Sanlakas v Executive Secretary
indefinite period.
DOCTRINE:
The declaration of a state of rebellion amounts to a
declaration of martial law and, therefore, is a
circumvention of the report requirement, is a leap of logic.
There is no indication that military tribunals have replaced
civil courts in the "theater of war" or that military
authorities have taken over the functions of civil
government. There is no allegation of curtailment of civil
or political rights. There is no indication that the President
has exercised judicial and legislative powers. In short,
there is no illustration that the President has attempted to
exercise or has exercised martial law powers.
The President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in
calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a
wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief
powers.
FACTS:
They came in the middle of the night. Armed with high-
powered ammunitions and explosives, some 300 junior
officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premiere
apartments in Makati City in the wee hours of July 27,
2003. Bewailing the corruption in the AFP, the soldiers
demanded, among other things, the resignation of the
President, the Secretary of Defense and the Chief of the
Philippine National Police (PNP).
In the wake of the Oakwood occupation, the President
issued later in the day Proclamation No. 427 and General
Order No. 4, both declaring "a state of rebellion"
thereafter, she issued GENERAL ORDER NO. 4 directing
officers and men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
and the Philippine National Police to immediately carry
out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to
suppress and quell the rebellion with due regard to
constitutional rights.
By the evening of July 27, 2003, the Oakwood occupation
had ended. After hours-long negotiations, the soldiers
agreed to return to barracks. The President, however, did
not immediately lift the declaration of a state of rebellion
and did so only on August 1, 2003, through Proclamation
No. 435:DECLARING THAT THE STATE OF REBELLION
HAS CEASED TO EXIST
In G.R. No. 159085 (Sanlakas and PM v. Executive Secretary,
et al.), party-list organizations Sanlakas and Partido ng
Manggagawa (PM), contend that Section 18, Article VII of
the Constitution does not require the declaration of a state
of rebellion to call out the armed forces. They further
submit that, because of the cessation of the Oakwood
occupation, there exists no sufficient factual basis for the
proclamation by the President of a state of rebellion for an
Petitioners in G.R. No. 159103 (SJS Officers/Members v.
Hon. Executive Secretary, et al.) are officers/members of
the Social Justice Society (SJS), "Filipino citizens, taxpayers,
law professors and bar reviewers." Like Sanlakas and PM,
they claim that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution
does not authorize the declaration of a state of
rebellion.6 They contend that the declaration is a
"constitutional anomaly" that "confuses, confounds and
misleads" because "[o]verzealous public officers, acting
pursuant to such proclamation or general order, are liable
to violate the constitutional right of private citizens."
Petitioners also submit that the proclamation is a
circumvention of the report requirement under the same
Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President to
submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from the
proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that the
presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise
of emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any
such power to the President.
In G.R. No. 159185 (Rep. Suplico et al. v. President
Macapagal-Arroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo),
petitioners brought suit as citizens and as Members of the
House of Representatives whose rights, powers and
functions were allegedly affected by the declaration of a
state of rebellion. Petitioners do not challenge the power of
the President to call out the Armed Forces. They argue,
however, that the declaration of a state of rebellion is a
"superfluity," and is actually an exercise of emergency
powers. Such exercise, it is contended, amounts to a
usurpation of the power of Congress granted by Section 23
(2), Article VI of the Constitution.
In G.R. No. 159196 (Pimentel v. Romulo, et al.), petitioner
Senator assails the subject presidential issuances as "an
unwarranted, illegal and abusive exercise of a martial law
power that has no basis under the Constitution." In the
main, petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of
rebellion "opens the door to the unconstitutional
implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime of
rebellion.
Required to comment, the Solicitor General argues that the
petitions have been rendered moot by the lifting of the
declaration. In addition, the Solicitor General questions the
standing of the petitioners to bring suit.
ISSUE: W/N the President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
declared martial law
RULING: No. The president merely declare a state
rebellion and it does not amount to declaration of
martial law
Lay to rest the validity of the declaration of a state of
rebellion in the exercise of the President's calling out
power, the mootness of the petitions notwithstanding.
That petitioner SJS officers/members are taxpayers and
citizens does not necessarily endow them with standing. A
taxpayer may bring suit where the act complained of
directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds
derived from taxation. No such illegal disbursement is
alleged.
On the other hand, a citizen will be allowed to raise a
constitutional question only when he can show that he has
personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a
result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government;
the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and
the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
Again, no such injury is alleged in this case.
Even granting these petitioners have standing on the
ground that the issues they raise are of transcendental
importance, the petitions must fail.
It is true that for the purpose of exercising the calling out
power the Constitution does not require the President to
make a declaration of a state of rebellion. Section 18,
Article VII provides:
Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of
all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces
to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion.
The above provision grants the President, as Commander-
in-Chief, a "sequence" of "graduated power[s]." From the
most to the least benign, these are: the calling out power,
the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, and the power to declare martial law. In the
exercise of the latter two powers, the Constitution requires
the concurrence of two conditions, namely, an actual
invasion or rebellion, and that public safety requires the
exercise of such power. However, as we observed
in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 32 "[t]hese
conditions are not required in the exercise of the calling
out power. The only criterion is that 'whenever it becomes
necessary,' the President may call the armed forces 'to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion.'"
Nevertheless, it is equally true that Section 18, Article VII
does not expressly prohibit the President from declaring a
state of rebellion. Note that the Constitution vests the
President not only with Commander-in-Chief powers but,
first and foremost, with Executive powers. In the course of
time, the U.S. President's power to call out armed forces
and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus without prior legislative approval, in case of
invasion, insurrection, or rebellion came to be recognized
and accepted. The United States introduced the expanded
presidential powers in the Philippines through the
Philippine Bill of 1902. Later, the grant of the power was
incorporated in the Constitution.
Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
states: "The executive power shall be vested in the
President…."
Thus, the plenitude of the powers of the presidency equips
the occupant with the means to address exigencies or
threats which undermine the very existence of
government or the integrity of the State.
The President's authority to declare a state of rebellion
springs in the main from her powers as chief executive
and, at the same time, draws strength from her
Commander-in-Chief powers. Indeed, as the Solicitor
General accurately points out, statutory authority for such
a declaration may be found in Section 4, Chapter 2
(Ordinance Power), Book III (Office of the President) of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1987, which states:
SEC. 4. Proclamations. – Acts of the President fixing a date
or declaring a status or condition of public moment or
interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a
specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be
promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of
an executive order.
The foregoing discussion notwithstanding, in calling out
the armed forces, a declaration of a state of rebellion is an
utter superfluity. At most, it only gives notice to the nation
that such a state exists and that the armed forces may be
called to prevent or suppress it. Perhaps the declaration
may wreak emotional effects upon the perceived enemies
of the State, even on the entire nation. But this Court's
mandate is to probe only into the legal consequences of the
declaration. This Court finds that such a declaration is
devoid of any legal significance. For all legal intents, the
declaration is deemed not written.
Should there be any "confusion" generated by the issuance
of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, we
clarify that, as the dissenters in Lacson correctly pointed
out, the mere declaration of a state of rebellion cannot
diminish or violate constitutionally protected rights.
Indeed, if a state of martial law does not suspend the
operation of the Constitution or automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, then it is with more
reason that a simple declaration of a state of rebellion
could not bring about these conditions. At any rate, the
presidential issuances themselves call for the suppression
of the rebellion "with due regard to constitutional rights."
For the same reasons, apprehensions that the military and
police authorities may resort to warrantless arrests are
likewise unfounded. In Lacson vs. Perez, supra, majority of
the Court held that "[i]n quelling or suppressing the
rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless
arrests of persons suspected of rebellion, as provided
under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if the
circumstances so warrant. The warrantless arrest feared
by petitioners is, thus, not based on the declaration of a
'state of rebellion.' In other words, a person may be
subjected to a warrantless arrest for the crime of rebellion
whether or not the President has declared a state of
rebellion, so long as the requisites for a valid warrantless
arrest are present.
It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary
power to call out the armed forces and to determine the
necessity for the exercise of such power. While the Court
may examine whether the power was exercised within
constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave
abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by
way of proof, supported their assertion that the President
acted without factual basis.
The argument that the declaration of a state of
rebellion amounts to a declaration of martial law and,
therefore, is a circumvention of the report
requirement, is a leap of logic. There is no indication
that military tribunals have replaced civil courts in the
"theater of war" or that military authorities have
taken over the functions of civil government. There is
no allegation of curtailment of civil or political rights.
There is no indication that the President has exercised
judicial and legislative powers. In short, there is no
illustration that the President has attempted to
exercise or has exercised martial law powers.
The President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in
calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a
wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-
Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested
on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as
opposed to the delegated legislative powers
contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI.
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th
Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo
issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency.
She cited the following facts as bases:
In January 2006, Captain Nathaniel Rabonza and First
Lieutenants Sonny Sarmiento, Lawrence San Juan and
Patricio Bumidang, members of the Magdalo Group
indicted in the Oakwood mutiny, escaped their detention
cell in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City. In a public statement,
they vowed to remain defiant and to elude arrest at all
costs. They called upon the people to "show and proclaim
our displeasure at the sham regime. Let us demonstrate our
disgust, not only by going to the streets in protest, but also
by wearing red bands on our left arms."
On February 17, 2006, the authorities got hold of a
document entitled "Oplan Hackle I " which detailed plans
for bombings and attacks during the Philippine Military
Academy Alumni Homecoming in Baguio City and to
assassinate selected targets including some cabinet
members and President Arroyo herself. Upon the advice of
her security, President Arroyo decided not to attend the
Alumni Homecoming. The next day, at the height of the
celebration, a bomb was found and detonated at the PMA
parade ground.
On February 21, 2006, Lt. San Juan was recaptured in a
communist safehouse in Batangas province. Found in his
possession were 2 flash disks containing minutes of the
meetings between members of the Magdalo Group and the
NPA, a tape recorder, audio cassette cartridges, diskettes,
and copies of subversive documents. Prior to his arrest, Lt.
San Juan announced through DZRH that the "Magdalo's D-
Day would be on February 24, 2006, the 20th Anniversary of
Edsa I."
On February 23, 2006, PNP Chief Arturo Lomibao
intercepted information that members of the PNP - Special
Action Force were planning to defect. Thus, he
immediately ordered SAF Commanding General Marcelino
Franco, Jr. to "disavow" any defection.
On the same day, at the house of former Congressman
Peping Cojuangco, President Cory Aquino's brother,
businessmen and mid-level government officials plotted
moves to bring down the Arroyo administration. Nelly
Sindayen of TIME Magazine reported that Pastor Saycon,
longtime Arroyo critic, called a U.S. government official
about his group's plans if President Arroyo is ousted.
Saycon also phoned a man code-named Delta. Saycon
identified him as B/Gen. Danilo Lim, Commander of the
Army's elite Scout Ranger. Lim said "it was all systems go
for the planned movement against Arroyo."
B/Gen. Danilo Lim and Brigade Commander Col. Ariel
Querubin confided to Gen. Generoso Senga, Chief of Staff of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), that a huge
number of soldiers would join the rallies to provide a
critical mass and armed component to the Anti-Arroyo
protests to be held on February 24, 2005. According to
these 2 officers, there was no way they could possibly stop
the soldiers because they too, were breaking the chain of
command to join the forces foist to unseat the President.
However, Gen. Senga has remained faithful to his
Commander-in-Chief and to the chain of command. He
immediately took custody of B/Gen. Lim.
Earlier, the CPP-NPA called for intensification of political
and revolutionary work within the military and the police
establishments in order to forge alliances with its
members and key officials. NPA spokesman Gregorio "Ka
Roger" Rosal declared: "The Communist Party and
revolutionary movement and the entire people look forward
to the possibility in the coming year of accomplishing its
immediate task of bringing down the Arroyo regime”
On the other hand, Cesar Renerio, spokesman for the
National Democratic Front (NDF) at North Central
Mindanao, publicly announced: "Anti-Arroyo groups within
the military and police are growing rapidly, hastened by the
economic difficulties suffered by the families of AFP officers
and enlisted personnel who undertake counter-insurgency
operations in the field." He claimed that with the forces of
the national democratic movement, the anti-Arroyo
conservative political parties, coalitions, plus the groups
that have been reinforcing since June 2005, it is probable
that the President's ouster is nearing its concluding stage
in the first half of 2006.
Respondents further claimed that the bombing of
telecommunication towers and cell sites in Bulacan and
Bataan was also considered as additional factual basis for
the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. So is the raid of an
army outpost in Benguet resulting in the death of three (3)
soldiers. And also the directive of the Communist Party of
the Philippines ordering its front organizations to join
5,000 Metro Manila radicals and 25,000 more from the
provinces in mass protests.
By midnight of February 23, 2006, the President convened
her security advisers and several cabinet members to
assess the gravity of the fermenting peace and order
situation. She directed both the AFP and the PNP to
account for all their men and ensure that the chain of
command remains solid and undivided. To protect the
young students from any possible trouble that might break
loose on the streets, the President suspended classes in all
levels in the entire NCR.
Thereafter on February 24, 2006 the President Arroyo
issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency.
On the same day, the President issued G. O. No. 5 directing
the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Chief of the PNP, as
well as the officers and men of the AFP and PNP, to
immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate
actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of
terrorism and lawless violence.
AFTER ISSUANCE OF PP & GO
-The Office of the President announced the cancellation of
all programs and activities related to the 20th anniversary
celebration of Edsa People Power I; and revoked the
permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local
governments.
-Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor announced
that "warrantless arrests and take-over of facilities,
including media, can already be implemented."
-Undeterred by the announcements that rallies and public
assemblies would not be allowed, groups of protesters
(members of Kilusang Mayo Uno [KMU] and National
Federation of Labor Unions - Kilusang Mayo Uno [NAFLU-
KMU]), marched from various parts of Metro Manila with
the intention of converging at the EDSA shrine.
-Those who were already near the EDSA site were
violently dispersed by huge clusters of anti-riot police. The
well-trained policemen used truncheons, big fiber glass
shields, water cannons, and tear gas to stop and break up
the marching groups, and scatter the massed participants.
The same police action was used against the protesters
marching forward to Cubao, Quezon City and to the corner
of Santolan Street and EDSA. That same evening, hundreds
of riot policemen broke up an EDSA celebration rally held
along Ayala Avenue and Paseo de Roxas Street in Makati
City.
According to petitioner Kilusang Mayo Uno, the police cited
PP 1017 as the ground for the dispersal of their
assemblies.
-During the dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA, police
arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a
professor at the University of the Philippines and
newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his companion,
Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan.
-At around 12:20 in the early morning of February 25,
2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017
and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila.
-The raiding team confiscated news stories by reporters,
documents, pictures, and mock-ups of the Saturday issue.
Policemen from Camp Crame in Quezon City were
stationed inside the editorial and business offices of the
newspaper; while policemen from the Manila Police
District were stationed outside the building.
A few minutes after the search and seizure at the Daily
Tribune offices, the police surrounded the premises of
another pro-opposition paper, Malaya, and its sister
publication, the tabloid Abante.
The raid, according to Presidential Chief of Staff Michael
Defensor, is"meant to show a 'strong presence,' to tell media
outlets not to connive or do anything that would help the
rebels in bringing down this government." The PNP warned
that it would take over any media organization that would
not follow "standards set by the government during the
state of national emergency." Director General Lomibao
stated that "if they do not follow the standards' and the
standards are - if they would contribute to instability in the
government, or if they do not subscribe to what is in General
Order No. 5 and Proc. No. 1017 'we will recommend a
'takeover.' " National Telecommunications' Commissioner
Ronald Solis urged television and radio networks
to "cooperate" with the government for the duration of the
state of national emergency. He asked for "balanced
reporting" from broadcasters when covering the events
surrounding the coup attempt foiled by the government.
He warned that his agency will not hesitate to recommend
the closure of any broadcast outfit that violates rules set
out for media coverage when the national security is
threatened.14
-Also, on February 25, 2006, the police arrested
Congressman Crispin Beltran, representing
the Anakpawis Party and Chairman of Kilusang Mayo
Uno (KMU), while leaving his farmhouse in Bulacan. The
police showed a warrant for his arrest dated 1985.
Beltran's lawyer explained that the warrant, which
stemmed from a case of inciting to rebellion filed during
the Marcos regime, had long been quashed. Beltran,
however, is not a party in any of these petitions.
-2 members of KMU were arrested and detained after they
went to Camp Crame to visit Beltran, while the rest were
dispersed by the police.
Bayan Muna Representative Satur Ocampo eluded arrest
when the police went after him during a public forum at
the Sulo Hotel in Quezon City. But his 2 drivers, identified
as Roel and Art, were taken into custody.
-Retired Major General Ramon Montaño, former head of
the Philippine Constabulary, was arrested while with his
wife and golfmates at the Orchard Golf and Country Club in
Dasmariñas, Cavite.
-Attempts were made to arrest Anakpawis Representative
Satur Ocampo, Representative Rafael Mariano, Bayan
Muna Representative Teodoro Casiño and Gabriela
Representative Liza Maza. Bayan Muna Representative
Josel Virador was arrested at the PAL Ticket Office in
Davao City. Later, he was turned over to the custody of the
House of Representatives where the "Batasan 5" decided
to stay indefinitely.
On March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP 1021
declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased
to exist.
In the interim, these seven (7) petitions challenging the
constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 were filed with
this Court against the above-named respondents.
G.R. No. 171396, petitioners Randolf S. David, et al.
assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on
the emergency powers of Congress; (2) itis a subterfuge to
avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition of
martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of
assembly.
In G.R. No. 171409, petitioners Ninez Cacho-Olivares
and TribunePublishing Co., Inc. challenged the CIDG's act of
raiding the Daily Tribuneoffices as a clear case of
"censorship" or "prior restraint." They also claimed that
the term "emergency" refers only to tsunami, typhoon,
hurricane and similar occurrences, hence, there is
"absolutely no emergency" that warrants the issuance of PP
1017.
In G.R. No. 171485, petitioners herein are Representative
Francis Joseph G. Escudero, and twenty one (21) other
members of the House of Representatives, including
Representatives Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, Teodoro
Casiño, Liza Maza, and Josel Virador. They asserted that PP
1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitute "usurpation of legislative
powers"; "violation of freedom of expression" and "a
declaration of martial law." They alleged that President
Arroyo "gravely abused her discretion in calling out the
armed forces without clear and verifiable factual basis of the
possibility of lawless violence and a showing that there is
necessity to do so."
In G.R. No. 171483,petitioners KMU, NAFLU-KMU, and
their members averred that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are
unconstitutional because (1) they arrogate unto President
Arroyo the power to enact laws and decrees; (2) their
issuance was without factual basis; and (3) they violate
freedom of expression and the right of the people to
peaceably assemble to redress their grievances.
In G.R. No. 171400, petitioner Alternative Law Groups,
Inc. (ALGI) alleged that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are
unconstitutional because they violate (a) Section 415 of
Article II, (b) Sections 1,16 2,17 and 418 of Article
III, (c) Section 2319 of Article VI, and (d) Section 1720 of
Article XII of the Constitution.
In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz et
al., alleged that PP 1017 is an "arbitrary and unlawful
exercise by the President of her Martial Law powers." And
assuming that PP 1017 is not really a declaration of Martial
Law, petitioners argued that "it amounts to an exercise by
the President of emergency powers without congressional
approval." In addition, petitioners asserted that PP 1017
"goes beyond the nature and function of a proclamation as
defined under the Revised Administrative Code."
And lastly, in G.R. No. 171424,petitionerLoren B. Legarda
maintained that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are
"unconstitutional for being violative of the freedom of
expression, including its cognate rights such as freedom of
the press and the right to access to information on matters
of public concern, all guaranteed under Article III, Section 4
of the 1987 Constitution." In this regard, she stated that
these issuances prevented her from fully prosecuting her
election protest pending before the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal.
In respondents' Consolidated Comment, the Solicitor
General countered that: first, the petitions should be
dismissed for being moot; second,petitioners in G.R. NOS.
171400 (ALGI), 171424 (Legarda), 171483 (KMU et al.),
171485 (Escudero et al.) and 171489 (Cadiz et al.) have no
legal standing; third, it is not necessary for petitioners to
implead President Arroyo as respondent; fourth, PP 1017
has constitutional and legal basis; and fifth, PP 1017 does
not violate the people's right to free expression and
redress of grievances. Respondents stated that the
proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the
conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents
of the New People's Army (NPA), and some members of
the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate
President Arroyo.4They considered the aim to oust or
assassinate the President and take-over the reigns of
government as a clear and present danger. The Solicitor
General argued that the intent of the Constitution is to give
full discretionary powers to the President in determining
the necessity of calling out the armed forces. He
emphasized that none of the petitioners has shown that PP
1017 was without factual bases.
ISSUE: Whether PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are
unconstitutional.
RULING: PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes
a call by the President for the AFP to prevent or
suppress lawless violence. The proclamation is sustained
by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution and the
relevant jurisprudence discussed earlier. However, PP
1017’s extraneous provisions giving the President express
or implied power (1) to issue decrees; (2) to direct the AFP
to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to
lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by the
President; and (3) to impose standards on media or any
form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra
vires and unconstitutional. The Court also rules that
under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the
President, in the absence of a legislation, cannot take over
privately-owned public utility and private business
affected with public interest.
The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into
three important provisions, thus:
First provision:
"by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18,
Artilce VII … do hereby command the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the
Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless
violence as well any act of insurrection or rebellion"
Second provision:
"and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees,
orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or
upon my direction;"
Third provision:
"as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution
do hereby declare a State of National Emergency."
First Provision: Calling-out Power
The first provision pertains to the President’s calling-out
power.
Under the calling-out power, the President may summon
the armed forces to aid him in suppressing lawless
violence, invasion and rebellion. This involves ordinary
police action. But every act that goes beyond the
President’s calling-out power is considered illegal or ultra
vires. For this reason, a President must be careful in the
exercise of his powers. He cannot invoke a greater power
when he wishes to act under a lesser power. There lies the
wisdom of our Constitution, the greater the power, the
greater are the limitations.
It is pertinent to state, however, that there is a distinction
between the President’s authority to declare a "state of
rebellion" (in Sanlakas) and the authority to proclaim a
state of national emergency. While President Arroyo’s
authority to declare a "state of rebellion" emanates from
her powers as Chief Executive
President Arroyo’s declaration of a "state of rebellion" was
merely an act declaring a status or condition of public
moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4
cited above. Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is
harmless, without legal significance, and deemed not
written. In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In
declaring a state of national emergency, President Arroyo
did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She also
relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the State’s
extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public
utility and business affected with public interest. Indeed,
PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power.
Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless,
without legal significance, or not written, as in the case
of Sanlakas.
Some of the petitioners vehemently maintain that PP 1017
is actually a declaration of Martial Law. It is no so. What
defines the character of PP 1017 are its wordings. It is
plain therein that what the President invoked was her
calling-out power.
The declaration of Martial Law is a "warn[ing] to citizens
that the military power has been called upon by the
executive to assist in the maintenance of law and order,
and that, while the emergency lasts, they must, upon pain
of arrest and punishment, not commit any acts which will
in any way render more difficult the restoration of order
and the enforcement of law."113
In his "Statement before the Senate Committee on Justice"
on March 13, 2006, Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,114an
authority in constitutional law, said that of the three
powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief, the
power to declare Martial Law poses the most severe threat
to civil liberties. It is a strong medicine which should not
be resorted to lightly. It cannot be used to stifle or
persecute critics of the government. It is placed in the
keeping of the President for the purpose of enabling him to
secure the people from harm and to restore order so that
they can enjoy their individual freedoms.
Ju stice Mendoza also stated that PP 1017 is not a
declaration of Martial Law. It is no more than a call by the
President to the armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence. As such, it cannot be used to justify acts
that only under a valid declaration of Martial Law can be
done. Its use for any other purpose is a perversion of its
nature and scope, and any act done contrary to its
command is ultra vires.
Justice Mendoza further stated that specifically, (a) arrests
and seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban on public
assemblies; (c) take-over of news media and agencies and
press censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees,
are powers which can be exercised by the President as
Commander-in-Chief only where there is a valid
declaration of Martial Law or suspension of the writ
of habeas corpus.
Based on the above disquisition, it is clear that PP 1017 is
not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise
of President Arroyo’s calling-out power for the armed
forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless
violence.
As the Executive in whom the executive power is
vested,115 the primary function of the President is to
enforce the laws as well as to formulate policies to be
embodied in existing laws. He sees to it that all laws are
enforced by the officials and employees of his department.
oners, especially Representatives Francis Joseph G.
Escudero, Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, Teodoro Casiño,
Liza Maza, and Josel Virador argue that PP 1017 is
unconstitutional as it arrogated upon President Arroyo the
power to enact laws and decrees in violation of Section 1,
Article VI of the Constitution, which vests the power to
enact laws in Congress. They assail the clause "to enforce
obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and
regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my
direction."
Petitioners’ contention is understandable. A reading of PP
1017 operative clause shows that it was lifted120 from
Former President Marcos’ Proclamation No. 1081, which
partly reads:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President
of the Philippines by virtue of the powers vested upon me
by Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph (2) of the
Constitution, do hereby place the entire Philippines as
defined in Article 1, Section 1 of the Constitution under
martial law and, in my capacity as their Commander-in-
Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the
Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless
violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion
and to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees,
orders and regulations promulgated by me personally
or upon my direction.
We all know that it was PP 1081 which granted President
Marcos legislative power. Its enabling clause states: "to
enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees, orders
and regulations promulgated by me personally or
upon my direction." Upon the other hand, the enabling
clause of PP 1017 issued by President Arroyo is: to
enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees,
orders and regulations promulgated by me personally
or upon my direction."
Is it within the domain of President Arroyo to promulgate
"decrees"?
PP 1017 states in part: "to enforce obedience to all the
laws and decrees x x x promulgated by me personally
or upon my direction."
The President is granted an Ordinance Power under
Chapter 2, Book III of Executive Order No. 292
(Administrative Code of 1987). She may issue any of the
following:
Sec. 2. Executive Orders. — Acts of the President providing
for rules of a general or permanent character in
implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory
powers shall be promulgated in executive orders.
Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. — Acts of the President
which relate to particular aspect of governmental
operations in pursuance of his duties as administrative
head shall be promulgated in administrative orders.
Sec. 4. Proclamations. — Acts of the President fixing a date
or declaring a status or condition of public moment or
interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a
specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be
promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force
of an executive order.
Sec. 5. Memorandum Orders. — Acts of the President on
matters of administrative detail or of subordinate or
temporary interest which only concern a particular officer
or office of the Government shall be embodied in
memorandum orders.
Sec. 6. Memorandum Circulars. — Acts of the President on
matters relating to internal administration, which the
President desires to bring to the attention of all or some of
the departments, agencies, bureaus or offices of the
Government, for information or compliance, shall be
embodied in memorandum circulars.
Sec. 7. General or Special Orders. — Acts and commands of
the President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be issued as general
or special orders.
President Arroyo’s ordinance power is limited to the
foregoing issuances. She cannot issue decrees similar to
those issued by Former President Marcos under PP 1081.
Presidential Decrees are laws which are of the same
category and binding force as statutes because they were
issued by the President in the exercise of his legislative
power during the period of Martial Law under the 1973
Constitution.121
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is
unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo
the authority to promulgate "decrees."
The import of this provision is that President Arroyo,
during the state of national emergency under PP 1017, can
call the military not only to enforce obedience "to all the
laws and to all decrees x x x" but also to act pursuant to the
provision of Section 17, Article XII which reads:
Sec. 17. In times of national emergency, when the public
interest so requires, the State may, during the emergency
and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily
take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned
public utility or business affected with public interest.
What could be the reason of President Arroyo in invoking
the above provision when she issued PP 1017?
The answer is simple. During the existence of the state of
national emergency, PP 1017 purports to grant the
President, without any authority or delegation from
Congress, to take over or direct the operation of any
privately-owned public utility or business affected with
public interest.
This provision was first introduced in the 1973
Constitution, as a product of the "martial law" thinking of
the 1971 Constitutional Convention.122 In effect at the time
of its approval was President Marcos’ Letter of Instruction
No. 2 dated September 22, 1972 instructing the Secretary
of National Defense to take over "the management, control
and operation of the Manila Electric Company, the
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, the National
Waterworks and Sewerage Authority, the Philippine
National Railways, the Philippine Air Lines, Air Manila (and)
Filipinas Orient Airways . . . for the successful prosecution by
the Government of its effort to contain, solve and end the
present national emergency."
Petitioners, particularly the members of the House of
Representatives, claim that President Arroyo’s inclusion of
Section 17, Article XII in PP 1017 is an encroachment on
the legislature’s emergency powers.
This is an area that needs delineation.
A distinction must be drawn between the President’s
authority to declare "a state of national emergency" and
to exercise emergency powers. To the first, as elucidated
by the Court, Section 18, Article VII grants the President
such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection
can be raised. But to the second, manifold constitutional
issues arise.
Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution reads:
SEC. 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both
Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall
have the sole power to declare the existence of a state
of war.
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the
Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a
limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may
prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to
carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner
withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers
shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of the
above provision refers not only to war but also to "other
national emergency." If the intention of the Framers of
our Constitution was to withhold from the President the
authority to declare a "state of national emergency"
pursuant to Section 18, Article VII (calling-out power) and
grant it to Congress (like the declaration of the existence of
a state of war), then the Framers could have provided so.
Clearly, they did not intend that Congress should first
authorize the President before he can declare a "state of
national emergency." The logical conclusion then is that
President Arroyo could validly declare the existence of a
state of national emergency even in the absence of a
Congressional enactment.
But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking
over of privately owned public utility or business affected
with public interest, is a different matter. This requires a
delegation from Congress.
Courts have often said that constitutional provisions
in pari materia are to be construed together. Otherwise
stated, different clauses, sections, and provisions of a
constitution which relate to the same subject matter will
be construed together and considered in the light of each
other.123 Considering that Section 17 of Article XII and
Section 23 of Article VI, previously quoted, relate to
national emergencies, they must be read together to
determine the limitation of the exercise of emergency
powers.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency
powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2),
Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the
President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power
not reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave
emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for
Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of
our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant
emergency powers to the President, subject to certain
conditions, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions
as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out
a national policy declared by Congress.
Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of
the emergency powers clause. The taking over of private
business affected with public interest is just another facet
of the emergency powers generally reposed upon
Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the "the State
may, during the emergency and under reasonable
terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct
the operation of any privately owned public utility or
business affected with public interest," it refers to
Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the
President may exercise such power is dependent on
whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law
prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.
“emergency," as contemplated in our Constitution, is of the
same breadth. It may include rebellion, economic crisis,
pestilence or epidemic, typhoon, flood, or other similar
catastrophe of nationwide proportions or effect.
Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII,
invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this Court
rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her during
the emergency to temporarily take over or direct the
operation of any privately owned public utility or business
affected with public interest without authority from
Congress.
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can
declare a state of national emergency, however, without
legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned
public utility or business affected with public interest. The
President cannot decide whether exceptional
circumstances exist warranting the take over of privately-
owned public utility or business affected with public
interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional
circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without
legislation, the President has no power to point out the
types of businesses affected with public interest that
should be taken over. In short, the President has no
absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State
under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an
emergency powers act passed by Congress.
PP 1017 is merely an invocation of the President’s calling-
out power. Its general purpose is to command the AFP to
suppress all forms of lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. It had accomplished the end desired which
prompted President Arroyo to issue PP 1021. But there is
nothing in PP 1017 allowing the police, expressly or
impliedly, to conduct illegal arrest, search or violate the
citizens’ constitutional rights.
Gudani v. Senga
DOCTRINE:
President as chief- commander; senate requires
officers of afp to appear bef its hearing tapos nag issue
ng order pres na hindi sila pwde pumunta w/o
President authority
ACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
Ampatuan v. Puno
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
On November 24, 2009, the day after the gruesome
massacre of 57 men and women, including some news
reporters, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Proclamation 1946,1 placing "the Provinces of
Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato
under a state of emergency." She directed the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National
Police (PNP) "to undertake such measures as may be
allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent and
suppress all incidents of lawless violence" in the named
places.
Three days later or on November 27, President Arroyo also
issued Administrative Order 273 (AO 273)2"transferring"
supervision of the Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM) from the Office of the President to the
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG). But,
due to issues raised over the terminology used in AO 273,
the President issued Administrative Order 273-A (AO 273-
A) amending the former, by "delegating" instead of
"transferring" supervision of the ARMM to the DILG.3
Claiming that the President’s issuances encroached on the
ARMM’s autonomy, petitioners Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan,
Ansaruddin Adiong, and Regie Sahali-Generale, all ARMM
officials,4 filed this petition for prohibition under Rule 65.
They alleged that the proclamation and the orders
empowered the DILG Secretary to take over ARMM’s
operations and seize the regional government’s powers
Petitioner ARMM officials claimed that the President had
no factual basis for declaring a state of emergency,
especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the City of
Cotabato, where no critical violent incidents occurred. The
deployment of troops and the taking over of the ARMM
constitutes an invalid exercise of the President’s
emergency powers.6 Petitioners asked that Proclamation
1946 as well as AOs 273 and 273-A be declared
unconstitutional and that respondents DILG Secretary, the
AFP, and the PNP be enjoined from implementing them.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) insisted that the
President issued Proclamation 1946, not to deprive the
ARMM of its autonomy, but to restore peace and order in
subject places.8She issued the proclamation pursuant to
her "calling out" power9 as Commander-in-Chief under the
first sentence of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution.
The determination of the need to exercise this power rests
solely on her wisdom.10 She must use her judgment based
on intelligence reports and such best information as are
available to her to call out the armed forces to suppress
and prevent lawless violence wherever and whenever
these reared their ugly heads.
On the other hand, the President merely delegated through
AOs 273 and 273-A her supervisory powers over the
ARMM to the DILG Secretary who was her alter ego any
way. These orders did not authorize a take over of the
ARMM. They did not give him blanket authority to suspend
or replace ARMM officials.11 The delegation was necessary
to facilitate the investigation of the mass
killings.12 Further, the assailed proclamation and
administrative orders did not provide for the exercise of
emergency powers.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not President Arroyo invalidly
exercised emergency powers when she called out the AFP
and the PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of
lawless violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and
Cotabato City- NO
(2) whether or not the President had factual bases for her
actions- YES
RULING:
(1)Petitioners contend that the President unlawfully
exercised emergency powers when she ordered the
deployment of AFP and PNP personnel in the places
mentioned in the proclamation.16 But such deployment is
not by itself an exercise of emergency powers as
understood under Section 23 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution, which provides:
SECTION 23. x x x (2) In times of war or other national
emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such
restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers
necessary and proper to carry out a declared national
policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the
Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next
adjournment thereof.
The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only
a state of emergency in the three places mentioned. And
she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress
that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The
calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence in such places is a power that the
Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not
need a congressional authority to exercise the same.
(2)The President’s call on the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence springs from the power vested
in her under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution,
which provides.17
SECTION 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-
Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. x x x
While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual
bases for the President’s exercise of the above power, 18 it
would generally defer to her judgment on the matter. As
the Court acknowledged in Integrated Bar of the
Philippines v. Hon. Zamora,19 it is clearly to the President
that the Constitution entrusts the determination of the
need for calling out the armed forces to prevent and
suppress lawless violence. Unless it is shown that such
determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion,
the Court will accord respect to the President’s judgment.
Thus, the Court said:
If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the
assertion that the President acted without factual basis,
then this Court cannot undertake an independent
investigation beyond the pleadings. The factual necessity
of calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable
and cannot be objectively established since matters
considered for satisfying the same is a combination of
several factors which are not always accessible to the
courts
The President, as Commander-in-Chief has a vast
intelligence network to gather information, some of which
may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the
security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call,
on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in
emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives
and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to
call out the military to prevent or suppress lawless
violence must be done swiftly and decisively if it were to
have any effect at all. x x x.20
Here, petitioners failed to show that the declaration of a
state of emergency in the Provinces of Maguindanao,
Sultan Kudarat and Cotabato City, as well as the
President’s exercise of the "calling out" power had no
factual basis. They simply alleged that, since not all areas
under the ARMM were placed under a state of emergency,
it follows that the take over of the entire ARMM by the
DILG Secretary had no basis too.21
But, apart from the fact that there was no such take over to
begin with, the OSG also clearly explained the factual bases
for the President’s decision to call out the armed forces, as
follows:
The Ampatuan and Mangudadatu clans are prominent
families engaged in the political control of Maguindanao. It
is also a known fact that both families have an arsenal of
armed followers who hold elective positions in various
parts of the ARMM and the rest of Mindanao.
Considering the fact that the principal victims of the brutal
bloodshed are members of the Mangudadatu family and
the main perpetrators of the brutal killings are members
and followers of the Ampatuan family, both the military
and police had to prepare for and prevent reported
retaliatory actions from the Mangudadatu clan and
additional offensive measures from the Ampatuan clan.
The Ampatuan forces are estimated to be approximately
two thousand four hundred (2,400) persons, equipped
with about two thousand (2,000) firearms, about four
hundred (400) of which have been accounted for. x x x
As for the Mangudadatus, they have an estimated one
thousand eight hundred (1,800) personnel, with about two
hundred (200) firearms. x x x
Apart from their own personal forces, both clans have
Special Civilian Auxiliary Army (SCAA) personnel who
support them: about five hundred (500) for the
Ampatuans and three hundred (300) for the
Mangudadatus.
What could be worse than the armed clash of two warring
clans and their armed supporters, especially in light of
intelligence reports on the potential involvement of rebel
armed groups (RAGs).
One RAG was reported to have planned an attack on the
forces of Datu Andal Ampatuan, Sr. to show support and
sympathy for the victims. The said attack shall worsen the
age-old territorial dispute between the said RAG and the
Ampatuan family.
On the other hand, RAG faction which is based in Sultan
Kudarat was reported to have received three million pesos
(₱3,000,000.00) from Datu Andal Ampatuan, Sr. for the
procurement of ammunition. The said faction is a force to
reckon with because the group is well capable of launching
a series of violent activities to divert the attention of the
people and the authorities away from the multiple murder
case. x x x
In addition, two other factions of a RAG are likely to
support the Mangudadatu family. The Cotabato-based
faction has the strength of about five hundred (500)
persons and three hundred seventy-two (372) firearms
while the Sultan Kudarat-based faction has the strength of
about four hundred (400) persons and three hundred
(300) firearms and was reported to be moving towards
Maguindanao to support the Mangudadatu clan in its
armed fight against the Ampatuans.22
In other words, the imminence of violence and anarchy at
the time the President issued Proclamation 1946 was too
grave to ignore and she had to act to prevent further
bloodshed and hostilities in the places mentioned.
Progress reports also indicated that there was movement
in these places of both high-powered firearms and armed
men sympathetic to the two clans.23 Thus, to pacify the
people’s fears and stabilize the situation, the President had
to take preventive action. She called out the armed forces
to control the proliferation of loose firearms and dismantle
the armed groups that continuously threatened the peace
and security in the affected places.
Fortun v. Arroyo
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
On November 23, 2009 heavily armed men, believed led by
the ruling Ampatuan family, gunned down and buried
under shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians on a highway in
Maguindanao. In response to this carnage, on November
24 President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation
1946, declaring a state of emergency in Maguindanao,
Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City to prevent and suppress
similar lawless violence in Central Mindanao.
Believing that she needed greater authority to put order in
Maguindanao and secure it from large groups of persons
that have taken up arms against the constituted authorities
in the province, on December 4, 2009 President Arroyo
issued Presidential Proclamation 1959 declaring martial
law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in that province except for identified areas of the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front.
Two days later or on December 6, 2009 President Arroyo
submitted her report to Congress in accordance with
Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which
required her, within 48 hours from the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, to submit to that body a report in person or
in writing of her action.
In her report, President Arroyo said that she acted based
on her finding that lawless men have taken up arms in
Maguindanao and risen against the government. The
President described the scope of the uprising, the nature,
quantity, and quality of the rebels’ weaponry, the
movement of their heavily armed units in strategic
positions, the closure of the Maguindanao Provincial
Capitol, Ampatuan Municipal Hall, Datu Unsay Municipal
Hall, and 14 other municipal halls, and the use of armored
vehicles, tanks, and patrol cars with unauthorized
"PNP/Police" markings.
On December 9, 2009 Congress, in joint session, convened
pursuant to Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
to review the validity of the President’s action. But, two
days later or on December 12 before Congress could act,
the President issued Presidential Proclamation 1963,
lifting martial law and restoring the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in Maguindanao.
Petitioners Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun and the other
petitioners in G.R. 190293, 190294, 190301,190302,
190307, 190356, and 190380 brought the present actions
to challenge the constitutionality of President Arroyo’s
Proclamation 1959 affecting Maguindanao. But, given the
prompt lifting of that proclamation before Congress could
review it and before any serious question affecting the
rights and liberties of Maguindanao’s inhabitants could
arise, the Court deems any review of its constitutionality
the equivalent of beating a dead horse.
ISSUE: W/N the court may review the factual basis of
the President for declaration of martial law
RULING: No
constitutionality of Proclamation 1959 is not unavoidable
for two reasons:
One. President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of
martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus before the joint houses of Congress could
fulfill their automatic duty to review and validate or
invalidate the same. The pertinent provisions of Section
18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution state:
Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of
all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public
safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty
days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or
place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial
law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of writ of
habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in
person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting
jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in
regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation
or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by
the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the
Congress may, in the same manner, extend such
proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined
by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist
and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four
hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene
in accordance with its rules without any need of a call.
Although the above vests in the President the power to
proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, he shares such power with the Congress.
Thus:
1. The President’s proclamation or suspension is
temporary, good for only 60 days;
2. He must, within 48 hours of the proclamation or
suspension, report his action in person or in writing to
Congress;
3. Both houses of Congress, if not in session must jointly
convene within 24 hours of the proclamation or
suspension for the purpose of reviewing its validity; and
4. The Congress, voting jointly, may revoke or affirm the
President’s proclamation or suspension, allow their
limited effectivity to lapse, or extend the same if Congress
deems warranted.
It is evident that under the 1987 Constitution the
President and the Congress act in tandem in exercising the
power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise the power, not
only sequentially, but in a sense jointly since, after the
President has initiated the proclamation or the suspension,
only the Congress can maintain the same based on its own
evaluation of the situation on the ground, a power that the
President does not have.
Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the
Supreme Court the power to review the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper
suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow Congress to
exercise its own review powers, which is automatic rather
than initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its express
duty to defend the Constitution through such review
should the Supreme Court step in as its final rampart. The
constitutional validity of the President’s proclamation of
martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is
first a political question in the hands of Congress before it
becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court.
Here, President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959
before the joint houses of Congress, which had in fact
convened, could act on the same. Consequently, the
petitions in these cases have become moot and the Court
has nothing to review. The lifting of martial law and
restoration of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
Maguindanao was a supervening event that obliterated
any justiciable controversy.2
Two. Since President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation
of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in just eight days, they have not been
meaningfully implemented. The military did not take over
the operation and control of local government units in
Maguindanao. The President did not issue any law or
decree affecting Maguindanao that should ordinarily be
enacted by Congress. No indiscriminate mass arrest had
been reported. Those who were arrested during the period
were either released or promptly charged in court. Indeed,
no petition for habeas corpus had been filed with the Court
respecting arrests made in those eight days. The point is
that the President intended by her action to address an
uprising in a relatively small and sparsely populated
province. In her judgment, the rebellion was localized and
swiftly disintegrated in the face of a determined and amply
armed government presence.
Here, however, the Court has not bothered to examine the
evidence upon which President Arroyo acted in issuing
Proclamation 1959, precisely because it felt no need to, the
proclamation having been withdrawn within a few days of
its issuance.
Justice Antonio T. Carpio points out in his dissenting
opinion the finding of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City that no probable cause exist that the accused
before it committed rebellion in Maguindanao since the
prosecution failed to establish the elements of the crime.
But the Court cannot use such finding as basis for striking
down the President’s proclamation and suspension.
For, firstly, the Court did not delegate and could not
delegate to the RTC of Quezon City its power to determine
the factual basis for the presidential proclamation and
suspension. Secondly, there is no showing that the RTC of
Quezon City passed upon the same evidence that the
President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces,
had in her possession when she issued the proclamation
and suspension.
The Court does not resolve purely academic questions to
satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually
challenging these are.5 This is especially true, said the
Court in Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities
v. Secretary of Education,6 where the issues "reach
constitutional dimensions, for then there comes into play
regard for the court’s duty to avoid decision of
constitutional issues unless avoidance becomes evasion."
The Court’s duty is to steer clear of declaring
unconstitutional the acts of the Executive or the Legislative
department, given the assumption that it carefully studied
those acts and found them consistent with the
fundamental law before taking them. "To doubt is to
sustain."7
Notably, under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution, the Court has only 30 days from the filing of
an appropriate proceeding to review the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Thus –
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or
the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision
thereon within thirty days from its filing. (Emphasis
supplied)
More than two years have passed since petitioners filed
the present actions to annul Proclamation
1959.1âwphi1 When the Court did not decide it then, it
actually opted for a default as was its duty, the question
having become moot and academic.
Justice Carpio of course points out that should the Court
regard the powers of the President and Congress
respecting the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus as
sequential or joint, it would be impossible for the Court to
exercise its power of review within the 30 days given it.
But those 30 days, fixed by the Constitution, should be
enough for the Court to fulfill its duty without pre-empting
congressional action. Section 18, Article VII, requires the
President to report his actions to Congress, in person or in
writing, within 48 hours of such proclamation or
suspension. In turn, the Congress is required to convene
without need of a call within 24 hours following the
President’s proclamation or suspension. Clearly, the
Constitution calls for quick action on the part of the
Congress. Whatever form that action takes, therefore,
should give the Court sufficient time to fulfill its own
mandate to review the factual basis of the proclamation or
suspension within 30 days of its issuance.
If the Congress procrastinates or altogether fails to fulfill
its duty respecting the proclamation or suspension within
the short time expected of it, then the Court can step in,
hear the petitions challenging the President’s action, and
ascertain if it has a factual basis. If the Court finds none,
then it can annul the proclamation or the suspension. But
what if the 30 days given it by the Constitution proves
inadequate? Justice Carpio himself offers the answer in his
dissent: that 30-day period does not operate to divest this
Court of its jurisdiction over the case. The settled rule is
that jurisdiction once acquired is not lost until the case has
been terminated.
The problem in this case is that the President aborted the
proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao in
just eight days. In a real sense, the proclamation and the
suspension never took off. The Congress itself adjourned
without touching the matter, it having become moot and
academic.
Of course, the Court has in exceptional cases passed upon
issues that ordinarily would have been regarded as moot.
But the present cases do not present sufficient basis for the
exercise of the power of judicial review. The proclamation
of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus in this case, unlike similar
Presidential acts in the late 60s and early 70s, appear more
like saber-rattling than an actual deployment and arbitrary
use of political power.
Sanlakas v Exec Sec.
In the wee hours of July 27, 2003, three hundred twenty-
three (323) junior officers and enlisted men of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) took over the Oakwood
Premier Apartments, Ayala Center, Makati City.
Introducing themselves as the "Magdalo Group," they
claimed that they went to Oakwood to air their grievances
about graft and corruption in the military, the sale of arms
and ammunitions to the "enemies" of the state, the
bombings in Davao City allegedly ordered by Gen. Victor
Corpus, then Chief of the Intelligence Service of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP), the increased military
assistance from the United States, and
"micromanagement" in the AFP by Gen. Angelo Reyes, then
Secretary of the Department of National Defense.3 The
military men demanded the resignation of the President,
the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of the
Philippine National Police.
At about 9:00 A.M. of the same day, President Arroyo gave
the Magdalo Group until 5:00 P.M. to give up their
positions peacefully and return to the barracks. At around
1:00 P.M., she issued Proclamation No. 427 and General
Order No. 4 declaring the existence of a "state of rebellion"
and calling out the AFP to suppress the rebellion.
Shortly before the 5:00 P.M. deadline, President Arroyo
announced an extension until 7:00 P.M. During the two-
hour reprieve, negotiations between the Magdalo Group
and various personalities took place. The rebels agreed to
return to the barracks. They left the Oakwood premises at
11:00 P.M.
On July 28, 2003, Agents of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) searched the house owned by Ramon
Cardenas at 2177 Paraiso St., Dasmariñas Village, Makati
City. After the raid and the recovery of evidence claimed to
link him to rebellion, Cardenas, accompanied by Atty. Rene
Saguisag, went to the CIDG in Camp Crame. On the same
day, Cardenas was brought to the Department of Justice for
inquest proceeding. He was later charged with the crime of
rebellion.
The Mandaluyong City Police likewise searched the
townhouses belonging to Laarni Enriquez, allegedly used
as staging areas by the Magdalo Group.
On August 1, 2003, President Arroyo lifted her declaration
of a state of rebellion through Proclamation No. 435.
Meanwhile, on August 4, 2003, Secretary Jose Lina, Jr. of
the Department of the Interior and Local Government,
forwarded to the DOJ the affidavit-complaint for coup
d'etat of PC Chief Superintendent Eduardo Matillano
against Senator Gregorio Honasan, Ernesto Macahiya,
George Duldulao and several "John and Jane Does"
numbering about 1,000.
On August 8, 2003, PNP Chief Inspector Jesus Fernandez of
the Eastern Police District referred to the DOJ an
investigation report recommending that Enriquez and a
certain Romy Escalona be prosecuted for rebellion and
insurrection.
David v Arroyo [consolidated case w/ David v Ermita]
(Topic: declaration of state rebellion vs. declaration of
state of national emergency)
X Gudani v Senga (President as chief- commander; senate
requires officers of AFP to appear bef its hearing tapos nag
issue ng order pres na hindi sila pwde pumunta w/o
President authority)
Ampatuan v Puno
The Ampatuan and Mangudadatu clans are prominent
families engaged in the political control of Maguindanao. It
is also a known fact that both families have an arsenal of
armed followers who hold elective positions in various
parts of the ARMM and the rest of Mindanao.
Considering the fact that the principal victims of the brutal
bloodshed are members of the Mangudadatu family and
the main perpetrators of the brutal killings are members
and followers of the Ampatuan family, both the military
and police had to prepare for and prevent reported
retaliatory actions from the Mangudadatu clan and
additional offensive measures from the Ampatuan clan.
One RAG was reported to have planned an attack on the
forces of Datu Andal Ampatuan, Sr. to show support and
sympathy for the victims.
Fortun v Arroyo
Indeed, the nature, quantity and quality of their weaponry,
the movement of heavily armed rebels in strategic
positions, the closure of the Maguindanao Provincial
Capitol, Ampatuan Municipal Hall, Datu Unsay Municipal
Hall, and fourteen other municipal halls, and the use of
armored vehicles, tanks and patrol cars with unauthorized
"PNP/Police" markings, all together confirm the existence
of armed public uprising for the political purpose of:
1. removing allegiance from the national government of
the Province of Maguindanao; and,

2. depriving the Chief Executive of her powers and

prerogatives to enforce the laws of the land and to
maintain public order and safety.

While the government is at present conducting legitimate

operations to address the on-going rebellion, public safety
still requires the continued implementation of martial law
and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in the Province of Maguindanao until the time that
such rebellion is completely quelled.

Issue: w/n the proclamation is valid. NO

Ruling:

There is absolutely nothing which shows that the

Ampatuans and their armed followers, at any point in time,
intended to overthrow the government. On the contrary,
the Ampatuans were publicly known as very close political
allies of President Arroyo. There is not a single instance
where the Ampatuans denounced, expressly or impliedly,
the government, or attempted to remove allegiance to the
government or its laws or to deprive the President or
Congress of any of their powers. Based on the records,
what the government clearly established, among others,
were (1) the existence of the Ampatuans’ private army;
and (2) the Ampatuans’ vast collection of high powered
firearms and ammunitions.

These shocking discoveries, however, do not amount to

rebellion as defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal
Code. Based on the statements made by ranking
government and military officials, and as clearly found by
the RTC-Quezon City in Criminal Case No. Q-10-162667
and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, there was no public
uprising and taking arms against the government for
the purpose of removing from the allegiance to the
government or its laws the territory of the Philippines
or any part thereof, or depriving the Chief Executive or
Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers
and prerogatives. The Ampatuans’ amassing of
weaponry, including their collection of armored cars, tanks
and patrol cars, merely highlights this political clan’s
unbelievably excessive power and influence under the
Arroyo administration.

To repeat, only in case of actual invasion or rebellion,

when public safety requires it, may the President declare
martial law or suspend the writ. In declaring martial law
and suspending the writ in Maguindanao in the absence of
an actual rebellion, President Arroyo indisputably violated
the explicit provisions of Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution.