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Family Code provisions on substitute parental authority of grandparents
Posted on March 5, 2016by Erineus
Articles 214 and 216 of the Family Code speak clearly of situations when grandparents can
exercise substitute parental authority over their grandchildren:
Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority
shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent. In case several survive, the one designated by
the court, taking into account the same consideration mentioned in the preceding article, shall
exercise the authority.
Art. 216. In default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the following person shall
exercise substitute parental authority over the child in the order indicated:
(1) The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art. 214;
(2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified; and
(3) The child’s actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified.
Whenever the appointment of a judicial guardian over the property of the child becomes
necessary, the same order of preference shall be observed.
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Custody, Family Code, Family Code provisions on substitute parental authority of
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Family Code provisions on parental authority

Articles 209 to 233 of the Family Code are the governing laws on parental authority. Below are
some articles relevant to our discussion:
Art. 209. Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over the person and property of their
unemancipated children, parental authority and responsibility shall include the caring for and
rearing them for civic consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental
and physical character and well-being.
Art. 210. Parental authority and responsibility may not be renounced or transferred except in the
cases authorized by law.
Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of
their common children. In case of disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail, unless there
is a judicial order to the contrary.
Children shall always observe respect and reverence towards their parents and are obliged to
obey them as long as the children are under parental authority.
Art. 212. In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall continue
exercising parental authority. The remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the
parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints another person to be the guardian
of the person or property of the children.
Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent
designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially
the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.
No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise.
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Custody, Family Code on parental authority | Leave a comment
What is a travel clearance for minors?

A travel clearance is a document issued by the DSWD to a Filipino child (below 18 years of age)
traveling abroad alone or with someone other than his/her parents.
WHO NEEDS A TRAVEL CLEARANCE? A minor traveling alone to a foreign country ; A

minor traveling to a foreign country accompanied by a person other than his or her parents.
WHO DOES NOT NEED TRAVEL CLEARANCE? All minors other than those cited above,
for example:
A minor traveling to a foreign country with either parent or with his or her solo parent or legal
guardian;
A minor traveling abroad whose parents are in the Foreign Service or living abroad or are
immigrants, provided he/she is holding a valid pass such as a dependents visa/pass/identification
card or permanent resident visa/pass/identification card which serves as proof that he/she is
living with parents abroad and their travel does not constitute child trafficking. – See more
at: http://www.dswd.gov.ph/faqs/travel-clearance-for-minors/#sthash.gTg2P4A3.dpuf
IS A MARRIED MINOR REQUIRED TO SECURE A TRAVEL CLEARANCE?
 A minor, regardless of civil status, who is traveling abroad alone or with person/s other than
his/her parent is required to secure a travel clearance.
WHAT ARE THE REQUIREMENTS IN SECURING A TRAVEL CLEARANCE?
A. For a minor traveling alone to a foreign country for the first time
1. Duly accomplished application form
2. Photocopy of the Birth Certificate OR the passport of the minor
3. A written consent of both parents or the solo parent or the legal guardian permitting the
minor to travel alone to a foreign country
4. As appropriate, a photocopy of the marriage certificate of the minor’s parents or a photocopy
of the certificate of legal guardianship of the minor or in the case of solo parents, a
photocopy of the solo parent identification card from the Municipal Social Welfare and
Development Office or a photocopy of a certification from the Local Social Welfare and
Development Office of being a solo parent or Tallaq or Faskh certification from the Shariah
court or any Muslim Barangay or religious leader or in the case of an illegitimate minor, a
certificate of no marriage (CENOMAR)* from the National Statistics Office (NSO) or in the
case of a deceased parent, a photocopy of the death certificate
*Issuance of CENOMAR will take 1-5 days for cases of uncommon
surnames and 1-15 days for common surnames.
* Issuing office of CENOMAR is the National Statistics Office not the Local Civil Registrar.
5. Two colored passport size photos of the minor taken within the last six (6) months
B. For a minor traveling for the first time with a person other than the parents or legal guardian
1. Duly accomplished application form

2. A photocopy of the birth certificate of minor
3. A written consent of both parents or the solo parent or the legal guardian permitting the
minor to travel to a foreign country with a specific person other than them
4. As appropriate, a photocopy of the marriage certificate of the minor’s parents or a certificate
of legal guardianship of the minor or in the case of solo parents, a solo parent identification
card from the Municipal Social Welfare and Development Office or a certification from the
Local Social Welfare and Development Office of being a solo parent or a court decree of
separation, annulment or divorce, or Tallaq or Fasakh certification from the Shariah court or
any muslim barangay or religious leader or in the case of an illegitimate minor, a certificate
of no marriage from the Philippine Statistics Office (formerly National Statistics Office or
NSO) in the case of a deceased parent, a photocopy of the death certificate
* Issuance of CENOMAR will take 1-5 days for cases of
uncommon surnames and 1-15 days for common surnames
*Issuing office of CENOMAR is the National Statistics Office not the Local Civil
Registrar
5. Two colored passport size photos of the minor taken within the last 6 months.
6. Photocopy of the passport of the traveling companion
“The social worker may require additional documentary requirements during the assessment
of the Travel Clearance application to make sure that no child shall be trafficked and that the
child’s best interest and welfare is ensured”
C. In case of illegitimate children who is traveling abroad accompanied by their biological father,
they are still required to secure a travel clearance certificate as parental authority is vested only
to the mother of the child, per Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
IS THERE A VALIDITY PERIOD FOR A TRAVEL CLEARANCE?
A DSWD travel clearance is valid for a period of one (1) year from the date of issuance and shall
be valid for multiple travels within the validity period, provided the conditions under which the
travel clearance was issued have not changed. If a change in condition occurs like a change in
traveling companion, a new travel clearance must be obtained.
HOW MUCH IS THE PROCESSING FEE FOR A TRAVEL CLEARANCE ISSUED TO

A MINOR?
The DSWD shall collect a processing fee for each travel clearance issued to minors traveling
abroad under the following options:
 Php 300.00 with validity of one (1) year.

 Php 600.00 with validity of two (2) years.
WHERE CAN ONE FILE THE APPLICATION?
The application for travel clearance, together with the supporting documents required shall be
submitted/filed at anyDSWD Field Office.
Application forms maybe obtained from any DSWD-Field Office or maybe downloaded from the
website http://www.dswd.gov.ph. [click here to download application form in MS Word Format]
 On the appointed date, go to the nearest DSWD Field (regional) office which processed your
application to submit the original copy of your supporting documents and pay PhP300.00 per
travel clearance certificate. The travel clearance certificate will be obtained thereafter.
– See more at: http://www.dswd.gov.ph/faqs/travel-clearance-for-
minors/#sthash.gTg2P4A3.dpuf
Other frequently asked questions:
CAN A TRAVEL CLEARANCE BE ISSUED TO ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN WHO

ARE STILL APPLYING FOR THEIR VISA IN THE EMBASSY?
Illegitimate children are under the custody of the mother. If they will be traveling with the
mother, they are not required to secure a travel clearance from the DSWD. If they are traveling
with person other than the mother, they must secure a travel clearance.
IS A FAXED COPY OF THE PARENTAL CONSENT OF PARENTS RESIDING

ABROAD ACCEPTABLE?
Yes, a faxed copy is acceptable. Likewise, a computer generated photo of minors and emailed
documents are acceptable.
WHAT ARE THE REQUIREMENTS FOR ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN ABANDONED

BY THE MOTHER AND UNDER THE CUSTODY OF THE FATHER OR OTHER
RELATIVES WHO WILL BE TRAVELING ALONE OR WITH THE FATHER OR
OTHER RELATIVES?
Since the mother has the absolute parental authority over her illegitimate children the father
would need to secure a Court Order vesting in him the parental authority over the illegitimate
children. If a parental authority has been granted to the father, and the minor will be traveling
with the father, he is not required to secure a travel clearance. If the minor will travel alone or
with someone other than the father, he/she is required to secure a travel clearance. – See more
at: http://www.dswd.gov.ph/faqs/travel-clearance-for-minors/#sthash.gTg2P4A3.dpuf
Posted in Child Custody, DSWD, Parental Authority, Travel Clearance | Tagged Child
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What is the reason behind the visitorial right of an illegitimate father over his children?
In Silva v. Court of Appeals,[34] the Court sustained the visitorial right of an illegitimate father
over his children in view of the constitutionally protected inherent and natural right of parents
over their children.[35] Even when the parents are estranged and their affection for each other is
lost, their attachment to and feeling for their offspring remain unchanged. Neither the law nor the
courts allow this affinity to suffer, absent any real, grave or imminent threat to the well-being of
the child.
See Briones vs Miguel, G.R. No. 156343. October 18, 2004
Posted in Child Custody, Family Code, Illegitimate Children, Question and Answers, Visitorial
Right | Tagged Child Custody, Illegitimate Father, Visitorial right of an illegitimate father over
his children | Leave a comment
Can Father of Illegitimate Child Obtain Custody when Mother is Abroad?

In one case (Briones vs. Miguel, GR 156343, Oct. 18, 2004), the Supreme Court upheld the
illegitimate child’s mother’s custody even when the mother was working in Japan and eventually
brought the child out of the country to live with her there.
True, there are exceptions to this rule but only when there are compelling reasons to deprive the
mother of custody like for examples: neglect or abandonment, unemployment, immorality,
habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction with a
communicable disease.
The Court does not agree to the idea that merely working abroad while entrusting the child to the
care of the maternal grandparents or other immediate family member is one of the grounds for
taking away custody from the mother. The Court does not also consider it as abandonment or
neglect as well.
Posted in Child Custody, Family Code, Parental Authority, Question and

Answers | Tagged Abandonment and Neglect, Can Father of Illegitimate Child Obtain Custody
when Mother is Abroad?, Child Custody, Family Code of the Philippines | Leave a comment
Can the Father Compel An Illegitimate Child To Use His Surname?

Republic Act 9255 allowing illegitimate children to use their father’s surnames opened the door
to illegitimate mothers and fathers eager to let their children bear the father’s surname just like
legitimate children.
The problem started when the implementing rules of RA 9255 made it mandatory for illegitimate
children to use their father’s surnames upon the execution and registration of the Affidavit
Allowing Children to Use the Surname of their Fathers (AUSF) and the paternity
acknowledgment appearing on the back portion of the birth certificate.
The main culprit is that RA 9255’s implementing rules used the word ‘shall’ instead of ‘may’ in
giving effect to the law allowing children to use their father’s surnames. Today, that conflict has
been resolved with the high court’s pronouncement that it was voiding that particular provision
in RA 9255’s implementing rules insofar as it provides for the mandatory use of the illegitimate
father’s surname. The Supreme Court reiterates that the illegitimate child has the choice of
surname by which they wish to be known. (Grande vs. Antonio, GR No. 206248, February 18,
2014)
Posted in Illegitimate Children, Question and Answers, RA 9255, Surname | Tagged Can the
Father Compel An Illegitimate Child To Use His Surname? | Leave a comment
What are the grounds for petition for guardianship?

When you think you have both the interest and the grounds you should file a petition for
guardianship under A.M. No. 03-02-05-SC Rule on Guardianship of Minors. This Rule
amended Rules 92 to 97 of the Rules of Court pertaining to guardianship. The essential
provisions of the Rule are:
Sec. 4. Grounds of petition. – The grounds for the appointment of a guardian over the person
or property, or both, of a minor are the following:
(a) death, continued absence, or incapacity of his parents;
(b) suspension, deprivation or termination of parental authority;
(c) remarriage of his surviving parent, if the latter Is found unsuitable to exercise parental
authority; or
(d) when the best interests of the minor so require.
Sec. 5. Qualifications of guardians. – In appointing a guardian, the court shall consider the
guardian’s:
(a) moral character;
(b) physical, mental and psychological condition;
(c) financial status;
(d) relationship of trust with the minor;
(e) availability to exercise the powers and duties of a guardian for the full period of the
guardianship;
(f) lack of conflict of interest with the minor; and
(g) ability to manage the property of the minor.

Sec. 6. Who may be appointed guardian of the person or property, or both, of a minor. –
In default of parents or a court-appointed guardian, the court may appoint a guardian of the
person or property, or both, of a minor, observing as far as practicable, the following order of
preference:
(a) the surviving grandparent and In case several grandparents survive, the court shall select
any of them taking Into account all relevant considerations;
(b) the oldest brother or sister of the minor over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or
disqualified;
(c) the actual custodian of the minor over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified;
and
(d) any other person, who in the sound discretion of the court, would serve the best interests of
the minor.
Posted in Child Custody, Family Code, Guardianship, Parental Authority, Question and
Answers | Tagged Child Custody, Family Code of the Phiippines, Guardianship over the person
and property of minors, Parental Authority | Leave a comment
For reneging on her promise to return aforesaid amount, she is guilty of conduct
unbecoming a public officer
We agree with the common finding of the Ombudsman and the CA that, in the aftermath of the
aborted transaction, petitioner still failed to return the amount she accepted. As aptly stated by
the Ombudsman, if petitioner was persistent in returning the amount of P50,000 until the
preliminary investigation of the estafa case on September 18, 2003,[28] there would have been
no need for the parties’ agreement that petitioner be given until February 28, 2003 to pay said
amount including interest. Indeed, petitioner’s belated attempt to return the amount was
intended to avoid possible sanctions and impelled solely by the filing of the estafacase against
her.
For reneging on her promise to return aforesaid amount, petitioner is guilty of conduct
unbecoming a public officer. In Joson v. Macapagal, we have also ruled that the respondents
therein were guilty of conduct unbecoming of government employees when they reneged on
their promise to have pertinent documents notarized and submitted to the Government Service
Insurance System after the complainant’s rights over the subject property were transferred to the
sister of one of the respondents.[29] Recently, in Assistant Special Prosecutor III Rohermia J.
Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Justices Gregory S. Ong, et al., we said that unbecoming conduct means
improper performance and applies to a broader range of transgressions of rules not only of social
behavior but of ethical practice or logical procedure or prescribed method.[30]
This Court has too often declared that any act that falls short of the exacting standards for
public office shall not be countenanced.[31] The Constitution categorically declares as follows:
SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.[32]
Petitioner should have complied with her promise to return the amount to respondent after failing
to accomplish the task she had willingly accepted. However, she waited until respondent sued
her for estafa, thus reinforcing the latter’s suspicion that petitioner misappropriated her
money. Although the element of deceit was not proven in the criminal case respondent filed
against the petitioner, it is clear that by her actuations, petitioner violated basic social and ethical
norms in her private dealings. Even if unrelated to her duties as a public officer, petitioner’s
transgression could erode the public’s trust in government employees, moreso because she holds
a high position in the service.
As to the penalty, we reprimanded the respondents in Joson and imposed a fine in Jamsani-
Rodriguez. Under the circumstances of this case, a fine of P15,000 in lieu of the three months
suspension is proper. In imposing said fine, we have considered as a mitigating circumstance
petitioner’s 37 years of public service and the fact that this is the first charge against
her.[33] Section 53[34] of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service provides that mitigating circumstances such as length of service shall be
considered. And since petitioner has earlier agreed to return the amount of P50,000 including
interest, we find it proper to order her to comply with said agreement. Eventually, the parties
may even find time to rekindle their friendship.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/178454.htm
Posted in Administrative Law, Civil Service Commision, Civil Service Law, Public
Official/Employees | Tagged For reneging on her promise to return aforesaid amount she is
guilty of conduct unbecoming a public officer | Leave a comment
Grounds for administrative disciplinary action

RULE X. GROUNDS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY ACTION
SECTION 1. In addition to the grounds for administrative disciplinary action prescribed under
existing laws, the acts and omissions of any official or employee, whether or not he holds office
or employment in a casual, temporary, hold-over, permanent or regular capacity, declared
unlawful or prohibited by the Code, shall constitute grounds for administrative disciplinary
action, and without prejudice to criminal and civil liabilities provided herein, such as:
(a) Directly or indirectly having financial and material interest in any transaction requiring the
approval of his office. x x x.
(b) Owning, controlling, managing or accepting employment as officer, employee, consultant,

counsel, broker, agent, trustee, or nominee in any private enterprise regulated, supervised or
licensed by his office, unless expressly allowed by law;
(c) Engaging in the private practice of his profession unless authorized by the Constitution, law
or regulation, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with his official
functions;
(d) Recommending any person to any position in a private enterprise which has a regular or
pending official transaction with his office, unless such recommendation or referral is mandated
by (1) law, or (2) international agreements, commitment and obligation, or as part of the
functions of his office;
xxxx
(e) Disclosing or misusing confidential or classified information officially known to him by
reason of his office and not made available to the public, to further his private interests or give
undue advantage to anyone, or to prejudice the public interest;
(f) Soliciting or accepting, directly or indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor, entertainment, loan or
anything of monetary value which in the course of his official duties or in connection with any
operation being regulated by, or any transaction which may be affected by the functions of, his
office. x x x.
xxxx
(g) Obtaining or using any statement filed under the Code for any purpose contrary to morals or
public policy or any commercial purpose other than by news and communications media for
dissemination to the general public;
(h) Unfair discrimination in rendering public service due to party affiliation or preference;
(i) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines and to the Filipino people;
(j) Failure to act promptly on letters and request within fifteen (15) days from receipt, except as
otherwise provided in these Rules;
(k) Failure to process documents and complete action on documents and papers within a
reasonable time from preparation thereof, except as otherwise provided in these Rules;
(l) Failure to attend to anyone who wants to avail himself of the services of the office, or to act
promptly and expeditiously on public personal transactions;
(m) Failure to file sworn statements of assets, liabilities and net worth, and disclosure of business
interests and financial connections; and
(n) Failure to resign from his position in the private business enterprise within thirty (30) days
from assumption of public office when conflict of interest arises, and/or failure to divest himself
of his shareholdings or interests in private business enterprise within sixty (60) days from such
assumption of public office when conflict of interest arises: Provided, however, that for those
who are already in the service and a conflict of interest arises, the official or employee must
either resign or divest himself of said interests within the periods herein-above provided,
reckoned from the date when the conflict of interest had arisen.
In Domingo v. Office of the Ombudsman,[20] this Court had the occasion to rule that failure
to abide by the norms of conduct under Section 4(A)(b) of R.A. No. 6713, in relation to its
implementing rules, is not a ground for disciplinary action, to wit:
The charge of violation of Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 deserves further comment. The
provision commands that “public officials and employees shall perform and discharge their
duties with the highest degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill.” Said
provision merely enunciates “professionalism as an ideal norm of conduct to be observed by
public servants, in addition to commitment to public interest, justness and sincerity, political
neutrality, responsiveness to the public, nationalism and patriotism, commitment to democracy
and simple living. Following this perspective, Rule V of the Implementing Rules of R.A. No.
6713 adopted by the Civil Service Commission mandates the grant of incentives and rewards to
officials and employees who demonstrate exemplary service and conduct based on their
observance of the norms of conduct laid down in Section 4. In other words, under the mandated
incentives and rewards system, officials and employees who comply with the high standard set
by law would be rewarded. Those who fail to do so cannot expect the same favorable
treatment. However, the Implementing Rules does not provide that they will have to be
sanctioned for failure to observe these norms of conduct. Indeed, Rule X of the
Implementing Rules affirms as grounds for administrative disciplinary action only acts
“declared unlawful or prohibited by the Code.” Rule X specifically mentions at least
twenty three (23) acts or omissions as grounds for administrative disciplinary
action. Failure to abide by the norms of conduct under Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 is not
one of them. (Emphasis supplied.)
Consequently, the Court dismissed the charge of violation of Section 4(A)(b) of R.A. No.
6713 in that case.
We find no compelling reason to depart from our pronouncement in Domingo. Thus, we

reverse the CA and Ombudsman that petitioner is administratively liable under Section 4(A)(b)
of R.A. No. 6713. In so ruling, we do no less and no more than apply the law and its
implementing rules issued by the CSC under the authority given to it by Congress. Needless to
stress, said rules partake the nature of a statute and are binding as if written in the law
itself. They have the force and effect of law and enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and
legality until they are set aside with finality in an appropriate case by a competent court.[21]
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Incentive and Rewards System for public officials

In addition to its directive under Section 4(B), Congress authorized[19] the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) to promulgate the rules and regulations necessary to implement R.A. No.
6713. Accordingly, the CSC issued the Rules Implementing the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees (hereafter, Implementing Rules). Rule V of the
Implementing Rules provides for an Incentive and Rewards System for public officials and
employees who have demonstrated exemplary service and conduct on the basis of their
observance of the norms of conduct laid down in Section 4 of R.A. No. 6713, to wit:
RULE V. INCENTIVES AND REWARDS SYSTEM
SECTION 1. Incentives and rewards shall be granted officials and employees who have
demonstrated exemplary service and conduct on the basis of their observance of the norms of
conduct laid down in Section 4 of the Code, namely:
(a) Commitment to public interest. – x x x

(b) Professionalism. – x x x
(c) Justness and sincerity. – x x x
(d) Political neutrality. – x x x
(e) Responsiveness to the public. – x x x
(f) Nationalism and patriotism. – x x x
(g) Commitment to democracy. – x x x
(h) Simple living. – x x x
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Norms of Conduct of Public Officials and Employees

We quote the full text of Section 4 of R.A. No. 6713:
SEC. 4. Norms of Conduct of Public Officials and Employees. – (A) Every public official and
employee shall observe the following as standards of personal conduct in the discharge and
execution of official duties:
(a) Commitment to public interest. – Public officials and employees shall always uphold the
public interest over and above personal interest. All government resources and powers of their
respective offices must be employed and used efficiently, effectively, honestly and economically,
particularly to avoid wastage in public funds and revenues.
(b) Professionalism. – Public officials and employees shall perform and discharge their duties
with the highest degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill. They shall enter
public service with utmost devotion and dedication to duty. They shall endeavor to discourage
wrong perceptions of their roles as dispensers or peddlers of undue patronage.
(c) Justness and sincerity. – Public officials and employees shall remain true to the people at all
times. They must act with justness and sincerity and shall not discriminate against anyone,
especially the poor and the underprivileged. They shall at all times respect the rights of others,
and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy,
public order, public safety and public interest. They shall not dispense or extend undue favors on
account of their office to their relatives whether by consanguinity or affinity except with respect
to appointments of such relatives to positions considered strictly confidential or as members of
their personal staff whose terms are coterminous with theirs.
(d) Political neutrality. – Public officials and employees shall provide service to everyone
without unfair discrimination and regardless of party affiliation or preference.
(e) Responsiveness to the public. – Public officials and employees shall extend prompt,
courteous, and adequate service to the public. Unless otherwise provided by law or when
required by the public interest, public officials and employees shall provide information on their
policies and procedures in clear and understandable language, ensure openness of information,
public consultations and hearings whenever appropriate, encourage suggestions, simplify and
systematize policy, rules and procedures, avoid red tape and develop an understanding and
appreciation of the socioeconomic conditions prevailing in the country, especially in the
depressed rural and urban areas.
(f) Nationalism and patriotism. – Public officials and employees shall at all times be loyal to the
Republic and to the Filipino people, promote the use of locally-produced goods, resources and
technology and encourage appreciation and pride of country and people. They shall endeavor to
maintain and defend Philippine sovereignty against foreign intrusion.
(g) Commitment to democracy. – Public officials and employees shall commit themselves to the
democratic way of life and values, maintain the principle of public accountability, and manifest
by deed the supremacy of civilian authority over the military. They shall at all times uphold the
Constitution and put loyalty to country above loyalty to persons or party.
(h) Simple living. – Public officials and employees and their families shall lead modest lives
appropriate to their positions and income. They shall not indulge in extravagant or ostentatious
display of wealth in any form.
(B) The Civil Service Commission shall adopt positive measures to promote (1) observance of
these standards including the dissemination of information programs and workshops authorizing
merit increases beyond regular progression steps, to a limited number of employees recognized
by their office colleagues to be outstanding in their observance of ethical standards; and (2)
continuing research and experimentation on measures which provide positive motivation to
public officials and employees in raising the general level of observance of these standards.
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Employees | Leave a comment
administrative cases may proceed independently of criminal proceedings, and may

continue despite the dismissal of the criminal charges
On the second issue, it is wrong for petitioner to say that since the estafa case against her was
dismissed, she cannot be found administratively liable. It is settled that administrative cases may
proceed independently of criminal proceedings, and may continue despite the dismissal of the
criminal charges.[17]
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criminal proceedings and may continue despite the dismissal of the criminal charges | Leave a
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Does the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over respondent’s complaint against petitioner
although the act complained of involves a private deal between them
On the first issue, we agree with the CA that the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over respondent’s
complaint against petitioner although the act complained of involves a private deal between
them.[12] Section 13(1),[13] Article XI of the 1987 Constitution states that the Ombudsman can
investigate on its own or on complaint by any person any act or omission of any public official
or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, or improper. Under Section
16[14] of R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the jurisdiction of
the Ombudsman encompasses all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance
committed by any public officer or employee during his/her tenure. Section 19[15] of R.A. No.
6770 also states that the Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not limited, to acts
or omissions which are unfair or irregular. Thus, even if the complaint concerns an act of the
public official or employee which is not service-connected, the case is within the jurisdiction of
the Ombudsman. The law does not qualify the nature of the illegal act or omission of the public
official or employee that the Ombudsman may investigate. It does not require that the act or
omission be related to or be connected with or arise from the performance of official duty. Since
the law does not distinguish, neither should we.[16]
Posted in Jurisdiction, Ombudsman, Question and Answers | Tagged Does the Ombudsman has
jurisdiction over respondent’s complaint against petitioner although the act complained of
involves a private deal between them | Leave a comment
Legal researher is liable under Rule IV, Section 52 (A) 20 for conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service in view of her act of offering her services for facilitation of the
land transfer papers at the BIR
In her motion, Hernando repleads the assertions in her memorandum and prays that a more
severe penalty should be imposed on Bengson. According to her, respondent being a court
employee she had no business offering her services for facilitation of the land transfer papers at
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). Such actuation is “conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service,” and thus should be punished for such act pursuant to the ruling in Largo v.
CA.[2] In addition, she prays that the amount of P76,000.00 that was given to respondent should
be considered as a “just debt” and, therefore, she should be made to answer for the same from
her salary.[3]
In her Comment, Bengson counters that she merely accommodated the request for help from
Hernando’s own daughter. She insists that she had no interest whatsoever in the facilitation of
the said land transfer papers.[4]
The Court stands pat in its earlier holding that:
In the present case, the OCA (Office of the Court Administrator) found, and we agree, that
Bengson’s complicity in the failed titling of the property eyed by Hernando was manifest.
Based on the trial judge’s investigation and that of the OCA, Bengson offered to help Hernando
find a surveyor for a fee, and she was the very same one who directly received the money
intended for the titling of the property. To Hernando’s dismay, Villacorte did not turn out to be
the ‘expert’ that she was made to believe. To our mind, it was the very misrepresentation that
precipitated the transaction that eventually defrauded Hernando. Complainant would not have
parted with her hard-earned money were it not for Bengson’s misrepresentation with respect to
Villacorte’s capacity to facilitate the titling of the property. Respondent cannot extricate herself
by claiming that she had no direct participation in the negotiations.[5]
This is buttressed by the report of the investigating judge, Executive Judge Teodoro A.
Bay (Judge Bay). Although Judge Bay did opine in his report that the above transaction was
purely private in character and that there was no showing that respondent took advantage of her
position as legal researcher of the court, he did conclude:
x x x. The respondent, therefore, insofar as the complainant was concerned, was the person
responsible for the package contract for which reason all communication from the Hernandos
were directed to her. Moreover, respondent acknowledged to have received after repeated
calls/demands from the complainant.[6]
The above finding is likewise affirmed by the OCA. Through then Court Administrator and now
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, Justice Jose P. Perez, it made the following observation:
In the instant case, the participation of respondent Bengson, in the failed titling of the property
being eyed by the family of the complainant, cannot be denied. From the facts ascertained by the
investigating judge, it was respondent who offered to help the complainant find a surveyor, in
exchange for a fee. It was also established in the investigation that respondent directly received
money from the complainant. To aggravate the situation, the surveyor, Maritess Villacorte,
whom respondent recommended, did not turn out to be the ‘expert’ complainant had expected.
Complainant would not have parted with her hard-earned money, if not for the assurances she
received from the respondent. The ‘seed’ of the fraudulent transaction would not have been
‘planted’ if respondent did not offer her ‘services’ in the first place.[7]
The complicity of Bengson was very apparent. During the hearing before Judge Bay, she
admitted that it was she together with her husband who went to see Hernando at the latter’s
residence sometime in September 2002 in order to “explain” the package for facilitation of the
land transfer papers of the subject property at the BIR.[8] Certainly, no disinterested or
uninvolved person would go so far as to pay a visit to someone whom she had not met before
just to relay the package contract allegedly offered by her half-sister and niece, unless she herself
was very much involved in it or, at the least, would benefit from the arrangement.
Bengson also admitted that when she went to Hernando’s residence for the second time, she was
accompanied by her half-sister and niece purportedly to explain and reduce the package contract
cost from P100,000.00 to 70,000.00. In the meeting, payment was agreed to be paid through her
(Bengson).[9] Later in her testimony, Bengson admitted having received the amount
of P70,000.00 from Hernando in the presence of her half-sister and niece.[10]
While Bengson claimed that she immediately turned over the full amount to her half-sister and
her niece at the time that they were still at Hernando’s residence, the receipt covering the amount
was only issued when she allegedly chanced upon them at McDonald’s in April of the following
year. The Court is of the considered view that it is nothing but a desperate attempt on the part of
Bengson to distance herself from the deal made with Hernando.
Thus, the Court is not ready to depart from its original finding with respect to the complicity of
Bengson in the wrongdoing against Hernando. What remains to be resolved now in this motion
for reconsideration is whether Bengson should be held liable for Simple Misconduct or for
“Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service?”
In resolving this issue, a review of the Court’s disposition in the case of Largo v. CA[11] is
instructive. In that case, it was explained that an administrative offense constitutes “misconduct”
when it has a direct relation to, and is connected with, the performance of the official duties of
the one charged.
x x x. By uniform legal definition, it is a misconduct such as affects his performance of his duties
as an officer and not such only as affects his character as a private individual. In such cases, it
has been said at all times, it is necessary to separate the character of the man from the character
of the officer, x x x. It is settled that misconduct, misfeasance, or malfeasance warranting
removal from office of an officer must have direct relation to and be connected with the
performance of official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional
neglect and failure to discharge the duties of the office, x x x.[12]
Thus, misconduct refers to a transgression of an established and definite rule of action, more
specifically, some unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer charged.[13]
It must be noted however that in this case, no proof was offered to show that Largo’s actions
being complained of were related to, or performed by him in taking advantage of, his position.
His actions did not have any direct relation to or connection with the performance of his official
duties. Hence, it was concluded that Largo acted in his private capacity, and thus, could not be
made liable for misconduct.[14] But, considering that Largo’s questioned conduct tarnished the
image and integrity of his public office, he was still held liable for conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service. The basis for his liability was found in Republic Act No. 6713 (R.A.
6713) or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. The
Code, particularly Section 4 (c) thereof, commands that public officials and employees shall at
all times respect the rights of others, and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to public safety
and public interest. Largo’s actuations fell short of this standard.[15]
Similarly, applying the same standard to the present case, the Court agrees with the position
taken by Hernando – that Bengson should be liable under Rule IV, Section 52 (A) 20 for conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service in view of her act of offering her services for
facilitation of the land transfer papers at the BIR and representing that her half-sister and niece
had the power, influence and capacity to facilitate the titling of subject property.
Following the standard set forth in R.A. No. 6713, Bengson should not have offered the so called
package contract and asked for a considerable amount from Hernando knowing that her half-
sister and niece were neither
geodetic engineers nor employees of the BIR knowledgeable in the preparation of the necessary
papers and documents for the titling of the subject property. Certainly, this misrepresentation on
the part of Bengson begrimed both the image and integrity of her office.
At this point, the Court would like to once again underscore that the conduct of every court
personnel must be beyond reproach and free from suspicion that may cause to sully the image of
the judiciary. They must totally avoid any impression of impropriety, misdeed or misdemeanor
not only in the performance of their official duties but also in conducting themselves outside or
beyond the duties and functions of their office. Every court personnel are enjoined to conduct
themselves toward maintaining the prestige and integrity of the judiciary for the very image of
the latter is necessarily mirrored in their conduct, both official and otherwise. They must not
forget that they are an integral part of that organ of the government sacredly tasked in dispensing
justice. Their conduct and behavior, therefore, should not only be circumscribed with the heavy
burden of responsibility but at all times be defined by propriety and decorum, and above all else
beyond any suspicion.[16]
With Bengson’s complicity in the scam or fraud against Hernando, she is undeniably guilty of
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service which is punishable by suspension for six
(6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense pursuant to Section 52 A (20) of
the Uniform Rules of the Civil Service Commission (CSC).
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/P-09-2686.htm
Posted in Judicial and Legal Ethics | Tagged Legal researher is liable under Rule IV Section 52
(A) 20 for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service in view of her act of offering her
services for facilitation of the land transfer | 1 Comment
Can the employee be ordered by the court to return the money, thus, making the court a
collecting agent?
As regards Hernando’s prayer that Bengson be ordered to return the money in the amount
of P76,000.00, the Court resolves to reconsider its earlier disposition. While Courts should
refrain from becoming a collection agent, it cannot simply shy away from setting right those that
are evidently or obviously improper acts or conducts among its personnel, and instead,
order them to do what is but proper and just.[17] In this case, what is right and just under the
circumstances is to order the respondent to pay her obligation to the private complainant. In the
case of Villaseñor v. de Leon,[18] it was written:
Truly, this Court is not a collection agency for faltering debtors. Hence, in a disciplinary
proceeding, we cannot adjudicate on the existence and amount of the loan if such facts are
disputed by the parties.10 At the same time, it is not proper in these proceedings to issue writs of
execution or order the levy of respondent’s properties, including her salaries to satisfy the
indebtedness. For, the purpose of an administrative proceeding is to protect public service and
maintain its dignity based on the time-honored principle that a public office is a public trust.
Evidently, disciplinary cases involve no private interest and afford no redress for private
grievance, as they are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. The complainant
or the person who calls the attention of the court to the alleged misconduct is in no sense a party,
and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper
management of justice.
Consistent with the realm of an administrative case, we are dutybound to correct whatever we
perceive as an improper conduct among court employees by ordering them to do what is proper
in the premises. In the instant case, therefore, we direct respondent to pay her indebtedness to
complainant, i.e., inclusive of principal and interest agreed upon, in accordance with their
agreement, if any, or within a reasonable time from receipt of this Decision. A violation of this
order could become the basis of another administrative charge for a second offense of “willful
failure to pay just debts” punishable by suspension of one (1) to thirty (30) days, among other
serious charges arising from a willful violation of a lawful order of this Court. With this
command, we hope that respondent will stay away from such misdeed and shun a subsequent
offense of the same nature, or any other offense for that matter.
The payment of respondent’s debt is in addition to the penalty of reprimand with warning that
commission of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely. This ruling
should suffice to accomplish the purpose of disciplining an erring court employee to whom a
passage in the Book of Proverbs must have a reverberating significance, “A single reprimand
does more for a man of intelligence than a hundred lashes for a fool.”
Considering that Bengson, in her comment on Hernando’s motion for reconsideration offered to
restitute the said amount without admitting guilt but only to buy peace; that her complicity in the
so called package contract remains; that he did admit having received the amount of P70,000.00
during her testimony before the investigating judge, the Court now resolves and orders the
restitution of the said amount of P76,000.00 plus legal interest starting from the year 2003.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/P-09-2686.htm
Posted in Judicial and Legal Ethics | Tagged Can the employee be ordered by the court to return
the money thus making the court a collecting agent? | Leave a comment
Even if not all the details are identical, as long as the general appearance of the two
products are such that any ordinary purchaser would be deceived, the imitator should be
liable for trademark infringement
A perusal of the motions submitted by petitioner and petitioner-intervenor would show that the
primary issue posed by them dwells on the issue of whether or not respondent is guilty of
trademark infringement.
After a thorough review of the arguments raised herein, this Court reconsiders its earlier
decision.
The basic law on trademark, infringement, and unfair competition is Republic Act (R.A.) No.
8293. Specifically, Section 155 of R.A. No. 8293 states:
Remedies; Infringement. — Any person who shall, without the consent of the owner of the
registered mark:
155.1. Use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a
registered mark or the same container or a dominant feature thereof in connection with the
sale, offering for sale, distribution, advertising of any goods or services including other
preparatory steps necessary to carry out the sale of any goods or services on or in
connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive; or
155.2. Reproduce, counterfeit, copy or colorably imitate a registered mark or a dominant
feature thereof and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation to labels,
signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended to be used in commerce
upon or in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or
services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive, shall be liable in a civil action for infringement by the registrant for the
remedies hereinafter set forth: Provided, That the infringement takes place at the moment any of
the acts stated in Subsection 155.1 or this subsection are committed regardless of whether there
is actual sale of goods or services using the infringing material.[15]
The essential element of infringement under R.A. No. 8293 is that the infringing mark is
likely to cause confusion. In determining similarity and likelihood of confusion, jurisprudence
has developed tests the Dominancy Test and the Holistic or Totality Test. The Dominancy
Test focuses on the similarity of the prevalent or dominant features of the competing trademarks
that might cause confusion, mistake, and deception in the mind of the purchasing public.
Duplication or imitation is not necessary; neither is it required that the mark sought to be
registered suggests an effort to imitate. Given more consideration are the aural and visual
impressions created by the marks on the buyers of goods, giving little weight to factors like
prices, quality, sales outlets, and market segments.[16]
In contrast, the Holistic or Totality Test necessitates a consideration of the entirety of the marks
as applied to the products, including the labels and packaging, in determining confusing
similarity. The discerning eye of the observer must focus not only on the predominant words, but
also on the other features appearing on both labels so that the observer may draw conclusion on
whether one is confusingly similar to the other.[17]
Relative to the question on confusion of marks and trade names, jurisprudence has noted two (2)
types of confusion, viz.: (1) confusion of goods (product confusion), where the ordinarily prudent
purchaser would be induced to purchase one product in the belief that he was purchasing the
other; and (2) confusion of business (source or origin confusion), where, although the goods of
the parties are different, the product, the mark of which registration is applied for by one party, is
such as might reasonably be assumed to originate with the registrant of an earlier product, and
the public would then be deceived either into that belief or into the belief that there is some
connection between the two parties, though inexistent.[18]
Applying the Dominancy Test to the case at bar, this Court finds that the use of the stylized “S”
by respondent in its Strong rubber shoes infringes on the mark already registered by petitioner
with the IPO. While it is undisputed that petitioner’s stylized “S” is within an oval design, to this
Court’s mind, the dominant feature of the trademark is the stylized “S,” as it is precisely the
stylized “S” which catches the eye of the purchaser. Thus, even if respondent did not use an oval
design, the mere fact that it used the same stylized “S”, the same being the dominant feature of
petitioner’s trademark, already constitutes infringement under the Dominancy Test.
This Court cannot agree with the observation of the CA that the use of the letter “S” could hardly
be considered as highly identifiable to the products of petitioner alone. The CA even supported
its conclusion by stating that the letter “S” has been used in so many existing trademarks, the
most popular of which is the trademark “S” enclosed by an inverted triangle, which the CA says
is identifiable to Superman. Such reasoning, however, misses the entire point, which is that
respondent had used a stylized “S,” which is the same stylized “S” which petitioner has a
registered trademark for. The letter “S” used in the Superman logo, on the other hand, has a
block-like tip on the upper portion and a round elongated tip on the lower portion. Accordingly,
the comparison made by the CA of the letter “S” used in the Superman trademark with
petitioner’s stylized “S” is not appropriate to the case at bar.
Furthermore, respondent did not simply use the letter “S,” but it appears to this Court that based
on the font and the size of the lettering, the stylized “S” utilized by respondent is the very same
stylized “S” used by petitioner; a stylized “S” which is unique and distinguishes petitioner’s
trademark. Indubitably, the likelihood of confusion is present as purchasers will associate the
respondent’s use of the stylized “S” as having been authorized by petitioner or that respondent’s
product is connected with petitioner’s business.
Both the RTC and the CA applied the Holistic Test in ruling that respondent had not infringed
petitioner’s trademark. For its part, the RTC noted the following supposed dissimilarities
between the shoes, to wit:
1. The mark “S” found in Strong Shoes is not enclosed in an “oval design.”
2. The word “Strong” is conspicuously placed at the backside and insoles.
3. The hang tags and labels attached to the shoes bears the word “Strong” for respondent and
“SkechersU.S.A.” for private complainant;
4. Strong shoes are modestly priced compared to the costs of Skechers Shoes.[19]
While there may be dissimilarities between the appearances of the shoes, to this Court’s mind
such dissimilarities do not outweigh the stark and blatant similarities in their general features. As
can be readily observed by simply comparing petitioner’s Energy[20] model and respondent’s
Strong[21] rubber shoes, respondent also used the color scheme of blue, white and gray utilized
by petitioner. Even the design and “wavelike” pattern of the midsole and outer sole of
respondent’s shoes are very similar to petitioner’s shoes, if not exact patterns thereof. At the side
of the midsole near the heel of both shoes are two elongated designs in practically the same
location. Even the outer soles of both shoes have the same number of ridges, five at the back and
six in front. On the side of respondent’s shoes, near the upper part, appears the stylized “S,”
placed in the exact location as that of the stylized “S” on petitioner’s shoes. On top of the
“tongue” of both shoes appears the stylized “S” in practically the same location and size.
Moreover, at the back of petitioner’s shoes, near the heel counter, appears “Skechers Sport Trail”
written in white lettering. However, on respondent’s shoes appears “Strong Sport Trail”
noticeably written in the same white lettering, font size, direction and orientation as that of
petitioner’s shoes. On top of the heel collar of petitioner’s shoes are two grayish-white semi-
transparent circles. Not surprisingly, respondent’s shoes also have two grayish-white semi-
transparent circles in the exact same location.
Based on the foregoing, this Court is at a loss as to how the RTC and the CA, in applying the
holistic test, ruled that there was no colorable imitation, when it cannot be any more clear and
apparent to this Court that there is colorable imitation. The dissimilarities between the shoes are
too trifling and frivolous that it is indubitable that respondent’s products will cause confusion
and mistake in the eyes of the public. Respondent’s shoes may not be an exact replica of
petitioner’s shoes, but the features and overall design are so similar and alike that confusion is
highly likely.
In Converse Rubber Corporation v. Jacinto Rubber & Plastic Co., Inc.,[22] this Court, in a case
for unfair competition, had opined that even if not all the details are identical, as long as the
general appearance of the two products are such that any ordinary purchaser would be deceived,
the imitator should be liable, to wit:
From said examination, We find the shoes manufactured by defendants to contain, as found by
the trial court, practically all the features of those of the plaintiff Converse Rubber Corporation
and manufactured, sold or marketed by plaintiff Edwardson Manufacturing Corporation, except
for their respective brands, of course. We fully agree with the trial court that “the respective
designs, shapes, the colors of the ankle patches, the bands, the toe patch and the soles of the two
products are exactly the same … (such that) at a distance of a few meters, it is impossible to
distinguish “Custombuilt” from “Chuck Taylor.” These elements are more than sufficient to
serve as basis for a charge of unfair competition. Even if not all the details just mentioned were
identical, with the general appearances alone of the two products, any ordinary, or even perhaps
even a not too perceptive and discriminating customer could be deceived, and, therefore,
Custombuilt could easily be passed off for Chuck Taylor. Jurisprudence supports the view that
under such circumstances, the imitator must be held liable. x x x[23]
Neither can the difference in price be a complete defense in trademark infringement.
In McDonald’s Corporation v. L.C. Big Mak Burger. Inc.,[24] this Court held:
Modern law recognizes that the protection to which the owner of a trademark is entitled is not
limited to guarding his goods or business from actual market competition with identical or
similar products of the parties, but extends to all cases in which the use by a junior appropriator
of a trade-mark or trade-name is likely to lead to a confusion of source, as where prospective
purchasers would be misled into thinking that the complaining party has extended his business
into the field (see 148 ALR 56 et seq; 53 Am. Jur. 576) or is in any way connected with the
activities of the infringer; or when it forestalls the normal potential expansion of his business (v.
148 ALR 77, 84; 52 Am. Jur. 576, 577). x x x[25]
Indeed, the registered trademark owner may use its mark on the same or similar products, in
different segments of the market, and at different price levels depending on variations of the
products for specific segments of the market.[26] The purchasing public might be mistaken in
thinking that petitioner had ventured into a lower market segment such that it is not
inconceivable for the public to think that Strong or Strong Sport Trail might be associated or
connected with petitioner’s brand, which scenario is plausible especially since both petitioner
and respondent manufacture rubber shoes.
Withal, the protection of trademarks as intellectual property is intended not only to preserve the
goodwill and reputation of the business established on the goods bearing the mark through actual
use over a period of time, but also to safeguard the public as consumers against confusion on
these goods.[27] While respondent’s shoes contain some dissimilarities with petitioner’s shoes,
this Court cannot close its eye to the fact that for all intents and purpose, respondent had
deliberately attempted to copy petitioner’s mark and overall design and features of the shoes. Let
it be remembered, that defendants in cases of infringement do not normally copy but only make
colorable changes.[28] The most successful form of copying is to employ enough points of
similarity to confuse the public, with enough points of difference to confuse the courts.[29]
Posted in Intellectual Property, IPO, Trademark | Tagged Even if not all the details are identical
as long as the general appearance of the two products are such that any ordinary purchaser would
be deceived the imitator should be liable for trademark infri | Leave a comment
When will the State’s cloak of invincibility against suit and liability be shredded
On the issue regarding the state immunity doctrine, the Commissioner cannot escape liability for
the lost shipment of goods. This was clearly discussed in the UNIMEX Micro-Electronics
GmBH decision, where the Court wrote:
Finally, petitioner argues that a money judgment or any charge against the government requires a
corresponding appropriation and cannot be decreed by mere judicial order.
Although it may be gainsaid that the satisfaction of respondent’s demand will ultimately fall on
the government, and that, under the political doctrine of “state immunity,” it cannot be held
liable for governmental acts (jus imperii), we still hold that petitioner cannot escape its liability.
The circumstances of this case warrant its exclusion from the purview of the state immunity
doctrine.
As previously discussed, the Court cannot turn a blind eye to BOC’s ineptitude and gross
negligence in the safekeeping of respondent’s goods. We are not likewise unaware of its
lackadaisical attitude in failing to provide a cogent explanation on the goods’
disappearance, considering that they were in its custody and that they were in fact the
subject of litigation. The situation does not allow us to reject respondent’s claim on the
mere invocation of the doctrine of state immunity. Succinctly, the doctrine must be fairly
observed and the State should not avail itself of this prerogative to take undue advantage of
parties that may have legitimate claims against it.
In Department of Health v. C.V. Canchela & Associates, we enunciated that this Court, as the
staunch guardian of the people’s rights and welfare, cannot sanction an injustice so patent in its
face, and allow itself to be an instrument in the perpetration thereof. Over time, courts have
recognized with almost pedantic adherence that what is inconvenient and contrary to reason is
not allowed in law. Justice and equity now demand that the State’s cloak of invincibility against
suit and liability be shredded.
Accordingly, we agree with the lower courts’ directive that, upon payment of the necessary
customs duties by respondent, petitioner’s “payment shall be taken from the sale or sales of
goods or properties seized or forfeited by the Bureau of Customs.”
WHEREFORE, the assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 75359 and
75366 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. PetitionerRepublicof the Philippines,
represented by the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, upon payment of the necessary
customs duties by respondent Unimex Micro-Electronics GmBH, is hereby ordered to pay
respondent the value of the subject shipment in the amount of Euro 669,982.565. Petitioner’s
liability may be paid in Philippine currency, computed at the exchange rate prevailing at the
time of actual payment.
SO ORDERED.[14] [Emphases supplied]
In line with the ruling in UNIMEX Micro-Electronics GmBH, the Commissioner of Customs
should pay AGFHA the value of the subject lost shipment in the amount of US$160,348.08
which liability may be paid in Philippine currency computed at the exchange rate prevailing at
the time of the actual payment.
Posted in BOC, CTA, Question and Answers, Sovereign Immunity | Tagged When will the
State's cloak of invincibility against suit and liability be shredded | Leave a comment
Is any individual or corporate entity entitled to recover the value of its lost shipment based
on the acquisition cost at the time of payment
The Court agrees with the ruling of the CTA that AGFHA is entitled to recover the value of its
lost shipment based on the acquisition cost at the time of payment.
In the case of C.F. Sharp and Co., Inc. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. the Court ruled that the
rate of exchange for the conversion in the peso equivalent should be the prevailing rate at the
time of payment:
In ruling that the applicable conversion rate of petitioner’s liability is the rate at the time of
payment, the Court of Appeals cited the case of Zagala v. Jimenez, interpreting the provisions of
Republic Act No. 529, as amended by R.A. No. 4100. Under this law, stipulations on the
satisfaction of obligations in foreign currency are void. Payments of monetary obligations,
subject to certain exceptions, shall be discharged in the currency which is the legal tender in the
Philippines. But since R.A. No. 529 does not provide for the rate of exchange for the payment of
foreign currency obligations incurred after its enactment, the Court held in a number of cases
that the rate of exchange for the conversion in the peso equivalent should be the prevailing
rate at the time of payment.[12] [Emphases supplied]
Likewise, in the case of Republic of the Philippines represented by the Commissioner of
Customs v. UNIMEX Micro-Electronics GmBH,[13] which involved the seizure and detention of
a shipment of computer game items which disappeared while in the custody of the Bureau of
Customs, the Court upheld the decision of the CA holding that petitioner’s liability may be paid
in Philippine currency, computed at the exchange rate prevailing at the time of actual payment.
Posted in BOC, CTA | Tagged Is any individual or corporate entity entitled to recover the value
of its lost shipment based on the acquisition cost at the time of payment | Leave a comment
The glaring absence of maliciousness in the assailed portion of the news article subject of
this case negates the existence of probable cause that libel has been committed by
the accused
Libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or
imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to discredit or cause
the dishonor or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is
dead.[22] Consequently, the following elements constitute libel: (a) imputation of a discreditable
act or condition to another; (b) publication of the imputation; (c) identity of the person defamed;
and, (d) existence of malice.[23] The glaring absence of maliciousness in the assailed portion of
the news article subject of this case negates the existence of probable cause that libel has been
committed by the PDI staff.
As previously stated, Judge Cruz initiated the complaint for libel, asserting the falsity and
maliciousness of the statement in a news report that “(a)ccording to Mendoza, Cruz still has a
pending case of sexual harassment filed with the Supreme Court by Fiscal Maria Lourdes Garcia,
also of the Makati RTC.”[24] It can be easily discerned that the article merely reported the
statement of Mendoza that there was allegedly a pending case of sexual harassment against
Judge Cruz and that said article did not report the existence of the alleged sexual harassment suit
as a confirmed fact. Judge Cruz never alleged, much less proved, that Mendoza did not utter
such statement. Nevertheless, Judge Cruz concludes that there was malice on the part of the PDI
Staff by asserting that they did not check the facts. He claimed that the report got its facts
wrong, pointing to a certification from the Deputy Court Administrator attesting to the pendency
of only two administrative cases against him, both of which bear captions not mentioning sexual
harassment.
A newspaper should not be held to account to a point of suppression for honest mistakes, or
imperfection in the choice of words.[25] While, indeed, the allegation of inappropriate sexual
advances in an appeal of a contempt ruling does not turn such case into one for sexual
harassment, we agree with petitioners’ proposition that the subject news article’s author, not
having any legal training, cannot be expected to make the fine distinction between a sexual
harassment suit and a suit where there was an allegation of sexual harassment. In fact, three
other newspapers reporting the same incident committed the same mistake: the Manila Times
article was headlined “Judge in sex case now in physical injury rap”;[26] the Philippine Star
article described Judge Cruz as “(a) Makati judge who was previously charged with sexual
harassment by a lady prosecutor”;[27] and the Manila Standard Article referred to him as “(a)
Makati judge who was reportedly charged with sexual harassment by a lady fiscal.”[28]
The questioned portion of the news article, while unfortunately not quite accurate, on its own, is
insufficient to establish the element of malice in libel cases. We have held that malice connotes
ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely to injure the reputation of the
person defamed, and implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm.[29] Malice is
present when it is shown that the author of the libelous remarks made such remarks with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity thereof.[30]
The lack of malice on the part of the PDI Staff in the quoting of Mendoza’s allegation of a sexual
harassment suit is furthermore patent in the tenor of the article: it was a straightforward
narration, without any comment from the reporter, of the alleged mauling incident involving
Judge Cruz. The subject article was, in fact, replete with other allegations by Mendoza of
purported misconduct on the part of Judge Cruz. Except for the above-quoted statement, Judge
Cruz did not find the other assertions by Mendoza as reported by the PDI article to be libelous:
At around 2 p.m., Mendoza said, an employee at Cruz’s court fetched him to the judge’s
chamber.
He was walking along the corridor when Cruz looked out, saw him, and yelled,
“Mendoza, halika nga rito (come here).”
“He dragged me to his chamber and locked the door. Tatlo kami doon, kasama ang sheriff niya
na si Nory Santos,” Mendoza said.
Inside, Mendoza said Cruz began taunting him, asking him, “Matigas ba ang dibdib mo, ha? (Do
you have a strong chest?)” Mendoza said, (h)e was made to sit in a guest’s chair in front of
Cruz’s desk. He recalled seeing placed on top of a side table a .99mm and a .45 caliber pistol
which he presumed to belong to the judge.
While standing, Mendoza said the judge began punching him, at the same time subjecting him to
verbal abuse. The first punch was at the left side of his chest, the second at the right. The third
was at his left knee, then last was at the right knee, Mendoza said.
His right knee was still swollen as of yesterday.
“Hinamon pa niya ako, square daw kami,” he said. “At hindi daw niya ako titigilan at
ipapatanggal pa daw niya ako (He even dared me to a fight. He threatened me that he would not
stop until I am fired from my job),” Mendoza said.
“Kung anak pa daw niya ang nakalaban ko, babarilin na lang daw niya ako sa sentido at
babayaran na lang ako (He said if it was his son with whom I quarreled, he would have simply
put a bullet to my head and paid for my life).”[31]
In Borjal v. Court of Appeals,[32] we held that “[a] newspaper especially one national in reach
and coverage, should be free to report on events and developments in which the public has a
legitimate interest with minimum fear of being hauled to court by one group or another on
criminal or civil charges for libel, so long as the newspaper respects and keeps within the
standards of morality and civility prevailing within the general community.”[33] Like fair
commentaries on matters of public interest,[34] fair reports on the same should thus be included
under the protective mantle of privileged communications, and should not be subjected to
microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity.[35] The concept of privileged
communication is implicit in the constitutionally protected freedom of the press,[36] which
would be threatened when criminal suits are unscrupulously leveled by persons wishing to
silence the media on account of unfounded claims of inaccuracies in news reports.
Posted in Definitions, Freedom of the Press, Libel, Privileged Communications, Probable
Cause, Quotations | Leave a comment
Definition and elements of libel

and, (d) existence of malice.[23]
Posted in Definitions, Libel | Tagged Definition and elements of libel | Leave a comment
The acts of a quasi-judicial officer like DOJ Secretary may be assailed by the aggrieved
party via a petition for certiorari and enjoined
On March 3, 2000, then Secretary of Justice Artemio Tuquero (Secretary Tuquero) dismissed the
PDI Staff’s Petition for Review of the Resolution of the City Prosecutor.[11] Secretary Tuquero
rejected the argument of therein petitioners that the complaint should be dismissed on the ground
of lack of supporting affidavits from third persons. According to Secretary Tuquero, affidavits
of third persons are not essential for a libel complaint to prosper, as it is enough that the person
defamed can be identified.[12] As regards the factual basis presented by Contreras, Secretary
Tuquero noted it cannot be said that Judge Cruz was indeed facing a sexual harassment suit in
this Court.[13] The Motion for Reconsideration[14] was denied in a Resolution[15] dated
October 12, 2000.
The PDI Staff with the exception of Hidalgo (herein petitioners) filed a Petition
for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals to challenge the aforementioned Resolutions of
Secretary Tuquero. The Petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 62479.
On July 8, 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision dismissing the Petition
for Certiorari. Applying our ruling in Advincula v. Court of Appeals,[16] the appellate
court held that since the Information had already been filed with the trial court, the primary
determination of probable cause is now with the latter.[17] The Court of Appeals denied the
ensuing Motion for Reconsideration in the assailed Resolution dated September 29, 2005.
Hence, petitioners filed this Petition for Review with this Court, raising the following
issues:
(A) WHETHER OR NOT A CRIMINAL COMPLAINT FOR LIBEL IS FATALLY

DEFECTIVE OR DEFICIENT IF IT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY AFFIDAVITS OF THIRD
PERSONS.
(B) WHETHER OR NOT A NEWS REPORT ON THE ACTUATIONS OF A PUBLIC

OFFICIAL IS PRIVILEGED IN NATURE AND HENCE, THE PRESUMPTION OF MALICE
IS DESTROYED.
(C) WHETHER OR NOT THE PRIVILEGED NATURE OF A PUBLICATION IS A

GROUND FOR DISMISSAL AND THAT THE RESPONDENT NEED NOT WAIT UNTIL
TRIAL TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF PRIVILEGE.
(D) WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLISHER AND EDITORS ARE JOINTLY LIABLE
WITH THE AUTHOR OF THE ALLEGEDLY OFFENDING NEWS REPORT EVEN IF
THEY DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE WRITING AND EDITING OF SAID NEWS
REPORT.[18]
In raising the above issues, petitioners essentially questioned the Makati City Prosecutors
Office’s finding of probable cause to charge them with libel, as affirmed by the Secretary of
Justice. As stated above, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition for Certiorari by applying
the procedural doctrine laid down in Advincula.
Similar to the present case, in Advincula, respondents Amando and Isagani Ocampo filed a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the Court of Appeals questioning the Resolution of
the Secretary of Justice which had earlier led to the filing of Informations against them in
court. The Court of Appeals granted the Petition and set aside the Resolution of the Secretary of
Justice. In reversing the Decision of the Court of Appeals, we applied the rule that certiorari,
being an extraordinary writ, cannot be resorted to when other remedies are available. The Court
observed that respondents had other remedies available to them, such as the filing of a Motion to
Quash the Information under Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, or allowing the trial to proceed
where they could either file a demurrer to evidence or present their evidence to disprove the
charges against them.[19]
At the outset, it should be made clear that the Court is not abandoning the foregoing ruling
in Advincula. However, Advincula cannot be read to completely disallow the institution
of certiorari proceedings against the Secretary of Justice’s determination of probable cause when
the criminal information has already been filed in court. Under exceptional circumstances, a
petition for certiorari assailing the resolution of the Secretary of Justice (involving an appeal of
the prosecutor’s ruling on probable cause) may be allowed, notwithstanding the filing of an
information with the trial court.
In Ching v. Secretary of Justice,[20] petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of
Appeals assailing the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice finding probable cause for violation
of Presidential Decree No. 115, otherwise known as the Trust Receipts Law. Conformably with
said Resolution, the City Prosecutor filed 13 Informations against petitioner. Upon denial of the
Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
with the Court of Appeals assailing the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice. While this Court
ultimately affirmed the Court of Appeals’ ruling denying the Petition for Certiorari, the
discussion affirming the resort to said extraordinary writ is enlightening:
In Mendoza-Arce v. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), this Court held that the acts of a quasi-
judicial officer may be assailed by the aggrieved party via a petition for certiorari and
enjoined (a) when necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the
accused; (b) when necessary for the orderly administration of justice; (c) when the acts of
the officer are without or in excess of authority; (d) where the charges are manifestly false
and motivated by the lust for vengeance; and (e) when there is clearly no prima facie case
against the accused. The Court also declared that, if the officer conducting a preliminary
investigation (in that case, the Office of the Ombudsman) acts without or in excess of his
authority and resolves to file an Information despite the absence of probable cause, such act may
be nullified by a writ of certiorari.
Indeed, under Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Information
shall be prepared by the Investigating Prosecutor against the respondent only if he or she finds
probable cause to hold such respondent for trial. The Investigating Prosecutor acts without or
in excess of his authority under the Rule if the Information is filed against the respondent
despite absence of evidence showing probable cause therefor. If the Secretary of Justice
reverses the Resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor who found no probable cause to
hold the respondent for trial, and orders such prosecutor to file the Information despite the
absence of probable cause, the Secretary of Justice acts contrary to law, without authority
and/or in excess of authority. Such resolution may likewise be nullified in a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.[21]
In light of the particular factual context of the present controversy, we find that the need to
uphold the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the press and crystal clear absence of a prima
facie case against the PDI staff justify the resort to the extraordinary writ of certiorari.
and, (d) existence of malice.[23] The glaring absence of maliciousness in the assailed portion of
the news article subject of this case negates the existence of probable cause that libel has been
committed by the PDI staff.
Posted in Certiorari, Certiorari Under Rule 65, DOJ, Libel, Probable Cause, Remedial
Law | Tagged The acts of a quasi-judicial officer like DOJ Secretary may be assailed by the
aggrieved party via a petition for certiorari and enjoined | Leave a comment
In cases where the critics are not only citizens but members of the Bar, jurisprudence has
repeatedly affirmed the authority of this Court to discipline lawyers whose statements
regarding the courts and fellow lawyers, whether judicial or extrajudicial, have exceeded
the limits of fair comment and common decency.
Posted on February 24, 2012by Erineus
The Show Cause Resolution does not deny respondents their freedom of expression.
It is respondents’ collective claim that the Court, with the issuance of the Show Cause
Resolution, has interfered with respondents’ constitutionally mandated right to free speech and
expression. It appears that the underlying assumption behind respondents’ assertion is the
misconception that this Court is denying them the right to criticize the Court’s decisions and
actions, and that this Court seeks to “silence” respondent law professors’ dissenting view on
what they characterize as a “legitimate public issue.”
This is far from the truth. A reading of the Show Cause Resolution will plainly show that it
was neither the fact that respondents had criticized a decision of the Court nor that they had
charged one of its members of plagiarism that motivated the said Resolution. It was the manner
of the criticism and the contumacious language by which respondents, who are not parties nor
counsels in the Vinuya case, have expressed their opinion in favor of the petitioners in the said
pending case for the “proper disposition” and consideration of the Court that gave rise to said
Resolution. The Show Cause Resolution painstakingly enumerated the statements that the Court
considered excessive and uncalled for under the circumstances surrounding the issuance,
publication, and later submission to this Court of the UP Law faculty’s Restoring Integrity
Statement.
To reiterate, it was not the circumstance that respondents expressed a belief that Justice Del
Castillo was guilty of plagiarism but rather their expression of that belief as “not only as an
established fact, but a truth”[111] when it was “[o]f public knowledge [that there was] an
ongoing investigation precisely to determine the truth of such allegations.”[112] It was also
pointed out in the Show Cause Resolution that there was a pending motion for reconsideration of
the Vinuya decision.[113] The Show Cause Resolution made no objections to the portions of the
Restoring Integrity Statement that respondents claimed to be “constructive” but only asked
respondents to explain those portions of the said Statement that by no stretch of the imagination
could be considered as fair or constructive, to wit:
Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise concern for the Court. The
opening sentence alone is a grim preamble to the institutional attack that lay ahead. It reads:
An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas who had
suffered abuse during a time of war.
The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v. Executive
Secretary as a reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the
land. x x x.
The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of deliberately delaying
the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis of “polluted sources,” the
Court’s alleged indifference to the cause of petitioners [in the Vinuya case], as well as
the supposed alarming lack of concern of the members of the Court for even the most basic
values of decency and respect.[114] x x x. (Underscoring ours.)
To be sure, the Show Cause Resolution itself recognized respondents’ freedom of
expression when it stated that:
While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free and
democratic society, there is also a general consensus that healthy criticism only goes so far.
Many types of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross the line to become harmful and
irresponsible attacks. These potentially devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the
independence of the judiciary. The court must “insist on being permitted to proceed to the
disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of
its functions and tending to embarrass the administration of justice.”
The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty’s less than objective
comments except to discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the
Court’s honesty, integrity and competence in addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if
the case on the comfort women’s claims is not controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would
fan the flames and invite resentment against a resolution that would not reverse the said decision.
This runs contrary to their obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be the
first to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which they owe fidelity according
to the oath they have taken as attorneys, and not to promote distrust in the administration
of justice.[115] x x x. (Citations omitted; emphases and underscoring supplied.)
Indeed, in a long line of cases, including those cited in respondents’ submissions, this
Court has held that the right to criticize the courts and judicial officers must be balanced against
the equally primordial concern that the independence of the Judiciary be protected from due
influence or interference. In cases where the critics are not only citizens but members of the Bar,
jurisprudence has repeatedly affirmed the authority of this Court to discipline lawyers whose
statements regarding the courts and fellow lawyers, whether judicial or extrajudicial, have
exceeded the limits of fair comment and common decency.
As early as the 1935 case of Salcedo v. Hernandez,[116] the Court found Atty. Vicente J.
Francisco both guilty of contempt and liable administratively for the following paragraph in his
second motion for reconsideration:
We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the resolution of this court,
denying our motion for reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous and constitutes an outrage to
the rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at
the polls in the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all the means within our
power in order that this error may be corrected by the very court which has committed
it, because we should not want that some citizen, particularly some voter of the
municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to denounce, as he has a right
to do, the judicial outrage of which the herein petitioner has been the victim, and because it is
our utmost desire to safeguard the prestige of this honorable court and of each and every member
thereof in the eyes of the public. But, at the same time we wish to state sincerely that
erroneous decisions like these, which the affected party and his thousands of voters will
necessarily consider unjust, increase the proselytes of ‘sakdalism’ and make the public lose
confidence in the administration of justice.[117] (Emphases supplied.)
The highlighted phrases were considered by the Court as neither justified nor necessary and
further held that:
[I]n order to call the attention of the court in a special way to the essential points relied upon in
his argument and to emphasize the force thereof, the many reasons stated in his said motion were
sufficient and the phrases in question were superfluous. In order to appeal to reason and
justice, it is highly improper and amiss to make trouble and resort to threats, as Attorney
Vicente J. Francisco has done, because both means are annoying and good practice can
never sanction them by reason of their natural tendency to disturb and hinder the free
exercise of a serene and impartial judgment, particularly in judicial matters, in the
consideration of questions submitted for resolution.
There is no question that said paragraph of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco’s motion contains a
more or less veiled threat to the court because it is insinuated therein, after the author shows the
course which the voters of Tiaong should follow in case he fails in his attempt, that they will
resort to the press for the purpose of denouncing, what he claims to be a judicial outrage of
which his client has been the victim; and because he states in a threatening manner with the
intention of predisposing the mind of the reader against the court, thus creating an
atmosphere of prejudices against it in order to make it odious in the public eye, that
decisions of the nature of that referred to in his motion promote distrust in the administration of
justice and increase the proselytes of sakdalism, a movement with seditious and revolutionary
tendencies the activities of which, as is of public knowledge, occurred in this country a few days
ago. This cannot mean otherwise than contempt of the dignity of the court and disrespect of
the authority thereof on the part of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, because he presumes
that the court is so devoid of the sense of justice that, if he did not resort to intimidation, it
would maintain its error notwithstanding the fact that it may be proven, with good reasons,
that it has acted erroneously.[118] (Emphases supplied.)
Significantly, Salcedo is the decision from which respondents culled their quote from
the minority view of Justice Malcolm. Moreover, Salcedo concerned statements made in a
pleading filed by a counsel in a case, unlike the respondents here, who are neither parties nor
counsels in the Vinuya case and therefore, do not have any standing at all to interfere in
the Vinuya case. Instead of supporting respondents’ theory, Salcedo is authority for the
following principle:
As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, as any
attorney, is in duty bound to uphold its dignity and authority and to defend its integrity,
not only because it has conferred upon him the high privilege, not a right (Malcolm, Legal
Ethics, 158 and 160), of being what he now is: a priest of justice (In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St.
Rep., 492, 669), but also because in so doing, he neither creates nor promotes distrust in the
administration of justice, and prevents anybody from harboring and encouraging
discontent which, in many cases, is the source of disorder, thus undermining the foundation
upon which rests that bulwark called judicial power to which those who are aggrieved turn for
protection and relief.[119] (Emphases supplied.)
Thus, the lawyer in Salcedo was fined and reprimanded for his injudicious statements in his
pleading, by accusing the Court of “erroneous ruling.” Here, the respondents’ Statement goes
way beyond merely ascribing error to the Court.
Other cases cited by respondents likewise espouse rulings contrary to their position. In re: Atty.
Vicente Raul Almacen,[120] cited in the Common Compliance and the Vasquez Compliance,
was an instance where the Court indefinitely suspended a member of the Bar for filing and
releasing to the press a “Petition to Surrender Lawyer’s Certificate of Title” in protest of what he
claimed was a great injustice to his client committed by the Supreme Court. In the decision, the
petition was described, thus:
He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal “peopled by men who are calloused to
our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and
commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity.” His client’s he continues,
who was deeply aggrieved by this Court’s “unjust judgment,” has become “one of the
sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy.” In the same breath that he alludes to the
classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of this Court, saying “that justice as
administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf
and dumb.” He then vows to argue the cause of his client “in the people’s forum,” so that
“the people may know of the silent injustices committed by this Court,” and that “whatever
mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated.“ He ends his
petition with a prayer that
“x x x a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned
attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and in
the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of
the noblest profession.”[121]
It is true that in Almacen the Court extensively discussed foreign jurisprudence on the principle
that a lawyer, just like any citizen, has the right to criticize and comment upon actuations of
public officers, including judicial authority. However, the real doctrine in Almacen is that such
criticism of the courts, whether done in court or outside of it, must conform to standards of
fairness and propriety. This case engaged in an even more extensive discussion of the legal
authorities sustaining this view. To quote from that decision:
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not
spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on
the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate
and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a
misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not
mere flux and ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no
burden more basic, more exacting and more imperative than that of respectful behavior toward
the courts. He vows solemnly to conduct himself “with all good fidelity x x x to the courts;” and
the Rules of Court constantly remind him “to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of
justice and judicial officers.” The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him “to maintain towards
the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial
office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance.“
As Mr. Justice Field puts it:
“x x x the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express declaration
take upon themselves, when they are admitted to the Bar, is not merely to be obedient to the
Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all times the respect due to courts of justice and judicial
officers. This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous
demeanor in open court, but includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language
and offensive conduct toward judges personally for their judicial acts.” (Bradley, v. Fisher,
20 Law. 4d. 647, 652)
The lawyer’s duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the
orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients’ rights, lawyers —
even those gifted with superior intellect — are enjoined to rein up their tempers.
“The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than the judge, and
it may tax his patience and temper to submit to rulings which he regards as incorrect, but
discipline and self-respect are as necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they
are to the effectiveness of an army. The decisions of the judge must be obeyed, because he is
the tribunal appointed to decide, and the bar should at all times be the foremost in rendering
respectful submission.” (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)
xxxx
In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an
attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in
private conversations or communications or in the course of a political campaign, if couched in
insulting language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may subject
the attorney to disciplinary action.[122] (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)
In a similar vein, In re: Vicente Sotto,[123] cited in the Vasquez Compliance, observed
that:
[T]his Court, in In re Kelly, held the following:
The publication of a criticism of a party or of the court to a pending cause, respecting the
same, has always been considered as misbehavior, tending to obstruct the administration of
justice, and subjects such persons to contempt proceedings. Parties have a constitutional right
to have their causes tried fairly in court, by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by
publications or public clamor. Every citizen has a profound personal interest in the
enforcement of the fundamental right to have justice administered by the courts, under the
protection and forms of law, free from outside coercion or interference. x x x.
Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness of the
decision of the court in a pending case made in good faith may be tolerated; because if well
founded it may enlighten the court and contribute to the correction of an error if committed; but
if it is not well taken and obviously erroneous, it should, in no way, influence the court in
reversing or modifying its decision. x x x.
xxxx
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing deliberately
“so many blunders and injustices,” that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of one party
knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose
favor the decision was rendered, in many cases decided during the last years, would tend
necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the
members of this Court, and consequently to lower or degrade the administration of justice
by this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark
to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their
rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty
and integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice
therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and
perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts
Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of
this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney,
and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees
the stability of other institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky
foundation.[124] (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)
That the doctrinal pronouncements in these early cases are still good law can be easily gleaned
even from more recent jurisprudence.
In Choa v. Chiongson,[125] the Court administratively disciplined a lawyer, through the

imposition of a fine, for making malicious and unfounded criticisms of a judge in the guise of an
administrative complaint and held, thus:
As an officer of the court and its indispensable partner in the sacred task of administering justice,
graver responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the
courts and to show respect to its officers. This does not mean, however, that a lawyer cannot
criticize a judge. As we stated in Tiongco vs. Hon. Aguilar:
It does not, however, follow that just because a lawyer is an officer of the court, he cannot
criticize the courts. That is his right as a citizen, and it is even his duty as an officer of the court
to avail of such right. Thus, in In Re: Almacen (31 SCRA 562, 579-580 [1970]), this Court
explicitly declared:
Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right,
but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he
“professionally answerable to a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not
expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen.” (Case of Austin, 28 Am Dec. 657, 665).
xxxx
Nevertheless, such a right is not without limit. For, as this Court warned in Almacen:
But it is a cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill
over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the
one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate
and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct,
that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
xxxx
Elsewise stated, the right to criticize, which is guaranteed by the freedom of speech and of
expression in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, must be exercised responsibly, for every
right carries with it a corresponding obligation. Freedom is not freedom from
responsibility, but freedom with responsibility. x x x.
xxxx
Proscribed then are, inter alia, the use of unnecessary language which jeopardizes high
esteem in courts, creates or promotes distrust in judicial administration (Rheem, supra), or
tends necessarily to undermine the confidence of people in the integrity of the members of this
Court and to degrade the administration of justice by this Court (In re: Sotto, 82 Phil. 595
[1949]); or of offensive and abusive language (In re: Rafael Climaco, 55 SCRA 107
[1974]); or abrasive and offensive language (Yangson vs. Salandanan, 68 SCRA 42 [1975]; or
of disrespectful, offensive, manifestly baseless, and malicious statements in pleadings or in
a letter addressed to the judge (Baja vs. Macandog, 158 SCRA [1988], citing the resolution of
19 January 1988 in Phil. Public Schools Teachers Association vs. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 76180,
and Ceniza vs. Sebastian, 130 SCRA 295 [1984]); or of disparaging, intemperate, and
uncalled-for remarks (Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 177 SCRA 87 [1989]).
Any criticism against a judge made in the guise of an administrative complaint which is clearly
unfounded and impelled by ulterior motive will not excuse the lawyer responsible therefor under
his duty of fidelity to his client. x x x.[126] (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)
In Saberon v. Larong,[127] where this Court found respondent lawyer guilty of simple
misconduct for using intemperate language in his pleadings and imposed a fine upon him, we
had the occasion to state:
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:
CANON 8 – A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 – A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.
CANON 11 – A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to
judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
Rule 11.03 – A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or
behavior before the Courts.
To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to use
strong language in pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their clients.
However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such
enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds
with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not
derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.
On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all
offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or
witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the
dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer’s language even in his pleadings must be dignified.[128]
Verily, the accusatory and vilifying nature of certain portions of the Statement exceeded the
limits of fair comment and cannot be deemed as protected free speech. Even In the Matter of
Petition for Declaratory Relief Re: Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v.
Commission on Elections,[129] relied upon by respondents in the Common Compliance, held
that:
From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that the right is not
susceptible of any limitation. No law may be passed abridging the freedom of speech and of the
press. The realities of life in a complex society preclude however a literal
interpretation. Freedom of expression is not an absolute. It would be too much to insist that
at all times and under all circumstances it should remain unfettered and unrestrained.
There are other societal values that press for recognition. x x x.[130] (Emphasis supplied.)
One such societal value that presses for recognition in the case at bar is the threat to judicial
independence and the orderly administration of justice that immoderate, reckless and unfair
attacks on judicial decisions and institutions pose. This Court held as much in Zaldivar v.
Sandiganbayan and Gonzales,[131] where we indefinitely suspended a lawyer from the practice
of law for issuing to the media statements grossly disrespectful towards the Court in relation to a
pending case, to wit:
Respondent Gonzales is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. No one seeks to
deny him that right, least of all this Court. What respondent seems unaware of is that freedom
of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that
freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the
requirements of equally important public interest. One of these fundamental public
interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration
of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the system of
administering justice. For the protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can
be secured only within the context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing
justice, within the context, in other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of
justice which are accepted by the general community. x x x.[132] (Emphases supplied.)
For this reason, the Court cannot uphold the view of some respondents[133] that the Statement
presents no grave or imminent danger to a legitimate public interest.
Instances where a writ of execution may be appealed

Unjustified delay in the enforcement of a judgment sets at naught the role of courts in disposing
justiciable controversies with finality.[17] Once a judgment becomes final and executory, all the
issues between the parties are deemed resolved and laid to rest. All that remains is the execution
of the decision which is a matter of right.[18]
Banaga v. Majaducon,[19] however, enumerates the instances where a writ of execution may be
appealed:
1) the writ of execution varies the judgment;
2) there has been a change in the situation of the parties making execution inequitable or
unjust;
3) execution is sought to be enforced against property exempt from execution;
4) it appears that the controversy has never been subject to the judgment of the court;
5) the terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there remains room for
interpretation thereof; or
6) it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is
defective in substance, or is issued against the wrong party, or that the judgment debt has been
paid or otherwise satisfied, or the writ was issued without authority;
In these exceptional circumstances, considerations of justice and equity dictate that there be
some mode available to the party aggrieved of elevating the question to a higher court. That
mode of elevation may be either by appeal (writ of error or certiorari), or by a special civil action
of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus.
The instant case falls under one of the exceptions cited above. The fact that Danilo has left the
property under dispute is a change in the situation of the parties that would make execution
inequitable or unjust.
Posted in Appeal, Writ of Execution | Tagged Instances where a writ of execution may be
appealed | Leave a comment
Exceptions as meriting a relaxation of the rules in order to serve substantial justice

Moreover, there are exceptions that have been previously considered by the Court as meriting a
relaxation of the rules in order to serve substantial justice. These are: (1) matters of life, liberty,
honor or property; (2) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (3) the merits of the
case; (4) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the
suspension of the rules; (5) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and
dilatory; and (6) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.[20] We find that
Danilo’s situation merits a relaxation of the rules since special circumstances are involved; to
determine if his allegation were true would allow a final resolution of the case.
Applicable, too, is what Sec. 5, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court states as one of the powers
of a court:
Section 5. Inherent powers of the courts.¾Every court shall have power:
xxxx
(g) To amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law
and justice.
Thus, the Court ruled in Mejia v. Gabayan:[21]

x x x The inherent power of the court carries with it the right to determine every question
of fact and law which may be involved in the execution. The court may stay or suspend the
execution of its judgment if warranted by the higher interest of justice. It has the authority to
cause a modification of the decision when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice
or when supervening events warrant it. The court is also vested with inherent power to stay the
enforcement of its decision based on antecedent facts which show fraud in its rendition or want
of jurisdiction of the trial court apparent on the record. (Emphasis supplied.)
Posted in Court, Exceptions, Remedial Law, Rules of Procedures, Substantial

Justice | Tagged Exceptions as meriting a relaxation of the rules in order to serve substantial
justice | Leave a comment
The rules of evidence allow a trial court to rely on circumstantial evidence to support its
conclusion of guilt.
But even if the confession and evidence gathered as a result of it are disregarded, the evidence
that remains still supports the result of the conviction of accused-appellant.
Here, there are no direct witnesses to the crime. But even if no one saw the commission of the
crime, accused-appellant may still be pinned down as the perpetrator. As held in Salvador v.
People:
Direct evidence of the crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its
conclusion and finding of guilt. The rules of evidence allow a trial court to rely on
circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of guilt. Circumstantial evidence is that
evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue may be established
by inference. At times, resort to circumstantial evidence is imperative since to insist on direct
testimony would, in many cases, result in setting felons free and deny proper protection to the
community.[28]
In this particular case, with this particular crime, it is the circumstantial evidence that comes into
play to reach a conclusion. In People v. Pascual, it was held:
It is settled that in the special complex crime of rape with homicide, both the rape and the
homicide must be established beyond reasonable doubt. In this regard, we have held that the
crime of rape is difficult to prove because it is generally unwitnessed and very often only the
victim is left to testify for herself. It becomes even more difficult when the complex crime of
rape with homicide is committed because the victim could no longer testify. Thus, in crimes of
rape with homicide, as here, resort to circumstantial evidence is usually unavoidable.[29]
Under Sec. 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence shall be sufficient for
conviction when the following requisites are complied with: (1) there is more than one
circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proved; and (3) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Salvador also held:

All the circumstances must be consistent with one another, consistent with the hypothesis that
the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is
innocent. Thus, conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld, provided that the
circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion that point to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.[30]
Setting aside the knife and the bloodied t-shirt recovered from the room of accused-appellant, the
CA and the RTC relied on several circumstances to justify the conviction.
Posted in Evidence | Tagged The rules of evidence allow a trial court to rely on circumstantial
evidence to support its conclusion of guilt. | Leave a comment
Extrajudicial Confession
Accused-appellant was not informed of his rights, nor was there a waiver of said rights. Thus,
the information elicited is inadmissible, and the evidence garnered as the result of that
interrogation is also inadmissible. This parallels Aballe v. People,[26] wherein the accused in
that case was questioned without the presence of counsel, and later produced the weapon used in
killing the victim, also making an extrajudicial confession admitting his guilt. In that particular
case, it was held, “Together with the extrajudicial confession, the fatal weapon is but a fruit of a
constitutionally infirmed interrogation and must consequently be disallowed.”[27]
It is clear that the questioning of accused-appellant was made in violation of Section 12(1),
Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably
of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
Thus, the trial court erred in considering the knife and bloodied t-shirt when they are
inadmissible, which is what the CA correctly concluded.
Posted in Constitutional Rights, Evidence, Fruit of Poisonous Tree, Uncategorized | Leave a
comment
The correct redemption price payable to a mortgagee bank as purchaser of the property in
a foreclosure sale
On the correct computation of the redemption price, Section 78 of Republic Act No. 337,
otherwise known as the General Banking Act, governs in cases where the mortgagee is a
bank.[13] Said provision reads:
SEC. 78. x x x In the event of foreclosure, whether judicially or extrajudicially, of any mortgage
on real estate which is security for any loan granted before the passage of this Act or under the
provisions of this Act, the mortgagor or debtor whose real property has been sold at public
auction, judicially or extrajudicially, for the full or partial payment of an obligation to any bank,
banking or credit institution, within the purview of this Act shall have the right, within one year
after the sale of the real estate as a result of the foreclosure of the respective mortgage, to redeem
the property by paying the amount fixed by the court in the order of execution, or the amount
due under the mortgage deed, as the case may be, with interest thereon at the rate specified
in the mortgage, and all the costs, and judicial and other expenses incurred by the bank or
institution concerned by reason of the execution and sale and as a result of the custody of
said property less the income received from the property. x x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
Under the Mortgage Loan Agreement,[14] petitioners-mortgagors undertook to pay the
attorney’s fees and the costs of registration and foreclosure. The following contract terms would
show that the said items are separate and distinct from the bid price which represents only the
outstanding loan balance with stipulated interest thereon.
23. Application of Proceeds of Foreclosure Sale. The proceeds of sale of the mortgaged
property/ies shall be applied as follows:
a) To the payment of the expenses and cost of foreclosure and sale, including the attorney’s fees
as herein provided;
b) To the satisfaction of all interest and charges accruing upon the obligations herein and hereby
secured.
c) To the satisfaction of the principal amount of the obligations herein and hereby secured.
d) To the satisfaction of all other obligations then owed by the Borrower/Mortgagor to the Bank
or any of its subsidiaries/affiliates such as, but not limited to BPI Credit Corporation; or to Bank
of the Philippine Islands or any of its subsidiaries/affiliates such as, but not limited to BPI
Leasing Corporation, BPI Express Card Corporation, BPI Securities Corporation and BPI
Agricultural Development Bank; and
e) The balance, if any, to be due to the Borrower/Mortgagor.
xxxx
31. Attorney’s Fees: In case the Bank should engage the services of counsel to enforce its rights
under this Agreement, the Borrower/Mortgagor shall pay an amount equivalent to fifteen (15%)
percent of the total amount claimed by the Bank, which in no case shall be less than P2,000.00,
Philippine currency, plus costs, collection expenses and disbursements allowed by law, all of
which shall be secured by this mortgage.[15]
Additionally, the Disclosure Statement on Loan/Credit Transaction[16] also duly signed by the
petitioners-mortgagors provides:
10. ADDITIONAL CHARGES IN CASE CERTAIN STIPULATIONS ARE NOT MET BY
THE BORROWER
a. Post Default Penalty 3.00% per month

b. Attorney’s Services 15% of sum due but not less than P2,000.00
c. Liquidated Damages 15% of sum due but not less than P10,000.00
d. Collection & Legal Cost As provided by the Rules of Court
e. Others (Specify)
As correctly found by the trial court, that attorney’s fees and liquidated damages were not yet
included in the bid price of P10,372,711.35 is clearly shown by the Statement of Account as of
April 4, 1997 prepared by the petitioner bank and given to petitioners-mortgagors. On the other
hand, par. 23 of the Mortgage Loan Agreement indicated that asset acquired expenses were to be
added to the redemption price as part of “costs and other expenses incurred” by the mortgagee
bank in connection with the foreclosure sale.
Coming now to the issue of capital gains tax, we find merit in petitioners-mortgagors’ argument
that there is no legal basis for the inclusion of this charge in the redemption price. Under
Revenue Regulations (RR) No. 13-85 (December 12, 1985), every sale or exchange or other
disposition of real property classified as capital asset under Section 34(a)[17] of the Tax
Code shall be subject to the final capital gains tax. The term sale includes pacto de retro and
other forms of conditional sale. Section 2.2 of Revenue Memorandum Order (RMO) No. 29-86
(as amended by RMO No. 16-88 and as further amended by RMO Nos. 27-89 and 6-92) states
that these conditional sales “necessarily include mortgage foreclosure sales (judicial and
extrajudicial foreclosure sales).” Further, for real property foreclosed by a bank on or after
September 3, 1986, the capital gains tax and documentary stamp tax must be paid before title to
the property can be consolidated in favor of the bank.[18]
Under Section 63 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree, if no right of redemption exists, the certificate of title of the mortgagor shall be
cancelled, and a new certificate issued in the name of the purchaser. But where the right of
redemption exists, the certificate of title of the mortgagor shall not be cancelled, but the
certificate of sale and the order confirming the sale shall be registered by brief memorandum
thereof made by the Register of Deeds upon the certificate of title. In the event the property is
redeemed, the certificate or deed of redemption shall be filed with the Register of Deeds, and a
brief memorandum thereof shall be made by the Register of Deeds on the certificate of title.
It is therefore clear that in foreclosure sale, there is no actual transfer of the mortgaged real
property until after the expiration of the one-year redemption period as provided in Act No. 3135
and title thereto is consolidated in the name of the mortgagee in case of non-redemption. In the
interim, the mortgagor is given the option whether or not to redeem the real property. The
issuance of the Certificate of Sale does not by itself transfer ownership.[19]
RR No. 4-99 issued onMarch 16, 1999, further amends RMO No. 6-92 relative to the payment of
Capital Gains Tax and Documentary Stamp Tax on extrajudicial foreclosure sale of capital assets
initiated by banks, finance and insurance companies.
SEC. 3. CAPITAL GAINS TAX. –

(1) In case the mortgagor exercises his right of redemption within one year from the
issuance of the certificate of sale, no capital gains tax shall be imposed because no capital
gains has been derived by the mortgagor and no sale or transfer of real property was realized. x x
x
(2) In case of non-redemption, the capital gains [tax] on the foreclosure sale imposed under
Secs. 24(D)(1) and 27(D)(5) of the Tax Code of 1997 shall become due based on the bid price of
the highest bidder but only upon the expiration of the one-year period of redemption provided for
under Sec. 6 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, and shall be paid within thirty (30)
days from the expiration of the said one-year redemption period.
SEC. 4. DOCUMENTARY STAMP TAX. –

(1) In case the mortgagor exercises his right of redemption, the transaction shall only be subject
to the P15.00 documentary stamp tax imposed under Sec. 188 of the Tax Code of 1997
because no land or realty was sold or transferred for a consideration.
(2) In case of non-redemption, the corresponding documentary stamp tax shall be levied,
collected and paid by the person making, signing, issuing, accepting, or transferring the real
property wherever the document is made, signed, issued, accepted or transferred where the
property is situated in the Philippines. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
Although the subject foreclosure sale and redemption took place before the effectivity of RR No.
4-99, its provisions may be given retroactive effect in this case.
Section 246 of the NIRC of 1997 states:
SEC. 246. Non-Retroactivity of Rulings. – Any revocation, modification, or reversal of any of

the rules and regulations promulgated in accordance with the preceding Sections or any of the
rulings or circulars promulgated by the Commissioner shall not be given retroactive
application if the revocation, modification, or reversal will be prejudicial to the taxpayers,
except in the following cases:
(a) where the taxpayer deliberately misstates or omits material facts from his return or in any
document required of him by the Bureau of Internal Revenue;
(b) where the facts subsequently gathered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue are materially
different from the facts on which the ruling is based; or
(c) where the taxpayer acted in bad faith.
In this case, the retroactive application of RR No. 4-99 is more consistent with the policy of
aiding the exercise of the right of redemption. As the Court of Tax Appeals concluded in one
case, RR No. 4-99 “has curbed the inequity of imposing a capital gains tax even before the
expiration of the redemption period [since] there is yet no transfer of title and no profit or gain is
realized by the mortgagor at the time of foreclosure sale but only upon expiration of the
redemption period.”[20] In his commentaries, De Leon expressed the view that while revenue
regulations as a general rule have no retroactive effect, if the revocation is due to the fact that the
regulation is erroneous or contrary to law, such revocation shall have retroactive operation as to
affect past transactions, because a wrong construction of the law cannot give rise to a vested
right that can be invoked by a taxpayer.[21]
Considering that herein petitioners-mortgagors exercised their right of redemption before the
expiration of the statutory one-year period, petitioner bank is not liable to pay the capital gains
tax due on the extrajudicial foreclosure sale. There was no actual transfer of title from the
owners-mortgagors to the foreclosing bank. Hence, the inclusion of the said charge in the total
redemption price was unwarranted and the corresponding amount paid by the petitioners-
mortgagors should be returned to them.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, both petitions are PARTLY GRANTED.

In G.R. No. 165617, BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. is hereby ordered to RETURN the amounts
representing capital gains and documentary stamp taxes as reflected in the Statement of Account
To Redeem as of April 7, 1997, to petitioners Supreme Transliner, Inc., Moises C. Alvarez and
Paulita Alvarez, and to retain only the sum provided in RR No. 4-99 as documentary stamps tax
due on the foreclosure sale.
In G.R. No. 165837, petitioner BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. is hereby declared entitled
to the attorney’s fees and liquidated damages included in the total redemption price paid by
Supreme Transliner, Inc., Moises C. Alvarez and Paulita Alvarez. The sums awarded as moral
and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs in favor of Supreme Transliner, Inc., Moises
C. Alvarez and Paulita Alvarez are DELETED.
The Decision dated April 6, 2004of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74761 is
accordingly MODIFIED.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/165617.htm
Posted in Foreclosure Sale, Land, Mortgage, Mortgage Law | Leave a comment
The dispute as to the validity of the assessments is purely an intra-corporate matter, thus,
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the SEC
The case before the RTC involved an intra-corporate dispute – the Moreno spouses were asking
for an accounting of the association dues and were questioning the manner the petitioner
calculated the dues assessed against them. These issues are alien to the first case that was
initiated by Salvacion – a third party to the petitioner-Moreno relationship – to stop the
extrajudicial sale on the basis of the lack of the requirements for a valid foreclosure sale.
Although the extrajudicial sale of theMoreno properties to the petitioner has been fully effected
and the Salvacion petition has been dismissed with finality, the completion of the sale does not
bar theMoreno spouses from questioning the amount of the unpaid dues that gave rise to the
foreclosure and to the subsequent sale of their properties. The propriety and legality of the sale
of the condominium unit and the parking spaces questioned by Salvacion are different from the
propriety and legality of the unpaid assessment dues that theMorenospouses are questioning in
the present case.
The facts of this case are similar to the facts in Wack Wack Condominium Corporation, et al. v.
Court of Appeals, et al.,[20] where we held that the dispute as to the validity of the assessments
is purely an intra-corporate matter between Wack Wack Condominium Corporation and its
stockholder, Bayot, and is, thus, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC).[21] We ruled in that case that since the extrajudicial sale was
authorized by Wack Wack Condominium Corporation’s by-laws and was the result of the
nonpayment of the assessments, the legality of the foreclosure was necessarily an issue within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the SEC. We added that:
Just because the property has already been sold extrajudicially does not mean that the questioned
assessments have now become legal and valid or that they have become immaterial. In fact, the
validity of the foreclosure depends on the legality of the assessments and the issue must be
determined by the SEC if only to insure that the private respondent was not deprived of her
property without having been heard. If there were no valid assessments, then there was no lien on
the property, and if there was no lien, what was there to foreclose? Thus, SEC Case No. 2675 has
not become moot and academic and the SEC retains its jurisdiction to hear and decide the case
despite the extrajudicial sale.[22]
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the decision of the CA’s First Division dismissing the
petitioner’s petition. The way is now clear for the RTC to continue its proceedings on the
Morenocase.
Posted in Jurisdiction, SEC | Tagged The dispute as to the validity of the assessments is purely
an intra-corporate matter thus within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the SEC | Leave a
comment
Exception to the general rule that the mistakes and negligence of counsel bind the client
Records also bear out that the earlier civil case against Armando, the petitioner’s husband, was
also finally resolved in his favor since the obligation had already been settled.[24] This civil case
is also intertwined with the administrative and criminal cases filed against petitioner.
Thus, it appears that the filing of the criminal case against petitioner was merely an
afterthought considering that the civil case against her husband and the administrative case
against her were resolved in the couple’s favor.
In light of what has been shown, the Court is inclined to suspend the rules to give the petitioner a
chance to seek relief from the Sandiganbayan. The Court likewise makes exception to the
general rule that the mistakes and negligence of counsel bind the client. Doubtless, the filing of
the appeal before the CA by the petitioner’s former counsel was not simple negligence. It
constituted gross negligence.
It bears stressing at this point, that the rule which states that the mistakes of counsel bind the
client may not be strictly followed where observance of it would result in outright deprivation of
the client’s liberty or property, or where the interests of justice so require. In rendering justice,
procedural infirmities take a backseat against substantive rights of litigants. Corollarily, if the
strict application of the rules would tend to frustrate rather than promote justice, this Court is not
without power to exercise its judicial discretion in relaxing the rules of procedure.[25] The Court
takes note of settled jurisprudence which holds that:
The function of the rule that negligence or mistake of counsel in procedure is imputed to
and binding upon the client, as any other procedural rule, is to serve as an instrument to advance
the ends of justice. When in the circumstances of each case the rule desert[s] its proper office as
an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, its rigors must be relaxed to
admit exceptions thereto and to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.
xxx xxx xxx
The court has the power to except a particular case from the operation of the rule
whenever the purposes of justice require it.[26]
The Court also takes note that the petitioner has no participatory negligence. The resulting
dismissal by the CA was utterly attributable to the gross negligence of her counsel. For said
reason, the Court is not averse to suspending its own rules in the pursuit of justice. “Where
reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law, or when its
application will result in outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or property or where the
interests of justice so require, relief is accorded to the client who suffered by reason of the
lawyer’s gross or palpable mistake or negligence.”[27]
“Aside from matters of life, liberty, honor or property which would warrant the suspension of the
rules of the most mandatory character and an examination and review by the appellate court of
the lower court’s findings of fact, the other elements that are to be considered are the following:
(1) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (2) the merits of the case, (3) a cause
not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the
rules, (4) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, (5) the
other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.”[28] All these factors are attendant in this
case. In the case of Tiangco v. Land Bank of the Philippines,[29] it was written:
Dismissal of appeals on purely technical grounds is not encouraged. The rules of procedure
ought not to be applied in a very rigid and technical sense, for they have been adopted to help
secure, not override, substantial justice. Judicial action must be guided by the principle that a
party-litigant should be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or
defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on technicalities. When a rigid
application of the rules tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, this Court is
empowered to suspend their operation.
Petitioner’s liberty here is at stake. The MCTC convicted her and imposed upon her the penalty
of five (5) years imprisonment and the disqualification to hold office. This MCTC decision was
affirmed by the RTC.[30] If she has to suffer in prison, her guilt must be established beyond
reasonable doubt, availing all the remedies provided for under the law to protect her right. It is
highly unjust for her to lose her liberty only because of the gross negligence of her former
counsel.
Acts of lasciviousness defined and its elements enumerated

Appellant was charged with violation of Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in
relation to Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610. These provisions state:
Art. 336. Acts of lasciviousness. — Any person who shall commit any act of lasciviousness upon
other persons of either sex, under any of the circumstances mentioned in the preceding article,
shall be punished by prision correccional.
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. – Children, whether male or female, who
for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be
children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed
upon the following:
xxxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse of lascivious conduct with a child exploited
in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victim is under twelve
(12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape
and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious
conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is
under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; x x x
The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of Republic Act No. 7610 are as
follows:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.

2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse.
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.31
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, all the elements of sexual abuse under Section 5,
Article III of RA 7610 are present here.
First, appellant’s repeated touching, fondling, and sucking of AAA’s breasts and inserting his
finger into AAA’s vagina with lewd designs undoubtedly constitute lascivious conduct under
Section 2(h) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 7610, to wit:
(h) “Lascivious conduct” means the intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of
the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into
the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent
to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person,
bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or public area of a person.
Second, appellant, as a father having moral ascendancy over his daughter, coerced AAA to
engage in lascivious conduct, which is within the purview of sexual abuse. In People v.
Larin,32 we held:
A child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, when the child
indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other
consideration; or (b) under the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group.
Third, AAA is below 18 years old at the time of the commission of the offense, based on her
testimony which was corroborated by her Birth Certificate33 presented during the trial. Section
3(a), Article I of Republic Act No. 7610 provides:
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. –
(a) “Children” refers [to] persons below eighteen (18) years of age or those over but are unable
to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or
discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition;
Since all three elements of the crime were present, the conviction of appellant for acts of
lasciviousness was proper.
As to the alleged failure of the prosecution to establish with particularity the date of the
commission of the acts of lasciviousness, suffice it to state that the date and time of the
commission of the offense are not material ingredients of such crime. Section 11, Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 11. Time of the commission of the offense. — It is not necessary to state in the complaint or
information the precise time at which the offense was committed except when time is a material
ingredient of the offense, but the act may be alleged to have been committed at any time as to the
actual date at which the offense was committed as the information or complaint will permit.
In People v. Losano,34 the Court held:

Thus, as early as 1903, this Court has ruled that while the complaint must allege a specific time
and place when and where the offense was committed, the proof need not correspond to this
allegation, unless the time and place is material and of the essence of the offense as necessary
ingredient in its description. Evidence so presented is admissible and sufficient if it shows 1) that
the crime was committed at any time within the period of the statute of limitations; and 2) before
or after the time stated in the complaint or indictment and before the action is commenced.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/182521.html
Posted in Acts of Lasciviousness, Children and Women, Sexual Abuse | Leave a comment
The sugar corporations are not entitled to reimbursement of 25% of the conversion fee
The sugar corporations are not entitled to reimbursement of 25% of the conversion fee
amounting to P38,637,000.00.
Section 2 of EO 87 granted the Committee on Sugar Conversion/Auction power to promulgate
rules governing sugar importation by the private sector. It provides:
SEC. 2. Committee on Sugar Conversion/Auction. – There is hereby created a Committee on

Sugar Conversion/Auction which shall be headed by the DA, with the following as members:
NEDA, DTI, DOF, SRA, and a representative each from the sugar planters’ group and the sugar
millers’ group. The Committee is hereby authorized to determine the parameters and
procedures on the importation of sugar by the private sector, and the collection and
remittance of the fee for the conversion of sugar from “C” (reserve sugar) to “B” (domestic
sugar). (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuant to this authority, the Committee issued the Bidding Rules subject of the
controversy, paragraph G.1 of which provides that if the importer fails to make the
importation, 25% of the conversion fee shall be forfeited in favor of the SRA, thus:
G. Forfeiture of Conversion Fee
G.1 In case of failure of the importer to make the importation or for the imported sugar to
arrive in the Philippines on or before the Arrival Date, the 25% of Conversion Fee Bid already
paid shall be forfeited in favor of the SRA and the imported sugar shall not be classified as
“B” (domestic sugar) unless, upon application with the SRA and without objection of the
Committee, the SRA allows such conversion after payment by the importer of 100% of the
Conversion Fee applicable to the shipment.23 (Emphasis supplied)
In joining the bid for sugar importation, the sugar corporations are deemed to have assented to
the Bidding Rules, including the forfeiture provision under paragraph G.1. The Bidding Rules
bind the sugar corporations. The latter cannot rely on the lame excuse that they are not aware of
the forfeiture provision.
At the trial, Teresita Tan testified that the Bidding Rules were duly published in a newspaper of
general circulation.24 Vicente Cenzon, a sugar importer who participated in the bidding for the
3rd tranche, testified that he attended the pre-bid conference where the Bidding Rules were
discussed and copies of the same were distributed to all the bidders.25
On the other hand, all that the sugar corporations managed to come up with was the self-serving
testimony of its witness, Daniel Fajardo, that the sugar corporations were not informed of the
forfeiture provision in the Bidding Rules.26
The Bidding Rules passed through a consultative process actively participated by various
government agencies and their counterpart in the private sector: the Department of Agriculture,
the National Economic Development Authority, the Department of Trade and Industry, the
Department of Finance, the Sugar Regulatory Administration, and a representative each from the
sugar planters’ group and the sugar millers’ group.27
We find nothing in the forfeiture provision of the Bidding Rules that is contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order, or public policy. On the contrary, the forfeiture provision fully
supports government efforts to aid the country’s ailing sugar industry. Conversion fees, including
those that are forfeited under paragraph G.1 of the Bidding Rules, are automatically remitted to
the Bureau of Treasury and go directly to the Agricultural Competitiveness Enhancement Fund.28
It is unrefuted that the sugar corporations failed in their contractual undertaking to import the
remaining 27,000 metric tons of sugar specified in their sugar import allocation. Applying
paragraph G.1 of the Bidding Rules, such failure is subject to forfeiture of the 25% of the
conversion fee the sugar corporations paid as part of their contractual undertaking.
The RTC gravely erred in ordering the SRA to return the forfeited conversion fee to the sugar
corporations. Its strained interpretation that paragraph G.1 of the Bidding Rules contemplates
cases of delay in the arrival of imported sugar but not cases of cancellation of sugar importation
defies logic and the express provision of paragraph G.1. If delay in the arrival of imported sugar
is subject to forfeiture of 25% of the conversion fee, with more reason is outright failure to
import sugar, by cancelling the sugar importation altogether, subject to forfeiture of the 25% of
the conversion fee.
Plainly and expressly, paragraph G.1 identifies two situations which would bring about the
forfeiture of 25% of the conversion fee: (1) when the importer fails to make the
importation or (2) when the imported sugar fails to arrive in the Philippines on or before the set
arrival date. It is wrong for the RTC to interpret the forfeiture provision in a way departing from
its plain and express language.
Where the language of a rule is clear, it is the duty of the court to enforce it according to the
plain meaning of the word. There is no occasion to resort to other means of interpretation.29
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The deputized SRA counsel by the OSG may file a notice of appeal.
Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 198717 authorizes the
OSG to represent the SRA, a government agency established pursuant to Executive Order No.
18, Series of 1986,18 in any litigation, proceeding, investigation, or matter requiring the services
of lawyers. It provides:
SEC. 35. Powers and Functions. – The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and
agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation, or matter requiring the services of
lawyers. When authorized by the President or head of the office concerned, it shall also
represent government owned or controlled corporations. The Office of the Solicitor General shall
constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall discharge duties requiring the
services of lawyers. (Emphasis supplied)
The OSG is empowered to deputize legal officers of government departments, bureaus, agencies,
and offices in cases involving their respective offices. Paragraph 8 of the same section reads:
(8) Deputize legal officers of government departments, bureaus, agencies, and offices to
assist the Solicitor General and appear or represent the Government in cases involving
their respective offices, brought before the courts and exercise supervision and control over
such legal officers with respect to such cases. (Emphasis supplied)
In National Power Corporation v. Vine Development Corporation,19 this Court ruled that the
deputization by the OSG of NAPOCOR counsels in cases involving the NAPOCOR included the
authority to file a notice of appeal. The Court explained that the OSG could have withdrawn the
appeal if it believed that the appeal would not advance the government’s cause. The Court held
that even if the deputized NAPOCOR counsel had no authority to file a notice of appeal, the
defect was cured by the OSG’s subsequent manifestation that the deputized NAPOCOR counsel
had authority to file a notice of appeal.
The sugar corporations’ reliance on another NAPOCOR case, National Power Corporation v.
NLRC,20 is misplaced. There, service of the decision was never made on the OSG, the principal
counsel for NAPOCOR. Only the deputized NAPOCOR counsel was served a copy of the
decision. Hence, the Court held that the period to appeal the decision did not commence to run.
The Court explained that service of the decision on the deputized NAPOCOR counsel was
insufficient and not binding on the OSG. This was why the Court stated in that case that the
deputized NAPOCOR counsel had no authority to decide whether an appeal should be made.
Noteworthy, in National Power Corporation v. Vine Development Corporation, both the OSG
and the deputized NAPOCOR counsel were served copies of the decision subject of the appeal.
In National Power Corporation v. NLRC, only the deputized NAPOCOR counsel was furnished
a copy of the appealed decision. Hence, the differing rulings by this Court.
In the present case, records show that both the OSG and the deputized SRA counsel were served
copies of the RTC decision subject of the appeal. Thus, what applies is National Power
Corporation v. Vine Development Corporation. Applying here the doctrine laid down in the said
case, deputized SRA counsel Atty. Labay is, without a doubt, authorized to file a notice of
appeal.
Assuming Atty. Labay had no authority to file a notice of appeal, such defect was cured when
the OSG subsequently filed its opposition to the motion to expunge the notice of appeal. As the
OSG explained, its reservation21 to “approve the withdrawal of the case, the non-appeal, or other
actions which appear to compromise the interest of the government” was meant to protect the
interest of the government in case the deputized SRA counsel acted in any manner prejudicial to
government. Obviously, what required the approval of the OSG was the non-appeal, not the
appeal, of a decision adverse to government.
We hold that the RTC should have given due course to the notice of appeal that Atty. Labay
timely filed. Thus, the 19 December 2006 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-02-46236
cannot be deemed to have attained finality.
The next logical step is to remand the case to the RTC. However, a remand would only delay the
resolution of this case and frustrate the ends of justice. As a rule, remand is avoided in the
following instances: (a) where the ends of justice would not be served; (b) where public interest
demands an early disposition of the case; or (c) where the trial court already received all the
evidence presented by both parties, and the Supreme Court is in a position, based upon said
evidence, to decide the case on its merits.22 All three conditions are present here.
Posted in OSG, SRA | Leave a comment
The expropriator should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the
petition for expropriation filed, failing which, it should file another petition for the new
purpose. If not, it is then incumbent upon the expropriator to return the said property to
its private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the same.
The Republic and MCIAA’s petition in G.R. No. 168812 is bereft of merit, while the Ouano
petition in G.R. No. 168770 is meritorious.
At the outset, three (3) fairly established factual premises ought to be emphasized:
First, the MCIAA and/or its predecessor agency had not actually used the lots subject of
the final decree of expropriation in Civil Case No. R-1881 for the purpose they were originally
taken by the government, i.e., for the expansion and development ofLahugAirport.
Second, the Lahug Airport had been closed and abandoned. A significant portion of it had, in
fact, been purchased by a private corporation for development as a commercial complex.[20]
Third, it has been preponderantly established by evidence that the NAC, through its team of
negotiators, had given assurance to the affected landowners that they would be entitled to
repurchase their respective lots in the event they are no longer used for airport purposes.[21] “No
less than Asterio Uy,” the Court noted in Heirs of Moreno, “one of the members of the CAA
Mactan Legal Team, which interceded for the acquisition of the lots for the Lahug Airport’s
expansion, affirmed that persistent assurances were given to the landowners to the effect that as
soon as the Lahug Airport is abandoned or transferred to Mactan, the lot owners would be able to
reacquire their properties.”[22] In Civil Case No. CEB-20743, Exhibit “G,” the transcript of the
deposition[23] of Anunciacion vda. de Ouano covering the assurance made had been formally
offered in evidence and duly considered in the initial decision of the RTC Cebu City. In Civil
Case No. CEB-18370, the trial court, on the basis of testimonial evidence, and later the CA,
recognized the reversionary rights of the suing former lot owners or their successors in
interest[24] and resolved the case accordingly. In point with respect to the representation and
promise of the government to return the lots taken should the planned airport expansion do not
materialize is what the Court said in Heirs of Moreno, thus:
This is a difficult case calling for a difficult but just solution. To begin with there exists
an undeniable historical narrative that the predecessors of respondent MCIAA had suggested
to the landowners of the properties covered by the Lahug Airport expansion scheme that they
could repurchase their properties at the termination of the airport’s venue. Some acted on this
assurance and sold their properties; other landowners held out and waited for the exercise of
eminent domain to take its course until finally coming to terms with respondent’s predecessors
that they would not appeal nor block further judgment of condemnation if the right of repurchase
was extended to them. A handful failed to prove that they acted on such assurance when they
parted with ownership of their land.[25] (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)
For perspective, Heirs of Moreno––later followed by MCIAA v. Tudtud (Tudtud)[26] and
the consolidated cases at bar––is cast under the same factual setting and centered on the
expropriation of privately-owned lots for the public purpose of expanding the Lahug Airport and
the alleged promise of reconveyance given by the negotiating NAC officials to the private lot
owners. All the lots being claimed by the former owners or successors-in-interest of the former
owners in the Heirs of Moreno, Tudtud, and the present cases were similarly adjudged
condemned in favor of the Republic in Civil Case No. R-1881. All the claimants sought was or
is to have the condemned lots reconveyed to them upon the payment of the condemnation price
since the public purpose of the expropriation was never met. Indeed, the expropriated lots were
never used and were, in fact, abandoned by the expropriating government agencies.
In all then, the issues and supporting arguments presented by both sets of petitioners in these
consolidated cases have already previously been passed upon, discussed at length, and practically
peremptorily resolved in Heirs of Moreno and the November 2008 Tudtud ruling. The Ouanos,
as petitioners in G.R. No. 168770, and the Inocians, as respondents in G.R. No. 168812, are
similarly situated as the heirs of Moreno in Heirs of Moreno and Benjamin Tudtud in Tudtud. Be
that as it may, there is no reason why the ratio decidendi in Heirs of Moreno and Tudtud should
not be made to apply to petitioners Ouanos and respondents Inocians such that they shall be
entitled to recover their or their predecessors’ respective properties under the same manner and
arrangement as the heirs of Moreno and Tudtud. Stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to
precedents, and not to unsettle things which are established).[27]
Just like in Tudtud and earlier in Heirs of Moreno, MCIAA would foist the theory that the
judgment of condemnation in Civil Case No. R-1881 was without qualification and was
unconditional. It would, in fact, draw attention to the fallo of the expropriation court’s decision
to prove that there is nothing in the decision indicating that the government gave assurance or
undertook to reconvey the covered lots in case the Lahug airport expansion project is aborted.
Elaborating on this angle, MCIAA argues that the claim of the Ouanos and the Inocians
regarding the alleged verbal assurance of the NAC negotiating team that they can reacquire their
landholdings is barred by the Statute of Frauds.[28]
Under the rule on the Statute of Frauds, as expressed in Article 1403 of the Civil Code, a contract
for the sale or acquisition of real property shall be unenforceable unless the same or some note of
the contract be in writing and subscribed by the party charged. Subject to defined exceptions,
evidence of the agreement cannot be received without the writing, or secondary evidence of its
contents.
MCIAA’s invocation of the Statute of Frauds is misplaced primarily because the statute applies
only to executory and not to completed, executed, or partially consummated
contracts.[29] Carbonnel v. Poncio, et al., quoting Chief Justice Moran, explains the rationale
behind this rule, thusly:
x x x “The reason is simple. In executory contracts there is a wide field for fraud because
unless they may be in writing there is no palpable evidence of the intention of the contracting
parties. The statute has been precisely been enacted to prevent fraud.” x x x However, if a
contract has been totally or partially performed, the exclusion of parol evidence would promote
fraud or bad faith, for it would enable the defendant to keep the benefits already derived by him
from the transaction in litigation, and at the same time, evade the obligations, responsibilities or
liabilities assumed or contracted by him thereby.[30] (Emphasis in the original.)
Analyzing the situation of the cases at bar, there can be no serious objection to the proposition
that the agreement package between the government and the private lot owners was already
partially performed by the government through the acquisition of the lots for the expansion of the
Lahug airport. The parties, however, failed to accomplish the more important condition in the
CFI decision decreeing the expropriation of the lots litigated upon: the expansion of
theLahugAirport. The project––the public purpose behind the forced property taking––was, in
fact, never pursued and, as a consequence, the lots expropriated were abandoned. Be that as it
may, the two groups of landowners can, in an action to compel MCIAA to make good its oral
undertaking to allow repurchase, adduce parol evidence to prove the transaction.
At any rate, the objection on the admissibility of evidence on the basis of the Statute of Frauds
may be waived if not timely raised. Records tend to support the conclusion that MCIAA did not,
as the Ouanos and the Inocians posit, object to the introduction of parol evidence to prove its
commitment to allow the former landowners to repurchase their respective properties upon the
occurrence of certain events.
In a bid to deny the lot owners the right to repurchase, MCIAA, citing cases,[31] points to the
dispositive part of the decision in Civil Case R-1881 which, as couched, granted the Republic
absolute title to the parcels of land declared expropriated. The MCIAA is correct about the
unconditional tone of the dispositive portion of the decision, but that actuality would not carry
the day for the agency. Addressing the matter of the otherwise absolute tenor of the CFI’s
disposition in Civil Case No. R-1881, the Court, in Heirs of Moreno, after taking stock of the
ensuing portion of the body of the CFI’s decision, said:
As for the public purpose of the expropriation proceeding, it cannot now be
doubted. Although MactanAirportis being constructed, it does not take away the actual
usefulness and importance of the LahugAirport: it is handling the air traffic of both civilian and
military. From it aircrafts fly to Mindanao and Visayas and pass thru it on their flights to the
North and Manila. Then, no evidence was adduced to show how soon is the Mactan Airport to
be placed in operation and whether the Lahug Airport will be closed immediately thereafter. It
is up to the other departments of the Government to determine said matters. The Court cannot
substitute its judgments for those of the said departments or agencies. In the absence of such
showing, the court will presume that the Lahug Airport will continue to be in
operation.[32] (Emphasis supplied.)
We went on to state as follows:
While the trial court in Civil Case No. R-1881 could have simply acknowledged the presence of
public purpose for the exercise of eminent domain regardless of the survival of the Lahug
Airport, the trial court in its Decision chose not to do so but instead prefixed its finding of public
purpose upon its understanding that ‘Lahug Airport will continue to be in operation’. Verily,
these meaningful statements in the body of the Decision warrant the conclusion that the
expropriated properties would remain to be so until it was confirmed that Lahug Airport was no
longer ‘in operation’. This inference further implies two (2) things: (a) after the Lahug Airport
ceased its undertaking as such and the expropriated lots were not being used for any airport
expansion project, the rights vis-à-vis the expropriated lots x x x as between the State and their
former owners, petitioners herein, must be equitably adjusted; and (b) the foregoing
unmistakable declarations in the body of the Decision should merge with and become an intrinsic
part of the fallo thereof which under the premises is clearly inadequate since the dispositive
portion is not in accord with the findings as contained in the body thereof.[33]
Not to be overlooked of course is what the Court said in its Resolution disposing of MCIAA’s
motion to reconsider the original ruling in Heirs of Moreno. In that resolution, We stated that
the fallo of the decision in Civil Case R-1881 should be viewed and understood in connection
with the entire text, which contemplated a return of the property taken if the airport expansion
project were abandoned. For ease of reference, following is what the Court wrote:
Moreover, we do not subscribe to the [MCIAA’s] contention that since the possibility of the
LahugAirport’s closure was actually considered by the trial court, a stipulation on reversion or
repurchase was so material that it should not have been discounted by the court a quo in its
decision in Civil Case No. R-1881, if, in fact, there was one. We find it proper to cite, once more,
this Court’s ruling that the fallo of the decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 must be read in
reference to the other portions of the decision in which it forms a part. A reading of the Court’s
judgment must not be confined to the dispositive portion alone; rather it should be meaningfully
construed in unanimity with the ratio decidendi thereof to grasp the true intent and meaning of a
decision.[34]
The Court has, to be sure, taken stock of Fery v. Municipality of Cabanatuan,[35] a case
MCIAA cites at every possible turn, where the Court made these observations:
If, for example, land is expropriated for a particular purpose, with the condition that when that
purpose is ended or abandoned the property shall return to its former owner, then of course,
when the purpose is terminated or abandoned, the former owner reacquires the property so
expropriated. x x x If, upon the contrary, however the decree of expropriation gives to the entity
a fee simple title, then, of course, the land becomes the absolute property of the expropriator x x
x and in that case the non-user does not have the effect of defeating the title acquired by the
expropriation proceedings x x x.
Fery notwithstanding, MCIAA cannot really rightfully say that it has absolute title to the
lots decreed expropriated in Civil Case No. R-1881. The correct lesson of Fery is captured by
what the Court said in that case, thus: “the government acquires only such rights in expropriated
parcels of land as may be allowed by the character of its title over the properties.” In light of our
disposition in Heirs of Moreno and Tudtud, the statement immediately adverted to means that in
the event the particular public use for which a parcel of land is expropriated is abandoned, the
owner shall not be entitled to recover or repurchase it as a matter of right, unless such recovery
or repurchase is expressed in or irresistibly deducible from the condemnation judgment. But
as has been determined below, the decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 enjoined MCIAA, as a
condition of approving expropriation, to allow recovery or repurchase upon abandonment of the
Lahug airport project. To borrow from our underlying decision in Heirs of Moreno, “[n]o doubt,
the return or repurchase of the condemned properties of petitioners could readily be justified as
the manifest legal effect of consequence of the trial court’s underlying presumption that ‘Lahug
Airport will continue to be in operation’ when it granted the complaint for eminent domain and
the airport discontinued its activities.”[36]
Providing added support to the Ouanos and the Inocians’ right to repurchase is what
in Heirs of Moreno was referred to as constructive trust, one that is akin to the implied trust
expressed in Art. 1454 of the Civil Code,[37] the purpose of which is to prevent unjust
enrichment.[38] In the case at bench, the Ouanos and the Inocians parted with their respective
lots in favor of the MCIAA, the latter obliging itself to use the realties for the expansion of
Lahug Airport; failing to keep its end of the bargain, MCIAA can be compelled by the former
landowners to reconvey the parcels of land to them, otherwise, they would be denied the use of
their properties upon a state of affairs that was not conceived nor contemplated when the
expropriation was authorized. In effect, the government merely held the properties condemned in
trust until the proposed public use or purpose for which the lots were condemned was actually
consummated by the government. Since the government failed to perform the obligation that is
the basis of the transfer of the property, then the lot owners Ouanos and Inocians can demand the
reconveyance of their old properties after the payment of the condemnation price.
Constructive trusts are fictions of equity that courts use as devices to remedy any situation
in which the holder of the legal title, MCIAA in this case, may not, in good conscience, retain the
beneficial interest. We add, however, as in Heirs of Moreno, that the party seeking the aid of
equity––the landowners in this instance, in establishing the trust––must himself do equity in a
manner as the court may deem just and reasonable.
The Court, in the recent MCIAA v. Lozada, Sr., revisited and abandoned the Fery ruling
that the former owner is not entitled to reversion of the property even if the public purpose were
not pursued and were abandoned, thus:
On this note, we take this opportunity to revisit our ruling in Fery, which involved an
expropriation suit commenced upon parcels of land to be used as a site for a public market.
Instead of putting up a public market, respondent Cabanatuan constructed residential houses for
lease on the area. Claiming that the municipality lost its right to the property taken since it did
not pursue its public purpose, petitioner Juan Fery, the former owner of the lots expropriated,
sought to recover his properties. However, as he had admitted that, in 1915, respondent
Cabanatuan acquired a fee simple title to the lands in question, judgment was rendered in favor
of the municipality, following American jurisprudence, particularly City of Fort Wayne v. Lake
Shore & M.S. RY. Co., McConihay v. Theodore Wright, and Reichling v. Covington Lumber
Co., all uniformly holding that the transfer to a third party of the expropriated real property,
which necessarily resulted in the abandonment of the particular public purpose for which the
property was taken, is not a ground for the recovery of the same by its previous owner, the title
of the expropriating agency being one of fee simple.
Obviously, Fery was not decided pursuant to our now sacredly held constitutional right that
private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.It is well settled that
the taking of private property by the Governments power of eminent domain is subject to two
mandatory requirements: (1) that it is for a particular public purpose; and (2) that just
compensation be paid to the property owner. These requirements partake of the nature of implied
conditions that should be complied with to enable the condemnor to keep the property
expropriated.
More particularly, with respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should
commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation
filed, failing which, it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, it is then
incumbent upon the expropriator to return the said property to its private owner, if the
latter desires to reacquire the same. Otherwise, the judgment of expropriation suffers an
intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one indispensable element for the proper exercise of the power of
eminent domain, namely, the particular public purpose for which the property will be
devoted. Accordingly, the private property owner would be denied due process of law, and the
judgment would violate the property owners right to justice, fairness, and equity.
In light of these premises, we now expressly hold that the taking of private property, consequent
to the Governments exercise of its power of eminent domain, is always subject to the condition
that the property be devoted to the specific public purpose for which it was taken. Corollarily, if
this particular purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all pursued, and is peremptorily
abandoned, then the former owners, if they so desire, may seek the reversion of the property,
subject to the return of the amount of just compensation received. In such a case, the exercise of
the power of eminent domain has become improper for lack of the required factual
justification.[39] (Emphasis supplied.)
Clinging to Fery, specifically the fee simple concept underpinning it, is no longer
compelling, considering the ensuing inequity such application entails. Too, the Court
resolved Fery not under the cover of any of the Philippine Constitutions, each decreeing that
private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. The twin elements
of just compensation and public purpose are, by themselves, direct limitations to the exercise of
eminent domain, arguing, in a way, against the notion of fee simple title. The fee does not vest
until payment of just compensation.[40]
In esse, expropriation is forced private property taking, the landowner being really without
a ghost of a chance to defeat the case of the expropriating agency. In other words, in
expropriation, the private owner is deprived of property against his will. Withal, the mandatory
requirement of due process ought to be strictly followed, such that the state must show, at the
minimum, a genuine need, an exacting public purpose to take private property, the purpose to be
specifically alleged or least reasonably deducible from the complaint.
Public use, as an eminent domain concept, has now acquired an expansive meaning to
include any use that is of “usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is productive of general
benefit [of the public].”[41] If the genuine public necessity—the very reason or condition as it
were—allowing, at the first instance, the expropriation of a private land ceases or disappears,
then there is no more cogent point for the government’s retention of the expropriated land. The
same legal situation should hold if the government devotes the property to another public use
very much different from the original or deviates from the declared purpose to benefit another
private person. It has been said that the direct use by the state of its power to oblige landowners
to renounce their productive possession to another citizen, who will use it predominantly for that
citizen’s own private gain, is offensive to our laws.[42]
A condemnor should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for
expropriation, failing which it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, then it
behooves the condemnor to return the said property to its private owner, if the latter so desires.
The government cannot plausibly keep the property it expropriated in any manner it pleases and,
in the process, dishonor the judgment of expropriation. This is not in keeping with the idea of
fair play,
The notion, therefore, that the government, via expropriation proceedings, acquires unrestricted
ownership over or a fee simple title to the covered land, is no longer tenable. We suggested as
much in Heirs of Moreno and in Tudtud and more recently in Lozada, Sr. Expropriated lands
should be differentiated from a piece of land, ownership of which was absolutely transferred by
way of an unconditional purchase and sale contract freely entered by two parties, one without
obligation to buy and the other without the duty to sell. In that case, the fee simple concept really
comes into play. There is really no occasion to apply the “fee simple concept” if the transfer is
conditional. The taking of a private land in expropriation proceedings is always conditioned on
its continued devotion to its public purpose. As a necessary corollary, once the purpose is
terminated or peremptorily abandoned, then the former owner, if he so desires, may seek its
reversion, subject of course to the return, at the very least, of the just compensation received.
To be compelled to renounce dominion over a piece of land is, in itself, an already bitter pill to
swallow for the owner. But to be asked to sacrifice for the common good and yield ownership to
the government which reneges on its assurance that the private property shall be for a public
purpose may be too much. But it would be worse if the power of eminent domain were
deliberately used as a subterfuge to benefit another with influence and power in the political
process, including development firms. The mischief thus depicted is not at all far-fetched with
the continued application of Fery. Even as the Court deliberates on these consolidated cases,
there is an uncontroverted allegation that the MCIAA is poised to sell, if it has not yet sold, the
areas in question to Cebu Property Ventures, Inc. This provides an added dimension to
abandon Fery.
Given the foregoing disquisitions, equity and justice demand the reconveyance by MCIAA of the
litigated lands in question to the Ouanos and Inocians. In the same token, justice and fair play
also dictate that the Ouanos and Inocian return to MCIAA what they received as just
compensation for the expropriation of their respective properties plus legal interest to be
computed from default, which in this case should run from the time MCIAA complies with the
reconveyance obligation.[43] They must likewise pay MCIAA the necessary expenses it might
have incurred in sustaining their respective lots and the monetary value of its services in
managing the lots in question to the extent that they, as private owners, were benefited thereby.
In accordance with Art. 1187 of the Civil Code on mutual compensation, MCIAA may keep
whatever income or fruits it may have obtained from the parcels of land expropriated. In turn, the
Ouanos and Inocians need not require the accounting of interests earned by the amounts they
received as just compensation.[44]
Following Art. 1189 of the Civil Code providing that “[i]f the thing is improved by its nature,
or by time, the improvement shall inure to the benefit of the creditor x x x,” the Ouanos and
Inocians do not have to settle the appreciation of the values of their respective lots as part of the
reconveyance process, since the value increase is merely the natural effect of nature and time.
Finally, We delete the award of PhP 50,000 and PhP 10,000, as attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses, respectively, made in favor of the Inocians by the Cebu City RTC in its judgment in
Civil Case No. CEB-18370, as later affirmed by the CA. As a matter of sound policy, no
premium should be set on the right to litigate where there is no doubt about the bona fides of the
exercise of such right,[45] as here, albeit the decision of MCIAA to resist the former
landowners’ claim eventually turned out to be untenable.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 168770 is GRANTED. Accordingly, the CA Decision
dated September 3, 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 78027 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Mactan-
Cebu International Airport Authority is ordered to reconvey subjectLot No. 763-A to petitioners
Anunciacion vda. de Ouano, Mario P. Ouano, Leticia Ouano Arnaiz, and Cielo Ouano Martinez.
The Register of Deeds of Cebu City is ordered to effect the necessary cancellation of title and
transfer it in the name of the petitioners within fifteen (15) days from finality of judgment.
Exceptions to the general rule that final and executory judgments are immutable
and unalterable
As a general rule, final and executory judgments are immutable and unalterable, except under
these recognized exceptions, to wit: (a) clerical errors; (b) nunc pro tunc entries which cause no
prejudice to any party; and (c) void judgments.[17] What the CA rendered on December 10,
2004 was a nunc pro tunc order clarifying the decretal portion of theAugust 29, 2002 Decision.
In Briones-Vazquez v. Court of Appeals,[18] nunc pro tunc judgments have been defined and
characterized as follows:
The object of a judgment nunc pro tunc is not the rendering of a new judgment and the
ascertainment and determination of new rights, but is one placing in proper form on the record,
the judgment that had been previously rendered, to make it speak the truth, so as to make it show
what the judicial action really was, not to correct judicial errors, such as to render a judgment
which the court ought to have rendered, in place of the one it did erroneously render, nor to
supply nonaction by the court, however erroneous the judgment may have been.[19]
By filing the instant petition for review with Us, petitioners would like to appeal anew the merits
of the illegal dismissal case filed by respondent against petitioners raising the same arguments
which had long been passed upon and decided in the August 29, 2002 CA Decision which had
already attained finality. As the CA said in denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the
assailedDecember 10, 2004Resolution, to wit:
It is basic that once a decision becomes final and executory, it is immutable and unalterable.
Private respondents’ (herein petitioners) motion for reconsideration seeks a modification or
reversal of this Court’s August 29, 2002 decision, which has long become final and executory, as
in fact, it is already in its execution stage. It may no longer be modified by this Court or even
by the Highest Court of the land.
It should be sufficiently clear to private respondents (herein petitioners) that the December 10,
2004 Resolution was issued merely to clarify a seeming ambiguity in the decision but as stressed
therein, it is neither an amendment nor a rectification of a perceived error therein. The instant
motion for reconsideration has, therefore, no merit at all.[20]
We find that petitioners’ action is merely a subterfuge to alter or modify the final and executory
Decision of the CA which we cannot countenance without violating procedural rules and
jurisprudence.
In Navarro v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company,[21] We discussed the rule on

immutability of judgment and said:
No other procedural law principle is indeed more settled than that once a
judgment becomes final, it is no longer subject to change, revision, amendment or reversal,
except only for correction of clerical errors, or the making of nunc pro tunc entries which cause
no prejudice to any party, or where the judgment itself is void. The underlying reason for the rule
is two-fold: (1) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus make orderly the
discharge of judicial business, and (2) to put judicial controversies to an end, at the risk of
occasional errors, inasmuch as controversies cannot be allowed to drag on indefinitely and the
rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time.
As the Court declared in Yau v. Silverio,
Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective
and efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party
be, not through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore
guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an
end to controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them.
Indeed, just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed
period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of
his case by the execution and satisfaction of the judgment. Any attempt to thwart this rigid rule
and deny the prevailing litigant his right to savor the fruit of his victory must immediately be
struck down. Thus, in Heirs of Wenceslao Samper v. Reciproco-Noble, we had occasion to
emphasize the significance of this rule, to wit:
It is an important fundamental principle in our Judicial system that every litigation
must come to an end x x x Access to the courts is guaranteed. But there must be a limit thereto.
Once a litigant’s rights have been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a competent court, he
should not be granted an unbridled license to come back for another try. The prevailing party
should not be harassed by subsequent suits. For, if endless litigations were to be encouraged,
then unscrupulous litigants will multiply in number to the detriment of the administration of
justice.[22]
Posted in Decision, Judgment | Tagged Exceptions to the general that final and executory
judgments are immutable and unalterable | Leave a comment
When does a person or group guilty of unjust enrichment?

As a rule, a contract is perfected upon the meeting of the minds of the two parties. Under Article
1475[13] of the Civil Code,a contract of sale is perfected the moment there is a meeting of the
minds on the thing which is the object of the contract and on the price.
In the case of Traders Royal Bank v. Cuison Lumber Co., Inc.,[14] the Court ruled:
Under the law, a contract is perfected by mere consent, that is, from the moment that there is a
meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause that constitute the contract.
The law requires that the offer must be certain and the acceptance absolute and unqualified. An
acceptance of an offer may be express and implied; a qualified offer constitutes a counter-offer.
Case law holds that an offer, to be considered certain, must be definite, while an acceptance is
considered absolute and unqualified when it is identical in all respects with that of the offer so as
to produce consent or a meeting of the minds. We have also previously held that the
ascertainment of whether there is a meeting of minds on the offer and acceptance depends on the
circumstances surrounding the case.
… the offer must be certain and definite with respect to the cause or consideration and object of
the proposed contract, while the acceptance of this offer – express or implied – must be
unmistakable, unqualified, and identical in all respects to the offer. The required concurrence,
however, may not always be immediately clear and may have to be read from the attendant
circumstances; in fact, a binding contract may exist between the parties whose minds have met,
although they did not affix their signatures to any written document. (Italics supplied.)
Also, in Manila Metal Container Corporation v. Philippine National Bank,[15] the Court
ruled,
A qualified acceptance or one that involves a new proposal constitutes a counter-offer
and a rejection of the original offer. A counter-offer is considered in law, a rejection of the
original offer and an attempt to end the negotiation between the parties on a different basis.
Consequently, when something is desired which is not exactly what is proposed in the offer, such
acceptance is not sufficient to guarantee consent because any modification or variation from the
terms of the offer annuls the offer. The acceptance must be identical in all respects with that of
the offer so as to produce consent or meeting of the minds. (Italics supplied.)
In the present case, Medrano’s offer to sell the shares of the minority stockholders at the
price of 65% of the par value was not absolutely and unconditionally accepted by DBP. DBP
imposed several conditions to its acceptance and it is clear that Medrano indeed tried in good
faith to comply with the conditions given by DBP but unfortunately failed to do so. Hence, there
was no birth of a perfected contract of sale between the parties.
The petitioner is also correct that Paragraph 1, Article 1545 of the Civil Code speaks of a
perfected contract of sale. Paragraph 1, Article 1545 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 1545. Where the obligation of either party to a contract of sale is subject to any
condition which is not performed, such party may refuse to proceed with the contract or he may
waive performance of the condition. If the other party has promised that the condition should
happen or be performed, such first mentioned party may also treat the nonperformance of the
condition as a breach of warranty.
x x x x (Italics supplied.)
It is clear from a plain reading of this article that it speaks of a party to a contract of sale
who fails in the performance of his/her obligation. The application of this article presupposes
that there is a perfected contract between the parties and that one of them fails in the
performance of an obligation under the contract.
The present case does not fall under this article because there is no perfected contract of
sale to speak of. Medrano’s failure to comply with the conditions set forth by DBP prevented the
perfection of the contract of sale. Hence, Medrano and DBP remained as prospective-seller and
prospective-buyer and not parties to a contract of sale.
This notwithstanding, however, we cannot simply agree with DBP’s argument that since
there is no perfected contract of sale, DBP should not be ordered to pay Medrano any amount.
The factual scenario of this case took place in 1980 or over thirty (30) years
ago. Medrano had turned over and delivered his own shares of stock to DBP in his attempt to
comply with the conditions given by DBP. DBP then accepted the shares of stock as partial
fulfillment of the conditions that it imposed on Medrano. However, after the lapse of some time
and after it became clear that Medrano would not be able to comply with the conditions, DBP
decided to retain Medrano’s shares of stock without paying Medrano. After the realization that
DBP would in fact not pay him for his shares of stock, Medrano was constrained to file a suit to
enforce his rights.[16]
In civil law, DBP’s act of keeping the shares delivered by Medrano without paying for
them constitutes unjust enrichment. As we held in Car Cool Philippines, Inc. v. Ushio Realty and
Development Corporation[17],
… “[t]here is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of
another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental
principles of justice, equity and good conscience.” Article 22 of the Civil Code provides that
“[e]very person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or
comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall
return the same to him.” The principle of unjust enrichment under Article 22 requires two
conditions: (1) that a person is benefited without a valid basis or justification, and (2) that such
benefit is derived at another’s expense or damage.
It was not proper for DBP to hold on to Medrano’s shares of stock after it became
obvious that he will not be able to comply with the conditions for the contract of sale. From that
point onwards, the prudent and fair thing to do for DBP was to return Medrano’s shares because
DBP had no just or legal ground to retain them.
We find that equitable considerations militate against DBP’s claimed right over the subject
shares. First, it is clear that DBP did not buy the shares from Medrano as it even asserts there
was no perfected contract of sale because of the failure of the latter to comply with DBP’s
conditions. Second, it cannot be said that Medrano voluntarily donated his shares of stock as he
is in fact still trying to recover them 30 years later. Third, it cannot be said that DBP was merely
holding the shares of stock for safekeeping as DBP even claims that the shares were transferred
to the APT (now PMO). In fine, there is no reason whatsoever for DBP to continue in the
possession of the shares of stock against Medrano. For nearly 30 years, Medrano was deprived of
his shares without any compensation at all from DBP. To this Court, such situation is
tantamount to the loss of respondent’s shares of stock, by reason of DBP’s unjustified retention.
Posted in Civil Law, Obligations and Contracts, Sales, Unjust Enrichment | Tagged When does a
person or group guilty of unjust enrichment? | Leave a comment
A lack of diligence by a party claiming an estoppel is generally fatal.

Substantially, FAT KEE primarily argues there was neither any agreement to enter into a foreign
currency-based transaction, nor to use a dollar exchange rate of P37:US$1. The invoice receipts
denominated in US dollars were unilaterally prepared by ONLINE. Similarly, the Accounting
Department of ONLINE required that the Purchase Order to be submitted by FAT KEE be
denominated in US dollars and Frederick Huang, Jr. merely complied with the same upon the
instructions of Payoyo. Contrary to ONLINE’s claim, it issued the SOA dated December 9,
1997 with the alleged unpaid obligation of FAT KEE quoted in Philippine pesos. FAT KEE also
takes issue with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that it assented to the payment in US dollars
of the transactions covered under Invoice Nos. 4680, 4838, 5090 and 5096. Lastly, FAT KEE
reiterates the ruling of the RTC that ONLINE was estopped from seeking payment in US dollars
since the outstanding obligation of FAT KEE was denominated in Philippine pesos in the SOA
dated December 9, 1997. Claiming that the SOA was its only basis for payment, FAT KEE
allegedly paid its obligations in accordance therewith and ONLINE duly accepted the payments.
After a meticulous review of the records, we resolve to deny the petition.
FAT KEE subscribes to the rulings of the RTC in the Decision dated November 7, 2000 and the
Order dated July 25, 2001. The trial court found that there was no agreement as to the exchange
rate for the conversion of the outstanding balance of FAT KEE to Philippine pesos. A reading of
the RTC rulings reveals that the trial court principally relied on the SOA dated December 9,
1997 and the testimony of Frederick Huang, Jr. in setting the exchange rate at P34:US$1. The
RTC ruled that ONLINE was estopped from claiming otherwise since FAT KEE actually paid its
outstanding balance in accordance with the SOA. Furthermore, the RTC determined that
ONLINE failed to undertake any action to correct the SOA, which the latter claimed was
unauthorized. No disciplinary action was likewise taken against Edwin Morales, the employee
who allegedly issued the SOA without authority.
In British American Tobacco v. Camacho,[66] the Court emphasized the doctrine of estoppel as
follows:
Estoppel, an equitable principle rooted in natural justice, prevents persons from going back on
their own acts and representations, to the prejudice of others who have relied on them. The
principle is codified in Article 1431 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Through estoppel, an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making
it and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.
Estoppel can also be found in Rule 131, Section 2 (a) of the Rules of Court, viz:
Sec. 2. Conclusive presumptions. — The following are instances of conclusive presumptions:
(a) Whenever a party has by his own declaration, act or omission, intentionally and
deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot,
in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission be permitted to falsify it.
The elements of estoppel are: first, the actor who usually must have knowledge, notice or
suspicion of the true facts, communicates something to another in a misleading way, either by
words, conduct or silence; second, the other in fact relies, and relies reasonably or justifiably,
upon that communication; third, the other would be harmed materially if the actor is later
permitted to assert any claim inconsistent with his earlier conduct; and fourth, the actor knows,
expects or foresees that the other would act upon the information given or that a reasonable
person in the actor’s position would expect or foresee such action.[67]
In the instant case, we find that FAT KEE cannot invoke estoppel against ONLINE for the
latter’s issuance of the SOA on December 9, 1997. The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals’
ruling that any misconception on the part of FAT KEE engendered by the issuance of the SOA
should have already been rectified when the parties subsequently met on January 15, 1998. The
testimonial evidence of both ONLINE and FAT KEE establish that, during the meeting, the
parties tried but failed to reach an agreement as regards the payment of FAT KEE’s outstanding
obligation and the exchange rate to be applied thereto. Whether or not FAT KEE was duly
informed of the fact that the SOA was unauthorized is no longer of much importance. By their
act of submitting their respective proposals and counter-proposals on the mode of payment and
the exchange rate, FAT KEE and ONLINE demonstrated that it was not their intention to be
further bound by the SOA, especially with respect to the exchange rate to be used. Moreover,
FAT KEE only started making payments vis-à-vis the subject invoice receipts on March 17,
1998, or two months after the aforementioned meeting.
At this point, Mijares v. Court of Appeals[68] is instructive in declaring that:
One who claims the benefit of an estoppel on the ground that he has been misled by the
representations of another must not have been misled through his own want of reasonable care
and circumspection. A lack of diligence by a party claiming an estoppel is generally fatal. If the
party conducts himself with careless indifference to means of information reasonably at hand, or
ignores highly suspicious circumstances, he may not invoke the doctrine of estoppel. Good faith
is generally regarded as requiring the exercise of reasonable diligence to learn the truth, and
accordingly estoppel is denied where the party claiming it was put on inquiry as to the truth and
had available means for ascertaining it, at least where actual fraud has not been practised on the
party claiming the estoppel.[69]
Thus, after participating in the meeting on January 15, 1998, submitting its own proposals and
further renegotiating for the lowering of the exchange rate, FAT KEE cannot anymore insist that
it was completely under the impression that the applicable exchange rate was P34:US$1 as
purportedly indicated in the December 9, 1997 SOA.
Anent the proper exchange rate to be applied in this case, we likewise uphold the ruling of the
Court of Appeals that estoppel finds application in this case as regards the implied acquiescence
of ONLINE to the use of the P37:US$1 exchange rate. On March 2, 1998, after a series of
proposals on the conversion rate to be applied, FAT KEE finally offered to settle its outstanding
balance at the rate of P37:US$1. To this offer, ONLINE did not respond. Thereafter, on March
17, 1998, FAT KEE began remitting payments continuously, which ONLINE duly
accepted. Following the dictum stated in British American Tobacco, ONLINE communicated,
through its silence and acceptance of payments, that it was agreeable to the P37:US$1
rate. Indeed, ONLINE should not be allowed to adopt a contrary position to the detriment of
FAT KEE.
Premises considered, we find therefore that the applicable exchange rate to determine the
outstanding balance of FAT KEE is P37:US$1. We note, however, that the Court of Appeals
inadvertently erred in computing the remaining balance to be paid by FAT KEE. According to
Invoice Nos. 4680, 4838, 5090 and 5096, the total unpaid amount is US$136,149.43. By
applying P37:US$1 rate on the unpaid amount, the resulting balance is P5,037,528.91,
not P5,148,528.91 as determined by the Court of Appeals. As FAT KEE has already paid a total
amount of P4,758,574.18,[70] the total unpaid amount owed to ONLINE is P278,954.73.
Posted in Estoppel | Tagged A lack of diligence by a party claiming an estoppel is generally
fatal. | Leave a comment
When a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves
substantial and controversial alterations including those on citizenship, legitimacy of
paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements
of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated.
A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE OF NAME) using valid and
meritorious grounds including (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence such as
legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and
been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a
sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and
without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no
showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of
name would prejudice public interest.[17] Respondent’s reason for changing his name cannot be
considered as one of, or analogous to, recognized grounds, however.
The present petition must be differentiated from Alfon v. Republic of the
Philippines.[18] In Alfon, the Court allowed the therein petitioner, Estrella Alfon, to use the
name that she had been known since childhood in order to avoid confusion. Alfon did not deny
her legitimacy, however. She merely sought to use the surname of her mother which she had
been using since childhood. Ruling in her favor, the Court held that she was lawfully entitled to
use her mother’s surname, adding that the avoidance of confusion was justification enough to
allow her to do so. In the present case, however, respondent denies his legitimacy.
The change being sought in respondent’s petition goes so far as to affect his legal status in
relation to his parents. It seeks to change his legitimacy to that of illegitimacy. Rule 103 then
would not suffice to grant respondent’s supplication.
Labayo-Rowe v. Republic[19] categorically holds that “changes which may affect the civil status
from legitimate to illegitimate . . . are substantial and controversial alterations which can only be
allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings . . .”
Since respondent’s desired change affects his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, Rule
108 applies. It reads:
SECTION 1. Who may file petition.—Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree
concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a
verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the [RTC]
of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
xxxx
SEC. 3. Parties.—When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is

sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be
affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. –Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix
the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given
to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once
a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province. (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns one’s civil status should be filed in the
civil registry in which the entry is sought to be cancelled or corrected – that ofMakatiin the
present case, and “all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby”
should be made parties to the proceeding.
As earlier stated, however, the petition of respondent was filed not inMakatiwhere his birth
certificate was registered but inQuezon City. And as the above-mentioned title of the petition
filed by respondent before the RTC shows, neither the civil registrar ofMakatinor his father and
mother were made parties thereto.
Respondent nevertheless cites Republic v. Capote[20] in support of his claim that his change of
name was effected through an appropriate adversary proceeding.
Republic v. Belmonte,[21] illuminates, however:
The procedure recited in Rule 103 regarding change of name and in Rule 108 concerning the
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry are separate and distinct. They may not
be substituted one for the other for the sole purpose of expediency. To hold otherwise would
render nugatory the provisions of the Rules of Court allowing the change of one’s name or the
correction of entries in the civil registry only upon meritorious grounds. . . . (emphasis,
capitalization and underscoring supplied)
Even assuming arguendo that respondent had simultaneously availed of these two statutory
remedies, respondent cannot be said to have sufficiently complied with Rule 108. For, as
reflected above, aside from improper venue, he failed to implead the civil registrar
of Makati and all affected parties as respondents in the case.
Republic v. Labrador[22] mandates that “a petition for a substantial correction or change of
entries in the civil registry should have as respondents the civil registrar, as well as all other
persons who have or claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby.” It cannot be
gainsaid that change of status of a child in relation to his parents is a substantial correction or
change of entry in the civil registry.
Labayo-Rowe[23] highlights the necessity of impleading indispensable parties in a petition
which involves substantial and controversial alterations. In that case, the therein petitioner
Emperatriz Labayo-Rowe (Emperatriz) filed a petition for the correction of entries in the birth
certificates of her children, Vicente Miclat, Jr. and Victoria Miclat, in the Civil Registry of San
Fernando, Pampanga. Emperatriz alleged that her name appearing in the birth certificates is
Beatriz, which is her nickname, but her full name is Emperatriz; and her civil status appearing in
the birth certificate of her daughter Victoria as “married” on “1953 Bulan” are erroneous because
she was not married to Vicente Miclat who was the one who furnished the data in said birth
certificate.
The trial court found merit in Emperatriz’s petition and accordingly directed the local civil
registrar to change her name appearing in her children’s birth certificates from Beatriz to
Emperatriz; and to correct her civil status inVictoria’s birth certificate from “married” to “single”
and the date and place of marriage to “no marriage.”
On petition before this Court after the Court of Appeals found that the order of the trial court
involved a question of law, the Court nullified the trial court’s order directing the change of
Emperatriz’ civil status and the filiation of her child Victoria in light of the following
observations:
x x x x Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General, all other indispensable parties should
have been made respondents. They include not only the declared father of the child but the
child as well, together with the paternal grandparents, if any, as their hereditary rights would be
adversely affected thereby. All other persons who may be affected by the change should be
notified or represented. The truth is best ascertained under an adversary system of justice.
The right of the child Victoria to inherit from her parents would be substantially impaired if her
status would be changed from “legitimate” to “illegitimate.” Moreover, she would be exposed to
humiliation and embarrassment resulting from the stigma of an illegitimate filiation that she will
bear thereafter. The fact that the notice of hearing of the petition was published in a newspaper
of general circulation and notice thereof was served upon the State will not change the nature of
the proceedings taken. Rule 108, like all the other provisions of the Rules of Court, was
promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-making authority under Section 13,
Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, which directs that such rules “shall not diminish, increase
or modify substantive rights.” If Rule 108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or harmless
changes or corrections of errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, so
as to comprehend substantial and controversial alterations concerning citizenship, legitimacy of
paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, without observing the proper proceedings as
earlier mentioned, said rule would thereby become an unconstitutional exercise which
would tend to increase or modify substantive rights. This situation is not contemplated under
Article 412 of the Civil Code.[24] (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
As for the requirement of notice and publication, Rule 108 provides:
SEC. 4. Notice and publication.—Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order,
fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to
be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to
be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation
in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition.—The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest
under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15)
days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his
opposition thereto. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
A reading of these related provisions readily shows that Rule 108 clearly mandates two sets of
notices to different “potential oppositors.” The first notice is that given to the “persons named in
the petition” and the second (which is through publication) is that given to other persons who are
not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties, such
as creditors. That two sets of notices are mandated under the above-quoted Section 4 is validated
by the subsequent Section 5, also above-quoted, which provides for two periods (for the two
types of “potential oppositors”) within which to file an opposition (15 days from notice or from
the last date of publication).
This is the overriding principle laid down in Barco v. Court of Appeals.[25] In that case, Nadina
Maravilla (Nadina) filed a petition for correction of entries in the birth certificate of her daughter
June from June Salvacion Maravilla to June Salvacion “Gustilo,” Armando Gustilo being,
according to Nadina, her daughter’s real father. Gustilo in fact filed before the trial court
a “CONSTANCIA” wherein he acknowledged June as his daughter. The trial court granted the
petition.
After Gustilo died, his son Jose Vicente Gustilo filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
annulment of the Order of the trial court granting the change of June’s family name to Gustilo.
Milagros Barco (Barco), natural guardian of her minor daughter Mary Joy Ann Gustilo, filed
before the appellate court a motion for intervention, alleging that Mary Joy had a legal interest in
the annulment of the trial court’s Order as Mary Joy was, by Barco’s claim, also fathered by
Gustilo.
The appellate court dismissed the petition for annulment and complaint-in-intervention.
On appeal by Barco, this Court ruled that she should have been impleaded in Nadina’s petition
for correction of entries of the birth certificate of Mary Joy. But since a petitioner, like Nadina,
is not expected to exhaustively identify all the affected parties, the subsequent publication of the
notice cured the omission of Barco as a party to the case. Thus the Court explained:
Undoubtedly, Barco is among the parties referred to in Section 3 of Rule 108. Her interest was
affected by the petition for correction, as any judicial determination that June was the daughter of
Armando would affect her ward’s share in the estate of her father. It cannot be established
whether Nadina knew of Mary Joy’s existence at the time she filed the petition for
correction. Indeed, doubt may always be cast as to whether a petitioner under Rule 108
would know of all the parties whose interests may be affected by the granting of a
petition. For example, a petitioner cannot be presumed to be aware of all the legitimate or
illegitimate offsprings of his/her spouse or paramour. x x x x.
xxxx
The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the subsequent
judgment on the petition. The sweep of the decision would cover even parties who should
have been impleaded under Section 3, Rule 108 but were inadvertently left out. x x x
x.[26] (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
Meanwhile, in Republic v. Kho,[27] Carlito Kho (Carlito) and his siblings named the civil
registrar as the sole respondent in the petition they filed for the correction of entries in their
respective birth certificates in the civil registry ofButuanCity, and correction of entries in the
birth certificates of Carlito’s minor children. Carlito and his siblings requested the correction in
their birth certificates of the citizenship of their mother Epifania to “Filipino,” instead of
“Chinese,” and the deletion of the word “married” opposite the phrase “Date of marriage of
parents” because their parents ─ Juan and Epifania ─ were not married. And Carlito requested
the correction in the birth certificates of their children of his and his wife’s date of marriage to
reflect the actual date of their marriage as appearing in their marriage certificate. In the course of
the hearing of the petition, Carlito also sought the correction of the name of his wife from
Maribel to “Marivel.”
The Khos’ mother Epifania took the witness stand where she declared that she was not married
to Juan who died before the filing of the Khos’ petition.
The trial court granted the petition.
On the issue of whether the failure to implead Marivel and the Khos’ parents rendered the trial of
the petition short of the required adversary proceedings and the trial court’s judgment void, this
Court held that when all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are followed, the
publication of the notice of hearing cures the failure to implead an indispensable party. In so
ruling, the Court noted that the affected parties were already notified of the proceedings in the
case since the petitioner-siblings Khos were the ones who initiated the petition respecting their
prayer for correction of their citizenship, and Carlito respecting the actual date of his marriage to
his wife; and, with respect to the Khos’ petition for change of their civil status from legitimate to
illegitimate, their mother Epifania herself took the witness stand declaring that she was not
married to their father.
What is clear then in Barco and Kho is the mandatory directive under Section 3 of Rule 108 to
implead the civil registrar and the parties who would naturally and legally be affected by the
grant of a petition for correction or cancellation of entries. Non-impleading, however, as party-
respondent of one who is inadvertently left out or is not established to be known by the petitioner
to be affected by the grant of the petition or actually participates in the proceeding is notified
through publication.
IN FINE, when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register
involves substantial and controversial alterations including those on citizenship, legitimacy of
paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule
108 of the Rules of Court is mandated.
Posted in Civil Register Law, Civil Status, Name | Tagged correction of an entry in the civil
register involves substantial and controversial alterations including those on citizenship
legitimacy of paternity or filiation or legitimacy of marriage a strict c, Rule 103 and 108 | 1
Comment
Does the suspension of “all claims” as an incident to a corporate rehabilitation also

contemplate the suspension of criminal charges filed against the corporate officers of the
distressed corporation?
The issue to be resolved then is: does the suspension of “all claims” as an incident to a corporate
rehabilitation also contemplate the suspension of criminal charges filed against the corporate
officers of the distressed corporation?
This Court rules in the negative.
In Rosario v. Co[24] (Rosario), a case of recent vintage, the issue resolved by this Court was
whether or not during the pendency of rehabilitation proceedings, criminal charges for violation
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 should be suspended, was disposed of as follows:
x x x the gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a
worthless check; that is, a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is
designed to prevent damage to trade, commerce, and banking caused by worthless checks.
In Lozano v. Martinez,this Court declared that it is not the nonpayment of an obligation which
the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The
thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making and circulation of
worthless checks. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is
proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense
against public order. The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order
to deter him and others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from society,
to reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order. Hence, the criminal
prosecution is designed to promote the public welfare by punishing offenders and deterring
others.
Consequently, the filing of the case for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is not a “claim” that can be
enjoined within the purview of P.D. No. 902-A. True, although conviction of the accused for
the alleged crime could result in the restitution, reparation or indemnification of the
private offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by reason of the felonious act
of the accused, nevertheless, prosecution for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is a criminal action.
A criminal action has a dual purpose, namely, the punishment of the offender and indemnity to
the offended party. The dominant and primordial objective of the criminal action is the
punishment of the offender. The civil action is merely incidental to and consequent to the
conviction of the accused. The reason for this is that criminal actions are primarily intended to
vindicate an outrage against the sovereignty of the state and to impose the appropriate penalty for
the vindication of the disturbance to the social order caused by the offender. On the other hand,
the action between the private complainant and the accused is intended solely to indemnify the
former.[25]
Rosario is at fours with the case at bar. Petitioners are charged with violations of Section
28 (h) of the SSS law, in relation to Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code, or Estafa. The
SSS law clearly “criminalizes” the non-remittance of SSS contributions by an employer to
protect the employees from unscrupulous employers. Therefore, public interest requires that the
said criminal acts be immediately investigated and prosecuted for the protection of society.
The rehabilitation of SIHI and the settlement of claims against the corporation is not a legal
ground for the extinction of petitioners’ criminal liabilities. There is no reason why criminal
proceedings should be suspended during corporate rehabilitation, more so, since the prime
purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter him and others from
committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, reform and rehabilitate him
or, in general, to maintain social order.[26] As correctly observed in Rosario,[27] it would be
absurd for one who has engaged in criminal conduct could escape punishment by the mere filing
of a petition for rehabilitation by the corporation of which he is an officer.
The prosecution of the officers of the corporation has no bearing on the pending rehabilitation of
the corporation, especially since they are charged in their individual capacities. Such being the
case, the purpose of the law for the issuance of the stay order is not compromised, since the
appointed rehabilitation receiver can still fully discharge his functions as mandated by law. It
bears to stress that the rehabilitation receiver is not charged to defend the officers of the
corporation. If there is anything that the rehabilitation receiver might be remotely interested in is
whether the court also rules that petitioners are civilly liable. Such a scenario, however, is not a
reason to suspend the criminal proceedings, because as aptly discussed in Rosario, should the
court prosecuting the officers of the corporation find that an award or indemnification is
warranted, such award would fall under the category of claims, the execution of which would be
subject to the stay order issued by the rehabilitation court.[28] The penal sanctions as a
consequence of violation of the SSS law, in relation to the revised penal code can therefore be
implemented if petitioners are found guilty after trial. However, any civil indemnity awarded as a
result of their conviction would be subject to the stay order issued by the rehabilitation court.
Only to this extent can the order of suspension be considered obligatory upon any court, tribunal,
branch or body where there are pending actions for claims against the distressed corporation.[29]
On a final note, this Court would like to point out that Congress has recently enacted Republic
Act No. 10142, or the Financial Rehabilitation and Insolvency Act of 2010.[30] Section 18
thereof explicitly provides that criminal actions against the individual officer of a corporation are
not subject to the Stay or Suspension Order in rehabilitation proceedings, to wit:
The Stay or Suspension Order shall not apply:
xxxx
(g) any criminal action against individual debtor or owner, partner, director or officer of a debtor
shall not be affected by any proceeding commenced under this Act.
Withal, based on the foregoing discussion, this Court rules that there is no legal
impediment for Branch 51 to proceed with the cases filed against petitioners.
Posted in Action for Claims, Anti Bouncing Check, Corporate Rehabilitation, Insolvency
Act, SSS | Tagged Does the suspension of “all claims” as an incident to a corporate rehabilitation
also contemplate the suspension of criminal charges filed against the corporate officers of the
distressed corporat | Leave a comment
Nature and Features Corporate Rehabilitation

To begin with, corporate rehabilitation connotes the restoration of the debtor to a position of
successful operation and solvency, if it is shown that its continued operation is economically
feasible and its creditors can recover more, by way of the present value of payments projected in
the rehabilitation plan, if the corporation continues as a going concern than if it is immediately
liquidated.[17] It contemplates a continuance of corporate life and activities in an effort to
restore and reinstate the corporation to its former position of successful operation and solvency,
the purpose being to enable the company to gain a new lease on life and allow its creditors to be
paid their claims out of its earnings.[18]
A principal feature of corporate rehabilitation is the suspension of claims against the distressed
corporation. Section 6 (c) of Presidential Decree No. 902-A, as amended, provides for
suspension of claims against corporations undergoing rehabilitation, to wit:
Section 6 (c). x x x
x x x Provided, finally, that upon appointment of a management committee, rehabilitation

receiver, board or body, pursuant to this Decree, all actions for claims against corporations,
partnerships or associations under management or receivership pending before any court,
tribunal, board or body, shall be suspended accordingly.[19]
In November 21, 2000, this Court En Banc promulgated the Interim Rules of Procedure on
Corporate Rehabilitation,[20] Section 6, Rule 4 of which provides a stay order on all claims
against the corporation, thus:
Stay Order. – If the court finds the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, it shall, not
later than five (5) days from the filing of the petition, issue an Order x x x; (b) staying
enforcement of all claims, whether for money or otherwise and whether such enforcement is by
court action or otherwise, against the debtor, its guarantors and sureties not solidarily liable with
the debtor; x x x[21]
In Finasia Investments and Finance Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[22] the term “claim” has
been construed to refer to debts or demands of a pecuniary nature, or the assertion to have money
paid. The purpose for suspending actions for claims against the corporation in a rehabilitation
proceeding is to enable the management committee or rehabilitation receiver to effectively
exercise its/his powers free from any judicial or extrajudicial interference that might unduly
hinder or prevent the rescue of the debtor company.[23]
Posted in Action for Claims, Corporate Rehabilitation, Corporation Law | Leave a comment
Upon invoking the justifying circumstance of self-defense, the accused assumed the burden
of proving the justification of his act with clear and convincing evidence
An accused who asserts self-defense admits his infliction of the fatal blows and bears the burden
of satisfactorily establishing all the elements of self-defense. Otherwise, his conviction for the
felony of murder or homicide will be affirmed.
Specifically, the RTC and the CA correctly rejected Jose’s claim of self-defense and defense of a
relative because he did not substantiate it with clear and convincing proof.
The Revised Penal Code delineates the standards for self-defense and defense of a relative in
Article 11, viz:
Article 11. Justifying circumstances. The following do not incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances
concur:
First. Unlawful aggression;

Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.”
2. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse, ascendants, descendants, or
legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or his relatives by affinity in the same degrees
and those by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree, provided that the first and second
requisites prescribed in the next preceding circumstance are present, and the further requisite, in
case the provocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making defense had no part
therein.
xxx
Indeed, upon invoking the justifying circumstance of self-defense, Jose assumed the
burden of proving the justification of his act with clear and convincing evidence. This is because
his having admitted the killing required him to rely on the strength of his own evidence, not on
the weakness of the Prosecution’s evidence, which, even if it were weak, could not be
disbelieved in view of his admission.[6]
It is also notable that unlawful aggression is the condition sine qua non for the justifying
circumstances of self-defense and defense of a relative. There can be no self-defense unless the
victim committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to self-defense.[7] As the
CA pointed out, however, Jose did not support his claim that Jimmy had committed aggression
by punching Rodolfo and by throwing stones at him and his father.[8] In fact, he and his father
were not able to identify any weapon used by Jimmy aside from the stone that he supposedly
picked up from the ground. Even that testimony was contrary, for Jose testified that he had
unsheathed his bolo and hacked Jimmy after dodging the stone thrown at him. Plainly, he did not
establish with clear and convincing proof that Jimmy had assaulted him or his father as to pose to
either of them an imminent threat of great harm before he mounted his own attack on Jimmy.
Moreover, the post-mortem examination disclosed that Jimmy had sustained a total of seven
wounds: two incised wounds and five hack wounds.[9] Three of the hack wounds were inflicted
on Jimmy’s neck, one of which fatally extended to and cut the trachea, esophagus, and the
carotid and jugular vessels that supplied blood to the heart and brain of Jimmy.[10] Dr. Moll
Lee, the medico-legal expert, opined at the trial that the injuries were possibly sustained by
Jimmy from the assailant who was behind him and while he was already down.[11] This opinion
was consistent with Lilia’s testimony to the effect that Jose had attacked Jimmy from behind as
well as when Jimmy was already lying on the ground.[12] The nature, number, and gravity of
Jimmy’s wounds spoke not of defense on the part of Jose but of a criminal intent to kill
Jimmy.[13] They indicated beyond doubt the treacherous manner of the assault, that is, that Jose
thereby ensured that the killing would be without risk and would deny to Jimmy any opportunity
to defend himself.[14]
Lastly, the testimonies of Jose and Rodolfo were infected with inconsistencies. For one, Rodolfo
did not mention that his son had carried a bolo during the incident; instead, Rodolfo recalled that
Jose and Jimmy had engaged in a fistfight. [15] Also, Rodolfo’s claim that he chose to return
home after being badly hurt from Jimmy’s attack was unnatural, for, if that were true, he was
thereby unnaturally leaving his son to engage the attacker alone.
We modify the award of damages to make their amounts consistent with the law and
jurisprudence relating to an accused adjudged guilty of a crime covered by Republic Act No.
7659,[16] regardless of aggravating or mitigating circumstances.[17] The correct amounts
are P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; P75,000.00 as moral damages; and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages, all to be granted without proof or pleading. In addition, the Court notes that actual
damages awarded to the heirs was only P24,000.00. In furtherance of justice and consistent with
our ruling in People v. Villanueva[18] that when actual damages proven by receipts is lower
than P25,000.00, the award of P25,000.00 as temperate damages is justified in lieu of actual
damages of a lesser amount.[19]
A client is bound by the counsel’s acts, including even mistakes in the realm of
procedural technique
In its resolution dated August 14, 2003, the CA denied admission to the petition for review and
ordered it expunged from the records; and reiterated its March 13, 2002resolution of
dismissal.[1]
Aggrieved, the petitioner is now before the Court to plead his cause. He submits that Atty.
Besario’s reckless abandonment of his case effectively deprived him of his day in court and of
his right to due process; and that said former counsel’s actuation constituted reckless and gross
negligence that should not be binding against him.
The petition is denied due course.

That Atty. Besario was negligent in handling the petitioner’s case was clear. Indeed, his
abject failure to file the petition for review in the CA despite his two motions for extension for
that purpose warranted no other conclusion but that he was negligent.
Nonetheless, we find no justification to reverse the CA’s disposition of the appeal. The petitioner
was bound by Atty. Besario’s negligence.
The general rule is that a client is bound by the counsel’s acts, including even mistakes in the
realm of procedural technique.[2] The rationale for the rule is that a counsel, once retained, holds
the implied authority to do all acts necessary or, at least, incidental to the prosecution and
management of the suit in behalf of his client, such that any act or omission by counsel within
the scope of the authority is regarded, in the eyes of the law, as the act or omission of the client
himself.[3] A recognized exception to the rule is when the reckless or gross negligence of the
counsel deprives the client of due process of law. For the exception to apply, however, the gross
negligence should not be accompanied by the client’s own negligence or malice, considering that
the client has the duty to be vigilant in respect of his interests by keeping himself up-to-date on
the status of the case. Failing in this duty, the client should suffer whatever adverse judgment is
rendered against him.
Truly, a litigant bears the responsibility to monitor the status of his case, for no prudent
party leaves the fate of his case entirely in the hands of his lawyer. It is the client’s duty to be in
contact with his lawyer from time to time in order to be informed of the progress and
developments of his case;[4] hence, to merely rely on the bare reassurances of his lawyer that
everything is being taken care of is not enough.
Here, the petitioner took nearly 16 months from the issuance of the entry of judgment by the CA,
and almost 22 months from when the RTC affirmed the convictions before he actually filed his
petition for review in the CA. He ought to have been sooner alerted about his dire situation by
the fact that an unreasonably long time had lapsed since the RTC had handed down its dismissal
of his appeal without Atty. Besario having updated him on the developments, including showing
to him a copy of the expected petition for review. Also, he could have himself verified at the CA
whether or not the petition for review had been filed, especially upon realizing that Atty. Besario
had started making himself scarce to him. In short, the petitioner’s failure to know or to find out
the real status of his appeal rendered him undeserving of any sympathy from the Court vis-à-
vis the negligence of his former counsel.
The right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process, but is merely a statutory
privilege that may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the law.[5] The right is
unavoidably forfeited by the litigant who does not comply with the manner thus prescribed. So it
is with the petitioner.
Posted in Lawyer-Client | Tagged a client is bound by the counsel’s acts including even mistakes
in the realm of procedural technique | Leave a comment
Who may intervene in a case? When shall intervention be allowed?

Notwithstanding the intervenors’ compliance with the procedural requirements, their attempt to
intervene is doomed to fail.
Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings,
becomes a litigant therein to enable him, her or it to protect or preserve a right or interest which
may be affected by such proceedings.[16] It is a proceeding in a suit or action by which a third
person is permitted by the court to make himself a party, either joining plaintiff in claiming what
is sought by the complaint, or uniting with defendant in resisting the claims of plaintiff, or
demanding something adversely to both of them; the act or proceeding by which a third person
becomes a party in a suit pending between others; the admission, by leave of court, of a person
not an original party to pending legal proceedings, by which such person becomes a party thereto
for the protection of some right of interest alleged by him to be affected by such
proceedings.[17]
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court states:
SECTION 1. Who may intervene. — A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation,
or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or
of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court
shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of
the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenor’s rights may be fully protected
in a separate proceeding.
Under this Rule, intervention shall be allowed when a person has (1) a legal interest in the matter
in litigation; (2) or in the success of any of the parties; (3) or an interest against the parties; (4) or
when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or disposition of property in
the custody of the court or an officer thereof.[18] Moreover, the court must take into
consideration whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of
the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenor’s right or interest can be
adequately pursued and protected in a separate proceeding.
In the case at bar, the intervenors are claiming that they are the legitimate heirs of Estanislao
Miñoza and Inocencia Togono and not the original plaintiffs represented by Leila Hermosisima.
True, if their allegations were later proven to be valid claims, the intervenors would surely have a
legal interest in the matter in litigation. Nonetheless, this Court has ruled that the interest
contemplated by law must be actual, substantial, material, direct and immediate, and not simply
contingent or expectant. It must be of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor
will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.[19] Otherwise, if
persons not parties to the action were allowed to intervene, proceedings would become
unnecessarily complicated, expensive and interminable.[20]
Moreover, the intervenors’ contentions that Leila’s predecessors-in-interest executed, in fraud of
the intervenors, an extra judicial settlement of the estate of the late spouses Estanislao Miñoza
and Inocencia Togono and adjudicated unto themselves the estate of the deceased spouses, and
that subsequently, her predecessors-in-interest fraudulently and deceitfully sold the subject lots
to the NAC, would unnecessarily complicate and change the nature of the proceedings.
In addition to resolving who the true and legitimate heirs of Estanislao Miñoza and Inocencia
Togono are, the parties would also present additional evidence in support of this new allegation
of fraud, deceit, and bad faith and resolve issues of conflicting claims of ownership, authenticity
of certificates of titles, and regularity in their acquisition. Verily, this would definitely cause
unjust delay in the adjudication of the rights claimed by the original parties, which primarily
hinges only on the issue of whether or not the heirs represented by Leila have a right to
repurchase the subject properties from the MCIAA.
Verily, the allegation of fraud and deceit is an independent controversy between the original
parties and the intervenors. In general, an independent controversy cannot be injected into a suit
by intervention, hence, such intervention will not be allowed where it would enlarge the issues in
the action and expand the scope of the remedies. It is not proper where there are certain facts
giving the intervenor’s case an aspect peculiar to himself and differentiating it clearly from that
of the original parties; the proper course is for the would-be intervenor to litigate his claim in a
separate suit.[21] Intervention is not intended to change the nature and character of the action
itself, or to stop or delay the placid operation of the machinery of the trial. The remedy of
intervention is not proper where it will have the effect of retarding the principal suit or delaying
the trial of the action.[22]
To be sure, not only will the intervenors’ rights be fully protected in a separate proceeding, it
would best determine the rights of the parties in relation to the subject properties and the issue of
who the legitimate heirs of Estanislao Miñoza and Inocencia Togono, would be laid to rest.
Furthermore, the allowance or disallowance of a motion for intervention rests on the sound
discretion of the court after consideration of the appropriate circumstances.[23] It is not an
absolute right. The statutory rules or conditions for the right of intervention must be shown. The
procedure to secure the right to intervene is to a great extent fixed by the statute or rule, and
intervention can, as a rule, be secured only in accordance with the terms of the applicable
provision.[24]
Consequently, the denial of the motion to intervene by the RTC was but just and proper. The
conclusion of the RTC is not bereft of rational bases. It denied the motion to intervene in the
exercise of its sound discretion and after taking into consideration the particular circumstances of
the case.
Posted in Intervenors, Question and Answers | Tagged When shall intervention be
allowed?, Who may intervene in a case? | Leave a comment
What is punished in falsification of public documents? What are its elements?

The Information alleged that Guillergan committed falsification by making it appear in several
public documents that P1,519,000.00 in AFP funds intended for the CIAs’ payroll were paid for
that purpose when in truth these were just given to Rio, resulting in damage and prejudice to the
government. Although the charge was estafa in relation to Article 171 of the RPC, the facts
alleged in the information sufficiently made out a case for violation of Article 172 of which
Guillergan was convicted. What is important is that the Information described the latter offense
intelligibly and with reasonable certainty, enabling Guillergan to understand the charge against
him and suitably prepare his defense.[15]
What is punished in falsification of a public document is the violation of the public faith
and the destruction of the truth as solemnly proclaimed in it.[16] Generally, the elements of
Article 171 are: 1) the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public; 2) he takes
advantage of his official position; and 3) that he falsifies a document by committing any of the
ways it is done.[17]
On the other hand, the elements of falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article
172 are: 1) the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take
advantage of his official position; 2) the offender committed any of the acts of falsification
enumerated in Article 171; [18] and 3) the falsification was committed in a public or official or
commercial document.[19] All of the foregoing elements of Article 172 are present in this case.
First. Guillergan was a public officer when he committed the offense charged. He was the
comptroller to the PC/INP Command in Region 6. While the Information said that he took
advantage of his position in committing the crime, the Sandiganbayan found that his work as
comptroller did not include the preparation of the appointments and payrolls of CIAs. Nor did
he have official custody of the pertinent documents.[20] His official function was limited to
keeping the records of the resources that the command received from Camp Crame.[21] Still, he
took the liberty of intervening in the preparation of the time record, book, and payrolls in
question.
Second. The Information alleged that Guillergan committed the offense charged by
“causing it to appear that persons participated in an act or a proceeding when they did not in fact
so participate.”[22] In People v. Yanson-Dumancas,[23] the Court held that a person may induce
another to commit a crime in two ways: 1) by giving a price or offering a reward or promise; and
2) by using words of command. In this case, the Sandiganbayan found that Guillergan ordered
Butcon to sign the “receive” portion of the payrolls as payee to make it appear that persons
whose names appeared on the same had signed the document when they in fact did not.[24]
Third. There is no dispute that the falsification was committed on the time record, book,
and payrolls which were public documents.
What is more, given that some of the essential elements of Article 171 constitute the lesser
offense of falsification of public documents under Article 172, then the allegations in
the Information were sufficient to hold Guillergan liable under Article 172.
As a rule, the Court regards as conclusive on it the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan
unless these fall under certain established exceptions.[25] Since none of those exceptions can be
identified in this case, the Court must accord respect and weight to the Sandiganbayan’s
findings. It had the better opportunity to examine and evaluate the evidence presented before
it.[26] As aptly pointed out by the Sandiganbayan, to wit:
There are tell-tales signs that the agents listed on the payrolls did not receive their
salaries. First, x x x Guillergan declared that he personally turned over the entire amount
of [P1,519,000.00] to Gen. Rio. Second, Butcon’s narration that he was instructed by
Guillergan, to [affix his] initial at the receive portion of the payrolls. Lastly, according to
the records of the case, the office of Guillergan had no business in processing the payroll of
these personnel. x x x
Additionally, the appointment papers from which these payrolls were based do not
reveal any information about the acceptance of the appointments by the agents. In a letter
dated April 14, 1989 of the Anti-Graft Board of the Armed forces of the Philippines x x x
[to Ombudsman Vasquez], it was stated that the appointment papers of the agents “must”
be accompanied by the acceptance of the agents. These papers “should ordinarily” be
attached to the payrolls for proper clearing purposes. Since there were no acceptance
papers presented, it only suggests that the lists on the payrolls are names of ghost agents.
Even more, the board made a comment that x x x Guillergan denies knowledge of the
persons appointed even if he certified to the correctness of the payrolls.
The only conclusion x x x is the deliberate falsification of the payrolls; causing it to
appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so
participate.[27]
The Court finds no error in the decision of the Sandiganbayan that found Guillergan guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Falsification of Public Documents under Article 172 of the RPC.
Posted in Criminal Law, Falsification of Public Document, Question and Answers | Tagged What
is punished in falsification of public documents? What are its elements? | 1 Comment
It is settled that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable
and may no longer be modified in any respect
It is settled that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may
no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the
highest court of the land.[26] When a decision becomes final and executory, the court loses
jurisdiction over the case and not even an appellate court will have the power to review the said
judgment. Otherwise, there will be no end to litigation and this will set to naught the main role of
courts of justice to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and
order by settling justifiable controversies with finality.[27]
Posted in Decision, Judgment, Quotations | Tagged It is settled that a decision that has acquired
finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any
respect | Leave a comment
Accion publiciana is a plenary action for recovery of possession in an ordinary civil

proceeding, in order to determine the better and legal right to possess, independently
of title
Besides, it must be emphasized that this case is one for recovery of possession, also known
as accion publiciana, which is a plenary action for recovery of possession in an ordinary civil
proceeding, in order to determine the better and legal right to possess, independently of
title.[10] The objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not
ownership. However, where the parties raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon
the issue to determine who between the parties has the right to possess the property. This
adjudication, however, is not a final and binding determination of the issue of ownership; it is
only for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession where the issue of ownership is
inseparably linked to the issue of possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership, being
provisional, is not a bar to an action between the same parties involving title to the property.[11]
Posted in Accion Publiciana, Land, Possession | Tagged Accion publiciana is a plenary action for
recovery of possession in an ordinary civil proceeding in order to determine the better and legal
right to possess independently of title | 2 Comments
It is a well-entrenched rule that where the deed of sale states that the purchase price has
been paid but in fact has never been paid, the deed of sale is null and void ab initio for lack
of consideration.
It is a well-entrenched rule that where the deed of sale states that the purchase price has been
paid but in fact has never been paid, the deed of sale is null and void ab initio for lack of
consideration. Moreover, Article 1471 of the Civil Code, provides that “if the price is simulated,
the sale is void,” which applies to the instant case, since the price purportedly paid as indicated
in the contract of sale was simulated for no payment was actually made.[8]
Since it was well established that the Deed of Sale is simulated and, therefore void,
petitioners’ claim that respondent’s cause of action is one for annulment of contract, which
already prescribed, is unavailing, because only voidable contracts may be annulled. On the other
hand, respondent’s defense for the declaration of the inexistence of the contract does not
prescribe.[9]
Posted in Deed of Sale, Land, Obligations and Contracts, Sales | Tagged It is a well-entrenched
rule that where the deed of sale states that the purchase price has been paid but in fact has never
been paid the deed of sale is null and void ab initio for lack of considerat | Leave a comment
Who has a better right to possess? The registered owners or the holder of an unregistered
deed of sale?
Thus, even if we sustain petitioner Catindig’s arguments and rule that the Deed of Sale is valid,
this would still not help petitioners’ case. It is undisputed that the subject property is covered by
TCT No. T-1749, registered in the name of respondent’s husband. On the other hand, petitioner
Catindig’s claim of ownership is based on a Deed of Sale. In Pascual v. Coronel,[12] the Court
held that as against the registered owners and the holder of an unregistered deed of sale, it is the
former who has a better right to possess. In that case, the court held that:
Even if we sustain the petitioner’s arguments and rule that the deeds of sale are valid
contracts, it would still not bolster the petitioners’ case. In a number of cases, the Court had
upheld the registered owners’ superior right to possess the property. In Co v. Militar, the Court
was confronted with a similar issue of which between the certificate of title and an unregistered
deed of sale should be given more probative weight in resolving the issue of who has the better
right to possess. There, the Court held that the court a quo correctly relied on the transfer
certificate of title in the name of petitioner as opposed to the unregistered deeds of sale of
respondents. x x x
Likewise, in the recent case of Umpoc v. Mercado, the Court declared that the trial court
did not err in giving more probative weight to the TCT in the name of the decedent vis-a-vis the
contested unregistered Deed of Sale. x x x[13]
What do the legal maxims “Animi sermo est” (speech is the index of intention) and “Verba
legis non est recedendum” (from the words of a statute there should be no
departure) mean?
Posted on January 26, 2012by Erineus
As to the issue of who has the better right over the SSS death benefits, Section 8(e) and (k) of R.
A. No. 8282[27] is very clear. Hence, we need only apply the law. Under the principles of
statutory construction, if a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its
literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This plain meaning rule or verba
legis, derived from the maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention), rests on
the valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its
intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or,
from the words of a statute there should be no departure.[28]
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/jan2008/173582.htm
Posted in Legal Maxim, Question and Answers, Statutory Construction | Tagged What do the
legal maxims "Animi sermo est" (speech is the index of intention) and "Verba legis non est
recedendum" (from the words of a statute there should be no departure) mean? | Leave a
comment
Can the SSS deny the petitioner’s application for survivor’s pension on the sole ground
that she was not the legal spouse of Bonifacio “as of the date of his retirement;” hence, she
could not be considered as his primary beneficiary under Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act
No. 8282?
In the Resolution dated July 19, 2005, the Court required the parties, as well as the Office of the
Solicitor General, to file their respective comments on the issue of whether or not the proviso “as
of the date of his retirement” in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 violates the equal
protection and due process clauses of the Constitution. The Court believes that this issue is
intertwined with and indispensable to the resolution of the merits of the petition.
In compliance therewith, in its comment, the SSC argues that the proviso “as of the date of his
retirement” in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 does not run afoul of the equal protection
clause of the Constitution as it merely determines the reckoning date of qualification and
entitlement of beneficiaries to the survivorship pension. It asserts that this classification of
beneficiaries is based on valid and substantial distinctions that are germane to the legislative
purpose of Rep. Act No. 8282.
The SSC also impugns the marriage of the petitioner to Bonifacio after his retirement stating that
it was contracted as an afterthought to enable her to qualify for the survivorship pension upon the
latter’s death. It further alleges that there is no violation of the due process clause as the
petitioner was given her day in court and was able to present her side.
The SSS filed its separate comment and therein insists that the petitioner was not the legitimate
spouse of the deceased member at the time when the contingency occurred (his retirement) and,
therefore, she could not be considered a primary beneficiary within the contemplation of Rep.
Act No. 8282. The SSS posits that the statute’s intent is to give survivorship pension only to
primary beneficiaries at the time of the retirement of the deceased member. Rep. Act No. 8282
itself ordains the persons entitled thereto and cannot be subject of change by the SSS.
The Solicitor General agrees with the stance taken by the SSS that the proviso “as of the date of
his retirement” merely marks the period when the primary beneficiary must be so to be entitled
to the benefits. It does not violate the equal protection clause because the classification resulting
therefrom rests on substantial distinctions. Moreover, the condition as to the period for
entitlement, i.e., as of the date of the member’s retirement, is relevant as it set the parameters for
those availing of the benefits and it applies to all those similarly situated. The Solicitor General
is also of the view that the said proviso does not offend the due process clause because claimants
are given the opportunity to file their claims and to prove their case before the Commission.
For clarity, Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 is quoted anew below:
Sec. 12-B. Retirement Benefits. –

…
(d) Upon the death of the retired member, his primary beneficiaries as of the date of his
retirement shall be entitled to receive the monthly pension. …
Under Section 8(k) of the same law, the “primary beneficiaries” are:
1. The dependent spouse until he or she remarries; and
2. The dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate children.
Further, the “dependent spouse” and “dependent children” are qualified under paragraph (e) of
the same section as follows:
1. The legal spouse entitled by law to receive support until he or she remarries; and
2. The dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is
unmarried, not gainfully employed and has not reached twenty-one (21) years of age, or if over
twenty-one years of age, he is congenitally or while still a minor has been permanently
incapacitated and incapable of self-support, physically or mentally.
The SSS denied the petitioner’s application for survivor’s pension on the sole ground that she
was not the legal spouse of Bonifacio “as of the date of his retirement;” hence, she could not be
considered as his primary beneficiary under Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282.
The Court holds that the proviso “as of the date of his retirement” in Section 12-B(d) of
Rep. Act No. 8282, which qualifies the term “primary beneficiaries,” is unconstitutional for it
violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.[7]
In an analogous case, Government Service Insurance System v. Montesclaros,[8] the Court
invalidated the proviso in Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1146[9] which stated that “the
dependent spouse shall not be entitled to said pension if his marriage with the pensioner is
contracted within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension.” In the said case,
the Court characterized retirement benefits as property interest of the pensioner as well as his or
her surviving spouse. The proviso, which denied a dependent spouse’s claim for survivorship
pension if the dependent spouse contracted marriage to the pensioner within the three-year
prohibited period, was declared offensive to the due process clause. There was outright
confiscation of benefits due the surviving spouse without giving him or her an opportunity to be
heard. The proviso was also held to infringe the equal protection clause as it discriminated
against dependent spouses who contracted their respective marriages to pensioners within three
years before they qualified for their pension.
For reasons which shall be discussed shortly, the proviso “as of the date of his retirement”
in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 similarly violates the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Constitution.
The proviso infringes the equal protection clause

As illustrated by the petitioner’s case, the proviso “as of the date of his retirement” in Section 12-
B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 which qualifies the term “primary beneficiaries” results in the
classification of dependent spouses as primary beneficiaries into two groups:
(1) Those dependent spouses whose respective marriages to SSS members were contracted
prior to the latter’s retirement; and
(2) Those dependent spouses whose respective marriages to SSS members were contracted after
the latter’s retirement.
Underlying these two classifications of dependent spouses is that their respective marriages are
valid. In other words, both groups are legitimate or legal spouses. The distinction between them
lies solely on the date the marriage was contracted. The petitioner belongs to the second group
of dependent spouses, i.e., her marriage to Bonifacio was contracted after his retirement. As
such, she and those similarly situated do not qualify as “primary beneficiaries” under Section 12-
B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 and, therefore, are not entitled to survivor’s pension under the same
provision by reason of the subject proviso.
It is noted that the eligibility of “dependent children” who are biological offsprings of a retired
SSS member to be considered as his primary beneficiaries under Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act
No. 8282 is not substantially affected by the proviso “as of the date of his retirement.” A
biological child, whether legitimate, legitimated or illegitimate, is entitled to survivor’s pension
upon the death of a retired SSS member so long as the said child is unmarried, not gainfully
employed and has not reached twenty-one (21) years of age, or if over twenty-one (21) years of
age, he or she is congenitally or while still a minor has been permanently incapacitated and
incapable of self-support, physically or mentally.
On the other hand, the eligibility of legally adopted children to be considered “primary
beneficiaries” under Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 is affected by the proviso “as of the
date of his retirement” in the same manner as the dependent spouses. A legally adopted child
who satisfies the requirements in Section 8(e)(2)[10] thereof is considered a primary beneficiary
of a retired SSS member upon the latter’s death only if the said child had been legally adopted
prior to the member’s retirement. One who was legally adopted by the SSS member after his or
her retirement does not qualify as a primary beneficiary for the purpose of entitlement to
survivor’s pension under Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282.
In any case, the issue that now confronts the Court involves a dependent spouse who claims to
have been unjustly deprived of her survivor’s pension under Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No.
8282. Hence, the subsequent discussion will focus on the resultant classification of the
dependent spouses as primary beneficiaries under the said provision.
As earlier stated, the petitioner belongs to the second group of dependent spouses, i.e., her
marriage to Bonifacio was contracted after his retirement. She and those similarly situated are
undoubtedly discriminated against as the proviso “as of the date of his retirement” disqualifies
them from being considered “primary beneficiaries” for the purpose of entitlement to survivor’s
pension.
Generally, a statute based on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional
guaranty of the equal protection clause of the law.[11] With respect to Rep. Act No. 8282, in
particular, as a social security law, it is recognized that it “is permeated with provisions that draw
lines in classifying those who are to receive benefits. Congressional decisions in this regard are
entitled to deference as those of the institution charged under our scheme of government with the
primary responsibility for making such judgments in light of competing policies and
interests.”[12]
However, as in other statutes, the classification in Rep. Act No. 8282 with respect to entitlement
to benefits, to be valid and reasonable, must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must rest
on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same
class.[13]
The legislative history of Rep. Act No. 8282 does not bear out the purpose of Congress in
inserting the proviso “as of the date of his retirement” to qualify the term “primary beneficiaries”
in Section 12-B(d) thereof. To the Court’s mind, however, it reflects congressional concern with
the possibility of relationships entered after retirement for the purpose of obtaining benefits. In
particular, the proviso was apparently intended to prevent sham marriages or those contracted by
persons solely to enable one spouse to claim benefits upon the anticipated death of the other
spouse.
This concern is concededly valid. However, classifying dependent spouses and determining their
entitlement to survivor’s pension based on whether the marriage was contracted before or after
the retirement of the other spouse, regardless of the duration of the said marriage, bears no
relation to the achievement of the policy objective of the law, i.e., “provide meaningful
protection to members and their beneficiaries against the hazard of disability, sickness,
maternity, old age, death and other contingencies
resulting in loss of income or financial burden.”[14] The nexus of the classification to the policy
objective is vague and flimsy. Put differently, such classification of dependent spouses is not
germane to the aforesaid policy objective.
For if it were the intention of Congress to prevent sham marriages or those entered in
contemplation of imminent death, then it should have prescribed a definite “duration-of-
relationship” or durational period of relationship as one of the requirements for entitlement to
survivor’s pension. For example, in the United States, a provision in their social security law
which excludes from social security benefits the surviving wife and stepchild of a deceased wage
earner who had their respective relationships to the wage earner for less than nine months prior
to his death, was declared valid.[15] Thus, nine months is recognized in the United States as the
minimum duration of a marriage to consider it as having been contracted in good faith for the
purpose of entitlement to survivorship pension.
In contrast, the proviso “as of the date of his retirement” in Section 12-B(d) in Rep. Act No.
8282 effectively disqualifies from entitlement to survivor’s pension all those dependent spouses
whose respective marriages to retired SSS members were contracted after the latter’s
retirement. The duration of the marriage is not even considered. It is observed that, in certain
instances, the retirement age under Rep. Act No. 8282 is sixty (60)
years old.[16] A marriage contracted by a retired SSS member after the said age may still last
for more than ten years, assuming the member lives up to over seventy (70) years old. In such a
case, it cannot be said that the marriage was a sham or was entered into solely for the purpose of
enabling one spouse to obtain the financial benefits due upon the death of the other
spouse. Nonetheless, the said surviving spouse is not entitled to survivor’s pension because he
or she is not a primary beneficiary as of the date of retirement of the SSS member following
Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282.
Further, the classification of dependent spouses on the basis of whether their respective
marriages to the SSS member were contracted prior to or after the latter’s retirement for the
purpose of entitlement to survivor’s pension does not rest on real and substantial distinctions. It
is arbitrary and discriminatory. It is too sweeping because the proviso “as of the date of his
retirement,” which effectively disqualifies the dependent spouses whose respective marriages to
the retired SSS member were contracted after the latter’s retirement as primary beneficiaries,
unfairly lumps all these marriages as sham relationships or were contracted solely for the
purpose of acquiring benefits accruing upon the death of the other spouse. The proviso thus
unduly prejudices the rights of the legal surviving spouse, like the petitioner, and defeats the
avowed policy of the law “to provide meaningful protection to members and their
beneficiaries against the hazards of disability, sickness, maternity, old age, death, and other
contingencies resulting in loss of income or financial burden.”[17]
The proviso infringes the due process clause
As earlier opined, in Government Service Insurance System v. Montesclaros,[18] the Court
characterized retirement benefits as a property interest of a retiree. We held therein that “[i]n a
pension plan where employee participation is mandatory, the prevailing view is that
employees have contractual or vested rights in the pension where the pension is part of the terms
of employment.”[19] Thus, it was ruled that, “where the employee retires and meets the
eligibility requirements, he acquires a vested right to benefits that is protected by the due process
clause” and “[r]etirees enjoy a protected property interest whenever they acquire a right to
immediate payment under pre-existing law.”[20] Further, since pursuant to the pertinent law
therein, the dependent spouse is entitled to survivorship pension, “a widow’s right to receive
pension following the demise of her husband is also part of the husband’s contractual
compensation.”[21]
Although the subject matter in the above-cited case involved the retirement benefits under
P.D. No. 1146 or the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977[22] covering
government employees, the pronouncement therein that retirees enjoy a protected property
interest in their retirement benefits applies squarely to those in the private sector under Rep. Act
No. 8282. This is so because the mandatory contributions of both the employers[23] and the
employees[24] to the SSS do not, likewise, make the retirement benefits under Rep. Act No.
8282 mere gratuity but form part of the latter’s compensation. Even the retirement benefits of
self-employed individuals, like Bonifacio, who have been included in the compulsory coverage
of Rep. Act No. 8282[25] are not mere gratuity because they are required to pay both the
employer and employee contributions.[26] Further, under Rep. Act No. 8282, the surviving
spouse is entitled to survivor’s pension accruing on the death of the member; hence, the
surviving spouse’s right to receive such benefit following the demise of the wife or husband, as
the case may be, is also part of the latter’s contractual compensation.
The proviso “as of the date of his retirement” in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282
runs afoul of the due process clause as it outrightly deprives the surviving spouses whose
respective marriages to the retired SSS members were contracted after the latter’s retirement of
their survivor’s benefits. There is outright confiscation of benefits due such surviving spouses
without giving them an opportunity to be heard.
By this outright disqualification of the surviving spouses whose respective marriages to

SSS members were contracted after the latter’s retirement, the proviso “as of the date of his
retirement” qualifying the term “primary beneficiaries” for the purpose of entitlement to
survivor’s pension has created the presumption that marriages contracted after the retirement
date of SSS members were entered into for the purpose of securing the benefits under Rep. Act
No. 8282. This presumption, moreover, is conclusive because the said surviving spouses are not
afforded any opportunity to disprove the presence of the illicit purpose. The proviso, as it creates
this conclusive presumption, is unconstitutional because it presumes a fact which is not
necessarily or universally true. In the United States, this kind of presumption is characterized as
an “irrebuttable presumption” and statutes creating permanent and irrebutable presumptions have
long been disfavored under the due process clause. [27]
In the petitioner’s case, for example, she asserted that when she and Bonifacio got married in
1997, it was merely to legalize their relationship and not to commit fraud. This claim is quite
believable. After all, they had been living together since 1980 and, in fact, during that time their
eldest child was already twenty-four (24) years old. However, the petitioner was not given any
opportunity to prove her claim that she was Bonifacio’s bona fide legal spouse as she was
automatically disqualified from being considered as his primary beneficiary. In effect, the
petitioner was deprived of the survivor’s benefits, a property interest, accruing from the death of
Bonifacio without any opportunity to be heard. Standards of due process require that the
petitioner be allowed to present evidence to prove that her marriage to Bonifacio was contracted
in good faith and as his bona fide spouse she is entitled to the survivor’s pension accruing upon
his death.[28] Hence, the proviso “as of the date of his retirement” in Section 12-B(d) which
deprives the petitioner and those similarly situated dependent spouses of retired SSS members
this opportunity to be heard must be struck down.
Conclusion
Even as the proviso “as of the date of his retirement” in Section 12-B(d) is nullified, the
enumeration of primary beneficiaries for the purpose of entitlement to survivor’s pension is not
substantially affected since the following persons are considered as such under Section 8(k) of
Rep. Act No. 8282:
(1) The dependent spouse until he or she remarries; and
(2) The dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate children.
In relation thereto, Section 8(e) thereof qualifies the dependent spouse and dependent
children as follows:
(1) The legal spouse entitled by law to receive support from the member;
(2) The legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is unmarried, not
gainfully employed and has not reached twenty-one years (21) of age, or if over twenty-one (21)
years of age, he is congenitally or while still a minor has been permanently incapacitated and
incapable of self-support, physically or mentally.
Finally, the Court concedes that the petitioner did not raise the issue of the validity of the proviso
“as of the date of his retirement” in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282. The rule is that the
Court does not decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a
decision of the case.[29] However, the question of the constitutionality of the proviso is
absolutely necessary for the proper resolution of the present case. Accordingly, the Court
required the parties to present their arguments on this issue and proceeded to pass upon the same
in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction and in order to render substantial justice to the petitioner
who, presumably in her advanced age by now, deserves to receive forthwith the survivor’s
pension accruing upon the death of her husband.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated April 15, 2003 and Resolution
dated December 15, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69632
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The proviso “as of the date of his retirement” in Section 12-
B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 is declared VOID for being contrary to the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Constitution. The Social Security System cannot deny the claim of
petitioner Elena P. Dycaico for survivor’s pension on the basis of this invalid proviso.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/161357.htm
Posted in Constitutional Law, ECC, Labor Law, Pension/Retirement, SSS | Tagged Can the SSS
deny the petitioner’s application for survivor’s pension on the sole ground that she was not the
legal spouse of Bonifacio “as of the date of his retirement” hence she could not be | 1 Comment
Conditions under which cardio-vascular or heart diseases can be considered as work-

related and thus compensable
The second issue of whether or not the illness of petitioner’s husband, myocardial infarction
which was the cause of his death is work-related, must likewise be resolved in favor of the
petitioner.
Under the law on employees’ compensation, death is compensable only when it results from a
work-connected injury or sickness. In the instant case, the cause of petitioner’s husband’s death
was myocardial infarction and it must be considered work-connected. While it is true that
myocardial infarction is not among the occupational diseases listed under Annex “A” of the
Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation, the Commission, under ECC Resolution No. 432
dated July 20, 1977, laid down the conditions under which cardio-vascular or heart diseases can
be considered as work-related and thus compensable, viz:
(a) If the heart disease was known to have been present during employment, there must be proof
that an acute exacerbation was clearly precipitated by the unusual strain by reasons of the nature
of his/her/her work.
(b) The strain of work that brings about an acute attack must be of sufficient severity and must be
followed within 24 hours by the clinical signs of a cardiac insult to constitute causal relationship.
(c) If a person who was apparently asymptomatic before being subjected to strain at work
showed signs and symptoms of cardiac injury during the performance of his/her work and such
symptoms and signs persisted, it is reasonable to claim a causal relationship.
Myocardial infarction is also known as heart attack. It results in permanent heart damage or
death. A heart attack is called myocardial infarction because part of the heart muscle
(myocardium) may literally die (infarction). This occurs when a blood clot blocks one of the
coronary arteries (the blood vessels that bring blood and oxygen to the heart muscle). When the
heart muscle does not obtain the oxygen-rich blood that it needs, it will begin to die. The
severity of a heart attack usually depends on how much of the heart muscle is injured or dies
during the heart attack. Heart attack accounts for 1 out of every 5 deaths. It is a major cause of
sudden death in adults. Heavy exertion or emotional stress can trigger a heart attack.[16]
In the case at bar, the petitioner’s husband’s heart disease falls under the second condition of
ECC Resolution No. 432 dated July 20, 1977 which states that the strain of work that brought
about the acute attack must be of sufficient severity and must be followed within 24 hours by the
clinical signs of a cardiac insult to constitute causal relationship. Petitioner’s husband was
driving a dump truck within the company premises where they were stacking gravel and sand
when he suffered the heart attack. He had to be taken down from the truck and brought to the
workers’ quarters where he expired at 10:30 a.m., just a few minutes after the heart attack, which
is much less than the 24 hours required by ECC Resolution No. 432. This is a clear indication
that severe strain of work brought about the acute attack that caused his death.
Professional drivers, especially truck drivers like the decedent in the instant case, carry the
burden of being more exposed and subjected to the stress and strain of everyday traffic, and the
greater physical exertion brought about by driving a large and heavy vehicle. In addition,
according to the petitioner, her husband was under a lot of stress in the workplace. He was a
model worker and his employer highly depended on him. He became the object of envy of his
co-workers which caused him much emotional stress. Add to this the fact that he has been a
truck driver for more than twenty-four (24) years. Due to the combination of emotional stress
and vigorous physical exertion, it was easy for him to succumb to the heart ailment. We hold
that the illness of the decedent which caused his death is work-connected, and thus compensable
by virtue of ECC Resolution No. 432 dated 20 July 1977.
As a final note, we find it necessary to reiterate that P.D. No. 626, as amended, is a social
legislation whose primordial purpose is to provide meaningful protection to the working class
against the hazards of disability, illness and other contingencies resulting in the loss of
income. Thus, as the official agents charged by law to implement social justice guaranteed by
the Constitution, the ECC and the SSS should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in
deciding claims for compensability especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring
a work connection with the illness or injury, as the case may be. It is only this kind of
interpretation that can give meaning and substance to the compassionate spirit of the law as
embodied in Article 4 of the New Labor Code which states that all doubts in the implementation
and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code including its implementing rules and
regulations should be resolved in favor of labor.[17]
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/apr2003/147745.htm
Posted in ECC, Social Legislations, SSS, State Policies | Tagged Conditions under which cardio-
vascular or heart diseases can be considered as work-related and thus compensable | Leave a
comment
A claim for Medicare, sickness, burial, disability or death should be filed within three (3)
years from the occurrence of the contingency
We agree with the petitioner that her claim for death benefits under the SSS law should be
considered as the Employees’ Compensation claim itself. This is but logical and reasonable
because the claim for death benefits which petitioner filed with the SSS is of the same nature as
her claim before the ECC. Furthermore, the SSS is the same agency with which Employees’
Compensation claims are filed. As correctly contended by the petitioner, when she filed her
claim for death benefits with the SSS under the SSS law, she had already notified the SSS of her
employees’ compensation claim, because the SSS is the very same agency where claims for
payment of sickness/disability/death benefits under P.D. No. 626 are filed.
Section 4(b)(2), Rule 3 of the ECC Rules of Procedure for the Filing and Disposition of the
Employees’ Compensation Claims, quoted above, also provides for the conditions when EC
claims filed beyond the three-year prescriptive period may still be given due course. Section
4(b)(2) states the condition for private sector employees, requiring that a claim for Medicare,
sickness, burial, disability or death should be filed within three (3) years from the occurrence of
the contingency. In the instant case, the petitioner was able to file her claim for death
benefits under the SSS law within the three-year prescriptive period. In fact, she has been
receiving her pension under the SSS law since November 1988.
It is true that under the proviso, the employees’ compensation claim shall be filed with the
GSIS/SSS within a reasonable time as provided by law. It should be noted that neither statute
nor jurisprudence has defined the limits of “reasonable time.” Thus, what is reasonable time
depends upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case.[12] In the case at bar, we also
find petitioner’s claim to have been filed within a reasonable time considering the situation and
condition of the petitioner. We have ruled that when the petitioner filed her claim for death
benefits under the SSS law, her claim for the same benefits under the Employees’ Compensation
Law should be considered as filed. The evidence shows that the System failed to process her
compensation claim. Under the circumstances, the petitioner cannot be made to suffer for the
lapse committed by the System. It is the avowed policy of the State to construe social
legislations liberally in favor of the beneficiaries.[13] This court has time and again upheld the
policy of liberality of the law in favor of labor. Presidential Decree No. 626 itself, in its Art. 166
reads:
“ART. 166. Policy. – The State shall promote and develop a tax-exempt employees’
compensation program whereby employees and their dependents, in the event of work-connected
disability or death, may promptly secure adequate income benefit, and medical or related
benefits.” (emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, Art. 4 of P.D. No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the
Philippines, which P.D. No. 626 forms a part of, reads as follows:
“ART. 4. Construction in favor of labor. – All doubts in the implementation and interpretation
of the provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved
in favor of labor.”
Particularly, the policy of liberality in deciding claims for compensability was given emphasis by
this court in the case of Employees’ Compensation Commission vs. Court of Appeals,[14] where
it held that:
“. . . the liberality of law in favor of the working man and woman still prevails and the official
agency charged by law to implement the constitutional guarantee of social justice should adopt a
liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims for compensability, especially in light
of compassionate policy towards labor which the 1987 Constitution vivifies and
enhances. Elsewise stated, a humanitarian impulse, dictated by no less than the Constitution
itself under the social justice policy, calls for a liberal and sympathetic approach to legitimate
appeals of disabled public servants; or that all doubts to the right to compensation must be
resolved in favor of the employee or laborer. Verily the policy is to extend the applicability of
the law on employees’ compensation to as many employees who can avail of the benefits
thereunder.”
Claims falling under the Employees’ Compensation Act should be liberally resolved to fulfill its
essence as a social legislation designed to afford relief to the working man and woman in our
society.[15]
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/apr2003/147745.htm
Posted in ECC, Labor Law, Social Legislations, SSS, State Policies, Statutory
Construction | Tagged a claim for Medicare sickness burial disability or death should be filed
within three (3) years from the occurrence of the contingency | Leave a comment
A party may not impeach his own witness

It is well to note that, as stated by the Court of Appeals, Jose Sebastian was originally a witness
for petitioner Augusto. As such, Rule 132, Section 12, of the Rules of Court prohibits petitioner
from impeaching him:
SEC. 12. Party may not impeach his own witness. – Except with respect to witnesses referred to
in paragraphs (d) and (e) of section 10, the party producing a witness is not allowed to impeach
his credibility.
A witness may be considered as unwilling or hostile only if so declared by the court upon
adequate showing of his adverse interest, unjustified reluctance to testify, or his having misled
the party into calling him to the witness stand.
The unwilling or hostile witness so declared, or the witness who is an adverse party, may be
impeached by the party presenting him in all respects as if he had been called by the adverse
party, except by evidence of his bad character. He may also be impeached and cross-examined
by the adverse party, but such cross-examination must only be on the subject matter of his
examination-in-chief.
This rule is based on the theory that a person who produces a witness vouches for him as being
worthy of credit, and that a direct attack upon the veracity of the witness “would enable the party
to destroy the witness, if he spoke against him, and to make him a good witness, if he spoke for
him, with the means in his hands of destroying his credit, if he spoke against him.”[73]
Neither had there been declaration by the court that Jose Sebastian was an unwilling or hostile
witness. Jose Sebastian is also neither an adverse party, nor an officer, director nor a managing
agent of a public or private corporation or of a partnership or association which is an adverse
party.[74]
Be that as it may, even if Jose Sebastian had been declared by the court as an unwilling or hostile
witness, the third paragraph of Section 12 as quoted above, in relation to Section 11[75] of the
same Rule, only allows the party calling the witness to impeach such witness by contradictory
evidence or by prior inconsistent statements, and never by evidence of his bad character. Thus,
Jose Sebastian’s subsequent dismissal as a judge would not suffice to discredit him as a witness
in this case.
We have also ruled in People v. Dominguez,[76] which, in turn cited Cordial v. People,[77] that:
(E)ven convicted criminals are not excluded from testifying in court so long as, having organs of
sense, they “can perceive and perceiving can make known their perceptions to others.”
The fact of prior criminal conviction alone does not suffice to discredit a witness; the
testimony of such a witness must be assayed and scrutinized in exactly the same way the
testimony of other witnesses must be examined for its relevance and credibility. x x
x. (Emphasis supplied.)
The effect of this pronouncement is even more significant in this case, as Jose Sebastian has
never been convicted of a crime before his testimony, but was instead administratively
sanctioned eleven years after such testimony. Scrutinizing the testimony of Jose Sebastian, we
find, as the trial court and the Court of Appeals did, no evidence of bias on the part of Jose
Sebastian. On top of this, Jose Sebastian’s testimony is supported by the records of the notarial
registry, which shows that the documents in question were received by the Notarial Registrar on2
July 1979, which was four months before the death of Consuelo on6 November 1979.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2007/feb2007/156284.htm
Posted in Evidence | Tagged A party may not impeach his own witness, Evidence, Unwilling or
hostile witness or adverse witness | Leave a comment
A judge who fails his SALN is GUILTY of violation of Section 7, R.A. No. 3019 and Section
8, R.A. No. 6713
The Court also agrees with the OCA that respondent is guilty of violating Section 7 of R.A. No.
3019 and Section 8 of R.A. No. 6713.
Section 7 of R.A. No. 3019 provides:
Sec. 7. Statement of Assets and Liabilities. – Every public officer, within thirty days after
assuming office and, thereafter, on or before the fifteenth day of April following the close of
every calendar year, as well as upon the expiration of his term of office, or upon his resignation
or separation from office, shall prepare and file with the office of the corresponding Department
Head, or in the case of a Head of Department or Chief of an independent office, with the Office
of the President, a true, detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities, including a
statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family
expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year: Provided,
That public officers assuming office less than two months before the end of the calendar year,
may file their first statement on or before the fifteenth day of April following the close of the
said calendar year.
In the same manner, Section 8, R.A. No. 6713 states:
SEC. 8. Statements and Disclosure. – Public officials and employees have an obligation to
accomplish and submit declarations under oath of, and the public has the right to know, their
assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and business interests including those of their spouses
and of unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age living in their households.
(A) Statements of Assets and Liabilities and Financial Disclosure. – All public officials and
employees, except those who serve in an honorary capacity, laborers and casual or temporary
workers, shall file under oath their Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth and a
Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial connections and those of their spouses and
unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age living in their households.
The two documents shall contain information on the following:

(a) real property, its improvements, acquisition costs, assessed value and current fair market
value;
(b) personal property and acquisition cost;
(c) all other assets such as investments, cash on hand or in banks, stocks, bonds, and the like;
(d) liabilities, and;
(e) all business interests and financial connections.
The documents must be filed:
(a) within thirty (30) days after assumption of office;
(b) on or before April 30, of every year thereafter; and
(c) within thirty (30) days after separation from the service.
All public officials and employees required under this section to file the aforestated documents
shall also execute, within thirty (30) days from the date of their assumption of office, the
necessary authority in favor of the Ombudsman to obtain from all appropriate government
agencies, including the Bureau of Internal Revenue, such documents as may show their assets,
liabilities, net worth, and also their business interests and financial connections in previous years,
including, if possible, the year when they first assumed any office in the Government.
Husband and wife who are both public officials or employees may file the required statements
jointly or separately.
xxx xxx xxx
From the foregoing, it is imperative that every public official or government employee must
make and submit a complete disclosure of his assets, liabilities and net worth in order to suppress
any questionable accumulation of wealth.[5] This serves as the basis of the government and the
people in monitoring the income and lifestyle of public officials and employees in compliance
with the constitutional policy to eradicate corruption, to promote transparency in government,
and to ensure that all government employees and officials lead just and modest lives,[6] with the
end in view of curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and
maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service.[7]
In the present case, respondent clearly violated the above-quoted laws when he failed to file his
SALN for the years 2004-2008. He gave no explanation either why he failed to file his SALN for
five (5) consecutive years. While every office in the government service is a public trust, no
position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a
seat in the Judiciary. Hence, judges are strictly mandated to abide with the law, the Code of
Judicial Conduct and with existing administrative policies in order to maintain the faith of our
people in the administration of justice.[8]
Considering that this is the first offense of the respondent, albeit for five years, the Court shall
impose a fine of only Five Thousand Pesos (₱5,000.00) with warning.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Uyag P. Usman, Presiding Judge, Shari’a Circuit
Court, Pagadian City, GUILTY of violation of Section 7, R.A. No. 3019 and Section 8, R.A. No.
6713 and orders him to pay a FINE of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/october2011/SCC-08-12.htm
Posted in Anti Graft and Corruption, Judicial and Legal Ethics, SAL-N | Tagged A judge who
fails his SALN is GUILTY of violation of Section 7 R.A. No. 3019 and Section 8 R.A. No.
6713 | Leave a comment
The quantum of evidence required in administrative cases is substantial evidence

Gross misconduct and dishonesty are serious charges which warrant the removal or dismissal
from service of the erring public officer or employee, together with the accessory penalties, such
as cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and perpetual disqualification from
reemployment in government service. Hence, a finding that a public officer or employee is
administratively liable for such charges must be supported by substantial evidence.
The quantum of evidence required in administrative cases is substantial evidence. The

landmark case Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations[67] laid down the guidelines for quasi-
judicial administrative proceedings, including the following:
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion (City of Manila vs.
Agustin, G. R. No. 45844, promulgated November 29, 1937, XXXVI 0.G. 1335), but the
evidence must be “substantial.” (Washington, Virginia& Maryland Coach Co. v. National Labor
Relations Board, 301 U. S.142, 147, 57 S. Ct.648, 650, 81 Law. ed. 965.) “Substantial evidence
is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” (Appalachian Electric Power v. National Labor
Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d 985, 989; National Labor Relations Board v. Thompson
Products, 6 Cir., 97 F. 2d 13, 15; Ballston-Stillwater Knitting Co. v. National Labor Relations
Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758, 760.) * * * The statute provides that ‘the rules of evidence prevailing
in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.’ The obvious purpose of this and similar
provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the
mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent in judicial proceedings would
not invalidate the administrative order. (Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U. S.
25, 44, 24 S. Ct. 563, 568, 48 Law. ed. 860; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville &
Nashville R. Co., 227 U. S. 88, 93, 33 S. Ct. 185, 187, 57 Law. ed. 431; United States v. Abilene
& Southern Ry. Co., 265 U. S. 274, 288, 44 S. Ct. 565, 569, 68 Law. ed. 1016; Tagg Bros. &
Moorhead v. United States, 280 U. S. 420, 442, 50 S. Ct. 220, 225, 74 Law. ed. 624.) But this
assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify
orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative force. Mere uncorroborated
hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence. (Consolidated Edison Co. v.
National Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed. No. 4, Adv. Op., p. 131.) “
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. (Interstate Commence
Commission vs. L. & N. R. Co., 227U. S. 88, 33S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed. 431.) Only by confining
the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in
their right to know and meet the case against them. It should not, however, detract from their
duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal
methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the
controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and
determining the facts in any given case, but their report and decision are only advisory. (Section
9, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the Petition at bar, great, if not absolute, reliance was made by the Office of the
Ombudsman on the Complaint of the PNP-CIDG and the attached Joint Affidavit of its
investigating officers. Although certain pieces of documentary evidence were also attached to
the said Complaint, such as TCTs and tax declarations of the real properties in the names of
petitioner, his wife, and his children, and the travel information provided by the BID, these
mostly prove facts which were not denied by petitioner, but for which he had credible
explanation or qualification. These pieces of evidence may have been sufficient to give rise to
a prima facie presumption of unlawfully acquired wealth against petitioner; however, such a
presumption is disputable or rebuttable. When petitioner presented evidence in support of his
defense, the Office of the Ombudsman proceeded to question and challenge and, ultimately,
disregard in totality petitioner’s evidence, despite the fact that the PNP-CIDG no longer
presented any evidence to controvert the same.
Each party in an administrative case must prove his affirmative allegation with substantial
evidence – the complainant has to prove the affirmative allegations in his complaint, and the
respondent has to prove the affirmative allegations in his affirmative defenses and
counterclaims.[68] In this case, contrary to the findings of the Office of the Ombudsman and the
Court of Appeals, this Court pronounces that substantial evidence sways in favor of the
petitioner and against complainant PNP-CIDG.
While this Court commends the efforts of the PNP-CIDG and the Office of the
Ombudsman to hold accountable public officers and employees with unexplained wealth and
unlawfully acquired properties, it cannot countenance unsubstantiated charges against a hapless
public official just to send a message that the government is serious in its campaign against graft
and corruption. No matter how noble the intentions of the PNP-CIDG and the Office of the
Ombudsman are in pursuing this administrative case against petitioner, it will do them well to
remember that good intentions do not win cases; evidence does.
The one-year bar rule of impeachment

Posted on December 21, 2011by Erineus
The one-year bar rule

Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: “No
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a
period of one year.”
Petitioner reckons the start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first impeachment
complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or four days before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the
15th Congress. She posits that within one year from July 22, 2010, no second impeachment
complaint may be accepted and referred to public respondent.
On the other hand, public respondent, respondent Reyes group and respondent-intervenor
submit that the initiation starts with the filing of the impeachment complaint and ends with the
referral to the Committee, following Francisco, but venture to alternatively proffer that the
initiation ends somewhere between the conclusion of the Committee Report and the transmittal
of the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate. Respondent Baraquel group, meanwhile,
essentially maintains that under either the prevailing doctrine or the parties’ interpretation, its
impeachment complaint could withstand constitutional scrutiny.
Contrary to petitioner’s asseveration, Francisco[58] states that the term “initiate” means to
file the complaint and take initial action on it.[59] The initiation starts with the filing of the
complaint which must be accompanied with an action to set the complaint moving. It refers to
the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress’ taking initial action of said
complaint. The initial action taken by the House on the complaint is the referral of the complaint
to the Committee on Justice.
Petitioner misreads the remark of Commissioner Joaquin Bernas, S.J. that “no second
verified impeachment may be accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for
action”[60] which contemplates a situation where a first impeachment complaint had already
been referred. Bernas and Regalado, who both acted as amici curiae in Francisco, affirmed that
the act of initiating includes the act of taking initial action on the complaint.
From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two
former Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term “to initiate” refers to the
filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress’ taking initial action of said
complaint.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or
endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing
by at least one-third[61] of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary
General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed
against the same official within a one year period.[62] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Court, in Francisco, thus found that the assailed provisions of the 12th Congress’ Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings ─ Sections 16[63] and 17[64] of Rule V thereof ─
“clearly contravene Section 3(5) of Article XI since they g[a]ve the term ‘initiate’ a meaning
different from filing and referral.”[65]
Petitioner highlights certain portions of Francisco which delve on the relevant records of
the Constitutional Commission, particularly Commissioner Maambong’s statements[66] that the
initiation starts with the filing of the complaint.
Petitioner fails to consider the verb “starts” as the operative word. Commissioner
Maambong was all too keen to stress that the filing of the complaint indeed starts the initiation
and that the House’s action on the committee report/resolution is not part of that initiation phase.
Commissioner Maambong saw the need “to be very technical about this,”[67] for certain
exchanges in the Constitutional Commission deliberations loosely used the term, as shown in the
following exchanges.
MR. DAVIDE. That is for conviction, but not for initiation. Initiation of impeachment
proceedings still requires a vote of one-fifth of the membership of the House under the 1935
Constitution.
MR. MONSOD. A two-thirds vote of the membership of the House is required to initiate
proceedings.
MR. DAVIDE. No. for initiation of impeachment proceedings, only one-fifth vote of the
membership of the House is required; for conviction, a two-thirds vote of the membership is
required.
xxxx
MR. DAVIDE. However, if we allow one-fifth of the membership of the legislature to

overturn a report of the committee, we have here Section 3 (4) which reads:
No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year.
So, necessarily, under this particular subsection, we will, in effect, disallow one-fifth of
the members of the National Assembly to revive an impeachment move by an individual or an
ordinary Member.
MR. ROMULO. Yes. May I say that Section 3 (4) is there to look towards the possibility
of a very liberal impeachment proceeding. Second, we were ourselves struggling with that
problem where we are faced with just a verified complaint rather than the signatures of one-fifth,
or whatever it is we decide, of the Members of the House. So whether to put a period for the
Committee to report, whether we should not allow the Committee to overrule a mere verified
complaint, are some of the questions we would like to be discussed.
MR. DAVIDE. We can probably overrule a rejection by the Committee by providing

that it can be overturned by, say, one-half or a majority, or one-fifth of the members of the
legislature, and that such overturning will not amount to a refiling which is prohibited under
Section 3 (4).
Another point, Madam President. x x x[68] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
An apparent effort to clarify the term “initiate” was made by Commissioner Teodulo
Natividad:
MR. NATIVIDAD. How many votes are needed to initiate?
MR. BENGZON. One-third.
MR. NATIVIDAD. To initiate is different from to impeach; to impeach is different

from to convict. To impeach means to file the case before the Senate.
MR. REGALADO. When we speak of “initiative,” we refer here to the Articles of
Impeachment.
MR. NATIVIDAD. So, that is the impeachment itself, because when we impeach, we
are charging him with the Articles of Impeachment. That is my understanding.[69] (emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Capping these above-quoted discussions was the explanation of Commissioner Maambong
delivered on at least two occasions:
[I]
MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a reconsideration of the
approval of the amendment submitted by Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of record
my thinking that we do not really initiate the filing of the Articles of Impeachment on the
floor. The procedure, as I have pointed out earlier, was that the initiation starts with the filing of
the complaint. And what is actually done on the floor is that the committee resolution containing
the Articles of Impeachment is the one approved by the body.
As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the Committee on Style, it
appears that the initiation starts on the floor. If we only have time, I could cite examples in the
case of the impeachment proceedings of President Richard Nixon wherein the Committee on the
Judiciary submitted the recommendation, the resolution, and the Articles of Impeachment to the
body, and it was the body who approved the resolution. It is not the body which initiates it. It
only approves or disapproves the resolution. So, on that score, probably the Committee on Style
could help in rearranging the words because we have to be very technical about this. I have been
bringing with me The Rules of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The Senate
Rules are with me. The proceedings on the case of Richard Nixon are with me. I have submitted
my proposal, but the Committee has already decided. Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this
on record.
Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.[70] (italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
[II]
MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of the approval of
Section 3 (3). My reconsideration will not at all affect the substance, but it is only with keeping
with the exact formulation of the Rules of the House of Representatives of theUnited
Statesregarding impeachment.
I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of its provision, that on
page 2, Section 3 (3), from lines 17 to 18, we delete the words which read: “to initiate
impeachment proceedings” and the comma (,) and insert on line 19 after the word “resolution”
the phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then capitalize the letter “i” in “impeachment” and
replace the word “by” with OF, so that the whole section will now read: “A vote of at least one-
third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a resolution WITH THE
ARTICLES of impeachment OF the committee or to override its contrary resolution. The vote
of each Member shall be recorded.”
I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as the House of
Representatives of the United Statesis concerned, really starts from the filing of the verified
complaint and every resolution to impeach always carries with it the Articles of
Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words “Articles of Impeachment” are mentioned on line
25 in the case of the direct filing of a verified complaint of one-third of all the Members of the
House. I will mention again, Madam President, that my amendment will not vary the substance
in any way. It is only in keeping with the uniform procedure of the House of Representatives of
the United States Congress.
Thank you, Madam President.[71] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
To the next logical question of what ends or completes the initiation, Commissioners
Bernas and Regalado lucidly explained that the filing of the complaint must be accompanied by
the referral to the Committee on Justice, which is the action that sets the complaint
moving. Francisco cannot be any clearer in pointing out the material dates.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment
complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the
meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been
initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one
year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint was filed by former President
Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this
Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003,
the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix
William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional
prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable
officer within a one-year period.[72] (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
These clear pronouncements notwithstanding, petitioner posits that the date of referral was
considered irrelevant in Francisco. She submits that referral could not be the reckoning point of
initiation because “something prior to that had already been done,”[73] apparently citing Bernas’
discussion.
The Court cannot countenance any attempt at obscurantism.
What the cited discussion was rejecting was the view that the House’s action on the
committee report initiates the impeachment proceedings. It did not state that to determine the
initiating step, absolutely nothing prior to it must be done. Following petitioner’s line of
reasoning, the verification of the complaint or the endorsement by a member of the House –
steps done prior to the filing – would already initiate the impeachment proceedings.
Contrary to petitioner’s emphasis on impeachment complaint, what the Constitution
mentions is impeachment “proceedings.” Her reliance on the singular tense of the word
“complaint”[74] to denote the limit prescribed by the Constitution goes against the basic
rule of statutory construction that a word covers its enlarged and plural sense.[75]
The Court, of course, does not downplay the importance of an impeachment complaint, for
it is the matchstick that kindles the candle of impeachment proceedings. The filing of an
impeachment complaint is like the lighting of a matchstick. Lighting the matchstick alone,
however, cannot light up the candle, unless the lighted matchstick reaches or torches the candle
wick. Referring the complaint to the proper committee ignites the impeachment
proceeding. With a simultaneous referral of multiple complaints filed, more than one lighted
matchsticks light the candle at the same time. What is important is that there should only be
ONE CANDLE that is kindled in a year, such that once the candle starts burning,
subsequent matchsticks can no longer rekindle the candle.
A restrictive interpretation renders the impeachment mechanism both illusive and illusory.
For one, it puts premium on senseless haste. Petitioner’s stance suggests that whoever
files the first impeachment complaint exclusively gets the attention of Congress which sets in
motion an exceptional once-a-year mechanism wherein government resources are devoted. A
prospective complainant, regardless of ill motives or best intentions, can wittingly or unwittingly
desecrate the entire process by the expediency of submitting a haphazard complaint out of sheer
hope to be the first in line. It also puts to naught the effort of other prospective complainants
who, after diligently gathering evidence first to buttress the case, would be barred days or even
hours later from filing an impeachment complaint.
Placing an exceedingly narrow gateway to the avenue of impeachment proceedings turns
its laudable purpose into a laughable matter. One needs only to be an early bird even without
seriously intending to catch the worm, when the process is precisely intended to effectively weed
out “worms” in high offices which could otherwise be ably caught by other prompt birds within
the ultra-limited season.
Moreover, the first-to-file scheme places undue strain on the part of the actual
complainants, injured party or principal witnesses who, by mere happenstance of an almost
always unforeseeable filing of a first impeachment complaint, would be brushed aside and
restricted from directly participating in the impeachment process.
Further, prospective complainants, along with their counsel and members of the House of
Representatives who sign, endorse and file subsequent impeachment complaints against the same
impeachable officer run the risk of violating the Constitution since they would have already
initiated a second impeachment proceeding within the same year. Virtually anybody can initiate
a second or third impeachment proceeding by the mere filing of endorsed impeachment
complaints. Without any public notice that could charge them with knowledge, even members of
the House of Representatives could not readily ascertain whether no other impeachment
complaint has been filed at the time of committing their endorsement.
The question as to who should administer or pronounce that an impeachment proceeding

has been initiated rests also on the body that administers the proceedings prior to the
impeachment trial. As gathered from Commissioner Bernas’ disquisition[76] in Francisco,
a proceeding which “takes place not in the Senate but in the House”[77] precedes the bringing of
an impeachment case to the Senate. In fact, petitioner concedes that the initiation of
impeachment proceedings is within the sole and absolute control of the House of
Representatives.[78] Conscious of the legal import of each step, the House, in taking charge of
its own proceedings, must deliberately decide to initiate an impeachment proceeding, subject to
the time frame and other limitations imposed by the Constitution. This chamber of Congress
alone, not its officers or members or any private individual, should own up to its processes.
The Constitution did not place the power of the “final say” on the lips of the House
Secretary General who would otherwise be calling the shots in forwarding or freezing any
impeachment complaint. Referral of the complaint to the proper committee is not done by the
House Speaker alone either, which explains why there is a need to include it in the Order of
Business of the House. It is the House of Representatives, in public plenary session, which has
the power to set its own chamber into special operation by referring the complaint or to
otherwise guard against the initiation of a second impeachment proceeding by rejecting a
patently unconstitutional complaint.
Under the Rules of the House, a motion to refer is not among those motions that shall be
decided without debate, but any debate thereon is only made subject to the five-minute
rule.[79] Moreover, it is common parliamentary practice that a motion to refer a matter or
question to a committee may be debated upon, not as to the merits thereof, but only as to the
propriety of the referral.[80] With respect to complaints for impeachment, the House has the
discretion not to refer a subsequent impeachment complaint to the Committee on Justice where
official records and further debate show that an impeachment complaint filed against the same
impeachable officer has already been referred to the said committee and the one year period has
not yet expired, lest it becomes instrumental in perpetrating a constitutionally prohibited second
impeachment proceeding. Far from being mechanical, before the referral stage, a period of
deliberation is afforded the House, as the Constitution, in fact, grants a maximum of three
session days within which to make the proper referral.
As mentioned, one limitation imposed on the House in initiating an impeachment
proceeding deals with deadlines. The Constitution states that “[a] verified complaint for
impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen
upon a resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order
of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session
days thereafter.”
In the present case, petitioner failed to establish grave abuse of discretion on the allegedly
“belated” referral of the first impeachment complaint filed by the Baraquel group. For while the
said complaint was filed on July 22, 2010, there was yet then no session in Congress. It was only
four days later or on July 26, 2010 that the 15th Congress opened from which date the 10-day
session period started to run. When, by Memorandum of August 2, 2010, Speaker Belmonte
directed the Committee on Rules to include the complaint in its Order of Business, it was well
within the said 10-day session period.[81]
There is no evident point in rushing at closing the door the moment an impeachment
complaint is filed. Depriving the people (recall that impeachment is primarily for the protection
of the people as a body politic) of reasonable access to the limited political vent simply prolongs
the agony and frustrates the collective rage of an entire citizenry whose trust has been betrayed
by an impeachable officer. It shortchanges the promise of reasonable opportunity to remove an
impeachable officer through the mechanism enshrined in the Constitution.
But neither does the Court find merit in respondents’ alternative contention that the
initiation of the impeachment proceedings, which sets into motion the one-year bar, should
include or await, at the earliest, the Committee on Justice report. To public respondent, the
reckoning point of initiation should refer to the disposition of the complaint by the vote of at
least one-third (1/3) of all the members of the House.[82] To the Reyes group, initiation means
the act of transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate.[83] To respondent-intervenor,
it should last until the Committee on Justice’s recommendation to the House plenary.[84]
The Court, in Francisco, rejected a parallel thesis in which a related proposition was
inputed in the therein assailed provisions of the Impeachment Rules of the 12th Congress. The
present case involving an impeachment proceeding against the Ombudsman offers no cogent
reason for the Court to deviate from what was settled in Francisco that dealt with the
impeachment proceeding against the then Chief Justice. To change the reckoning point of
initiation on no other basis but to accommodate the socio-political considerations of respondents
does not sit well in a court of law.
x x x We ought to be guided by the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere. This
doctrine, which is really “adherence to precedents,” mandates that once a case has been decided
one way, then another case involving exactly the same point at issue should be decided in the
same manner. This doctrine is one of policy grounded on the necessity for securing certainty and
stability of judicial decisions. As the renowned jurist Benjamin Cardozo stated in his treatise
The Nature of the Judicial Process:
It will not do to decide the same question one way between one set of litigants and the
opposite way between another. “If a group of cases involves the same point, the parties expect
the same decision. It would be a gross injustice to decide alternate cases on opposite
principles. If a case was decided against me yesterday when I was a defendant, I shall look for
the same judgment today if I am plaintiff. To decide differently would raise a feeling of
resentment and wrong in my breast; it would be an infringement, material and moral, of my
rights.” Adherence to precedent must then be the rule rather than the exception if litigants are to
have faith in the even-handed administration of justice in the courts.[85]
As pointed out in Francisco, the impeachment proceeding is not initiated “when the House
deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that
has already been done. The action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not
its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified
complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating
step which triggers the series of steps that follow.”[86]
Allowing an expansive construction of the term “initiate” beyond the act of referral allows
the unmitigated influx of successive complaints, each having their own respective 60-session-day
period of disposition from referral. Worse, the Committee shall conduct overlapping hearings
until and unless the disposition of one of the complaints ends with the affirmance of a resolution
for impeachment or the overriding[87] of a contrary resolution (as espoused by public
respondent), or the House transmits the Articles of Impeachment (as advocated by the Reyes
group),[88] or the Committee on Justice concludes its first report to the House plenary regardless
of the recommendation (as posited by respondent-intervenor). Each of these scenarios runs
roughshod the very purpose behind the constitutionally imposed one-year bar. Opening the
floodgates too loosely would disrupt the series of steps operating in unison under one
proceeding.
The Court does not lose sight of the salutary reason of confining only one impeachment
proceeding in a year. Petitioner concededly cites Justice Adolfo Azcuna’s separate opinion that
concurred with the Francisco ruling.[89] Justice Azcuna stated that the purpose of the one-year
bar is two-fold: “to prevent undue or too frequent harassment; and 2) to allow the legislature to
do its principal task [of] legislation,” with main reference to the records of the Constitutional
Commission, that reads:
MR. ROMULO. Yes, the intention here really is to limit. This is not only to protect
public officials who, in this case, are of the highest category from harassment but also to allow
the legislative body to do its work which is lawmaking. Impeachment proceedings take a lot of
time. And if we allow multiple impeachment charges on the same individual to take place, the
legislature will do nothing else but that.[90] (underscoring supplied)
It becomes clear that the consideration behind the intended limitation refers to the element
of time, and not the number of complaints. The impeachable officer should defend himself in
only one impeachment proceeding, so that he will not be precluded from performing his official
functions and duties. Similarly, Congress should run only one impeachment proceeding so as
not to leave it with little time to attend to its main work of law-making. The doctrine laid down
in Francisco that initiation means filing and referral remains congruent to the rationale of the
constitutional provision.
Petitioner complains that an impeachable officer may be subjected to harassment by the
filing of multiple impeachment complaints during the intervening period of a maximum of 13
session days between the date of the filing of the first impeachment complaint to the date of
referral.
As pointed out during the oral arguments[91] by the counsel for respondent-intervenor, the
framework of privilege and layers of protection for an impeachable officer abound. The
requirements or restrictions of a one-year bar, a single proceeding, verification of complaint,
endorsement by a House member, and a finding of sufficiency of form and substance – all these
must be met before bothering a respondent to answer – already weigh heavily in favor of an
impeachable officer.
Aside from the probability of an early referral and the improbability of inclusion in the
agenda of a complaint filed on the 11th hour (owing to pre-agenda standard operating
procedure), the number of complaints may still be filtered or reduced to nil after the Committee
decides once and for all on the sufficiency of form and substance. Besides, if only to douse
petitioner’s fear, a complaint will not last the primary stage if it does not have the stated
preliminary requisites.
To petitioner, disturbance of her performance of official duties and the deleterious effects
of bad publicity are enough oppression.
Petitioner’s claim is based on the premise that the exertion of time, energy and other
resources runs directly proportional to the number of complaints filed. This is non
sequitur. What the Constitution assures an impeachable officer is not freedom from arduous
effort to defend oneself, which depends on the qualitative assessment of the charges and
evidence and not on the quantitative aspect of complaints or offenses. In considering the side of
the impeachable officers, the Constitution does not promise an absolutely smooth ride for them,
especially if the charges entail genuine and grave issues. The framers of the Constitution did not
concern themselves with the media tolerance level or internal disposition of an impeachable
officer when they deliberated on the impairment of performance of official functions. The
measure of protection afforded by the Constitution is that if the impeachable officer is made to
undergo such ride, he or she should be made to traverse it just once. Similarly, if Congress is
called upon to operate itself as a vehicle, it should do so just once. There is no repeat ride for
one full year. This is the whole import of the constitutional safeguard of one-year bar rule.
Posted in Impeachment | Tagged The one-year bar rule of impeachment | Leave a comment
Is there denial of due process when there is a delay in the publication of

impeachment rules?
In another vein, petitioner, pursuing her claim of denial of due process, questions the lack of or,
more accurately, delay in the publication of the Impeachment Rules.
To recall, days after the 15th Congress opened on July 26, 2010 or on August 3, 2010,
public respondent provisionally adopted the Impeachment Rules of the 14th Congress and
thereafter published on September 2, 2010 its Impeachment Rules, admittedly substantially
identical with that of the 14th Congress, in two newspapers of general circulation.[40]
Citing Tañada v. Tuvera,[41] petitioner contends that she was deprived of due process
since the Impeachment Rules was published only on September 2, 2010 a day after public
respondent ruled on the sufficiency of form of the complaints. She likewise tacks her contention
on Section 3(8), Article XI of the Constitution which directs that “Congress shall promulgate its
rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.”
Public respondent counters that “promulgation” in this case refers to “the publication of rules in
any medium of information, not necessarily in the Official Gazette or newspaper of general
circulation.”[42]
Differentiating Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations[43] which held that the Constitution categorically requires publication of the rules
of procedure in legislative inquiries, public respondent explains that the Impeachment Rules is
intended to merely enable Congress to effectively carry out the purpose of Section 3(8), Art. XI
of Constitution.
Black’s Law Dictionary broadly defines promulgate as
To publish; to announce officially; to make public as important or obligatory. The formal
act of announcing a statute or rule of court. An administrative order that is given to cause an
agency law or regulation to become known or obligatory.[44] (emphasis supplied)
While “promulgation” would seem synonymous to “publication,” there is a statutory difference
in their usage.
The Constitution notably uses the word “promulgate” 12 times.[45] A number of those instances
involves the promulgation of various rules, reports and issuances emanating from Congress, this
Court, the Office of the Ombudsman as well as other constitutional offices.
To appreciate the statutory difference in the usage of the terms “promulgate” and “publish,” the
case of the Judiciary is in point. In promulgating rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the Court has
invariably required the publication of these rules for their effectivity. As far as promulgation of
judgments is concerned, however, promulgation means “the delivery of the decision to the clerk
of court for filing and publication.”[46]
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution contains a similar provision directing Congress to
“promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates” in the presidential and vice
presidential elections. Notably, when Congress approved its canvassing rules for the May 14,
2010 national elections on May 25, 2010,[47] it did not require the publication thereof for its
effectivity. Rather, Congress made the canvassing rules effective upon its adoption.
In the case of administrative agencies, “promulgation” and “publication” likewise take on
different meanings as they are part of a multi-stage procedure in quasi-legislation. As detailed in
one case,[48] the publication of implementing rules occurs after their promulgation or adoption.
Promulgation must thus be used in the context in which it is generally understood—that is,
to make known. Generalia verba sunt generaliter inteligencia. What is generally spoken shall
be generally understood. Between the restricted sense and the general meaning of a word, the
general must prevail unless it was clearly intended that the restricted sense was to be used.[49]
Since the Constitutional Commission did not restrict “promulgation” to “publication,” the former
should be understood to have been used in its general sense. It is within the discretion of
Congress to determine on how to promulgate its Impeachment Rules, in much the same way that
the Judiciary is permitted to determine that to promulgate a decision means to deliver the
decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication.
It is not for this Court to tell a co-equal branch of government how to promulgate when the
Constitution itself has not prescribed a specific method of promulgation. The Court is in no
position to dictate a mode of promulgation beyond the dictates of the Constitution.
Publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is but one avenue for
Congress to make known its rules. Jurisprudence emphatically teaches that
x x x in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is
devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative
thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not
intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province of courts to direct
Congress how to do its work. In the words of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court is of the
opinion that where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the
legislature must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate as well
as to implement them, before the courts may intervene.[50] (italics in the original; emphasis
and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
Had the Constitution intended to have the Impeachment Rules published, it could have stated
so as categorically as it did in the case of the rules of procedure in legislative inquiries,
per Neri. Other than “promulgate,” there is no other single formal term in the English language
to appropriately refer to an issuance without need of it being published.
IN FINE, petitioner cannot take refuge in Neri since inquiries in aid of legislation under Section
21, Article VI of the Constitution is the sole instance in the Constitution where there is
a categorical directive to duly publish a set of rules of procedure. Significantly notable
in Neri is that with respect to the issue of publication, the Court anchored its ruling on
the 1987 Constitution’s directive, without any reliance on or reference to the 1986 case
of Tañada v. Tuvera.[51] Tañada naturally could neither have interpreted a forthcoming 1987
Constitution nor had kept a tight rein on the Constitution’s intentions as expressed through the
allowance of either a categorical term or a general sense of making known the issuances.
From the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, then Commissioner, now retired
Associate Justice Florenz Regalado intended Section 3(8), Article XI to be the vehicle for the
House to fill the gaps in the impeachment process.
MR. REGALADO. Mr. Presiding Officer, I have decided to put in an additional section
because, for instance, under Section 3 (2), there is mention of indorsing a verified complaint for
impeachment by any citizen alleging ultimate facts constituting a ground or grounds for
impeachment. In other words, it is just like a provision in the rules of court. Instead, I propose
that this procedural requirement, like indorsement of a complaint by a citizen to avoid
harassment or crank complaints, could very well be taken up in a new section 4 which shall read
as follows: THE CONGRESS SHALL PROMULGATE ITS RULES ON IMPEACHMENT TO
EFFECTIVELY CARRY OUT THE PURPOSES THEREOF. I think
all these other procedural requirements could be taken care of by the Rules of
Congress.[52] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The discussion clearly rejects the notion that the impeachment provisions are not self-
executing. Section 3(8) does not, in any circumstance, operate to suspend the entire
impeachment mechanism which the Constitutional Commission took pains in designing even its
details.
As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a
different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate
directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of
constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence,
unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional
mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-
executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-
executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of
the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has
always been, that —
. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-
self-executing . . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution
should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to
determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to
the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing
to pass the needed implementing statute.[53] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Even assuming arguendo that publication is required, lack of it does not nullify the proceedings
taken prior to the effectivity of the Impeachment Rules which faithfully comply with the relevant
self-executing provisions of the Constitution. Otherwise, in cases where impeachment
complaints are filed at the start of each Congress, the mandated periods under Section 3, Article
XI of the Constitution would already run or even lapse while awaiting the expiration of the 15-
day period of publication prior to the effectivity of the Impeachment Rules. In effect, the House
would already violate the Constitution for its inaction on the impeachment complaints pending
the completion of the publication requirement.
Given that the Constitution itself states that any promulgation of the rules on impeachment is
aimed at “effectively carry[ing] out the purpose” of impeachment proceedings, the Court finds
no grave abuse of discretion when the House deemed it proper to provisionally adopt the Rules
on Impeachment of the 14th Congress, to meet the exigency in such situation of early filing and
in keeping with the “effective” implementation of the “purpose” of the impeachment
provisions. In other words, the provisional adoption of the previous Congress’ Impeachment
Rules is within the power of the House to promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively
carry out the avowed purpose.
Moreover, the rules on impeachment, as contemplated by the framers of the Constitution, merely
aid or supplement the procedural aspects of impeachment. Being procedural in nature, they may
be given retroactive application to pending actions. “It is axiomatic that the retroactive
application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is
adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason for this is that, as a
general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.”[54] In the present
case, petitioner fails to allege any impairment of vested rights.
It bears stressing that, unlike the process of inquiry in aid of legislation where the rights of
witnesses are involved, impeachment is primarily for the protection of the people as a body
politic, and not for the punishment of the offender.[55]
Even Neri concedes that the unpublished rules of legislative inquiries were not considered null
and void in its entirety. Rather,
x x x [o]nly those that result in violation of the rights of witnesses should be considered null
and void, considering that the rationale for the publication is to protect the rights of
witnesses as expressed in Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. Sans such violation, orders
and proceedings are considered valid and effective.[56] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioner in fact does not deny that she was fully apprised of the proper procedure. She even
availed of and invoked certain provisions[57] of the Impeachment Rules when she, on September
7, 2010, filed the motion for reconsideration and later filed the present petition. The Court thus
finds no violation of the due process clause.
Posted in Constitutional Rights, Definitions, Due

Process, Impeachment, Publication/Promulgation, Question and Answers | Tagged Is there denial
of due process when there is a delay in the publication of impeachment rules? | Leave a comment
While prosecutors are given sufficient latitude of discretion in the determination of

probable cause, their findings are subject to review by the Secretary of Justice
The Court held in First Women’s Credit Corporation v. Perez that:[13]

It is settled that the determination of whether probable cause exists to warrant the
prosecution in court of an accused should be consigned and entrusted to the Department of
Justice, as reviewer of the findings of public prosecutors. The court’s duty in an appropriate
case is confined to a determination of whether the assailed executive or judicial determination of
probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to want of jurisdiction. This is consistent with the general rule that criminal
prosecutions may not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final, albeit in extreme
cases, exceptional circumstances have been recognized. The rule is also consistent with this
Court’s policy of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and of
leaving to the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the exercise of
determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause for
the filing of an information against a supposed offender.
While prosecutors are given sufficient latitude of discretion in the determination of
probable cause, their findings are subject to review by the Secretary of Justice. (Emphasis
supplied)
And it held in UCPB v. Looyuko:[14]
Consistent with this policy, courts do not reverse the Secretary of Justice’s findings and
conclusions on the matter of probable cause except in clear cases of grave abuse of
discretion.
xxxx
In other words, judicial review of the resolution of the Secretary of Justice is limited to a
determination of whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction considering that full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
executive branch in the determination of probable cause during a preliminary
investigation. Courts are not empowered to substitute their judgment for that of the executive
branch; it may, however, look into the question of whether such exercise has been made in grave
abuse of discretion. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/july2009/172796.htm
Posted in Criminal Law, DOJ, Preliminary Investigation, Probable
Cause, Uncategorized | Tagged Probable Cause, While prosecutors are given sufficient latitude
of discretion in the determination of probable cause their findings are subject to review by the
Secretary of Justice | Leave a comment
Two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial

There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. The executive
determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a function
that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine
whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the
crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the
quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in
court.[22] Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the public
prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable
cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass
upon.[23]
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to
ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy
himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under
custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.[24] If the judge finds no probable cause, the
judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.[25]
Corollary to the principle that a judge cannot be compelled to issue a warrant of arrest if he or
she deems that there is no probable cause for doing so, the judge in turn should not override the
public prosecutor’s determination of probable cause to hold an accused for trial on the ground
that the evidence presented to substantiate the issuance of an arrest warrant was insufficient. It
must be stressed that in our criminal justice system, the public prosecutor exercises a wide
latitude of discretion in determining whether a criminal case should be filed in court, and that
courts must respect the exercise of such discretion when the information filed against the person
charged is valid on its face, and that no manifest error or grave abuse of discretion can be
imputed to the public prosecutor.[26]
Thus, absent a finding that an information is invalid on its face or that the prosecutor committed
manifest error or grave abuse of discretion, a judge’s determination of probable cause is limited
only to the judicial kind or for the purpose of deciding whether the arrest warrants should be
issued against the accused.
In the instant case, there is no question that both the original[27] and amended[28] Informations
were valid on their face because they complied with Section 6,[29] Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court. Also, a scrutiny of the Resolution[30] dated August 22, 2002 of the Ombudsman which
precipitated the filing of the original Information and the subsequent Memorandum dated August
4, 2004 recommending the amendment of the Information would likewise show that the finding
of probable cause against the respondents were sufficiently supported by substantial
evidence. As a matter of fact, in the Resolution datedAugust 22, 2002, the Ombudsman took
pains to mention each element of the crime of violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019 and
then one by one adequately explained how and why those elements were satisfied. Hence, as the
amended Information was valid on its face and there is no manifest error or arbitrariness on the
part of the Ombudsman, the Sandiganbayan erred in making an executive determination of
probable cause when it overturned the Ombudsman’s own determination. And this is true even if
the Sandiganbayan was no longer satisfied with the evidence presented to sustain the effectivity
of the arrest warrants previously issued for the original Information. The Sandiganbayan could
have just revoked the previously issued arrest warrants and required the Ombudsman to submit
additional evidence for the purpose of issuing the arrest warrants based on the amended
Information.
Moreover, it was clearly premature on the part of the Sandiganbayan to make a determinative
finding prior to the parties’ presentation of their respective evidence that there was no bad faith
and manifest partiality on the respondents’ part and undue injury on the part of the complainant.
In Go v. Fifth Division, Sandiganbayan,[31] we held that “it is well established that the presence
or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that
may be best passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits.”[32] Also, it would be unfair to
expect the prosecution to present all the evidence needed to secure the conviction of the accused
upon the filing of the information against the latter. The reason is found in the nature and
objective of a preliminary investigation. Here, the public prosecutors do not decide whether there
is evidence beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the person charged; they merely determine
whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.[33]
The Sandiganbayan and all courts for that matter should always remember the judiciary’s
standing policy on non-interference in the Office of the Ombudsman’s exercise of its
constitutionally mandated powers. This policy is based not only upon respect for the
investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the
Ombudsman but upon practicality as well, considering that otherwise, the functions of the courts
will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions regarding complaints filed before it, and in
much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they were to be compelled to
review the exercise of discretion on the part of the prosecutors each time they decide to file an
information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.[34]
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/june2009/171188.htm
Posted in Criminal Law, Ombudsman, Preliminary Investigation, Probable
Cause, Sandiganbayan | Tagged full-blown trial on the merits, public prosecutor and judge, Two
kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial | Leave a comment
The revenues of a local government unit do not consist of taxes alone, but also other fees
and charges. And rentals and goodwill fees, imposed by Municipal Ordinance for the
occupancy of the stalls at the municipal public market, fall under the definition of charges.
That the ordinance levying such taxes, fees or charges shall not be enacted without any
prior public hearing conducted for the purpose.
Posted on July 26, 2011by Erineus
Respondent maintains that the imposition of goodwill fees upon stall holders at the municipal
public market is not a revenue measure that requires a prior public hearing. Rentals and other
consideration for occupancy of the stalls at the municipal public market are not matters of
taxation.
Respondent’s argument is specious.
Article 219 of the Local Government Code provides that a local government unit exercising its
power to impose taxes, fees and charges should comply with the requirements set in Rule XXX,
entitled “Local Government Taxation”:
Article 219. Power to Create Sources of Revenue.—Consistent with the basic policy of
local autonomy, each LGU shall exercise its power to create its own sources of revenue and to
levy taxes, fees, or charges, subject to the provisions of this Rule. Such taxes, fees, or charges
shall accrue exclusively to the LGU. (Emphasis ours.)
Article 221(g) of the Local Government Code of 1991 defines “charges” as:
Article 221. Definition of Terms.

xxxx
(g) Charges refer to pecuniary liability, as rents or fees against persons or property. (Emphasis
ours.)
Evidently, the revenues of a local government unit do not consist of taxes alone, but also other
fees and charges. And rentals and goodwill fees, imposed by Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 for
the occupancy of the stalls at the municipal public market, fall under the definition of charges.
For the valid enactment of ordinances imposing charges, certain legal requisites must be
met. Section 186 of the Local Government Code identifies such requisites as follows:
Section 186. Power to Levy Other Taxes, Fees or Charges.—Local government units
may exercise the power to levy taxes, fees or charges on any base or subject not otherwise
specifically enumerated herein or taxed under the provisions of the National Internal Revenue
Code, as amended, or other applicable laws: Provided, That the taxes, fees or charges shall not
be unjust, excessive, oppressive, confiscatory or contrary to declared national policy: Provided,
further, That the ordinance levying such taxes, fees or charges shall not be enacted without
any prior public hearing conducted for the purpose. (Emphasis ours.)
Section 277 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code
establishes in detail the procedure for the enactment of such an ordinance, relevant provisions of
which are reproduced below:
Section 277. Publication of Tax Ordinance and Revenue Measures.—x x x.

xxxx
(b) The conduct of public hearings shall be governed by the following procedure:
xxxx
(2) In addition to the requirement for publication or posting, the sanggunian concerned shall
cause the sending of written notices of the proposed ordinance, enclosing a copy thereof, to the
interested or affected parties operating or doing business within the territorial jurisdiction of the
LGU concerned.
(3) The notice or notices shall specify the date or dates and venue of the public hearing or
hearings. The initial public hearing shall be held not earlier than ten (10) days from the
sending out of the notice or notices, or the last day of publication, or date of posting thereof,
whichever is later;
xxxx
(c) No tax ordinance or revenue measure shall be enacted or approved in the absence of a
public hearing duly conducted in the manner provided under this Article. (Emphases ours.)
It is categorical, therefore, that a public hearing be held prior to the enactment of an ordinance
levying taxes, fees, or charges; and that such public hearing be conducted as provided under
Section 277 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code.
There is no dispute herein that the notices sent to petitioners and other stall holders at the
municipal public market were sent out on 6 August 1998, informing them of the supposed
“public hearing” to be held on 11 August 1998. Even assuming that petitioners received their
notice also on 6 August 1998, the “public hearing” was already scheduled, and actually
conducted, only five days later, on 11 August 1998. This contravenes Article 277(b)(3) of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code which requires that the
public hearing be held no less than ten days from the time the notices were sent out, posted, or
published.
When the Sangguniang Bayan of Maasin sought to correct this procedural defect through
Resolution No. 68, series of 1998, dated 18 September 1998, respondent vetoed the said
resolution. Although the Sangguniang Bayan may have had the power to override respondent’s
veto,[37] it no longer did so.
The defect in the enactment of Municipal Ordinance No. 98 was not cured when another public
hearing was held on 22 January 1999, after the questioned ordinance was passed by
the Sangguniang Bayan and approved by respondent on 17 August 1998. Section 186 of the
Local Government Code prescribes that the public hearing be held priorto the enactment by a
local government unit of an ordinance levying taxes, fees, and charges.
Since no public hearing had been duly conducted prior to the enactment of Municipal Ordinance
No. 98-01, said ordinance is void and cannot be given any effect. Consequently, a void and
ineffective ordinance could not have conferred upon respondent the jurisdiction to order
petitioners’ stalls at the municipal public market vacant.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/october2009/182065.htm
Posted in LGU, Mayor, Rental, Taxes Fees Charges | Tagged The revenues of a local
government unit do not consist of taxes alone but also other fees and charges. And rentals and
goodwill fees imposed by Municipal Ordinance for the occupancy of the stalls at t | Leave a
comment
Under Section 443(a) and (d) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160 or the Local Government
Code, the head of a department or office in the municipal government, such as the
Municipal Budget Officer, shall be appointed by the mayor with the concurrence of the
majority of all Sangguniang Bayan members subject to civil service law, rules
and regulations.
Hence, the instant Petition raising the sole issue of whether the appointment of petitioner as
Municipal Budget Officer, without the written concurrence of the Sanggunian, but duly approved
by the CSC and after the appointee had served as such for almost ten years without interruption,
can still be revoked by the Commission.
We resolve to deny the Petition.
The law is clear. Under Section 443(a) and (d) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160[5] or the Local
Government Code, the head of a department or office in the municipal
government, such as the Municipal Budget Officer, shall be appointed by the mayor with the
concurrence of the majority of all Sangguniang Bayan members[6] subject to civil service law,
rules and regulations. Per records, the appointment of petitioner was never submitted to
the Sangguniang Bayan for its concurrence or, even if so submitted, no such concurrence was
obtained. Such factual finding of quasi-judicial agencies, especially if adopted and affirmed by
the CA, is deemed final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal by this Court. This
Court is not a trier of facts and generally, does not weigh anew evidence already passed upon by
the CA. Absent a showing that this case falls under any of the exceptions to this general rule, this
Court will refrain from disturbing the findings of fact of the tribunals below.
Moreover, we agree with the ruling of the CA that the verbal concurrence allegedly given by
the Sanggunian, as postulated by the petitioner, is not the concurrence required and envisioned
under R.A. No. 7160. The Sanggunian, as a body, acts through a resolution or an ordinance.
Absent such resolution of concurrence, the appointment of petitioner failed to comply with the
mandatory requirement of Section 443(a) and (d) of R.A. No. 7160. Without a valid
appointment, petitioner acquired no legal title to the Office of Municipal Budget Officer, even if
she had served as such for ten years.
Accordingly, the CSC has the authority to recall the appointment of the petitioner.[7]
All told, we find no reversible error on the part of the CA.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/october2008/177736.htm
Posted in Civil Service Commision, Civil Service Law, LGU, Mayor, Sangguniang
Bayan | Tagged Under Section 443(a) and (d) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160[5] or the Local
Government Code the head of a department or office in the municipal government such as the
Municipal Budget Officer shall b | Leave a comment
The only ground upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal resolution,
ordinance, or order invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or order is ‘beyond the
powers conferred upon the council or president making the same. Absolutely no other
ground is recognized by the law.
Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the instant case, is
a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty.[14] It is government’s right to
appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or
purpose.[15] Inherently possessed by the national legislature, the power of eminent domain may
be validly delegated to local governments, other public entities and public utilities.[16] For the
taking of private property by the government to be valid, the taking must be for public use and
there must be just compensation.[17]
The Municipality of Bunawan’s power to exercise the right of eminent domain is not disputed as
it is expressly provided for in Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the Local Government Code[18] in
force at the time expropriation proceedings were initiated. Section 9 of said law states:
“Section 9. Eminent Domain. — A local government unit may, through its head and acting
pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian, exercise the right of eminent domain and institute
condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose.”
What petitioners question is the lack of authority of the municipality to exercise this right since
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved Resolution No. 43-89.
Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337 provides:
“Sec. 153. Sangguniang Panlalawigan Review. — (1) Within thirty days after receiving copies
of approved ordinances, resolutions and executive orders promulgated by the municipal mayor,
the sangguniang panlalawigan shall examine the documents or transmit them to the provincial
attorney, or if there be none, to the provincial fiscal, who shall examine them promptly and
inform the sangguniang panlalawigan in writing of any defect or impropriety which he may
discover therein and make such comments or recommendations as shall appear to him proper.
(2) If the sangguniang panlalawigan shall find that any municipal ordinance, resolution or
executive order is beyond the power conferred upon the sangguniang bayan or the mayor, it
shall declare such ordinance, resolution or executive order invalid in whole or in part,
entering its actions upon the minutes and advising the proper municipal authorities thereof. The
effect of such an action shall be to annul the ordinance, resolution or executive order in question
in whole or in part. The action of the sangguniang panlalawigan shall be final.
xxx xxx xxx.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan’s disapproval of Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 is an infirm
action which does not render said resolution null and void. The law, as expressed in Section 153
of B.P. Blg. 337, grants the Sangguniang Panlalawigan the power to declare a municipal
resolution invalid on the sole ground that it is beyond the power of the Sangguniang Bayan or the
Mayor to issue. Although pertaining to a similar provision of law but different factual milieu
then obtaining, the Court’s pronouncements in Velazco v. Blas,[19] where we cited significant
early jurisprudence, are applicable to the case at bar.
“The only ground upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal resolution,
ordinance, or order invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or order is ‘beyond the powers
conferred upon the council or president making the same.’ Absolutely no other ground is
recognized by the law. A strictly legal question is before the provincial board in its consideration
of a municipal resolution, ordinance, or order. The provincial (board’s) disapproval of any
resolution, ordinance, or order must be premised specifically upon the fact that such resolution,
ordinance, or order is outside the scope of the legal powers conferred by law. If a provincial
board passes these limits, it usurps the legislative functions of the municipal council or president.
Such has been the consistent course of executive authority.”[20]
Thus, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without the authority to disapprove Municipal
Resolution No. 43-89 for the Municipality of Bunawan clearly has the power to exercise the right
of eminent domain and its Sangguniang Bayan the capacity to promulgate said resolution,
pursuant to the earlier-quoted Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337. Perforce, it follows that Resolution No.
43-89 is valid and binding and could be used as lawful authority to petition for the condemnation
of petitioners’ property.
As regards the accusation of political oppression, it is alleged that Percival Moday incurred the
ire of then Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo when he refused to support the latter’s candidacy for
mayor in previous elections. Petitioners claim that then incumbent Mayor C. Bustillo used the
expropriation to retaliate by expropriating their land even if there were other properties
belonging to the municipality and available for the purpose. Specifically, they allege that the
municipality owns a vacant seven-hectare property adjacent to petitioners’ land, evidenced by a
sketch plan.[21]
The limitations on the power of eminent domain are that the use must be public, compensation
must be made and due process of law must be observed.[22] The Supreme Court, taking
cognizance of such issues as the adequacy of compensation, necessity of the taking and the
public use character or the purpose of the taking[23], has ruled that the necessity of exercising
eminent domain must be genuine and of a public character.[24] Government may not
capriciously choose what private property should be taken.
After a careful study of the records of the case, however, we find no evidentiary support for
petitioners’ allegations. The uncertified photocopy of the sketch plan does not conclusively
prove that the municipality does own vacant land adjacent to petitioners’ property suited to the
purpose of the expropriation. In the questioned decision, respondent appellate court similarly
held that the pleadings and documents on record have not pointed out any of respondent
municipality’s “other available properties available for the same purpose.[25] ” The accusations
of political reprisal are likewise unsupported by competent evidence. Consequently, the Court
holds that petitioners’ demand that the former municipal mayor be personally liable for damages
is without basis.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/feb1997/107916.htm
Posted in Eminent Domain, Expropriation, LGU, Sangguniang Bayan, Sangguniang
Panlalawigan | Tagged The only ground upon which a provincial board may declare any
municipal resolution ordinance or order invalid is when such resolution ordinance or order is
'beyond the powers conferred upon the counci | Leave a comment
Supreme Court on Gambling

It should, furthermore, be borne in mind that cockfighting although authorized by law is still a
form of gambling. Gambling is essentially antagonistic to the aims of enhancing national
productivity and self-reliance.[24] As has been previously said, a statute which authorizes a
gambling activity or business should be strictly construed, and every reasonable doubt resolved
so as to limit rather than expand the powers and rights claimed by franchise holders under its
authority.[25]
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jan2004/155344.htm
Posted in Cockfighting, Gambling, Quotations, Supreme Court | Leave a comment
Neither prior notice nor a hearing is required for the issuance of a preventive suspension
order by the Ombudsman.
As early as 1995, this Court ruled in Lastimosa v. Vasquez[14] and Hagad v. Gozo-
Dadole,[15] that neither prior notice nor a hearing is required for the issuance of a preventive
suspension order. The well-settled doctrine is solidly anchored on the explicit text of the
governing law which is Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770. The provision defines the authority of the
Ombudsman to preventively suspend government officials and employees. It reads:
SEC. 24. Preventive Suspension.—The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend
any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the
evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves
dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the
charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent’s continued stay in office
may prejudice the case filed against him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the
Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition
of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the
respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period
of suspension herein provided.
Clearly, the plain language of the above-quoted provision debunks the appellate court’s position
that the order meting out preventive suspension may not be issued without prior notice and
hearing and before the issues are joined. Under Section 24, two requisites must concur to render
the preventive suspension order valid. The first requisite is unique and can be satisfied in only
one way. It is that in the judgment of the Ombudsman or the Deputy Ombudsman, the evidence
of guilt is strong. The second requisite, however, may be met in three (3) different ways, to wit:
(1) that the offense charged involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in
the performance of duty; (2) the charge would warrant removal from the service; or (3) the
respondent’s continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
Is the Ombudsman’s power in administrative cases limited to the recommendation of the

penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer
or employee found to be at fault? Accordingly, it has the power to impose the penalty
of suspension
Citing Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman,[25] the CA declared that the Ombudsman’s power
in administrative cases is limited to the recommendation of the penalty of removal, suspension,
demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at fault;
accordingly, it has no power to impose the penalty of suspension on Armilla, et al.
The CA adopted the same view in Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals and
Santos where it held that the Ombudsman had no authority to directly penalize therein
respondent Lorena Santos, but may only recommend to her agency, the Land Transportation
Franchising and Regulatory Board, the imposition of an administrative penalty against her.
In both cases, the Court reversed the CA and declared that the scope of the authority of the
Ombudsman in administrative cases as defined under the Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 is
broad enough to include the direct imposition of the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion,
fine or censure on an erring public official or employee. In Office of the Ombudsman v. Court
of Appeals and Armilla, the Court held:
Still in connection with their administrative disciplinary authority, the Ombudsman and his
deputies are expressly given the power to preventively suspend public officials and employees
facing administrative charges in accordance with Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6770:
Sec. 24. Preventive Suspension. – The Ombudsman and his Deputy may preventively suspend
any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the
evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves
dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the
charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent’s continued stay in office
may prejudice the case filed against him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the
Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition
of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the
respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period
of suspension herein provided.
Section 25 thereof sets forth the penalties as follows:
Sec. 25. Penalties. – (1) In administrative proceedings under Presidential Decree No. 807, the
penalties and rules provided therein shall be applied.
(2) In other administrative proceedings, the penalty ranging from suspension without pay for
one year to dismissal with forfeiture of benefits or a fine ranging from five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00) to twice the amount malversed, illegally taken or lost, or both at the discretion of the
Ombudsman, taking into consideration circumstances that mitigate or aggravate the liability of
the officer or employee found guilty of the complaint or charges.
As referred to in the above provision, under Presidential Decree No. 807,[32] the penalties that
may be imposed by the disciplining authority in administrative disciplinary cases are removal
from the service, transfer, demotion in rank, suspension for not more than one year without pay,
fine in an amount not exceeding six months’ salary, or reprimand.
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 provides for the period of effectivity and finality of the
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman:
Sec. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. – (1) All provisionary orders of the Office of the
Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory.
xxxx
Findings of facts by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are
conclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one month’s salary shall be final and unappealable.
xxxx
All these provisions in Republic Act No. 6770 taken together reveal the manifest intent of the
lawmakers to bestow on the Office of the Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary
authority. These provisions cover the entire gamut of administrative adjudication which
entails the authority to, inter alia, receive complaints, conduct investigations, hold hearings in
accordance with its rules of procedure, summon witnesses and require the production of
documents, place under preventive suspension public officers and employees pending an
investigation, determine the appropriate penalty imposable on erring public officers or
employees as warranted by the evidence, and, necessarily, impose the said penalty.
Moreover, in Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals and Santos, the Court drew attention
to subparagraph 3 of Sec. 15 of R.A. No. 6770, which provides:
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. – The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following
powers, functions and duties:
xxxx
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public officer or employee at
fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law, and recommend his
removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith;
or enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21 of this Act: Provided, That the
refusal by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to
remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee who is at fault or
who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law shall be a ground for
disciplinary action against said officer. (Emphasis supplied)
The Court held that the aforecited proviso — that the refusal, without just cause, of any officer to
comply with an order of the Ombudsman to penalize an erring officer or employee with removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution is a ground for disciplinary action against
said officer — is a strong indication that the Ombudsman’s “recommendation” is not merely
advisory in nature but is actually mandatory within the bounds of law.
It being settled that the Ombudsman has the authority to impose administrative penalties, it did
not act with grave abuse of discretion in the present case when it meted the penalty of suspension
on respondent for simple misconduct. The CA therefore erred in granting the petition
for certiorari of respondent.
The next issue is whether the imposition of such penalty can no longer be appealed to the CA.
The Court had occasion to resolve the same issue in Herrera v. Bohol.[26] In said case, the
Ombudsman found therein petitioner Herrera guilty of simple misconduct and imposed upon him
the penalty of suspension for one month without pay. Herrera filed an appeal with the CA, but
the same was dismissed on the ground “that the questioned decision of the Ombudsman is
unappealable x x x.” Citing Lopez v. Court of Appeals,[27] the Court affirmed the decision of
the CA, thus:
x x x [T]he Court, again citing Sec. 27 of R.A. No. 6770, Sec. 7, Rule III of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman and Lapid v. Court of Appeals, reiterated that
decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases imposing the penalty of public censure,
reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary
shall be final and unappealable.The penalty imposed upon herein petitioner being suspension
for one month without pay, we hold the same final and unappealable, as correctly ruled by the
Court of Appeals. (Emphasis added)
Thus, the CA erred when it reviewed on appeal the factual basis of the Ombudsman decision
despite its being final and unappealable under Sec. 27 of R.A. No. 6770. As we held in Republic
v. Francisco,[28] considering that a decision of the Ombudsman imposing the penalty of
suspension for not more than one month is final and unappealable, “it follows that the CA ha[s]
no appellate jurisdiction to review, rectify or reverse the same.” This is not to say that decisions
of the Ombudsman cannot be questioned – such decisions are still subject to the test of
arbitrariness or grave abuse of discretion through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. However, as earlier discussed, the Ombudsman did not act with grave abuse of
discretion in imposing on respondent the penalty of suspension without pay for not more than
one month, the same being within its ample authority to impose under the Constitution and R.A.
No. 6770.

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Family Code provisions on substitute parental authority of grandparents

Posted on March 5, 2016by Erineus

(1) The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art. 214;

Family Code provisions on parental authority

What is a travel clearance for minors?

WHO NEEDS A TRAVEL CLEARANCE? A minor traveling alone to a foreign country ; A

1. Duly accomplished application form

HOW MUCH IS THE PROCESSING FEE FOR A TRAVEL CLEARANCE ISSUED TO

 Php 300.00 with validity of one (1) year.

CAN A TRAVEL CLEARANCE BE ISSUED TO ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN WHO

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(b) suspension, deprivation or termination of parental authority;

(d) when the best interests of the minor so require.

(b) physical, mental and psychological condition;

(c) financial status;

(d) relationship of trust with the minor;

(f) lack of conflict of interest with the minor; and

(g) ability to manage the property of the minor.

Grounds for administrative disciplinary action

(b) Owning, controlling, managing or accepting employment as officer, employee, consultant,

We find no compelling reason to depart from our pronouncement in Domingo. Thus, we

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In Choa v. Chiongson,[125] the Court administratively disciplined a lawyer, through the

Instances where a writ of execution may be appealed

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Exceptions as meriting a relaxation of the rules in order to serve substantial justice

Thus, the Court ruled in Mejia v. Gabayan:[21]

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a. Post Default Penalty 3.00% per month

d. Collection & Legal Cost As provided by the Rules of Court

SEC. 3. CAPITAL GAINS TAX. –

SEC. 4. DOCUMENTARY STAMP TAX. –

Section 246 of the NIRC of 1997 states:

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(c) where the taxpayer acted in bad faith.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, both petitions are PARTLY GRANTED.

xxx xxx xxx

Acts of lasciviousness defined and its elements enumerated

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In People v. Losano,34 the Court held:

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In Navarro v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company,[21] We discussed the rule on

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A lack of diligence by a party claiming an estoppel is generally fatal.

SEC. 3. Parties.—When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is

The trial court granted the petition.

Does the suspension of “all claims” as an incident to a corporate rehabilitation also