G.R. No.

106357 September 3, 1998 Tunghayan natin kung papaano naganap ang gawang panloloko sa mga taga Palawan ng mga dayo lamang.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, On July 6, 1989, the Panata Foundation of the Philippines, Inc., a non-stock, non-profit corporation with principal
vs. address at San Miguel, Puerto Princesa, Palawan, was registered with the securities and Exchange Commission,
PRISCILLA BALASA, NORMITA VISAYA, GUILLERMO FRANCISCO, NORMA FRANCISCO and under S.E.C. Reg. No. 165565. Its ten incoporators were Priscilla Balasa, Normita Visaya, Analina Francisco,
ANALINA FRANCISCO, accused, NORMA FRANCISCO, GUILLERMO FRANCISCO and ANALINA Lolita Gelilang, Cynthia Ang, Norma Francisco, Purabel Espidol, Melinda Mercado, Rodolfo Ang, Jr. and Teresa G.
FRANCISCO, accused-appellants. Carandang. Five incorporators, namely, Priscilla Balasa, Normita Visaya, Analina Francisco, Lolita Gelilang and
Cynthia Ang were named first trustees.
G.R. No. 108601-02 September 3, 1998
In addition, the management of the foundation was entrusted to Priscilla Balasa, as president and general
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, manager; Normita Visaya as corporate secretary and head comptroller; Norma Francisco as cashier; Guillermo
vs. Francisco as the disbursing officer; and Analina Francisco as treasurer. The latter also doubled as a typist of the
PRISCILLA BALASA, NORMITA VISAYA, GUILLERMO FRANCISCO, NORMA FRANCISCO and Foundation.
ANALINA FRANCISCO, accused, NORMA FRANCISCO, GUILLERMO FRANCISCO and ANALINA
FRANCISCO, accused-appellants. On the other hand, the employees of the foundation were the tellers Rosemarie Balasa, Sylvia Magnaye, Judith
Ponciano, Jessica Buaya, Rosario Arciaga, Paul Francisco, Enriquita Gabayan and Anita Macmac. The
comptrollers, Ruth Jalover, Amarino Agayo, and Avelina Yan were under the supervision of Normita Visaya. Nelia
Daco, one of the clerks assigned outside, was the one in direct contact with the depositors.

ROMERO, J.: The Foundation's purposes, as stated in its by-laws, were as follows:

Avarice, mother of crimes, greedy for more the more she possesses, eversearching open- 1. Uplift members' economic condition by way of financial or consultative
mouthed for gold. 1 basis (sic);

Greed has always been one of man's failings. The hope of greater gain has lured many a man to throw caution, 2. To encourage members in a self-help program;
and his common sense, to the wind. This human foible, known to many, has been exploited throughout the ages
by con men, charlatans and cheats to bilk the gullible public of their hard-earned money. History has thus seen 3. To grant educational assistance;
the unraveling of various disingenuous stratagems which are at bottom nothing but seams. The case at hand
once again proves that "a sucker is born every minute." 4. To implement the program on the Anti-Drug campaign;

Totoong walang pagkaubos sa ating daigdig ang mga taong nanlilinlang. Hindi magkakagayon naman kung 5. To acquire facilities either by or through purchase, lease, bequest of
walang nagpapalinlang. Dahil sa kanilang malaking hangarin na magkamal ng kimpal kimpal na kayamanan, donations, equipments (sic), machineries (sic) and supplies for purposes of
pinapasukan nila ang mga kaduda-dudang alok ng mga mapagsamantala na kung sila ay mamuhunan ng carrying out its business operation or hold such real or personal properties
kaunting salapi, ito ay tutubo ng malaki sa ilang araw lamang. Kaya't napakaraming mga tao ang nagagantso. as may be convenient and proper in order to achieve the purpose of this
Hindi masasabing mga hangal o dili kaya'y mga maralita na walang gaanong pinag-aralan ang mga nabibiktima. corporation;
Kahit ang mga maykaya at matataas sa ating lipunan ay napaglalaruan din. Milyun-milyong salapi ang
nahuhuthot sa kanila, hindi ng mga masakim na magnanakaw, kundi ng kanila na ring mga kasamahan sa
6. To cooperate with other organizations, institutions with similar activities
tinatawag na "alta sociedad." Mismong mga kaibigan at kapanatag ng loob ang naguudyok sa kanilang sumali sa
for purposes of carrying out its business; and
mga pakana na magpapayaman sa kanila. Higit namang nakakaawa kapag ang naloloko ay iyong nangungutang
lamang at nagbabakasakali na ang ilang daan nila ay magiging libo.
7. To organize seminars or conferences specially in the rural areas and other
selected cities. 2
Itong kapasiyahang ito ng Mataas na Hukuman ay nagbababalang muli. Magpakaingat-ingat ang lahat. Ang
naghahangad ng kagitna, isang salop ang nawawala.
After obtaining its SEC registration, the foundation immediately swung into operation. It sent out brochures
soliciting deposits from the public, assuring would-be depositors that their money would either be doubled after
Iyon namang nanlilinlang. Walang gawaing masama na hindi nabubunyag rin. Totoong mahigpit ang ating batas
21 days or trebled after 30 days. Priscilla Balasa also went around convincing people to make deposits with the
na pumaparusa sa mga ganyang hindi na natututo, lalo't higit kung ang mga salarin ay mga sindikato.
foundation at their office at the Diaz Apartment, Puerto Princesa.
The modus operandi for investing with the foundation was as follows: Every afternoon, the comptrollers would take the list of depositors made by the tellers with the amounts
deposited by each, and have these typed. Norma Francisco would then receive from the tellers the amounts
When a person would deposit an amount, the amount would be taken by a clerk to be given to the teller. The deposited by the public. It was also her job to pay the salaries of the foundation's employees. For his part,
teller would then fill up a printed form called a "slot." These "slots" were part of a booklet, with one booklet Guillermo Francisco would release money whenever a deposit would mature as indicated in the slots.
containing one hundred "slots." A "slot," which resembled a check, contained the following data:
According to the foundations rules, an investor could deposit up to P5,000.00 only, getting a slot corresponding
PANATA FOUNDATION Control No. 33 thereto. Anyone who deposited more than that amount would, however, be given a slot but the slot had to be in
he name of another person or several other persons, depending upon the amount invested. 5 According to
Sylvia Magnaye, a foundation teller, all deposits maturing in August 1989 were to be tripled. For such deposits,
(Logo) OF THE PHILIPPINES INC. Date 12-5-87 / Dec. 26, 1987
the slots issued were colored yellow to signify that the depositor would have his deposit tripled. Deposits that
would mature subsequent to August were only given double the amount deposited. 6 However, there were
PFOPI Puerto Princesa, Palawan Amount P 500.00 times when it was the depositor who would choose that his deposit be tripled, in which case, the deposit would
mature later 7.
Sec. Reg. No. 165565
The amounts received by the foundation were deposited in banks. Thus, a foundation teller would, from time to
M CHESTER MONREAL time, go to PNB, PCI Bank, DBP and the Rural Bank of Coron to deposit the collections in a joint account in the
names of Priscilla Balasa and Norma Francisco.
Address RPC
Initially, the operation started with a few depositors, with most depositors investing small amounts to see
whether the foundation would make good on its promise. When the foundation paid double or triple the amounts
Share FIVE
of their investment at maturity, most not only reinvested their earnings but even added to their initial
investments. As word got around that deposits could be doubled within 21 days, or tripled if the period lasted for
Amount in words FIVE HUNDRED PESOS Only more than 30 days, more depositors were attracted. Blinded by the prospect of gaining substantial profits for
nothing more than a minuscule investment, these investors, like previous ones, were lured to reinvest their
(Sgd.) earnings, if not to invest more.

(Sgd.) PRICILLA BALASA Most would invest more than P5,000.00, the investment limit set by the foundation. Priscilla Balasa would,
however, encourage depositors to invest more than P5,000.00, provided that the excess was deposited under
————————— ————————— the name of others. She assured the depositors that this was safe because as long as the depositor was holding
the slots, he was the "owner" of the amount deposited. Most investors then deposited amounts in the names of
their relatives.
Signature of Member President / Manager

No. 30333 3
The control number indicated the number of the "slot" in a booklet, while the space after "date" would contain
the date when the slot was acquired, as well as the date of its maturity. The amount deposited determined the
number of shares, one share being equivalent to one hundred pesos. The depositor had the discretion when to
affix his signature on the space provided therefor. Some would sign their slot only after payment on maturity,
while others would sign as soon as they were given the slot. However, without the control number and the
stamp of the teller, duly signed or initialed, no depositor could claim the proceeds of his deposit upon
maturity. 4
After the slot had been filled up by the teller, he would give it to the clerk assigned outside. The clerk would
then give the slot to the depositor. Hence, while it was the teller who prepared and issued the slot, he had no
direct contact with the depositor. The slots handed to a depositor were signed beforehand by the president of
the foundation.
At the outset, the foundation's operations proceeded smoothly, as satisfied investors collected their investments
upon maturity. On November 29, 1989, however, the foundation did not open. Depositors whose investments
were to mature on said date demanded payments but none was forthcoming. On December 2, 1989, Priscilla
Balasa announced that since the foundation's money had been invested in the stock market, it would resume
operations on December 4, 1989. On that date, the foundation remained closed. Depositors began to demand
reimbursement of their deposits, but the foundation was unable to deliver.
Consequently, sixty-four informations, all charging the offense of estafa, as defined in Presidential Decree No.
1689, were filed against Priscilla Balasa, Normita Visaya, Norma Francisco, Guillermo Francisco, Analina Francisco
and eight other persons, mostly incorporators and employees of the Panata Foundation, before the Regional
Trial Court of Palawan. Fourteen cases, including Criminal Case Nos. 8429 and 8751, were raffled off to Branch
52. Two more cases, Criminal Case Nos. 8704 and 8749, were similarly assigned to it. Of the sixteen casts
assigned to Branch 52, eight were, with the consent of the accused, provisionally dismissed for lack of evidence.
In Criminal Case No. 8429, the information charging the accused with the crime of estafa "as amended by PD
1689" was filed on December 12, 1989. The accused in this case were: Priscilla Balasa, Almarino Agayo, Norma
Francisco, Normita Visaya, Paul Francisco, Nelia Daco, Ruth Jalover, 8 Guillermo Francisco, Candido Tolentino,
Jr., Rosemarie Balasa, 9 Ricardo del Rosario, Emelita Gabayan, Rosario Arciaga, Jessica Buaya, Avelina Yan,
Anita Macmac, Gina Gabaldon, Ronaldo Belo, Fernando Cadauan, Lolita Gelilang, Cynthia Ang, Judith Ponciano,
Sylvia Magnaye, 10 Analina Francisco and Sulpicio Nabayan. As Amended on February 16, 1990, the information
in this case reads as follows:
That sometime on (sic) December, 1989, the above-named accused being the Manager and
employees of the PANATA Foundation of the Philippines, Inc., with office at No. 20 Diaz
Apartment, Manalo Extension, Puerto Princesa City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused conspiring and confederating with one another and
operating as a syndicate, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud one
Estrella San Gabriel y Lacao by means of false representation and fraudulent means which
they made to said Estrella San Gabriel to the effect that as an investor/subscriber to the
PANATA Foundation, Inc. which is a non-stock corporation allegedly registered with the SEC
under Registration No. 165565 and by means of other similar deceit induce the said Estrella
San Gabriel to give and deliver to the said accused the amount of P5,500.00 as her investment
in said foundation, and by manifestation and misrepresentation by the said accused that the
said invested amount will be doubled or tripled within a certain period of days said accused
knowing fully well that their manifestation and representations were false and fraudulent as
they are made only for the purpose of obtaining as in fact they obtained the amount with
intent to defraud misapply, misappropriate and convert the said amount for their own personal
use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said Estrella San Gabriel in the amount of
P5,500.00, Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW and penalized under Presidential Decree No. 1689.
Likewise, in Criminal Case No. 8704, the information, filed on May 23, 1990, charged Priscilla Balasa, Norma
Francisco, Guillermo Francisco, Normita Visaya, Analina Francisco, Lolita Gelilang, Cynthia Ang, Rodolfo Ang, Jr.,
Purable Espidol, Melinda Mercado, Almarino Agayo, Candido Tolentino, Jr., Ricardo del Rosario, Fernando
Caduan, Paul Francisco and Teresita Carandang with the crime of estafa "as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1689" as follows:
That sometime in July, 1989 to December 1989, the above-named accused being then the
Manager incorporators, members of the board of trustees, officers and employees of the
PANATA FOUNDATION OF THE PHIL., INC. with Office No. 20 Diaz Apartment, Manalo
Extension, Puerto Princess City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, and
operating as a syndicate, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud, the
complainant Conchita Bigornia, by means of false pretenses/representation and fraudulent
means which they made to said Conchita Bigornia to the effect that as depositor/subscriber to
the PANATA FOUNDATION OF THE PHIL., INC., which is a non-stock corporation allegedly
registered with the SEC under Registration No. 165565 and by means of other similar deceit
induce the said Conchita Bigornia, to give and deliver to the said accused the amount of
TWENTY FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED (P24,100.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, as
his/her deposit/subscription in said Foundation, and by manifestation and misrepresentation by
the said accused that the said deposited/subscription amount will be doubled or tripled within
a certain period of days said accused knowing fully well that this manifestation were (sic) false
and fraudulent as they are made only for the purpose of obtaining as in fact they obtained the
amount of TWENTY FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED PESOS (P24,100.00) from the said
(Conchita Bigornia) and the said accused once in possession of the said amount with intent to
defraud, misapply, misappropriate and convert the said amount for their own personal use and
benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said Conchita Bigornia in the amount aforestated.
CONTRARY TO LAW and penalized under P.D. No. 1689.
Similar informations were filed against the same persons in Criminal Cases Nos. 8749 and 8751. The complainant
in Criminal Case No. 8749, complainant Shiela San Juan, was allegedly defrauded of P25,800.00 while in Criminal
Case No. 8751, the amount of P6,800.00 was allegedly defrauded from Benjamin Yangco.
In like manner, similarly worded informations in Criminal Case Nos. 8734 and 8428, raffled off to Branch 50,
alleged that Elisia Mensias was defrauded in the amount of P4,500.00 and Alfonso and Prescilla Lacao defrauded
in the amount of P58,850.00, respectively.
After the filing of the informations, warrants for the arrest of the defendants in the corresponding criminal cases
were issued. However, only Priscilla Balasa, Normita Visaya, Guillermo Francisco, Norma Francisco and Analina
Francisco were arrested, the rest of the defendants having gone into hiding.
On arraignment, the arrested defendants all pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged but before the
presentation of prosecution evidence, Priscilla Balasa and Normita Visaya escaped from police custody. With their
escape, only the spouses Guillermo and Norma Francisco were called to present evidence on behalf of the
defense. Analina Francisco, being a deaf-mute, was not called to the witness stand due to the lack of a
competent interpreter. The spouses, in denying criminal liability, presented the following facts:
Priscilla Balasa, Normita Visaya, and Analina Francisco, full-blooded sisters, are the common children of appellant
spouses Guillermo and Norma Francisco. Before the Panata Foundation started operations in July 1989, Priscilla
had been living with her parents in San Mateo, Isabela. Analina, on the other hand, was living with their elder
sister, Normita, in Manila. Priscilla, however, left for Palawan in June 1989.
Sometime thereafter, Guillermo Francisco received a letter from Priscilla asking him to come to Palawan to
provide her company, the latter's husband having left for abroad as a seaman. Consequently, Francisco came to
Palawan sometime in August 1989 to live with Priscilla at the Diaz Apartment in Puerto Princesa. Norma
Francisco also came to Palawan in August, purportedly to visit Priscilla's daughter, whom she missed. Analina
likewise came to Palawan from Manila in August.
Guillermo denies participation in the commission of the crime charged. In his testimony, he limits his
participation in the foundation's activities to paying the holders of matured slots. It was the comptroller, Ruth
Jalover, who would give him the record on which to base the remittances he would make. 11 The money he
disbursed was not always in his possession, as it would have to come from the bank. It was Sylvia Magnaye who
would withdraw the money from the bank while it was Nelia Daco who would directly receive money from the
people. Thus, not even once did he participate in the process of receiving money. His daughters Priscilla Balasa
and Normita Visaya performed other jobs in the operation of the foundation while his other daughter, Analina
Francisco, only typed documents. He knew that the foundation helped people who received money from
it. 12 Although the primary purpose of the foundation was to help the needy, Guillermo testified having present time are hereby ordered archived to be reinstated in the docket of this Court as soon
knowledge of only one recipient thereof, the church of Aborlan. they shall have been arrested or surrendered voluntarily to the jurisdiction of this Court.

In her testimony, Norma Francisco also denied complicity in the crime charged, claiming that she only did SO ORDERED.
household chores in Puerto Princesa. She alleged that sometimes, she would "help the tellers." However,
because Ruth Jalover was educated and she was not, the former would sometimes become the "acting manager On the other hand, Branch 52 rendered separate decisions in the cases assigned to it. Thus, on October 14,
of her daughter." Sylvia Magnaye, her daughter's sister-in-law and a permanent employee of the foundation, 1991, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 8429 rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as
was one of the tellers who would deposit and withdraw from the bank. The eight tellers of the foundation all follows:
applied for their jobs with Priscilla but it was Normita who interviewed them. However, Normita was only a clerk
in the foundation while Analina would type whatever work Ruth Jalover would give her. While Norma had no
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding co-accused
official position in the foundation, her husband, Guillermo, was the paymaster. During her stay in Puerto
PRISCILLA BALASA, NORMITA VISAYA, GULLLERMO FRANCISCO, and NORMA FRANCISCO
Princesa, she knew of no other business that her daughter Priscilla was engaged in except the foundation and
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals of the crime of estafa committed by a
a paluwagan, which she ran together with a certain Manny Diaz. Norma knew that the foundation was a
syndicate in violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1689, and each of the
charitable institution that had helped a lot of people. She did not help Ruth Jalover in the same way that she
aforenamed accused is sentenced to reclusion perpetua; to pay to Estrella Lacao San Gabriel,
helped Sylvia Magnaye with her job as teller, but she had nothing to do with the keeping of records. She knew
jointly and severally, by way of restitution, the sum of P5,500.00.00, with interest thereon of
that money came from the tellers, who got the money from Nelia Daco, the one receiving money from
12% per annum from December, 1989, until fully paid; and to pay the costs.
prospective investors. 13

On grounds of reasonable doubt engendered by lack of sufficiently clear and convincing

On March 31, 1992, Branch 50 of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan issued a joint decision in Criminal Case
evidence as against her, co-accused Analina Francisco is acquitted of the offense charged.
Nos. 8734 and 8428 finding the accused guilty of the crime charged and of having acted in conspiracy in
committing the same. Finding no aggravating or mitigating circumstances in the commission of the crime, the
trial court decreed thus: SO ORDERED.

WHEREFORE AND IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, judgment is hereby
rendered finding all the accused in the 2 above-entitled cases guilty as principals of the crime
of estafa as the same is defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code.
a. In Criminal Case No. 8428 accused Priscilla Balasa, Normita Visaya,
Analina Francisco, Guillermo Francisco and Norma Francisco are hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua as well as to pay the
costs. The accused are jointly and severally ordered to pay the offended
party Alfonso Lacao the sum of Fifty Eight Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty
(P58,850.00) Pesos and to pay the further sum of Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00) as and for moral damages;
b. In Criminal Case No. 8734, accused Normita Visaya, Analina Francisco,
Norma Francisco and Guillermo Francisco are hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua as well as to pay the costs. They are
furthermore ordered jointly and severally to indemnify the offended party
Elisea Mensias the sum of Four Thousand Five Hundred (P4,500.00) Pesos
as well as to pay the additional sum of Fifteen Thousand (P15,000.00) Pesos
as and for moral damages.
The cases against the accused Almarino Agayo, Paul Francisco, Candido Tolentino, Jr., Ricardo
del Rosario, Jessica Buaya, Fernando Cadauan, Lolita Gelilang Cynthia Ang, Rodolfo Ang Jr.,
Purable Espidol, Melinda Mercado, and Teresit Carandang who remained at large up to the
Although Branch 52 rendered separate decisions in the cases assigned to it, all had essentially the same
disposition — imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua upon each of the convicted accused — only the name
of the offended party and the amount to be restituted varied. Thus, in Criminal Case No.
8704, 14 the trial court ordered the accused to pay Conchita Bigornia by way of restitution, the amount of
P24,200.00 with interest thereon of 12% per annum from December 1989. In Criminal Case No. 8749, 15 the
same convicted accused were ordered to restitute Shiela San Juan the amount of P25,800.00 plus 12% per
annum from December 1989. In Criminal Case No. 8751, 16 the convicted accused were ordered to restitute
Benjamin Yangco the amount of P6,800.00 with 12% interest per annum from December 1989.
Guillermo and Norma Francisco filed notices of appeal in Criminal Case Nos. 8429, 8704, 8749 and 8751. Their
appeal was docketed as G.R. No. 106357. Likewise, the joint decision in Criminal Case Nos. 8734 and 8428 was
appealed to this Court by Guillermo Francisco, Norma Francisco, Analina Francisco, and Normita Visaya,
docketed herein as G.R. Nos. 108601-02. Noting Normita Visaya's escape from police custody after arraignment,
the Court, on August 15, 1994, and pursuant to Section 8, Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Court, ordered the
dismissal of her appeal on the ground of abandonment. The Court also considered Priscilla Balasa's conviction to
be final and executory, in light of her escape from police custody. It also ordered the issuance of a warrant for
the arrest of Normita Visaya and an alias warrant of arrest against Priscilla Balasa.
On October 16, 1993, appellants' counsel, Atty. Agustin Rocamora, filed an appellants' brief in G.R. No. 106357.
Thereafter, appellants appointed the Maramba and Mamauag Law Office as new counsel in substitution of Atty.
Rocamora. On November 2, 1994, new counsel filed a motion to consolidate G.R. No. 106357 and G.R. Nos.
108601-02. On December 7, 1994, the Court granted the motion and ordered the consolidation of the two cases.
On the same day, counsel for appellants submitted a consolidated appellants' brief.

In G.R. No. 106357, counsel for appellants raise the following errors:
 1. The trial court erred in convicting the appellants despite the total absence of
evidence against them;
2. The trial court erred in ruling that conspiracy existed on the basis of the
relationship of the appellants to the principal accused; and
3. The trial court erred in convicting appellants despite their prior conviction for the
same offense in Criminal Case No. 8429.
On the other hand, the brief filed by appellants in the consolidated cases mainly argues that they cannot be
convicted of the defined in Presidential Decree No. 1689 because the informations filed against them alleged
prejudice against the complaining witnesses, not against the national, provincial, or city economy nor was
evidence presented therefor.
Appellants' conviction must, however, be sustained, the issues raised being devoid of merit. The number and
diversity of issues raised by appellants impel us to discuss the points raised seriatim.
For the first assignment of error, we hold that the elements of the crime defined and penalized by P.D. No. 1689
have been proven beyond reasonable doubt in these appealed cases. The informations filed against appellants
alleged that by means of false representation or false pretenses and through fraudulent means, complainants
were defrauded of various amounts of money by the accused. Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal
Code provides that swindling or estafa by false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously
with the commission of the fraud is committed by "using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power,
influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by other similar
deceits." The elements of estafa under this penal provision are: (1) the accused defrauded another by means of
deceit and (2) damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third
party. 17 It is indisputable that the foundation failed to return the investments of the complaining witnesses,
hence it is undeniable that the complainants suffered damage in the amount of their unrecouped investments.
What needs elucidation is whether or not the element of defraudation by means of deceit has been established
beyond reasonable doubt.
Fraud, in its general sense, is deemed to comprise anything calculated to deceive, including all acts, omissions,
and concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence justly reposed, resulting in
damage to another, or by which an undue and unconscientious advantage is taken of another. 18 It is a generic
term embracing all multifarious means which human ingenuity can device, and which are resorted to by one
individual to secure an advantage over another by false suggestions or by suppression of truth and includes all
surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling and any unfair way by which another is cheated. 19 On the other hand,
deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading
allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed which deceives or is intended to
deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury. 20
In pursuit of their agenda, appellants established a foundation which, by its articles of incorporation, was
established, allegedly to "uplift members' economic condition by way of financial or consultative basis."
Organized as a non-stock, non-profit charitable institution, its funds were to be obtained through membership
dues and such other assessments as may be agreed upon by its board of directors. 21 Furthermore, the modus
operandi 22 of the foundation, duly signed by Priscilla Balasa, provided that:
Funding
Any funding requirements to finance the operation of the association shall be done through
the collection of membership fees, dues, donations, bequests and other assessments. The
amount of which shall be subject to the approval of the general membership of the
association.
Likewise, all funds in-flows would be used exclusively to carry out the purposes for which the
FOUNDATION is established and would not inure to the benefit of any single member of the
FOUNDATION.
The operations personnel shall come from volunteers among its members and should the need
arise, hiring of additional personnel be resorted to.
In contravention of these by-laws and modus operandi, the people behind the foundation enticed people to
"deposit or invest" funds in the foundation under a "double or treble your deposit" scheme. These investment
activities were clearly ultra vires acts or acts beyond the foundation's authority. Evidently, SEC registration was
obtained only for the purpose of giving a semblance of legitimacy to the foundation; that the foundation's
business was sanctioned by the government; and that it was allowed by law to accept deposits. This pretension
was carried out even on the slots it issued, the foundations' S.E.C. registry number being indicated thereon.
In carrying out the charade, the manager went to the extent of delivering a speech and personally encouraging
people to deposit or invest in the foundation. Alfonso Lacao, a complainant and prosecution witness, testified:
Q: Have you heard of this so called Panata Foundation?
A: Yes, ma'm I heard it from my friends who are talking about this Panata
Foundation they even informed me that the manager of this Panata
Foundation is calling for a meeting for all depositors and prospective
depositors on Saturday afternoon.
Q: With that information did you get interested in the proposed meeting
being called by this Panata Foundation?
A: I was curious and came Saturday I went to the office of the Panata
Foundation to attend the meeting.
Q: And at that time where was this office located?
A: At Diaz Apartment, Manalo Extension, Puerto Princesa City.
Q: Did you attend that meeting?
A: Yes ma'am.
 Q: Whom did you see sponsoring that meeting on that particular day?
A: Upon arrival I saw a woman delivering her message to the depositors and
to the prospective depositors. I asked a friend of me (sic) who is that
woman and he informed me that she is the manager of the Panata
Foundation Priscilla Balasa.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What was Priscilla Balasa doing if any in that particular meeting?
A: In her message she was convincing all the people there to make their
deposit to the Panata Foundation because according to her they were sent
here to help the people of Puerto Princesa City and the people of Palawan.
Q: Aside from that what did Priscilla Balasa tell those people who attended
the meeting?
A: She was assuring the people that they must not be afraid to deposit their
money because they will not be fooling around with them.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: And did Priscilla Balasa tell those persons attending the meeting what
would happen with the money they will deposit with the Panata Foundation?
A: She was telling the people that you could deposit the money and it will be
doubled within 21 days. I was further informed that the maximum amount
to be deposited is P5,000,00.
Q: You stated a while ago that the amount deposited will be doubled after
21 days?
A: Yes ma'am.
Q: Aside from that what else if any did Priscilla Balasa tell the public who
attended that meeting?
A: She was telling the public to make ease with their deposit because they
were sent here to help the people of Puerto Princesa City and Palawan.
Q: Did she tell the public as to where the money would be coming from?
A: Right that moment she was not able to tell the public. 23
On cross-examination, Mr. Lacao testified:
Q: But did it not occur to your mind considering your past experience to
investigate or cause the investigation of this Panata Foundation considering
your connection as to whether they are in a position to make double your
money investment specially so they are not engage (sic) in business, so to
speak?
A: Once I overheard the manager say when she was there telling the people
around the depositors that their money is being invested in a world
bank. 24
Priscilla Balasa, thus, promised the credulous public quick financial gains on their investments. The foundation
even printed brochures proclaiming the merits of the foundation's investment scheme. 25 Likewise, to bolster
the illusion that indeed, the foundation was legitimate, the claim was made that deposits would be invested
abroad in a world bank, with said transactions allegedly enabling the foundation to double or treble depositors'
investments. The evidence, however, proves the contrary. Sylvia Magnaye, one of the tellers, testified:
Q: Other than to issue slots, do you know what other phase of operation in
running the Panata Foundation during the time that you were employed?
A: No sir, I can only observe that issuing of slots.
Q: Madam Witness, aside from issuing slots, there is only the activity of the
foundation that you are well aware of?
A: Sometimes they also sent me to deposit.
Q: The deposit of the amount collected in the bank, is that correct?
A: I do not know but they just send me to deposit amounts.
Q: But you do not know in what other business activity other than the
matter of collecting money and issuance of slots you do not know if the
Panata Foundation is involved in any business activity?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You do not know whether the foundation receives money regularly from
any other source?
A: I do not know sir. 26
On cross-examination, she testified:
 Q: You mentioned Madam Witness, that on several occasions you were
asked to deposit certain amounts in the bank, do you remember having told
the Court that?
A: Right, sir.
Q: Do you remember how many banks these deposited amounts were if you
remember?
A: I deposited at PNB, PCIBank, and DBP and Rural Bank of Coron.
Q: Do you remember in whose names you deposited these amounts you
deposited?
A: In the name of the joint account of Priscilla Balasa and Norma
Francisco. 27
The testimonial evidence presented by the prosecution proves that appellants employed fraud and deceit upon
gullible people to convince them to invest in the foundation. It has been held that where one states that the
future profits or income of an enterprise shall be a certain sum, but he actually knows that there will be none, or
that they will be substantially less than he represents, the statement constitutes actionable fraud where the
hearer believes him and relies on the statement to his injury. 28 That there was no profit forthcoming can be
clearly deduced from the fact that the foundation was not engaged nor authorized to engage in any lucrative
business to finance its operation. It was not shown that it was the recipient of donations or bequest with which
to finance its "double or triple your money" scheme, nor did it have any operating capital to speak of when it
started operations.
Parenthetically, what appellants offered the public was a "Ponzi scheme," an investment program that offers
impossibly high returns and pays these returns to early investors out of the capital contributed by later
investors. 29 Named after Charles Ponzi who promoted the scheme in the 1920s, the original scheme involved
the issuance of bonds which offered 50% interest in 45 days or a 100% profit if held for 90 days. Basically, Ponzi
used the money he received from later investors to pay extravagant rates of return to early investors, thereby
inducing more investors to place their money with him in the false hope of realizing this same extravagant rate
of return themselves. This was the very same scheme practiced by the Panata Foundation.
However, the Ponzi scheme works only as long as there is an ever-increasing number of new investors joining
the scheme. To pay off the 50% bonds Ponzi had to come up with a one-and-a-half times increase with each
round. To pay 100% profit he had to double the number of investors at each stage, and this is the reason why a
Ponzi scheme is a scheme and not an investment strategy. The progression it depends upon is unsustainable.
The pattern of increase in the number of participants in the system explains how it is able to succeed in the
short run and, at the same time, why it must fail in the long run. This game is difficult to sustain over a long
period of time because to continue paying the promised profits to early investors, the operator needs an ever
larger pool of later investors. 30 The idea behind this type of swindle is that the "con-man" collects his money
from his second or third round of investors and then absconds before anyone else shows up to collect.
Necessarily, these schemes only last weeks, or months at most. 31
Note should also be taken of the fact that appellants used "slots" in their operation. These slots are actually
securities, 32 the issuance of which needs the approval of the Securities and Exchange Commission. Knowing
fully well that the S.E.C. would not approve the issuance of securities by a non-stock, non-profit organization,
the operators of the Ponzi scheme, nevertheless, applied for registration as a foundation, an entity not allowed
to engage in securities.
Finally, if the foundation were indeed legitimate, the incorporators, outside of the members of the Francisco
family, would not have escaped from the clutches of the law. If the foundation and its investment scheme were
legal, then it behooved them to come out and testify for their own exoneration. The wicked flee when no man
pursueth: but the righteous are bold as a lion. 33
In their defense, appellants would shift the blame on the investors. Invoking the legal principle of caveat emptor,
they maintain that it was the investors' own greed that did them in, implying that the depositors should have
known that no sensible business could afford to pay such extravagant returns. Having investigated the
foundation and its activities, the investors should fault themselves, not the appellants, for investing in the
foundation despite the patent impossibility of its claims.
The contention is untenable. The fact that the buyer makes an independent investigation or inspection has been
held not to preclude him from relying on the representation made by the seller where the seller has superior
knowledge and the falsity of such representation would not be apparent from such examination or inspection,
and, a fortiori, where the efforts of a buyer to learn the true profits or income of a business or property are
thwarted by some device of the seller, such efforts have been held not to preclude a recovery. 34 It has often
been held that the buyer of a business or property is entitled to rely on the seller's statements concerning its
profits, income or rents. The rule — that where a speaker has knowingly and deliberately made a statement
concerning a fact the falsity of which is not apparent to the hearer, and has thus accomplished a fraudulent
result, he cannot defend against the fraud by proving that the victim was negligent in failing to discover the
falsity of the statement — is said to be peculiarly applicable where the owner of the property or a business
intentionally makes a false statement concerning its rents, profits or income. The doctrine of caveat emptor has
been held not to apply to such a case. 35
The second assignment of error is likewise devoid of merit. Appellants deny the existence of a conspiracy in the
perpetration of the fraudulent scheme, charging that mere relationship does not prove conspiracy. Guillermo
Francisco further maintains that he was not even an incorporator of the foundation.
The evidence adduced by the prosecution confirms the existence of a conspiracy among the appellants in
committing the crime charged. The fact that Guillermo Francisco was not an incorporator of the foundation does
not make him any less liable for the crime charged. By his own admission, he participated in the foundation's
activities by serving as its paymaster. Because he is father and husband to three of the organizers of the
foundation, it is not farfetched to presume that he was aware of its operations. By his active cooperation, he
showed a community of design with the incorporators of the foundation, thereby making him a co-conspirator
and equally liable for the crime charged. His voluntary and indispensable cooperation was a concatenation of the
criminal acts performed by his co-accused. 36 In this regard, appellant Guillermo Francisco is not being
implicated as a co-conspirator solely because he is the father of the principal proponent of the Ponzi scheme. He
is held liable as a conspirator because of his indispensable act of being the paymaster of the foundation.
Likewise, Norma Francisco's bare denial cannot exempt her from complicity. Denials of an accused cannot be
accorded greater evidentiary weight than the positive declarations of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters. 37 Moreover, her efforts to show that she was a mere housewife who simply helped in her
daughter's "business" is refuted by the prosecution witnesses. Ruth Jalover testified:
Q: Madam Witness, do you know a person by the name of Norma Francisco?
A: Yes sir.
Q: And how did you come to Know her Madam Witness?
A: She is my co-employee at the Panata Foundation sir.
Q: What was her job in the Panata Foundation?
A: She was the one who received the money from our tellers every
afternoon. 38
Sylvia Magnaye, on the other hand, testified:
Q: Madam Witness, do you know a person by the name of Norma Francisco?
A: Yes sir.
Q: How did you come to know her Madam Witness?
A: She is our former cashier sir.
Q: In the Panata Foundation?
A: Yes sir. 39
On cross-examination, she further testified:
Q: Now, I would like to direct your attention also to the other accused,
Norma Francisco. You stated that she is your cashier, do you remember
having done that?
A: Yes sir.
Q: When you say she is the cashier, do you mean to say that she is the one
who pays out money or amounts to the employees Madam Witness?
A: Yes sir. 40
Aside from being the cashier, Norma Francisco was also an incorporator of the foundation. Likewise, the money
invested in the foundation was deposited in joint bank accounts in Priscilla Balasa's name and hers. Norma
Francisco's activities would thus show a community of design with the other accused making her a co-
conspirator and equally liable for the crime charged. Her voluntary and indispensable cooperation concurred with
the criminal acts performed by her co-accused.
As for Analina Francisco, however, the evidence adduced as to her complicity in the nefarious scheme is far from
conclusive. While she was an incorporator and treasurer of the foundation, there is no denying the fact that she
is a deaf-mute. As such, she is incapable of communicating and conveying her thoughts to the complaining
witnesses and other depositors. This casts serious doubt on whether she could be deemed to have similarly
conspired and confederated with the other accused. As Branch 52 pointed out, on paper she might have been in
the thick of the foundation's operation — being an incorporator and treasurer. We are not, however, convinced
that she was actually involved in the sinister scheme. In fact, she was given the manual task of typing papers,
despite her being the treasurer of the foundation. Her disability might have been the principal reason for giving
her that job — she was literally deaf and mute to the nefarious activities going on in the foundation that she did
not pose a danger to it. Furthermore, it is well settled that where the acts of an accused are capable of two
interpretations, that which is in consonance with innocence should prevail.
With respect to the third assignment of error, appellants cannot raise the defense of double jeopardy for which
the following requisites must concur: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first
jeopardy must have been validly terminated; (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the
second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt
to commit the same or a frustration thereof. 41 In the instant case, the offense charged in Criminal Case No.
8429 is different from the offense charged in the other cases. While these cases arose out of the same scheme,
the fraudulent acts charged were committed against different persons, hence they do not constitute the same
offense.
Lastly, appellants assert that they cannot be convicted under P.D. No. 1689. They contend that the following
requisites must concur for conviction under P.D. No. 1689: (1) that estafa is committed under Articles 315 or 316
of the Revised Penal Code; (2) by a syndication of five or more persons; (3) against a) stockholders or members
of rural banks, cooperatives, or samahang nayon; b) corporations or associations the funds of which are solicited
from the general public; and (4) such defraudation erodes the confidence of the public in the banking and
cooperative systems, contravenes public interest, and (5) constitutes economic sabotage that threatens the
stability of the nation. 42
In support of their argument, appellants point out that there could not have been economic sabotage under the
facts of the case because the total amount of P125,400.00 allegedly embezzled "by the other accused (not
herein appellants)," did not weaken or threaten national economic stability. To emphasize that point, appellants
enumerate the revenue collections of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, "for dearth of a better reference," from
1987 to 1992 showing that the revenue collections for 1989 alone amounted to P75,002,499,19. Appellants
assert that as compared to such revenue collection in 1989, the amount allegedly embezzled was negligible. As
such, the crime committed in this case was not of the same genre as the "Agrix" and "Dewey Dee" scams that
"spurred the birth of P.D. No. 1689. 43
Appellants, in a desperate attempt to avoid conviction, grasp at straws. The law upon which appellants have
been charged and convicted reads as follows:
 PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1689
INCREASING THE PENALTY FOR CERTAIN FORMS OF
SWINDLING OR ESTAFA.
WHEREAS, there is an upsurge in the commission of swindling and other forms of frauds in
rural banks, cooperatives, "samahang nayon(s)", and farmers' associations or
corporations/associations operating on funds solicited from the general public;
WHEREAS, such defraudation or misappropriation of funds contributed by stockholders or
members of such rural banks, cooperatives, "samahang nayon(s)", or farmers' associations, or
of funds solicited by corporations/associations from the general public, erodes the confidence
of the public in the banking and cooperative system, contravenes the public interest, and
constitutes economic sabotage that threatens the stability of the nation;
WHEREAS, it is imperative that the resurgence of said crimes be checked, or at least
minimized, by imposing capital punishment on certain forms of swindling and other frauds
involving rural banks, cooperatives, "samahang nayon(s)", farmers' associations or
corporations/associations operating on funds solicited from the general public;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the
powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby decree and order as follows:
Sec. 1. Any person or persons who shall commit estafa or other forms of swindling as defined
in Article 315 and 316 of the Revised penal Code, as amended, shall be punished by life
imprisonment to death if the swindling (estafa) is committed by a syndicate consisting of five
or more persons formed with the intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act,
transaction, enterprise or scheme, and the defraudation results in the misappropriation of
moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperatives, "samahang
nayon(s)", or farmers associations, or of funds solicited by corporations/associations from the
general public.
When not committed by a syndicate as above defined, the penalty imposable shall be reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua if the amount of the fraud exceeds 100,000 pesos.
Sec. 2. This decree shall take effect immediately.
DONE in Manila, Philippines, this 6th day of April, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred
and eighty.
Under this law, the elements of the crime are: (a) estafa or other forms of swindling as defined in Articles 315
and 316 of the Revised Penal Code is committed; (b) the estafa or swindling is committed by a syndicate, and
(c) defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of rural
banks, cooperatives, "samahang nayon(s)," or farmers associations, or of funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public. These are the only elements of the crime under Section 1 of
the decree. The two other "ingredients" added by appellants to constitute the crime of economic sabotage under
P.D. No. 1689 have been taken from the "whereas" clause or preamble of the law. A preamble is not exactly an
essential part of an act as it is an introductory or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the enactment,
usually introduced by the word "whereas." 44 In People v.
Purisima, 45 we explained that the preamble serves as the key to the intent and spirit of the decree. It
enumerates the facts or events justifying the promulgation of the decree. It enumerate the fact or events
justifying the promulgation of the decree and the sanctions for the acts prohibited therein. As such, although it is
an aid in interpretation, the preamble of an act or decree is not the law subject thereof. Appellants' novel theory
must, therefore, be given short shrift by this Court.
Assuming arguendo that the preamble was part of the statute, appellants' contention that they should not be
held criminally liable because it was not proven that their acts constituted economic sabotage threatening the
stability of the nation remains too flimsy for extensive discussion. As the preamble of P.D. No. 1689 shows, the
act prohibited therein need not necessarily threaten the stability of the nation. It is sufficient that it "contravenes
public interest." Public interest was affected by the solicitation of deposits under a promise of substantial profits,
as it was people coming from the lower income brackets who were victimized by the illegal scheme.
Similarly, the fact that the entity involved was not a rural bank, cooperative, samahang nayon or farmers'
association does not take the case out of the coverage of P.D. No. 1689. Its third "whereas clause" states that it
also applies to other "corporations/associations operating on funds solicited from the general public." The
foundation fits into these category as it "operated on funds solicited from the general public." To construe the
law otherwise would sanction the proliferation of minor-league schemers who operate in the countryside. To
allow these crimes to go unabated could spell disaster for people from the lower income bracket, the primary
target of swindlers.
Again, P.D. No. 1689 penalizes offenders with life imprisonment to death regardless of the amount involved,
provided that a syndicate committed the crime. A syndicate is defined in the same law as "consisting of five or
more persons formed with the intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or
scheme." If the offenders are not members of a syndicate, they shall nevertheless be held liable for the acts
prohibited by the law but they shall be penalized by reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua if the amount of
the fraud is more than one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00).
In the instant case, a syndicate perpetrated the Ponzi scheme. The evidence shows that at least five persons —
Priscilla Balasa, Normita Visaya, Norma Francisco, Guillermo Francisco, and the other incorporators of the
foundation — collaborated, confederated and mutually helped one another in directing the foundation's
activities.
In its decision in Criminal Case Nos. 8428 and 8734, Branch 50 found that the "accused numbering 5 who
composed the Francisco Family together with others acted and operated as a syndicate as defined under P.D.
No. 1689 and should be held liable therefor." 46 However, it imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua, the
penalty imposable under the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1689 — where the offenders are not
members of a syndicate and the amount involved is more than P100,000.00. The existence of a syndicate having
been proved, the crime falls under the first paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1689, with an imposable penalty
of life imprisonment to death. Hence, the imposition of reclusion perpetua is incorrect. Given the absence of
aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the lesser penalty, or life imprisonment, should have been meted
out. 47
Branch 52, likewise, ruled that the accused committed the offense of estafa by a syndicate under P.D. No. 1689.
Therefore appellants, due to the absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances, should have been punished
with life imprisonment. However, in the dispositive portion of its decision in the four cases assigned to it, Branch
52 imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua instead.

The Court finds this an opportune time to restate that the penalties of life imprisonment and reclusion
perpetua are not the same. Thus:

While "life imprisonment" may appear to be the English translation of reclusion perperua, in
reality, it goes deeper than that. First, "life imprisonment" is invariably imposed for serious
offenses penalized by special laws, while reclusion perpetua is prescribed under The Revised
Penal Code. Second, "life imprisonment," unlike reclusion perpetua, does not carry with it any
accessory penalty. Third, "life imprisonment" does not appear to have any definite extent or
duration, while reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years after
which the convict becomes eligible for pardon, although the maximum period thereof shall in
no case exceed forty (40) years. 48

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decisions appealed from are hereby AFFIRMED in so far as appellants
GUILLERMO and NORMA FRANCISCO are convicted for violation of the first paragraph of Section 1 of
Presidential Decree No. 1689 and ordered to restitute to complainants the amounts they have been defrauded,
subject to the MODIFICATION that appellants GUILLERMO and NORMA FRANCISCO shall each suffer the penalty
of life imprisonment for each violation of the same law under the corresponding criminal cases. Appellant
ANALINA FRANCISCO is hereby ACQUITTED of the crimes charged under Criminal Case Nos. 8428 and 8734 on
ground of reasonable doubt and her immediate release from custody is ordered unless she is being held on other
legal grounds.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Department of Justice and the Philippine National Police in order that
the arrest of Priscilla Balasa, Normita Visaya and the others who have so far eluded the law shall be effected
with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 136066-67 February 4, 2003 sealed Zest-O juice box, SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag hurriedly accosted him and introduced themselves as police
officers. As accused-appellant pulled out his wallet, a small transparent plastic bag with a crystalline substance
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, protruded from his right back pocket. Forthwith, SPO2 Nulud subjected him to a body search which yielded
vs. twenty (20) pieces of live .22 caliber firearm bullets from his left back pocket. When SPO2 Nunag peeked into
BINAD SY CHUA, accused-appellant. the contents of the Zest-O box, he saw that it contained a crystalline substance. SPO2 Nulud instantly
confiscated the small transparent plastic bag, the Zest-O juice box, the twenty (20) pieces of .22 caliber firearm
bullets and the car used by accused-appellant. Afterwards, SPO2 Nulud and the other police operatives who
DECISION
arrived at the scene brought the confiscated items to the office of Col. Guttierez at the PNP Headquarters in
Camp Pepito, Angeles City.3
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
When Col. Gutierrez opened the sealed Zest-O juice box, he found 2 big plastic bags containing crystalline
Accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua was charged with violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425, as amended substances. The initial field test conducted by SPO2 Danilo Cruz at the PNP Headquarters revealed that the
by R.A. 7659, and for Illegal Possession of ammunitions in two separate Informations which read as follows: siezed items contained shabu.4 Thereafter, SPO2 Nulud together with accused-appellant brought these items for
further laboratory examination to the Crime Laboratory at Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga. After due
Criminal Case No. 96-5071 testing, forensic chemist S/Insp. Daisy Babor concluded that the crystalline substances yielded positive results
for shabu. The small plastic bag weighed 13.815 grams while the two big plastic bags weighed 1.942 kilograms
of shabu.5
That on or about the 21st day of September 1996, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
in his possession and under his control two (2) plastic bags containing Methamphetamine Hydrochloride Accused-appellant vehemently denied the accusation against him and narrated a different version of the
(SHABU) weighing more or less two (2) kilos and one (1) small plastic bag containing Methamphetamine incident.
Hydrocloride weighing more or less fifteen (15) grams, which is a regulated drug, without any authority
whatsoever. Accused-appellant alleged that on the night in question, he was driving the car of his wife to follow her and his
son to Manila. He felt sleepy, so he decided to take the old route along McArthur Highway. He stopped in front
Criminal Case No. 96-5132 of a small store near Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago, Angeles City to buy cigarettes and candies. While at the
store, he noticed a man approach and examine the inside of his car. When he called the attention of the
onlooker, the man immediately pulled out a .45 caliber gun and made him face his car with raised hands. The
That on or about the 21st day of September 1996, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
man later on identified himself as a policeman. During the course of the arrest, the policeman took out his wallet
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
and instructed him to open his car. He refused, so the policeman took his car keys and proceeded to search his
in his possession and under his control twenty (20) pieces of live .22 cal. ammunitions, without first having
car. At this time, the police officer’s companions arrived at the scene in two cars. PO2 Nulud, who just arrived at
obtained a license or permit to possess or carry the same.
the scene, pulled him away from his car in a nearby bank, while the others searched his car.1awphi1.nét

Accused-appellant pleaded "not guilty" on arraignment.1awphi1.nét The two cases were then jointly tried.
Thereafter, he was brought to the Salakot Police Station and was held inside a bathroom for about fifteen
minutes until Col. Guttierez arrived, who ordered his men to call the media. In the presence of reporters, Col.
The prosecution presented three (3) witnesses, all members of the police force of Angeles City. Their testimonies Guttierez opened the box and accused-appellant was made to hold the box while pictures were being taken.6
can be synthesized as follows:
Wilfredo Lagman corroborated the story of the accused-appellant in its material points. He testified that he
On September 21, 1996, at around 10:00 in the evening, SPO2 Mario Nulud and PO2 Emmeraldo Nunag received witnessed the incident while he was conducting a routine security check around the premises of the Guess
a report from their confidential informant that accused-appellant was about to deliver drugs that night at the Building, near Thunder Inn Hotel.7
Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago, Angeles City. The informer further reported that accused-appellant distributes
illegal drugs in different karaoke bars in Angeles City. On the basis of this lead, the PNP Chief of Angeles City,
On September 15, 1998 the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 59, rendered a decision,8 the
Col. Neopito Gutierrez, immediately formed a team of operatives composed of Major Bernardino, Insp. Tullao,
dispositive portion of which reads:
Insp. Emmanuel Nunag, P02 Emmeraldo Nunag, SP01 Fernando Go, and some civilian assets, with SPO2 Mario
Nulud, as team investigator. The group of SPO2 Nulud, PO2 Nunag and the civilian informer positioned
themselves across McArthur Highway near Bali Hai Restaurant, fronting Thunder Inn Hotel. The other group WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, judgement is hereby rendered as follows:
acted as their back up.
1. In Criminal Case No. 96-513 for Illegal Possession of Ammunitions, the accused is hereby acquitted
At around 11:45 in the evening, their informer pointed to a car driven by accused-appellant which just arrived of the crime charged for insufficiency of evidence.
and parked near the entrance of the Thunder Inn Hotel. After accused-appellant alighted from the car carrying a
 2. In Criminal Case No. 96-507 for Illegal Possession of 1,955.815 grams of shabu, accused Binad Sy
Chua is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charge and is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of One Million (P1,000,000.00) Pesos.
SO ORDERED.9
Hence, the instant appeal where accused-appellant raised the following errors:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED GRAVELY IN ITS FOLLOWING FINDINGS:
A. THE ARREST OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT BINAD SY CHUA WAS LAWFUL;
B. THE SEARCH OF HIS PERSON AND THE SUBSEQUENT CONFISCATION OF SHABU ALLEGEDLY
FOUND ON HIM WERE CONDUCTED IN A LAWFUL AND VALID MANNER;
C. THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE CRIME CHARGED IS SUFICIENT TO PROVE THE
GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT BEYOND REAONABLE DOUBT.10
Accused-appellant maintains that the warrantless arrest and search made by the police operatives was unlawful;
that in the light of the testimony of SPO2 Nulud that prior to his arrest he has been under surveillance for two
years, there was therefore no compelling reason for the haste within which the arresting officers sought to arrest
and search him without a warrant; that the police officers had sufficient information about him and could have
easily arrested him. Accused-appellant further argues that since his arrest was null an void, the drugs that were
seized should likewise be inadmissible in evidence since they were obtained in violation of his constitutional
rights against unreasonable search and seizures and arrest.
Accused-appellant’s argument is impressed with merit.
Although the trial court’s evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to great
respect and will not be disturbed on appeal, however, this rule is not a hard and fast one.
It is a time-honored rule that the assessment of the trial court with regard to the credibility of witnesses
deserves the utmost respect, if not finality, for the reason that the trial judge has the prerogative, denied to
appellate judges, of observing the demeanor of the declarants in the course of their testimonies. The only
exception is if there is a showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or
circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the case.11
In the case at bar, there appears on record some facts of weight and substance that have been overlooked,
misapprehended, or misapplied by the trial court which casts doubt on the guilt of accused-appellant. An appeal
in a criminal case opens the whole case for review and this includes the review of the penalty and indemnity
imposed by the trial court.12 We are clothed with ample authority to review matters, even those not raised on
appeal, if we find that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just disposition of the case. Every
circumstance in favor of the accused shall be considered.13 This is in keeping with the constitutional mandate
that every accused shall be presumed innocent unless his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt.
First, with respect to the warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure made upon accused-appellant,
the court a quo made the following findings:
Accused was searched and arrested while in possession of regulated drugs (shabu). A crime was actually being
committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his personal
effects x x x allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. x x x x
While it is true that the police officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search was made over
the personal affects (sic) of the accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient
probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a crime.
xxxxxxxxx
In the present case, the police received information that the accused will distribute illegal drugs that evening at
the Thunder Inn Hotel and its vicinities. The police officer had to act quickly and there was no more time to
secure a search warrant. The search is valid being akin to a "stop and frisk".14
A thorough review of the evidence on record belies the findings and conclusion of the trial court. It confused the
two different concepts of a search incidental to a lawful arrest (in flagrante delicto) and of a "stop-and-frisk."
In Malacat v. Court of Appeals,15 we distinguished the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search incidental
to a lawful arrest, to wit:
At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search incidental
to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof
before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search,
the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely
used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there first be arrest before a
search can be made—the process cannot be reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer
may search the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or for
evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found which was used in the commission of the crime, or
the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the
means of escaping or committing violence.
xxxxxxxxx
We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a "stop-and-frisk" as a "limited protective search
of outer clothing for weapons," as laid down in Terry, thus:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to
conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is
dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies
himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter
serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others’ safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and
others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to
discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth
amendment.
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop-and-frisk," it
nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop-and-frisk". A genuine reason must
exist, in light of the police officer’s experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person
detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general
interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may,
under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating
possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-
preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals
is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police
officer.16 (Emphasis ours)
In the case at bar, neither the in flagrante delicto nor the "stop and frisk" principles is applicable to justify the
warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure made by the police operatives on accused-appellant.
In in flagrante delicto arrests, the accused is apprehended at the very moment he is committing or attempting to
commit or has just committed an offense in the presence of the arresting officer. Emphasis should be laid on the
fact that the law requires that the search be incidental to a lawful arrest. Therefore it is beyond cavil that a
lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his belongings.17 Accordingly, for this exception to apply
two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer.18
We find the two aforementioned elements lacking in the case at bar. The record reveals that when accused-
appellant arrived at the vicinity of Thunder Inn Hotel, he merely parked his car along the McArthur Highway,
alighted from it and casually proceeded towards the entrance of the Hotel clutching a sealed Zest-O juice box.
Accused-appellant did not act in a suspicious manner. For all intents and purposes, there was no overt
manifestation that accused-appellant has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime.
However, notwithstanding the absence of any overt act strongly manifesting a violation of the law, the group of
SPO2 Nulud "hurriedly accosted"19 accused-appellant and later on "introduced themselves as police
officers."20 Accused-appellant was arrested before the alleged drop-off of shabu was done. Probable cause in
this case was more imagined than real. Thus, there could have been no in flagrante delicto arrest preceding the
search, in light of the lack of an overt physical act on the part of accused-appellant that he had committed a
crime, was committing a crime or was going to commit a crime. As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it has
been held that "reliable information" alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the
presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would
justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.21 Hence, in People v. Aminudin,22 we ruled that "the accused-appellant
was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he
had just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no
outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers
innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the
marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension" (Emphasis supplied).
The reliance of the prosecution in People v. Tangliben23 to justify the police’s actions is misplaced. In the said
case, based on the information supplied by informers, police officers conducted a surveillance at the Victory Liner
Terminal compound in San Fernando, Pampanga against persons who may commit misdemeanors and also on
those who may be engaged in the traffic of dangerous drugs. At 9:30 in the evening, the policemen noticed a
person carrying a red travelling bag who was acting suspiciously. They confronted him and requested him to
open his bag but he refused. He acceded later on when the policemen identified themselves. Inside the bag
were marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic wrapper. The police officers only knew of the activities of Tangliben
on the night of his arrest.
In the instant case, the apprehending policemen already had prior knowledge from the very same informant of
accused-appellant’s activities. No less than SPO2 Mario Nulud, the team leader of the arresting operatives,
admitted that their informant has been telling them about the activities of accused-appellant for two years prior
to his actual arrest on September 21, 1996. An excerpt of the testimony of SPO2 Mario Nulud reveals the
illegality of the arrest of accused-appellant as follows:
Q. Did the civilian informer of yours mentioned to you the name of this chinese drug pusher?
A. He is mentioning the name of Binad or Jojo Chua.
Q. And he had been mentioning these names to you even before September 21, 1996?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How long did this civilian informant have been telling you about the activities of this chinese drug
pusher reckoning in relation to September 21, 1996?
A. That was about two years already.
Q. Nothwithstanding his two years personal knowledge which you gained from the civilian informant
that this chinese drug pusher have been engaged pushing drugs here in Angeles City, you did not think
of applying for a search warrant for this chinese drug pusher?
A. No, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q. When you accosted this Binad Chua, he was casually walking along the road near the Thunder Inn
Hotel, is that right?
A. He was pinpointed by the civilian informer that he is the chinese drug pusher that will deliver to him
also.
Q. My question Mr. Witness, is this Jojo Chua or Binad Chua the accused in this case he alighted with a
Corolla car with plate number 999, I think, he just alighted when you saw him?
 A. Yes, sir. before arresting accused-appellant and searching his person. Whatever information their civilian asset relayed to
them hours before accused-appellant’s arrest was not a product of an "on-the-spot" tip which may excuse them
Q. From the car when he alighted, he casually walked towards near the entrance of the Thunder Inn from obtaining a warrant of arrest. Accordingly, the arresting team’s contention that their arrest of accused-
Hotel? appellant was a product of an "on-the-spot" tip is untenable.

A. He was about to proceed towards Thunder Inn Hotel but he was pinpointed already by the civilian In the same vein, there could be no valid "stop-and-frisk" in this case. A stop-and-frisk was defined as the act of
informer. a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s)25 or contraband. The
police officer should properly introduce himself and make initial inquiries, approach and restrain a person who
manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check the latter’s outer clothing for possibly concealed
Q. But he was just walking towards the entrance of the Thunder Inn Hotel?
weapons.26 The apprehending police officer must have a genuine reason, in accordance with the police officer’s
experience and the surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to be held has weapons (or
A. Yes, sir, he is about to enter Thunder Inn Hotel. contraband) concealed about him.27 It should therefore be emphasized that a search and seizure should
precede the arrest for this principle to apply.28
xxxxxxxxx
This principle of "stop-and-frisk" search was invoked by the Court in Manalili v. Court of Appeals.29 In said case,
Q. While he was walking, then you and PO2 Nunag pounced on him as you used pounced on him in the policemen chanced upon the accused who had reddish eyes, walking in a swaying manner, and who
your affidavit? appeared to be high on drugs. Thus, we upheld the validity of the search as akin to a "stop-and-frisk." In People
v. Solayao,30 we also found justifiable reason to "stop-and-frisk" the accused after considering the following
circumstances: the drunken actuations of the accused and his companions, the fact that his companions fled
A. Yes, sir.
when they saw the policemen, and the fact that the peace officers were precisely on an intelligence mission to
verify reports that armed persons where roaming the vicinity.
xxxxxxxxx
The foregoing circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. There was no valid "stop-and-frisk" in the case of
Q. And you pounced on Jojo Chua before you saw that alleged small plastic bag, is that correct? accused-appellant. To reiterate, accused-appellant was first arrested before the search and seizure of the alleged
illegal items found in his possession. The apprehending police operative failed to make any initial inquiry into
A. Yes, sir. accused-appellant’s business in the vicinity or the contents of the Zest-O juice box he was carrying. The
apprehending police officers only introduced themselves when they already had custody of accused-appellant.
Q. And after that you also confiscated this Zesto juice box? Besides, at the time of his arrest, accused-appellant did not exhibit manifest unusual and suspicious conduct
reasonable enough to dispense with the procedure outlined by jurisprudence and the law. There was, therefore,
no genuine reasonable ground for the immediacy of accused-appellant’s arrest.
A. Yes, sir.

Obviously, the acts of the police operatives wholly depended on the information given to them by their
xxxxxxxxx confidential informant. Accordingly, before and during that time of the arrest, the arresting officers had no
personal knowledge that accused-appellant had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a
Q. But would you agree with me that not all crystalline substance is shabu? crime.

A. No, that is shabu and it is been a long time that we have been tailing the accused that he is really a
drug pusher.
Q. So you have been tailing this accused for quite a long time that you are very sure that what was
brought by him was shabu?
At any rate, even if the fact of delivery of the illegal drugs actually occurred, accused-appellant’s warrantless
arrest and consequent search would still not be deemed a valid "stop-and frisk". For a valid "stop-and-frisk" the
search and seizure must precede the arrest, which is not so in this case. Besides, as we have earlier emphasized,
the information about the illegal activities of accused-appellant was not unknown to the apprehending officers.
Hence, the search and seizure of the prohibited drugs cannot be deemed as a valid "stop-and-frisk".

A. Yes, sir.24
The police operatives cannot feign ignorance of the alleged illegal activities of accused-appellant. Considering
that the identity, address and activities of the suspected culprit was already ascertained two years previous to
the actual arrest, there was indeed no reason why the police officers could not have obtained a judicial warrant
Neither can there be valid seizure in plain view on the basis of the seized items found in accused-appellant’s
possession. First, there was no valid intrusion. Second, the evidence, i.e., the plastic bags found in the Zest-O
juice box which contained crystalline substances later on identified as methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu)
and the 20 rounds of .22 caliber ammunition, were not inadvertently discovered. The police officers first arrested
accused-appellant and intentionally searched his person and peeked into the sealed Zest-O juice box before they
were able to see and later on ascertain that the crystalline substance was shabu. There was no clear showing ground of reasonable doubt. Consequently, he is ordered forthwith released from custody, unless he is being
that the sealed Zest-O juice box accused-appellant carried contained prohibited drugs. Neither were the small lawfully held for another crime.
plastic bags which allegedly contained crystalline substance and the 20 rounds of .22 caliber ammunition visible.
These prohibited substances were not in plain view of the arresting officers; hence, inadmissible for being the SO ORDERED.
fruits of the poisonous tree.

In like manner, the search cannot be categorized as a search of a moving vehicle, a consented warrantless
search, or a customs search. It cannot even fall under exigent and emergency circumstances, for the evidence at
hand is bereft of any such showing.1a\^/phi1.net

All told, the absence of ill-motive on the part of the arresting team cannot simply validate, much more cure, the
illegality of the arrest and consequent warrantless search of accused-appellant. Neither can the presumption of
regularity of performance of function be invoked by an officer in aid of the process when he undertakes to justify
an encroachment of rights secured by the Constitution.31 In People v. Nubla,32 we clearly stated that:

The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot be used as basis for affirming accused-
appellant’s conviction because, first, the presumption is precisely just that – a mere presumption. Once
challenged by evidence, as in this case, xxx [it] cannot be regarded as binding truth. Second, the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official functions cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence that
prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Furthermore, we entertain doubts whether the items allegedly seized from accused-appellant were the very
same items presented at the trial of this case. The record shows that the initial field test where the items seized
were identified as shabu, was only conducted at the PNP headquarters of Angeles City.33 The items were
therefore not marked at the place where they were taken. In People v. Casimiro,34 we struck down with
disbelief the reliability of the identity of the confiscated items since they were not marked at the place where
they were seized, thus:

The narcotics field test, which initially identified the seized item as marijuana, was likewise not conducted at the
scene of the crime, but only at the narcotics office. There is thus reasonable doubt as to whether the item
allegedly seized from accused-appellant is the same brick of marijuana marked by the policemen in their
headquarters and given by them to the crime laboratory.

The government’s drive against illegal drugs needs the support of every citizen. But it should not undermine the
fundamental rights of every citizen as enshrined in the Constitution. The constitutional guarantee against
warrantless arrests and unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be so carelessly disregarded as overzealous
police officers are sometimes wont to do. Fealty to the constitution and the rights it guarantees should be
paramount in their minds, otherwise their good intentions will remain as such simply because they have
blundered. The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a
government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its
own existence.35

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 59, in
Criminal Cases Nos. 96-507 and 96-513, convicting accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua of violation of Section 16,
Article III, Republic Act No. 6425 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a
fine of P1,000,000.00, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua is ACQUITTED on the
G.R. No. 81567 October 3, 1991 Efren H. Mercado for petitioners in G.R. No. 81567 and G. R. No. 83162.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO DURAL and Ricardo C. Valmonte for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84581-82
RENATO VILLANUEVA, MANOLITA O. UMIL and NICANOR P. DURAL, FELICITAS V. SESE, petitioners,
vs. Josefina G. Campbell-Castillo for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84583-84.
FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG. GEN.
ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, respondents.
Potenciano A. Flores, Jr. for petitioner in G.R. No. 85727.
G.R. Nos. 84581-82 October 3, 1991
The Solicitor General for the respondents.
AMELIA ROQUE and WILFREDO BUENAOBRA, petitioners,
RESOLUTION
vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA and GEN, RAMON MONTANO, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 84583-84 October 3, 1991

PER CURIAM:p
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ATTY. DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and
RAMON CASIPLE: DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE, petitioners,
vs. Before the Court are separate motions filed by the petitioners in the above-entitled petitions, seeking
HON. FIDEL V. RAMOS, GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, COL. EVARISTO CARIÑO, LT. COL. REX D. PIAD, reconsideration of the Court's decision promulgated on 9 July 1990 (the decision, for brevity) which dismissed
T/SGT. CONRADO DE TORRES, S/SGT. ARNOLD DURIAN, and Commanding Officer, PC-INP the petitions, with the following dispositive part:
Detention Center, Camp Crame, Quezon City, respondents.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except that in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the
G.R. No. 83162 October 3, 1991 bail bond for petitioner's provisional liberty is hereby ordered reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00.
No costs.
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF VICKY A. OCAYA AND DANNY
RIVERA: VIRGILIO A. OCAYA, petitioners, The Court avails of this opportunity to clarify its ruling a begins with the statement that the decision did not rule
vs. — as many misunderstood it to do — that mere suspicion that one is Communist Party or New People's Army
BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, COL. HERCULES CATALUNA, COL. NESTOR member is a valid ground for his arrest without warrant. Moreover, the decision merely applied long existing
MARIANO, respondents. laws to the factual situations obtaining in the several petitions. Among these laws are th outlawing the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) similar organizations and penalizing membership therein be dealt with
shortly). It is elementary, in this connection, if these laws no longer reflect the thinking or sentiment of the
G.R. No. 85727 October 3, 1991
people, it is Congress as the elected representative of the people — not the Court — that should repeal, change
or modify them.
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DEOGRACIAS ESPIRITU, petitioner,
vs.
In their separate motions for reconsideration, petitioners, in sum, maintain:
BRIG. GEN.ALFREDO S. LIM, COL. RICARDO REYES, respondents.

1. That the assailed decision, in upholding the validity of the questioned arrests made without warrant,
G.R. No. 86332 October 3, 1991
and in relying on the provisions of the Rules of Court, particularly Section 5 of Rule 113 (Arrest),
disregards the fact that such arrests violated the constitutional rights of the persons arrested;
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF NARCISO B. NAZARENO: ALFREDO
NAZARENO,petitioner,
2. That the doctrine laid down in Garcia vs. Enrile 1 and Ilagan vs. Enrile 2 should be abandoned;
vs.
THE STATION COMMANDER OF THE MUNTINGLUPA POLICE STATION, Muntinglupa, Metro Manila,
P/SGT. JACINTO MEDINA, P/SGT. ELADIO TAGLE, P/SGT. LEVI SOLEDAD, and P/SGT. MALTRO
AROJADO, respondents.
 3. That the decision erred in considering the admissions made by the persons arrested as to their
membership in the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army, and their ownership of the
unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and subversive documents found in their possession at the time of
arrest, inasmuch as those confessions do not comply with the requirements on admissibility of
extrajudicial admissions;
4. That the assailed decision is based on a misappreciation of facts;
5. That G.R. No. 81567 (the Umil case) should not be deemed moot and academic.
We find no merit in the motions for reconsideration.
It can not be overlooked that these are petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, filed by
petitioners under the Rules of Court. 3 The writ of habeas corpus exists as a speedy and effective remedy to
relieve persons from unlawful restraint. 4 Therefore, the function of the special proceedings of habeas corpus is
to inquire into the legality of one's detention, 5 so that if detention is illegal, the detainee may be ordered
forthwit released.
In the petitions at bar, to ascertain whether the detention petitioners was illegal or not, the Court before
rendering decision dated 9 July 1990, looked into whether their questioned arrests without warrant were made
in accordance with law. For, if the arrests were made in accordance with law, would follow that the detention
resulting from such arrests also in accordance with law.
There can be no dispute that, as a general rule, no peace officer or person has the power or authority to arrest
anyo without a warrant of arrest, except in those cases express authorized by law. 6 The law expressly allowing
arrests witho warrant is found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court which states the grounds upon which
a valid arrest, without warrant, can be conducted.
In the present cases, the focus is understandably on Section 5, paragraphs (a) and (b) of the said Rule 113,
which read:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to he arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrest has committed it; and
. . . (Emphasis supplied).
The Court's decision of 9 July 1990 rules that the arrest Rolando Dural (G.R. No. 81567) without warrant is
justified it can be said that, within the contemplation of Section 5 Rule 113, he (Dural) was committing an
offense, when arrested because Dural was arrested for being a member of the New People's Army, an outlawed
organization, where membership penalized, 7 and for subversion which, like rebellion is, under the doctrine
of Garcia vs. Enrile, 8 a continuing offense, thus:
The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and
other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance ( sic) on the occasion thereof, or incident
thereto, or in connection therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of
continuing offenses which set them apart from the common offenses, aside from their essentially
involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide magnitude. . . .
Given the ideological content of membership in the CPP/NPA which includes armed struggle for the overthrow of
organized government, Dural did not cease to be, or became less of a subversive, FOR PURPOSES OF ARREST,
simply because he was, at the time of arrest, confined in the St. Agnes Hospital. Dural was identified as one of
several persons who the day before his arrest, without warrant, at the St. Agnes Hospital, had shot two (2)
CAPCOM policemen in their patrol car. That Dural had shot the two (2) policemen in Caloocan City as part of his
mission as a "sparrow" (NPA member) did not end there and then. Dural, given another opportunity, would have
shot or would shoot other policemen anywhere as agents or representatives of organized government. It is in
this sense that subversion like rebellion (or insurrection) is perceived here as a continuing offense. Unlike other
so-called "common" offenses, i.e. adultery, murder, arson, etc., which generally end upon their commission,
subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base which compels the repetition of the same acts of
lawlessness and violence until the overriding objective of overthrowing organized government is attained.
Nor can it be said that Dural's arrest was grounded on mere suspicion by the arresting officers of his
membership in the CPP/NPA. His arrest was based on "probable cause," as supported by actual facts that will be
shown hereafter.
Viewed from another but related perspective, it may also be said, under the facts of the Umil case, that the
arrest of Dural falls under Section 5, paragraph (b), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which requires two (2)
conditions for a valid arrestt without warrant: first, that the person to be arrested has just committed an offense,
and second, that the arresting peace officer or private person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested is the one who committed the offense. Section 5(b), Rule 113, it will be noted, refers to
arrests without warrant, based on "personal knowledge of facts" acquired by the arresting officer or private
person.
It has been ruled that "personal knowledge of facts," in arrests without warrant must be based upon probable
cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion 9
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the
suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts,
i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the
person to be arrested. 10 A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with
good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. 11
These requisites were complied with in the Umil case and in the other cases at bar.
In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil case) , military agents, on 1 February 1988, were dispatched to the St. Agnes Hospital,
Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a confidential information which was received by their office, about a
"sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been admitted to the said hospital with a gunshot wound; that the
information further disclosed that the wounded man in the said hospital was among the five (5) male "sparrows"
who murdered two (2) Capcom mobile patrols the day before, or on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock
noon, before a road hump along Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City; that based on the same
information, the wounded man's name was listed by the hospital management as "Ronnie Javellon," twenty-two
(22) years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Biñan, Laguna. 12
Said confidential information received by the arresting officers, to the effect that an NPA member ("sparrow
unit") was being treated for a gunshot wound in the named hospital, is deemed reasonable and with cause as it
was based on actual facts and supported by circumstances sufficient to engender a belief that an NPA member
was truly in the said hospital. The actual facts supported by circumstances are: first — the day before, or on 31
January 1988, two (2) CAPCOM soldiers were actually killed in Bagong Bario, Caloocan City by five (5)
"sparrows" including Dural; second — a wounded person listed in the hospital records as "Ronnie Javellon" was
actually then being treated in St. Agnes Hospital for a gunshot wound; third — as the records of this case
disclosed later, "Ronnie Javellon" and his address entered in the hospital records were fictitious and the
wounded man was in reality Rolando Dural.
In fine, the confidential information received by the arresting officers merited their immediate attention and
action and, in fact, it was found to be true. Even the petitioners in their motion for reconsideration, 13 believe
that the confidential information of the arresting officers to the effect that Dural was then being treated in St.
Agnes Hospital was actually received from the attending doctor and hospital management in compliance with the
directives of the law, 14 and, therefore, came from reliable sources.
As to the condition that "probable cause" must also be coupled with acts done in good faith by the officers who
make the arrest, the Court notes that the peace officers wno arrested Dural are deemed to have conducted the
same in good faith, considering that law enforcers are presumed to regularly perform their official duties. The
records show that the arresting officers did not appear to have been ill-motivated in arresting Dural. 15 It is
therefore clear that the arrest, without warrant, of Dural was made in compliance with the requirements of
paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5, Rule 113.
Parenthetically, it should be mentioned here that a few day after Dural's arrest, without warrant, an information
charging double murder with assault against agents of persons in authority was filed against Dural in the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (Criminal Case No. C-30112). He was thus promptly placed under judicial
custody (as distinguished fro custody of the arresting officers). On 31 August 1988, he wa convicted of the crime
charged and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The judgment of conviction is now on appeal before this Court in
G.R. No. 84921.
As to Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple (G.R.
Nos. 84583-84) and Vicky Ocaya (G.R. No. 83162), their arrests, without warrant, are also justified. They were
searched pursuant to search warrants issued by a court of law and were found wit unlicensed firearms,
explosives and/or ammunition in their persons. They were, therefore, caught in flagrante delicto which justified
their outright arrests without warrant, under Sec 5(a), Rule 113, Rules of Court. Parenthetically, it should be
mentioned here that a few davs after their arrests without warrant, informations were filed in court against said
petitioners, thereby placing them within judicial custody and disposition. Furthermore, Buenaobra mooted his
own petition fo habeas corpus by announcing to this Court during the hearing of these petitions that he had
chosen to remain in detention in the custody of the authorities.
More specifically, the antecedent facts in the "in flagrante" cases are:
1. On 27 June 1988, the military agents received information imparted by a former NPA about the
operations of the CPP and NPA in Metro Manila and that a certain house occupied by one Renato
Constantine, located in the Villaluz Compound, Molave St., Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila was
being used as their safehouse; that in view of this information, the said house was placed under
military surveillance and on 12 August 1988, pursuant to a search warrant duly issued by court, a
search of the house was conducted; that when Renato Constantine was then confronted he could not
produce any permit to possess the firearms, ammunitions, radio and other communications equipment,
and he admitted that he was a ranking member of the CPP. 16
2. In the case of Wilfredo Buenaobra, he arrived at the house of Renato Constantino in the evening of
12 August 1988, and admitted that he was an NPA courier and he had with him letters to Renato
Constantine and other members of the rebel group.
3. On the other hand, the arrest of Amelia Roque was a consequence of the arrest of Buenaobra who
had in his possession papers leading to the whereabouts of Roque; 17 that, at the time of her arrest,
the military agents found subversive documents and live ammunitions, and she admitted then that the
documents belonged to her. 18
4. As regards Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple they were arrested without warrant on 13 August
1988, when they arrived at the said house of Renato Constantine in the evening of said date; that when
the agents frisked them, subversive documents, and loaded guns were found in the latter's possession
but failing to show a permit to possess them. 19
 5. With regard to Vicky Ocaya, she was arrested, without warrant when she arrived (on 12 May 1988)
at the premises ofthe house of one Benito Tiamzon who was believed to be the head of the CPP/NPA,
and whose house was subject of a search warrant duly issued by the court . At the time of her arrest
without warrant the agents of the PC-Intelligence and Investigation found ammunitions and subversive
documents in the car of Ocaya. 20
It is to be noted in the above cases (Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya) that the reason which
compelled the military agents to make the arrests without warrant was the information given to the military
authorities that two (2) safehouses (one occupied by Renato Constantine and the other by Benito Tiamzon) were
being used by the CPP/NPA for their operations, with information as to their exact location and the names of
Renato Constantine and Benito Tiamzon as residents or occupants thereof.
And at the time of the actual arrests, the following circumstances surrounded said arrests (of Roque, Buenaobra,
Anonuevo and Casiple), which confirmed the belief of the military agents that the information they had received
was true and the persons to be arrested were probably guilty of the commission of certain crimes: first: search
warrant was duly issued to effect the search of the Constantine safehouse; second: found in the safehouse was
a person named Renato Constantine, who admitted that he was a ranking member of the CPP, and found in his
possession were unlicensed firearms and communications equipment; third: at the time of their arrests, in their
possession were unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and/or subversive documents, and they admitted ownership
thereof as well as their membership in the CPP/NPA. And then, shortly after their arrests, they were positively
identified by their former comrades in the organization as CPP/NPA members. In view of these circumstances,
the corresponding informations were filed in court against said arrested persons. The records also show that, as
in the case of Dural, the arrests without warrant made by the military agents in the Constantino safehouse and
later in the Amelia Roque house, do not appear to have been ill-motivated or irregularly performed.
With all these facts and circumstances existing before, during and after the arrest of the afore-named persons
(Dural, Buenaobra, Roque, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya), no prudent an can say that it would have been better
for the military agents not to have acted at all and made any arrest. That would have been an unpardonable
neglect of official duty and a cause for disciplinary action against the peace officers involved.
For, one of the duties of law enforcers is to arrest lawbreakers in order to place them in the hands of executive
and judicial authorities upon whom devolves the duty to investigate the acts constituting the alleged violation of
law and to prosecute and secure the punishment therefor. 21 An arrest is therefore in the nature of an
administrative measure. The power to arrest without warrant is without limitation as long as the requirements of
Section 5, Rule 113 are met. This rule is founded on an overwhelming public interest in peace and order in our
communities.
In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant is conducted in accordance with the conditions set forth in
Section 5, Rule 113, this Court determines not whether the persons arrested are indeed guilty of committing the
crime for which they were arrested. 22 Not evidence of guilt, but "probable cause" is the reason that can validly
compel the peace officers, in the performance of their duties and in the interest of public order, to conduct an
arrest without warrant. 23
The courts should not expect of law-enforcers more than what the law requires of them. Under the conditions
set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, particularly paragraph (b) thereof, even if the arrested persons are later found
to be innocent and acquitted, the arresting officers are not liable. 24 But if they do not strictly comply with the
said conditions, the arresting officers can be held liable for the crime of arbitrary detention, 25 for damages
under Article 32 of the Civil Code 26 and/or for other administrative sanctions.
In G.R. No. 85727, Espiritu, on 23 November 1988, was arrested without warrant, on the basis of the attestation
of certain witnesses: that about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 22 November 1988, at the corner of Magsaysay
Boulevard and Velencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, Espiritu spoke at a gathering of drivers and sympathizers, where
he said, among other things:
Bukas tuloy ang welga natin . . . hanggang sa magkagulona. 27 (Emphasis supplied)
and that the police authorities were present during the press conference held at the National Press Club (NPC)
on 22 November 1988 where Espiritu called for a nationwide strike (of jeepney and bus drivers) on 23 November
1988. 28 Espiritu was arrested without warrant, not for subversion or any "continuing offense," but for uttering
the above-quoted language which, in the perception of the arresting officers, was inciting to sedition.
Many persons may differ as to the validity of such perception and regard the language as falling within free
speech guaranteed by the Constitution. But, then, Espiritu had not lost the right to insist, during the pre-trial or
trial on the merits, that he was just exercising his right to free speech regardless of the charged atmosphere in
which it was uttered. But, the authority of the peace officers to make the arrest, without warrant, at the time the
words were uttered, or soon thereafter, is still another thing. In the balancing of authority and freedom, which
obviously becomes difficult at times, the Court has, in this case, tilted the scale in favor of authority but only for
purposes of the arrest (not conviction). Let it be noted that the Court has ordered the bail for Espiritu's release
to be reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00.
Let it also be noted that supervening events have made the Espiritu case moot and academic. For Espiritu had
before arraignment asked the court a quo for re-investigation, the peace officers did not appear. Because of this
development, the defense asked the court a quo at the resumption of the hearings to dismiss the case. Case
against Espiritu (Criminal Case No. 88-68385) has been provisionally dismissed and his bail bond cancelled.
In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno), the records show that in the morning of 14 December 1988, Romulo Bunye II
was killed by a group of men in Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila; that at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of
28 December 1988, Ramil Regala, one of the suspects in the said killing, was arrested and he pointed to Narciso
Nazareno as one of his companions during the killing of Bunye II; that at 7:20 of the same morning (28
December 1988), the police agents arrested Nazareno, without warrant, for investigation. 29
Although the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988, while Nazareno's arrest without warrant was
made only on 28 December 1988, or 14 days later, the arrest fans under Section 5(b) of Rule 113, since it was
only on 28 December 1988 that the police authorities came to know that Nazareno was probably one of those
guilty in the killing of Bunye II and the arrest had to be made promptly, even without warrant, (after the police
were alerted) and despite the lapse of fourteen (14) days to prevent possible flight.
As shown in the decision under consideration, this Court, in upholding the arrest without warrant of Nazareno
noted several facts and events surrounding his arrest and detention, as follows:
. . . on 3 January 1989 (or six (6) days after his arrest without warrant), an information charging
Narciso Nazareno, Ramil Regala and two (2) others, with the killing of Romulo Bunye II was filed wit
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila. The case is dock eted therein as Criminal Case No.
731.
On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail but the motion was denied by the trial
court in an order dated 10 January 1989, even as the motion to post bail, earlier filed by his co-
accused, Manuel Laureaga, was granted by the same trial court.
On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of Narciso
Nazareno and on 13 January 1989, the Court issued the writ of habeas corpus, retumable to the
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bifian, Laguna, Branch 24, ordering said court to hear the
case on 30 January 1989 and thereafter resolve the petition.
At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1 February 1989, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Biñan, Laguna issued a resolution denying the petition for habeas corpus, it appearing that the said
Narciso Nazareno is in the custody of the respondents by reason of an information filed against him
with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila which liad taken cognizance of said case and had,
in fact, denied the motion for bail filed by said Narciso Nazareno (presumably because of the strength
of the evidence against him).
This Court reiterates that shortly after the arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno, the corresponding informations
against them were filed in court. The arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno were based on probable cause and
supported by factual circumstances. They complied with conditions set forth in Section 5(b) of Rule 113. They
were not arbitrary or whimsical arrests.
Parenthetically, it should be here stated that Nazareno has since been convicted by the court a quo for murder
and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. He has appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals where
it is pending as of this date ( CA-G.R. No. still undocketed).
Petitioners contend that the decision of 9 July 1990 ignored the contitution requisiteds for admissibility of an
extrajudicial admission.
In the case of Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), he admitted 30 that he was an NPA courier. On the other hand,
in the case of Amelia Roque, she admitted 31 that the unlicensed firearms, ammunition and subversive
documents found in her possession during her arrest, belonged to her.
The Court, it is true, took into account the admissions of the arrested persons of their membership in the
CPP/NPA, as well as their ownership of the unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and documents in their possession.
But again, these admissions, as revealed by the records, strengthen the Court's perception that truly the grounds
upon which the arresting officers based their arrests without warrant, are supported by probable cause, i.e. that
the persons arrested were probably guilty of the commission of certain offenses, in compliance with Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. To note these admissions, on the other hand, is not to rule that the persons
arrested are already guilty of the offenses upon which their warrantless arrests were predicated. The task of
determining the guilt or innocence of persons arrested without warrant is not proper in a petition for habeas
corpus. It pertains to the trial of the case on the merits.
As to the argument that the doctrines in Garcia vs. Enrile, and Ilagan vs. Enrile should be abandoned, this Court
finds no compelling reason at this time to disturb the same, particularly ln the light of prevailing conditions
where national security and liability are still directly challenged perhaps with greater vigor from the communist
rebels. What is important is that everv arrest without warrant be tested as to its legality via habeas
corpus proceeding. This Court. will promptly look into — and all other appropriate courts are enjoined to do the
same — the legality of the arrest without warrant so that if the conditions under Sec. 5 of Rule 113, Rules of
Court, as elucidated in this Resolution, are not met, then the detainee shall forthwith be ordered released; but if
such conditions are met, then the detainee shall not be made to languish in his detention but must be promptly
tried to the end that he may be either acquitted or convicted, with the least delay, as warranted by the evidence.
A Final Word
This Resolution ends as it began, reiterating that mere suspicion of being a Communist Party member or a
subversive is absolutely not a ground for the arrest without warrant of the suspect. The Court predicated the
validity of the questioned arrests without warrant in these petitions, not on mere unsubstantiated suspicion, but
on compliance with the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court, a long existing law, and
which, for stress, are probable cause and good faith of the arresting peace officers, and, further, on the basis of,
as the records show, the actual facts and circumstances supporting the arrests. More than the allure of
popularity or palatability to some groups, what is important is that the Court be right.
ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration of the decision dated 9 July 1990, are DENIED. This denial is
FINAL.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
FERNAN, C.J., concurring and dissenting:
After a deep and thorough reexamination of the decision of Julv 9, 1990 and an exhaustive evaluation of the
motions for reconsideration of the said decision, I am inclined to agree with the, majority's resolution on said
motions for reconsideration except for the legality of the warrantless arrests of petitioner Deogracias Espiritu for
the crime of inciting to sedition and petitioner Alfredo Nazareno for the crime of murder.
In the words of the resolution, Espiritu "was arrested without warrant, not for subversion or any 'continuing
offense,' but for uttering" the following: "Bukas tuloy ang welga natin . . . hanggang sa magkagulo na."
Apparently, such statement was, in the perception of the arresting officers, inciting to sedition. While not
conceding the validity of such perception, realizing that it is indeed possible that Espiritu was merely exercising
his right to free speech, the resolution nonetheless supports the authority of peace officers " only for purposes of
the arrest."
I find this position to be adverse to the very essence of the resolution which sanctions warrantless arrests
provided they are made in accordance with law. In the first place, Espiritu mav not be considered as having "just
committed" the crime charged. He allegedly first uttered seditious remarks at the National Press Club in the
afternoon of November 12, 1988. The second allegedly seditious remark aforequoted was made at around 5:00
o'clock in the same afternoon (Decision, pp. 23-24). Under these circumstances, the law enforcement agents
had time, short though it might seem, to secure a warrant for his arrest. Espiritu's apprehension may not
therefore be considered as covered by Section 5(b) of Rule 113 which allows warrantless arrests "when an
offense has in fact just been committed."
The same observation applies with greater force in the case of Nazareno who was arrested 14 days after the
commission of the crime imputed to him.
Secondly, warrantless arrests may not be allowed if the arresting officer are not sure what particular provision of
law had beeri violated by the person arrested. True it is that law en.orcement agents and even prosecutors are
not all adept at the However, errneous perception, not to mention ineptitude among their ranks, especially if it
would result in the violation of any right of a person, may not be tolerated. That the arrested person has the
"right to insist during the pre-trial or trial on the merits" (Resolution., p. 18) that he was exercising a right which
the arresting officer considered as contrary to law, is beside the point. No person should be subjected to the
ordeal of a trial just because the law enforcers wrongly perceived his action.
Thirdly, inciting to sedition is not a continuous crime for which the offender may be arrested without a warrant
duly issued by the proper authority. By its nature, a single act of urging others to commit any of the acts
enumerated in Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code may suffice to hold anyone liable for inciting to sedition.
While the crime is aimed at anarchy and radicalism and presents largely a question of policy (Espuelas vs.
People, 90 Phil, 524 [1951]), it should be remembered that any of the prohibited acts in Article 142 may infringe
upon the fundamental freedoms of speech and expression. There arises, therefore, the necessity of balancing
interests; those of the State as against those of its individual citizen. Here lies the urgency of judicial intervention
before an arrest is made. Added to this is the subjectivity of the determination of what may incite other people
to sedition. Hence, while the police should act swiftly when a seditious statement has been uttered in view of the
jeopardy it may cause the government, speedy action should consist not in warrantless arrests but in securing
warrants for such arrests.
On the legality of warrantless arrests of violators of the Anti-Subversion Law, it should be underscored that
anyone who undertakes such arrest must see to it that the alleged violator is knowing member of a subversive
organization as distinguished from a nominal one (People vs. Ferrer, L-32613-14, December 27, 1972, 48 SCRA
382). Thus, a subversive may be arrested even if has not committed overt act of overthrowing the government
such as bombing of government offices trie assassination of government officials provided there is probable
cause to believe that he is in the roll of members of a subversive organization. It devolves upon the accused to
prove membership by force or ciorcion. Certainly, one may not be in such a roll without undergoing the concious
act of enlistment.
It bears repeating theat warrantless arrests are governed by law and subject to stringent application. Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure now requires that an offense "has in fact just been committed.
"connotes immediacy in point of time and excludes cases under the old rule where an offense 'has in fact been
committed' no how long ago. Similarly, the arrestor must have 'personal knowledge of the facts indicating that
the [arrestee] has committed it' (instead of just 'reasonable ground believe that the [arrestee] has committed it'
under the old rule)." (Dissenting opinion in Ilagan vs. Enrile, G.R. No. 70748, October 21, 1985, 139 SCRA 349,
408).
I deem it aptherein to recall other Court rulings provide guidelines in effecting arrests without warrants.
In People vs. Burgos (G.R. No. 68955, September 4, 1986,144 SCRA 1), the Court considered as illegal the
warrantless arrest of a subversive not based on the arresting officer's personal knowledge such subversion and
held that any rule on arrests witho warrants must be strictly construed. We categorically state therein that
warrantless arrests should "clearly fall within the situations when securing a warrant be absurd or is manifestly
unnecessary was provided by the Rules" (144 SCRA at 14). Moreover. "it is not enough that there is reasonable
ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually (has
just) been committed first. That crime has actually been committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough
to suspect that a crime may have been committed. The fact of the commission of the offense must be
undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator. (Supra, at p. 15).
Earlier, in Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile (G.R. No. 61016, April 26, 1983, 121 SCRA 538), the Court laid out the
procedure to be observed the moment a person is arrested:
At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to imform him of the reason
for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be
used against him. The person shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone
he chooses by the most expedient means — by telephone if possible — or by letter or messenger. It
shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial
investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person
arressted, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition on his behalf, or
appointed the court upon the petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The
right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of
counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, in whole or in part shall be inadmissible evidence. (121 SCRA at 554).
These judicial pronouncements must be observed by everyone concerned: the military and civilian components
of the government tasked with law enforcement as well as the ordinary citizen who faces a situation wherein
civic duty demands his intervention to preserve peace in the community.
I am not unmindful of the fact that abuses occur in arrests especially of offenders of crimes with a political or
ideological element. Such abuses are more often than not, triggered by the difficulty in finding evidence that
could stand judicial scrutiny — to pinpoint a subversive, police officers usually have to make long persistent
surveillance. However, for the orderly administration of government and the maintenance of peace and order in
the country, good faith should be reposed on the officials implementing the law. After all, we are not wanting in
laws to hold any offending peace officer liable both administratively and criminally for abuses in the performance
of their duties. Victims of abuses should resort to legal remedies to redress their grievances.
If existing laws are inadequate, the policy-determining branches of the government may be exhorted peacefully
by the citizenry to effect positive changes. This Court, mandated b the Constitution to uphold the law, can only
go as far as inter pruting existing laws and the spirit behind them. Otherwise, we hail be entering the dangerous
ground of judicial legislation.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring and dissenting:
The philosophy adopted in our Constitution is that liberty is an essential condition for order, It is disturbing
whenever the Court leans in the direction of order instead of liberty in har cases coming before us.
People all over the world are fast accepting the theory that only as a society encourages freedom and permits
dissent can it have lasting security and real progress, the theory that enhancing order through constraints on
freedom is deceptive because restrictions on liberty corrode the very values Govenment pretends to promote. I
believe we should move with the people of the world who are fast liberating themselves.
I, therefore, vote for the strict application of Section 5 (a) and (b) of Rule 113 on arrests without warrant, to wit:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.
xxx xxx xxx
Only in the cases found in the Rule should we allow arrests without warrants. In case of doubt, the tendency
should be to declare the warrantless arrest illegal.
Insofar as G.R. Nos, 84581-82, G.R. Nos. 84583-84 and G.R. No. 83162 involving Amelia Roque, Wilfredo
Buenaobra, Domingo Anonuevo, Ramon Casiple, and Vicky Ocaya are concerned, the petitioners were arrested
after having been apprehended while in possession of illegal firearms and ammunitions. They were actually
committing a crime when arrested. I concur in the denial of their motions for reconsideration.
I vote to grant the motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 85727 where Deogracias Espiritu was arrested while
urging jeepnev and bus drivers to join a strike of transport workers on the ground that that was inciting to
sedition.
This impresses me as Court validation of a clear infringement of an individual's freedom of speech. "Inciting to
sedition" is a term over which the most learned writers and jurists will differ when applied to actual cases. I
doubt if there are more than a handful of policemen in the whole country who would know the full dimensions of
the fine distinctions which separate the nation's interest in the liberty to fully anfd freely discuss matters of
national importance on one hand and the application of the clear and present danger rule as the test when
claims of national security and public safety are asserted, on the other. In fact, the percentage of
knowledgeability would go down further if we consider that "inciting to sedition" requires the ability to define,
among other (1) what kinds of speeches or writings fall lander the term "inciting" (2) the meaning of
rising publicly and tumultously; (3,) when does a certain effort amount to force, intimidation. or illegal method;
(4) what constitute the five objects or ends of sedition; and (5) what is a scurrilous libel against the Philippines.
If we allow public speakers to be picked up simply because what they say is irritating or obnoxious to the ears of
a peace officer or critical of government policy and action, we will undermine all pronouncements of this Court
on the need to protect that matrix of all freedoms, which is freedom of expression. At the very least, a warrant
of arrest after a preliminary examination by a Judge is essential in this type of offense.
Insofar as G.R. No. 81567 is concemed, I join the other dissenting Justices in their observations regarding
"continuing oftenses." To base warrantless arrests on the doctrine of continuing offense is to give a license for
the illegal detention of persons on pure suspicion. Rebellion, insurrection, or sedition are political offenses where
the line between overt acts and simple advocacy or adherence to a belief is extremely thin. If a court has
convicted an accused of rebellion and he is found roaming around, he may be arrested. But until a person is
proved guilty, I fail to see how anybody can jump to a personal conclusion that the suspect is indeed a rebel and
must be picked up on sight whenever seen. The grant of authority in the majority opinion is too broad. If
warrantless searches are to be validated, it should be Congress and not this Court which should draw strict and
narrow standards. Otherwise, the non-rebels who are critical, noisy, or obnoxious will be indiscriminately lumped
up with those actually taking up arms against the Government.
The belief of law enforcement authorities, no matter how well grounded on past events, that the petitioner
would probably shoot other policemen whom he may meet does not validate warrantless arrests. I cannot
understand why the authorities preferred to bide their time, await the petitioner's surfacing from underground,
and pounce on him with no legal authority instead of securing warrants of arrest for his apprehension. The
subsequent conviction of a person arrested illegally does not the warrantless arrest.
In G.R. No. 86332, Romulo Bunye was killed on December 14, 1988. The information that Narciso Nazareno was
one of the killers came to the attention of peace officers only on December 28, 1988 or fourteen (14) days later.
To say that the offense "has in fact just been committed" even if 14 days have lapsed is to stretch Rule 11 3 on
warrantless arrests into ridiculous limits. A warrant of arrest is essential in this case. I vote to grant the motion
for reconsideration.
The subsequent conviction of a person arrested illegally does not reach back into the past and render legal what
was illegal. The violation of the constitutional right against illegal seizures is not cured by the fact that the
arrested person is indeed guilty of the offense for which he was seized. A government of laws must abide by its
own Constitution.
CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING, I VOTE TO:
(1) DENY the motions for reconsideration in G.R. Nos. 84581-82; G.R. No. 84583-84; and G.R. No. 83162;
(2) GRANT the motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 85727;
(3) GRANT the motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 86332;and
(4) GRANT the motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 81567.
CRUZ, J., Separate Opinion:
I reiterate my concurrence with the ponencia insofar as it dismissed the petitions of those who were arrested
in flagrante, or subsequently posted bail or chose to remain in the custody of the military, or voluntarily
permitted the search of the house without warrant. I do not think that under the applicable circumstances the
petitioners can validly complain that they are being unlawfully detained.
But I must again express may dissent to the continued observance of Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile, 121 SCRA 472, to
justify the warrantless arrest and detention of the other petitioners on the ground that they were apprehended
for the continuing offenses of rebellion and other allied crimes.
We find in the said decision this partltularly disturbing observation, which was quoted with approval in the
original ponencia:
The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion, whether as its fighting armed elements, or for
committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in the
course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting
them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the
prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a judge of the existence of probable cause
before the issuance of arrest and the granting of bail of the offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence
of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of
violence against govenment forces, or any other milder acts but equally in pursuance of the rebellious
movement. (Emphasis supplied.)
The treatment suggested envisions an actual state of war and is justified only when a recognition of beuigerency
is accorded by the legitimate government to the rebels, resulting in the application of the laws of war in the
regulation of their relations. The rebels are then considered alien enemies-to be treated as prisoners of war
when captured-and cannot invoke the municipal law of the legitimate government they have disowned. It is in
such a situation that the processes of the local courts are not observed and the rebels cannot demand the
protection of the Bill of Rights that they are deemed to have renounced by their defiance of the government.
But as long as that recognition has not yet been extended, the legitimate govenment must treat the rebels as its
citizens, subject to its municipal law and entitled to all the rights provided thereunder, including and especially
those guaranteed by the Constitution. Principal among these — in our country — are whose embodied in the Bill
of Rights, particularly those guaranteeing due process, prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, allowing
bail, and presuming the innocence of the accused. The legitimate government cannot excuse the suppression of
these rights by the "exigencies" of an armed conflict that at this time remains an intemal matter governed
exclusively by the laws of the Republic of the Philippines.
Treatment of the rebels as if they were foreign invaders — or combatants — is not justified in the present
situation as our government continues to prosecute them as violators of our own laws. Under the doctrine
announced in Garcia-Padilla, however, all persons suspected as rebels are by such suspicion alone made subject
to summary arrest no different from the unceremonious capture of an enemy soldier in the course of a battle.
The decision itself says that the arrest "need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses" and
"the absence of a judicial warrant is no impediment" as long as the person arrested is suspected by the
authorities of the "continuing offense" of subversion or rebellion or other related crimes. International law is thus
substituted for municipal law in regulating the relations of the Republic with its own citizens in a purely domestic
matter.
As for the duration of the offenses, the decision contained the following pronouncement which this Court has
also adopted as its own:
. . . The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes,
and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance on the occasion thereof, or incident
thereto, or in connection therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature
of continuing offenses which set them apart from the common offenses, aside front their essentially
involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide manitude. (Emphasis supplied.)
The beginning of the "continuing offense" may be arbitrarily fixed by the authorities, usually by simply placing
the suspect "under surveillance," to lay the basis for his eventual apprehension. Once so placed, he may at any
time be arrested without warrant on the specious pretext that he is in the process of committing the "continuing
offense," no matter that what he may be actuallly doing at the time is a perfectly innocent act.
In the case of Dural. the arrest was made while he was engaged in the passive and innocuous act of undergoing
medical treatment. The fiction was indulged that he was even then, as he lay supine in his sickbed, engaged in
the continuing offense of rebellion against the State. In further justification, the Court says that the arresting
officers acted on "confidential information" that he was in the hospital, which information "was found to be
true." This is supposed to have validated the determination of the officers that there was "probable cause" that
excused the absence of a warrant.
My own impression is that probable cause must be established precisely to justify the issuance of a warrant, not
to dispense with it; moreover, probable cause must be determined by the judge issuing the warrant, not the
arresting officer who says it is not necessary.
In the case of Espiritu, the arrest was made while he was actually sleeping, and for allegedly seditious remarks
made by him the day before. The Court says his case is not covered by the Garcia-Padilla doctrine but approves
the arrest just the same because the remarks were supposed to continue their effects even to the following day.
The offense was considered as having been just committed (to make it come under Rule 113, Section 5, of the
Rules of Court) despite the considerable time lapse.
It was worse in the case of Nazareno, who was also arrested without warrant, and no less than fourteen days
after the killing. In sustaining this act, the Court says that it was only on the day of his arrest that he was
identified as one of the probable killers, thus suggesting that the validity of a warrantless arrest is reckoned not
from the time of the commission of an offense but from the time of the Identification of the suspect.
Section 5 of Rule 113 says that a peace officer may arrest a person without a warrant if the latter "has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense" or when an offense "has in fact just
been committed." The requirement of immediacy is obvious from the word "just," which, according to Webster,
means "a very short time ago." The arrest must be made almost immediately or soon after these acts, not at any
time after the suspicion of the arresting officer begins, no matter how long ago the offense was committed.
I am also uneasy over the following observations in the present resolution which I hope will not be the start of
another dangerous doctrine:
 The Court, it is true, took into account the admissions of the arrested persons of their membership in
the CPP/NPA, as well as their ownership of the unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and documents in
their possession. But again, these admissions, as revealed by the records, strengthen the Court's
perception that truly the grounds upon wmch the arresting officers based their arrests without warrant,
are supported by probable cause, i.e., that the persons arrested were probably guilty of the commission
of certain offenses, in compliance with Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
I can only repeat my own misgivings when I dissented in the recent case of People vs. Malmstedt, G.R. No.
91107, June 19, 1991, where I noted: "The conclusion that there was probable cause may have been influenced
by the subsequent discovery that the accused was carrying a prohibited drug. This is supposed to justify the
soldier's suspicion. In other words, it was the fact of illegal possession that retroactively established the probable
cause that validated the illegal search and seizure. It was the fruit of the poisonous tree that washed clean the
tree itself."
I submit that the affirmation by this Court of the Garcia-Padilla decision to justify the illegal arrests made in the
cases before us is a step back to that shameful past when individual rights were wantonly and systematically
violated by the Marcos dictatorship. It seems some of us have short memories of that repressive regime, but I
for one am not one to forget so soon. As the ultimate defender of the Constitution, this Court should not gloss
over the abuses of those who, out of mistaken zeal, would violate individual liberty in the dubious name of
national security. Whatever their ideology and even if it be hostile to ours, the petitioners are entitled to the
protection of the Bill of Rights, no more and no less than any other person in this country. That is what
democracy is all about.
FELICIANO, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the result reached by the majority in the Resolution disposing of the Motion for Reconsideration.
At the same time, however, I feel compelled to dissent from certain statements made by the majority principally
concerning the applicability of the "continuing crimes" doctrine to the problem of arrests without warrants. It
seems clear that these statements are really obiter dicta, since they are quite unnecessary for sustaining the
actual results reached in the majority Resolution. This was summarily pointed out in my very brief statement
concurring in the result reached in the original Decision of the Court dated 9 July 1990. The subsequent
developments in several of the cases here consolidated, which are carefully detailed in the majority Resolution,
make this even clearer. Nonetheless, the majority Resolution has taken the time and trouble expressly to
reiterate the "continuing crimes" doctrine as applicable in respect of warrantless arrests. Although the above
statements are obiter, they have been made and, I believe, need to be addressed to some extent and the inter-
relation of the "continuing crimes" doctrine with constitutional rights explored.
1. We start at the beginning, that is, the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable seizures of persons.
Article III Section 2 of the Constitution reads:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
(Emphais supplied)
Under the above provision, arrests, i.e., the constraint and seizure of the persons of individual members of
society, must, as a general rule, be preceded by the securing of a warrant of arrest, the rendition of which
complies with the constitutional procedure specified in Article III Section 2. Arrests made without a warrant
issued by a judge after complying with the constitutional procedure, are prima facie unreasonable seizures of
persons within the meaning of Article III Section 2.
2. There are, however, certain well-recognized exceptions to the norm that warrantless arrests are unreasonable
seizures of persons. Those exceptions are, in our day, essentially found in Section 5(a) and (b) of Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court. Section 5(a) and (b) mark out the situations where an officer of the law, or a private person
for that matter, may lawfully arrest a person without previously securing a warrant of arrest. The full text of
Section 5, Rule 113 follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance
with Rule 112, Section 7.
3. Before examining the scope and implications of Section 5(a) and (b), it is important to recall that judicial
interpretation and application of Section 5(a) and (b) must take those provision for what they are: they
are exceptions to a vital constitutional norm enshrined in the Bill of Rights. Exceptions to such a norm must be
strictly construed so as not to render futile and meaningless the constitutional rule requiring warrants of arrests
before the persons of individuals may be lawfully constrained and seized. The ordinary rule generally applicable
to statutory provisions is that exceptions to such provisions must not be stretched beyond what the language in
which they are cast fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provision, rather
than the exception. 1 This rule must apply with special exigency and cogency where we deal, not with an
ordinary statutory provision, but with a constitutional guarantee. 2 Exceptions to such a guarantee must be read
with especial care and sensitivity and kept within the limits of their language so to keep vital and significant the
general constitutional norms warrantless arrests. In Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance, 3 this Court, stressing
that:
II. As the protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his constitutional rights is one of the highest
duties and privileges of the court. these constitutional guaranties should be given a liberal construction
or a strict construction in favor of the individual, to prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual
depreciation of, the rights secured by them (State vs. Custer County, 198 Pac., 362; State vs. McDaniel,
231 Pac., 965; 237 Pac., 373). Since the proceeding is a drastic one, it is the general rule that statutes
 authorizing searches and seizures or search warrants must be strictly construed (Rose vs. St. Clair, 28
Fed. [2d], 189; Leonard vs. U.S., 6 Fed. [2d], 353; Perry vs. U.S., 14 Fed. [2d], 88; Cofer vs. State, 118
So., 613. (emphasis supplied)
held that:
. . . All illegal searches and seizures are unreasonable whith lawful ones are reasonable. 4
In People vs. Burgos, 5 this Court reiterated the above rule in the following terms:
There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was possessed by the arresting
officers, it came in its entirety from the information furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The location of the
firearm was given by the appellant's wife.
At the time of the appellant's arrest, he was not in actual possession of any firearm or subversive
document. Neither was he commit ting any act which could be described as subversive. He was, in fact
plowing his field at the time of the arrest.
The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation of
his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule which allows exceptions the
requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly construed. Any exception must clearly fall within the
situations when securing a warrant would be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary as provided by the
Rule. We cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without warrant or extend its application beyond
the cases specifically provided by law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty and set back a
basic right so often vilated and so deserving of full protection. 6 (emphasis supplied)
4. Section 5(a) relates to situations where a crime is committed or attempted to be committed in the presence of
the arresting officer. The fact of the occurrence of the offense, or of the attempt to commit an offense, in the
presence of the arresting officer, may be seen to be the substitute, under the circumstances, for the securing of
a warrant of arrest. In such situation, there is an obvious need for immediate, even instantaneous, action on the
part of the arresting officer to suppress the breach of public order and to prevent further breaches then and
there. Section 5(a) may, moreover, be seen to refer to overt acts constitutive of a crime taking place in the
presence of the arresting officer. The term "presence" in this connection is properly and restrictively construed to
relate to acts taking place within the optical or perhaps auditory perception of the arresting officer. 7 If no overt,
recognizably criminal, acts occur which are perceptible through the senses of the arresting officer, such officer
could not, of course, become aware at all that a crime is being committed or attempted to be committed in his
presence. 8 It is elementary that purely mental or psychological phenomena, not externalized in overt physical
acts of a human person, cannot constitute a crime in our legal system. For a crime to exist in our legal law, it is
not enough that mens rea be shown; there must also be an actus reus. If no such overt acts are actually taking
place in the presence or within the sensor perception of the arresting officer, there would, in principle, be ample
time to go to a magistrate and ask for a warrant of arrest. There would, in other words, not be that imperious
necessity for instant action to prevent an attempted crime, to repress the crime being committed, or to capture
the doer of the perceive criminal act, the necessity which serves as the justification in law of warrantless arrests
under Section 5(a).
5. Turning to Section 5 (b), two (2) elements must be coincide before a warrantless arrest may be sustained
under this subsection: 1) the offense must have "just been committed" when the arresting officer arrived in the
scene; and 2) the officer must have "personal knowledge" of facts indicating tha the person to be arrested has
committed the offense. In somewhat different terms, the first requirement imports that th effects or corpus of
the offense which has just been committed are still visible: e.g. a person sprawled on the ground, dead of
gunshot wound; or a person staggering around bleeding profusely from stab wounds. The arresting officer may
not ha seen the actual shooting or stabbing of the victim, and thereto the offense can not be said to have been
committed "in [his] presence." The requirement of "personal knowledge" on the part of the arresting officer is a
requirement that such knowledge must have been obtained directly from sense perception the arresting officer.
That requirement would exclude informtion conveyed by another person, no matter what his reputation for,
truth and reliability might be. 9 Thus, where the arresting officer comes upon a person dead on the street and
sees a person running away with a knife from where the victim is sprawled the ground, he has personal
knowledge of facts which render it highly probable that the person fleeing was the doer of the criminal deed.
The arresting officer must, in other words, perceive through his own senses some act which directly connects
the person to be arrested with the visible effects or corpus of a crime which has "just been committed."
6. The use of the words "has in fact just been committed" underscores the requirement that the time interval
between the actual commission of the crime and the arrival of the arresting officer must be brief indeed. In the
first place, the word "just" was fairly recently inserted in Section 5(b) by the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedures,
no doubt in order to underscore the point here being made. In the second place, a latitudinarian view of the
phrase "has in fact just been committed" would obviously render pointless the requirement in Section 5(a) that
the crime must have been committed "[in] the presence" of the arresting officer. In G.R. No. 86332, the
warrantless arrest of Alfredo Nazareno 14-days after the occurrence of the killing with which he was charged
along with other persons, cannot by any standard be justified under Section 5(b). In G.R. No. 81567, Dural was
arrested without warrant while being treated in a hospital the day after the shooting of the policemen in which
he was suspected to have been a participant. While 1-day may be substantially different from 14-days, still it
must be pointed out that at the time Dural was arrested in the hospital, the killing of the two (2) policemen in
Caloocan City far away from the St. Agnes Hospital in Quezon City could not reasonably be said to have
been just committed. There was no showing, nor did the Court require it, that the arresting officers had been in
"hot pursuit" of Dural beginning at the scene of the killing and ending the next day in the hospital.
7. It is worth noting that the requisite of "personal knowledge" on the part of the arresting officer who is
determining "probable cause" right at the scene of the crime, is in a sense more exacting than the standard
imposed by the Constitution upon the judge who, in the seclusion of his chambers, ascertains "probable cause"
by examining the evidence submitted before him. The arresting officer must himself have "personal knowledge";
the magistrate may rely upon the personal knowledge of the witnesses examined by or for him in issuing a
warrant of arrest. In the present Resolution, the majority begins with noting the requirement of "personal
knowledge" in Section 5(b), but winds up in the next page with a very diluted standard of "reasonable belief and
"good faith" on the part of the arresting officers. The stricter standard is properly applicable to the officers
seizing a person without a warrant of arrest, for they are acting in derogation of a constitutional right. That the
person unlawfully arrested without a warrant may later turn out to be guilty of the offense he was suspected of
in the first place is, course, quite beside the point. Even a person secretly guilty some earlier crime is
constitutionally entitled to be secure from warrantless arrest, unless he has in fact committed physically
observable criminal acts in the presence of the arresting officer or hadjust committed such acts when the
arresting officer burst upon the scene.
8. Examination of the utilization in the majotity Resolution of the doctrine of "continuing crimes," shows that
doctrine is here being used as a substitute for the requirement under Section 5(a) that the offense "has in fact
just been presence of the arresting officer arrived, but rather because the person to be arrested is suspected of
having committed a crime in the future. The pertinent portion of the majority Resolution reads:
 . . . Dural did not cease to be, or because less of a subversive, FOR PURPOSE OF ARREST, simply
because he was, at the time of arrest, confined in the St. Agnes Hospital. . . . That Dural had shot the
two (2) policemen in Caloocan City as part of his mission as a "sparrow" (NPA member) did not end
there and then. Dural, given another opportunity, would have shot or would shoot other policemen
anywhere as agents or representatives of organized government. It is in this sense that subversion like
rebelion (or insurrection) is perceived here as a continuing offense. Unlike other so-called "common"
offenses, i.e., adultery, murder, arson, etc., which generally end upon their
commission, subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base which compels the repetition
of the same acts of lawlessness and violence until the overriding objectives of overthrowing organized
government is attained. (Emphasis supplied)
9. I respectfully submit that an examination of the "continuing crimes" doctrine as actually found in our case law
offers no reasonable basis for such use of the dotrine. More specifically, that doctrine, in my submission,
does not dispence with the requirement that overt acts recognizably criminal in character must take place in the
presence of the arresting officer, or must have just been committed when the arresting officer arrived, if the
warrantless arrest it to be lawful. The "continuing crimes" doctrine in our case law ( before rendition of Garcia-
Padilla vs. Enrile 10 does not sustain warrantless arrests of person to be arrested is, as it were, merely resting in
between specific lawless and commit the moment he gets an opportunity to do so.
Our case law shows that the "continuing crimes" doctrine has been used basically in relation to two (2)
problems: the first problem is that of determination of whether or not a particular offense was committed within
the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; the second problem is that of determining whether a single crime or
multiple crimes were committed where the defense of double jeopardy is raised.
10. In respect of the first problem, the gist of our case law is that where some of the ingredients or elements of
an offense taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of one court and some other ingredients or elements of
the same offense occur in the territory of another court, (e.g., estafa or malversation) either one of the two
courts has jurisdiction to try the offense. Where all of the essential elements of a crime take place within the
territory of one court but "by reason of he very nature of the offense committed" the violation of the law is
deemed to be "continuing," then the court within whose territorial jurisdiction the offense continues to be
committed, has jurisdiction to try a person charged with such offense. In the latter case, the offense is deemed
to be continuing because some or all of the elements constituting the offense occurred within jurisdiction of the
second court (e.g., kidnapping and illegal detention; libel; evasion of service of sentence). The criminal acts are
regarded as repeated or as continuing within the province or city where the defendant was found and
arrested. 11 Clearly, overt acts of the accussed constituting elements of the crime charged must be shown to
have been committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court where he is charged.
11. Turning to the second type of problem, the question is normally presented in terms of whether one crime or
multiple crimes were committed by the accused. Where the series of acts actually alleged and proven to have
been committed by the accused constituted only one and the same crime, the defense of double jeopardy
becomes available where a second information is filed covering acts later in the series. Upon the other hand,
where the acts of the accused constituted discrete, multiple offenses, each act comprising a distinct and
separate offense, the double jeopardy defense is non-available. 12 The point worth stressing is that in passing
upon the issue relating to the unity or multiplicity of offense committed, the overt acts of the accused
constitutive either of the single offense or of the plural offenses, must be shown.
12. My final submission, is that, the doctrine of "continuing crimes," which has its own legitimate function to
serve in our criminal law jurisprudence, cannot be invoked for weakening and dissolving the constitutional
guarantee against warrantless arrest. Where no overt acts comprising all or some of the elements of the offense
charged are shown to have been committed by the person arrested without warrant, the "continuing crime"
doctrine should not be used to dress up the pretense that a crime, begun or committed elsewhere, continued to
be committed by the person arrested in the presence of the arresting officer. The capacity for mischief of such a
utilization of the "continuing crimes" doctrine, is infinitely increased where the crime charged does not consist of
unambiguous criminal acts with a definite beginning and end in time and space (such as the killing or wounding
of a person or kidnapping and illegal dentention or arson) but rather of such problematic offenses as
membership in or affiliation with or becoming a member of, a subversive association or organization. For in such
cases, the overt constitutive acts may be morally neutral in themselves, and the unlawfulness of the acts a
function of the aims or objectives of the organization involved. Note, for instance, the following acts which
constitute prima facie evidence of "membership in any subversive association:" 13
a) Allowing himself to be listed as a member in any book or any of the lists, records, correspondence,
or any other document of the organization;
b) Subjecting himself to the discipline of such association or organization in any form whatsoever;
c) Giving financial contribution to such association or organization in dues, assessments, loans or in any
other forms;
xxx xxx xxx
f) Conferring with officers or other members of such association or organization in furtherance of any
plan or enterprise thereof;
xxx xxx xxx
h) Preparing documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, or any other type of publication to promote the
objectives and purposes of such association or organization;
xxx xxx xxx
k) Participating in any was in the activities, planning action, objectives, or purposes of such association
or organization;
xxx xxx xxx
It may well be, as the majority implies, that the constitutional rule against warrantless arrests and seizures
makes the law enforcement work of police agencies more difficult to carry out. It is not our Court's function,
however, and the Bill of Rights was not designed, to make life easy for police forces but rather to protect the
liberties of private individuals. Our police forces must simply learn to live with the requirements of the Bill of
Rights, to enforce the law by modalities which themselves comply with the fundamental law. Otherwise they are
very likely to destroy, whether through sheer ineptness or excess of zeal, the very freedoms which make our
polity worth protecting and saving.
REGALADO, J.: Separate Opinion:
While I have heretofore concurred in the ponencia in the above-entitled cases and I reiterate such concurrence,
I wish to unburden myself of some reservations on the rationale adopted in G.R. No. 86332.
It is posited in this resolution that "(a)lthough the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988, while
Nazareno's arrest without warrant was made only on 28 December 1988, or 14 days later, the arrest falls under
Section 5(b) of Rule 113, since it was only on 28 December 1988 that the police authorities came to know that
Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye II."
I am afraid that there has been a misapplication of Section 5(b) of Rule 113 which, while authorizing a peace
officer or a private person to effect a warrantless arrest, specifically conditions that grant of authority upon the
situation "(w)hen an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it."
It is significant that when the corresponding provisions of the 1964 Rules of Court were amended in the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the particular revision of paragraph (b) of the aforesaid section consisted in
imposing the requirements that the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that
the arrestee is responsible for an offense which has just been committed.
Now, according to the resolution, "the records show that in the morning of 14 December 1988, Romulo Bunye II
was killed by a group of men in Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila; that at about 5 o'clock in the morning of 28
December 1988, Ramil Regala, one of the suspects in the said killing, was arrested and he pointed to Narciso
Nazareno as one of his companions during the killing of Bunye II; that at 7:20 of the same morning (28
December 1988), the police agents arrested Nazareno, without warrant, for investigation."
Since, clearly, the arresting police agents merely acted upon the information imparted by one of the suspects,
Ramil Regala, the resolution has emasculated the requirement in Section 5(b) that the person making the arrest
must have had personal knowledge of factual indications regarding the complicity or liability of the arrestee for
the crime. Yet, that amendment requiring such personal knowledge must have been designed to obviate the
practice in the past of warrantless arrests being effected on the basis of or supposed reliance upon information
obtained from third persons who merely professed such knowledge or, worse, concocted such reports for variant
reasons not necessarily founded on truth.
Further, and obviously as an added deterrent to the possibility that such arrest without a warrant may result
from imputations based on dubious motives, it is now required that the crime must have just been committed.
The recency contemplated here, in relation to the making of the warrantless arrest, is the time when the crime
was in fact committed, and not the time when the crime was in fact committed, and not the time when the
person making the arrest learned or was informed of such commission. Otherwise, at the risk of resorting
to reductio ad absurdum, such warrantless arrests could be validly made even for a crime committed, say, more
than a year ago but of which the arresting officer received information only today.
The brevity in the interval of time between the commission of the crime and the arrest, as now required by
Section 5(b), must have been dictated by the consideration, among others, that by reason of such recency of the
criminal occurrence, the probability of the arresting officer acquiring personal and/or reliable knowledge of such
fact and the identity of the offender is necessarily enhanced, if not assured. The longer the interval, the more
attenuated are the chances of his obtaining such verifiable knowledge. In the case under consideration, the
obtention of information of a crime committed fourteen (14) days earlier necessarily undermines the capacity of
the arresting officer to ascertain the reliability of the information he is acting upon and to acquire personal
knowledge thereof after such verification.
It may be granted, as an ad hoc proposition, that the arrest of Nazareno was based on probable cause and it
was not whimsical, at least, in this instance. It is correct to say that prevailing conditions affecting national
security and stability must also be taken into account. However, for the reasons above elucidated, I take
exception to the conclusion that the conditions in Section 5(b) of Rule 113 had been complied with in this case.
It is true that the corresponding information was filed against Nazareno shortly after his arrest but that,
precisely, is another cause for controversy. Definitely, if the rules on arrest are scrupulously observed, there
would be no need for the usual invocation of Ilagan as a curative balm for unwarranted incursions into civil
liberties.
SARMIENTO, J.: dissenting:
I reiterate my dissent. I submit that in spite of its "clarificatory" resolution, 1 the majority has not shown why the
arrests in question should after all be sustained.
According to the majority, Rolando Dural (G.R. No. 815667) was validly arrested without a warrant and that his
arrest was sufficient compliance with the provisions of Section 5, paragraph (b), Rule 113, of the Rules of Court.
According to the majority, he, Dural, was after all committing an offense (subversion being supposedly a
continuing offense) and that the military did have personal knowledge that he had committed it. "Personal
knowledge," according to the majority, is supposedly no more than "actual belief or reasonable grounds . . . of
suspicion," and suspicion is supposedly reasonable:
. . . when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be
arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilty of the person to
be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good
faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. 2
As I said, I dissent.
First, and as I held, subversion, as an offense punished by Executive Order No. 167, as amended by Executive
Order No. 276, in relation to Republic Act No. 1700, 3 is made up of "overt acts." 4 In People vs. Ferrer 5 this
Court defined "overt acts" as follows:
. . . Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would be totally unnecessary to charge
Communists in court, as the law alone, without more would suffice to secure their punishment. But the
undeniable fact is that their guilt still has to be judicially established. The Government has yet to prove
 at the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly, willfully and by overt acts, and that they joined The majority is apparently unaware that under Executive Order No. 212, amending Presidential Decree No. 169,
the Party, knowing its subversive character and with specific intent to further its basic objective, i.e., to hospital establishments are required to report cases of acts of violence to "government health authorities" — not
overthrow the existing government by force, deceit, and other illegal means and place the country to the military.
under the control and domination of a foreign power.
I am concerned that if the military were truly armed with reliable information and if it did have personal
As Ferrer held, that above "overt acts" constitute the essence of "subversion," and as Ferrer has taken pains to knowledge to believe that Dural had committed an offense, there was no reason for the military to ignore the
explain, the law requires more than mere membership in a subversive organization to make the accused liable. I courts, to which the Constitution after all, gives the authority to issue warrants. As People vs. Burgos held:
respectfully submit that for purposes of arrest without a warrant, that above "overt acts" should be visible to the
eyes of the police officers (if that is possible), otherwise the accused can not be said to be committing any More important, we find no compelling reason for the haste with which the arresting officers sought to
offense within the contemplation of the Rules of Court, to justify police action, and otherwise, we would have arrest the accused. We fail to see why they failed to first go through the process of obtaining a warrant
made "subversion" to mean mere "membership" when, as Ferrer tells us, subversion means more that mere of arrest, if indeed they had reasonable ground to believe that the accused had truly committed a
membership. crime. There is no showing that there was a real apprehension that the accused was on the verge of
flight or escape. Likewise, there is no showing that the whereabouts of the accused were unknown. 12
I find strained that majority's interpretation of "personal knowledge," as the majority would interpret it, as no
more than "actual belief or reasonable suspicion," that is, "suspicion . . . based on actual facts . . . [and]
founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith . . . " 6 I submit that personal knowledge means exactly
what it says — that the peace officer is aware that the accused has committed an offense, in this case,
I do not likewise see how the petitioners Amelia Roque, Wilfredo Buenaobra, Domingo Anonuevo, Ramon
membership in a subversive organization with intent to further the objectives thereof. It is to be noted that prior
Caspile, and Vicky Ocaya (G.R. Nos. 84581-82; 83162) could have been lawfully picked up under similar
to their amendment, the Rules (then Section 6) spoke of simple "reasonable ground" — which would have
circumstances. As the majority points out, the military had (again) acted on a mere tip-the military had no
arguably encompassed "actual belief or suspicion . . . coupled with good faith" referred to by the majority.
personal knowledge (as I elaborated what personal knowledge means). Second, I do not think that the majority
Section 5(b) as amended, however, speaks of "personal knowledge"; I respectfully submit that to give to
can say that since Amelia Roque, et al. "were NPA's anyway" (As Roque, et al. allegedly admitted),
"personal knowledge" the same meaning as "reasonable ground" is to make the amendment as useless exercise.
immediate arrests were "prudent" and necessary. As I said, that Roque, et al. were admitted "NPA's" is (was)
the question before the trial court and precisely, the subject of controversy. I think it is imprudent for this Court
What, furthermore, we have here was a mere "confidential information" that a "sparrow man" had been to pass judgment on the guilt of the petitioners-since after all, and as the majority points out, we are talking
wounded and was recuperating in the hospital, and that that person was Rolando Dural. Clearly, what we have is simply of the legality of the petitioner's arrests.
second-hand, indeed, hearsay, information, and needless to say, not personal knowledge.
More important, that Roque, et al. "were NPA's anyway" is evidently, a mere say-so of the military, and
I would like to point out that in the case of People vs. Burgos 7 this Court rejected a similar arrest because of evidently, the Court is not bound by bare say-so's. Evidently, we can not approve an arrest simply because the
lack of personal knowledge, and, as the Court held, "[w]hatever knowledge was possessed by the arresting military says it is a valid arrest (the accused being "NPA's anyway")— that would be abdication of judicial duty
officers came in its entirety from the information furnished by [another] . . ." 8 I do not see how We can act and when, moreover, the very basis of the claim rests on dubious "confidential information."
differently here.
According to the majority, we are speaking of simple arrests; we are not talking of the guilt or innocence of the
I do not find the majority's reliance on the case of United States vs. Santos 9 to be well-taken. Santos involved a accused. I certainly hope not, after the majority referred to Rolando Dural as a "sparrow man" and having
prosecution for coercion (against a peace officer for affecting an arrest without a warrant). Santos, however, did Amelia Roque, et al. admit to being NPA's."
in fact affirm the illegality of the arrest but absolved the peace officer on grounds of good faith. Santos did not
say that so long as he, the peace officer, was acting in good faith, as the majority here says that the military was
It is to gloss over at any rate, the nature of arrest as a restraining on liberty. It is to me immaterial that the guilt
acting in good faith, the arrest is valid. Quite to the contrary, Santos suggested that notwithstanding good faith
of the accused still has to be established, since meanwhile, the accused are in fact being deprived of liberty.
on the part of the police, the arrest is nevertheless subject to question.
Arrest to me, is something to crow about, even if in the opinion of the majority, it is nothing to crow about (a
mere "administrative measure").
As far as the information leading to the arrest of Dural is concerned, the majority would quite evidently swallow
the version of the military as if in the first place, there truly was an information, and that it was reliable, and that
I can not, again, accept the validity of the arrests of Deogracia Espiritu or Narciso Nazareno (G.R. Nos. 85727;
"it was found to be true;" 10 and as if, in the second place, the hospital authorities (the alleged informants)
86332). Espiritu was supposedly picked up for inciting to sedition, in uttering supposedly, on November 22,
could have legally tipped the military under existing laws. We have, it should be noted, previously rejected such
1988, the following:
a species of information because of the lack of "compulsion for [the informant] to state truthfully his charges
under pain of criminal prosecution." 11 Here, it is worse, because we do not even know who that informant was.
Bukas tuloy and welga natin . . . hanggang sa magkagulo na. 13
Espiritu however was arrested on November 23, 1988, a day later-and in no way is "inciting to sedition" a
continuing offense. Obviously, the majority is not saying that it is either, but that:
. . . Many persons may differ as to the validity of such perception and regard the language as falling
within free speech guaranteed by the Constitution. But, then, Espiritu has not lost the right to insist,
during the trial on the merits, that he was just exercising his right to free speech regardless of the
charged atmosphere in which it was uttered. But, the authority of the peace officers to make the arrest,
without warrant, at the time the words were uttered, or soon thereafter, is still another thing. In the
balancing of authority and freedom, which obviously becomes difficult at times, the Court has, in this
case, titled the scale in favor of authority but only for purposes of the arrest (not conviction). Let it be
noted that the Court has ordered the bail for Espiritu's release to be reduced from P60,000.00 to
P10,000.00. 14
And obviously, the majority is concerned about whether or not Espiritu's speech was after all, protected speech,
but apparently, that is also of no moment, since: (1) that is a matter of defense; (2) we are talking of mere
arrests, and as far as arrests are concerned, "the Court has, in this case, titled in favor of authority," 15 and (3)
we have, anyway, given a reduced bail to the accused.
First, that the accused's statement is in the category of free speech is not only plain to my mind, it is a question
I do not think the majority can rightly evade in these petitions without shirking the Court's constitutional duty. It
is to my mind plain, because it does not contain enough "fighting words" recognized to be
seditious. 16 Secondly, it is the very question before the Court—whether or not the statement in question
constitutes an offense for purposes of a warrantless arrest. It is a perfectly legal question to my mind and I am
wondering why we can not answer it.
What the majority has not answered, as I indicated, is that inciting to sedition is in no way a continuing offense,
and as I said, the majority is not apparently convicted that it is, either. Of course, the majority would anyway
force the issue: "But the authority of the peace officers to make the arrest, without warrant, at the time the
words were uttered, or soon thereafter, is still another thing." 17 First, Espiritu was picked up the following day,
and in no way is "the following day" "soon thereafter". Second, we would have stretched the authority of peace
officers to make warrantless arrests for acts done days before. I do not think this is the contemplation of the
Rules of Court.
As in the case of Burgos in People vs. Burgos, 18 Espiritu was neither "on the verge of flight or escape" 19 and
there was no impediment for the military to go through the judicial processes, as there was none in the case of
Burgos.
In the case of People vs. Aminnudin, 20 this Court held that unless there "was a crime about to be committed or
had just been committed," and unless there existed an urgency as where a moving vehicle is involved, instant
police action can not be justified.
"In the balancing of authority and freedom," states the majority, "the Court has, in this case, titled in favor of
authority but only for purposes of the arrest (not conviction)." 21 It is a strange declaration, first, because it is
supported by no authority (why the Court should "tilt" on the side of Government), and second, because this
Court has leaned, by tradition, on the side of liberty — as the custodian of the Bill of Rights — even if we were
talking of "simple" arrests.
I do not understand why this Court should "tilt" . . . the scale in favor of authority . . . in this case," 22 as if to
say that normally, this Court would have tilted the scales the other way. I do not understand why these cases
are apparently, special cases, and apparently, the majority is not telling us neither. I am wondering why, apart
from the fact that these cases involved, incidentally, people who think differently from the rest of us.
The majority goes on:
Although the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988, while Nazareno's arrest without
warrant was made only on 28 December 1988, or 14 days later, the arrest falls under Section 5(b) of
Rule 113, since it was only on 28 December 1988 that the police authorities came to know that
Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye II. 23
With all due respect, I do not think that the majority is aware of the serious implications of its pronouncement
on individual rights (and statutory construction in general), and I feel I am appropriately concerned because as a
member of the Court, I am co-responsible for the acts of my colleagues and I am afraid that I may, rightly or
wrongly, be in time made to defend such an indefensible pronouncement.
Section 5(b) of Rule 113 is clear and categorical: the offense must have been "just committed" and the
authorities must have "personal knowledge."
In no way can an offense be said to have been "just committed" fourteen days after it was in fact (allegedly)
committed. In no way can the authorities be said to have "personal knowledge" two weeks thereafter; whatever
"personal knowledge" they have can not possibly be "personal knowledge" of a crime that had "just been
committed;" whatever "personal knowledge" they have is necessarily "personal knowledge" of a crime
committed two weeks before.
In no way can Nazareno's arrest be said to be an arrest sanctioned by the exceptional provisions of the Rules.
I am not saying that the military can not act in all cases, and it is sheer ignorance to suppose that I am saying it,
(or worse, that I am "coddling criminals"). I am not saying that a suspected criminal, if he can not be arrested
without a warrant, can not be arrested at all — but that the military should first procure a warrant from a judge
before effecting an arrest. It is not too much to ask of so-called law enforcers.
As it is, the majority has enlarged the authority of peace officers to act, when the Rules have purposely limited it
by way of an exception, precisely, to the general rule, mandated by the Constitution no less, that arrests may be
done only through a judicial warrant. As it is, the majority has in fact given the military the broadest discretion to
act, a discretion the law denies even judges 24 — today it is fourteen days, tomorrow, one year, and sooner, a
decade. I submit that a year, a decade, would not be in fact unreasonable, following the theory of the majority,
since the military can claim anytime that it "found out only later," as the majority did not find it unreasonable for
the Capital Command to claim that it "came to know that Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the killing
of Bunye II" 25—and none of us can possibly dispute it.
I would like to stress strongly that we are not talking of a simple "administrative measure" alone—we are talking
of arrests, of depriving people of liberty—even if we are not yet talking of whether or not people are guilty. That
we are not concerned with guilt or innocence is hardly the point, I respectfully submit, and it will not minimize
the significance of the petitioners' predicament.
With respect to Wilfredo Buenaobra, I submit that the majority has, as in the cases of Amelia Roque, et al.,
ignored the fact that Buenaobra's alleged "admission" (actually, an uncounselled confession) was precisely, the
basis for Buenaobra's arrest. It is to beg the question, I respectfully submit, to approve the military's action for
the reason that Buenaobra confessed, because Buenaobra confessed for the reason that the military, precisely,
pounced on him. I am not to be mistaken for prejudging Buenaobra's innocence (although it is supposed to be
presumed) but I can not imagine that Buenaobra would have voluntarily proclaimed to the military that he was
an NPA courier so that the military could pounce on him.
I respectfully submit that the cases Garcia vs. Padilla 26 and Ilagan vs. Enrile 27 have been better days. I do not
see how this court can continuously sustain them "where national security and stability are still directly
challenged perhaps with greater vigor from the communist rebels." 28 First and foremost, and as the majority
has conceded, we do not know if we are in fact dealing with "Communists." The case of Deogracias Espiritu, for
one, hardly involves subversion. Second, "Communism" and "national security" are old hat — the dictator's own
excuses to perpetuate tyranny, and I am genuinely disappointed that we would still fall for old excuses. Third,
Garcia and Ilagan rested on supposed grounds that can not be possibly justified in a regime that respects the
rule of law — that the Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) is a valid presidential document (Garcia) and that
the filing of an information cures a defective arrest (Ilagan). Fourth and finally, it is evident that neither
"Communist threat" nor "national security" are valid grounds for warrantless arrests under Section 5(b) of Rule
113.
I most respectfully submit that Garcia and Ilagan have not only been diluted by subsequent jurisprudence (e.g.,
People vs. Burgos, supra), they are relics of authoritarian rule that can no longer be defended, if they could have
been defended, in Plaza Miranda or before our own peers in the bar.
"What is important," says the majority, "is that every arrest without warrant be tested as to its legality,
via habeas corpus proceedings." 29 I supposed that goes without saying. But it is also to patronize the
petitioners and simply, to offer a small consolation, when after all, this Court is validating their continued
detention. 30 With all due respect, I submit that it is nothing for which the public should be elated.
A Final Word
As I began my dissent, in this Resolution and the Decision sought to be reconsidered, I reiterate one principle:
The State has no right to bother citizens without infringing their right against arbitrary State action. "The right of
the people," states the Constitution, "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searchers and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable . . . ." 31 "The
State," the Charter likewise states, "values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for
human rights." 32 The Constitution states the general rule — the majority would make the exception the rule,
and the rule the exception. With all due respect, this is not what constitutionalism is all about.
I submit that the "actual facts and circumstances" the majority refers to are, in the first place, doubtful, the
"actual facts and circumstances" being no more than "confidential information" (manufactured or genuine, we
have no way of telling) and in the second place, any information with which the military (or police) were armed
could no more than be hearsay, not personal, information. I submit that the "actual facts and circumstances" the
majority insists on can not justify the arrests in question under Section 5(b) of Rule 113, the rule the majority
insists is the applicable rule.
Apparently, Section 5(b) is not the applicable rule, as far as Deogracias Espiritu and Narciso Nazareno are
concerned; certainly, it is not the Section 5(b) I know. As I indicated, Espiritu was arrested one day after the act,
allegedly, inciting to sedition; Nazareno was picked up fourteen days after it (allegedly, murder). Yet, the
majority would approve the police's actions nonetheless because the police supposedly "found out only later." I
submit that the majority has read into Section 5(b) a provision that has not been written there.
"More than the allure of popularity of palatability to some groups," concludes the majority, "what is important is
that the Court be right." 33
Nobody has suggested in the first place, that Umil was and is a question of popularity or palatability. Umil is a
question, on the contrary, of whether or not the military (or police), in effecting the arrests assailed, had
complied with the requirements of law on warrantless arrests. Umil is a question of whether or not this Court, in
approving the military's actions, is right.
In spite of "EDSA", a climate of fear persists in the country, as incidences of disappearances, torture, hamletting,
bombings, saturation drives, and various human rights violations increase in alarming rates. In its update for
October, 1990, the Task Force Detainees of the Philippines found:
An average of 209 arrested for political reasons monthly since 1988, 94% of them illegally;
Four thousand four hundred eight (4,408) political detentions from January, 1989 to September, 1990, 4,419,
illegally;
Of those arrested, 535 showed signs of torture; 280 were eventually salvaged, 40, of frustrated salvage, and 109
remained missing after their arrest;
Forty (40) cases of massacres, with 218 killed; 54 cases of frustrated massacre, in which 157 were wounded;
The victims belonged to neighborhood and union organizations;
Since February, 1986, 532 of those illegally arrested were women;
From January to June 1990, 361 children were detained for no apparent reason;

One million ten thousand four hundred nine (1,010,409) have been injured as a consequence of bombing,
shellings, and food blockades undertaken by the military since 1988. 34
It is a bleak picture, and I am disturbed that this Court should express very little concern. I am also disappointed
that it is the portrait of the Court I am soon leaving. Nonetheless, I am hopeful that despite my departure, it will
not be too late.
Motions denied.
G.R. No. 95847-48. March 10, 1993.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GABRIEL GERENTE y BULLO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT; LAWFUL WHEN ARRESTING
OFFICER HAS PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE THAT THE PERSON TO BE ARRESTED HAS COMMITTED THE CRIME;
CASE AT BAR. — The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions
had killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of the crime, they
found the instruments of death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used to
bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to the policemen and
pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under those circumstances, since the policemen had
personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed
him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they had postponed his arrest until they could
obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as his two companions did.
2. ID.; ID.; SEARCH AND SEIZURE; VALID EVEN WITHOUT A WARRANT WHEN MADE AS AN INCIDENT TO
LAWFUL ARREST; RATIONALE. — The search conducted on Gerente's person was likewise lawful because it was
made as an incident to a valid arrest. This is in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of
Court which provides: "Section 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense,
without a search warrant." The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his arrest was a permissible
precautionary measure of arresting officers to protect themselves, for the person who is about to be arrested
may be armed and might attack them unless he is first disarmed. In Adams vs. Williams, 47 U.S. 143, cited in
Justice Isagani A. Cruz's Constitutional Law, 1991 Edition, p. 150, it was ruled that "the individual being arrested
may be frisked for concealed weapons that may be used against the arresting officer and all unlawful articles
found his person, or within his immediate control may be seized."
3. CRIMINAL LAW; CONSPIRACY; LIABILITY OF CONSPIRATORS; RULE; CASE AT BAR. — There is no merit in
appellant's allegation that the trial court erred in convicting him of having conspired and cooperated with Fredo
and Totoy Echigoren to kill Blace despite the testimony of Dr. Valentin Bernales that the fracture on the back of
the victim's skull could have been inflicted by one person only. what Dr. Bernales stated was a mere possibility
that only one person dropped the concrete hollow block on the head of the victim, smashing it. That
circumstance, even if true, does not absolve the other two co-conspirators in the murder of Blace for when there
is a conspiracy to commit a crime, the act of one conspirator is the act of all. The conspiracy was proven by the
eyewitness-testimony of Edna Edwina Reyes, that she overheard the appellant and his companions conspire to
kill Blace, that acting in concert, they attacked their victim with a piece of wood and a hollow block and caused
his death. "When there is no evidence indicating that the principal witness for the prosecution was moved by
improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so moved and his testimony is entitled to full faith and
credit" (People vs. Belibet, 199 SCRA 587, 588). Hence, the trial court did not err in giving full credit to Edna
Reyes' testimony.
4. ID.; CIVIL INDEMNITY FOR DEATH; INCREASED TO P50,000.00. — The Solicitor General correctly pointed out
in the appellee's brief that the award of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of Clarito Blace should be
increased to P50,000.00 in accordance with our ruling in People vs. Sison, 189 SCRA 643.
DECISION
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J p:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172, which
found the appellant guilty of Violation of Section 8 of Republic Act 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as
minimum, to twenty (20) years, as maximum; and also found him guilty of Murder for which crime he was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The dispositive portion of the appealed decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing the Court finds the accused Gabriel Gerente in Criminal Case No. 10255-
V-90 guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 8 of R.A. 6425 and hereby sentences him to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment of twelve years and one day as minimum to twenty years as maximum, and a fine
of twelve thousand, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
"In Criminal Case No. 10256-V-90, the Court finds the accused Gabriel Gerente guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Murder, and there by (sic) no aggravating circumstances nor mitigating circumstances, is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of
P30,000.00, and in the amount of P17,609.00 as funeral expenses, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs. The accused Gabriel Gerente shall be credited with the full term of his
preventive imprisonment." (p. 25, Rollo.)
Appellant Gabriel Gerente y Bullo was charged with Violation of Section 8, Art. II of R.A. 6425, which was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 10255-V-90 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. The
Information reads:
"That on or about the 30th day of April, 1990, in the municipality of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without justification, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and control dried flowering tops wrapped in foil On May 2, 1990, two separate informations were filed by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Benjamin Caraig against
with markings and place in a transparent plastic bag which are considered prohibited drugs." (p. 2, Rollo.) him for Violation of Section 8, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, and for Murder.

The same accused, together with Totoy and Fredo Echigoren who are both at large, was charged with Murder in When arraigned on May 16, 1990, the appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. A joint trial of the two cases
Criminal Case No. 10256-V-90 in an information of the same date and signed by the same Assistant Provincial was held. On September 24, 1990, the trial court rendered a decision convicting him of Violation of Section 8 of
Prosecutor, as follows: R.A. 6425 and of Murder.

"That on or about the 30th day of April, 1990, in the municipality of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Philippines, and In this appeal of the appellant, the following errors are ascribed to the trial court:
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused together with two (2) others who are
still at large and against whom the preliminary investigation has not yet been terminated by the Office of the 1. the court a quo gravely erred in admitting the marijuana leaves adduced in evidence by the prosecution; and
Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, armed
with a piece of wood and hallow (sic) block and with intent to kill one Clarito B. Blace, did then and there
2. the court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crimes charged despite the absence
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation and treachery, attack, assault and hit with the
of evidence required to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
said piece of wood and hollow block the said Clarito B. Blace, hitting the latter on the different parts of his body,
thereby inflicting serious physical injuries which directly caused the death of the said victim." (p. 3, Rollo.)
The appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting the marijuana leaves as evidence in violation of his
constitutional right not to be subjected to illegal search and seizure, for the dried marijuana leaves were seized
Edna Edwina Reyes testified that at about 7:00 a.m. of April 30, 1990, appellant Gabriel Gerente, together with
from him in the course of a warrantless arrest by the police officers. We do not agree.
Fredo Echigoren and Totoy Echigoren, started drinking liquor and smoking marijuana in the house of the
appellant which is about six (6) meters away from the house of the prosecution witness who was in her house
on that day. She overheard the three men talking about their intention to kill Clarito Blace. She testified that she The search of appellant's person and the seizure of the marijuana leaves in his possession were valid because
heard Fredo Echigoren saying, "Gabriel, papatayin natin si Clarito Blace," and Totoy Echigoren allegedly they were incident to a lawful warrantless arrest.
seconded Fredo's suggestion saying: "Papatayin natin 'yan mamaya." Appellant allegedly agreed: "Sigue,
papatayin natin mamaya." (pp. 3-4, tsn, August 24, 1990.) Paragraphs (a) and (b), Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court provide:

Fredo and Totoy Echigoren and Gerente carried out their plan to kill Clarito Blace at about 2:00 p.m. of the same 'SECTION 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
day. The prosecution witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, testified that she witnessed the killing. Fredo Echigoren arrest a person:
struck the first blow against Clarito Blace, followed by Totoy Echigoren and Gabriel Gerente who hit him twice
with a piece of wood in the head and when he fell, Totoy Echigoren dropped a hollow block on the victim's head.
"(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
Thereafter, the three men dragged Blace to a place behind the house of Gerente.
commit an offense;"

At about 4:00 p.m. of the same day, Patrolman Jaime Urrutia of the Valenzuela Police Station received a report
"(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
from the Palo Police Detachment about a mauling incident. He went to the Valenzuela District Hospital where the
the person to be arrested has committed it; . . .'
victim was brought. He was informed by the hospital officials that the victim died on arrival. The cause of death
was massive fracture of the skull caused by a hard and heavy object. Right away, Patrolman Urrutia, together
with Police Corporal Romeo Lima and Patrolman Alex Umali, proceeded to Paseo de Blas where the mauling The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions had killed Blace.
incident took place. There they found a piece of wood with blood stains, a hollow block and two roaches of They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of the crime, they found the
marijuana. They were informed by the prosecution witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, that she saw the killing and she instruments of death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used to bludgeon him to
pointed to Gabriel Gerente as one of the three men who killed Clarito. death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to the policemen and pinpointed her
neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under those circumstances, since the policemen had personal
knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him, they
The policemen proceeded to the house of the appellant who was then sleeping. They told him to come out of
could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a
the house and they introduced themselves as policemen. Patrolman Urrutia frisked appellant and found a coin
warrant, he would have fled the law as his two companions did.
purse in his pocket which contained dried leaves wrapped in cigarette foil. The dried leaves were sent to the
National Bureau of Investigation for examination. The Forensic Chemist found them to be marijuana.
In Umil vs. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311, the arrest of the accused without a warrant was effected one (1) day after he
had shot to death two Capcom soldiers. The arrest was held lawful by this Court upon the rationale stated by us
Only the appellant, Gabriel Gerente, was apprehended by the police. The other suspects, Fredo and Totoy
in People vs. Malasugui, 63 Phil. 221, 228, thus:
Echigoren, are still at large.
"To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the evidence and tokens of his crime
without a warrant, would be to leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert,
and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances."

The search conducted on Gerente's person was likewise lawful because it was made as an incident to a valid
arrest. This is in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides:

"SECTION 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant."

The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his arrest was a permissible precautionary measure of arresting
officers to protect themselves, for the person who is about to be arrested may be armed and might attack them
unless he is first disarmed. In Adams vs. Williams, 47 U.S. 143, cited in Justice Isagani A. Cruz's Constitutional
Law, 1991 Edition, p. 150, it was ruled that "the individual being arrested may be frisked for concealed weapons
that may be used against the arresting officer and all unlawful articles found in his person, or within his
immediate control may be seized."

There is no merit in appellant's allegation that the trial court erred in convicting him of having conspired and
cooperated with Fredo and Totoy Echigoren to kill Blace despite the testimony of Dr. Valentin Bernales that the
fracture on the back of the victim's skull could have been inflicted by one person only.

What Dr. Bernales stated was a mere possibility that only one person dropped the concrete hollow block on the
head of the victim, smashing it. That circumstance, even if true, does not absolve the other two co-conspirators
in the murder of Blace for when there is a conspiracy to commit a crime, the act of one conspirator is the act of
all. The conspiracy was proven by the eyewitness-testimony of Edna Edwina Reyes, that she overheard the
appellant and his companions conspire to kill Blace, that acting in concert, they attacked their victim with a piece
of wood and a hollow block and caused his death. "When there is no evidence indicating that the principal
witness for the prosecution was
G.R. Nos. 113511-12 July 11, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DANILO SINOC y SUMAYLO, accused-appellant.
NARVASA, C.J.:
In a decision handed down on October 7, 1993 by Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court of Surigao City, Danilo
Sinoc was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt in two cases jointly tried:1 one, of the special complex crime of
kidnapping with murder (under Article 267 in relation to Articles 2482 and
483 of the Revised Penal Code) — in Criminal Case No. 3564; and the other, of the complex crime of kidnapping
with frustrated murder (under Articles 267, 248, 6,4 and 48 of the same Code) — in Criminal Case No. 3565. In
each case, the penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed on him.5
The amended informations under which Sinoc was tried and convicted, both dated January 23, 1992, included
five (5) other accused, namely: Vicente Salon @ "Dodong," Benjamin Espinosa @ "Benji," Jaime Jornales @
"James," Victorino Delegencia @ "Jun-Gren," and one Roger Doe @ "Ram" (at-large).6 However, only Sinoc and
Vicente Salon were arraigned, on July 14, 1992, the other accused being then at large, as they still appear to be
to this day. Assisted by their respective counsel, both Sinoc and Salon entered pleas of not guilty and were
thereafter jointly tried. The joint trial resulted in Salon's acquittal in both cases. The Court agreed with him that
"none of the witnesses presented by the prosecution remotely implicate . . (him in) the crimes charged," and
that "(i)ndeed, the only piece of evidence pointing to . . (him [Salon]) as the mastermind is contained in the
affidavit of confession of accused Danilo Sinoc;" hence, conspiracy not having been proved, the case against
Salon "has to be dismissed." Only Sinoc, therefore, is concerned in the appeal at bar.
Respecting the essential facts constituting the corpus delicti, there appears to be no serious dispute. It appears
that on September 20, 1991, at about 6 o'clock in the morning, Isidoro Viacrusis, manager of Taganito Mining
Corporation, was motoring from the company compound (at Taganito, Claver, Surigao del Norte) to Surigao City.
He was riding on a company vehicle, a Mitsubishi Pajero (with Plate No. DFX-397), driven by Tarcisio Guijapon.
As Viacrusis and Guijapon were approaching the public cemetery of Claver, they were stopped by several armed
men. The latter, identifying themselves as members of the New People's Army (NPA), boarded the Pajero and
ordered Guijapon to proceed. When they reached Barobo, Surigao del Norte, the armed men ordered Viacrusis
and Guijapon to alight, led them, their hands bound behind their back, to a coconut grove some six meters from
the road, and after making them lie face down on the ground, shot them several times. Viacrusis miraculously
survived. The driver, Guijapon, was not as lucky; he died on the spot.
These facts are set forth in, among others, a sworn statement given to the police by Sinoc, infra, and an affidavit
executed and sworn to by Viacrusis on October 17, 1991, about a month later.7 In that affidavit, Viacrusis
described the armed men who had kidnapped and shot him and Guijapon. The only malefactor he was able to
identify by name, however, was Danilo Sinoc who, he said, had "curly hair, (was) known as 'Colot' (Danilo
Sinoc), (and was known to) driver Tarcing . . ."
Two prosecution witnesses gave germane testimony at the trial of the consolidated cases: Marlyn Legaspi, a
resident of San Vicente, Barobo, Surigao del Sur; and Barangay Captain Terencio Jamero, also of Barangay San
Vicente.
Marlyn testified that she was startled by the sound of gunshots that morning of September 20, 1991. She ran
towards the direction of the gunfire and as she neared the place, heard the moaning of a man. She moved
quickly to the highway and saw a blue "Pajero" parked at the barangay road, its engine idling; and moments
later, she saw the same vehicle running fast towards San Francisco, Agusan del Sur. She lost no time in
reporting the incident to Barangay Councilor Terencio Jamero.
Jamero testified that on receiving Marlyn's report, he and another Councilor, Alberto Saliling, at once proceeded
to the place indicated. There they came upon the slain driver, and Isidoro Viacrusis, lying on the ground, sorely
wounded, crying out for help. With the assistance of policemen of Barobo, they brought Viacrusis to the Agusan
del Sur Provincial Hospital at Patin-ay. Timely medical attention enabled Viacrusis to recover from his grievous
wounds.
The evidence of the prosecution further establishes that in the morning of the following day, September 21,
1991, at about 7 o'clock, a secret informant (known as a "civilian asset") named Boyet reported to the Police
Station at Monkayo, Davao del Norte that the stolen ("carnapped") "Pajero" was parked behind the apartment of
a certain Paulino Overa at the Bliss Housing Project at Poblacion, Monkayo. On instructions of the Station
Commander, a police team8 went to the place. They saw the "Pajero" and, their initial inquiries having yielded
the information that the man who had brought it there would return that morning, posted themselves in such a
manner as to keep it in view. Some three hours later, at about 10:30 o'clock, they saw a man approach the
"Pajero" who, on seeing them, tried to run away. They stopped him. They found out that the man, identified as
Danilo Sinoc, of Surigao del Norte,9 had the key of the "Pajero," and was acting under instructions of certain
companions who were waiting for him at the Star Lodge at Tagum, Davao del Norte. Riding on the recovered
"Pajero," the police officers brought Sinoc to the Star Lodge only to discover that his companions were no longer
there. They later turned over Sinoc to the 459(th) Mobile Force, together with the "Pajero."
Four months afterwards, in the afternoon of January 21, 1993, SPO1 Roger A. Basadre and two other officers (of
the CIS) brought Danilo Sinoc to the Public Attorneys' Office at Curato Street, Butuan City. They asked one of
the attorneys there, Atty. Alfredo Jalad, for permission to take Sinoc's statement in writing in his office. Sinoc
asked Jalad to assist him because he wished to make an "affidavit of confession."
Atty. Jalad told Sinoc that he had the right to choose his own counsel, and to remain silent. Sinoc said he
wanted to make the affidavit nonetheless, and be assisted by Jalad in doing so. The latter then had Sinoc
narrate the occurrence in question in "Cebuano/Visayan," a dialect with which Sinoc was familiar. That done,
Jalad asked Sinoc if the CIS had promised him anything for the affidavit he would execute. Sinoc said no. Only
then did the CIS officers commence to take Sinoc's statement, typing their questions and Sinoc's answers — as
well as the initial apprisal of his constitutional rights — on a typewriter in Atty. Jalad's office.
In his sworn statement, 10 Sinoc declared that he knew the victims, Isidoro Viacrusis and Tarcisio Guijapon
because he was "formerly working at Taganito Mining Company" (TAMICO); that in June, 1991, he learned that
Benjamin Espinosa (@ Benji), Jaime Jornales (@ James), Victorino Delegencia (@ Jun-Gren), and a certain
"Ram" had been monitoring the activities of TAMICO Manager Viacrusis whom they planned to kidnap and rob of
his "Pajero," and make it appear to be an act of the NPA; that the criminal undertaking was planned by a certain
Vicente Salon (@ Dodong), who made available the needed funds and two (2) hand guns; that in September,
1991, at a meeting of the group at the boarding house of "Jun-Gren" to which he (Sinoc) was invited. Sinoc was
offered P20,000.00 to join in the "kidnapping and carnapping" operation; that he agreed "because of poverty;"
that in the morning of September 20, 1991, at about 6:30 o'clock, he, "Ram" and Benjamin Espinosa stopped
the "Pajero" driven by Tarcisio Guijapon in which Viacrusis was riding, brandishing two .38 caliber revolvers, and
a piece of wood shaped like a rifle; that they boarded the vehicle, identifying themselves as NPA (soldiers of the
New People's Army) and had the driver proceed towards Surigao City; that at the bridge of Tres de Mayor, they
had the "Pajero" stop to pick up two other companions, "James" (Jaime Jornales) and "Jun-gren" (Victor
Delegencia); that "Ram" took over the wheel and drove towards Butuan City; that at San Vicente, Barobo "Ram"
turned into a feeder road and stopped about seven (7) meters from the highway; that there, Viacrusis and
Guijapon, whose hands had been tied behind their back, were made to get down; that "James" Jornales shot
Viacrusis four times after which "Jun-gren" Delegencia, Jr. fired at Guijapon four times, too; that when Sinoc
remonstrated at the shootings, he was told it was on Dodong Salon's orders; that the malefactors then
proceeded to the "Bliss" Housing Project at Monkayo where they left the "Pajero," this being the place where the
mastermind, Vicente Salon, was supposed to get the vehicle and pay Sinoc the promised sum of P20,000.00;
that they then all went to Tagum; that on the following day, Sinoc was instructed by Jungren and James to
return to Monkayo with the key of the "Pajero" and deliver it to "Ram," and that when he arrived at the place at
about 9 o'clock in the morning, he was apprehended by soldiers and brought to the "459(th) PNP Mobile
Company."
During the entire period of Sinoc's interrogation, which commenced at about 3:00 P.M., Atty. Jalad remained
seated beside him; and at its conclusion, Jalad read to Sinoc the contents of his statement from beginning to
end. The statement was thereafter signed by Sinoc and by Jalad, the latter being described as "witness to
signature. " 11
Sinoc was next brought to the home of Butuan City Prosecutor Ernesto M. Brocoy so that he might take oath on
his statement. This was at about 7:00 P.M. After going over the statement, City Fiscal Brocoy told Sinoc that it
was "very damaging," briefly discussing the contents thereof in Cebuano. The latter stood by his answers,
however, averring that they had been voluntarily given. Evidently satisfied of the authenticity and voluntariness
of the statement, Brocoy administered the oath to Sinoc, and signed the certification typed at the left hand
margin of page 4 thereof, reading: "SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 21st day of January 1992, at
Butuan City, Philippines. I hereby certify that I personally examined the herein affiant and that I am satisfied
that he voluntarily executed and understood his statement." He also initialed every page of the statement. 12
While under detention at the Provincial Jail, awaiting trial, Sinoc wrote two (2) letters to the Trial Judge dated
June and July, 1992, in both of which he asked that he be transferred to the City Jail because he had heard that
Vicente Salon, who had been arrested on the strength of his sworn statement, had made plans to kill him. He
sent the Judge a third letter — dated August 11, 1993, consisting of four (4) pages — which is described by His
Honor as "substantially a repetition of the contents of his affidavit of confession." All the letters were
handwritten in block letters in the Cebuano dialect. 13
Sinoc proffered the defense of alibi. His claim, as summarized by his counsel, was that "on September 19, 1991,
he was in Sibagat, Agusan del Sur together with his wife and prepared on that early morning to sell tableya
(native chocolate) in Tagum, Davao del Norte. On the same day they reached Tagum and they sold tableya and
on the same day there were not able to sell the tableya; on September 20, 1991 they were again selling tableya
in Tagum, Davao del Norte. It was while in Tagum that . . (they met) a certain Darves, they did not know
exactly the name, he offered to them the money to accompany the said driver of Darves who is name(d) Ram.
He was offered . . money to accompany this Ram in prior (sic) to allegedly get the Pajero vehicle from Moncayo
together with Ram, and while in Moncayo he was first apprehended by the police and detained at Moncayo, first
. . (by) the 459 Mobile Force of . . Moncayo and on January 14, 1992 to January 24, 1992 he was detained by
the CIS authorities in Butuan City."
Elaborating, Sinoc testified that he saw Darves with three companions at "a certain restaurant in Tagum;" that
Darves introduced himself, and offered to give him P1,000.00) if he would accompany his driver to get a vehicle
at Moncayo; that he agreed, and at 6 o'clock in the morning of September 21, 1991 he went to the Star Lodge
where Darves was staying; that there, he was introduced to the latter's driver, Ram, given P1,000.00, and told
to go with Ram; and that he went out of the Star Lodge, gave his wife P800.00, and then went with Ram to
Moncayo on board a bus.
In Moncayo, they went to where the Pajero was parked. Sinoc went towards the vehicle. Ram lagged behind,
having paused to buy some cigarettes. When Sinoc reached the Pajero, five persons suddenly pointed guns at
him, searched him, and found on him the key to the "Pajero" which Darves had given to him. The five persons,
who were led by Sgt. Michael Aringgo of the PNP, brought him to the Moncayo police station where they
investigated him without informing him of his constitutional rights.
In the afternoon of that day, September 21, 1991, he was surrendered to the 459th Mobile Force Company
which detained him until January 14, 1992. On this date he was taken by CIS personnel and brought to the CIS
Compound at Butuan City, at which place he was confined up to January 24, 1992, and subjected to
interrogation without being informed that he had a right to remain silent. He was told, however, that he had the
right to counsel, but although he told the investigators that his lawyer was Atty. Gavino Samontina, they never
called the latter.
The investigators wished him to sign an affidavit. When he refused, they maltreated him by repeatedly
submerging his head in a toilet bowl full of excrement, as well as by tying him on a bed, raising the bed on one
end so that his feet were up and his head down, and keeping him in that position for hours.
On January 20, 1992, his wife and Efren Dak-ang came to see him at the CIS Compound. He talked to them and
revealed what was being done to him while under investigation.
On January 21, 1992, after having been interrogated the whole night, he finally agreed to sign the affidavit
because the CIS officers told him, "(W)e will kill you or salvage you." In fact, the night before, police officers had
brought him to an uninhabited place near the bridge and, with guns pointed at his head, commanded him to
run. He refused, of course. So, in the afternoon of that day, at around 4 o'clock, he was brought to the office of
Public Attorney Jalad, where the police investigators "hurriedly typed" his affidavit and made him sign it. He
denied that Atty. Jalad informed him of his constitutional rights. He asserted that when he told Jalad he had his
own lawyer, Jalad merely remarked, "Never mind, all attorneys are just the same as long as it is attorney." He
was next brought to Fiscal Brocoy who, without talking to him, "right away signed that document" (his
confession).
Sinoc also explained how he had come to write the letter of August 11, 1992 to the Judge some seven months
after his confession. That letter — it will be recalled and as is evident from a comparison of both documents —
was described by the latter as "substantially a repetition of the contents of his affidavit of
confession," supra. 14 He said: "(T)here were persons who visited me while at the Provincial Jail and told me to
accept the crime . . because if I will not accept the crime my wife and children (and) my parents, they will
liquidate all of them . . ."
Sinoc's wife, Jovita, testified for the defense, and sought to corroborate his testimony. She affirmed that she had
seen her husband at the CIS on September 20, 1992, at about 8:30 in the evening, and he had told her then to
"keep . . silent, not to tell anybody that he will be accompan(ied) by the CIS." Efren Dak-ang also gave
corroborating testimony.
For some undisclosed reason, the surviving victim, Isidoro Viacrusis, did not testify; this, despite the fiscal's
assurances to the Trial Judge that he was "very interested" in giving evidence. Obviously because of Viacrusis'
failure to testify, his affidavit of October 17, 1991 was not formally offered, being obviously hearsay, although it
is attached to the record.
Be this as it may, the Trial Court was satisfied that the evidence actually presented by the Government sufficed
to establish Sinoc's guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the two felonies with which he stood charged.
Sinoc has taken an appeal to this Court and ascribes to the Trial Court the following errors: (1) convicting him of
the offenses charged although conspiracy had not been independently proven to exist among him and the other
persons named in the indictment: (2) not rejecting the evidence obtained after he had been "arrested without
any warrant of arrest," and (3) not rejecting his confession after he had been illegally arrested and had
thereafter been "under custodial investigation . . without a counsel of choice" from September 21, 1991 to
January 20, 1992, first by the Monkayo 459th Mobile Force, and later by the C.I.S., Butuan City.
As regards Sinoc's claim of illegal arrest, the law provides that an arrest without warrant may be licitly effected
by a peace officer, inter alia, "When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge
of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it." 15
There is no question that the police officers in this case were aware that an offense had just been
committed: i.e., that some twelve hours earlier, a "Pajero" belonging to a private company had been stolen
("carnapped") and its driver and passenger shot, the former having died and the latter being on the verge of
death. Nor is there any doubt that an informer ("asset") had reported that the stolen "Pajero" was at the Bliss
Housing Project at Moncayo. It was precisely to recover the "Pajero" that a team composed of SPO1 Michael
Aringo and "joint elements of 459 PNP MFC and Monkayo Police Stn led by Insptr Eden T. Ugale," went to that
place and, on taking custody of the "Pajero," forthwith dispatched a radio message to "Higher Headquarters"
advising of that fact. 16
There is no question either that when SPO1 Aringo and his companions reached the place where the "Pajero"
was parked, they were told by Paulino Overa, owner of the apartment behind which the vehicle was parked, that
the man who had brought the "Pajero" would be back by 12:00 noon; that the person thus described did in fact
show up at about 10:00 A.M., and was immediately identified by Overa as "the one who rode on that car
'pajero;'" 17 just as there is no question that when the police officers accosted him, Sinoc had the key to the
stolen "Pajero" and was in the act of moving toward it admittedly to take possession of it (after having arrived
by bus from Tagum together with another suspect, "Ram"). Sinoc's link to the stolen vehicle (and hence to the
kidnapping and killing accompanying its asportation) was thus palpable.
The foregoing circumstances left the police officers no alternative save to arrest Sinoc and take possession of the
"Pajero." His arrest without warrant was justified; indeed, it was in the premises the officers' clear duty to
apprehend him; their omission to do so would have been inexcusable.
Sinoc's assault against the propriety of his interrogation after his warrantless arrest, because conducted without
advice to him of his constitutional rights, is pointless. It is true that, as candidly admitted by the arresting
officers, their initial interrogation of Sinoc was made without his first being told of his corresponding rights. This
is inconsequential, for the prosecution never attempted to prove what he might have said on that occasion.
The confession made by him some time afterwards at the Public Attorneys' Office at Butuan City is altogether a
different matter, however. The record adequately shows it to have been executed voluntarily and under
applicable safeguards, apart from being confirmed by, or consistent with, other evidence.
Sinoc does not dispute that he was taken to the Public Attorney's Office; that he spoke to Atty. Alfredo Jalad and
it was in the latter's office that his confession was prepared by the CIS investigator. Nor does he deny that he
was then brought to the home of City Prosecutor Ernesto M. Brocoy who certified that the confession had been
subscribed and sworn to before him and that he was satisfied that Sinoc had voluntarily executed and
understood his statement. Sinoc nonetheless claims that he was under intimidation at that time and never
advised of his constitutional rights.
After carefully considering the evidence, this Court is convinced that the Trial Judge was correct in accepting the
account of the execution of Sinoc's confession (Exhs. K, K-1 to K-5) narrated by Public Atty. Alfredo Jalad and
City Prosecutor Ernesto Brocoy, to the effect that the confession was voluntarily given after he had been duly
informed of his constitutional rights. No reason whatever is discernible in the record for these Government
officials to give false evidence against Sinoc, or testify otherwise than to the truth.
Sinoc's confession of January 21, 1992 is confirmed by the letter
he admittedly wrote to the Trial Judge more than a year later, on August 11, 1993, 18 the contents of which are,
as observed by the Trial Judge, substantially identical with those of the confession. In said letter, in which he
narrates in no little detail the same story contained in his confession, he apologizes for "bothering you again at
this time" (obviously referring to his prior letters to the Judge of June and July 1992), and gives his reasons for
writing the latest letter: to ask for the Judge's assistance and take account of his allegation that his agreement
with his co-accused was only to stop the "Pajero," that it was poverty that impelled him to join the plotters
(Vicente Salon, et al.); to see that Tarcisio Guijapon and Viacrucis be given justice; and to plead that the Judge
take pity on him, and not give him too heavy a penalty.
The confession is also consistent with Sinoc's testimony at his trial in which he admitted that he had indeed
traveled from Tagum to Moncayo where he was arrested; and that he had made the trip, together with his co-
accused, "Ram," precisely to get the stolen "Pajero" the key of which he had on his person at the time. It
contains details (e.g., the use of two (2) hand guns and a wooden rifle, the bringing of the Pajero from the
scene of the killing to Moncayo, the identities of the individual malefactors who shot the victims) which it is
improbable to think were conjured out of thin air by the police investigators or deduced from other evidence.
The confession is consistent, too, with the other proofs, particularly the testimony of Marlyn Legaspi and
Barangay Councilor Jamero as regards the time and place of the shooting of the hapless victims.
In any event, the Trial Judge appears to have carefully assessed the demeanor of the witnesses for the
prosecution and those for the defense, in relation to the documents on record, and on this basis and from his
vantage point, found that the prosecution's proofs were more credible than the defense, and that their combined
weight established beyond reasonable doubt the appellant's culpable participation in the crimes charged.
It must additionally be pointed out that apart from Sinoc's protestations that his extrajudicial confession was the
result of torture and threats, no competent evidence exists on record to substantiate that claim. He made no
such claim to either Public Attorney Alfredo Jalad or City Prosecutor Ernesto Brocoy although there is absolutely
nothing in the record to indicate any cause for him to distrust either government officer, much less believe they
were in conspiracy with the police officers to concoct a case against him. In fact, although he professes to have
disclosed his supposed maltreatment to his wife when she visited him at the place of his detention, the latter
made no mention of it in her testimony, nor did she ever attempt to have him medically examined to confirm
such a revelation, if it had been made. Moreover, the counsel he said he wanted to represent him during his
interrogation at Public Attorney Jalad's office, Atty. Gavino Samontina, was never presented to confirm his
statement.
While the evidence does show that Sinoc became embroiled in a criminal conspiracy 19 — he agreed (out of
poverty, he says) to join in a crime being planned by certain men named by him and decided to commit it with
them — the agreement, as far as he was concerned, was to waylay Viacrusis, the Manager of the Tagum Mining
Company, and rob him of his "Pajero," for which his share would be P20,000.00; but it did not include the
shooting of Viacrusis or any one else. In fact, he raised a protest when Viacrusis and Guijapon were shot. In
other words, as far as Sinoc understood it, and as far as may in fact be deduced from the evidence, the plan was
not so much to capture Viacrusis and deprive him of liberty, even less to assassinate him, but to steal his
"Pajero" by violent means. The "kidnapping" was not the principal objective; it was merely incidental to the
forcible taking of the vehicle. Unfortunately, by reason or on the occasion of the seizure of the "Pajero" — and
(as far as the proofs demonstrate) without fore-knowledge on Sinoc's part — its driver was killed, and the lone
passenger seriously injured.
There was thus no kidnapping as the term is understood in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code — the essential
object of which is to "kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty." The idea of
"kidnapping" in this case appears to have been the result of the continuous but uninformed use of that term by
the peace officers involved in the investigation, carelessly carried over into the indictments and the record of the
trial, and even accepted by His Honor. 20
The offense actually committed in Criminal Case No. 3564 —where the killing of Tarcesio Guijapon accompanied
the taking of the "Pajero" — is that defined and penalized by Article 294 of the Criminal Code, 21 viz.:
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons-Penalties. — Any person
guilty of robbery with the use of violence against any person shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery,
the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been
accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson.
xxx xxx xxx
It is germane to observe that even if the intent to deprive of liberty were as important or primordial an objective
as the asportation of the "Pajero," the kidnapping would be absorbed in the robbery with homicide; 22 and that
the term, "homicide," is used in the quoted article in the generic sense — i.e., as also including murder, the
nature of the offense not being altered by the treacherous character, or the number, of the killings in connection
with the robbery. 23
On the other hand, the wrongful acts actually proven to have been committed by the defendants in Criminal
Case No. 3565 are: (1) robbery, of course, as above described, and (2) frustrated murder on the occasion
thereof — gunshot wounds having been inflicted on Isidoro Viacrusis, while bound and prostrate on the ground,
utterly unable to put up any defense, the wounds being of such a nature as would have resulted in his death
were it not for timely medical intervention. Obviously, these acts do not fall within the ambit of Article 294,
which treats of the special complex crime of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons, but NOT
robbery with attempted or frustrated homicide (or murder), although the law does punish the crime
of attempted and frustrated robbery with homicide. 24
Neither do the crimes come within the operation of Article 48 of the Criminal Code which, speaking of complex
crimes, provides that when "a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed,
the same to be applied in its maximum period." In this case, the two crimes of "carnapping" and frustrated
murder did not result from "a single act." Nor was either offense a "necessary means for committing the other."
The shooting of the victim was not necessary to commit the "carnapping;" indeed at the time the victim was
shot, the "carnapping" had already been consummated. And, of course, the "carnapping" which, according to the
evidence, was the conspirators' principal objective, was not necessary to perpetrate the shooting.
It follows then that the malefactors' felonious acts in Criminal Case No. 3565 cannot be regarded as juridically
fused into a "complex crime" under Article 48. They should be considered separate offenses, separately
punishable.
Now, Sinoc admittedly entered into a conspiracy with his co-accused; but he insists that as far as he was
concerned, the conspiracy was to "carnap" the "Pajero," and did not include any killing or assault against
persons. His theory is that the slaying of the driver and passenger might conceivably have been contemplated
from the outset by one or some or all his co-conspirators; but Sinoc himself never had that intention. Indeed, he
says he had no inkling that the shooting would take place; had no opportunity to prevent it, and could only
remonstrate about it after it was done; and he invokes the doctrine that conspirators may only be held
accountable for the acts embraced in the criminal agreement; and as regards felonious acts not included, only
the author thereof would be liable. 25
Sinoc's disclaimers notwithstanding, it is this Court's view that the crime that may properly be ascribed to him
in Case No. 3564 is robbery with homicide under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. For unfortunately for
him, there is no avoiding the fact that a homicide — although not agreed to or expected by him — was
committed on the occasion of the robbery of the "Pajero;" and he could not but have realized or anticipated the
possibility of serious harm, even death, being inflicted on the person or persons in the "Pajero" targeted for
robbery, since two of his companions were armed with guns, even if in his mind, to repeat, his agreement with
them did not include killing. 26 The most that can be conceded is to credit him with the mitigating circumstance
of having "no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed." 27
Sinoc may not be held liable in Case No. 3565 for the separate offense of frustrated murder as regards Viacrusis,
for the reasons already mentioned; in this particular case, the evidence shows that he agreed only to the plan to
"carnap" the "Pajero," but not to any assault or killing. 28 Nor is it logical to convict him twice of robbery of the
same property under the same circumstances. Hence, he may not be pronounced responsible for
the separate offense of robbery of the same "Pajero," in addition to being declared guilty of robbery (of that
same "Pajero") with homicide under Article 294.
The penalty imposable on Sinoc is that provided in Article 294 of the Penal Code, which is reclusion perpetua to
death. Appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong as
that done, the penalty that should be applied to him is reclusion perpetua.

WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 3564, appellant Danilo Sinoc, being guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of robbery with homicide defined and punished by Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, is sentenced
to reclusion perpetua. Criminal Case No. 3565 is DISMISSED as to him.

SO ORDERED.

entitled to full faith and credit" (People vs. Belibet, 199 SCRA 587, 588). Hence, the trial court did not err in
giving full credit to Edna Reyes' testimony.

Appellant's failure to escape (because he was very drunk) is no indicium of his innocence.

The Solicitor General correctly pointed out in the appellee's brief that the award of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity
for the death of Clarito Blace should be increased to P50,000.00 in accordance with our ruling in People vs.
Sison, 189 SCRA 643.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with modification of the civil indemnity awarded to the
heirs of the victim, Clarito Blace, which is hereby increased to P50,000.00.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 102140 April 22, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROLANDO MANLULU AND DANTE SAMSON, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Celso P. De Las Alas for accused-appellants.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
GERARDO ALFARO, a NARCOM agent, was stabbed and shot with his service pistol in a drinking spree. He died
in the hospital the following day. His drinking partners, Rolando Manlulu and Dante Samson, were haled to court
for his violent death.
The prosecution charges that Manlulu and Samson conspired in the murder of Agent Alfaro. The accused on the
other hand invoke self-defense. They also insist that the non-issuance of a search warrant and warrant of arrest
should nullify their arrest and consequently exclude from judicial consideration the evidence thus obtained.
But the trial court was not convinced. It found accused Dante Samson and Rolando Manlulu "guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principals in the crime of Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 of The Revised
Penal Code with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender on the part of Dante Samson and no
mitigating circumstance modifying the commission of the offense on the part of Rolando Manlulu." 1 As a result,
accused Dante Samson was sentenced to a prison term of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, while
accused Rolando Manlulu, to twelve (12) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal, as
minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion perpetua as maximum. They
were also sentenced jointly to indemnify the offended party P30,000.00 as compensatory damages and
P10,410.00 for hospitalization and funeral expenses, and to pay the costs.
Upon review, the appellate court raised their penalties to reclusion perpetua and certified the case to this Court
pursuant to Sec. 13, Rule 124, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. 2
Testifying for the prosecution, Wally Manlapaz, a.k.a. Crisanto Meneses, narrated that at around ten o'clock in
the evening of 29 May 1986, he and accused Dante Samson and Rolando Manlulu were having a drinking spree
in an alley along Quirino Avenue, Paco, Manila. They were later joined by Agent Gerardo Alfaro who had a .45
cal. pistol tucked to his waist. When Alfaro arrived he blurted out, " Dito may kumakatalo sa aking tao." 3 At
twelve o'clock midnight, the group transferred in front of the house of Manlapaz and continued to drink. There
Samson suddenly stabbed Alfaro in the chest with a 6-inch double-bladed knife while boasting, "Dapat sa iyo
manahimik na." 4 Alfaro at this time was "somewhat bent because he was already drunk." 5 Manlulu then
followed suit and stabbed Alfaro in the abdomen several times with an ice pick they used to chip ice. Samson
grabbed the .45 cal. service pistol of Alfaro and shot him in the neck. When Alfaro slumped on the pavement,
both accused fled, with Samson holding Alfaro's handgun. After a few seconds, both accused returned and got
Alfaro's wristwatch and wallet. 6
Noel Pagco, another witness for the prosecution, recounted that at the time of the shooting he was outside the
alley where the accused and the deceased were drinking. After hearing a gunshot coming from the direction of
the alley, he saw Dante Samson and Rolando Manlulu coming out the alley, the former tucking a gun in his waist
and sporting a watch on his right wrist, and the latter holding an ice pick. 7
As already adverted to, both accused invoke self- defense. According to Samson, while they were drinking, and
after taking ekis pinoy, 8 Alfaro said he had a "prospect" and invited them to go with him. Thinking that
"prospect" meant they were going to rob somebody, Samson excused himself by saying that he had just been
released from prison, and had yet to fetch his wife. Alfaro, apparently resenting Samson's unwillingness to join
them, drew his gun and pointed it to Samson who parried it saying: "Pare, wala tayong biruan ng ganyan. Baka
pumutok iyan." But Alfaro repeatedly pointed the gun to him. Every time he did, Samson would push the gun
aside. Fearful that it might go off, he held the gun and tried to ward it off, resulting in a struggle for its
possession. He got hold of the ice pick on top of the drum and stabbed Alfaro instinctively. Manlapaz tried to
separate them; as a consequence, Samson dropped the ice pick. As Samson and Alfaro continued to wrestle for
the possession of the gun, they fell on the ground and the gun accidentally went off hitting Alfaro in the neck.
Rattled, Samson immediately fled. He then fetched his wife from Malate, proceeded to Pasay City, and sent word
to his father who later accompanied him to surrender to Capt. Pring of the Homicide Division of the Western
Police District. When he fled, he left behind Alfaro's gun. 9
Rolando Manlulu corroborated the testimony of his co-accused. He added that he picked up the ice pick when it
fell, and fearing that he might be the next victim should Alfaro succeed in shooting Samson, he (Manlulu)
stabbed Alfaro several times with the ice pick, then dropped it, and ran away. He looked back and saw Samson
and Alfaro fall on the pavement. Almost simultaneously, the gun went off. 10
Patrolman Reynaldo Perez recounted that at around seven o'clock in the evening of 30 May 1986 he, together
with some other officers, arrested Manlulu on the information given by Manlapaz. He said that he seized from
Manlulu the .45 cal. pistol and Casio wristwatch said to belong to Alfaro, 11 and that Manlulu verbally confessed
to the commission of the crime. Patrolman Perez however admitted on cross- examination that when he arrested
Manlulu and seized from him the handgun as well as the wristwatch, he (Perez) was not with any warrant nor
did he inform the accused of the latter's right to counsel. Perez added that at that time Manlulu was under the
influence of liquor. 12
Dr. Marcial Ceñido, Medico-Legal Officer of the Western Police District, confirmed that Alfaro sustained nine (9)
wounds, four (4) of them fatal, i.e., a gunshot wound in the neck; a penetrating stab wound probably caused by
a bladed weapon, and two (2) stab wounds probably caused by an ice pick. 13
In this appeal, accused Manlulu and Samson would want us to believe, first, in their version of the incident, and
next, that they acted in self-defense.
The account of the appellants does not inspire belief. A review of the testimony of Manlapaz, who admittedly
had drunk a little too much, reveals that his story tallies not only with some accounts of accused Samson and
Manlulu but also with the findings of Dr. Ceñido. Hence, except for the actual attack on the victim, the
testimonies of Samson and Manlulu square with that of Manlapaz, including the conversation that took place.
Thus we give credence to the testimony of Manlapaz that Samson used a bladed weapon and not an ice pick in
stabbing Alfaro, contrary to what Samson would want us to believe. This version of Manlapaz is consistent with
the necropsy report of Dr. Ceñido which states that the deceased had a penetrating stab wound which could
have been caused by a bladed weapon. That Manlulu according to Manlapaz used an ice pick in repeatedly
stabbing Alfaro was not only admitted by Manlulu on the witness stand but is confirmed likewise by the medical
findings of Dr. Ceñido.
If Manlapaz was indeed too drunk to recall the events that transpired before the actual killing, then in all
probability he could not have remembered the weapons used by the accused. Certainly, eyewitness Manlapaz
could not have been so drunk as to muddle those incidents which impute guilt to the accused and recall only
those which are consistent with their innocence.
Similarly, we cannot disregard those portions of the testimonies of the two accused which tend to confirm the
narration of Manlapaz. Expectedly, the accused will refute the statements tending to establish their culpability.
Hence, they have to differ in some respects from the narration of Manlapaz. Since it appears from the testimony
of Manlapaz that he had not yet reached that degree of intoxication where he would have otherwise lost control
of his mental faculties, we find his version to be credible as it conforms with the autopsy report and admissions
of both accused. 14 Thus, we sustain the factual findings of the trial court and reject the version of the defense.
But, even if we consider the theory of the accused thus far if only to satisfy them, still they cannot elude the
consequences of their felonious acts. By invoking self-defense, the accused admit killing Alfaro. The burden of
proof is thus shifted to them. Their duty now is to establish by clear and convincing evidence the lawful
justification for the killing. 15 In this regard, they have miserably failed.
The three (3) requisites for self-defense are: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and, (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself. 16 For self- defense to prosper, it must be positively shown that there was a previous
unlawful and unprovoked attack that placed the life of the accused in danger which forced him to inflict more or
less severe wounds upon his assailant, employing therefore reasonable means to resist said attack. 17
Here, at the outset, the two accused have already failed to show that there was unlawful aggression on the part
of Alfaro. A gun aimed at the accused, without more, is insufficient to prove unlawful aggression. For unlawful
aggression to be appreciated in self-defense, there must be an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or
imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. 18
Even the means employed to repel or prevent the supposed attack was not reasonable. For, even if we disregard
the gunshot wound which Samson claims to have resulted from an accidental firing, the victim also suffered
seven other stab wounds, three of which were fatal, one of which was admittedly inflicted by Samson, while the
other two, by accused Manlulu. Definitely, it was not necessary to stab, more so repeatedly, the victim.
Considering their relative positions as they drank - each within the other's reach — all that was necessary was
for the two accused to band together and overpower the lone victim with their bare hands, assuming the
deceased was indeed pointing his gun at one of them. A stab wound may not necessarily be fatal and thus
enable the victim to fire his gun. But a firm grasp by the two accused of the victim's arm holding the gun, or of
the gun itself, could prevent the victim from shooting them. At any rate, the number of wounds suffered by
Alfaro indicates a determined effort of both accused to kill the victim, which negates self- defense. 19
Furthermore, their flight from the scene of the crime is a strong indication of their guilt. 20 Indeed, a righteous
individual will not cower in fear and unabashedly admit the killing at the earliest opportunity if he were morally
justified in so doing. A belated plea suggests that it is false and only an afterthought made as a last ditch effort
to avoid the consequences of the
crime. 21 If the accused honestly believed that their acts constituted self-defense against the unlawful
aggression of the victim, they should have reported the incident to the police, instead of escaping and avoiding
the authorities until they were either arrested or prevailed upon to surrender. 22
The reliance of the accused on the Constitution however is warranted. Certainly, the police authorities should
have first obtained a warrant for the arrest of accused Rolando Manlulu, and for the search and seizure of his
personal effects. The killing took place at one o'clock in the morning. The arrest and the consequent search and
seizure came at around seven o'clock that evening, some nineteen hours later. This instance cannot come within
the purview of a valid warrantless arrest. Paragraph (b), Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides that the arresting officer must have "personal knowledge" of an offense which "has in fact
just been committed." In the instant case, neither did Pat. Perez have "personal knowledge," nor was the
offense "in fact just been committed." While Pat. Perez may have personally gathered the information which led
to the arrest of Manlulu, that is not enough. The law requires "personal knowledge." Obviously, "personal
gathering of information" is different from "personal knowledge." The rule requires that the arrest immediately
follows the commission of the offense, not some nineteen hours later. This is not any different from People v.
Cendana 23 where the accused was arrested one day after the killing of the victim, and only on the basis of
information obtained by the police officers. There we said that the "circumstances clearly belie a lawful
warrantless arrest."
However, the flaw, fatal as it may be, becomes moot in view of the eyewitness account of Manlapaz which we
find to be credible. Hence, in spite of the nullification of the arrest of accused Manlulu, and the exclusion of real
evidence, i.e., the .45 cal. service pistol of Agent Alfaro and his Casio wristwatch, as well as his extra-judicial
confession which was taken in violation of the provisions of the Constitution, still the prosecution was able to
prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. After all, the illegality of the warrantless arrest cannot
deprive the state of its right to prosecute the guilty when all other facts on record point to their culpability. 24
While we confirm the factual findings of the trial court, which were affirmed by the appellate court, we
nevertheless differ from the conclusions drawn that treachery and conspiracy attended the killing of Alfaro.
Indeed, there is serious doubt as to whether treachery could be appreciated against the two accused. There is
nothing on record to show that both accused deliberately employed means tending to insure the killing of Alfaro
without risk to themselves arising from the defense which the latter might make. It must be noted that Alfaro set
the mood of the evening with a threatening tone that someone in the group was provoking him. Clearly, the
attack on Alfaro who was then armed with a .45 cal. revolver by Samson who on the other hand was merely
armed with a knife could not have been so sudden as to catch the former off-guard. In fact, Manlapaz testified
that after Samson's initial attack on Alfaro the latter was even able to push Samson back. 25 Even Manlulu, who
impulsively stabbed the victim, only picked up the ice pick they were using to chip ice. Taking into account the
attendant circumstances, our minds cannot rest easy in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of treachery.
Hence, the two accused may only be convicted of simple homicide.
There was no conspiracy likewise in the killing of Alfaro. Settled is the rule that neither joint nor simultaneous
action per se is a sufficient indicium of conspiracy.26 The evidence shows that it was the victim who chanced
upon Manlapaz and the two accused drinking, and decided to join them. Accused Manlulu was not even armed
when he went to the drinking spree. We have often said that conspiracy must be established beyond reasonable
doubt. Here, the prosecution failed to show that Manlulu and Samson conspired to kill Alfaro. There being no
conspiracy, each is liable for his own acts.
The penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal 27 the range of which is twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
twenty (20) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law to accused Rolando Manlulu, there being no
mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, the maximum of his penalty shall be taken from the medium period
of reclusion temporal, which is fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years
and four (4) months, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision
mayor, the range of which is six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, in any of its periods.

As regards accused Dante Samson, although he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender,
the same is offset by reiteracion or habituality he having previously been convicted once of robbery and thrice of
theft28 within ten (10) years prior to this incident, each time serving sentence therefor, which further bars him
from availing of the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.29 Consequently, he should be sentenced
to reclusion temporal medium the range of which is fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. Furthermore, being a habitual delinquent as defined in the last
paragraph of Art. 62 of The Revised Penal Code,30 he should serve an additional penalty within the range
of prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal minimum.31 And, as correctly determined by the appellate
court, the civil liability of both accused is increased from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00. In addition, both accused
are liable to indemnify the heirs of their victim in the amount of P10,410.00 for hospitalization and funeral
expenses.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is modified as follows:

(a) ROLANDO MANLULU is found guilty of HOMICIDE and is sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of eight
(8) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight
(8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum;

(b) DANTE SAMSON is found guilty of HOMICIDE and is sentenced to a straight prison term of fourteen (14)
years, ten (10) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal medium and, for being a habitual delinquent,
is ordered to serve an additional penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum; and

(c) ROLANDO MANLULU and DANTE SAMSON are directed jointly and severally to pay the heirs of Gerardo Alfaro
the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P10,410.00 as death and funeral expenses, with costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 109633 July 20, 1994 to undergo imprisonment: in Crim. Case No. 236-91 for Violation of P.D. 1866 of Seventeen
(17) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum to Twenty
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum and in Crim. Case No. 237-91 for a violation of
vs. Section 15, Article III of Republic Act 6425, as amended of life imprisonment and to pay a fine
NORMANDO DEL ROSARIO Y LOPEZ, accused-appellant. of P30,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs in
both cases.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
The shabu, the One Hundred Peso bill and other paraphernalia are hereby ordered confiscated
in favor of the government.
Topacio and Topacio for accused-appellants.
(pp. 28-29, Rollo.)

From said decision, the instant appeal has been interposed.

MELO, J.:

The prosecution's version of the case, as set forth in appellee's brief, is as follows:
Normando del Rosario was charged before Branch 17 of the Regional Trial Court of the Fourth Judicial Region
stationed in Cavite City with Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunitions in Criminal Case No. 236-91 and
Illegal Sale of Regulated Drugs in Criminal Case No. 237-91, under two informations reading, respectively, as
follows:
Criminal Case No. 236-91
That on or about September 4, 1991, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without legal
authority, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have in his
possession and control a homemade (paltik)caliber .22 revolver with three (3) live ammunition.
Contrary to law.
Criminal Case No. 237-91
That on or about September 4, 1991, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without legal
authority, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly sell to a poseur
buyer an aluminum foil containing Methamphetamine Hydrochloride also known as "Shabu", a
regulated drug.
Contrary to law.
(pp. 20-21, Rollo.)
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges, and after joint trial of the two cases,
the court a quo rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Normando del Rosario y
Lopez guilty beyond reasonable doubt in the above-entitled cases and he is hereby sentenced
Upon application of SPO3 Raymundo Untiveros of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Cavite
City, Regional Trial Court Judge Arturo de Guia issued in the morning of September 4, 1991 a
search warrant
(Exh. T, p. 50, Rec.— Crim. Case No. 237-91) authorizing the search and seizure of an
"undetermined quantity of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known as shabu and
its paraphernalias" in the premises of appellant's house located at 828 R. Basa St., San Roque,
Cavite City. However, the search warrant was not implemented immediately due to the lack of
police personnel to form the raiding team (pp. 4, 7, tsn., Feb. 4, 1992).
At about 9 o'clock in the evening of that day, a raiding team was finally organized. SPO3
Untiveros headed the raiding team with PO3 Rogelio Francisco, SPO1 Eduardo Novero, SPO3
Reynaldo de la Cruz, PO1 Carlito Barbuco, PO3 Onrubio and SPO2 Villegas as members
(pp. 5, 10, tsn., Feb. 4, 1992; p. 7, tsn., Dec. 11, 1991).
In the final briefing of the raiding team at the police station, it was agreed upon that PO1
Venerando Luna will buy shabu from appellant and after his return from appellant's house, the
raiding team will implement the search warrant (p. 10, tsn., Feb. 4, 1992; pp. 17-18, tsn., Dec.
11, 1991). A marked money consisting of a P100 bill bearing serial no. PQ 329406
(Exh. P, p. 51, Rec.) was given by the Station Commander to PO1 Luna and entered in the
police logbook (p. 12, Feb. 4, 1992). PO1 Luna with a companion proceeded to appellant's
house to implement the search warrant. Barangay Capt. Maigue, Norma del Rosario and
appellant witnessed the search at appellant's house (p. 10, tsn., Dec. 11, 1991). SPO3 de la
Cruz and PO3 Francisco found a black canister containing shabu, an aluminum foil, a paltik .22
caliber (Exh. O) atop the TV set, three used ammunitions in a cup and three wallets (Exhs. Q,
R, S), one containing the marked money (Exh. P; pp. 11-12, tsn., Dec. 11, 1992). SPO1
Novero found inside a show box aluminum foils, napkins and a burner (p. 9, tsn., March 11,
1992). SPO3 de la Cruz turned over the wallet containing the marked money to PO3 Onrubio
(p. 8, 32, tsn., Jan. 7, 1992). The seized items were photographed thereat by Fred Agana and
then turned over to PO3 Onrubio (pp. 8, 32, tsn., Jan. 7, 1992). SPO3 Untiveros issued
receipts (Exhs. V, V-1, pp. 53-54, Rec.) for the seized items with Barangay Capt. Maigue and
 appellant's sister Norma as signing witnesses. He also made a return (Exh. U, p. 52, Rec.) of
the seized items to the court (pp. 11-155, tsn., Feb. 18, 1992.).
At police station, the seized items were taped and initialed by SPO3 de la Cruz (p. 33, tsn.,
Jan. 7, 1992). The next day, SPO4 Pilapil, through PO1 Barbuco, forwarded to NBI Forensic
Chemist Mary Ann Aranas for laboratory analysis the aluminum foil (Exhs. A, J, pp. 37, 46,
Rec.) containing suspected shabu bought by PO1 Luna from appellant in the
buy-bust operation as well as the aluminum foils (Exhs. G, K, pp. 43, 47, Rec.) containing
suspected marijuana which were confiscated by virtue of the search warrant.
The findings of NBI Forensic Chemist Aranas disclosed that all the specimen submitted to her
for laboratory analysis by SPO1 Pilapil, thru PO1 Barbuco, gave positive results for
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (pp. 2-9, tsn., Dec. 3, 1991; Exh. B, C, H, I, pp. 38, 39, 44,
45, Rec.).
(pp. 102-105, Rollo.)
Carefully evaluating the evidence on record, we believe that the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of
accused-appellant. Much is to be desired in the manner the police authorities effected the arrest of accused-
appellant and the same observation may be made with regard to the way the prosecution conducted its case.
Foremost among the inadequacies of the prosecution is its failure to call to the witness stand PO1 Venerando
Luna, the alleged poseur-buyer. There is, thus, a total absence of evidence to establish the purported sale of
shabu by accused-appellant to Venerando Luna, the supposed poseur-buyer. The omission to present the
poseur-buyer casts serious doubts that an illegal sale of a dangerous drug actually took place.
The trial court gave much weight to the testimonies of the police members of the buy-bust
operation. However, the prosecution did not present as witness the supposed poseur-buyer.
Such omission casts serious doubt on appellant's guilt because without the testimony of the
poseur-buyer, there is no convincing evidence to show that appellant sold marijuana. The
testimonies of the rest of the buy-bust operation are hearsay in view of the fact that the
poseur-buyer, was never presented at the trial. There was even no testimony that when the
accused-appellant handed the stuff to the poseur-buyer that the latter in turn handed the
marked money. The failure of the prosecution to present the alleged buyer of the marijuana
was a fatal flaw in the case against the accused.
(People vs. Fulgarillas, 212 SCRA 76, 80 [1992])
The testimony of prosecution witness PO3 Rogelio Francisco that Veneracion Luna, the alleged Poseur-buyer,
bought shabu from accused-appellant was derived solely from what Luna supposedly told him (pp. 19-20, tsn.,
December 11, 1991) and, therefore, is patently hearsay evidence, without any evidentiary weight whatsoever.
Likewise, the statements of prosecution witnesses Policemen Reynaldo de la Cruz, Raymundo Untiveros, and
Eduardo Novera, Jr. as to the alleged sale of shabu are hearsay, without weight, as all of them were not present
during the alleged sale.
According to the version of the prosecution, during the alleged buy-bust operation, accused-appellant handed
over to Veneracion Luna, the alleged poseur-buyer, a quantity of shabu, and Luna in turn paid accused-appellant
a marked P100 bill and then returned to the police station and informed the raiding team that he had already
bought the shabu from accused-appellant. Thereupon, the raiding team proceeded to the house of accused-
appellant to implement the search warrant. The version of the prosecution is highly incredible. The record is
devoid of any reason why the police officers did not make any attempt to arrest accused-appellant at the time he
allegedly sold the shabu to Veneracion Luna who was accompanied by another police officer. That was the
opportune moment to arrest accused-appellant. The version foisted by the prosecution upon this Court is
contrary to human experience in the ordinary course of human conduct. The usual procedure in a buy-bust
operation is for the police officers to arrest the pusher of drugs at the very moment he hands over the
dangerous drug to the poseur-buyer. That is the very reason why such a police operation is called a "buy-bust"
operation. The police poseur-buyer "buys" dangerous drugs from the pusher and "busts" (arrests) him the
moment the pusher hands over the drug to the police officer.
We thus entertain serious doubts that the shabu contained in a small canister was actually seized or confiscated
at the residence of accused-appellant. In consequence, the manner the police officers conducted the subsequent
and much-delayed search is highly irregular. Upon bargaining into the residence of accused-appellant, the police
officers found him lying down and they immediately arrested and detained him in the living room while they
searched the other parts of the house. Although they fetched two persons to witness the search, the witnesses
were called in only after the policemen had already entered accused-appellant's residence (pp. 22-23, tsn,
December 11, 1991), and, therefore, the policemen had more than ample time to plant the shabu. Corollary to
the constitutional precept that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved (Sec. 14(2), Article III, Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines) is the rule that in order
to convict an accused the circumstances of the case must exclude all and each and every hypothesis consistent
with his innocence (People vs. Tanchoco; 76 Phil. 463 [1946]; People vs. Constante, 12 SCRA 653 [1964];
People vs. Jara, 144 SCRA 516 [1986]). The facts of the case do not rule out the hypothesis that accused-
appellant is innocent.
At any rate, accused-appellant cannot be convicted of possession of the shabu contained in a canister and
allegedly seized at his house, for the charge against him was for selling shabu with the information alleging that
the "accused, without legal authority did . . . sell to a poseur buyer an aluminum foil containing
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride . . ." Sale is totally different from possession. Article 1458 of the Civil Code
defines sale as a contract whereby "one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of
and to deliver a determine thing, and the other to pay therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent", while
"possession is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right" as defined by Article 523 of the Civil Code.
Accused-appellant cannot be convicted of a crime which is not charged in the information for to do so would
deny him the due process of law (People vs. Despavellador, 1 SCRA 205 [1961]; People vs. Mori, 55 SCRA 382
[1974]).
Neither can accused-appellant be convicted of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. The search warrant
implemented by the raiding party authorized only the search and seizure of ". . . the described quantity of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known as shabu and its paraphernalia" (Exh. O, p. 50, original
record). Thus, the raiding party was authorized to seize only shabu and paraphernalia for the use thereof and no
other. A search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a finishing
expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime. The Constitution
itself (Section 2, Article III) and the Rules of Court (Section 3, Rule 126) specifically mandate that the search
warrant must particularly describe the things to be seized. Thus, the search warrant was no authority for the
police officers to seize the firearm which was not mentioned, much less described with particularity, in the
search warrant. Neither may it be maintained that the gun was seized in the course of an arrest, for as earlier
observed, accused-appellant's arrest was far from regular and legal. Said firearm, having been illegally seized,
the same is not admissible in evidence (Stonehill vs. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 [1967]). The Constitution expressly
ordains the exclusion in evidence of illegally seized articles.

Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.

(Section 3[2], Article III, Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines).

With the exclusion in evidence of the illegally seized firearm, there is, therefore, a total absence of evidence to
support the charge of illegal possession of firearm, against accused-appellant.

The same may be said of the charge of illegal possession of ammunition.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and accused-appellant is hereby ACQUITTED in
Criminal Case No. 236-91 and Criminal Case No. 237-91.

The immediate release of accused-appellant is hereby ordered unless there exists a pending valid cause against
him.

The shabu, the marked P100 bill, firearm, and ammunition are hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the
government.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 109287 April 18, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTOLIN CUIZON y ORTEGA, STEVE PUA y CLOFAS alias "STEPHEN PO y UY" or "TOMMY SY" and
PAUL LEE y WONG alias "PAUL LEUNG", accused- appellants.
PANGANIBAN, J.:p
In deciding the case at bench, the Court reiterates doctrines on illegal searches and seizures, and the
requirements for a valid warrantless search incident to a valid warrantless arrest. While the Court appreciates
and encourages pro-active law enforcement, it nonetheless upholds the sacredness of constitutional rights and
repeats the familiar maxim, "the end never justifies the means."
This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated January 5, 1993 (Criminal Case No. 92-0230) of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 116,2 Pasay City finding appellants guilty of violating Section 15 of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
On March 10, 1992, an Information3 was filed against the appellants charging them as follows:
That on or about February 21, 1992 in Pasay City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously carry and transport into
the country, without lawful authority, 16 kilograms, more or less, of METHAMPHETAMINE
HYDROCHLORIDE, also popularly known as "SHABU", a regulated drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, appellant Antolin Cuizon, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty. During the
arraignment of appellants Paul Lee and Steve Pua, the latter translated the information into Chinese-Cantonese
for the understanding of appellant Lee, who does not speak nor understand English, Pilipino or any other
Philippine dialect. Both of them, duly assisted by their counsel, also pleaded not guilty.4 Trial ensued and on
January 5, 1993, the court a quo found appellants guilty as charged and rendered the following disposition:5
WHEREFORE, accused Antolin Cuizon y Ortega, Steve Pua y Clofas alias Stephen Po y Uy or
Tommy Sy, and Paul Lee y Wong, alias Paul Leung, are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of transporting, without legal authority, methamphetamine hydrochloride, or "shabu", a
regulated drug, as charged in the aforequoted Information; and they are each sentenced to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00.
The methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu" involved in this case is declared forfeited in
favor of the government and is ordered turned over to the Dangerous Drug Board for proper
disposal.
The Facts
According to the Prosecution
The facts as summarized by the trial court and adopted by the Solicitor General, who added the page references
to the transcript of stenographic notes as indicated in brackets, are as follows:6
In January 1992, the Reaction Group of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) gathered
an information regarding the drug, activities of accused Antolin Cuizon y Ortega and his wife,
Susan Cuizon. A surveillance was conducted on them. The residence of the spouses was
traced to Caloocan City (tsn, May 19, 1992, pp. 17-18, 21).
In the morning of February 21, 1992, the Reaction Group received a report from its informant
in Hong Kong that accused Cuizon, together with his wife, was arriving on the same day at the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) in Pasay City, Metro Manila, from the British crown
colony, carrying with him a big quantity of "shabu". A team was organized to intercept the
suspects. Heading the team was Jose Yap, with Ernesto Diño, Marcelino Amurao, Jose Bataller
and Alfredo Jacinto, as members. Some belonged to the Narcotics Division and the others to
the Reaction Group of the NBI (tsn, May 19, 1992, pp. 4, 18).
Arriving at the NAIA shortly before 12:00 noon of February 21, 1992, Diño positioned himself
at the Arrival Area, while Yap and the other members of the team posted themselves at the
parking area of the airport. At about 12:45 in the afternoon of the same date, accused Cuizon
and his wife, who had just returned from Hong Kong, after passing through the Immigration
and Customs Areas at the NAIA, proceeded to the Arrival Area of the airport preparatory to
their boarding a car. While there, accused Cuizon, together with his wife, handed four (4)
traveling bags to accused Steve Pua y Clofas and accused Paul Lee y Wong, who were at the
vicinity of the Arrival Area. Accused Pua and Lee loaded the bags in a taxicab which they
boarded in leaving the airport. Accused Cuizon and his wife took another vehicle (tsn, May 19,
1992, pp. 4-5, 8-9).
At this juncture, Diño, who was observing the activities of the accused, radioed the group of
Yap at the parking area, describing the vehicle boarded by accused Pua and Lee so that Yap
and his companions could apprehend the two. However, the message of Diño was not
completely received by his teammates as the radio he was using ran short of battery power
(tsn, May 13, 1992, pp. 25-26).
Immediately after the vehicle boarded by Pua and Lee had left, Diño proceeded to the place
where his companions were stationed for the purpose of giving assistance to them, believing
that they were already in the process of apprehending accused Pua and Lee. When he realized
that the two accused were not apprehended, Diño told the group of Yap to follow him as he
was following the vehicle taken by Pua and Lee which, according to an earlier tip he learned,
was proceeding to the Manila Peninsula Hotel in Makati, Metro Manila (tan, May 19, 1992 pp.
25-26; tsn, May 21, 1992, pp. 6, 15).
Upon arriving at about 2:00 p.m. of the same date of February 21, 1992, in the Manila
Peninsula Hotel, in whose premises the taxicab boarded by accused Pua and Lee entered, Diño
 and the other members of the team coordinated with Col. Regino Arellano, Chief Security
Officer of the hotel, for the purpose of apprehending the two accused. A verification made by
the Chief Security Officer showed that accused Pua and Lee occupied Room 340 of the hotel.
The two accused allowed Diño and Yap, together with Col. Arellano, to enter their room.
Found inside Room 340 were four (4) traveling bags, which were similar to the ones handed
by accused Cuizon to accused Pua and Lee at the Arrival Area of the NAIA. After having
introduced themselves as NBI agents, Diño and Yap were permitted by accused Pua and Lee
to search their bags in the presence of Col. Arellano. The permission was made in writing.
(Exh. I). Three (3) of the four (4) bags each yielded a plastic package containing a
considerable quantity of white crystalline substance suspected to be methamphethamine
hydrochloride or "shabu". Each package was sandwiched between two (2) pieces of board
which appear to be "lawanit" placed at the bottom of each of the three (3) bags. The
suspected "shabu" contained in one bag weighed 2.571 kilos, that found in the other had a
weight of 2.768 kilos, and the suspected "shabu" retrieved from the third bag weighed 2.970
kilos. Pua and Lee were then apprehended by Diño and his companions (tsn, May 20, 1992,
pp. 9-13; tsn, May 7, 1992, p. 9, Exh. "F-2", p. 75, Records).
Immediately thereafter, Diño and the other members of the team proceeded to the house of
accused Cuizon in Caloocan City, taking with them accused Pua and Lee and the bags with
their contents of suspected dangerous drugs. They reached the place at about 5:50 in the
afternoon of the same date of February 21, 1992. Retrieved from accused Cuizon in his
residence was another bag also containing a white crystalline substance weighing 2.695 kilos,
likewise believed to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu". In addition, a .38 Cal.
firearm was taken from accused Cuizon (tsn, May 19, 1992, pp. 10-11).
Pua, Lee, Cuizon and his wife were then brought by the arresting officers to the NBI
headquarters at Taft Avenue, Manila, for further investigation. They were subsequently
referred to the Prosecution Division of the Department of Justice for inquest. However, only
the present three accused were charged in court (tsn, May 19, 1992, pp. 12-13, 16-17).
In the meantime, at about 5:30 p.m. of the same date of February 21, 1992, Joselito Soriano,
roomboy of the Manila Peninsula Hotel, while cleaning Room 340, observed that a portion of
the ceiling was misaligned. While fixing it, he discovered in the ceiling a laundry bag containing
suspected "shabu" of more than five (5) kilos (Exh. "X," p. 110). Informed of the discovery
while they were already in their office in the NBI, Yap and some companions returned to the
hotel. The suspected "shabu" was turned over to them (tsn, May 20, 1992, pp. 19-22).
When examined in the Forensic Chemistry Section of the NBI, the white crystalline substance
taken from the three (3) travelling bags found in the room of accused Pua and Lee in the
Manila Peninsula hotel, the white crystalline substance retrieved from the bag confiscated from
accused Cuizon in his house in Caloocan City, and the white crystalline substance hidden in the
ceiling of Room 340 of the hotel were confirmed to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or
"shabu", a regulated drug. (Board Regulation No. 6, dated December 11, 1972, of the
Dangerous Drugs Board) (tsn, May 7, 1992, p. 12).
The Defense's Version(s)
Appellant Pua, on his part, interposed the defense of alibi. On direct examination, he testified that at the time of
the alleged commission of the offense, he and his co-appellant Lee were in their room at the Manila Peninsula
Hotel.7 His version of what happened on February 21, 1992 can be summarized as follows:
At around 9:30 in the morning, he accompanied appellant Paul Lee to check-in at the Manila Peninsula Hotel for
and in behalf of the latter's personal friend named Leong Chong Chong or Paul Leung, who was expected to
arrive that evening because of a delayed flight. Appellant Pua was engaged by appellant Lee to act as interpreter
as Lee does not know how to speak English and the local language.8
While in Room 340, past 1:00 in the afternoon, they received a call from the lobby informing them of the arrival
of Paul Leung's luggage. At Pua's instructions, the said luggage were brought to the room by a bellboy.
Thereafter, two persons knocked on their door, accompanied by a "tomboy" and a thin man with curly hair. The
two men identified themselves as NBI agents and asked appellant Pua to let them in. He declined since he did
not know who they were. However, when Col. Arellano, the Chief Security Officer of the hotel, arrived and
identified the two NBI agents, he and Lee relented and permitted them to enter. Thereafter, he and Lee were
told by the agents to sign a piece of paper. Made to understand that they were merely giving their consent for
the agents to enter their room, Pua and Lee signed the same. Whereupon, the agents told them that they will
open Paul Leung's bags. Again appellant Pua refused, saying that the bags did not belong to them. Just the
same, the agents, without appellants Pua and Lee's consent, opened the bags and found the shabu. Pua and Lee
were then apprehended and brought to the NBI headquarters.9
Appellant Cuizon, on the other hand, flatly rejected the prosecution's version of the incident. While admitting
that on February 21, 1992, he and his wife Susan did arrive from Hong Kong with several pieces of luggage, he
denied that he met Pua and Lee at the arrival area of the airport, much less passed to them the four pieces of
luggage. According to him, only his two-year old son, accompanied by his cousin, Ronald Allan Ong, met them
outside the airport. Ong fetched them from the airport and brought them to their home in Caloocan city. They
arrived at their house around 3:00 in the afternoon.10
About two hours later, while he was resting together with his wife and son on his bed, two NBI agents suddenly
barged in and poked a gun at him. They manhandled him in front of his wife and son. His hands were tied with a
necktie and he was forcibly brought out of their house while the NBI agents ransacked the place without any
warrant. He, his wife Susan, and his cousin Ronald Allan Ong, were afterwards brought to the NBI Headquarters
in Manila and there the NBI agents continued mauling him.11
Appellant Cuizon's wife Susan, his cousin Ronald Allan Ong, and his nephew Nestor Dalde, testified in his favor
basically reiterating or confirming his testimony.12
Unfortunately, appellant Paul Lee, who does not speak or understand a word of English or Pilipino and only
knows Chinese-Cantonese, was not able to take the witness stand for lack of an interpreter who would translate
his testimony to English. In the hearing set on October 28, 1992, the last trial date allotted to the defense for
the reception of Lee's testimony, his counsel, although notified of the proceedings, did not appear. Thus, the
trial court deemed him and Pua to have waived their right to present additional evidence,13 and the case was
considered submitted for decision after the filing of memoranda. The counsel for Pua and Lee did not ask for the
reconsideration of such ruling; neither did he submit any memorandum. Only accused Cuizon, who was assisted
by another counsel, was able to submit his memorandum.
The Issues
In their brief, appellants Pua and Lee made the following assignments of errors:14
I. The trial court erred in finding conspiracy among the accused.
II. The trial court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses
Marcelino Amurao, Jose Yap and Ernesto Diño despite contradictions made on material points.
III. The trial court erred in not giving accused Paul Lee the opportunity to present his evidence
in his defense in violation of his constitutional right to due process.
Appellant Cuizon, in a separate brief, essentially reiterates the first two assignments of errors above-quoted, and
in addition challenges the legality and validity of his warrantless arrest and the search and seizure incidental
thereto.15
As this Court sees it, the resolution of this case hinges on the pivotal question of the legality of the arrest and
search of herein appellants effected by the NBI operatives. Put differently, were the warrantless arrests and the
warrantless searches conducted by the NBI legal and constitutional?
The answer to this threshold question determines whether the judgment of the court a quo will stand or fall.
Consequently, there is a need to resolve first this issue before endeavoring to consider the other issues raised by
appellants.
A necessary side issue to be considered is, assuming the searches and arrests to have been illegal, whether
failure by appellants Pua and Lee to explicitly assign the same as errors before this Court amounted to a waiver
of their constitutional rights against such illegal searches and arrests.
The Court's Ruling
General Rule on Warrantless
Arrests, Searches & Seizures
Well entrenched in this country is the rule that no arrest, search and seizure can be made without a valid
warrant issued by a competent judicial authority. So sacred is this right that no less than the fundamental law of
the
land16 ordains it:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may "produce, and particularly describing the place to be
Searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
It further decrees that any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.17
However, the right against warrantless arrest and search and seizure is not absolute. Thus, under Section 5 of
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court, an arrest without a warrant may be lawfully made by a peace officer or a
private person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
On the occasion of any of the aforementioned instances of legitimate arrest without warrant, the person arrested
may be subjected to a search of his body and of his personal effects or belongings, "for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense," likewise without need of a search
warrant.18
However, where a person is searched without a warrant, and under circumstances other than those justifying a
warrantless arrest, as discussed above, upon a mere suspicion that he has embarked on some criminal activity,
and/or for the purpose of discovering if indeed a crime has been committed by him, then the search made of
such person as well as his arrest are deemed illegal.19 Consequently, any evidence which may have been
obtained during such search, even if tending to confirm or actually confirming such initial suspicion, is absolutely
inadmissible for any purpose and in any proceeding,20 the same being "the fruit of the poisonous
tree".21 Emphasis is to be laid on the fact that the law requires that the search be incident to a lawful arrest, in
order that the search itself may likewise be considered legal. Therefore, it is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest
must precede the search of a person and his belongings. Were a search first undertaken, then an arrest effected
based on evidence produced by the search, both such search and arrest would be unlawful, for being contrary to
law.
The Instant Case Does Not Fall Under
The Exceptions for Warrantless Searches, etc.
Re-assessing the factual backdrop of the case at bench, this Court cannot agree with and accept the conclusion
of the trial court that the appellants were caught in flagrante delicto which would justify the search without a
warrant. The shaky reasoning of the court a quo gives away the baselessness of its findings and conclusion:
. . . the search conducted on their bags in the hotel room could still be regarded as valid for
being incidential to a lawful arrest. . . . The arrest of accused Pua and Lee without a warrant
of arrest was lawful, as they could be considered to have committed the crime of transporting
"shabu" in the presence of the arresting officers from the time they received the bags
 containing the regulated drug in the airport up to the time they brought the bags to the hotel.
Or their arrest without a warrant was legal as falling under the situation where an offense had
in fact just been committed, and the arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the said accused were the ones who committed it. . . .22
Scrutinizing the provisions of Sec. 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court on lawful arrests without warrant, we note
that par. (c) of said section is obviously inapplicable, the appellants not being escapees from a penal institution
at the time of arrest. Par. (a) an the other hand requires that the person be arrested (i) after he has committed
or while he is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (ii) in the presence of the
arresting officer(s). These requirements are not present in the case at bench, for at the time of their arrest,
appellants Pua and Lee were merely resting in their hotel room, and appellant Cuizon for his part was in bed
resting with his wife and child inside his home. No offense had just been committed, or was being actually
committed or being attempted by any of the accused in the presence of the lawmen.23
Par. (b) of the same provision is likewise inapplicable since its equally exacting requirements have also not been
met. The prosecution failed to establish that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been
committed and the arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused-appellants had
committed it. Appellant Cuizon could not, by the mere act of handing over four pieces of luggage to the other
two appellants, be considered to have committed the offense of "carrying and transporting" prohibited drugs.
Under the circumstances of the case, there was no sufficient probable cause for the arresting officers to believe
that the accused were then and there committing a crime. The act per se of handing over the baggage,
assuming the prosecution's version to be true; cannot in any way be considered a criminal act. It was not even
an act performed under suspicious circumstances as indeed, it took place in broad daylight, practically at high
noon, and out in the open, in full view of the public.24 Furthermore, it can hardly be considered unusual, in an
airport setting, for travellers and/or their welcomers to be passing, handing over and delivering pieces of
baggage, especially considering the somewhat obsessive penchant of our fellow countrymen for sending along
("pakikipadala") things and gifts through friends and relatives. Moreover, one cannot determine from the
external appearance of the luggage that they contained "shabu" hidden beneath some secret panel or false
bottom. The only reason why such act of parting with luggage took on the color and dimensions of a felonious
deed, at least as far as the lawmen were concerned, was the alleged tip that the NBI agents purportedly
received that morning, to the effect that appellant Cuizon would be arriving that same day with a shipment of
shabu. To quote from another decision of like import, "(A)11 they had was hearsay information (from the
telephone caller), and about a crime that had yet to be committed."25
In the leading case of People vs. Burgos,26 this Court laid down clear guidelines, as follows:
Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is
committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of that fact. The
offense must also be committed in his presence or within his view. (Sayo v. Chief of Police, 80
Phil. 859).
The same decision is highly instructive as it goes on to state:
The Solicitor General is of the persuasion that the arrest may still be considered lawful under
Section 6 (b) using the test of reasonableness. He submits that the information given by Cesar
Masamlok was sufficient to induce a reasonable ground (for belief) that a crime has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.
In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that there is
reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime
must in fact or actually have been committed first. That a crime has actually been committed
is an essential precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may have been
committed. The fact of the commission of the offense must be undisputed. The test of
reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator.
In this case, the accused was arrested on the sole basis of Masamlok's verbal report.
Masamlok led the authorities to suspect that the accused had committed a crime. They were
still fishing for evidence of a crime not yet ascertained. The subsequent recovery of the subject
firearm on the basis of information from the lips of a frightened wife cannot make the arrest
lawful. . . .
The foregoing doctrine was affirmed in the case of Alih vs. Castro,27 where this Court ruled that ". . . under the
Revised Rule 113, Section 5(b), the officer making the arrest must have personal knowledge of the ground
therefor as stressed in the recent case of People v. Burgos."
In the case at bench, not only did the NBI agents rely merely on hearsay information ("tips"), but they were
completely uncertain that anything was really "going down" that day. That much is undisputed, from a reading
of the testimony of Agent Diño:
Q Now, but you were informed by the personnel of the airport that the
spouses Cuizon were going to bring in or transport into the country shabu
on February 21, 1992?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, you were not sure or your group was not sure that they indeed
would bring in shabu, is it not? That was only the information relayed to
your group?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q But then you were jumping ahead. You were not sure is it not that they
were bringing in shabu?
A Yes, sir. (TSN, May 19, 1992, pp. 37-38.)
In his testimony, NBI Investigator Jose Justo Yap, who was with Agent Diño during the operation,
likewise admitted in substantially the same tenor their uncertainty regarding the commission of the
offense (cf. TSN, May 20, 1992, pp. 29 & 34.).
We therefore hold that under the circumstances obtaining, the prosecution failed to establish that there was
sufficient and reasonable ground for the NBI agents to believe that appellants had committed a crime at the
point when the search and arrest of Pua and Lee were made; hence, said search and arrest do not come under
the exception in par. (b) of Sec. 5 of Rule 113, and therefore should be deemed illegal. We eight add that the
search conducted on Pua and Lee was not incident to a lawful warrantless arrest, having preceded the same and
produced the justification therefor. On the other hand, the search on Cuizon's residence, without the benefit of a
search warrant, was clearly illegal and the "shabu" seized thereat cannot but be considered inadmissible in
evidence. More an these points later.
Comparison Between The Present Case
and Earlier Decisions of This Court
For clarity's sake, it is imperative to compare the foregoing holding with previous decisions by this Court in
various drug cases, in which apparently different conclusions were reached, in order to distinguish them from
the instant case and avoid any potential misunderstanding of the foregoing holding as well as the constitutional
and legal principles on which it is based.
1. In People vs. Claudio,28 the accused, a passenger on a bus bound for Baguio city, was arrested by a
policeman on the same bus because of the distinctive odor of marijuana emanating from the plastic bag she was
carrying. The Court held the warrantless arrest under the circumstances to be lawful, the search justified and the
evidence thus discovered admissible in evidence.
2. In People vs. Tangliben,29 the accused, carrying a travelling bag at a bus terminal, was noticed by lawmen to
be acting suspiciously, and was also positively fingered by an informer as carrying marijuana, and so he was
accosted by policemen who happened to be on a surveillance mission; the lawmen asked him to open the bag,
in which was found a package of marijuana leaves. It was held that there was a valid warrantless arrest and
search incident thereto. The Court in effect considered the evidence on hand sufficient to have enabled the law
enforcers to secure a search warrant had there been time, but as the case "presented urgency," and there was
actually no time to obtain a warrant since the accused was about to board a bus, and inasmuch as an informer
had given information "on the spot" that the accused was carrying marijuana, the search of his person and
effects was thus considered valid.
3. In Posadas vs. Court of Appeals,30 the accused was seen acting suspiciously, and when accosted by two
members of the Davao INP who identified themselves as lawmen, he suddenly fled, but was pursued, subdued
and placed in custody. The buri bag he was carrying yielded an unlicensed revolver, live ammunition and a tear
gas grenade. This Court upheld his conviction for illegal possession of firearms, holding that there was under the
circumstances sufficient probable cause for a warrantless search.
4. In People vs. Moises Maspil, Jr., et al.,31 agents of the Narcotics Command set up a checkpoint on a highway
in Atok, Benguet, to screen vehicular traffic on the way to Baguio City due to confidential reports from informers
that Maspil and a certain Bagking would be transporting a large quantity of marijuana. At about 2 a.m. of
November 1, 1986, the two suspects, riding a jeepney, pulled up to the checkpoint and were made to stop. The
officers noticed that the vehicle was loaded with some sacks and tin cans, which, when opened, were seen to
contain marijuana leaves. The Court upheld the search thus conducted as being incidental to a valid warrantless
arrest.
5. In People vs. Lo Ho Wing, et al.,32 the Court ruled that the search of the appellants' moving vehicles and the
seizure of "shabu" therefrom was legal, in view of the intelligence information, including notably, clandestine
reports by a planted deep penetration agent or spy who was even participating in the drug smuggling activities
of the syndicate, to the effect that appellants were bringing in prohibited drugs into the country. The Court also
held that it is not practicable to secure a search warrant in cases of smuggling with the use of a moving vehicle
to transport contraband, because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant must be sought.
6. In People vs. Malmstedt,33 NARCOM agents stationed at Camp Dangwa, Mountain Province, set up a
temporary checkpoint to check vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region, due to persistent reports that
vehicles from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other drugs, and because of particular information to the
effect that a Caucasian would be travelling from Sagada that day with prohibited drugs. The bus in which
accused was riding was stopped at the checkpoint. While conducting an inspection, one of the NARCOM men
noticed that accused, the only foreigner on board, had a bulge at the waist area. Thinking it might be a gun, the
officer sought accused's passport or other identification papers. When the latter failed to comply, the lawman
directed him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging at his waist. It was a pouch bag which, when opened
by the accused, was found to contain packages of hashish, a derivative of marijuana. Invited for questioning, the
accused disembarked from the bus and brought along with him two pieces of luggage; found inside were two
teddy bears stuffed with more hashish. The Court held that there was sufficient probable cause in the premises
for the lawmen to believe that the accused was then and there committing a crime and/or trying to hide
something illegal from the authorities. Said probable cause arose not only from the persistent reports of the
transport of prohibited drugs from Sagada, and the "tip" received by the NARCOM that same day that a
Caucasian coming from Sagada would be bringing prohibited drugs, but also from the failure of the accused to
present his passport or other identification papers when confronted by the lawmen, which only triggered
suspicion on the part of the law enforcers that accused was trying to hide his identity, it being the normal thing
expected of an innocent man with nothing to hide, that he readily present identification papers when asked to do
so. The warrantless arrest and search were thus justified.
In all the cases discussed hereinabove, there were facts which were found by the Court to provide probable
cause justifying warrantless arrests and searches, i.e., distinct odor of marijuana, reports about drug
transporting or positive identification by informers, suspicious behaviour, attempt to flee, failure to produce
identification papers, and so on. Too, urgency attended the arrests and searches because each of the above-
mentioned cases involved the use of motor vehicles and the great likelihood that the accused would get away
long before a warrant can be procured. And, lest it be overlooked, unlike in the case before us now, the law
enforcers in the aforementioned cases acted immediately on the information received, suspicions raised, and
probable causes established, and effected the arrests and searches without any delay.
Unexplained Matters in the Instant Case
In the case before us, the NBI agents testified that they purportedly decided against arresting the accused-
appellants inside the airport as they allegedly wanted to discover the identities of the airport immigration,
security or customs personnel who might be protecting the accused or otherwise involved in the drug smuggling
activities, and also in order to avoid the possibility of an armed encounter with such protectors, which might
result in injuries to innocent bystanders. These excuses are simply unacceptable. They are obviously after-
thoughts concocted to justify their rank failure to effect the arrest within constitutional limits. Indeed, the NBI
men failed to explain how come they did not apprehend the appellants at the moment Cuizon handed over the
baggage to Pua and Lee, or even afterwards, in relative safety. Such arrest would have been consistent with the
settled constitutional, legal and jurisprudential precedents earlier cited.
The spouses Cuizon had already passed through the airport security checks allegedly with their contraband cargo
undetected in their luggage. Apparently, the NBI agents did not see (as indeed they did not testify that they
saw) anyone from the airport immigration, security or customs who could have escorted the spouses Cuizon, and
therefore, there was no danger of any "live ammo encounter" with such group(s). The alleged drug couriers had
already made their way outside the NAIA, had allegedly made contact with the accused Pua and Lee, and were
in the very act of handing over the luggage to the latter. Why the NBI men did not move in and pounce on them
at that very instant has not been satisfactorily explained. Instead, one of the agents, Diño, merely watched as
Pua and Lee loaded the luggage into a cab and took off for Makati. Furthermore, it taxes the imagination too
much to think that at the most critical and climactic moment, when agent Diño radioed his companions for help
to close in on the suspects, the most amazing and stupendous thing actually happened: Murphy's Law kicked in
— whatever could go wrong, did, and at the worst possible time — the batteries in Agent Diño's hand-held radio
supposedly went dead and his message was not transmitted. Thus the departing Pua and Lee proceeded merrily
and unimpeded to the Peninsula Hotel, while the spouses Cuizon simultaneously sped off to their residence in
Caloocan City, leaving the lawmen empty-handed and scampering madly to catch up. Such absolutely
astounding and incredible happenstance might find a place in a fourth-rate movie script, but expecting the
courts to swallow it — hook, line and sinker — is infinite naivete, if not downright malevolence.
Even granting arguendo that the radio really went dead, nevertheless, the agents were not thereby rendered
helpless or without recourse. The NBI agents, numbering five in all, not counting their so-called informant,
claimed to have piled into three cars (TSN, May 19, 1992) and tailed the suspects Pua and Lee into Makati,
keeping a safe two-car distance behind (TSN, May 20, 1992). The lawmen and the prosecutors failed to explain
why the agents did not intercept the vehicle in which Pua and Lee were riding, along the way, pull them over,
arrest them and search the luggage. And since the agents were in three (3) cars, they also could have easily
arranged to have agents in one vehicle follow, intercept and apprehend the Cuizons while the others went after
Pua and Lee. All or any of these possible moves are mere ordinary, common-sense steps, not requiring a great
deal of intelligence. The NBI men who testified claimed to have conducted or participated in previous drug busts
or similar operations and therefore must have been familiar with contingency planning, or at least should have
known what to do in this situation where their alleged original plan fell through. At any rate, what the lawmen
opted to do, i.e., allow Pua and Lee to freely leave the airport, allegedly bringing the drug cache to the hotel,
and Cuizon to leave unimpededly the airport and reach his residence with one of the luggage, increased
significantly the risk of the suspects (and/or the drugs) slipping through the lawmen's fingers, and puts into
question the regularity of performance of their official functions. The agents' alleged actions in this case compare
poorly with the forthright and decisive steps taken by lawmen in the cases earlier cited where this Court held the
arrests and seizures to be valid.
Had the arrests and searches been made in transitu, i.e., had the agents intercepted and collared the suspects
on the way to Makati and Caloocan, or better yet, at the very moment of the hand-over, then there would not
have been any question at all as to the legality of their arrest and search, as they would presumably have been
caught red-handed with the evidence, and consequently for that reason and by the very nature and manner of
commission of the offense charged, there would have been no doubt also as to the existence of conspiracy
among the appellants to transport the drugs. However, because of the way the operation actually turned out,
there is no sufficient proof of conspiracy between Pua and Lee on the one hand, and Cuizon on the other,
inasmuch as there is no clear and convincing evidence that the four (4) bags handed by Cuizon to Pua and Lee
at the airport were the very same ones found in the possession of the latter in Room 340 of the Peninsula Hotel.
Not one of the NBI agents when testifying could definitely and positively state that the bags seized from Room
340 were the very same ones passed by Cuizon at the airport; at best, they could only say that they "looked
like" the ones they saw at the airport. And even assuming them to be the same bags, there remains doubt and
uncertainty as to the actual ownership of the said bags as at the alleged turnover vis-a-vis the time they were
seized by the agents. For these reasons, we cannot sustain the finding of conspiracy as between Cuizon on the
one hand and Pua and Lee on the other. Well-settled is the rule that conspiracy must be proved independently
and beyond reasonable doubt.34
Additionally, in light of the foregoing discussion, we find it extremely difficult to subscribe to the trial court's
finding as to the existence and sufficiency of probable cause in this case, one major component of which would
have been the alleged information or "tip" purportedly received by the agents as to the expected arrival of the
spouses Cuizon that fateful day with a large cache of "shabu". The question that defies resolution in our minds is
why, if indeed the information or "tip" was genuine and from a highly reliable source as claimed by the
government agents, did they not act on it? Throw in the alleged month-long surveillance supposedly conducted
by some of the NBI people on the Cuizon couple, and the mystery only deepens. Even with the so-called tip and
the results of surveillance, the government officers were still seemingly hesitant, reluctant, uncertain, or perhaps
afraid, to arrest and search the accused appellants, so much so that the NBI agents who went after Pua and Lee
at the Peninsula Hotel, instead of outrightly cuffing and searching them, as they were supposed to, opted
instead to play it safe and meekly beseeched the two to sign a written consent for the agents to search their
personal effects! Indeed, this is one for the books. If this is how confident the agents were about their "hot
tips", reliable informers and undercover surveillance, then we cannot be blamed for failing to appreciate the
existence/sufficiency of probable cause to justify a warrantless arrest and search in this case. There is a whole
lot more that can be said on this score, but we shall leave it at that for now. We shall now dispose of the
appeals of the accused-appellants individually.
Re: Appellant Antolin Cuizon
The search of the house of appellant Cuizon, having been conducted without any warrant, and not on the
occasion or as an incident of a valid warrantless arrest, was indubitably illegal, and the shabu seized thereat
could not be admissible in evidence. That is why even the trial judge did not make an effort to hold him liable
under such seizure. He lamely argued: "(A)t any rate, accused Cuizon is not held criminally liable in this case in
connection with the bag containing "shabu" confiscated from his residence. His responsibility is based on the
bags containing "shabu" which he handed to Pua and Lee at the NAIA. Consequently, even if the bag and its
contents of "shabu" taken from his house were not admitted in evidence, the remaining proofs of the
prosecution would still be sufficient to establish the charge against him." However, contrary to the trial judge's
conclusion, we hold that insofar as Cuizon is concerned, all the evidence seized are considered fruit of the
poisonous tree and are inadmissible as against him, and thus, he should be acquitted, since, as shown
hereinabove, (i) the warrantless search conducted on Pua and Lee was clearly illegal per se, not being incident
to a valid warrantless arrest either; (ii) and even if the search on Pua and Lee were not illegal, conspiracy as
between Cuizon on the one hand and appellants Pua and Lee on the other had not been established by sufficient
proof beyond reasonable doubt; and (iii) appellant Cuizon had timely raised before this Court the issue of the
illegality of his own arrest and the search and seizure conducted at his residence, and questioned the admission
of the seized shabu in evidence.
Re: Appellant Steve Pua @ "Tommy Sy"
What has been said for Cuizon cannot, alas, be said for appellant Pua. While the search and arrest carried out on
him and Lee may have been illegal for not being incident to a lawful warrantless arrest, the unfortunate fact is
that appellant Pua failed to challenge the validity of his arrest and search, as well as the admission of the
evidence obtained thereby; he did not raise the issue or assign the same as an error before this Court.
Accordingly, any possible challenge thereto based on constitutional grounds is deemed waived. This Court has
upheld and recognized waivers of constitutional rights, including, particularly, the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures, in cases such as People vs. Malasugui 35 and De Garcia vs. Locsin.36
Additionally, the prosecution had argued and the trial court agreed that by virtue of the handwritten consent Regulated Drugs, penalized under Section 15, R.A. No. 6425, as amended, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
(Exhibit "I") secured by the arresting officers from appellants Pua and Lee, the latter freely gave their consent to penalty of reclusion perpetua; the Decision appealed from, as herein modified, is hereby affirmed as to appellant
the search of their baggage, and thus, the drugs discovered as a result of the consented search is admissible in Pua. Finally, the case as to appellant Lee is hereby ordered REMANDED to the trial court in order that said
evidence. The said written permission is in English, and states plainly that they (Pua and Lee) freely consent to accused may be given his day in court. The Decision appealed from is also AFFIRMED with respect to the
the search of their luggage to be conducted by NBI agents to determine if Pua and Lee are carrying shabu. It disposition of the prohibited drugs involved in the case.
appears that appellant Pua understands both English and Tagalog; he is born of a Filipino mother, had resided in
Vito Cruz, Manila, and gave his occupation as that of salesman. He admitted that he was asked to sign the SO ORDERED.
written consent, and that he did in fact sign it (TSN, May 28, 1992, pp. 33-34). His barefaced claim made during
his direct and cross examinations to the effect that he did not really read the consent but signed it right away,
and that by signing it he only meant to give permission for the NBI agents to enter the room (and not to search)
is hardly worthy of belief, considering that prior to the search, he seemed to have been extra careful about who
to let into the hotel room.

Thus, the full weight of the prosecution's testimonial evidence plus the large amount of prohibited drugs found,
must be given full force vis-a-vis Pua's claim of innocent presence in the hotel room, which is weak and not
worthy of credence.

Re: Appellant Paul Lee @ "Paul Leung"

Appellant Lee's situation is different from that of Pua. We agree with the Solicitor General when he noted that
the trial judge did not exert sufficient effort to make available compulsory process and to see to it that accused-
appellant Lee was given his day in court. It is clear that appellant Lee was effectively denied his right to counsel,
for although he was provided with one, he could not understand and communicate with him concerning his
defense such that, among other things, no memorandum was filed on his behalf; further, he was denied his right
to have compulsory process to guarantee the availability of witnesses and the production of evidence on his
behalf, including the services of a qualified and competent interpreter to enable him to present his
testimony.3 7 In sum, he was denied due process. For this reason, we hold that the case as against Lee must be
remanded to the court of origin for a re-trial.

Epilogue

It is evident and clear to us that the NBI agents gravely mishandled the drug bust operation and in the process
violated the constitutional guarantees against unlawful arrests and illegal searches and seizures. Because of the
large haul of illegal drugs that the government officers claimed to have recovered, this Court agonized over the
case before us and struggled to apply the law with an even hand. In the final analysis, we in the administration
of justice would have no right to expect ordinary people to be law-abiding if we do not insist on the full
protection of their rights. Some lawmen, prosecutors and judges may still tend to gloss over an illegal search and
seizure as long as the law enforcers show the alleged evidence of the crime regardless of the methods by which
they were obtained. This kind of attitude condones law-breaking in the name of law enforcement. Ironically, it
only fosters the more rapid breakdown of our system of justice, and the eventual denigration of society. While
this Court appreciates and encourages the efforts of law enforcers to uphold the law and to preserve the peace
and security of society, we nevertheless admonish them to act with deliberate care and within the parameters
set by the Constitution and the law. Truly, the end never justifies the means.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, accused-appellant Antolin Cuizon y Ortega is hereby
ACQUITTED on constitutional grounds. His immediate release is ordered unless he is detained for other valid
causes. Accused-appellant Steve Pua y Clofas is hereby found GUILTY of the crime of Illegal Transport of