Santos vs.

Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 112019. January 04, 1995

LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND

JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA- SANTOS, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner, Leouel Santos married respondent, Julia Rosario Bedia- Santos on September 20,
1986 in Iloilo City. Not long after, on May 18, 1988, Julia left for United States of America
to work as a nurse despite Leouel’s plead to so dissuade her. Seven months after her
departure, Julia called up for the very first time and promised to return home by the end of
her contract but she never did. When Leouel got the chance to visit USA, he desperately
locate, or get in touch with Julia but all his efforts were no to avail. This made the petitioner
file a complaint for “Voiding of Marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code” before the
RTC of Negros Oriental on May 31, 1991. The respondent opposed the complaint and denied
the allegation. On October 25, 1991, Julia filed a manifestation, stating that she would neither
appear nor submit evidences.

The RTC dismissed the complaint for the lack of merit. The petitioner appealed to the Court
of Appeals. The latter affirmed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE:

Wether or not the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least, to communicate with
him, for more than 5 years constitute to psychological incapacity according to the Article 36
of the Family Code.

HELD:

NO, the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least, to communicate with him, for
more than 5 years does not constitute psychological incapacity.

“Psychological incapacity” should refer to no less than a mental (not a physical) capacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must
be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article
68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render hep and support.

There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
“Psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrate of an utter insensitive or inability to give meaning and significance of the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.
LUCITA ESTRELLA HERNANDEZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIO C.
HERNANDEZ, respondents.

FACTS:

The Petitioner and the Private Respondent got married on January 1, 1981. They were given
three lovely children. It was not long thereafter that the respondent, while working, his
smoking, drinking, gambling, and womanizing became worse. There was even a time when
Mario beat up Lucita after confronting the former about his infidelity with whom he has an
illegitimate child, which results to latter’s cerebral concussion .Apart from that, respondent
engaged in extreme promiscuous conduct where the respondent contracted gonorrhoea and
infected the petitioner. Thereafter, the respondent abandoned her and his family. The
Petitioner, then, filed a petition of annulment of marriage under Article 36 before the RTC of
Tagaytay City. The lower court dismissed the case and later affirmed by Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

WON the marriage of petitioner and private respondent should be annulled on the ground of
private respondent’s psychological incapacity.

HELD:

NO, the marriage of petitioner and private respondent should not be annulled on the ground
of private respondent’s psychological incapacity.

Petitioner failed to establish the fact that a time they were married, private respondent was
suffering from a psychological defect which in fact deprived him of the ability to assume the
essential duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities. As the Court of Appeals
pointed out, no evidence was presented to show that private respondent was not cognizant of
the basic marital obligations. It was not sufficiently proved that the private respondent was
really incapable of fulfilling his duty to some incapacity of a psychological in nature, not on
merely physical. The private respondent’s alleged habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or
perversion, abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds for finding that he is
suffering from a psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. It
must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make the
private respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital
state, and not merely due to latter’s youth and self-conscious feeling of being handsome, as
the appellate court held. The Court held that they found no reason to reverse the ruling the
respondent Court Of Appeals whose conclusions, affirming the trial court’s finding with
regard to non-existence of private respondent’s psychological capacity at the time of
marriage, are entitled to great weight and even finality.