petition to review the decision of the then Court of Appeals, now the
Intermediate Appellate Court, which affirmed in toto the decision of the Court of Agrarian
Relations in CAR Case No. 6793-NE (SA-Q) '73, the dispositive portion of which reads:

In view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

(1) ordering defendants-spouses Manuel and Maria Guerrero to reinstate plaintiff

Apolinario Benitez to the 10-hectare portion of the 16-hectare coconut holding in
question, located at Bo. San Joaquin, Maria Aurora Sub-province Quezon and to
maintain said plaintiff in the peaceful possession and cultivation thereof, with all
the rights accorded and obligations imposed upon him by law;

(2) ordering defendants Paulino and Rogelio both surnamed Latigay to vacate
the said ten-hectare portion and deliver possession thereof to plaintiff Apolinario
Benitez;

(3) ordering defendants-spouses Manuel and Maria Guerrero to pay damages to

plaintiffs in the amount of P14,911.20 beginning from July, 1973 and to pay the
same amount every year thereafter until plaintiff is effectively reinstated to the
ten-hectare portion;

(4) denying plaintiff-tenants' prayer for reconstruction of the copra cottage: and

(5) ordering defendants-spouses Manuel and Maria Guerrero to pay plaintiff the
amount of P200.00 by way of litigation expenses.

All other claims of the parties are denied. With costs against defendants-spouses.

The petitioners adopt the respondent court's findings of fact excepting, however, to its
conclusion that tenancy relations exist between the petitioners and the respondents, thus:

In 1969, plaintiff Apolinario Benitez was taken by defendants- spouses Manuel

and Maria Guerrero to take care of their 60 heads of cows which were grazing
within their 21-hectare coconut plantation situated at Bo. San Joaquin, Maria
 Aurora, Subprovince of Aurora, Quezon. Plaintiff was allowed for that purpose to
put up a hut within the plantation where he and his family stayed. In addition to
attending to the cows, he was made to clean the already fruitbearing coconut
trees, burn dried leaves and grass and to do such other similar chores. During
harvest time which usually comes every three months, he was also made to pick
coconuts and gather the fallen ones from a 16-hectare portion of the 21-hectare
plantation. He had to husk and split the nuts and then process its meat into copra
in defendants' copra kiln. For his work related to the coconuts, he shared 1/3 of
the proceeds from the copra he processed and sold in the market. For attending
to the cows he was paid P500 a year.

Sometime in the early part of 1973, plaintiff was refrained from gathering nuts
from the 10-hectare portion of the 16-hectare part of the plantation from where he
used to gather nuts. He felt aggrieved by the acts of defendants and he brought
the matter to the attention of the Office of Special Unit in the Office of the
President in Malacanang, Manila. This led to an execution of an agreement, now
marked as Exh. D, whereby defendants agreed, among others, to let plaintiff
work on the 16-hectare portion of the plantation as tenant thereon and that their
relationship will be guided by the provisions of republic Act No. 1199. The
Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines.

Then in July, 1973, he was again refrained from gathering nuts from the 10-
hectare portion of the plantation with threats of bodily harm if he persists to
gather fruits therefrom. Defendant spouses, the Guerreros, then assigned
defendants Rogelio and Paulino Latigay to do the gathering of the nuts and the
processing thereof into copra. Defendants Guerreros also caused to be
demolished a part of the cottage where plaintiff and his family lived, thus, making
plaintiffs feel that they (defendants) meant business. Hence, this case for
reinstatement with damages.

The lower court formulated four (4) issues by which it was guided in the
resolution of the questions raised by the pleadings and evidence and we
pertinently quote as follows:

(1) whether or not plaintiff is the tenant on the coconut landholding in question
consisting of sixteen (16) hectares;

(2) In The affirmative, whether or not he was unlawfully dispossessed of ten (10)
hectare thereof;

(3) Whether or not the parties are entitled to actual and moral damages,
attorney's fees and litigation expenses.

This petition for review poses the following questions of law:

Whether or not with the passage of Presidential Decree 1038 only last October
21, 1976, Republic Act 6389 otherwise known as the Code of Agrarian Reforms
has repealed in their entirety the Agricultural Tenancy Act (Republic Act 1199)
 and the Agricultural Reform Code (Republic Act 3844) abrogating or nullifying
therefore all agricultural share tenancy agreements over all kinds of lands, as the
one involved in the case at bar-over coconut plantation-and hence, the complaint
below as well as the challenged decision by the courts below, based as they are
on such share tenancy agreements, have lost their validity cessante ratio legis,
cessat ipsa lex.

II

Assuming arguendo that said laws have not thus been repealed, is respondent
Benitez hereunder the undisputed fact of the case as found by the courts below a
share tenant within the purview of the said laws, i.e., Republic Acts 1199 and
3844, or a mere farmhand or farm worker as such relationship were extensively
discussed in Delos Reyes vs. Espinelli, 30 SCRA 574. (Copied verbatim from
Petition, p. 31- rollo)

Petitioner insists in this petition that Benitez was a mere farmhand or laborer who was
dismissed as an employee from the landholding in question and not ousted therefrom as tenant.
Whether a person is a tenant or not is basically a question of fact and the findings of the
respondent court and the trial court are, generally, entitled to respect and non-disturbance.

The law defines "agricultural tenancy" as the physical possession by a person of land devoted
to agriculture, belonging to or legally possessed by another for the purpose of production
through the labor of the former and of the members of his immediate farm household in
consideration of which the former agrees to share the harvest with the latter or to pay a price
certain or ascertainable, either in produce or in money, or in both (Section 3, Republic Act 1199,
The Agricultural tenancy Act, as amended.)

With petitioner reference to this case, "share tenancy" exists whenever two persons agree on a
joint undertaking for agricultural production wherein one party furnishes the land and the other
his labor, with either or both contributing any one or several of the items of production, the
tenant cultivating the land with the aid of labor available from members of his immediate farm
household, and the produce thereof to be divided between the landholder and the tenant in
proportion to their respective contributions (Sec. 4, RA 1199; Sec. 166(25) RA 3844, Agricultural
Land Reform Code).

In contrast, a farmhand or agricultural laborer is "any agricultural salary or piece worker but is
not limited to a farmworker of a particular farm employer unless this Code expressly provides
otherwise, and any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection
with, a current agrarian dispute or an unfair labor practice and who has not obtained a
substantially equivalent and regular employment" (Sec. 166(15) RA 3844, Agricultural Land
Reform Code).

The petitioners contend that the two courts below applied erroneous definitions of "tenancy"
found in repealed laws. They assert that the Agricultural Tenancy Act and the Agricultural Land
Reform Code have been superseded by the Code of Agrarian Reforms, Rep. Act 6389, which
the trial court and the Court of Appeals failed to cite and apply.
There is no question that the latest law on land and tenancy reforms seeks to abolish
agricultural share tenancy as the basic relationship governing farmers and landowners in the
country.

On August 8, 1963, Republic Act 3844 abolished and outlawed share tenancy and put in its
stead the agricultural leasehold system. On September 10, 1971, Republic Act 6389 amending
Republic Act 3844 declared share tenancy relationships as contrary to public policy. On the
basis of this national policy, the petitioner asserts that no cause of action exists in the case at
bar and the lower court's committed grave error in upholding the respondent's status as share
tenant in the petitioners' landholding.

The petitioners' arguments are regressive and, if followed, would turn back the advances in
agrarian reform law. The repeal of the Agricultural Tenancy Act and the Agricultural Land
Reform Code mark the movement not only towards the leasehold system but towards eventual
ownership of land by its tillers. The phasing out of share tenancy was never intended to mean a
reversion of tenants into mere farmhands or hired laborers with no tenurial rights whatsoever.

It is important to note that the Agricultural Tenancy Act (RA 1199) and the Agricultural Land
Reform Code (RA 3844) have not been entirely repealed by the Code of Agrarian Reform (RA
6389) even if the same have been substantially modified by the latter.

However, even assuming such an abrogation of the law, the rule that the repeal of a statute
defeats all actions pending under the repealed statute is a mere general principle. Among the
established exceptions are when vested rights are affected and obligations of contract are
impaired. (Aisporna vs. Court of Appeals, 108 SCRA 481).

The records establish the private respondents' status as agricultural tenants under the legal
definitions.

Respondent Benitez has physically possessed the landholding continuously from 1969 until he
was ejected from it. Such possession of longstanding is an essential distinction between a mere
agricultural laborer and a real tenant within the meaning of the tenancy law (Moreno, Philippine
Law Dictionary, 1972 Edition), a tenant being one who, has the temporary use and occupation
of land or tenements belonging to another (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Vol. II, p. 3254) for the
purpose of production (Sec. 3, Republic Act 1199; delos Reyes vs. Espinelli, 30 SCRA 574).
Respondent Benitez lives on the landholding. He built his house as an annex to the petitioner's
copra kiln. A hired laborer would not build his own house at his expense at the risk of losing the
same upon his dismissal or termination any time. Such conduct is more consistent with that of
an agricultural tenant who enjoys security of tenure under the law.

Cultivation is another important factor in determining the existence of tenancy relationships. It is

admitted that it had been one Conrado Caruruan, with others, who had originally cleared the
land in question and planted the coconut trees, with the respondent coming to work in the
landholding only after the same were already fruit bearing. The mere fact that it was not
respondent Benitez who had actually seeded the land does not mean that he is not a tenant of
the land. The definition of cultivation is not limited merely to the tilling, plowing or harrowing of
the land. It includes the promotion of growth and the care of the plants, or husbanding the
ground to forward the products of the earth by general industry. The raising of coconuts is a
unique agricultural enterprise. Unlike rice, the planting of coconut seedlings does not need
harrowing and plowing. Holes are merely dug on the ground of sufficient depth and distance, the
seedlings placed in the holes and the surface thereof covered by soil. Some coconut trees are
planted only every thirty to a hundred years. The major work in raising coconuts begins when
the coconut trees are already fruitbearing. Then it is cultivated by smudging or smoking the
plantation, taking care of the coconut trees, applying fertilizer, weeding and watering, thereby
increasing the produce. The fact that respondent Benitez, together with his family, handles all
phases of farmwork from clearing the landholding to the processing of copra, although at times
with the aid of hired laborers, thereby cultivating the land, shows that he is a tenant, not a mere
farm laborer. (delos Reyes vs. Espinelli, supra Marcelo vs. de Leon, 105 Phil. 1175).

Further indicating the existence of a tenancy relationship between petitioners and respondent is
their agreement to share the produce or harvest on a "tercio basis" that is, a 1/3 to 2/3 sharing
in favor of the petitioner-landowners. Though not a positive indication of the existence of
tenancy relations perse the sharing of harvest taken together with other factors characteristic of
tenancy shown to be present in the case at bar, strengthens the claim of respondent that indeed,
he is a tenant. The case of delos Reyes vs. Espinelli (supra) clearly explains the matter thus:

The agricultural laborer works for the employer, and for his labor he receives a
salary or wage, regardless of whether the employer makes a profit. On the other
hand, the share tenant par ticipates in the agricultural produce. His share is
necessarily dependent on the amount of harvest.

Hence, the lower court's computation of damages in favor of respondent based on the number
of normal harvests. In most cases, we have considered the system of sharing produce as
convincing evidence of tenancy relations.

The petitioners entered into an agreement on May 2, 1973 which in clear and categorical terms
establishes respondent as a tenant, to wit:

AGREEMENT

This agreement entered into by and between Manuel Guerrero hereinafter

referred to as the landowner and Apolinario Benitez hereinafter referred to as
tenant.

xxx xxx xxx

The petitioners, however, contend that the word "tenant" in the aforequoted agreement was
used to mean a hired laborer farm employee as understood agreed upon by the parties. The
fact that their relationship would be guided by the provisions of Republic Act 1199 or the
Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines militates against such an assertion. It would be an
absurdity for Republic Act 1199 to govern an employer-employee relationship. If as the
petitioners insist a meaning other than its general acceptation had been given the word "tenant",
the instrument should have so stated '. Aided by a lawyer, the petitioners, nor the respondent
could not be said to have misconstrued the same. In clear and categorical terms, the private
respondent appears to be nothing else but a tenant:

Finally, comes the admission by the petitioners' counsel of the respondent's status as tenant:

ATTY. ESTEBAN:
 Q You said you are living at San Joaquin, who cause the sowing
of the lumber you made as annex in the house?

ATTY. NALUNDASAN

Please remember that under the law, tenant is given the right to
live in the holding in question. We admit him as tenant.

xxxxxxxxx

(Apolinario Benitez on Redirect, TSN, June 25, 1974, pp. 4950).

The respondent's status as agricultural tenant should be without question.

Once a tenancy relationship is established, the tenant has the right to continue working until
such relationship is extinguished according to law.

The Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1954 (Republic Act 1199), the Agricultural Land Reform Code
of 1963 (Republic Act 3844), the Code of Agrarian Reforms (Republic Act 6389) and
Presidential Decree 1038 (Strengthening the Security of Tenure of Tenant Tillers in Non-
Rice/Corn Producing Agricultural Lands) all provide for the security of tenure of agricultural
tenants. Ejectment may be effected only for causes provided by law, to wit:

l) Violation or failure of the tenant to comply with any of the terms and conditions
of the tenancy contract or any of the provisions of the Agricultural Tenancy Act;

2) The tenant's failure to pay the agreed rental or to deliver the landholder's
share unless the tenant's failure is caused by a fortuitous event or force majeure;

3) Use by the tenant of the land for purposes other than that specified by the
agreement of the parties;

4) Failure of the tenant to follow proven farm practices:

5) Serious injury to the land caused by the negligence of the tenant;

6) Conviction by a competent court of a tenant or any member of his immediate

family or farm household of a crime against the landholder or a member of his
immediate family. (Section 50, Rep. Act 1199).

None of the above causes exists in the case at bar. The respondent has been unlawfully
deprived of his right to security of tenure and the Court of Agrarian Reforms did not err in
ordering the reinstatement of respondent as tenant and granting him damages therefor.

Before we close this case, it is pertinent to reiterate that the respondent's right as share tenant
do not end with the abolition of share tenancy. As the law seeks to "uplift the farmers from
poverty, ignorance and stagnation to make them dignified, self-reliant, strong and responsible
citizens ... active participants in nation-building", agricultural share tenants are given the right to
leasehold tenancy as a first step towards the ultimate status of owner-cultivator, a goal sought
to be achieved by the government program of land reform.

It is true that leasehold tenancy for coconut lands and sugar lands has not yet been
implemented. The policy makers of government are still studying the feasibility of its application
and the consequences of its implementation. Legislation still has to be enacted. Nonetheless,
wherever it may be implemented, the eventual goal of having strong and independent farmers
working on lands which they own remains. The petitioners' arguments which would use the
enactment of the Agrarian Reform Code as the basis for setting back or eliminating the tenurial
rights of the tenant have no merit.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the appellate court
is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.