Torts and Damages

PART I.
TORTS for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only

and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a
I. QUASI-DELICT (Arts. 2176-2194, NCC) declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act
charged has not happened or has not been
a. INTRODUCTORY CONCEPTS committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here
hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana
a.1 Nature, scope and includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be
punishable by law.
coverage ELCANO V. HILL,
Now under Article 2180, the obligation imposed by
77 SCRA 98 FACTS: Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own
acts or omissions, but also for those persons for
Reginald Hill, son of defendant Marvin Hill, was whom one is responsible. The father and, in case
charged criminally for the killing of Agapito Elcano, of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
son of plaintiffs Elcano spouses. At the time of the responsible for the damages caused by the minor
killing, Reginald was a minor, married and was children who live in their company. In the instant
living with his father Marvin and receiving case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although
subsistence from him. Reginald was acquitted on married was living with his father and getting
the ground that his act was not criminal because of subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence
lack of intent to kill coupled with mistake. in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still
Subsequently the Elcano spouses filed a civil action subservient to and dependent on his father.
for damages against Reginald and his father arising
from the killing of their son. The case was “It must be borne in mind that, according to
dismissed by the lower court and plaintiffs appealed Manresa, the reason behind the joint and solidary
to the Supreme Court. One of the questions raised liability of parents with their offending child under
was whether the father of the minor who was Article 2180 is that it is the obligation of the parent
already married but living with, and receiving to supervise their minor children in order to
subsistence from said father was liable in damages prevent them from causing damage to third
for the crime committed by the minor. persons. On the other hand the clear implication
of Article 399, in providing that a minor
ISSUE: emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless,
sue or be sued without the assistance of the
W/N the civil action for damages is barred by the parents, is that such emancipation does not carry
acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case. with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any
act that can give rise to judicial litigation. And
RULING: surely, killing someone else invites judicial action.
Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor child,
Criminal negligence is in violation of the criminal while still a minor, does not relieve the parents of
law while civil negligence is a culpa aquiliana or the duty to see to it that the child, while still a
quasi-delict, having always had its own foundation minor, does not give cause to any litigation, in the
and individuality, separate from criminal same manner that the parents are answerable for
negligence. Culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and the borrowings of money and alienation or
negligent acts which may be punishable by law. It encumbering of real property which cannot be
results that the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal done by their minor married child without their
case has not extinguished his liability for quasi- consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.) Accordingly,
delict. Hence, the acquittal is not a bar to the in our considered view, Article 2170 applies to
instant action against him. Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by
marriage of Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is
Responsibility for fault or negligence under the evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of
Article 2176 is entirely separate and distinct from equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become
the civil liability arising from negligence under the subsidiary to that of his son.”
RPC. But the plaintiff cannot recover twice for the
same act or omission of the defendant. GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH V. CA, GR
NO.97336, FEB. 19, 1993
Article 2176, where it refers to fault or negligence
covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but FACTS:
also acts criminal in character, whether intentional
and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a On October 27, 1987, private respondent filed
separate civil action lies against the offender in a with the aforesaid trial court a complaint for
criminal act, whether or not he is criminally damages against petitioner for the alleged
prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided violation of their agreement to get married. She
that the offended party is not allowed, if he is alleges in said complaint that she is 20 years old,
actually charged also criminally, to recover single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral
damages on both scores, and would be entitled in character and reputation duly respected in her
such eventuality only to the bigger award of the country; petitioner, on the other hand, is an
two, assuming the awards made in the two cases Iranian citizen residing at Lozano Apartments,
vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student.
referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers Before August 20, 1987, the latter courted and
exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of proposed to marry her, she accepted his love on
the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability the condition that they get married; they therefore
Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 1

agreed to get married. The petitioner forced her
to live with him in the Lozano apartments. She
was a virgin at that time; after a week before the
filing of complaint, petitioner’s attitude towards
her started to change. He maltreated and
threatened to kill her. Petitioner repudiated the
marriage agreement and asked her not to live
with him anymore and that the petitioner is
already married to someone in Bacolod City.
Private respondent then prayed for judgment
ordering petitioner to pay her damages. On the
other hand, petitioner claimed that he never
proposed marriage to or agreed to be married
with the private respondent and denied all
allegations against him. After trial, the lower court
ordered petitioner to pay the private respondent
damages.
ISSUE

W/N Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case lose shop and became jobless and destitute.
at bar.
ISSUE:
HELD:
W/N the subsequent action for damages against the
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to soft drinks manufacturer should be treated as one
marry per se is not an actionable wrong. for breach of implied warranty against hidden
Notwithstanding, Article 21, which is designed to defects or merchantability pursuant to Article 1571
expand the concepts of torts and quasi-delicts in of the Civil Code, or one for quasi-delict, as held by
this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy the public respondent, which can be filed within four
for the untold number of moral wrongs which is years pursuant to Article 1146 of the same Code.
impossible for human foresight to specifically
enumerate and punish in the statute books. Article
2176 of the Civil Code, which defines quasi-delicts
thus:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to

another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article

21, the court held that where a man’s promise to
marry in fact the proximate cause of the
acceptance of his love by a woman and his
representation to fulfill that promise thereafter
becomes the proximate cause of the giving of
herself unto him in sexual congress, proof that he
had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that
the promise was only subtle scheme or deceptive
device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and
obtain her consent to sexual act could justify the
award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not
because of such breach of promise of marriage but
because of the fraud and deceit behind it, and the
willful injury to her honor and reputation which
followed thereafter. It is essential however, that
such injury should have been committed in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public
policy.
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC. VS. CA,

GR NO. 110295, OCT. 18, 1993
FACTS:
Geronimo, herein private respondent, filed a

complaint for damages against petitioner. She
alleges in her complaint that she was the
proprietress of Kindergarten Wonderland Canteen,
an enterprise engaged in the sale of soft drinks and
other goods to the students of Kindergarten
Wonderland and to the public. Some parents of the
students complained to her that the Coke and
Sprite soft drinks sold by her contained fiber-like
matter and other foreign substances or particles.
She brought the said bottles to the Regional Health
Office of the DOH for examination; subsequently,
the DOH informed her that the samples she
submitted "are adulterated”. Due to this, her sales
of soft drinks severely plummeted from the usual
10 cases per day to as low as 2 to 3 cases per day
resulting in losses; not long after that, she had to

HELD: granted the defendants' motion to dismiss.
NAVIDA, et al., prayed for the payment of
The public respondent's conclusion that the damages in view of the illnesses and injuries to
cause of action is found on quasi-delict and that, the reproductive systems which they allegedly
therefore, pursuant to Article 1146 of the Civil suffered because of their exposure to DBCP.
Code, it prescribes in four (4) years is supported They claimed, among others, that they were
by the allegations in the complaint, more exposed to this chemical during the early 1970's
particularly paragraph 12 thereof, which makes up to the early 1980's when they used the same in
reference to the reckless and negligent the banana plantations where they worked at;
manufacture of "adulterated food items intended and/or when they resided within the agricultural
to be sold for public consumption." area where such chemical was used. NAVIDA,
et al., claimed that
The vendor could likewise be liable for quasi-
delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, and an
action based thereon may be brought by the
vendee. While it may be true that the pre-existing
contract between the parties may, as a general
rule, bar the applicability of the law on quasi-
delict, the liability may itself be deemed to arise
from quasi-delict, i.e., the acts which breaks the
contract may also be a quasi-delict. Thus, in
Singson vs. Bank of the Philippine Islands, this
Court stated:
We have repeatedly held, however, that the

existence of a contract between the parties
does not bar the commission of a tort by the
one against the other and the consequent
recovery of damages therefor.
Liability for quasi-delict may still exist despite the

presence of contractual relations. The liabilities of
a manufacturer or seller of injury-causing
products may be based on negligence, breach of
warranty, tort, or other grounds such as fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation.Quasi-delict, as
defined in Article 2176 of the Civil Code, is
homologous but not identical to tort under the
common law, which includes not only negligence,
but also intentional criminal acts, such as assault
and battery, false imprisonment and deceit.
NAVIDA V. DIZON ET. AL G.R. NO. 125078,

MAY 30, 2011
FACTS:
Beginning 1993, a number of personal injury suits

were filed in different Texas state courts by
citizens of twelve foreign countries, including the
Philippines. The thousands of plaintiffs sought
damages for injuries they allegedly sustained
from their exposure to dibromochloropropane
(DBCP), a chemical used to kill nematodes
(worms), while working on farms in 23 foreign
countries. The cases were eventually transferred
to, and consolidated in, the Federal District Court
for the Southern District of Texas, Houston
Division. The cases therein that involved plaintiffs
from the Philippines were "Jorge Colindres
Carcamo, et al. v. Shell Oil Co., et al.," which was
docketed as Civil Action No. H-94-1359, and
"Juan Ramon Valdez, et al. v. Shell Oil Co., et
al.," which was docketed as Civil Action No. H-
95-1356. The defendants in the consolidated
cases prayed for the dismissal of all the actions
under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
In a Memorandum and Order dated July 11,
1995, the Federal District Court conditionally

their illnesses and injuries were due to the fault or
negligence of each of the defendant companies in a.2 Requisites
that they produced, sold and/or otherwise put into
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes
the stream of commerce DBCP-containing
damage to another, there being fault or negligence,
products. According to NAVIDA, et al., they were
is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
allowed to be exposed to the said products, which
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
the defendant companies knew, or ought to have
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
known, were highly injurious to the former's health
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
and well-being.
The RTC of General Santos City issued an Order
dismissing the complaint. First, the trial court
determined that it did not have jurisdiction to hear
the case because the acts of defendants cited in
the complaint included the manufacture of
pesticides, their packaging in containers, their
distribution through sale or other disposition,
resulting in their becoming part of the stream of
commerce which occurred abroad.
Second, the RTC of General Santos City declared

that the tort alleged by NAVIDA, et al., in their
complaint is a tort category that is not recognized in
Philippine laws.
ISSUE:
W/N DOLE Inc., should be held liable for damages

due to exposure of the nematocides.
HELD:
Quite evidently, the allegations in the Amended

Joint- Complaints of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA,
et al., attribute to defendant companies certain acts
and/or omissions which led to their exposure to
nematocides containing the chemical DBCP.
According to NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al.,
such exposure to the said chemical caused ill
effects, injuries and illnesses, specifically to their
reproductive system.
Thus, these allegations in the complaints constitute
the cause of action of plaintiff claimants — a quasi-
delict, which under the Civil Code is defined as an
act, or omission which causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence. To be precise,
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides:
Article 2176.Whoever by act or
omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a
quasi- delict and is governed by
the provisions of this Chapter.
Moreover, the injuries and illnesses, which

NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., allegedly
suffered resulted from their exposure to DBCP
while they were employed in the banana
plantations located in the Philippines or while they
were residing within the agricultural areas also
located in the Philippines. The factual allegations in
the Amended Joint-Complaints all point to their
cause of action, which undeniably occurred in the
Philippines. The RTC of General Santos City and
the RTC of Davao City obviously have reasonable
basis to assume jurisdiction over the cases.

CHILD LEARNING V. TAGORIO, GR sufficient basis to sustain a finding of liability on
NO.150920, NOV. 25, 2005 petitioners' part. Our pronouncement that Timothy
climbed out of the window because he could not
FACTS: get out using the door, negates petitioners' other
contention that the proximate cause of the
Timothy Tagario entered the boy's comfort room accident was Timothy's own negligence. The
at the third floor of the Marymount building to injuries he sustained from the fall were the
answer the call of nature. He, however, found product of a natural and continuous sequence,
himself locked inside and unable to get out. unbroken by any intervening cause that originated
Timothy started to panic and so he banged and from CLC's own negligence.
kicked the door and yelled several times for
help. When no help arrived, he decided to open b. QUASI-DELICT DISTINGUISHED FROM:
the window to call for help. In the process of
opening the window, Timothy went right through
and fell down three stories. Timothy was
hospitalized and given medical treatment for
serious multiple physical injuries. An action
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code was filed by
respondents against the Child Learning Center.
The trial court found in favor of respondents.
The CA affirmed the decision in toto.
ISSUE:
W/N CLC is guilty under Article 2176 of the Civil

Code.
HELD:
In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the

Civil Code, plaintiff has to prove by a
preponderance of evidence:
(1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff;
(2) the fault or negligence of the defendant

or some other person for whose act he must
respond
(3) the connection of cause and effect

between the fault or negligence and the
damages incurred.
Difference between fault and negligence:
o FAULT
 voluntary act or omission which causes

damage to the right of another giving
rise to an obligation on the part of the
actor to repair such damage.
 requires the execution of a positive act

which causes damage to another
o NEGLIGENCE
 failure to observe for the protection of

the interest of another person that
degree of care, precaution and vigilance
which the circumstances justly demand.
 Consists of the omission to do acts

which result in damage to another.
The fact that Timothy fell out through the window

shows that the door could not be opened from
the inside. That sufficiently points that something
was wrong with the door, if not the door knob,
under the principle of res ipsa loquitor. There is

b.1. culpa criminal of the Civil Code, and that the same negligent act
may produce either a civil liability arising from a
BARREDO V. GARCIA AND ALMARIO, GR NO. crime under the penal Code, or a separate
48006, JULY 8, 1942 responsibility for fault or negligence under Articles
1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Still more concretely
FACTS: the authorities above cited render it inescapable to
conclude that the employer in this case the
A head-on collision between a taxicab owned by defendant-petitioner is primarily and directly liable
Barredo and a carretela occurred. The carretela under Article 1903 of the Civil Code.
was overturned and one of its passengers, a son of
Garcia and Almario, died as a result of the injuries
which he received. The driver of the taxicab, an
employee of Barredo, was prosecuted for the crime
and was convicted. When the criminal case was
instituted, Garcia and Almario reserved their right to
institute a separate civil action for damages.
Subsequently, Garcia and Almario instituted a civil
action for damages against Barredo.
ISSUE:
Whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil

action against Fausto Barredo thus making him
primarily and directly responsible under Article
1903 of the Civil Code as an employer of Pedro
Fontanilla.
HELD:
The same negligent act causing damages may

produce civil liability arising from a crime under
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; or create an
action for cuasi- delito or culpa extra-contractual
under Articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
Some of the differences between crimes under the

Penal Code and the culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito
under the Civil Code are:
(1) That crimes affect the public interest, while

cuasi- delitos are only of private concern.
(2)That, consequently, the Penal Code

punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the
Civil Code, by means of indemnification, merely
repairs the damage.
(3) That delicts are not as broad as quasi-

delicts, because the former are punished only if
there is a penal law clearly covering them,
while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in
which "any king of fault or negligence
intervenes. However, it should be noted that
not all violations of the penal law produce civil
responsibility, such as begging in contravention
of ordinances, violation of the game laws, and
infraction of the rules of traffic when nobody is
hurt.
The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the

separate individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa
aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they
show that there is a distinction between civil liability
arising from criminal negligence (governed by the
Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or
negligence under Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil
Code, and that the same negligent act may
produce either a civil liability arising from a crime
under the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility
for fault or negligence under Articles 1902 to 1910

JOSEPH V. BAUTISTA, GR NO.L-41423, FEB. although the bases of recovery invoked by
23, 1989 petitioner against the defendants therein were not
necessarily identical since the respondents were
FACTS: not identically circumstanced. However, a
recovery by the petitioner under one remedy
Respondent Patrocinio Perez is the owner of a necessarily bars recovery under the other. This, in
cargo truck for conveying cargoes and essence, is the rationale for the proscription in our
passengers for a consideration from Dagupan law against double recovery for the same act or
City to Manila. On January 12, 1973, said cargo omission which, obviously, stems from the
truck driven by defendant Domingo Villa was on fundamental rule against unjust enrichment.
its way to Valenzuela. Petitioner boarded the
cargo truck at Dagupan City after paying the sum
of P 9.00 as one way fare to Valenzuela,
Bulacan. While said cargo truck was negotiating
the National Highway proceeding towards Manila,
defendant Domingo Villa tried to overtake a
tricycle likewise proceeding in the same direction.
At about the same time, a pick-up truck
supposedly owned by respondents Antonio
Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan, then driven by
respondent Lazaro Villanueva, tried to overtake
the cargo truck which was then in the process of
overtaking the tricycle, thereby forcing the cargo
truck to veer towards the shoulder of the road
and to ram a mango tree. As a result, petitioner
sustained a bone fracture in one of his legs.
Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against

respondent Patrocinio Perez, as owner of the
cargo truck, based on a breach of contract of
carriage and against respondents Antonio Sioson
and Lazaro Villanueva, as owner and driver,
respectively, of the pick-up truck, based on quasi-
delict. Respondents Sioson, Pagarigan, Cardeno
and Villanueva filed a "Motion to Exonerate and
Exclude Defs/ Cross defs. Alberto Cardeno,
Lazaro Villanueva, Antonio Sioson and Jacinto
Pagarigan on the Instant Case", alleging that
respondents Cardeno and Villanueva already
paid P 7,420.61 by way of damages to
respondent Perez, and alleging further that
respondents Cardeno, Villanueva, Sioson and
Pagarigan paid P 1,300.00 to petitioner by way of
amicable settlement. The trial court decided in
favor of respondents
ISSUE:
Was the trial court correct to dismiss the case for

lack of cause of action.
HELD:
The argument that there are two causes of action

embodied in petitioner's complaint, hence the
judgment on the compromise agreement under
the cause of action based on quasi-delict is not a
bar to the cause of action for breach of contract
of carriage, is untenable. If only one injury
resulted from several wrongful acts, only one
cause of action arises. In the case at bar, there is
no question that the petitioner sustained a single
injury on his person. That vested in him a single
cause of action, albeit with the correlative rights
of action against the different respondents
through the appropriate remedies allowed by law.
The trial court was, therefore, correct in holding

that there was only one cause of action involved

Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence liable because of the filing of the separate civil
under the preceding article is entirely separate and action based on q u a s i d e l i c t against it.
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence However, Reyes Trucking, as defendant in the
under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot separate civil action for damages filed against it,
recover damages twice for the same act or based on q u a s i d e l i c t , may be held liable
omission of the defendant. thereon.
RAFAEL REYES TRUCKING CORPORATION V.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET.AL. GR
NO.129029, APR. 3, 2000
FACTS:
Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation is a domestic

corporation engaged in the business of transporting
beer products for the San Miguel Corporation
(SMC). Among its fleets of vehicles for hire is the
white truck trailer driven by Romeo Dunca. At
around 4:00 o’clock in the morning while the truck
was descending at a slight downgrade along the
national road at Tagaran, Cauayan, Isabela, it
approached a damaged portion of the road which
was uneven because there were potholes about
five to six inches deep. The left lane parallel to this
damaged portion is smooth. Before approaching
the potholes, Dunca and his truck helper saw the
Nissan with its headlights on coming from the
opposite direction. They used to evade this
damaged road by taking the left lane but at that
particular moment, because of the incoming
vehicle, they had to run over it. This caused the
truck to bounce wildly. Dunca lost control of the
wheels and the truck swerved to the left invading
the lane of the Nissan. The Nissan was severely
damaged, and its two passengers, Feliciano Balcita
and Francisco Dy, Jr. died instantly. Reyes
Trucking settled the claim of the heirs of Balcita.
The heirs of Dy opted to pursue the criminal action
but did not withdraw the civil case quasi ex delicto
they filed against Reyes Trucking. They also
withdrew their reservation to file a separate civil
action against Dunca and manifested that they
would prosecute the civil aspect ex delicto in the
criminal action. TC consolidated both criminal and
civil cases and conducted a joint trial of the
same. TC held Dunca guilty of the crime of
Double Homicide through Reckless Imprudence
with violation of the Motor Vehicle Law and liable
to indemnify the heirs of Dy for damages and the
dismissal of the complaint in the separate civil
case. TC rendered a supplemental decision
ordering Reyes Trucking subsidiarily liable for all
the damages awarded to the heirs of Francisco Dy,
Jr., in the event of insolvency of the Dunca.
ISSUES:
May Reyes Trucking be held subsidiarily liable for

the damages awarded to the heirs of Dy in the
criminal action against Dunca, despite the filing of a
separate civil action against Reyes Trucking?
HELD:
No.
Reyes Trucking, as employer of the accused who

has been adjudged guilty in the criminal case for
reckless imprudence, cannot be held subsidiarily

 Rule Against Double Recovery: In connection with a vehicle collision between a
negligence cases, the aggrieved party has southbound Viron Transit bus driven by Sibayan
the choice between: and a northbound Lite Ace Van, which claimed the
lives of the van's driver and three of its
(1) an action to enforce civil liability passengers, including a two-month old baby, and
arising from crime under Article 100 of the caused physical injuries to five of the van's
Revised Penal Code [civil liability ex passengers. Sibayan was convicted and
delicto]; and (2) a separate action for q u a sentenced due to the said crime. There was a
s i d e l i c t under Article 2176 of the Civil reservation to file a separate civil action.
Code [civil liability quasi delicto].
Once the choice is made, the injured party can

not avail himself of any other remedy
because he may not recover damages twice
for the same negligent act or omission of the
accused (Article 2177 of the Civil Code). In other
words, "the same act or omission can create two
kinds of liability on the part of the offender, that is,
civil liability ex delicto, and civil liability quasi
delicto" either of which "may be enforced against
the culprit, subject to the caveat under Article
2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party
cannot recover damages under both types of
liability."
In the instant case, the offended parties elected

to file a separate civil action for damages
against Reyes Trucking as employer of Dunca,
based on quasi delict, under Article 2176 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines.
Under the law, the vicarious liability of the

employer is founded on at least two specific
provisions of law:
Art. 2176 in relation to Article 103 of the

Art. 2180 of the Civil Revised Penal Code
Code
 Preponderance of  Proof Beyond

Evidence Reasonable
Doubt
 Liability of employer
is Direct and  Liability of
Primary subject to employer is
the defense of due subsidiary to the
diligence in the liability of the
selection and employee.
supervision of the
employee.
 Employer and  Liability attaches

employee are when the
solidarily liable, employee is
thus, it does not found to be
require the insolvent.
employer to be
insolvent.
SPS. SANTOS, EL. AL. V. PIZARDO, ET. AL.,

GR NO.151452, JUL. 29, 2005
FACTS:
Dionisio M. Sibayan (Sibayan) was charged with

Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple
Homicide and Multiple Physical Injuries in

In the filing of the separate civil action, the trial was still at the back of the jeep when the jeep was
court dismissed the complaint on the principal hit. On the other hand, according to petitioner,
ground that the cause of action had already explained that when the Philippine Rabbit bus was
prescribed. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari about to go to the left lane to overtake the jeep, the
with the CA which dismissed the same for error in latter jeep swerved to the left because it was to
the choice or mode of appeal. overtake another jeep in front of it.Petitioner was
then acquitted of the criminal charges against him.
ISSUE: However, in the civil case, he, along with his
employer, PRBLI, was still made to pay damages to
W/N the trial court is correct in dismissing the case respondent.
on the ground of prescription based on quasi delict
and not on ex delicto.
HELD:
An act or omission causing damage to another may

give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part
of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto,
under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and
(2) independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not
arising from an act or omission complained of as a
felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising
from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code,
intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa
aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or
(b) where the injured party is granted a right to file
an action independent and distinct from the criminal
action under Article 33 of the Civil Code.Either of
these liabilities may be enforced against the
offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of
the Civil Code that the plaintiff cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant and the similar proscription against
double recovery.
At the time of the filing of the complaint for

damages in this case, the cause of action ex quasi
delicto had already prescribed. Nonetheless,
petitioners can pursue the remaining avenue
opened for them by their reservation, i.e., the
surviving cause of action ex delicto. This is so
because the prescription of the action ex quasi
delicto does not operate as a bar to an action to
enforce the civil liability arising from crime
especially as the latter action had been expressly
reserved.
MANLICLIC V. CALAUNAN, GR NO.150157,

JAN. 25, 2007
FACTS:
Petitioner Manliclic is a driver of Philippine Rabbit

Bus Lines, Inc. (PRBLI) While driving his bus going
to Manila, he bumped rear left side of the owner-
type jeep of Respondent Calaunan.Because of the
collision, petitioner was criminally charged with
reckless imprudence resulting to damage to
property with physical injuries. Subsequently,
respondent filed a damage suit against petitioner
and PRBLI.According to respondent, his jeep was
cruising at the speed of 60 to
70 kilometers per hour on the slow lane of the
expressway when the Philippine Rabbit Bus
overtook the jeep and in the process of overtaking
the jeep, the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear of
the jeep on the left side. At the time the Philippine
Rabbit Bus hit the jeep, it was about to overtake
the jeep. In other words, the Philippine Rabbit Bus

ISSUE: required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponds with the circumstances of the
What is the effect of Manliclic’s acquittal to the persons, of the time and of the place. When
civil case? negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of
Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
HELD:
If the law or contract does not state the
Since the civil case is one for quasi delict, diligence which is to be observed in the
Manliclic’s acquittal does not affect the case. performance, that which is expected of a good
MANLICLIC AND PRBLI ARE STILL LIABLE father of a family shall be required.
FOR DAMAGES.
OCHOA V. G&S TRANSPORT G.R. NO. 170071,
A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate MARCH 9, 2011
legal institution under the Civil Code with a
substantivity all its own, and individuality that is
entirely apart and independent from a delict or
crime – a distinction exists between the civil
liability arising from a crime and the responsibility
for quasi-delicts or culpa extra- contractual. The
same negligence causing damages may produce
civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal
Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or
culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. It is
now settled that acquittal of the accused, even if
based on a finding that he is not guilty, does not
carry with it the extinction of the civil liability
based on quasi delict.
In other words, if an accused is acquitted based

on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his civil liability
arising from the crime may be proved by
preponderance of evidence only. However, if an
accused is acquitted on the basis that he was not
the author of the act or omission complained of
(or that there is declaration in a final judgment
that the fact from which the civil might arise did
not exist), said acquittal closes the door to civil
liability based on the crime or ex delicto. In this
second instance, there being no crime or delict
to speak of, civil liability based thereon or ex
delicto is not possible. In this case, a civil action,
if any, may be instituted on grounds other than
the delict complained of.
As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict

or culpa aquiliana, same will not be extinguished
by an acquittal, whether it be on ground of
reasonable doubt or that accused was not the
author of the act or omission complained of (or
that there is declaration in a final judgment that
the fact from which the civil liability might arise
did not exist). The responsibility arising from
fault or negligence in quasi-delict is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising
from negligence under the Penal Code. An
acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is
entirely irrelevant in the civil case based on
quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.
b.2 CULPA-CONTRACTUAL
Art. 1172. Responsibility arising from negligence

in the performance of every kind of obligation is
also demandable, but such liability may be
regulated by the courts, according to the
circumstances.
Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor

consists in the omission of that diligence which is

The respondent trial court, however, overruled
GUTIERREZ V. GUTIERREZ, 56 PHIL 177 petitioners' contention and denied their motion to
dismiss. The respondent appellate court affirmed
(1913) FACTS: the trial court's orders.
A passenger truck and an automobile of private ISSUE:

ownership collided while attempting to pass each
other on the Talon Bridge on the Manila South
Road in Las Pinas, Rizal. As a result of the collision
a passenger in the truck, Narciso Gutierrez,
suffered a fracture in his right leg. The truck was
owned by the defendant Saturnino Cortez. The
automobile was operated by Bonifacio Gutierrez, a
lad 18 years of age, and was owned by Bonifacio's
father and mother, Mr. & Mrs. Manuel Gutierrez,
also defendants in this case. At the time of the
collision, the father was not in the car, but the
mother together with several other members of the
Gutierrez family, seven in all, were in the car. The
court found that both drivers of the truck and the
car were negligent.
ISSUE:
Who among the passenger truck and the

automobile is liable for damages due to
negligence?
HELD:
In case of injury to a passenger due to the
negligence of the bus driver on which he was riding
and of the driver of another vehicle, the drivers as
well as the owners of the two vehicles are jointly
and severally liable for damages.
In amplification of so much of the above

pronouncement as concerns the Gutierrez family, it
may be explained that the youth Bonifacio was an
incompetent chauffeur, that he was driving at an
excessive rate of speed, and that, on approaching
the bridge and the truck, he lost his head and so
contributed by his negligence to the accident. The
guaranty given by the father at the time the son
was granted a license to operate motor vehicles
made the father responsible for the acts of his son.
Based on these facts, pursuant to the provisions of
Article 1903 of the Civil Code, the father alone and
not the minor or the mother, would be liable for the
damages caused by the minor.
PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF
BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION,
ET.AL. V. CA, GR NO. 84698, JAN 4, 1992
FACTS:
A stabbing incident which caused the death of

Carlitos Bautista while on the second-floor
premises of the Philippine School of Business
Administration (PSBA) prompted the parents of the
deceased to file suit for damages against the said
PSBA and its corporate officers. At the time of his
death, Carlitos was enrolled in the third year
commerce course at the PSBA. It was established
that his assailants were not members of the
school's academic community but were elements
from outside the school.

W/N PSBA is liable for civil damages through persons, time and place.
quasi- delictdue to negligence.
AIR FRANCE V. CARRASCOSO, 18 SCRA 155
HELD:
FACTS:
No.
Carrascoso was a member of a group of 48
Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes on
the Civil Code, establishes the rule of in loco March 30, 1958. Air France issued a “first class”
parentis. It had been stressed that the law (Article round trip ticket from Manila to Rome. From
2180) plainly provides that the damage should Manila to Bangkok, passenger Carrascoso
have been caused or inflicted by pupils or traveled in first class but at Bangkok, the
students of the educational institution sought to Manager of Air France forced him to vacate the
be held liable for the acts of its pupils or students first class seat because a white man had a
while in its custody. However, this material
situation does not exist in the present case for, as
earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were
not students of the PSBA, for whose acts the
school could be made liable.
When an academic institution accepts students

for enrollment, there is established a contract
between them, resulting in bilateral obligations
which both parties are bound to comply with.
Because the circumstances of the present case
evince a contractual relation between the PSBA
and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do
not really govern. A perusal of Article 2176 shows
that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort,
also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise
only between parties not otherwise bound by
contract, whether express or implied. However,
this impression has not prevented this Court from
determining the existence of a tort even when
there obtains a contract.
In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar,

however, there is, as yet, no finding that the
contract between the school and Bautista had
been breached thru the former's negligence in
providing proper security measures. This would
be for the trial court to determine. And, even if
there be a finding of negligence, the same could
give rise generally to a breach of contractual
obligation only. Using the test of Cangco, the
negligence of the school would not be relevant
absent a contract. In fact, that negligence
becomes material only because of the contractual
relation between PSBA and Bautista. In other
words, a contractual relation is a condition sine
qua non to the school's liability. The negligence
of the school cannot exist independently of the
contract, unless the negligence occurs under the
circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil
Code.
It would not be equitable to expect of schools to

anticipate all types of violent trespass upon their
premises, for notwithstanding the security
measures installed, the same may still fail against
an individual or group determined to carry out a
nefarious deed inside school premises and
environs. Should this be the case, the school
may still avoid liability by proving that the breach
of its contractual obligation to the students was
not due to its negligence, here statutorily defined
to be the omission of that degree of diligence
which is required by the nature of the obligation
and corresponding to the circumstances of

better right to it. The purser wrote in his record SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, GR NO. 156109,
book “First class passenger was forced to go to the NOV 18, 2004
tourist class against his will, and the captain
refused to intervene” which was written in French. FACTS:
Petitioner contends that damages must be averred Petitioner Khristine Rea M. Regino was a first year
that there was fraud and bad faith in order that computer science student at Respondent
claim for damages should set in. Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology
(PCST). She was enrolled in logic and statistics
ISSUE: subjects under Respondents Rachelle A. Gamurot
and Elissa Baladad, respectively, as teachers.
W/N passenger Carrascoso was entitled to PCST held a fund raising
damages.
RULING:
The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from

enjoying his right to a first class seat; worse, he
imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him
from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of
having to go to the tourist class compartment - just
to give way to another passenger whose right
thereto has not been established. Certainly, this is
bad faith. Unless, of course, bad faith has assumed
a meaning different from what is understood in law.
For, "bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind
affirmatively operating with furtive design or with
some motive of self-interest or will or for ulterior
purpose."
The responsibility of an employer for the tortious

act of its employees need not be essayed. It is well
settled in law.For the willful malevolent act of
petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer, must
answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says:
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss

or injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing

legal precept; and, we held that upon the provisions
of Article 2219 (10), Civil Code, moral damages are
recoverable.
A contract to transport passengers is quite different

in kind and degree from any other contractual
relation. And this, because of the relation which an
air-carrier sustains with the public its business is
mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to
avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The
contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a
relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or
malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally,
could give ground for an action for damages.
Thus, "Where a steamship company had accepted

a passenger's check, it was a breach of contract
and a tort, giving a right of action for its agent in the
presence of third persons to falsely notify her that
the check was worthless and demand payment
under threat of ejection, though the language used
was not insulting and she was not ejected."
Although the relation of passenger and carrier is
"contractual both in origin and nature" nevertheless
"the act that breaks the contract may be also a
tort".
REGINO V. PANGASINAN COLLEGES OF

campaign dubbed the “Rave Party and Dance of the ship for discharging heavy cargo was not
Revolution,” the proceeds of which were to go to sufficiently strong to handle these boilers, and it
the construction of the school’s tennis and was therefore necessary for the Steamship
volleyball courts. The project was allegedly Company to procure assistance in the port of
implemented by recompensing students who Manila. Atlantic Company was accordingly
purchased tickets with additional points in their employed by the Steamship Company.
test scores; those who refused to pay were
Upon the arrival of the steamship, the Atlantic
denied the opportunity to take the final
company sent out its crane in charge of one
examinations. At the scheduled dates of the final
Leyden. The crane
examinations in logic and statistics, respondents
Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa Baladad
allegedly disallowed her from taking the tests.
ISSUE:
W/N respondents are liable for tort.
HELD:
The acts of respondents supposedly caused her

extreme humiliation, mental agony and
“demoralization of unimaginable proportions” in
violation of Articles 19, 21 and 26 of the Civil
Code.
Art. 26.Every person shall respect the

dignity, personality, privacy and peace of
mind of his neighbors and other persons. The
following and similar acts, though they may
not constitute a criminal offense, shall
produce a cause of action for damages,
prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another’s

residence;
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the

private life or family relations of
another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be

alienated from his friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on

account of his beliefs, lowly station
in life, place of birth, physical defect,
or other personal condition.”
Generally, liability for tort arises only between

parties not otherwise bound by a contract. An
academic institution, however, may be held liable
for tort even if it has an existing contract with its
students, since the act that violated the contract
may also be a tort. In sum, the Court holds that
the Complaint alleges sufficient causes of action
against respondents, and that it should not have
been summarily dismissed. Needless to say, the
Court is not holding respondents liable for the
acts complained of. That will have to be ruled
upon in due course by the court a quo.
MANILA RAILROAD CO. V. LA COMPANIATRASATLANTICA, GR NO. 11318, OCT 26, 1918
FACTS:
A steamship belonging to the Compañia

Transatlantica de Barcelona, arrived at Manila
with two locomotive boilers aboard, the property
of The Manila Railroad Company. The equipment

and the boiler were however damaged when whom the contract of affreightment was made.
discharging the cargoes. It was found to be so
CALALAS V. CA, GR NO. 122039, MAY 31,
badly damaged that it had to be reshipped to
England where it was rebuilt, and afterwards was 2000 FACTS:
returned to Manila. The Railroad Company made
expenses for the damage; to recover these Private respondent Eliza Sunga took a passenger
damages the present action was instituted by the jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente
Railroad Company against the Steamship Calalas. As the jeepney was already full, Calalas
Company. The latter caused the Atlantic Company gave Sunga an stool at the back of the door at the
to be brought in as a codefendant. The trial court rear end of the vehicle. Along the way, the jeepney
gave judgment in favor of the plaintiff against the stopped to let a
Atlantic Company, but the absolved the Steamship
Company from the complaint.
ISSUE:
W/N Atlantic Company is liable for damages.
HELD:
It is desirable to bring out the distinction between

negligence in the performance of a contractual
obligation (culpa contractual) and negligence
considered as an independent source of obligation
between parties not previously bound (culpa
aquiliana). This distinction is well established in
legal jurisprudence and is fully recognized in the
provisions of the Civil Code. As illustrative of this,
we quote the following passage from the opinion of
this Court in the well-known case of Rakes vs.
Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co., and in this quotation we
reproduce the first paragraph of here presenting a
more correct English version of said passage.
The acts to which these articles are applicable

are understood to be those not growing out of
preexisting duties of the parties to one another.
But where relations already formed give arise
to duties, whether springing from contract or
quasi-contract, then breaches of those duties
are subject to articles 1101, 1103, and 1104 of
the same code.
Culpa, or negligence, may be understood in two

different senses, either as culpa, substantive and
independent, which of itself constitutes the source
of an obligation between two person not formerly
bound by any other obligation; or as an incident in
the performance of an obligation which already
existed, and which increases the liability arising
from the already existing obligation.
If there had been no contract of any sort between

the Atlantic company and the Steamship Company,
an action could have been maintained by the
Railroad Company, as owner, against the Atlantic
Company to recover the damages sustained by the
former. Such damages would have been
demandable under article 1103 of the Civil Code
and the action would not have been subject to the
qualification expressed in the last paragraph of
article 1903. It is equally obvious that, for lack of
privity with the contract, the Railroad Company can
have no right of action to recover damages from the
Atlantic Company for the wrongful act which
constituted the violation of said contract. The rights
of the plaintiff can only be made effective through
the Compañia Trasatlantica de Barcelona with

passenger off. Sunga stepped down to give way never reached their destination because their bus
when an Isuzu truck owned by Francisco Salva was rammed from behind by a tractor-truck of
and driven by Iglecerio Verena bumped the CDCP in the South Expressway. The strong
jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured. Sunga impact pushed forward their seats and pinned
filed a complaint against Calalas for violation of their knees to the seats in front of them. They
contract of carriage. Calalas filed a third party regained consciousness only when rescuers
complaint against Salva. The trial court held created a hole in the bus and extricated their legs
Salva liable and absolved Calalas, taking from under the seats. They were brought to the
cognisance of another civil case for quasi-delict Makati Medical Center.
wherein Salva and Verena were held liable to
Thereafter, respondents filed a Complaint for
Calalas. The Court of Appeals reversed the
damages against CDCP, BLTB, Espiridion
decision and found Calalas liable to Sunga for
Payunan, Jr. and Wilfredo Datinguinoo before the
violation of contract of carriage.
Regional Trial Court of Manila. The trial court
ISSUE: rendered a decision finding CDCP
Whether petitioner is liable on his contract of

carriage.
HELD:
Yes.
The first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa

aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its
source the negligence of the tort feasor.
The second, breach of contract or culpa

contractual, is premised upon the negligence in
the performance of a contractual obligation.
Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or
fault should be clearly established because it is
the basis of the action, whereas in breach of
contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by
proving the existence of the contract and the fact
that the obligor, in this case the common carrier,
failed to transport his passenger safely to his
destination. In case of death or injuries to
passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides
that common carriers are presumed to have been
at fault or to have acted negligently unless they
prove that they observed extraordinary diligence
as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code.
This provision necessarily shifts to the common
carrier the burden of proof. It is immaterial that
the proximate cause of the collision between the
jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the
truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is
applicable only in actions for quasi- delict, not in
actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine
is a device for imputing liability to a person where
there is no relation between him and another
party. In such a case, the obligation is created by
law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, it is the
parties themselves who create the obligation, and
the function of the law is merely to regulate the
relation thus created.
CONSTRUCTION DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES V.
ESTRELLA, ET.AL., GR NO.147791, SEPT. 8,
2006
FACTS:
Respondents Rebecca G. Estrella and her

granddaughter, Rachel E. Fletcher, boarded a
BLTB bus bound for Pasay City. However, they

and BLTB and their employees liable for damages.
II. ACT OR OMISSION
The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court but
modified the amount of damages. Art. 1173, NCC.The fault or negligence of the
obligor consists in the omission of that diligence
ISSUE:
which is required by the nature of the obligation and
Whether BLTB and its driver Wilfredo Datinguinoo corresponds with the circumstances of the persons,
are solely liable for the damages sustained by of the time and of the place. When negligence
respondents. shows bad faith, the
HELD:
The case filed by respondents against petitioner is

an action for culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code. In this regard, Article
2180 provides that the obligation imposed by Article
2176 is demandable for the acts or omissions of
those persons for whom one is responsible.
Consequently, an action based on quasi-delict may
be instituted against the employer for an
employee's act or omission. The liability for the
negligent conduct of the subordinate is
direct and primary, but is subject to the defense of
due diligence in the selection and supervision of the
employee. In the instant case, the trial court found
that petitioner failed to prove that it exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of Payunan, Jr.
It is well-settled that the owner of the other vehicle

which collided with a common carrier is solidarily
liable to the injured passenger of the same. The
same rule of liability was applied in situations where
the negligence of the driver of the bus on which
plaintiff was riding concurred with the negligence of
a third party who was the driver of another vehicle,
thus causing an accident. In Anuran v. Buño,
Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, and Metro Manila Transit
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the bus company,
its driver, the operator of the other vehicle and the
driver of the vehicle were jointly and severally held
liable to the injured passenger or the latter's heirs.
The basis of this allocation of liability was explained
in Viluan v. Court of Appeals, thus:
Nor should it make any difference that the

liability of petitioner [bus owner] springs
from contract while that of respondents
[owner and driver of other vehicle] arises
from quasi- delict. As early as 1913, we
already ruled in Gutierrez vs. Gutierrez, 56 Phil.
177, that in case of injury to a passenger due to
the negligence of the driver of the bus on which
he was riding and of the driver of another
vehicle, the drivers as well as the owners of the
two vehicles are jointly and severally liable for
damages.
Joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for

the tort which they commit. The persons injured
may sue all of them or any number less than all.
Each is liable for the whole damages caused by all,
and all together are jointly liable for the whole
damage. It is no defense for one sued alone, that
the others who participated in the wrongful act are
not joined with him as defendants; nor is it any
excuse for him that his participation in the tort was
insignificant as compared to that of the others.

provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph
ISSUE:
2, shall apply.
W/N petitioner is negligent for the accident
Art. 3, (RPC). Definitions. — Acts and
resulting to the death of Dayata.
omissions punishable by law are felonies
(delitos). HELD:
Felonies are committed not only be means of The presence or absence of negligence on the
deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa). part of petitioner is determined by the operative
events leading to the death of Dayata which
There is deceit when the act is performed with
actually comprised of two phases or stages. The
deliberate intent and there is fault when the
first stage began when Dayata flagged down the
wrongful act results from imprudence,
jeepney while positioned on the left
negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
GAID vs. PEOPLE, GR No. 171636, Apr. 7,
2009 FACTS:
Petitioner was driving his passenger jeepney

along a two-lane road where the Laguindingan
National High School is At the time several
students were coming out of the school premises.
Meanwhile, a fourteen year-old student, Michael
Dayata (Dayata), was seen by eyewitness
Artman Bongolto (Bongolto) sitting near a store
on the left side of the road. From where he was at
the left side of the road, Dayata raised his left
hand to flag down petitioner's jeepney which was
traveling on the right lane of the road. However,
neither did petitioner nor the conductor, Dennis
Mellalos (Mellalos), saw anybody flagging down
the jeepney to ride at that point.
The next thing Bongalto saw, Dayata's feet was

pinned to the rear wheel of the jeepney, after
which, he laid flat on the ground behind the
jeepney. Dayata was then seen lying on the
groundand caught in between the rear
tires.Petitioner felt that the left rear tire of the
jeepney had bounced and the vehicle tilted to the
right side. Mellalos heard a shout that a boy was
run over, prompting him to jump off the jeepney
to help the victim. Petitioner stopped and saw
Mellalos carrying the body of the victim. Mellalos
loaded the victim on a motorcycle and brought
him to the hospital. Dayata was first brought to
the Laguindingan Health Center, but it was
closed. Mellalos then proceeded to the El
Salvador Hospital. Upon advice of its doctors,
however, Dayata was brought to the Northern
Mindanao Medical Center where he was
pronounced dead on arrival.
The Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of

Laguindingan found petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The
lower court held petitioner negligent in his driving
considering that the victim was dragged to a
distance of 5.70 meters from the point of impact.
He was also scored for "not stopping his vehicle
after noticing that the jeepney's left rear tire
jolted causing the vehicle to tilt towards the
right."On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
affirmed in toto the decision of the MCTC. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
judgment with modification in that it found
petitioner guilty only of simple negligence
resulting in homicide.

side of the road and ended when he was run over would still not have saved the life of the victim as
by the jeepney. The second stage covered the the injuries he suffered were fatal. Mere suspicions
span between the moment immediately after the and speculations that the victim could have lived
victim was run over and the point when petitioner had petitioner stopped can never be the basis of a
put the jeepney to a halt. conviction in a criminal case. The Court must be
satisfied that the guilt of the accused had been
FIRST STAGE: Petitioner cannot be held liable proven beyond reasonable doubt.Conviction must
during the first stage. Specifically, he cannot be rest on nothing less than a moral certainty of the
held liable for reckless imprudence resulting in guilt of the accused. The overriding consideration is
homicide, as found by the trial court. The proximate not whether the
cause of the accident and the death of the victim
was definitely his own negligence in trying to catch
up with the moving jeepney to get a ride. In the
instant case, petitioner had exercised extreme
precaution as he drove slowly upon reaching the
vicinity of the school. He cannot be faulted for not
having seen the victim who came from behind on
the left side.
Negligence has been defined as the failure to

observe for the protection of the interests of
another person that degree of care, precaution, and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,
whereby such other person suffers injury. The
elements of simple negligence: are (1) that there is
lack of precaution on the part of the offender; and
(2) that the damage impending to be caused is not
immediate or the danger is not clearly manifest.
The standard test in determining whether a person
is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or
damage results to the person or property of another
is this: could a prudent man, in the position of the
person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee
harm to the person injured as a reasonable
consequence of the course actually pursued? If so,
the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from
that course or to take precautions to guard against
its mischievous results, and the failure to do so
constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of
harm, followed by the ignoring of the admonition
born of this provision, is always necessary before
negligence can be held to exist.
SECOND PART: The Court of Appeals found

petitioner guilty of simple negligence resulting in
homicide for failing to stop driving at the time when
he noticed the bouncing of his vehicle. Verily, the
appellate court was referring to the second stage of
the incident. Assuming arguendo that petitioner had
been negligent, it must be shown that his
negligence was the proximate cause of the
accident. Proximate cause is defined as that
which, in the natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred. In order to establish a
motorist's liability for the negligent operation of a
vehicle, it must be shown that there was a direct
causal connection between such negligence and
the injuries or damages complained of. Thus,
negligence that is not a substantial contributing
factor in the causation of the accident is not the
proximate cause of an injury.
The head injuries sustained by Dayata at the point

of impact proved to be the immediate cause of his
death, as indicated in the post-mortem findings. His
skull was crushed as a result of the accident. Had
petitioner immediately stopped the jeepney, it

court doubts the innocence of the accused but another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
whether it entertains doubt as to his guilt. Clearly to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
then, the prosecution was not able to establish negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
that the proximate cause of the victim's death relation between the parties, is called a
was petitioner's alleged negligence, if at all, even quasi-delict. To sustain a claim based on quasi-
during the second stage of the incident. delict, the following requisites must concur:
DYTEBAN V. JOSE CHING, GR NO.161803, (a) damage suffered by plaintiff;

FEB. 4, 2008
(b) fault or negligence of defendant; and
FACTS:
Rogelio Ortiz was driving a Nissan van owned by

petitioner Dy Teban Trading, Inc. along the
National Highway in Barangay Sumilihon, Butuan
City, going to Surigao City. A Joana Paula
passenger bus was cruising on the opposite lane
towards the van. In between the two vehicles was
a parked prime mover with a trailer that suffered
a tire blowout, owned by private respondent
Liberty Forest, Inc. The driver, private respondent
Cresilito Limbaga, parked the prime mover askew
occupying a substantial portion of the national
highway, on the lane of the passenger bus. He
parked the prime mover with trailer at the
shoulder of the road with the left wheels still on
the cemented highway and the right wheels on
the sand and gravel shoulder of the highway
which was not equipped with triangular,
collapsible reflectorized plates. To avoid hitting
the parked prime mover occupying its lane, the
incoming passenger bus swerved to the right,
onto the lane of the approaching Nissan van.
Ortiz saw two bright and glaring headlights and
the approaching passenger bus. He pumped his
break slowly, swerved to the left to avoid the
oncoming bus but the van hit the front of the
stationary prime mover. The passenger bus hit
the rear of the prime mover.
Petitioner Nissan van owner filed a complaint for

damages against private respondents prime
mover owner and driver with the RTC in Butuan
City. The Joana Paula passenger bus was not
impleaded as defendant in the complaint. The
RTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner Dy
Teban Trading, Inc. The RTC held that the
proximate cause of the three-way vehicular
collision was improper parking of the prime mover
on the national highway and the absence of an
early warning device on the vehicle. The CA
reversed the RTC decision. The CA held that the
proximate cause of the vehicular collision was the
failure of the Nissan van to give way or yield to
the right of way of the passenger bus.
ISSUE:
W/N Limbaga was negligent in parking the vehicle.
HELD:
Limbaga was negligent in parking the prime

mover on the national highway; he failed to
prevent or minimize the risk to oncoming
motorists.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that

whoever by act or omission causes damage to

(c) connection of cause and happened that Fr. Sanz, the representative of the
effect between the fault or Recoletos, exerted some influence and ascendancy
negligence of defendant and over Endencia, who was a woman of little force and
the damage incurred by easily subject to the influence of other people.
plaintiff. Father Sanz knew of the existence of the contracts
with Daywalt and discouraged her from conveying
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the entire tract. Daywalt filed an action for damages
the protection of the interests of another person against the Recoletos on the ground that it
that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which unlawfully induced Endencia to refrain from the
the circumstances justly demand, whereby such performance of her contract for the sale of the land
other person suffers injury. The test by which to in question and to withhold delivery of the Torrens
determine the existence or negligence in a title.
particular case may be stated as follows: Did the
defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use
that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary
person would have used in the same situation? If
not, then he is guilty of negligence.
The test of negligence is objective. We measure

the act or omission of the tortfeasor with that of an
ordinary reasonable person in the same situation.
The test, as applied to this case, is whether
Limbaga, in parking the prime mover, used that
reasonable care and caution which an ordinary
reasonable person would have used in the same
situation.
We find that Limbaga was utterly negligent in

parking the prime mover askew on the right side of
the national highway. The vehicle occupied a
substantial portion of the national road on the lane
of the passenger bus. It was parked at the shoulder
of the road with its left wheels still on the cemented
highway and the right wheels on the sand and
gravel shoulder of the highway. It is common sense
that the skewed parking of the prime mover on the
national road posed a serious risk to oncoming
motorists. It was incumbent upon Limbaga to take
some measures to prevent that risk, or at least
minimize it. Private respondent Liberty Forest, Inc.
was also negligent in failing to supervise Limbaga
and in ensuring that the prime mover was in proper
condition.
DAYWALT V. CORPORACION DE PP.

AGUSTINOS RECOLETOS, 39 PHIL587
FACTS:
In 1902, Teodorica Endencia executed a contract

whereby she obligated herself to convey to Geo W.
Daywalt a 452-hectare parcel of land for P4,000.
They agreed that a deed should be executed as
soon as Endencia’s title to the land was perfected
in the Court of Land Registration and a Torrens title
issued in her name. When the Torrens title was
issued, Endencia found out that the property
measured 1,248 hectares instead of 452 hectares,
as she initially believed. Because of this, she
became reluctant to transfer the whole tract to
Daywalt, claiming that she never intended to sell
so large an amount and that she had been
misinformed as to its area. Daywalt filed an action
for specific performance. The SC ordered Endencia
to convey the entire tract to Daywalt. Meanwhile,
the La Corporacion de los Padres Agustinos
Recoletos (Recoletos), was a religious corporation,
which owned an estate immediately adjacent to the
property sold by Endencia to Daywalt. It also

Daywalt claims that because of the interference
of the Recoletos, he failed to consummate a  Reasonable foresight of harm
contract with another person for the sale of the
 Failure to take necessary precaution
property and its conversion into a sugar mill.
PICART V. SMITH, 69
ISSUE:
SCRA 809 FACTS:
Whether Recoletos is liable to Daywalt for
damages. Plaintiff Amado Picart was riding on his pony on
the Carlatan Bridge in San Fernando, La Union
HELD:
when the defendant, riding on his car,
No. approached. Defendant
Defendants believed in good faith that the

contract could not be enforced and that
Teodorica would be wronged if it should be
carried into effect. Any advice or assistance
which they may have given was prompted by no
mean or improper motive. Teodorica would have
surrendered the documents of title and given
possession of the land but for the influence and
promptings of members of the defendant’s
corporation. But the idea that they were in any
degree influenced to the giving of such advice by
the desire to secure to themselves the paltry
privilege of grazing their cattle upon the land in
question to the prejudice of the just rights of the
plaintiff can’t be credited.
The stranger who interferes in a contract between

other parties cannot become more extensively
liable in damages for the nonperformance of the
contract than the party in whose behalf he
intermeddles. Hence, in order to determine the
liability of the Recoletos, there isfirst a need to
consider the liability of Endencia to Daywalt. The
damages claimed by Daywalt fromEndencia
cannot be recovered from her, first, because
these are special damages which were notwithin
the contemplation of the parties when the
contract was made, and secondly, these
damagesare too remote to be the subject of
recovery. Since Endencia is not liable for
damages to Daywalt,neither can the Recoletos
be held liable.
NEGLIGENCE, defined
NEGLIGENCE – conduct that creates undue risk

of harm to another. It is the failure to observe that
degree of care, precaution and vigilance that the
circumstances justly demand, whereby that other
person suffers injury. (Smith Bell Dodwell
Shipping Agency Corp. v. Borja, G.R. No.
143008, June 10, 2002)
- want of care required by the

circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not
an absolute term, and its application depends
upon the situation of the parties, and the degree
of care and vigilance which the circumstances
reasonably impose. Where the danger is great a
high degree of care is necessary, and the failure
to observe it is a want of ordinary care under the
circumstances. (US v. Juanillo, G.R. No. 7255,
Oct. 3, 1912)
Elements:

blew his horn to give warning. Plaintiff moved the On May 14, 1972 a storm with strong rain hit Alcala,
horse to the right instead of moving to the left, Pangasinan. During the storm banana plants
reasoning that he had no sufficient time to move to standing on an elevated ground along the barrio
the right direction. Defendant continued to road near the transmission line of the Alcala Electric
approach, and when he had gotten quite near, he Plant were blown down and fell on the electric wire.
quickly turned to the left. The horse was frightened As a result the live electric wire was cut, one end of
that it turned his body across the bridge. His limb which was left hanging on the electric post and the
was broken and the rider was thrown off and got other fell on the ground under the fallen banana
injured. The horse died. An action for damages was plants. At about 9:00 o’clock the following morning
filed against the defendant. the barrio captain who was passing by saw the
broken electric wire and he warned the people
ISSUE:
W/N the defendant in maneuvering his car in the

manner above described was guilty of negligence
such as to give rise to a civil obligation to repair the
damage done.
HELD:
As the defendant started across the bridge, he had

the right to assume that the horse and rider would
pass over to the proper side; but as he moved
toward the center of the bridge it was demonstrated
to his eyes that this would not be done; and he
must in a moment have perceived that it was too
late for the horse to cross with safety in front of the
moving vehicle. In the nature of things this change
of situation occurred while the automobile was yet
some distance away; and from this moment it was
not longer within the power of the plaintiff to escape
being run down by going to a place of greater
safety. The control of the situation had then passed
entirely to the defendant.
The test by which to determine the existence of

negligence in a particular case may be stated as
follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that reasonable care and caution
which an ordinarily prudent person would have
used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty
of negligence. Conduct is said to be negligent when
a prudent man in the position of the tort feasor
would have foreseen that an effect harmful to
another was sufficiently probable to warrant his
foregoing the conduct or guarding against its
consequences.
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was

not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent
negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of
the road. But as we have already stated, the
defendant was also negligent; and in such case the
problem always is to discover which agent is
immediately and directly responsible. It will be
noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were
not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the
defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff
by an appreciable interval. Under these
circumstances the law is that the person who has
the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm
and fails to do so is chargeable with the
consequences, without reference to the prior
negligence of the other party.
UMALI V. BACANI, 69
SCRA 263 FACTS:

in the place not to go near the wire for they might aforementioned series of negligence on the part of
get hurt. He also told an employee of the electric defendants' employees resulting in a live wire
plant of the broken line and asked him to fix it. lying on the premises without any visible warning
The employee replied that he could not do it but of its lethal character, anybody, even a
he was going to look for a lineman to fix it. responsible grown up or not necessarily an
Manuel Saynes, a boy of 3 years and 8 months innocent child, could have met the same fate that
old whose house was just opposite the road, befell the victim. It may be true, as the lower
went to the place where the broken line was and Court found out, that the contributory negligence
got in contact with it. The boy was electrocuted of the victim's parents in not properly taking care
and subsequently died. Fidel Saynes father of the of the child, which enabled him to leave the house
boy brought an action for damages against alone on the morning of the incident and go to a
Teodoro Umali the owner and manager of the nearby place cut wire was very near the house
electric plant. One of Umali’s defenses was that (where victim was
as owner and manager of the electric plant he
was not liable on a quasidelict or tort because the
boy’s death was not due to any negligence on his
part but to a fortuitous event which was the storm
that caused the banana plants to fall and cut the
electric line.
ISSUE:
W/N Alcala Electric can be liable for TORT.
HELD:
Alcala Electric is LIABLE under TORT
First, by the very evidence of the defendant,

there were big and tall banana plants at the place
of the incident standing on an elevated ground
which were about 30 feet high and which were
higher than the electric post supporting the
electric line, and yet the employees of the
defendant who, with ordinary foresight, could
have easily seen that even in case of moderate
winds the electric line would be endangered by
banana plants being blown down, did not even
take the necessary precaution to eliminate that
source of danger to the electric line.
Second, even after the employees of the Alcala

Electric Plant were already aware of the possible
damage the storm of May 14, 1972, could have
caused their electric lines, thus becoming a
possible threat to life and property, they did not
cut off from the plant the flow of electricity along
the lines, an act they could have easily done
pending inspection of the wires to see if they had
been cut.
Third, employee Cipriano Baldomero was

negligent on the morning of the incident because
even if he was already made aware of the live cut
wire, he did not have the foresight to realize that
the same posed a danger to life and property,
and that he should have taken the necessary
precaution to prevent anybody from approaching
the live wire; instead Baldomero left the premises
because what was foremost in his mind was the
repair of the line, obviously forgetting that if left
unattended to it could endanger life and
property.
On defendants' argument that the proximate

cause of the victim's death could be attributed to
the parents' negligence in allowing a child of
tender age to go out of the house alone, We
could readily see that because of the

living) where the fatal fallen wire electrocuted him, HELD:
might mitigate respondent's liability, but we cannot
CAA contended that the elevation in question "had a
agree with petitioner's theory that the parents'
legitimate purpose for being on the terrace and was
negligence constituted the proximate cause of the
never intended to trip down people and injure them.
victim's death because the real proximate cause
It was there for no other purpose but to drain water
was the fallen live wire which posed a threat to life
on the
and property on that morning due to the series of
negligence adverted to above committed by
defendants' employees and which could have killed
any other person who might by accident get into
contact with it.
Art. 2179 of the Civil Code provides that if the

negligence of the plaintiff (parents of the victim in
this case) was only contributory, the immediate and
proximate cause of the injury being the
defendants' lack of due care, the plaintiff may
recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the
damages to be awarded. This law may be availed
of by the petitioner but does not exempt him from
liability. Petitioner's liability for injury caused by his
employees negligence is well defined in par. 4, of
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which states:
The owner and manager of an establishment or

enterprise are likewise responsible for
damages caused by their employees in the
service of the branches in which the latter are
employed or on tile occasion of their functions.
The negligence of the employee is presumed to be

the negligence of the employer because the
employer is supposed to exercise supervision over
the work of the employees. This liability of the
employer is primary and direct (Standard Vacuum
Oil Co. vs. Tan and Court of Appeals, 107 Phil.
109). In fact the proper defense for the employer to
raise so that he may escape liability is to prove
that he exercised, the diligence of the good father
of the family to prevent damage not only in the
selection of his employees but also inadequately
supervising them over their work. This defense was
not adequately proven as found by the trial Court,
and We do not find any sufficient reason to deviate
from its finding.
CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION V. CA,

ET.AL., GR NO. L-51806, NOV 8, 1988
FACTS:
Ernest E. Simke, a naturalized Filipino citizen, was

Honorary Consul General of Israel in the
Philippines. He went to Manila International Airport
to meet his future son-in-law. As the plane was
landing, he and his companions went to the viewing
deck to watch the arrival of the plane. While
walking, Simke slipped on an elevation 4 inches
high and fell on his back, breaking his thigh bone
in the process. He underwent a 3- hour
operation and after recovery he filed a claim for
damages against the Civil Aeronautics
Administration (CAA), which was the government
entity in charge of the airport.
ISSUE:
W/N CAA was negligent

floor area of the terrace." But upon ocular man, in the case under consideration, foresee
inspection by the trial court, it was found that the harm as a result of the course actually
terrace was in poor condition. Under RA 776, the pursued' If so, it was the duty of the actor to
CAA is charged with the duty of planning, take precautions to guard against that harm.
designing, constructing, equipping, expanding, Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the
maintenance...etc. of the Manila International ignoring of the suggestion born of this
Airport. prevision, is always necessary before
negligence can be held to exist....
Responsibility of CAA
The private respondent, who was the plaintiff in
Pursuant to Art. 1173, "the fault or negligence of the case before the lower court, could not have
the obligor consists in the omission of that reasonably
diligence which is required by the nature of the
obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the person, of the time, and of
the place." Here, the obligation of the CAA in
maintaining the viewing deck, a facility open to
the public, requires that CAA insure the safety of
the viewers using it. As these people come to
look to where the planes and the incoming
passengers are and not to look down on the floor
or pavement of the viewing deck, the CAA should
made sure that no dangerous obstructions or
elevations exist on the floor of the deck to prevent
any undue harm to the public.
Contributory Negligence
Under Art. 2179, contributory negligence

contemplates a negligent act or omission on the
part of the plaintiff, which although not the
proximate cause of his injury, CONTRIBUTED to
his own damage. The Court found no contributory
negligence on the part of the plaintiff, considering
the following test formulated in the early case of
Picart v. Smith:
The test by which to determine the existence

of negligence in a particular case may be
stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing
the alleged negligent act use that reasonable
care and caution which an ordinarily prudent
man would have used in the same situation?
If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law
here in effect adopts the standard supposed
to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of
the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law.
The existence of the negligence in a given
case is not determined by reference to the
personal judgment of the actor in the
situation before him. The law considers what
would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent
in the man of ordinary intelligence and
prudence and determines liability by that.
The question as to what would constitute the

conduct of a prudent man in a given situation
must of course be always determined in the
light of human experience and in view of the
facts involved in the particular case. Abstract
speculations cannot be here of much value
but this much can be profitably said:
Reasonable men govern their conduct by the
circumstances which are before them or
known to them. They are not, and are not
supposed to be omniscient of the future.
Hence they can be expected to take care
only when there is something before them to
suggest or warn of danger. Could a prudent

foreseen the harm that would befall him,
ASSOCIATED BANK v. TAN, GR No. 156940, Dec
considering the attendant factual circumstances.
14, 2004
Even if the private respondent had been looking
where he was going, the step in question could FACTS:
not easily be noticed because of its construction.
Vicente Henry Tan is a regular depositor-creditor of
RAKES V. AG & P, 7
the Associated Bank. He deposited a postdated
PHIL 359 FACTS: UCPB
Rakes was a laborer employed by Atlantic. While

transporting iron rails from a barge to the
company’s yard using a railroad hand car, Rakes
broke his leg when the hand car toppled over and
the rails fell on him. It appears that the hand car fell
due to a sagging portion of the track that gave with
the weight of the rails. Atlantic knew of the weak
state of the rail but did nothing to repair it. When
Rakes filed an action for damages, Atlantic’s
defense was that Rakes’ injuries were caused by
his own negligence in walking alongside the car,
instead of in front or behind it, as the laborers were
told to do.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Rakes was negligent.
2. Whether Atlantic is liable to Rakes.
HELD:
1. Rakes was negligent. He disobeyed the orders

of his superiors when he walked alongside the car
instead of in front or behind it.
2. Atlantic is liable to Rakes. The negligence of

Rakes will not totally bar him from recovering
anything from Atlantic, although the liability of the
latter will be mitigated as a result of Rakes’
contributory negligence. This is because although
Rakes contributed with his own negligence, the
primary cause of the accident was still the weak
rails which Atlantic refused to repair.
Distinction must be made between the accident

and the injury, between the event itself, without
which there could have been no accident, and
those acts of the victim not entering into it,
independent of it, but contributing to his own proper
hurt.
Where he contributes to the principal occurrence as

one of its determining factors, he cannot recover.
Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he
contributes only to his own injury, he may recover
the amount that the defendant responsible for the
event should pay for such injury, less a sum
deemedequivalent for his own imprudence.
We are with reference to such obligations, that

culpa or negligence, may be understood in two
different senses: either as culpa, substantive and
independent, which on account of its origin arises
in an obligation between two persons not formerly
bound by any other obligation; or as an incident in
the performance of an obligation; or as already
existed, which cannot be presumed to exist without
the other, and which increases the liability arising
from the already existing obligation.

check with the said bank in the amount of must be very high, if not the highest, degree of
P101,000.00 which was added to his original diligence." The standard applies, regardless of
deposit. The check was duly entered in his bank whether the account consists of only a few
record and upon advice and instruction of the hundred pesos or of millions. The fiduciary nature
bank that it was already cleared and backed up of banking, previously imposed by case law, is
by sufficient funds, Tan, on the same date, now enshrined in Republic Act No. 8791 or the
withdrew the sum of P240,000.00. A day after, General Banking Law of 2000. Section 2 of the
Tan deposited the amount of P50,000.00 making law specifically says that the State recognizes the
his existing balance in the amount of "fiduciary nature of banking that requires high
P107,793.45, because he has issued several standards of integrity and performance."
checks to his business partners. However, his
suppliers and business partners went back to him
alleging that the checks he issued bounced for
insufficiency of funds. Thereafter, Tan, thru his
lawyer, informed the bank to take positive steps
regarding the matter for he has adequate and
sufficient funds to pay the amount of the subject
checks. Nonetheless, the bank did not bother nor
offer any apology regarding the incident.
Consequently, Tan filed a Complaint for
Damages with the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City.
The trial court rendered its decision in favor of the

respondent and against the petitioner. It was
shown that respondent was not officially informed
about the debiting of the P101,000.00 from his
existing balance and that the bank merely
allowed the respondent to use the fund prior to
clearing merely for accommodation because the
bank considered him as one of its valued clients.
It ruled that the bank manager was negligent in
handling the particular checking account of the
respondent stating that such lapses caused all
the inconveniences to the respondent. Affirming
the trial court, the CA ruled that the bank should
not have authorized the withdrawal of the value of
the deposited check prior to its clearing. Having
done so, contrary to its obligation to treat
respondents account with meticulous care, the
bank violated its own policy. Without such notice,
it is estopped from blaming respondent for failing
to fund his account.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioner, which is acting as a depository

bank and a collecting agent, has properly
exercised its right to set- off the account of its
client for a check deposit which was dishonored
by the drawee bank.
HELD:
1. Obligation as a depositor bank
The banking business is impressed with public

interest. "Consequently, the highest degree of
diligence is expected, and high standards of
integrity and performance are even required of it.
By the nature of its functions, a bank is under
obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors
with meticulous care. The degree of diligence
required of banks is more than that of a good
father of a family where the fiduciary nature of
their relationship with their depositors is
concerned. Indeed, the banking business is
vested with the trust and confidence of the public;
hence the "appropriate standard of diligence

The respondents did not treat the account of the relationship between respondent and Matibag. The
petitioner with highest degree of care. It is Court of Appeals found that Matibag was not under
undisputed -- nay, even admitted -- that purportedly the control of respondent with respect to the means
as an act of accommodation to a valued client, and methods in the performance of his work. Even if
petitioner allowed the withdrawal of the face value no employer-employee relationship existed, it found
of the deposited check prior to its clearing. That act that no negligence can be attributed to respondent.
certainly disregarded the clearance requirement of
ISSUE:
the banking system.
2. Obligation as a collecting agent
As a general rule, a bank is liable for the wrongful

or tortuous acts and declarations of its officers or
agents within the course and scope of their
employment. Due to the very nature of their
business, banks are expected to exercise the
highest degree of diligence in the selection and
supervision of their employees. Jurisprudence has
established that the lack of diligence of a servant is
imputed to the negligence of the employer, when
the negligent or wrongful act of the former
proximately results in an injury to a third person; in
this case, the depositor. The manager of the banks
Cabanatuan branch, Consorcia Santiago,
categorically admitted that she and the employees
under her control had breached bank policies. They
admittedly breached those policies when, without
clearance from the drawee bank in Baguio, they
allowed respondent to withdraw on October 1,
1990, the amount of the check deposited.
PACIS v. MORALES, GR NO. 169467, Feb 25,
2010 FACTS:
Alfred Dennis Pacis, then 17 years old, died due to

a gunshot wound in the head which he sustained
while he was at the Top Gun Firearm[s] and
Ammunition[s] Store located at Upper Mabini
Street, Baguio City. The gun store was owned and
operated by defendant Jerome Jovanne Morales.
The bullet which killed Alfred Dennis Pacis was
fired from a gun brought in by a customer of the
gun store for repair which was left by defendant
Morales, who was in Manila that time, in a drawer
of a table located inside the gun store. It appears
that Matibag and Herbolario later brought out the
gun from the drawer and placed it on top of the
table to which Alfred Dennis Pacis got hold of the
same. Matibag asked Alfred Dennis Pacis to return
the gun. The latter followed and handed the gun to
Matibag. It went off, the bullet hitting the young
Alfred in the head.
The trial court held that the accidental shooting of

Alfred which caused his death was partly due to the
negligence of respondent’s employee Aristedes
Matibag (Matibag). Matibag and Jason Herbolario
(Herbolario) were employees of respondent even if
they were only paid on a commission basis. Under
the Civil Code, respondent is liable for the damages
caused by Matibag on the occasion of the
performance of his duties, unless respondent
proved that he observed the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent the damage. The Court
of Appeals held that respondent cannot be held
civilly liable since there was no employer-employee

W/N respondent is negligent for the death of horses, came along the street in the opposite
Alfred Dennis Pacis. direction to that the in which said plaintiff was
proceeding, and that thereupon the driver of the
HELD: said plaintiff's carromata, observing that the
delivery wagon of the defendant was coming at
Unlike the subsidiary liability of the employer great speed, crowded close to the sidewalk and
under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, the stopped, in order to give defendant's delivery
liability of the employer, or any person for that wagon an opportunity to pass by, but that instead
matter, under Article 2176 of the Civil Code is of passing by the defendant's wagon and horses
primary and direct, based on a person’s own ran into the carromata occupied by said plaintiff
negligence. with her child and overturned it, severely
wounding said plaintiff by making a serious cut
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission upon her head, and also injuring the carromata
causes damage to another, there being fault itself and the harness upon the horse which was
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the drawing it.
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.
A higher degree of care is required of someone

who has in his possession or under his control an
instrumentality extremely dangerous in character,
such as dangerous weapons or substances.
Such person in possession or control of
dangerous instrumentalities has the duty to take
exceptional precautions to prevent any injury
being done thereby. Unlike the ordinary affairs of
life or business which involve little or no risk, a
business dealing with dangerous weapons
requires the exercise of a higher degree of care.
As a gun store owner, respondent is presumed to
be knowledgeable about firearms safety and
should have known never to keep a loaded
weapon in his store to avoid unreasonable risk of
harm or injury to others. Respondent has the duty
to ensure that all the guns in his store are not
loaded. Firearms should be stored unloaded and
separate from ammunition when the firearms are
not needed for ready- access defensive use. With
more reason, guns accepted by the store for
repair should not be loaded precisely because
they are defective and may cause an accidental
discharge such as what happened in this case.
Respondent was clearly negligent when he
accepted the gun for repair and placed it inside
the drawer without ensuring first that it was not
loaded. In the first place, the defective gun should
have been stored in a vault. Before accepting the
defective gun for repair, respondent should have
made sure that it was not loaded to prevent any
untoward accident. For failing to ensure that the
gun was not loaded, respondent himself was
negligent. Clearly, respondent did not exercise
the degree of care and diligence required of a
good father of a family, much less the degree of
care required of someone dealing with dangerous
weapons, as would exempt him from liability in
this case.
S.D. MARTINEZ v. BUSKIRK, GR No. L-5691,

Dec 27, 1910
FACTS:
The plaintiff, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding

in a carromata when a delivery wagon belonging
to the defendant which was attached a pair of

The cochero, who was driving his delivery wagon, FACTS:
was a good servant and was considered a safe and
Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the
reliable cochero; that the delivery wagon had sent
principal of the Gabaldon Primary School wherein
to deliver some forage and for the purpose of
private respondent Edgardo Aquino was a teacher
delivery the cochero driving the team as
therein. that time, the school was fittered with
defendant's employee tied the driving lines of the
several concrete blocks which were remnants of the
horses to the front end of the delivery wagon and
old school shop that was destroyed in World War II.
then went back inside of the wagon to unload the
Realizing that the huge stones were serious
forage; that while unloading the forage and in the
hazards to the schoolchildren, another teacher by
act of carrying some of it out, another vehicle drove
the name of Sergio Banez started
by, the driver of which cracked a whip and made
some other noises, which frightened the horses
attached to the delivery wagon and they ran away,
and the driver was thrown from the inside of the
wagon out through the rear upon the ground and
was unable to stop the horses; that the horses then
ran up and on which street they came into collision
with the carromata in which the plaintiff, Carmen
Ong de Martinez, was riding.
ISSUE:
W/N defendant is guilty of negligence.
HELD:
In our judgment, the cochero of the defendant was

not negligent in leaving the horses in the manner
described by the evidence in this case. It appears
from the undisputed evidence that the horses which
caused the damage were gentle and tractable; that
the cochero was experienced and capable; that he
had driven one of the horses several years and the
other for five or six months; that he had been in the
habit, during all that time, of leaving them in the
condition in which they were left on the day of the
accident; that they had never run away up to that
time and there had been, therefore, no accident
due to such practice; that to leave the horses and
assist in unloading the merchandise in the manner
described on the day of the accident was the
custom of all cochero who delivered merchandise
of the character of that which was being delivered
by the cochero of the defendant on the day in
question, which custom was sanctioned by their
employers.
It is a matter of common knowledge as well as

proof that it is the universal practice of merchants to
deliver merchandise of the kind of that being
delivered at the time of the injury, in the manner in
which that was then being delivered; and that it is
the universal practice to leave the horses in the
manner in which they were left at the time of the
accident. This is the custom in all cities. It has not
been productive of accidents or injuries. The public,
finding itself unprejudiced by such practice, has
acquiesced for years without objection. Ought the
public now, through the courts, without prior
objection or notice, to be permitted to reverse the
practice of decades and thereby make culpable and
guilty one who had every reason and assurance to
believe that he was acting under the sanction of the
strongest of all civil forces, the custom of a people?
We think not.
YLARDE, ET. AL., V. AQUINO, ET.AL., GR NO.

L- 33722, JUL 29, 1988

burying them. Deciding to help his colleague, their playful and adventurous instincts and not
private respondent Edgardo Aquino gathered knowing the risk they were facing three of them
some of his pupils aged ten to eleven after class jumped into the hole while the other one jumped
dismissal to to dig beside a one-ton concrete on the stone. Since the stone was so heavy and
block in order to make a hole wherein the stone the soil was loose from the digging, it was also a
can be buried. As teacher-in-charge, he called natural consequence that the stone would fall into
Reynaldo Alonso, Francisco Alcantara, Ismael the hole beside it, causing injury on the
Abaga and Novelito Ylarde, to dug until the unfortunate child caught by its heavy weight.
excavation was one meter and forty centimeters Everything that occurred was the natural and
deep. When the depth was right enough to probable effect of the negligent acts of private
accommodate the concrete block, private respondent Aquino. Needless to say, the child
respondent Aquino and his four pupils got out of Ylarde would not have died were it not for the
the hole. He then left the students to level the unsafe situation created by private respondent
loose soil around the open hole while he went to Aquino which exposed the lives of all the
see Banez to get some Rope. Three of the four
kids, Alonso, Alcantara and Ylarde, playfully
jumped into the pit. Then, without any warning at
all, the remaining Abaga jumped on top of the
concrete block causing it to slide down towards
the opening. Alonso and Alcantara were able to
scramble out of the excavation on time but
unfortunately fo Ylarde, the concrete block caught
him before he could get out, pinning him to the
wall in a standing position which caused him
several injuries and later on died. Petitioners filed
a suit for damages against both private
respondents Aquino and Soriano. The lower court
dismissed the complaint and was affirmed by the
CA.
ISSUE:
1. W/N both private respondents can be held

liable for damages.
2. Were there acts and omissions on the part of

private respondent Aquino amounting to fault
or negligence which have direct causal
relation to the death of his pupil Ylarde?
HELD:
1. Soriano cannot be made responsible for the

death of the child Ylarde, he being the head
of an academic school and not a school of
arts and trades.
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, it is only the

teacher and not the head of an academic school
who should be answerable for torts committed by
their students. This Court went on to say that in a
school of arts and trades, it is only the head of
the school who can be held liable. However,
respondent Aquino can be held liable under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code as the teacher-in-
charge of the children for being negligent in his
supervision over them and his failure to take the
necessary precautions to prevent any injury on
their persons.
2. YES, Aquino is liable for damages.
The negligent act of private respondent Aquino in

leaving his pupils in such a dangerous site has a
direct causal connection to the death of the child
Ylarde. Left by themselves, it was but natural for
the children to play around. Tired from the
strenuous digging, they just had to amuse
themselves with whatever they found. Driven by

pupils concerned to real danger. A truly careful and
ISSUE:
cautious person would have acted in all contrast to
the way private respondent Aquino did. Were it not W/N negligence may be attributed to petitioner's
for his gross negligence, the unfortunate incident driver, and whether negligence on his part was the
would not have occurred and the child Ylarde would proximate cause of the accident, resulting in the
probably be alive today, a grown- man of thirty-five. death of Silvino Tan and causing physical injuries to
Due to his failure to take the necessary precautions respondent.
to avoid the hazard, Ylarde's parents suffered great
anguish all these years. HELD:
We cannot agree with the finding of the lower court
that the injuries which resulted in the death of the
child Ylarde were caused by his own reckless
imprudence. It should be remembered that he was
only ten years old at the time of the incident. As
such, he is expected to be playful and daring. His
actuations were natural to a boy his age. The
degree of care required to be exercised must vary
with the capacity of the person endangered to care
for himself. A minor should not be held to the same
degree of care as an adult, but his conduct should
be judged according to the average conduct of
persons of his age and experience. The standard of
conduct to which a child must conform for his own
protection is that degree of care ordinarily
exercised by children of the same age, capacity,
discretion, knowledge and experience under the
same or similar circumstances. Bearing this in
mind, We cannot charge the child Ylarde with
reckless imprudence.
PHIL. HAWK CORP. V. VIVIAN TAN LEE, GR NO.

166869, FEB. 16, 2010
FACTS:
The accident involved a motorcycle, a passenger

jeep, and a bus which was owned by petitioner
Philippine Hawk Corporation, and was then being
driven by Margarito Avila. Respondent testified that
she was riding on their motorcycle in tandem with
her husband, who was on the wheel. They were on
a stop position at the side of the highway; and
when they were about to make a turn, she saw a
bus running at fast speed coming toward them, and
then the bus hit a jeep parked on the roadside, and
their motorcycle as well. She lost consciousness
and was brought to the hospital but her husband
died due to the vehicular accident.
The driver of the passenger jeep involved in the

accident testified that his jeep was parked on the
left side of the highway. He did not notice the
motorcycle before the accident. But he saw the bus
dragging the motorcycle along the highway, and
then the bus bumped his jeep and sped away. The
driver of petitioner's bus testified that he was
driving his bus at 60 kilometers per hour on the
Maharlika Highway. When a motorcycle ran from
his left side of the highway, and as the bus came
near, the motorcycle crossed the path of the bus,
and so he turned the bus to the right. From his side
mirror, he saw that the motorcycle turned turtle
("bumaliktad"). He did not stop to help out of fear
for his life, but drove on and surrendered to the
police. He denied that he bumped the motorcycle.
The trial court rendered judgment against petitioner
and defendant Margarito Avila which affirmed by
the CA.

There is negligence indeed on the part of Provincial Hospital in Legaspi City. His daughter,
petitioner’s driver Margarito Avila. To be Andrea Pomasin Pagunsan, sister Narcisa
negligent, a defendant must have acted or failed Pomasin Roncales and Abraham Dionisio Perol
to act in such a way that an ordinary reasonable died on the spot. His other daughter Laarni, the
man would have realized that certain interests of jitney driver, and granddaughter Annie Jane
certain persons were unreasonably subjected to Pomasin Pagunsan expired at the hospital. His
a general but definite class of risks. In this case, wife, Consorcia Pomasin, another granddaughter
the bus driver, who was driving on the right side Dianne Pomasin Pagunsan, Ricky Ponce, Vicente
of the road, already saw the motorcycle on the Pomasin, Gina Sesista, Reynaldo Sesista,
left side of the road before the collision. However, Antonio Sesista and Sonia Perol sustained
he did not take the necessary precaution to slow injuries. On the other hand, Jabon and one of the
down, but drove on and bumped the motorcycle, passengers in the tractor-trailer were injured.
and also the passenger jeep parked on the left
side of the road, showing that the bus was
negligent in veering to the left lane, causing it to
hit the motorcycle and the passenger jeep.
Whenever an employee's negligence causes

damage or injury to another, there instantly arises
a presumption that the employer failed to
exercise the due diligence of a good father of the
family in the selection or supervision of its
employees. To avoid liability for a quasi-delict
committed by his employee, an employer must
overcome the presumption by presenting
convincing proof that he exercised the care and
diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of his employee.
The Court upholds the finding of the trial court

and the Court of Appeals that petitioner is liable
to respondent, since it failed to exercise the
diligence of a good father of the family in the
selection and supervision of its bus driver,
Margarito Avila, for having failed to sufficiently
inculcate in him discipline and correct behavior
on the road. Indeed, petitioner's tests were
concentrated on the ability to drive and physical
fitness to do so. It also did not know that Avila
had been previously involved in sideswiping
incidents.
REGALA V. CARIN G.R. NO. 188715 APRIL 6,

2011
FRANCISCO V. CHEMICAL BULK CARRIERS

G.R. NO. 193577 SEPTEMBER 7, 2011
III. DAMAGE TO ANOTHER (See

discussion on Damages, infra.)
IV. CAUSAL RELATION BETWEEN ACT

OR OMISSION AND DAMAGE
TISON ET AL V. SPS POMASIN, G.R. NO.

173180 AUGUST 24, 2011
FACTS:
Two vehicles, a tractor-trailer and a jitney, figured

in a vehicular mishap along Maharlika Highway in
Barangay Agos, Polangui, Albay last 12 August
1994. Laarni Pomasin (Laarni) was driving the
jitney towards the direction of Legaspi City while
the tractor-trailer, driven by Claudio Jabon
(Jabon), was traversing the opposite lane going
towards Naga City.
Gregorio was injured and brought to the Albay

They alleged that the proximate cause of the doctrine should not be rendered inflexible so as to
accident was the negligence, imprudence and deny relief when in fact there is no causal relation
carelessness of petitioners. between the statutory violation and the injury
sustained. Presumptions in law, while convenient,
ISSUE: are not intractable so as to forbid rebuttal rooted in
fact. After all, tort law is remunerative in spirit,
Who is the negligent part or the party at fault? aiming to provide compensation for the harm
suffered by those whose interests have been
HELD: invaded owing to the conduct of other.
This interplay of rules and exceptions is more

pronounced in this case of quasi-delict in which,
according to Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. To sustain a claim
based on quasi-delict, the following requisites must
concur: (a) damage suffered by the plaintiff; (b)
fault or negligence of defendant; and
(c) connection of cause and effect between the
fault or negligence of defendant and the damage
incurred by the plaintiff. These requisites must be
proved by a preponderance of evidence. The
claimants, respondents in this case, must,
therefore, establish their claim or cause of action
by preponderance of evidence, evidence which is
of greater weight, or more convincing than that
which is offered in opposition to it.
Driving without a proper license is a violation of

traffic regulation. Under Article 2185 of the Civil
Code, the legal presumption of negligence arises if
at the time of the mishap, a person was violating
any traffic regulation. However, in Sanitary Steam
Laundry, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we held that a
causal connection must exist between the injury
received and the violation of the traffic regulation. It
must be proven that the violation of the traffic
regulation was the proximate or legal cause of the
injury or that it substantially contributed thereto.
Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of
violation of law, like any other negligence, is without
legal consequence unless it is a contributing cause
of the injury. Likewise controlling is our ruling in
Añonuevo v. Court of Appeals where we reiterated
that negligence per se, arising from the mere
violation of a traffic statute, need not be sufficient in
itself in establishing liability for damages. In said
case, Añonuevo, who was driving a car, did not
attempt "to establish a causal connection between
the safety violations imputed to the injured cyclist,
and the accident itself. Instead, he relied on a
putative presumption that these violations in
themselves sufficiently established negligence
appreciable against the cyclist. Since the onus on
Añonuevo is to conclusively prove the link between
the violations and the accident, we can deem him
as having failed to discharge his necessary burden
of proving the cyclist' s own liability." We took the
occasion to state that:
The rule on negligence per se must admit

qualifications that may arise from the logical
consequences of the facts leading to the mishap.
The doctrine (and Article 2185, for that matter) is
undeniably useful as a judicial guide in adjudging
liability, for it seeks to impute culpability arising
from the failure of the actor to perform up to a
standard established by a legal fiat. But the

In the instant case, no causal connection was At the onset, the Court notes that the present
established between the tractor-trailer driver's case is one for damages based on torts, the
restrictions on his license to the vehicular employer- employee relationship being merely
collision. Furthermore, Jabon was able to incidental. To successfully prosecute an action
sufficiently explain that the Land Transportation anchored on torts, three elements must be
Office merely erred in not including restriction present, viz.: (1) duty (2) breach (3) injury and
code 8 in his license. proximate causation. The assailed decision of the
appellate court held that it was the duty of
OCEAN BUILDERS V. SPS CUBACUB G.R. petitioners to provide adequate medical
NO. 150898, APRIL 13, 2011 assistance
FACTS:
On April 9, 1995, Bladimir was afflicted with

chicken pox. He was thus advised by petitioner
Dennis Hao (Hao), the company's general
manager, to rest for three days which he did at
the company's "barracks" where he lives free of
charge.
Three days later or on April 12, 1995, Bladimir

went about his usual chores of manning the gate
of the company premises and even cleaned the
company vehicles. Later in the afternoon,
however, he asked a co-worker, Ignacio Silangga
(Silangga), to accompany him to his house in
Capas, Tarlac so he could rest. Informed by
Silangga of Bladimir's intention, Hao gave
Bladimir P1,000.00 and ordered Silangga to
instead bring Bladimir to the nearest hospital.
Along with co-workers Narding and Tito Vergado,

Silangga thus brought Bladimir to the Caybiga
Community Hospital (Caybiga Hospital), a
primary-care hospital around one kilometer away
from the office of the company.
The hospital did not allow Bladimir to leave the

hospital. He was then confined, with Narding
keeping watch over him. The next day, April 13,
1995, a doctor of the hospital informed Narding
that they needed to talk to Bladimir's parents,
hence, on Silangga's request, their co-workers
June Matias and Joel Edrene fetched Bladimir's
parents from Tarlac. AIcaDC
At about 8 o'clock in the evening of the same

day, April 13, 1995, Bladimir's parents-
respondent spouses Cubacub, with their friend
Dr. Hermes Frias (Dr. Frias), arrived at the
Caybiga Hospital and transferred Bladimir to the
Quezon City General Hospital (QCGH) where he
was placed in the intensive care unit and died the
following day, April 14, 1995.
The death certificate issued by the QCGH

recorded Bladimir's immediate cause of death as
cardio- respiratory arrest and the antecedent
cause as pneumonia. On the other hand, the
death certificate issued by Dr. Frias recorded the
causes of death as cardiac arrest, multiple organ
system failure, septicemia and chicken pox.
ISSUE:
W/N Hoa’s negligence is the proximate cause of

the death Bladimir.
HELD:

to the employees under Art. 161 of the Labor Code, death of all five victims as "asphyxia" caused by the
failing which a breach is committed. diminution of oxygen supply in the body working
below normal conditions. The lungs of the five
victims burst, swelled in hemmorrhagic areas and
AT ALL EVENTS, the alleged negligence of Hao
this was due to their intake of toxic gas, which, in
cannot be considered as the proximate cause of
this case, was sulfide gas produced from the waste
the death of Bladimir. Proximate cause is that
matter inside the septic tank. Petitioners, children of
which, in natural and continuous sequence,
the deceased, file a complaint for damages. TC:
unbroken by an efficient intervening cause,
Dismissed. CA: In favor of petitioners, based on
produces injury, and without which, the result would
social justice. CA on MR: Reversed, in favor of
not have occurred. An injury or damage is
Davao City.
proximately caused by an act or failure to act,
whenever it appears from the evidence in the case
that the act or omission played a substantial part in
bringing about or actually causing the injury or
damage, and that the injury or damage was either a
direct result or a reasonably probable consequence
of the act or omission.
Verily, the issue in this case is essentially factual in

nature. The dissent, apart from adopting the
appellate court's findings, finds that Bladimir
contracted chicken pox from a co-worker and Hao
was negligent in not bringing that co-worker to the
nearest physician, or isolating him as well. This
finding is not, however, borne by the records.
Nowhere in the appellate court's or even the trial
court's decision is there any such definite finding
that Bladimir contracted chicken pox from a co-
worker. At best, the only allusion to another
employee being afflicted with chicken pox was
when Hao testified that he knew it to heal within
three days as was the case of another worker,
without reference, however, as to when it
happened.
a. Doctrine of Proximate Cause
FERNANDO V. CA, 208
SCRA 714 FACTS:
On November 7, 1975, Bibiano Morta, market

master of the Agdao Public Market filed a
requisition request with the Chief of Property of the
City Treasurer's Office for the re-emptying of the
septic tank in Agdao. An invitation to bid was
issued to Aurelio Bertulano, Lito Catarsa, Feliciano
Bascon, Federico Bolo and Antonio Suñer, Jr.
Bascon won the bid. On November 26, 1975
Bascon was notified and he signed the purchase
order. However, before such date, specifically on
November 22, 1975, bidder Bertulano with four
other companions namely Joselito Garcia, William
Liagoso, Alberto Fernandoand Jose Fajardo, Jr.
were found dead inside the septic tank. The bodies
were removed by a fireman. One body, that of
Joselito Garcia, was taken out by his uncle, Danilo
Garcia and taken to the Regional Hospital but he
expired there. The City Engineer's office
investigated the case and learned that the five
victim sentered the septic tank without clearance
neither from it nor with the knowledge and consent
of the market master. In fact, the septic tank was
found to be almost empty and the victims were
presumed to be the ones who did the re-emptying.
Dr. Juan Abear of the City Health Office autopsied
the bodies and in his reports, put the cause of

ISSUE: immediate predecessor, the final event in the
chain immediately effecting the injury as natural
W/N Davao City is liable. and probable result of the cause which first acted,
under such circumstances that the person
HELD: responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have
No. We find no compelling reason to grant the reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his
petition. We affirm. act or default that an injury to some person might
probably result therefrom.
While it may be true that the public respondent
has been remiss in its duty to re-empty the septic There is no exact mathematical formula to
tank annually, such negligence was not a determine proximate cause. It is based upon
continuing one. Upon learning from the report of mixed considerations of logic, common sense,
the market master about the need to clean the policy and precedent. Plaintiff
septic tank of the public toilet in Agdao Public
Market, the public respondent immediately
responded by issuing invitations to bid for such
service. Thereafter, it awarded the bid to the
lowest bidder, Mr. Feliciano Bascon. The public
respondent, therefore, lost no time in taking up
remedial measures to meet the situation. It is
likewise an undisputed fact that despite the
public respondent's failure to re-empty the septic
tank since 1956, people in the market have been
using the public toilet for their personal
necessities but have remained unscathed.
In view of this factual milieu, it would appear that

an accident such as toxic gas leakage from the
septic tank is unlikely to happen unless one
removes its covers. The accident in the case at
bar occurred because the victims on their own
and without authority from the public respondent
opened the septic tank. Considering the nature of
the task of emptying a septic tank especially one
which has not been cleaned for years, an
ordinarily prudent person should undoubtedly be
aware of the attendant risks. The victims are no
exception; more so with Mr. Bertulano, an old
hand in this kind of service, who is presumed to
know the hazards of the job. His failure,
therefore, and that of his men to take
precautionary measures for their safety was the
proximate cause of the accident.
DYTEBAN V. JOSE CHING,
supra. ISSUE:
W/N prime mover driver Limbaga’s negligence

was the proximate cause of the damage to the
Nissan van.
HELD:
SC held that the skewed parking of the prime

mover (negligence of the driver) was the
proximate cause of the collision.
Proximate cause is defined as that cause,

unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred. More comprehensively,
proximate cause is that cause acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by
setting other events in motion, all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events, each
having a close causal connection with its

must, however, establish a sufficient link between to what degree. A satisfactory definition of
the act or omission and the damage or injury. That proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages 695-
link must not be remote or far-fetched; otherwise, 696 of American jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-
no liability will attach. The damage or injury must appellants in their brief. It is as follows:
be a natural and probable result of the act or
. . . 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous
omission.
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
Here, We agree with the RTC that the damage cause, produces the injury, and without which
caused to the Nissan van was a natural and the
probable result of the improper parking of the prime
mover with trailer. As discussed, the skewed
parking of the prime mover posed a serious risk to
oncoming motorists. Limbaga failed to prevent or
minimize that risk. The skewed parking of the prime
mover triggered the series of events that led to the
collision, particularly the swerving of the passenger
bus and the Nissan van. The skewed parking is the
proximate cause of the damage to the Nissan van.
BATACLAN V. MEDINA, 102
PHIL 181 FACTS:
The deceased Juan Bataclan was among the

passengers of Medina Transportation, driven by
Conrado Saylon and operated by Mariano Medina.
On its way from Cavite to Pasay, the front tires
burst and the vehicle fell into a canal. Some
passengers were able to escape by themselves or
with some help, while there were 4, including
Bataclan, who could not get out. Their cries were
heard in the neighbourhood. Then there came
about 10 men, one of them carrying a torch. As
they approached the bus, it caught fire and the
passengers died. The fire was due to gasoline leak
and the torch. Salud Villanueva Vda. de Bataclan,
in her name and on behalf of her 5 minor children,
sought to claim damages from the bus company.
The CFI favored the plaintiff, and the CA forwarded
the case to the SC due to the amount involved.
ISSUE:
What was the proximate cause of the death of Juan

and the other passengers?
HELD:
We agree with the trial court that the case involves

a breach of contract of transportation for hire, the
Medina Transportation having undertaken to carry
Bataclan safely to his destination, Pasay City. We
also agree that there was negligence on the part of
the defendant, through his agent, the driver Saylon.
At the time of the blow out, the bus was speeding,
as testified to by one of the passengers, and as
shown by the fact that according to the testimony of
the witnesses, including that of the defense, from
the point where one of the front tires burst up to the
canal where the bus overturned after zig- zaging,
there was a distance of about 150 meters. The
chauffeur, after the blow-out, must have applied the
brakes in order to stop the bus, but because of the
velocity at which the bus must have been running,
its momentum carried it over a distance of 150
meters before it fell into the canal and turned turtle.
There is no question that under the circumstances,

the defendant carrier is liable. The only question is

result would not have occurred.' And more the edge of the “media agua” and 2-1/2 feet from
comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause it. He was electrocuted and died as a result
is that acting first and producing the injury, thereof. The electric wire was already in the
either immediately or by setting other events premises at the time the house was built. This
in motion, all constituting a natural and distance of 2-1/2 feet of the “media agua” from the
continuous chain of events, each having a electric wire was not in accordance with city
close causal connection with its immediate regulations which required a distance of 3 feet but
predecessor, the final event in the chain somehow or other the owner of the building was
immediately effecting the injury as a natural able to have the construction approved. In an
and probable result of the cause which first action for damages brought by the heirs of Magno
acted, under such circumstances that the against the Manila Electric Co. the CA awarded
person responsible for the first event should,
as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person,
have reasonable ground to expect at the
moment of his act or default that an injury to
some person might probably result therefrom.
In the present case, we do not hesitate to hold

that the proximate cause was the overturning of
the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle
turned not only on its side but completely on its
back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank
was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming
of the men with a lighted torch was in response to
the call for help, made not only by the
passengers, but most probably, by the driver and
the conductor themselves, and that because it
was dark (about 2:30 am), the rescuers had to
carry a light with them, and coming as they did
from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights
were not available; and what was more natural
than that said rescuers should innocently
approach the vehicle to extend the aid and effect
the rescue requested from them. In other words,
the coming of the men with a torch was to be
expected and was a natural sequence of the
overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its
passengers and the call for outside help. What is
more, the burning of the bus can also in part be
attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through
its driver and its conductor. According to the
witness, the driver and the conductor were on the
road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the
driver should and must have known that in the
position in which the overturned bus was,
gasoline could and must have leaked from the
gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around
the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline
when spilled, specially over a large area, can be
smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet
neither the driver nor the conductor would appear
to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the
rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near
the bus. Said negligence on the part of the
agents of the carrier come under the codal
provisions above-reproduced, particularly,
Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.
MANILA ELECTRIC CO V. REMOQUILLO, 99

PHIL 117
FACTS:
Efren Magno went to repair a “media agua” of the

house of his brother-in-law on Rodriguez Lanuza
Street, Manila. While making the repair, a
galvanized iron roofing which he was holding
came into contact with the electric wire of the
petitioner Manila Electric Co. strung parallel to

damages holding that although the owner of the efficient cause of the injury, even though
house in constructing the “media agua” exceeded such injury would not have happened but
the limits fixed in the permit, still after making that for such injury would not have happened
finally approved because he was given a final but for such condition or occasion. If not
permit to occupy the house and that the company danger existed in the condition except
was at fault and guilty of negligence because because of the independent cause, such
although the electric wire had been installed long condition was not the proximate cause.
before the construction of the house the electric And if an independent negligent act or
company did not exercise due diligence nor take defective condition sets into operation the
other precautionary measures as may be circumstances which result in
warranted. Said decision was appealed to the SC.
HELD:
SC held that the real cause of the accident or death

was the reckless or negligent act of Magno himself.
When he was called by his stepbrother to repair the

“media agua” just below the third story window, it is
to be presumed that due to his age and experience
he was qualified to do so. Perhaps he was a
tinsmith or carpenter and had training and
experience for the job. So, he could not have been
entirely a stranger to electric wires and the danger
lurking in them. But unfortunately, in the instant
case, his training and experience failed him, and
forgetting where he was standing, holding the 6-
feet iron sheet with both hands and at arms length,
evidently without looking, and throwing all prudence
and discretion to the winds, he turned around
swinging his arms with the motion of his body,
thereby causing his own electrocution.
But even assuming for a moment that the

defendant electric company could be considered
negligent in installing its electric wires so close to
the house and ‘mediaagua’ in question, and in
failing to properly insulate those wires (although
according to the unrefuted claim of said company it
was impossible to make the insulation of that kind
of wire), nevertheless to hold the defendant liable in
damages for the death of Magno, such supposed
negligence of the company must have been the
proximate and principal cause of the accident,
because if the act of Magno in turning around and
swinging the galvanized iron sheet with his hands
was the proximate and principal cause of the
electrocution, then his heirs may not recover.
To us it is clear that the principal and proximate

cause of the electrocution was not the electric wire,
evidently a remote cause, but rather the reckless
and negligent act of Magno in turning around and
swinging the galvanized iron sheet without taking
any precaution, such as looking back toward the
street and at the wire to avoid its contacting said
iron sheet, considering the latter’s length of 6 feet.
For a better understanding of the rule on remote
and proximate cause with respect to injuries, we
find the following citation helpful:
A prior and remote cause cannot be

made the basis of an action if such
remote cause did nothing more than
furnish the condition or give rise to the
occasion by which the injury was made
possible, if there intervened between
such prior or remote cause and the injury
a distinct, successive, unrelated, and

injury because of prior defection cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a
condition, such subsequent act or mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury
condition is the proximate cause. was incurred; and the record discloses throughout
that he was exceptionally well qualified to take
TAYLOR V. MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD & care of himself. The evidence of record leaves no
LIGHT CO., 16 PHIL 8 room for doubt that, despite his denials on the
witness stand, he well knew the explosive
FACTS: character of the cap with which he was amusing
himself. The series of experiments made by him in
The defendant left some twenty or thirty his attempt to produce an explosion, as described
fulminating caps used for blasting charges of by the little girl who was present, admit of no other
dynamite scattered in the premises behind its explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by
power plant. The plaintiff, a boy 15 years of age, the use of electricity, followed
in company with another boy 12 years of age,
entered the premises of the defendant, saw the
fulminating caps and carried them away. Upon
reaching home they made a series of
experiments with the caps. They thrust the ends
of the wires into an electric light socket and
obtained no result. They next tried to break the
cap with a stone and failed. They then opened
one of the caps with a knife, and finding that it
was filled with a yellowish substance they got
matches, and the plaintiff held the cap while the
other boy applied a lighted match to the contents.
An explosion followed causing injuries to the
boys. This action was brought by the plaintiff to
recover damages for the injuries which he
suffered.
ISSUE:
W/N Manila Electric is liable for damages to the

petitioners
HELD:
No. The immediate cause of the explosion, the

accident which resulted in plaintiff's injury, was in
his own act in putting a match to the contents of
the cap, and that having "contributed to the
principal occurrence, as one of its determining
factors, he cannot recover."
But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff

upon defendant's property without defendant's
express invitation or permission would not have
relieved defendant from responsibility for injuries
incurred there by plaintiff, without other fault on
his part, if such injury were attributable to the
negligence of the defendant, we are of opinion
that under all the circumstances of this case the
negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps
exposed on its premises was not the proximate
cause of the injury received by the plaintiff, which
therefore was not, properly speaking, "attributable
to the negligence of the defendant," and, on the
other hand, we are satisfied that plaintiffs action
in cutting open the detonating cap and putting
match to its contents was the proximate cause of
the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted
upon the plaintiff, and that the defendant,
therefore is not civilly responsible for the injuries
thus incurred.
In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the

accident was a well-grown youth of 15, more
mature both mentally and physically than the
average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a

by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a person who has the last clear chance of avoiding an
hammer, and the final success of his endeavors accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his
brought about by the application of a match to the opponent, is solely responsible for the
contents of the caps, show clearly that he knew consequences of the accident. He petitioner claimed
what he was about. Nor can there be any that the cimarron had the last opportunity of
reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate avoiding an accident.
that the explosion might be dangerous, in view of
ISSUE:
the fact that the little girl, 9 years of age, who was
within him at the time when he put the match to the
contents of the cap, became frightened and ran
away.
True, he may not have known and probably did not

know the precise nature of the explosion which
might be expected from the ignition of the contents
of the cap, and of course he did not anticipate the
resultant injuries which he incurred; but he well
knew that a more or less dangerous explosion
might be expected from his act, and yet he willfully,
recklessly, and knowingly produced the explosion.
It would be going far to say that "according to his
maturity and capacity" he exercised such and "care
and caution" as might reasonably be required of
him, or that defendant or anyone else should be
held civilly responsible for injuries incurred by him
under such circumstances.
The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can

be said to have the necessary capacity to
understand and appreciate the nature and
consequences of his own acts, so as to make it
negligence on his part to fail to exercise due care
and precaution in the commission of such acts; and
indeed it would be impracticable and perhaps
impossible so to do, for in the very nature of things
the question of negligence necessarily depends on
the ability of the minor to understand the character
of his own acts and their consequences; and the
age at which a minor can be said to have such
ability will necessarily depends of his own acts and
their consequences; and at the age at which a
minor can be said to have such ability will
necessarily vary in accordance with the varying
nature of the infinite variety of acts which may be
done by him.
SANITARY STEAM LAUNDRY V. CA, 300
SCRA 20 FACTS:
This case involves a collision between a truck

owned by petitioner and a cimarron which caused
the death of three persons and injuries to several
others. Petitioner’s truck crashed the cimarron
when the driver stepped on the brakes to avoid
hitting the jeepney and this caused his vehicle to
swerve to the left and encroach on a portion of the
opposite lane. RTC found Petitioner’s driver to be
responsible for the accident and awarded damages
in favor of Private respondents. Petitioner contends
that the driver of the cimarron was guilty of
contributory negligence since it was guilty of
violation of traffic rules and regulations
(overloading, had only one headlight on) at the time
of mishap. He also argued that sudden swerving of
a vehicle caused by its driver stepping on the
brakes is not negligence per se. He further argued
that the driver should be exonerated based on the
doctrine of last clear chance, which states that the

1. W/N the cimmaron was guilty of contributory minimum requirements fixed by law. But
negligence due to violation of traffic rules and petitioner did not show in what manner drivers
regulation which added to the proximate were supervised to ensure that they drove
cause of the accident or such was based their vehicles in a safe way.
solely on the negligence of the panel truck
MERCURY DRUG V. BAKING, GR NO. 156037,
driver.
MAY 25, 2007
2. W/N petitioner failed to exercise due
FACTS:
diligence in the selection and supervision of
its employees. Sebastian M. Baking, went to the clinic of Dr.
Cesar Sy for a medical check-up. Respondent
HELD:
was given two medical prescriptions Diamicron for
1. It has not been shown how the alleged his blood sugar and
negligence of the Cimarron driver contributed to
the collision between the vehicles. Petitioner has
the burden of showing a causal connection
between the injury received and the violation of
the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. He
must show that the violation of the statute was
the proximate or legal cause of the injury or that
it substantially contributed thereto. Petitioner says
that "driving an overloaded vehicle with only one
functioning headlight during night time certainly
increases the risk of accident," that because the
Cimarron had only one headlight, there was
"decreased visibility," and that the fact that the
vehicle was overloaded and its front seat
overcrowded "decreased [its] maneuver ability."
We are convinced that no maneuvering which the
Cimarron driver could have done would have
avoided a collision with the panel truck, given the
suddenness of the events. Clearly, the
overcrowding in the front seat was immaterial.
All these point to the fact that the proximate

cause of the accident was the negligence of
petitioners driver. As the trial court noted, the
swerving of petitioners panel truck to the opposite
lane could mean not only that petitioners driver
was running the vehicle at a very high speed but
that he was tailgating the passenger jeepney
ahead of it as well.
2. With respect to the requirement of passing

psychological and physical tests prior to his
employment, although no law requires it, such
circumstance would certainly be a reliable
indicator of the exercise of due diligence. As the
trial court said:
. . . No tests of skill, physical as well as

mental and emotional, were conducted on
their would-be employees. No on-the-job
training and seminars reminding employees,
especially drivers, of road courtesies and
road rules and regulations were done. There
were no instructions given to defendants
drivers as to how to react in cases of
emergency nor what to do after an
emergency occurs. All these could only mean
failure on the part of defendant to exercise
the diligence required of it of a good father of
a family in the selection and supervision of its
employees. Indeed, driving exacts a more
than usual toll on the sense. Accordingly, it
behooves employers to exert extra care in
the selection and supervision of their
employees. They must go beyond the

Benalize tablets for his triglyceride. Respondent
Here, the vehicular accident could not have
then proceeded to petitioner Mercury Drug
occurred had petitioners employee been careful in
Corporation to buy the prescribed medicines.
reading Dr. Sys prescription. Without the potent
However, the saleslady misread the prescription for
effects of Dormicum, a sleeping tablet, it was
Diamicron as a prescription for Dormicum, a potent
unlikely that respondent would fall asleep while
sleeping tablet. On the third day of taking the
driving his car, resulting in a collision.
medicine, respondent figured in a vehicular
Complementing Article 2176 is Article 2180 of the
accident. The car he was driving collided with the
same Code.The employer of a negligent employee
car of one Josie Peralta due to falling asleep while
is liable for
driving. He could not remember anything about the
collision nor felt its impact. Suspecting that the
tablet he took may have a bearing on his physical
and mental state at the time of the collision,
respondent returned to Dr. Sy’s clinic. Dr. Sy was
shocked to find that what was sold to respondent
was Dormicum, instead of the prescribed
Diamicron. The trial court rendered its decision in
favor of respondent and this was affirmed by the
CA in toto.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner was negligent, and if so,

whether such negligence was the proximate cause
of respondents accident.
HELD:
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides:

damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this Chapter.
Requisites under Art. 2176:
(a) damage suffered by the plaintiff;
(b) fault or negligence of the defendant; and,
(c) connection of cause and effect between the

fault or negligence of the defendant and the
damage incurred by the plaintiff.
Petitioners employee was grossly negligent in

selling to respondent Dormicum, instead of the
prescribed Diamicron. Considering that a fatal
mistake could be a matter of life and death for a
buying patient, the said employee should have
been very cautious in dispensing medicines. She
should have verified whether the medicine she
gave respondent was indeed the one prescribed by
his physician. The care required must be
commensurate with the danger involved, and the
skill employed must correspond with the superior
knowledge of the business which the law demands.
Proximate Cause
Proximate cause is defined as any cause that

produces injury in a natural and continuous
cause, such that the result would not have occurred
otherwise. Proximate cause is determined from the
facts of each case, upon a combined consideration
of logic, common sense, policy, and precedent.

the damages caused by the latter. When an injury in Suarez’s testimony which convincingly shows
is caused by the negligence of an employee, that the erroneous marking of DAIF on the checks
there instantly arises a presumption of the law proximately caused his alleged psychological or
that there has been negligence on the part of the social injuries. Suarez merely testified that he
employer, either in the selection of his employee suffered humiliation and that the prospective
or in the supervision over him, after such consolidation of the titles to Tagaytay properties
selection. The presumption, however, may be did not materialize due to the dishonor of his
rebutted by a clear showing on the part of the checks, not due to the erroneous marking of DAIF
employer that he has exercised the care and on his checks. Hence, Suarez had only himself to
diligence of a good father of a family in the blame for his hurt feelings and the unsuccessful
selection and supervision of his employee. Thus, transaction with his client as these were directly
petitioner's failure to prove that it exercised the caused by the justified dishonor of the checks. In
due diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its employee will
make it solidarily liable for damages caused by
the latter.
BPI V. SUAREZ, GR NO. 167750, MAR
15, 2010 FACTS:
Respondent Reynald R. Suarez (Suarez) is a

lawyer who used to maintain both savings and
current accounts with petitioner Bank of the
Philippine Islands (BPI). Suarez had a client who
planned to purchase several parcels of land in
Tagaytay City, but preferred not to deal directly
with the land owners. They agreed that the client
would deposit the money in Suarez’s BPI account
as payment for the Tagaytay properties and then,
Suarez would issue checks to the sellers. An
RCBC check was then deposited to Suarez’s
current account in BPI. Suarez instructed his
secretary, Garaygay, to confirm from BPI whether
the face value of the RCBC check was already
credited to his account that same day it was
deposited. It was alleged that BPI confirmed the
same- day crediting of the RCBC check. With
this, Suarez issued on the same day five checks
for the purchase of the Tagaytay properties. Days
after while in the U.S. for vacation, he was
informed by Garaygay that the checks issued
were dishonored due to insufficiency of funds
with penalties despite an assurance from RCBC
that it has already been debited in his account
and fully funded. Claiming that BPI mishandled
his account through negligence, Suarez filed with
the Regional Trial Court a complaint for
damages. The TC rendered judgment in favor of
respondent which was affirmed by CA.
ISSUE:
W/N the erroneous marking of DAIF (drawn

against insufficient funds), instead of DAUD
(drawn against uncollected deposit)on the
checks,is the proximate cause of respondents
injury.
HELD:
In the present case, Suarez failed to establish

that his claimed injury was proximately caused by
the erroneous marking of DAIF on the checks.
Proximate Cause has been defined as any cause
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the result complained of and without
which would not have occurred. There is nothing

short, Suarez cannot recover compensatory Article 2185.Unless there is proof to the
damages for his own negligence. contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a
motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time
RAMOS V. C.O.L. REALTY, GR NO. 184905, of the mishap, he was violating any traffic
AUG. 28, 2009 regulation.
FACTS: If the master is injured by the negligence of

a third person and by the concurring
A vehicular accident took place between a Toyota contributory negligence of his own servant or
Altis Sedan, owned by petitioner C.O.L. Realty agent, the latter’s negligence is imputed to his
Corporation, and driven by Aquilino Larin superior and will defeat the superior’s action
("Aquilino"), and a Ford Expedition, owned by against the third person,
Lambert Ramos (Ramos) and driven by Rodel
Ilustrisimo ("Rodel"). (C.O.L. Realty) averred that its
driver, Aquilino, was slowly driving the Toyota Altis
car at a speed of five to ten kilometers per hour
along Rajah Matanda Street and has just crossed
the center lane of Katipunan Avenue when
(Ramos’) Ford Espedition violently rammed against
the car’s right rear door and fender. With the force
of the impact, the sedan turned 180 degrees
towards the direction where it came from. A
passenger of the sedan, one Estela Maliwat
("Estela") sustained injuries. Ramos denied liability
for damages insisting that it was the negligence of
Aquilino, (C.O.L. Realty’s) driver, which was the
proximate cause of the accident. Ramos
maintained that the sedan car crossed Katipunan
Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street despite the
concrete barriers placed thereon prohibiting
vehicles to pass through the intersection.
Petitioner demanded from respondent

reimbursement for the expenses incurred in the
repair of its car and the hospitalization of Estela.
The demand fell on deaf ears prompting (C.O.L.
Realty) to file a Complaint for Damages based on
quasi-delict before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Metro Manila (MeTC), Quezon City. MeTC
rendered the decision exculpating Ramos from
liability. RTC affirmed the decision of the MeTC.
The CA affirmed the view that Aquilino was
negligent in crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah
Matanda Street since, as per Certification of the
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority
(MMDA).
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner could be held solidarily liable

with his driver, Rodel Ilustrisimo, to pay respondent
C.O.L. Realty for damages suffered in a vehicular
collision.
HELD:
Articles 2179 and 2185 of the Civil Code on quasi-

delicts apply in this case, viz:
Article 2179.When the plaintiff’s own

negligence was the immediate and proximate
cause of his injury, he cannot recover
damages. But if his negligence was only
contributory, the immediate and proximate
cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack
of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages,
but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be
awarded.

assuming of course that the contributory motorcycle with his employee, Teddy Emperado
negligence was the proximate cause of the (Emperado). Catubig was the one driving the
injury of which complaint is made. motorcycle. While approaching a curve at
kilometers 59 and 60, Catubig tried to overtake a
Applying the foregoing principles of law to the slow moving ten-wheeler cargo truck by crossing-
instant case, Aquilino’s act of crossing Katipunan over to the opposite lane, which was then being
Avenue via Rajah Matanda constitutes traversed by the Ceres Bulilit bus driven by
negligence because it was prohibited by law. Cabanilla, headed for the opposite direction.
Moreover, it was the proximate cause of the When the two vehicles collided, Catubig and
accident, and thus precludes any recovery for Emperado were thrown from the motorcycle.
any damages suffered by respondent from the Catubig died on the spot where he was thrown,
accident.Proximate cause is defined as that while Emperado died while being rushed to the
cause, which, in natural and continuous hospital.
cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred. And more
comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is
that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion,
all constituting a natural and continuous chain of
events, each having a close causal connection
with its immediate predecessor, the final event in
the chain immediately effecting the injury as a
natural and probable result of the cause which
first acted, under such circumstances that the
person responsible for the first event should, as
an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his
act or default that an injury to some person might
If Aquilino heeded the MMDA prohibition against

crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda,
the accident would not have happened. This
specific untoward event is exactly what the
MMDA prohibition was intended for. Thus, a
prudent and intelligent person who resides within
the vicinity where the accident occurred, Aquilino
had reasonable ground to expect that the
accident would be a natural and probable result if
he crossed Katipunan Avenue since such
crossing is considered dangerous on account of
the busy nature of the thoroughfare and the
ongoing construction of the Katipunan-Boni
Avenue underpass. It was manifest error for the
Court of Appeals to have overlooked the principle
embodied in Article 2179 of the Civil Code, that
when the plaintiff’s own negligence was the
immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he
cannot recover damages. It is unnecessary to
delve into the issue of Rodel’s contributory
negligence, since it cannot overcome or defeat
Aquilino’s recklessness which is the immediate
and proximate cause of the accident.
VALLACAR TRANSIT V. CATUBIG G.R. NO.

175512 MAY 30, 2011
FACTS:
Petitioner is engaged in the business of

transportation and the franchise owner of a Ceres
Bulilit bus with Plate No. T-0604-1348. Quirino C.
Cabanilla (Cabanilla) is employed as a regular
bus driver of petitioner.
On January 27, 1994, respondent's husband,

Quintin Catubig, Jr. (Catubig), was on his way
home from Dumaguete City riding in tandem on a

ISSUE: necessary to delve into the defense of petitioner that
it exercised due diligence in the selection and
W/N the proximate cause of the collision was supervision of Cabanilla as its employee driver.
Catubig’s reckless and negligent act.
b. Doctrine of Imputed Negligence
HELD:
The petition is meritorious.
The issue of negligence is basically factual.
There is merit in the argument of the petitioner that

Article 2180 of the Civil Code — imputing fault or
negligence on the part of the employer for the fault
or negligence of its employee — does not apply to
petitioner since the fault or negligence of its
employee driver, Cabanilla, which would have
made the latter liable for quasi-delict under Article
2176 of the Civil Code, has never been established
by respondent. To the contrary, the totality of the
evidence presented during trial shows that the
proximate cause of the collision of the bus and
motorcycle is attributable solely to the negligence of
the driver of the motorcycle, Catubig.
Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in

natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred.
And more comprehensively, the proximate legal
cause is that acting first and producing the injury,
either immediately or by setting other events in
motion, all constituting a natural and continuous
chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final
event in the chain immediately effecting the injury
as a natural and probable result of the cause which
first acted, under such circumstances that the
person responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his
act or default that an injury to some person might
The RTC concisely articulated and aptly concluded

that Catubig's overtaking of a slow-moving truck
ahead of him, while approaching a curve on the
highway, was the immediate and proximate cause
of the collision which led to his own death.
The testimonies of prosecution witnesses Cadimas

and PO2 Elnas that Cabanilla was driving the bus
at a reckless speed when the collision occurred
lack probative value.
We are unable to establish the actual speed of the

bus from Cadimas's testimony for he merely stated
that the bus did not stop when he tried to flag it
down because it was "running very fast."
The presumption that employers are negligent

under Article 2180 of the Civil Code flows from the
negligence of their employees. Having adjudged
that the immediate and proximate cause of the
collision resulting in Catubig's death was his own
negligence, and there was no fault or negligence on
Cabanilla's part, then such presumption of fault or
negligence on the part of petitioner, as Cabanilla's
employer, does not even arise. Thus, it is not even

Art. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is Art 2184 is indeed the basis of a master’s liability
solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who in a vehicular accident.Note however that the 2nd
was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the sentence of Art 2184 qualifies before the owner
due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is can be made solidarity liable with the negligent
disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, driver. This is because the basis of the master’s
if he had been found guilty or reckless driving or liability is not RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR but
violating traffic regulations at least twice within rather the relationship of PATERFAMILIAS. The
the next preceding two months. theory is that, the negligence of the servant, is
known to the master and susceptible of timely
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the correction by him, reflects the master’s negligence
provisions of Article 2180 are applicable. if he fails to correct it order to prevent injury
Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it

is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle
has been negligent if at the time of the mishap,
he was violating any traffic regulation.
Art. 2188. There is prima facie presumption of

negligence on the part of the defendant if the
death or injury results from his possession of
dangerous weapons or substances, such as
firearms and poison, except when the possession
or use thereof is indispensable in his occupation
or business.
TISON V. POMASIN G.R. NO. 173180 AUGUST

24,
2011, supra
CAEDO V. YU KHE THAI, 26 SCRA
381 FACTS:
Plaintiff Caedo was driving his Mercury car at

about 5:30 in the morning of March 24, 1958
along E. de los Santos Ave., in the vicinity of San
Lorenzo Village bound for the airport. Several
members of his family were in the car. Coming
from the opposite direction was the Cadillac car
of defendant Yu Khe Thai driven by his driver
Rafael Bernardo. The two cars were traveling at a
moderate speed with their headlights on. Ahead
of the Cadillac was a caretela (rig). Defendant’s
driver did not notice it until he was about eight (8)
meters away. Instead of slowing down behind the
caretela defendant’s driver veered to the left with
the intention of passing by the caretela but in
doing so its rear bumper caught the ream of the
caretela’s left wheel wrenching it off. Defendant’s
car skidded obliquely to the other end and
collided with the on-coming vehicle of the plaintiff.
The plaintiff on his part, slackened his speed and
tried to avoid the collision by veering to the right
but the collision occurred just the same injuring
the plaintiff and members of his family. Plaintiff
brought an action for damages against both the
driver and owner of the Cadillac car.
ISSUE:
W/N Bernardo is liable? If Yes, W/N Yu Khe Thai

is solidarily liable with Bernardo?
HELD:
YES. Bernardo is liable, because facts reveal that

the collision was directly traceable to his
negligence. BUT, owner, Yu Khe Thai is not
solidarily liable with his driver.

or damage.Test of imputed negligence in Art 2184 stopped and cautiously treated the intersection as a
is necessarily subjective. Car owners are not held "Thru Stop' street, which it is not. The KBL bus was
in a uniform and inflexible standard of diligence as on its way from Sta. Cruz, Laguna, driven by its
are professional drivers. The law does not require regular driver Virgilio Llamoso, on its way towards
that a person must possess a certain measure of Manila. The regular itinerary of the KBL bus is
skill or proficiency either in mechanics of driving or through the town proper of Pila, Laguna, but at
in the observance of traffic rules before he can own times it avoids this if a bus is already fully loaded
a motor vehicle. The test of his intelligence, with passengers and can no longer accommodate
within the meaning of Article 2184, is his omission additional passengers. As the KBL bus
to do that which the evidence of his own senses
tells him he should do in order to avoid the
accident. And as far as perception is concerned,
absent a minimum level imposed by law, a
maneuver that appears to be fraught with danger to
one passenger may appear to be entirely safe and
commonplace to another. Were the law to require a
uniform standard of perceptiveness, employment of
professional drivers by car owners who, by their
very inadequacies, have real need of drivers'
services, would be effectively proscribed.
In the present case the defendants' evidence is that

Rafael Bernardo had been Yu Khe Thai's driver
since 1937, and before that had been employed by
Yutivo Sons Hardware Co. in the same capacity for
over ten years. During that time he had no record
of violation of traffic laws and regulations. No
negligence for having employed him at all may be
imputed to his master.
Negligence on the part of the latter, if any, must be

sought in the immediate setting and circumstances
of the accident, that is, in his failure to detain the
driver from pursuing a course which not only gave
him clear notice of the danger but also sufficient
time to act upon it.
We do not see that such negligence may be

imputed. The car, as has been stated, was not
running at an unreasonable speed. The road was
wide and open, and devoid of traffic that early
morning. There was no reason for the car owner to
be in any special state of alert. He had reason to
rely on the skill and experience of his driver. He
became aware of the presence of the carretela
when his car was only twelve meters behind it, but
then his failure to see it earlier did not constitute
negligence, for he was not himself at the wheel.
And even when he did see it at that distance, he
could not have anticipated his driver's sudden
decision to pass the carretela on its left side in
spite of the fact that another car was approaching
from the opposite direction. The time element was
such that there was no reasonable opportunity for
Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks involved and warn
the driver accordingly. The thought that entered his
mind, he said, was that if he sounded a sudden
warning it might only make the other man nervous
and make the situation worse. It was a thought that,
wise or not, connotes no absence of that due
diligence required by law to prevent the misfortune.
KAPALARAN BUS LINE V. CORONADO, GR NO.

85331, AUG 25, 1989
FACTS:
The jeepney driven by Lope Grajera has reached

the intersection where there is a traffic sign 'yield,' it

neared the intersection, Virgilio Llamoso inquired unable to overthrow.
from his conductor if they could still
Application of Article 2180:
accommodate passengers and learning that they
were already full, he decided to bypass Pila and The patent and gross negligence on the part of
instead, to proceed along the national highway. the petitioner Kapalaran's driver raised the legal
Virgilio Llamoso admitted that there was another presumption that Kapalaran as employer was
motor vehicle ahead of him. The general rule is guilty of negligence either in the selection or in the
that the vehicle on the national highway has the supervision of its bus driver. Where the employer
right-of-way as against a feeder road. is held liable for damages, it has of course a right
of recourse against its own negligent employee.
Judging from the testimony of Atty. Conrado L.
The liability of the employer under Article 2180 of
Manicad, the sequence of events shows that the
the Civil Code is direct and
first vehicle to arrive at the intersection was the
jeepney. Seeing that the road was clear, the
jeepney which had stopped at the intersection
began to move forward, and for his part, Atty.
Manicad stopped his car at the intersection to
give way to the jeepney. At about this time, the
KBL bus was approaching the intersection and its
driver was engaged in determining from his
conductor if they would still pass through the
town proper of Pila. Upon learning that they were
already full, he turned his attention to the road
and found the stopped vehicles at the intersection
with the jeepney trying to cross the intersection.
The KBL bus had no more room within which to
stop without slamming into the rear of the vehicle
behind the car of Atty. Manicad. The KBL driver
chose to gamble on proceeding on its way,
unfortunately, the jeepney driven by Grajera,
which had the right-of-way, was about to cross
the center of the highway and was directly on the
path of the KBL bus. The gamble made by
Llamoso did not pay off. The impact indicates that
the KBL bus was travelling at a fast rate of speed
because, after the collision, it did not stop; it
travelled for another 50 meters and stopped only
when it hit an electric post. After trial, the trial
court rendered a judgment in favor of private
respondents which was affirmed by the CA but
modified the award of damages.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioner is liable for the accident.
HELD:
Kapalaran’s driver had become aware that some

vehicles ahead of the bus and traveling in the
same direction had already stopped at the
intersection obviously to give way either to
pedestrians or to another vehicle about to enter
the intersection. The bus driver, who was driving
at a speed too high to be safe and proper at or
near an intersection on the highway, and in any
case too high to be able to slow down and stop
behind the cars which had preceded it and which
had stopped at the intersection, chose to swerve
to the left lane and overtake such preceding
vehicles, entered the intersection and directly
smashed into the jeepney within the intersection.
Immediately before the collision, the bus driver
was actually violating the following traffic rules
and regulations, among others, in the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code, Republic Act
No. 4136, as amended. Thus, a legal
presumption arose that the bus driver was
negligent, a presumption that Kapalaran was

immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse the employers in supervising their employees unless
against the negligent employee and a prior showing they prove that they observed all the diligence of a
of the insolvency of such employee. So far as the good father of a family to prevent the damage.While
record shows, petitioner Kapalaran was unable to respondents could recover damages from
rebut the presumption of negligence on its own Macasasa in a criminal case and petitioner could
part. become subsidiarily liable, still petitioner, as owner
and employer, is directly and separately civilly liable
MENDOZA V. SORIANO, ET.AL, GR NO. 164012, for her failure to exercise due diligence in
JUNE 8, 2007 supervising Macasasa. We must emphasize that
this
FACTS:
Sonny Soriano, while crossing Commonwealth

Avenue, was hit by a speeding Tamaraw FX driven
by Lomer Macasasa. He was thrown five meters
away, while the vehicle only stopped some 25
meters from the point of impact. One of
Soriano’s companions, asked Macasasa to bring
Soriano to the hospital, but after checking out
the scene of the incident, Macasasa
returned to the FX, only to flee. A school bus
brought him to the hospital where he later died.
After trial, the trial court dismissed the complaint

against petitioner. It found Soriano negligent
for crossing Commonwealth Avenue by using a
small gap in the islands fencing rather than the
pedestrian overpass and that petitioner was not
negligent in the selection and supervision of
Macasasa. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court’s decision.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioner is liable and W/N respondent is

guilty of contributory negligence.
HELD:
Application of Article 2185
Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a

motor vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of
the mishap, he was violating traffic regulations. The
records show that Macasasa violated two traffic
rules under the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code. First, he failed to maintain a safe speed to
avoid endangering lives. Both the trial and the
appellate courts found Macasasa overspeeding.
The records show also that Soriano was thrown five
meters away after he was hit. Moreover, the vehicle
stopped only some 25 meters from the point of
impact.Both circumstances support the conclusion
that the FX vehicle driven by Macasasa was
overspeeding. Second, Macasasa, the vehicle
driver, did not aid Soriano, the accident victim, in
violation of Section 55, Article V of the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code. While Macasasa
at first agreed to bring Soriano to the hospital, he
fled the scene in a hurry. What remains undisputed
is that he did not report the accident to a police
officer, nor did he summon a doctor.
Application of Article 2180
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, employers are

liable for the damages caused by their employees
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. The
liability arises due to the presumed negligence of

damage suit is for the quasi-delict of petitioner, as HELD:
owner and employer, and not for the delict of
The applicability of Art. 2185 is expressly qualified
Macasasa, as driver and employee.
to motor vehicles only, and there is no ground to
In this case, we hold petitioner presume that the law intended a broader
primarily and solidarily liable for the damages coverage.
caused by Macasasa. Respondents could
Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the
recover directly from petitioner since the latter
contrary, it is presumed that a person driving
failed to prove that she exercised the diligence of
a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the
a good father of a family in supervising
time of the mishap he was violating any traffic
Macasasa.
regulation.
Contributory Negligence
We agree that the Court of Appeals did not err in

ruling that Soriano was guilty of contributory
negligence for not using the pedestrian overpass
while crossing Commonwealth Avenue. We even
note that the respondents now admit this point,
and concede that the appellate court had properly
reduced by 20% the amount of damages it
awarded. Hence, we affirm the reduction of the
amount earlier awarded, based on Article 2179 of
the Civil Code which reads:
When the plaintiff's own negligence was the

immediate and proximate cause of his injury,
he cannot recover damages. But if his
negligence was only contributory, the
immediate and proximate cause of the injury
being the defendant's lack of due care, the
plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts
shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
ANONUEVO V. CA, ET. AL., GR NO. 130003,

OCT. 20, 2004
FACTS:
Villagracia was traveling along Boni Avenue on

his bicycle, while Añonuevo, traversing the
opposite lane was driving his Lancer car with
owned by Procter and Gamble Inc., the employer
of Añonuevo’s brother, Jonathan. Añonuevo was
in the course of making a left turn towards
Libertad Street when the collision occurred.
Villagracia sustained serious injuries as a result.
As testified by eyewitness Alfredo Sorsano,
Añonuevo was “umaarangkada,” or speeding as
he made the left turn into Libertad and that
Añonuevo failed to exercise the ordinary
precaution, care and diligence required of him in
order that the accident could have been avoided.
Villagracia instituted an action for damages

against Procter and Gamble Phils., Inc. and
Añonuevo before the RTC. The RTC rendered
judgment against Procter and Gamble and
Añonuevo while the Court of Appeals affirmed the
RTC decision in toto.
ISSUE:
Whether Article 2185 of the New Civil Code

should apply by analogy to non-motorized
vehicles and whether Villagracia’s own fault and
negligence serves to absolve the Añonuevo of
any liability for damages.

As distinguished, motorized vehicle operates by inquire whether his prohibited conduct was
reason of a motor engine unlike a non-motorized unreasonably dangerous. It is enough that it was
vehicle, which runs as a result of a direct exertion prohibited. Violation of an ordinance intended to
by man or beast of burden of direct physical force. promote safety is negligence. If by creating the
A motorized vehicle, unimpeded by the limitations hazard which the ordinance was intended to avoid it
in physical exertion is capable of greater speeds brings about the harm which the ordinance was
and acceleration than non- motorized vehicles. At intended to prevent, it is a legal cause of the harm.
the same time, motorized vehicles are more
The general principle is that the violation of a statute
capable in inflicting greater injury or damage in the
or ordinance is not rendered remote as the cause of
event of an accident or collision.
an injury by the intervention of another agency if the
Art. 2185 was not formulated to compel or ensure
obeisance by all to traffic rules and regulations. If
such were indeed the evil sought to be remedied or
guarded against, then the framers of the Code
would have expanded the provision to include non-
motorized vehicles or for that matter, pedestrians.
Yet, that was not the case; thus the need arises to
ascertain the peculiarities attaching to a motorized
vehicle within the dynamics of road travel. The fact
that there has long existed a higher degree of
diligence and care imposed on motorized vehicles,
arising from the special nature of motor vehicle,
leads to the inescapable conclusion that the
qualification under Article 2185 exists precisely to
recognize such higher standard. Simply put, the
standards applicable to motor vehicle are not on
equal footing with other types of vehicles. Thus, we
cannot sustain the contention that Art. 2185 should
apply to non-motorized vehicles, even if by
analogy.
NEGLIGENCE PER SE:
The generally accepted view is that the violation of

a statutory duty constitutes negligence, negligence
as a matter of law, or negligence per se. The mere
fact of violation of a statute is not sufficient basis for
an inference that such violation was the proximate
cause of the injury complained. However, if the very
injury has happened which was intended to be
prevented by the statute, it has been held that
violation of the statute will be deemed to be the
proximate cause of the injury.
The rule on negligence per se must admit

qualifications that may arise from the logical
consequences of the facts leading to the mishap.
The doctrine (and Article 2185, for that matter) is
undeniably useful as a judicial guide in adjudging
liability, for it seeks to impute culpability arising
from the failure of the actor to perform up to a
standard established by a legal fiat. But the
doctrine should not be rendered inflexible so as to
deny relief when in fact there is no causal relation
between the statutory violation and
the injury sustained.
Presumptions in law, while convenient, are not
intractable so as to forbid rebuttal rooted in
fact. After all, tort law is remunerative in spirit,
aiming to provide compensation for the harm
suffered by those whose interests have been
invaded owing to the conduct of others.
WHEN THERE IS AN ORDINANCE:
But the existence of an ordinance changes the

situation. If a driver causes an accident by
exceeding the speed limit, for example, we do not

occurrence of the accident, in the manner in Two other members of the cast of Woman of the
which it happened, was the very thing which the Year, namely, Annabel Vilches (Annabel) and
statute or ordinance was intended to prevent. Jerome Macuja, joined Teresa Elena in the Galant
Sigma.
Should the doctrine of negligence per se
apply to Villagracia, resulting from his Around 11:30 p.m., while travelling along the
violation of an ordinance? Katipunan Road (White Plains), the Galant Sigma
collided with the shuttle bus owned by petitioner
It cannot be denied that the statutory purpose for and driven by Alfredo S. Mejia (Mejia), an
requiring bicycles to be equipped with headlights employee of petitioner. The Galant Sigma was
or horns is to promote road safety and to dragged about 12 meters from the point of impact,
minimize the occurrence of road accidents across the White Plains Road landing near the
involving bicycles. At face value, Villagracia’s perimeter fence of Camp Aguinaldo, where the
mishap was precisely the danger sought to be Galant
guarded against by the ordinance he violated.
However, there is the fact which we consider as
proven, that Añonuevo was speeding as he made
the left turn, and such negligent act was the
proximate cause of the accident. This reckless
behavior would have imperiled anyone unlucky
enough within the path of Añonuevo’s car as it
turned into the intersection, whether they are
fellow motorists, pedestrians, or cyclists. We are
hard put to conclude that Villagracia would have
avoided injury had his bicycle been up to par with
safety regulations, especially considering that
Añonuevo was already speeding as he made the
turn, or before he had seen Villagracia. Even
assuming that Añonuevo had failed to see
Villagracia because the bicycle was not equipped
with headlights, such lapse on the cyclist’s part
would not have acquitted the driver of his duty to
slow down as he proceeded to make the left turn.
The failure of the bicycle owner to comply with
accepted safety practices, whether or not
imposed by ordinance or statute, is not sufficient
to negate or mitigate recovery unless a causal
connection is established between such failure
and the injury sustained. The principle likewise
finds affirmation in Sanitary Steam, wherein we
declared that the violation of a traffic statute must
be shown as the proximate cause of the injury,
or that it substantially contributed thereto.
Añonuevo had the burden of clearly proving that
the alleged negligence of Villagracia was the
proximate or contributory cause of the latter’s
injury.
FILIPINAS SYNTHETIC FIBER V. DELOS

SANTOS G.R. NO. 152033 MARCH 16, 2011
FACTS:
On the night of September 30, 1984, Teresa

Elena Legarda-de los Santos (Teresa Elena), the
wife of respondent Wilfredo de los Santos
(Wilfredo), performed at the Rizal Theater in
Makati City, Metro Manila as a member of the
cast for the musical play, Woman of the Year.
On that same night, at the request of Wilfredo, his

brother Armando de los Santos (Armando),
husband of respondent Carmina Vda. de los
Santos, went to the Rizal Theater to fetch Teresa
Elena after the latter's performance. He drove a
1980 Mitsubishi Galant Sigma (Galant Sigma)
with Plate No. NSL 559, a company car assigned
to Wilfredo.

Sigma burst into flames and burned to death employer must
beyond recognition all four occupants of the car. formulate standard
operating procedures, monitor
ISSUE:
W/N Mejia was negligent.
W/N petitioner exercised the due diligence of a

good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of its employee.
HELD:
1st Issue:
It was well established that Mejia was driving at a

speed beyond the rate of speed required by law,
specifically Section 35 of Republic Act No. (RA)
4136. Given the circumstances, the allowed rate of
speed for Mejia's vehicle was 50 kilometers per
hour, while the records show that he was driving at
the speed of 70 kilometers per hour. Under the
New Civil Code, unless there is proof to the
contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a
motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of
the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
Apparently, in the present case, Mejia's violation of
the traffic rules does not erase the presumption that
he was the one negligent at the time of the
collision. Even apart from statutory regulations as
to speed, a motorist is nevertheless expected to
exercise ordinary care and drive at a reasonable
rate of speed commensurate with all the condition's
encountered which will enable him to keep the
vehicle under control and, whenever necessary, to
put the vehicle to a full stop to avoid injury to others
using the highway. To suggest that De los Santos
was equally negligent based on that sole statement
of the RTC is erroneous. The entire evidence
presented must be considered as a whole.
Incidentally, a close reading of the ruling of the CA
would clearly show the negligence of Mejia.
2nd Issue:
Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, when an

injury is caused by the negligence of the employee,
there instantly arises a presumption of law that
there was negligence on the part of the master or
employer either in the selection of the servant or
employee, or in supervision over him after selection
or both. The liability of the employer under Article
2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned
upon prior recourse against the negligent employee
and a prior showing of the insolvency of such
employee. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the
private respondents (in this case, the petitioner) to
prove that they exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of
their employee.
In Manliclic v. Calaunan, this Court ruled that:
In the selection of prospective

employees, employers are
required to examine them as to
their qualifications, experience
and service records. In the
supervision of employees, the

evidence, that they complied with
everything that was incumbent on them.
In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v.

Court of Appeals, it was explained that:
Due diligence in the supervision

of employees on the other hand,
includes the formulation of
suitable rules and regulations for
the guidance of employees and
the issuance of proper
instructions intended for the
protection of the public and
persons with whom the employer
has relations through his or its
employees and the imposition of
necessary disciplinary
measures upon employees in
case of breach or as may be
warranted to ensure the
performance of acts
indispensable to the business of
and beneficial to their employer.
To this, we add that actual
implementation and monitoring of
consistent compliance with said
rules should be the constant
concern of the employer, acting
through dependable supervisors
who should regularly report on
their supervisory functions.
In order that the defense of due

diligence in the selection and
supervision of employees may
be deemed sufficient and
plausible, it is not enough to
emptily invoke the existence of
said company guidelines and
policies on hiring and
supervision. As the negligence of
the employee gives rise to the
presumption of negligence on the
part of the employer, the latter
has the burden of proving that it
has been diligent not only in the
selection of employees but also
in the actual supervision of their
work. The mere allegation of the
existence of hiring procedures
and supervisory policies, without
anything more, is decidedly not
sufficient to overcome such
presumption.
We emphatically reiterate our

holding, as a warning to all
employers, that "the formulation
of various company policies on
safety without showing that they
were being complied with is

not sufficient to exempt EXERCISED IN THE CASE AT BAR.
petitioner from liability
The petitioner also disclaims liability on the ground
arising from negligence
of Article 2176 of the Civil Code, contending it has
of its employees. It is
exercised due diligence in the selection and
incumbent upon
supervision of its employees. The Court cannot
petitioner to show that in
agree. The record shows it was in fact lax in
recruiting and employing
requiring them to exercise the necessary vigilance
the erring driver the
in maintaining the rails in good condition to prevent
recruitment procedures
the derailments that sometimes
and company policies on
efficiency and safety
were followed." . . . .
d. Res Ipsa Loquitur
Translation: “The thing speaks for itself.”

Requisites:
1. Event does not ordinarily occur
o NOTE: The test is not based on
“rarity” but that it would not
ordinarily occur in the absence of
negligence.
2. Exclusive control of defendant
3. No other cause
4. No fault on party injured
MAAO CENTRAL CO. V. CA, GR NO. 83491,

AUG. 27, 1990
FACTS:
Famoso was riding with a co-employee in the

caboose or "carbonera" of Plymouth No. 12, a
cargo train of the petitioner, when the locomotive
was suddenly derailed. He and his companion
jumped off to escape injury, but the train fell on its
side, caught his legs by its wheels and pinned him
down. He was declared dead on the spot. The
claims for death and other benefits having been
denied by the petitioner, the herein private
respondent filed suit in the RTC of Bago City.
Judge Hobilla-Alinio ruled in her favor but deducted
from the total damages awarded 25% thereof for
the decedent's contributory negligence and the total
pension of P41,367.60 private respondent and her
children would be receiving from the SSS for the
next five years. The widow appealed, claiming that
the deductions were illegal. So did the petitioner,
but on the ground that it was not negligent and
therefore not liable at all. In its own decision, the
CA sustained the rulings of the trial court except as
to the contributory negligence of the deceased and
disallowed the deductions protested by the private
respondent.
ISSUE:
W/N the respondent court is at fault for finding the

petitioner guilty of negligence notwithstanding its
defense of due diligence under Art 2176 of the
Civil Code.
HELD:
Petitioner is guilty of negligence and cannot claim

defense under Art 2176.
DUE DILIGENCE IN THE SELECTION AND

SUPERVISION OF EMPLOYEES; NOT

happened "every hour." Obviously, merely collected P35,000.00 on the insurance on their
ordering the brakemen and conductors to fill out house and thecontents thereof.The Mables filed
prescribed forms reporting derailments — which an action for damages against the Cruz’s.The TC
reports have not been acted upon as shown by ruled in favor of the Mables. CA affirmed but
the hourly derailments — is not the kind of reduced the award ofdamages.
supervision envisioned by the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
W/N the doctrine of r e s i p s a l o q u i t o r is
We also do not see how the decedent can be applicable to the case.
held guilty of contributory negligence from the
HELD:
mere fact that he was not at his assigned station
when the train was derailed. That might have
been a violation of company rules but could not
have directly contributed to his injury, as the
petitioner suggests. It is pure speculation to
suppose that he would not have been injured if
he had stayed in the front car rather than at the
back and that he had been killed because he
chose to ride in the caboose. Contributory
negligence has been defined as "the act or
omission amounting to want of ordinary care on
the part of the person injured which, concurring
with the defendant's negligence, is the proximate
cause of the injury." It has been held that "to hold
a person as having contributed to his injuries, it
must be shown that he performed an act that
brought about his injuries in disregard of
warnings or signs of an impending danger to
health and body." There is no showing that the
caboose where Famoso was riding was a
dangerous place and that he recklessly dared to
stay there despite warnings or signs of impending
danger.
RES IPSA LOQUITOR
The absence of the fish plates — whatever the

cause or reason — is by itself alone proof of the
negligence of the petitioner. Res ipsa loquitur.
The doctrine was described recently in Layugan
v. Intermediate Appellate Court. (167 SCRA 376)
thus: Where the thing which causes injury is
shown to be under the management of the
defendant, and the accident is such as in the
ordinary course of things does not happen if
those who have the management use proper
care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of an explanation by the defendant, that
the accident arose from want of care.
FF CRUZ & CO. V. CA, GR NO. 52732, AUG
29, 1988 FACTS:
The furniture manufacturing shop of F.F. Cruz in

Caloocan City was situatedadjacent to the
residence of the Mables.Sometime in August
1971, private respondent Gregorio Mable first
approached Eric Cruz, petitioner's plant manager,
to request that a firewall be constructed between
the shop and Mable’s residence. The request
was repeated several times but they fell on deaf
ears.In the early morning of September 6, 1974,
fire broke out in Cruz’s shop.Cruz’s employees,
who slept in the shop premises, tried to put out
the fire, buttheir efforts proved futile. The fire
spread to the Mables’ house. Both the shopand
the house were razed to the ground.The Mables

YES. The doctrine of r e s i p s a l o q u i t o r is PHIL 2 FACTS:
applicable to the case. The CA, therefore, had
Mariano Crame, chauffeur of a motor vehicle, while
basis to find Cruz liable for the loss sustained by
driving along Calle Herran in the city of Manila,
the Mables’.
knocked down, dragged, and ran over the body of
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, may be stated as George E. Coombs, a private in the US army, who
follows: was then crossing the road, causing him injuries,
wounds, and bruises. Moreover, such injuries
Where the thing which caused the injury damaged his mental faculties and incapacitated him
complained of is shown to be under the from further
management of the defendant or his servants
and the accident is such as in the ordinary
course of things does not happen if those who
have its management or control use proper
care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of explanation by the defendant, that
the accident arose from want of care. [Africa v.
Caltex (Phil.),Inc., G.R. No. L- 12986, March
31, 1966, 16 SCRA 448.]
The facts of the case likewise call for the

application of the doctrine, considering that in the
normal course of operations of a furniture
manufacturing shop, combustible material such as
wood chips, sawdust, paint, varnish and fuel and
lubricants for machinery may be found thereon.
It must also be noted that negligence or want of

care on the part of petitioneror its employees was
not merely presumed.Cruz failed to construct a
firewall between its shop and the residenceof the
Mables as required by a city ordinance:
- that the fire could have been caused by a

heated motor or a litcigarette
- that gasoline and alcohol were used and

stored in the shop; and
- that workers sometimes smoked inside the

shop
Even without applying the doctrine of res ipsa

loquitur, Cruz's failure to construct a firewall in
accordance with city ordinances would suffice to
support a finding of negligence.Even then the fire
possibly would not have spread to the neighboring
houses were it not for another negligent omission
on the part of defendants, namely, their failure to
provide a concrete wall high enough to prevent
the flames from leaping over it. Defendant's
negligence,therefore, was not only with respect to
the cause of the fire but also with respect tothe
spread thereof to the neighboring houses.
In the instant case, with more reason should

petition er be found guilty of negligence since it had
failed to construct a firewall between its property
and private respondents' residence which
sufficiently complies with the pertinent city
ordinances. The failure to comply with an ordinance
providing for safety regulations had been ruled by
the Court as an act of negligence [Teague v.
Fernandez, G.R. No. L-29745, June 4, 1973, 51
SCRA
181.]
US V. CRAME, 30

performance of his duties as a soldier. Crame sober.
alleges that he was only going at about 10 miles
CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE; PRESUMPTIONS
per hour, and that since Coombs suddenly
AND BURDEN OF PROOF.
appeared in front of the car, he tried but failed to
change the course of the automobile so as to Where, in a criminal prosecution against the driver
avoid hitting him. The trial court convicted Crame of an automobile for running down and injuring a
of serious physical injuries by imprudencia pedestrian crossing a street, it appeared that at
temeraria, on the ground that: 1) he did not the time the injury was produced, the injured
reduce his speed sufficiently, nor did he attempt person was where he had a right to be, that the
to stop to avoid an accident; 2) he did not sound automobile was being driven on the wrong side of
his horn or whistle or use his voice to call the the street, and no warning was given of its
attention of Coombs to notify him that he should approach, it was properly held that there was a
stop and avoid being struck by the car; and 3)
Crame was driving in the center, or a little to the
right of the center of the street instead of on the
left side thereof.
ISSUE:
W/N Crame is criminally liable for the damages

caused to Coombs.
HELD:
THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE TRIAL COURT

ARE MORE THAN SUSTAINED.
The fact that Crame did not see Coombs until the
car was very close to him is strong evidence of
inattention to duty, especially since the street
was wide and unobstructed, with no buildings on
either side from which a person can dart out so
suddenly. Moreover, the street was also well-
lighted, so there is no reason why Crame did not
see Coombs long before he had reached the
position in the street where he was struck down.
The presence of the carromata was not

corroborated by any of the witnesses. Moreover,
it would have obscured his vision only for a
moment. Besides, it is the duty of automobile
drivers in meeting a moving vehicle on public
streets and highways to use due care and
diligence to see to it that persons who may be
crossing behind the moving vehicle are not run
down by them.
It is clearly established that Crame was driving

along the right-hand side of the streetwhen the
accident happened. According to the law of the
road and the custom ofthe country, he should
have been on the left- hand side of the street.
According towitnesses there was abundant room
for him to drive on such side.
There is no evidence which shows negligence on

the part of Coombs. At the time he was struck, he
had a right to be where the law fully protected
him from vehicles traveling in the direction in
which the accused was driving at the time of
injury. There is no evidence to show that the
soldier was drunk at the time of the accident. And
even if he were, mere intoxication is not
negligence, nor does it establish a want of
ordinary care. It is but a circumstance to be
considered with the other evidence tending to
prove negligence. If one’s conduct is
characterized by a proper degree of care and
prudence, it is immaterial whether he is drunk or

presumption of negligence on the part of the driver is in a very busy district and pedestrians often pass
and that the burden of proof was on him to through or mill around the premises; (2) the area is
establish that the accident occurred through other used as a car barn for around 10taxicabs owned
causes than his negligence. by Boquiren; (3) a store where people hang out and
possibly smoke cigarettes is located one meter
AFRICA V. CALTEX [PHIL], GR NO.L-12986, from the hole of the underground tank; and (4) the
MAR. 31, 1966 concrete walls adjoining the neighborhood are
only 2½ meters high at most and cannot prevent
FACTS: the flames from leaping over it in case of fire.
A fire broke out at the Caltex service station in

Manila. It started while gasoline was being hosed
from a tank truck into the underground storage,
right at the opening of the receiving truck where the
nozzle of the hose was inserted. The fire then
spread to and burned several neighboring houses,
including the personal properties and effects inside
them.The owners of the houses, among them
petitioners here, sued Caltex and Boquiren (agent
in charge of operation).Trial court and CA found
that petitioners failed to prove negligence and that
respondents had exercised due care in the
premises and with respect to the supervision of
their employees. Both courts refused to apply the
doctrine of res ipsaloquitur on the grounds that “as
to its applicability xxx in the Philippines, there
seemsto be nothing definite,” and that while the
rules do not prohibit its adoption inappropriate
cases, “in the case at bar, however, we find no
practical use for such doctrine.”
ISSUE:
W/N without proof as to the cause and origin of the

fire, the doctrine of r e s i p s a l o q u i t u r should
apply as to presume negligence on the part of the
appellees.
HELD:
DOCTRINE OF R E S I P S A L O Q U I T U R
APPLIES. CALTEX IS LIABLE.
Res ipsa Loquitur is a rule to the effect that “where

the thing which caused the injurycomplained of is
shown to be under the management of defendant
or his servants and the accident is such as in the
ordinary course of things does not happen if those
who have its management or control use proper
care, it affords reasonable evidence, in absence of
explanation of defendant, that the incident
happened because of want of care.
The gasoline station, with all its appliances,

equipment and employees, was under the control
of appellees. A fire occurred therein and spread to
and burned the neighboring houses. The person
who knew or could have known how the fire started
were the appellees and their employees, but they
gave no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is fair
and reasonable inference that the incident
happened because of want of care.
The report by the police officer regarding the fire,

as well as the statement of the driver of the
gasoline tank wagon who was transferring the
contents thereof into the underground storage
when the fire broke out, strengthen the
presumption of negligence. Verily, (1) the station

LAYUGAN V. IAC, 167 things does not happen if those who have the
management use proper care, it affords
SCRA 363 FACTS: reasonable evidence, in the absence of any
explanation by the defendant, that the accident
Pedro T. Layugan filed an action for damages arose from want of care.
against Godofredo Isidro, alleging that while at
Baretbet, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya, the Plaintiff AS DEFINED UNDER BLACK’S LAW
and a companion were repairing the tire of their DICTIONARY:
cargo truck which was parked along the right side
of the National Highway; that defendant's truck Res ipsa loquitur. The thing speaks for itself.
driven recklessly by Daniel Serrano bumped the Rebuttable presumption or inference that
plaintiff, that as a result, plaintiff was injured and defendant was negligent, which arises upon proof
hospitalized. Serrano bumped the truck being that instrumentality causing injury was in
repaired by Pedro Layugan, while the same was defendant’s exclusive control, and that the
at a stop position. From the evidence presented,
it has been established clearly that the injuries
sustained by the plaintiff was caused by
defendant's driver, Daniel Serrano. The police
report confirmed the allegation of the plaintiff and
admitted by Daniel Serrano on cross-
examination. The collision dislodged the jack
from the parked truck and pinned the plaintiff to
the ground. As a result thereof, plaintiff sustained
injuries on his left forearm and left foot. The left
leg of the plaintiff from below the knee was later
on amputated when gangrene had set in, thereby
rendering him incapacitated for work depriving
him of his income. The trial court rendered its
decision in favor of the plaintiff, however, the
Intermediate Appellate Court reversed the
decision of the trial court and dismissed the
complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether the IAC acted correctly in applying the

doctrine or res ipsa loquitur with proper
jurisprudential basis and if not, who is negligent?
HELD:
Whether the cargo truck was parked along the

road or on half the shoulder of the right side of
the road would be of no moment taking into
account the warning device consisting of the
lighted kerosene lamp placed three or four
meters from the back of the truck. But despite this
warning which we rule as sufficient, the Isuzu
truck driven by Daniel Serrano, an employee of
the private respondent, still bumped the rear of
the parked cargo truck. As a direct consequence
of such accident the petitioner sustained injuries
on his left forearm and left foot.
It is clear from the foregoing disquisition that the

absence or want of care of Daniel Serrano has
been established by clear and convincing
evidence. It follows that in stamping its
imprimatur upon the invocation by respondent
Isidro of the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur to
escape liability for the negligence of his
employee, the respondent court committed
reversible error.
DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR:
Where the thing which causes injury is shown to

be under the management of the defendant, and
the accident is such as in the ordinary course of

accident was one which ordinarily does not happen switched on the ignition key, the engine made an
in the absence of negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is “odd” sound and did not start. He again stepped on
rule of evidence whereby negligence of alleged the accelerator and started the car but petitioner
wrongdoer may be inferred from mere fact that again heard an unusual sound. He then saw a small
accident happened provided character of accident flame coming out of the engine. Startled, he turned
and circumstances attending it lead reasonably to it off, alighted from the vehicle and started to push it
belief that in absence of negligence it would not out of the garage when suddenly, fire spewed out of
have occurred and that thing which caused injury is its rear compartment and engulfed the whole
shown to have been under management and garage. Pascual was trapped inside and suffered
control of alleged wrongdoer. burns on his face, legs and arms.Meanwhile,
respondents were busy watching
RULE OF EVIDENCE:
The doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur as a rule of

evidence is peculiar to the law of negligence which
recognizes that prima facie negligence may be
established without direct proof and furnishes a
substitute for specific proof of negligence. The
doctrine is not a rule of substantive law but merely
a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience.
It merely determines and regulates what shall be
prima facie evidence thereof and facilitates the
burden of plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty of
due care. The doctrine can only be invoked when
and only when, under the circumstances involved,
direct evidence is absent and not readily available.
Hence, it has generally been held that the
presumption of inference arising from the doctrine
cannot be availed of, or is overcome, where plaintiff
has knowledge and testifies or presents evidence
as to the specific act of negligence which is the
cause of the injury complained of or where there is
direct evidence as to the precise cause of the
accident and all the facts and circumstances
attendant on the occurrence clearly appear. Finally,
once the actual cause of injury is established
beyond controversy, whether by the plaintiff or by
the defendant, no presumptions will be involved
and the doctrine becomes inapplicable when the
circumstances have been so completely elucidated
that no inference of defendant's liability can
reasonably be made, whatever the source of the
evidence, as in this case.
PERLA COMPANIA DE SEGUROS, INC. V.

SPS.SARANGAYA, GR NO. 147746, OCT. 25,
2005
FACTS:
In 1986, spouses Sarangaya erected a building

known as “Super A Building” and was subdivided
into three doors, each of which was leased out. The
two-storey residence of the Sarangayas was
behind the second and third doors of the
building.In 1988, petitioner Perla Compania de
Seguros, Inc., through its branch manager and co-
petitioner Bienvenido Pascual, entered into a
contract of lease of the first door of the “Super A
Building.” Perla Compania renovated its rented
space and divided it into two. The left side
wasconverted into an office while the right was
used by Pascual as a garage for a 1981model 4-
door Ford Cortina.
On July 7, 1988, Pascual left for San Fernando,

Pampanga but did not bring the car with him. Three
days later, he returned, and decided to “warm up”
the car. When he pulled up the handbrake and

television when they heard two loud explosions. the exclusive control of the person in
In no time, fire spread inside their house, charge and
destroying all their belongings, furniture and
3) the injury suffered must not have
appliances.The city fire marshall c submitted a
been due to any voluntary action or
report to the provincial fire marshall and
contribution on the part of the person
concluded that the fire was “accidental.” The
injured.
report also disclosed that petitioner-corporation
had no fire permit as required by law.Based on Under the first requisite, the occurrence must be
the same report, a criminal complaint for one that does not ordinarily occur unless there is
“Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Damage in negligence. A flame spewing out of a car engine,
Property” was filed against petitioner Pascual. On when it is switched on, is obviously not a normal
the other hand, Perla Compania was asked to event. Neither does an explosion usually occur
pay the amount of P7,992,350, inclusive of the when a car engine is revved. Hence, in this case,
value of the commercial building. At the without any direct evidence as to the cause of the
prosecutor’s office, petitioner Pascual moved for accident, the doctrine
the withdrawal of the complaint, which was
granted.
Respondents (spouses Sarangaya) later on filed

a civil complaint based on quasi-delict against
petitioners for a “sum of money and damages,”
alleging that Pascual acted with gross negligence
while petitioner-corporation lacked the required
diligence in the selection and supervision of
Pascual as its employee.
ISSUES:
W/N Pascual liable under res ipsa loquitur

doctrine and W/N Perla Compania liable under
tort
HELD:
a.) YES, Pascual liable under res ipsa loquitur

doctrine
Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which

literally means “the thing or the transaction
speaks for itself.” It relates to the fact of an injury
that sets out an inference to the cause thereof or
establishes the plaintiff’s prima facie case. The
doctrine rests on inference and not on
presumption. The facts of the occurrence warrant
the supposition of negligence and they furnish
circumstantial evidence of negligence when
direct evidence is lacking. The doctrine is based
on the theory that the defendant either knows the
cause of the accident or has the best opportunity
of ascertaining it and the plaintiff, having no
knowledge thereof, is compelled to allege
negligence in general terms. In such instance,
the plaintiff relies on proof of the happening of the
accident alone to establish negligence. The
doctrine provides a means by which a plaintiff
can pin liability on a defendant who, if innocent,
should be able to explain the care he exercised
to prevent the incident complained of. Thus, it is
the defendant’s responsibility to show that there
was no negligence on his part.
To sustain the allegation of negligence based on

the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the following
requisites must concur:
1) the accident is of a kind which does

not ordinarily occur unless someone is
negligent;
2) the cause of the injury was under

of res ipsa loquitur comes into play and, from it, we them.
draw the inference that based on the evidence at
CARMEN, JR. V. BACOY G.R. NO. 173870 APRIL
hand, someone was in fact negligent and
25, 2012
responsible for the accident.
FACTS:
Under the second requisite, the instrumentality or
agency that triggered the occurrence must be one
that falls under the exclusive control of the person At dawn on New Year's Day of 1993, Emilia Bacoy
in charge thereof. In this case, the car where the Monsalud (Emilia), along with her spouse Leonardo
fire originated was under the control of Pascual.
Being its caretaker, he alone had the responsibility
to maintain it and ensure its proper functioning.
Where the circumstances which caused the
accident are shown to have been under the
management or control of a certain person and, in
the normal course of events, the incident would not
have happened had that person used proper care,
the inference is that it occurred because of lack of
such care. The burden of evidence is thus shifted to
defendant to establish that he observed all that was
necessary to prevent the accident from happening.
In this aspect, Pascual utterly failed.
Under the third requisite, there is nothing in the

records to show that respondents contributed to the
incident. They had no access to the car and had no
responsibility regarding its maintenance even if it
was parked in a building they owned.
TEST TO DETERMINE NEGLIGENCE:
The test to determine the existence of

negligence in a particular case may be
stated as follows: did the defendant in
committing the alleged negligent act, use
reasonable care and caution which an
ordinarily prudent person in the same
situation would have employed? If not,
then he is guilty of negligence. Here, the
fact that Pascual, as the caretaker of the
car, failed to submit any proof that he had
it periodically checked (as its year-model
and condition required) revealed his
negligence. A prudent man should have
known thata14-year-old car, constantly
used in provincial trips, was definitely
prone to damage and other defects. For
failing to prove care and diligence in the
maintenance of the vehicle, the
necessary inference was that Pascual
had been negligent in the upkeep of the
car.
b.) YES, COMPANIA LIABLE UNDER TORT
In the selection of prospective employees,

employers are required to examine them as to their
qualifications, experience and service records.
While the petitioner- corporation does not appear
to have erred in considering Pascual for his
position, its lack of supervision over him made it
jointly and solidarily liable for the fire.In the
supervision of employees, the employer must
formulate standard operating procedures, monitor
their implementation and impose disciplinary
measures for the breach thereof. To fend off
vicarious liability, employers must submit concrete
proof, including documentary evidence that they
complied with everything that was incumbent on

Monsalud, Sr. and their daughter Glenda exclusive control of Oscar Jr. as its owner. When
Monsalud, were on their way home from a Oscar Jr. entrusted the ignition key to Rodrigo, he
Christmas party they attended in Poblacion, had the power to instruct him with regard to the
Sominot, Zamboanga Del Sur. Upon reaching specific restrictions of the jeep's use, including
Purok Paglaom in Sominot, they were run over by who or who may not drive it. As he is aware that
a Fuso passenger jeep bearing plate number UV- the jeep may run without the ignition key, he also
PEK-600 that was being driven by Allan has the responsibility to park it safely and securely
Maglasang (Allan). The jeep was registered in the and to instruct his driver Rodrigo to observe the
name of petitioner Oscar del Carmen, Jr. (Oscar same precaution. Lastly, there was no showing
Jr.) and used as a public utility vehicle plying the that the death of the victims was due to any
Molave, Zamboanga del Sur to Sominot, voluntary action or contribution on their part.
Zamboanga del Sur and vice versa route.
During the pendency of said criminal case,

Emilia's father, Geronimo Bacoy (Geronimo), in
behalf of the six minor children of the Monsaluds,
filed Civil Case No. 96- 20219, an independent
civil action for damages based on culpa aquilian.
Oscar Jr.'s core defense to release him from

responsibility for the death of the Monsaluds is
that his jeep was stolen. He highlights that the
unauthorized taking of the jeep from the parking
area was indeed carried out by the clandestine
and concerted efforts of Allan and his five
companions, notwithstanding the obstacles
surrounding the parking area and the weight of
the jeep.
ISSUE:
W/N will apply in this case.
HELD:
YES. Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,

"[w]here the thing that caused the injury
complained of is shown to be under the
management of the defendant or his servants;
and the accident, in the ordinary course of things,
would not happen if those who had management
or control used proper care, it affords reasonable
evidence — in the absence of a sufficient,
reasonable and logical explanation by defendant
— that the accident arose from or was caused by
the defendant's want of care.
The requisites of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur

as established by jurisprudence are as follows:
1) the accident is of a kind which does not

ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent;
2) the cause of the injury was under the exclusive

control of the person in charge and
3)the injury suffered must not have been due to

any voluntary action or contribution on the part of
the person injured
The above requisites are all present in this case.

First, no person just walking along the road would
suddenly be sideswiped and run over by an on-
rushing vehicle unless the one in charge of the
said vehicle had been negligent. Second, the
jeep which caused the injury was under the

V. DEFENSES
Worthy to mention that the fact that the PRC was
a. Complete Defenses not among those enumerated in the list of quasi-
judicial agencies in Rule 43 does not by its fact
a.1 Plaintiff’s own negligence alone, imply its exclusion from the coverage of the
said Rule. The Rule expressly provides that it
PAULAN V. SARABIA, 104 PHIL. 1050 (can’t should be applied to appeals from awards,
find, judgments final orders or resolutions of any quasi-
sorry) judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi- judicial
functions.
FE CAYAO-LASAM v. RAMOLETE, G.R. No.
159132,
December 18,
2008 FACTS:
On July 28, 1994, three months pregnant Editha

Ramolete (Editha) was admitted to the Lorma
Medical Center (LMC) due to vaginal bleeding. A
pelvic sonogram was then conducted on Editha
revealing the fetus’ weak cardiac pulsation. The
following day, Editha’s repeat pelvic sonogram
showed that aside from the fetus’ weak cardiac
pulsation, no fetal movement was also appreciated.
Due to Editha’s persistent and profuse vaginal
bleeding, petitioner performed a Dilatation and
Curettage Procedure (D&C) or "raspa."
On September 16, 1994, Editha was once again

brought at the LMC, as she was suffering from
vomiting and severe abdominal pains. Dr. Mayo
allegedly informed Editha that there was a dead
fetus in the latter’s womb. After, Editha underwent
laparotomy, she was found to have a massive intra-
abdominal hemorrhage and a ruptured uterus.
Thus, Editha had to undergo a procedure for
hysterectomy and as a result, she has no more
chance to bear a child.
Editha and her husband filed a Complaint for Gross

Negligence and Malpractice against petitioner
before the Professional Regulations Commission
(PRC).
The Board of Medicine of the PRC rendered a

Decision exonerating petitioner from the charges
filed against her.
Respondents went to the PRC on appeal. The PRC

rendered a Decision reversing the findings of the
Board and revoking petitioner’s authority or license
to practice her profession as a physician.
Petitioner brought the matter to the CA in a Petition

for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner also dubbed her petition as one for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The
petition was dismissed by the CA citing that neither
Rule 43 nor Rule 65 was a proper remedy. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioner was guilty of negligence and

malpractice.
HELD:

There are four elements involved in medical Had she returned, the respondent could have
negligence cases: duty, breach, injury and examined her thoroughly.
proximate causation.
Editha omitted the diligence required by the
A physician-patient relationship was created circumstances which could have avoided the
when Editha employed the services of the injury. The omission in not returning for a follow-
petitioner. As Editha’s physician, petitioner was up evaluation played a substantial part in bringing
duty-bound to use at least the same level of care about Editha’s own injury.
that any reasonably competent doctor would use
to treat a condition under the same Based on the evidence presented in the present
circumstances. The breach of these professional case under review, in which no negligence can be
duties of skill and care, or their improper attributed to the petitioner, the immediate cause of
performance by a physician surgeon, whereby the accident resulting in Editha’s injury was her
the patient is injured in body or in health, own omission when
constitutes actionable malpractice. As to this
aspect of medical malpractice, the determination
of the reasonable level of care and the breach
thereof, expert testimony is essential. Further,
inasmuch as the causes of the injuries involved in
malpractice actions are determinable only in the
light of scientific knowledge, it has been
recognized that expert testimony is usually
necessary to support the conclusion as to
causation.
In the present case, respondents did not present

any expert testimony to support their claim that
petitioner failed to do something which a
reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would
have done.
Petitioner, on the other hand, presented the

testimony of Dr. Augusto M. Manalo, who was a
specialist in gynecology and obstetrics. He
testified that the D & C procedure was not the
proximate cause of the rupture of Editha’s uterus
resulting in her hysterectomy. From his expert
testimony, the D&C procedure was conducted in
accordance with the standard practice, with the
same level of care that any reasonably
competent doctor would use to treat a condition
under the same circumstances, and that there
was nothing irregular in the way the petitioner
dealt with Editha.
Medical malpractice, in our jurisdiction, is often

brought as a civil action for damages under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The defenses in an
action for damages, provided for under Article
2179 of the Civil Code are:
Art. 2179.When the plaintiff’s own negligence

was the immediate and proximate cause of
his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if
his negligence was only contributory, the
immediate and proximate cause of the injury
being the defendant’s lack of due care, the
In the present case, the Court notes the findings

of the Board of Medicine that petitioner advised
her to return on August 4, 1994 or four (4) days
after the D&C. However, complainant failed to do
so. This being the case, the chain of continuity as
required in order that the doctrine of proximate
cause can be validly invoked was interrupted.

she did not return for a follow-up check up, in where the said youth has not been free from fault
defiance of petitioner’s orders. The immediate when he willfully and deliberately cut open the
cause of Editha’s injury was her own act; thus, she detonating cap, and placed a match to the contents,
cannot recover damages from the injury. knowing that his action would result in an explosion.
Petition is GRANTED. Decision of the CA reversed In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident
and the decision of the Board of Medicine is was a well-grown youth of 15, more mature both
affirmed. mentally and physically than the average boy of his
age; and the record discloses throughout that he
was exceptionally well qualified to take care of
Exception: Doctrine of Attractive
himself. True, he may not have known and
probably did not know the
Nuisance TAYLOR v. MANILA ELECTRIC
RAILROAD & LIGHT

CO., supra.
ISSUE:
W/N defendant company is liable to plaintiff for

damages for having negligently failed to provide
security measures to prevent the general public
from entering its premises.
HELD:
Counsel for plaintiff contends that because of

plaintiff's youth and inexperience, his entry upon
defendant company's premises, and the
intervention of his action between the negligent act
of defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its
premises and the accident which resulted in his
injury should not be held to have contributed in any
wise to the accident, which should be deemed to be
the direct result of defendant's negligence in
leaving the caps exposed at the place where they
were found by the plaintiff.
On this score, the doctrine of implied invitation is

applicable. In the case of young children, and other
persons not fully sui juris, an implied license might
sometimes arise when it would not on behalf of
others. Thus leaving a tempting thing for children to
play with exposed, where they would be likely to
gather for that purpose, may be equivalent to an
invitation to them to make use of it; and, perhaps, if
one were to throw away upon his premises things
tempting to children, the same implication should
arise.
But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon

defendant's property without defendant's express
invitation or permission would not have relieved
defendant from responsibility for injuries incurred
there by plaintiff, without other fault on his part, we
are of opinion that under all the circumstances of
this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving
the caps exposed on its premises was not the
proximate cause of the injury, and, on the other
hand, we are satisfied that plaintiffs action in cutting
open the detonating cap and putting match to its
contents was the proximate cause of the explosion
and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon the
plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore is not
civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred.
The doctrine of implied invitation does not apply

precise nature of the explosion which might be entering its premises.
expected from the ignition of the contents of the
cap, but he well knew that a more or less ISSUE:
dangerous explosion might be expected from his
act, and yet he willfully, recklessly, and knowingly W/N the said tanks constitute an attractive nuisance.
produced the explosion.
HELD:
We are satisfied that while it may be true that
these injuries would not have been incurred but The doctrine of attractive nuisance may be stated,
for the negligence act of the defendant in leaving as: One who maintains on his premises
the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a
plaintiff's own act was the proximate and principal character likely to attract children in play, and who
cause of the accident which inflicted the injury. fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children
from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is
HIDALGO ENTERPRISES, INC. v. BALANDAN, liable to a child of tender years who is injured
91 thereby, even if the child is technically a
P trespasser in the premises.
h The attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not

applicable to bodies of water, artificial as well as
il natural, in the absence of some unusual condition
or artificial feature other than the mere water and
4 its location.
8 Nature has created streams, lakes and pools

which attract children. Lurking in their waters is
always the danger of drowning. Against this
8
danger children are early instructed so that they
are sufficiently presumed to know the danger; and
F if the owner of private property creates an artificial
pool on his own property, merely duplicating the
A work of nature without adding any new danger,
(he) is not liable because of having created an
C "attractive nuisance.
Petitioner Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. was the

owner of an ice-plant factory in the City of San
Pablo, Laguna, in whose premises were installed
two tanks full of water for cooling purposes of its
engine. While the factory compound was
surrounded with fence, the tanks themselves
were not provided with any kind of fence or top
covers. Through the wide gate entrance, motor
vehicles hauling ice and persons buying said
commodity passed, and any one could easily
enter the said factory, as he pleased. There was
no guard assigned on the gate. On April 16,
1948, plaintiff's son, Mario Balandan, an 8 year
old boy, while playing with and in company of
other boys of his age entered the factory
premises through the gate, while bathing in one
of the said tanks, sank to the bottom of the tank,
only to be fished out later, already a cadaver,
having been died of "asphyxia secondary to
drowning."
The CA and the CFI of Laguna, took the view that

the petitioner maintained an attractive nuisance
(the tanks), and neglected to adopt the necessary
precautions to avoid accidents to persons

The appealed decision is reversed and the Hidalgo HELD:
Enterprises, Inc. is absolved from liability.
NO. For the statute names the possessor or user of
a.2. Assumption of Risk the animal as the person liable for "any damages it
may cause," and this for the obvious reason that the
possessor or user has the custody and control of
Art. 2179. When the plaintiff’s own negligence was
the animal and is therefore the one in a position to
the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he
prevent it from causing damage.
cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was
only contributory, the immediate and proximate
cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of
due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but
the courts shall mitigate the damages to be
awarded.
Art. 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever

may make use of the same is responsible for the
damage which it may cause, although it may
escape or be lost. 'This responsibility shall cease
only in case the damages should come from force
majeure from the fault of the person who has
suffered damage.
Thus, in Afialda v. Hisole, a person hired as

caretaker of a carabao gored him to death and his
heirs thereupon sued the owner of the animal for
damages. The complaint was dismissed on the
ground that it was the caretaker's duty to prevent
the carabao from causing injury to any one,
including himself.
AFILIADA v. HISOLE and HISOLE, 85 Phil 67
FACTS:
This is an action for damages arising from injury

caused by an animal. The complaint alleges that
the now deceased, Loreto Afialda, was employed
by the defendant spouses as caretaker of their
carabaos at a fixed compensation; that while
tending the animals he was, on March 21, 1947,
gored by one of them and later died as a
consequence of his injuries; that the mishap was
due neither to his own fault nor to force majeure;
and that plaintiff is his elder sister and heir
depending upon him for support.
Plaintiff seeks to hold defendants liable under

article 1905 of the Civil Code, which reads:
The possessor of an animal, or the one who uses

the same, is liable for any damages it may cause,
even if such animal should escape from him or
stray away.
This liability shall cease only in case, the damage

should arise from force majeure or from the fault of
the person who may have suffered it.
ISSUE:
W/N owner of the animal is liable for the injuries

caused to the caretaker.

In the present case, the animal was in custody with the CA which reversed the trial court’s
and under the control of the caretaker, who was decision. Hence, this petition.
paid for his work as such. Obviously, it was the
caretaker's business to try to prevent the animal ISSUE:
from causing injury or damage to anyone,
including himself. And being injured by the animal W/N the CA erred in not applying the legal
under those circumstances, was one of the risks principle of "assumption of risk" in the present
of the occupation which he had voluntarily case to bar private respondents from collecting
assumed and for which he must take the damages.
consequences.
HELD:
ILOCOS NORTE CO., v. CA, GR No. 53401,
Nov. 6, 1989
FACTS:
Inn the evening of June 28 until the early morning

of June 29, 1967, strong typhoon "Gening"
buffeted the province of Ilocos Norte, bringing
heavy rains and consequent flooding in its wake.
Between 5:30 and 6:00
A.M. on June 29, 1967, when the floodwaters
were beginning to recede, the deceased Isabel
Lao Juan, ventured out of the house of her son-
in-law, Antonio Yabes, on No. 19 Guerrero
Street, Laoag City, and proceeded towards the
direction of the Five Sisters Emporium to look
after her merchandise therein that might have
been damaged. The deceased was followed by
Aida Bulong and Linda Alonzo Estavillo. Aida and
Linda walked side by side at a distance of
between 5 and 6 meters behind the deceased.
Suddenly, the deceased screamed "Ay" and
quickly sank into the water. The two girls
attempted to help, but fear dissuaded them
because on the spot where the deceased sank
they saw an electric wire dangling from a post
and moving in snake-like fashion in the water.
Upon their shouts for help, Ernesto dela Cruz
tried to go to the deceased, but he turned back
shouting that the water was grounded.
Thereafter, Yabes requested the police to ask the

people of defendant Ilocos Norte Electric
Company or INELCO to cut off the electric
current. Then the party waded to the house on
Guerrero Street. The floodwater was receding
and the lights inside the house were out
indicating that the electric current had been cut
off in Guerrero. Yabes instructed his boys to fish
for the body of the deceased. The body was
recovered about two meters from an electric post.
An action for damages was instituted by the heirs

of the deceased against INELCO. INELCO
contends that the deceased could have died
simply either by drowning or by electrocution due
to negligence attributable only to herself and not
to petitioner. In this regard, it was pointed out that
the deceased, without petitioner's knowledge,
caused the installation of a burglar deterrent.
Petitioner conjectures that the switch to said
burglar deterrent must have been left on, hence,
causing the deceased's electrocution when she
tried to open her gate that fateful day. After due
trial, the CFI found the facts in favor of petitioner
and dismissed the complaint. An appeal was filed

In order to escape liability, petitioner ventures into Civil Case No. 3490 finding the driver and the owner
the theory that the deceased was electrocuted of the truck liable for quasi-delict ignores the fact
when she tried to open her steel gate, which was that she was never a party to that case and,
electrically charged by an electric wire she herself therefore, the principle of res judicata does not
caused to install to serve as a burglar deterrent. apply.
Petitioner suggests that the switch to said burglar
alarm was left on. But this is mere speculation, not Insofar as contracts of carriage are concerned, the
backed up with evidence. Civil Code requires extraordinary diligence from
common carriers with regard to the safety of
While it is true that typhoons and floods are passengers as well
considered Acts of God for which no person may
be held responsible, it was not said eventuality
which directly caused the victim's death. It was
through the intervention of petitioner's negligence
that death took place. In times of calamities such as
the one which occurred in Laoag City, extraordinary
diligence requires a supplier of electricity to be in
constant vigilto prevent or avoid any probable
incident that might imperil life or limb. The evidence
does not show that defendant did that. On the
contrary, evidence discloses that there were no
men (linemen or otherwise) policing the area, nor
even manning its office.
The negligence of petitioner having been shown, it

may not now absolve itself from liability by arguing
that the victim's death was solely due to a fortuitous
event. "When an act of God combines or concurs
with the negligence of the defendant to produce an
injury, the defendant is liable if the injury would not
have resulted but for his own negligent conduct or
omission"
Likewise, the maxim "volenti non fit injuria" relied

upon by petitioner finds no application in the case
at bar. It is imperative to note the surrounding
circumstances which impelled the deceased to
leave the comforts of a roof and brave the
subsiding typhoon. A person is excused from the
force of the rule, that when he voluntarily assents to
a known danger he must abide by the
consequences, if an emergency is found to exist or
if the life or property of another is in peril. Clearly,
an emergency was at hand as the deceased's
property, a source of her livelihood, was faced with
an impending loss. Furthermore, the deceased, at
the time the fatal incident occurred, was at a place
where she had a right to be without regard to
petitioner's consent as she was on her way to
protect her merchandise. Hence, private
respondents, as heirs, may not be barred from
recovering damages as a result of the death
caused by petitioner's negligence.
CALALAS v. CA, supra.
ISSUE:
W/N Calalas is liable for damages to private

respondent, Sunga.
HELD:
The petition has no merit.
The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in

as the presumption of negligence in cases of
death or injury to passengers. Ruby Lim, for her part, admitted having asked Mr.
Reyes to leave the party but not under the
Petitioner breached the contract of carriage on ignominious circumstance painted by the latter
two scores. First, as found by the CA, the and claimed that she asked the latter to leave in
jeepney was not properly parked, its rear portion the most discreet manner.
being exposed about two meters from the broad
shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle After trial, the court a quo dismissed the
of the highway in a diagonal angle. This is a complaint, giving more credence to the testimony
violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic of Ms. Lim . The trial court likewise ratiocinated
Code that Mr. Reyes assumed the risk of being thrown
out of the party as he was uninvited. On appeal,
Second, it is undisputed that petitioner's driver the CA reversed the ruling of the
took in more passengers than the allowed
seating capacity of the jeepney, a violation of
§32(a) of the same law.
The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension

seat" placed her in a peril greater than that to
which the other passengers were exposed.
Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to
overcome the presumption of negligence
imposed on him for the injury sustained by
Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was
actually negligent in transporting passengers.
We find it hard to give serious thought to

petitioner's contention that Sunga's taking an
"extension seat" amounted to an implied
assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the
injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in our
seas should not be compensated merely because
those passengers assumed a greater risk of
drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry.
NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN, ET.AL., v.

REYES, GR No. 154259, FEB. 28, 2005
FACTS:
Respondent Roberto Reyes, more popularly

known by the screen name "Amay Bisaya,"
alleged that in the evening of 13 October 1994, at
the lobby of Hotel Nikko, Dr. Violeta Filart invited
him to join her in a party at the hotel’s penthouse
in celebration of the natal day of the hotel’s
manager, Mr. Tsuruoka. At the penthouse, they
first had their picture taken with the celebrant
after which Mr. Reyes sat with the party of Dr.
Filart. When dinner was ready, Mr. Reyes lined-
up at the buffet table but, to his great shock,
shame and embarrassment, he was stopped by
petitioner herein, Ruby Lim, who was Hotel
Nikko’s Executive Secretary. In a loud voice and
within the presence and hearing of the other
guests, Ruby Lim told him to leave the party
("huwag ka nang kumain, hindi ka imbitado,
bumaba ka na lang"). Mr. Reyes tried to explain
that he was invited by Dr. Filart. Dr. Filart, who
was within hearing distance, however, completely
ignored him thus adding to his shame and
humiliation. Not long after, while he was still
recovering from the traumatic experience, a
Makati policeman approached and asked him to
step out of the hotel. Mr. Reyes claims damages
in an action instituted against the hotel, Ms. Lim
and Dr. Filart.

trial court as it found more commanding of belief Defendant is liable.
the testimony of Mr. Reyes.
As the defendant started across the bridge, he had
ISSUE: the right to assume that the horse and the rider
would pass over to the proper side; but as he
moved toward the center of the bridge it was
W/N the CA erred in not applying the doctrine of
demonstrated to his eyes that this would not be
volenti non fit injuria considering that Mr. Reyes, by
done; and he must in a moment have perceived that
its own account, is a gate crasher.
it was too late for the horse to cross with
HELD:
Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that

pursuant to the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria,
they cannot be made liable for damages as
respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked
to leave as he was a "gate- crasher."
The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria ("to which a

person assents is not esteemed in law as injury")
refers to self- inflicted injury or to the consent to
injury which precludes the recovery of damages by
one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed
himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in
doing so. As formulated by petitioners, however,
this doctrine does not find application to the case at
bar because even if respondent Reyes assumed
the risk of being asked to leave the party,
petitioners, under Articles 19 and 21 of the New
Civil Code, were still under obligation to treat him
fairly in order not to expose him to unnecessary
ridicule and shame.
From an in depth review of the evidence, we find

more credible the lower court’s findings of fact.
In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of

Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and expose him to
ridicule and shame, it is highly unlikely that she
would shout at him from a very close distance. Ms.
Lim having been in the hotel business for twenty
years wherein being polite and discreet are virtues
to be emulated, the testimony of Mr. Reyes that she
acted to the contrary does not inspire belief and is
indeed incredible.
All told, and as far as Ms. Lim and Hotel Nikko are
concerned, any damage which Mr. Reyes might
have suffered through Ms. Lim’s exercise of a
legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety
and good faith, must be his to bear alone.
a.3. Doctrine of Last Clear Chance;

Doctrine of Supervening Negligence; Doctrine
of Discovered Peril; or the “Humanitarian”
Doctrine
PICART vs. SMITH, supra.
ISSUE:
W/N defendant is guilty of negligence to be liable

for damages.
HELD:

safety in front of the moving vehicle. In the nature outward demands of the banks involved. PCHC
of things this change of situation occurred while likewise encouraged respondent to submit the
the automobile was yet some distance away; and controversy for resolution thru the PCHC
from this moment it was not longer within the Arbitration Mechanism.
power of the plaintiff to escape being run down by
going to a place of greater safety. The control of However, it was petitioner who filed a complaint
the situation had then passed entirely to the before the Arbitration Committee, asserting that
defendant; and it was his duty either to bring his respondent should solely bear the entire face
car to an immediate stop or, seeing that there value of the check due to its negligence in failing
were no other persons on the bridge, to take the to return the check to petitioner within the 24-hour
other side and pass sufficiently far away from the reglementary period as provided in Section 20.1
horse to avoid the danger of collision. of the Clearing House Rules and Regulations.
Petitioner prayed that respondent be
Plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he
was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting
himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we
have already stated, the defendant was also
negligent; and in such case the problem always is
to discover which agent is immediately and
directly responsible. Under these circumstances
the law is that the person who has the last fair
chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to
do so is chargeable with the consequences,
without reference to the prior negligence of the
other party.
ALLIED BANK V. BPI G.R. NO. 188363

FEBRUARY 27, 2013
FACTS:
On October 10, 2002, a check in the amount of

P1,000,000.00 payable to "Mateo Mgt. Group
International" (MMGI) was presented for deposit
and accepted at petitioner's Kawit Branch. The
check, post- dated "Oct. 9, 2003", was drawn
against the account of Mr. Silva with respondent
Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) Bel-Air
Branch. Upon receipt, petitioner sent the check
for clearing to respondent through the Philippine
Clearing House Corporation (PCHC).
The check was cleared by respondent and

petitioner credited the account of MMGI with
P1,000,000. On October 22, 2002, MMGI's
account was closed and all the funds therein
were withdrawn. A month later, Silva discovered
the debit of P1,000,000 from his account. In
response to Silva's complaint, respondent
credited his account with the aforesaid sum. On
March 21, 2003, respondent returned a
photocopy of the check to petitioner for the
reason: "Postdated." Petitioner, however, refused
to accept and sent back to respondent a
photocopy of the check. Thereafter, the check, or
more accurately, the Charge Slip, was tossed
several times from petitioner to respondent, and
back to petitioner, until on May 6, 2003,
respondent requested the PCHC to take custody
of the check. Acting on the request, PCHC
directed the respondent to deliver the original
check and informed it of PCHC's authority under
Clearing House Operating Memo (CHOM) No.
279 dated 06 September 1996 to split 50/50 the
amount of the check subject of a "Ping-Pong"
controversy which shall be implemented thru the
issuance of Debit Adjustment Tickets against the

ordered to reimburse the sum of P500,000 with procedure. As correctly found by the PCHC and
12% interest per annum, and to pay attorney's fees upheld by the RTC, if only respondent exercised
and other arbitration expenses. ordinary care in the clearing process, it could have
easily noticed the glaring defect upon seeing the
date written on the face of the check "Oct. 9, 2003".
In its Answer with Counterclaims, respondent
Respondent could have then promptly returned the
charged petitioner with gross negligence for
check and with the check thus dishonored,
accepting the post- dated check in the first place. It
petitioner would have not credited the amount
contended that petitioner's admitted negligence
thereof to
was the sole and proximate cause of the loss.
On December 8, 2004, the Arbitration Committee

rendered its Decision 10 in favor of petitioner and
against the respondent. First, it ruled that the
situation of the parties does not involve a "Ping-
Pong" controversy since the subject check was
neither returned within the reglementary time or
through the PCHC return window, nor coursed
through the clearing facilities of the PCHC.
As to respondent's direct presentation of a

photocopy of the subject check, it was declared to
be without legal basis because Section 21.1 11 of
the CHRR 2000 does not apply to post-dated
checks. The Arbitration Committee further noted
that respondent not only failed to return the check
within the 24-hour reglementary period, it also
failed to institute any formal complaint within the
contemplation of Section 20.3 12 and it appears
that respondent was already contented with the 50-
50 split initially implemented by the PCHC. Finding
both parties negligent in the performance of their
duties, the Committee applied the doctrine of "Last
Clear Chance" and ruled that the loss should be
shouldered by respondent alone.
ISSUE:
Last clear chance.
HELD:
The doctrine of last clear chance, stated broadly, is

that the negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude
a recovery for the negligence of the defendant
where it appears that the defendant, by exercising
reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided
injurious consequences to the plaintiff
notwithstanding the plaintiff's negligence. The
doctrine necessarily assumes negligence on the
part of the defendant and contributory negligence
on the part of the plaintiff, and does not apply
except upon that assumption. Stated differently, the
antecedent negligence of the plaintiff does not
preclude him from recovering damages caused by
the supervening negligence of the defendant, who
had the last fair chance to prevent the impending
harm by the exercise of due diligence. Moreover, in
situations where the doctrine has been applied, it
was defendant's failure to exercise such ordinary
care, having the last clear chance to avoid loss or
injury, which was the proximate cause of the
occurrence of such loss or injury. In this case, the
evidence clearly shows that the proximate cause of
the unwarranted encashment of the subject check
was the negligence of respondent who cleared a
post-dated check sent to it thru the PCHC clearing
facility without observing its own verification

the payee's account. Thus, notwithstanding the exercise of due care, have been aware of it. One
antecedent negligence of the petitioner in cannot be expected to avoid an accident or injury
accepting the post-dated check for deposit, it can if he does not know or could not have known the
seek reimbursement from respondent the amount existence of the peril. In this case, there is nothing
credited to the payee's account covering the to show that the jeepney driver David Ico knew of
check. the impending danger. When he saw at a distance
that the approaching bus was encroaching on his
lane, he did not immediately swerve the jeepney
PANTRANCO v. BAESA, GR No. 79050, Nov.
to the dirt shoulder on his right since he must
have assumed that the bus driver will return the
14, 1989 FACTS: bus to its own lane upon seeing the jeepney
approaching from the opposite direction. As held
In the morning of June 12, 1981, the spouses by this Court in the case of Vda. De Bonifacio v.
Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa and their children,
together with 10 other persons, were aboard a
passenger jeepney on their way to a picnic to
celebrate the fifth wedding anniversary of the
spouses. Upon reaching the highway, the
jeepney turned right and proceeded to Malalam
River at a speed of about 20 kph. While they
were proceeding towards Malalam River, a
speeding PANTRANCO bus from Aparri
encroached on the jeepney's lane while
negotiating a curve, and collided with it. As a
result of the accident David Ico, spouses Ceasar
and Marilyn Baesa and their children, Harold Jim
and Marcelino Baesa, died while the rest of the
passengers suffered injuries.
Trial Court ruled in favor of respondents.

Petitioner appealed but CA dismissed the case.
Petitioner faults the Court of Appeals for not
applying the doctrine of the "last clear chance"
against the jeepney driver. Petitioner claims that
under the circumstances of the case, it was the
driver of the passenger jeepney who had the last
clear chance to avoid the collision and was
therefore negligent in failing to utilize with
reasonable care and competence his then
existing opportunity to avoid the harm.
ISSUE:
Will the doctrine of last clear chance apply in this

case?
HELD:
The above contention of petitioner is manifestly

devoid of merit.
The doctrine of the last clear
chance simply, means that the
negligence of a claimant does
not preclude a recovery for the
negligence of defendant where
it appears that the latter, by
exercising reasonable care and
prudence, might have avoided
injurious consequences to
claimant notwithstanding his
negligence.
Contrary to the petitioner's contention, the
doctrine of "last clear chance" finds no application
in this case. For the doctrine to be applicable, it is
necessary to show that the person who allegedly
had the last opportunity to avert the accident was
aware of the existence of the peril or should, with

BLTB, G.R. No. L-26810, August 31, 1970, 34 W/N petitioner is answerable for the death of Engr.
SCRA Calibo owing to the negligence of its employee,
618, a motorist who is properly proceeding on his Zacarias.
own side of the highway is generally entitled to
assume that an approaching vehicle coming HELD:
towards him on the wrong side, will return to his
proper lane of traffic. There was nothing to indicate The petition is meritorious. The IAC’s decision is
to David Ico that the bus could not return to its own reversed.
lane or was prevented from returning to the proper
lane by anything beyond the control of its driver.
Leo Marantan, an alternate driver of the Pantranco
bus who was seated beside the driver Ramirez at
the time of the accident, testified that Ramirez had
no choice but to swerve the steering wheel to the
left and encroach on the jeepney's lane because
there was a steep precipice on the right [CA
Decision, p. 2; Rollo, p. 45]. However, this is belied
by the evidence on record which clearly shows that
there was enough space to swerve the bus back to
its own lane without any danger [CA Decision, p. 7;
Rollo, p. 50].
Considering the foregoing, the Court finds that the
negligence of petitioner's driver in encroaching into
the lane of the incoming jeepney and in failing to
return the bus to its own lane immediately upon
seeing the jeepney coming from the opposite
direction was the sole and proximate cause of the
accident without which the collision would not have
occurred. There was no supervening or intervening
negligence on the part of the jeepney driver which
would have made the prior negligence of
petitioner's driver a mere remote cause of the
accident.
GLAN PEOPLE’S LUMBER v. IAC, GR No.

70493, May 18, 1989
FACTS:
Engr. Calibo, Roranes, and Patos were on the jeep

owned by the Bacnotan Consolidated Industries,
Inc., with Calibo at the wheel, as it approached
from the South Lizada Bridge going towards the
direction of Davao City in the afternoon of July
4,1979. At about that time, the cargo truck, driven
by defendant Zacarias and owned by petitioners
herein, coming from the opposite direction of Davao
City had just crossed said bridge. The cargo truck
and the jeep collided as a consequence of which
Engr Calibo died while Roranes and Patos
sustained physical injuries. Zacarias was unhurt.
After the impact, the jeep fell and rested on its right
side on the asphalted road a few meters to the rear
of the truck, while the truck stopped on its wheels
on the road.
A case for damages was filed by the surviving

spouse and children of the late Engr Calibo against
the driver and owners of the cargo truck.
The Trial Court ruled that plaintiffs were unable to

establish the negligence of defendant and thus,
dismissed the case. The trial court’s decision was
reversed upon appeal to the IAC.
ISSUE:

The finding that "the truck driven by defendant and leave him a clear path.
Zacarias occupied the lane of the jeep when the
collision occurred" is, based on nothing more DE ROY vs. CA, January
than the showing that at the time of the accident,
the truck driven by Zacarias had edged over the 29, 1988 FACTS:
painted center line of the road into the opposite
lane by a width of twenty-five (25) centimeters. It The firewall of a burned-out building owned by
ignores the fact that by the uncontradicted petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring
evidence, the actual center line of the road was shop occupied by the family of private
not that indicated by the painted stripe, that respondents, resulting in injuries to private
although it was not disputed that the truck respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a
overrode the painted stripe by twenty-five (25) daughter. Private respondents had been warned
centimeters, it was still at least eleven by petitioners to vacate their shop in view
(11) centimeters away from its side of the true
center line of the road and well inside its own
lane when the accident occurred. By this same
reckoning, since it was unquestionably the jeep
that rammed into the stopped truck, it may also
be deduced that the jeep was at the time
travelling beyond its own lane and intruding into
the lane of the truck by at least the same 11-
centimeter width of space.
Nor was the IAC correct in finding that Zacarias

had acted negligently in applying his brakes
instead of getting back inside his lane upon
spying the approaching jeep. Being well within
his own lane, he had no duty to swerve out of the
jeep's way. And even supposing that he was in
fact partly inside the opposite lane, coming to a
full stop with the jeep still thirty (30) meters away
cannot be considered an unsafe or imprudent
action, there also being uncontradicted evidence
that the jeep was "zigzagging” and hence no way
of telling in which direction it would go as it
approached the truck.
It was rather Engr. Calibo’s negligence which

was the proximate cause of the accident.
Evidence and testimonies show that the jeep had
been “zigzagging” or was driven erratically at that
time and that its driver had been on a drinking
spree on the occasion prior.
Even, however, ignoring theof negligence on the

part of Calibo, and assuming some antecedent
negligence on the part of Zacarias in failing to
keep within his designated lane, incorrectly
demarcated as it was, the physical facts, would
still absolve the latter of any actionable
responsibility for the accident under the rule of
the last clear chance.
Both drivers had had a full view of each other's

vehicle from a distance of one hundred fifty
meters. It is also admitted that the truck was
already at a full stop while the jeep was still 30
meters away when thereafter, the latter plowed
into the truck. From these facts the logical
conclusion emerges that the driver of the jeep
had the last clear chance to avoid the accident,
by stopping in his turn or swerving his jeep away
from the truck, either of which he had sufficient
time to do. In those circumstances, his duty was
to seize that opportunity of avoidance, not merely
rely on a supposed right to expect, as the
Appellate Court would have it, the truck to swerve

of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former
failed to do so. The petition is meritorious.
The RTC rendered judgment finding petitioners As evidenced by the factual findings of respondent
guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages court, private respondents’ jeep were running along
to private respondents. On appeal, the decision of the inside lane of Lacson street when it suddenly
the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of swerved (as shown through the tiremarks) from the
Appeals. Hence, this petition. left and thereafter
ISSUE:
W/N petitioners are free of liability since

respondents had the last clear chance of avoiding
the incident.
HELD:
The petition is denied.
This Court finds that the CA committed no grave

abuse of discretion in affirming the trial court's
decision holding petitioner liable under Article 2190
of the Civil Code, which provides that "the
proprietor of a building or structure is responsible
for the damage resulting from its total or partial
collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary
repairs.”
Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners

argument that private respondents had the "last
clear chance" to avoid the accident if only they
heeded the warning to vacate the tailoring shop
and , therefore, petitioners prior negligence should
be disregarded, since the doctrine of "last clear
chance," which has been applied to vehicular
accidents, is inapplicable to this case.
PLDT vs. CA, GR No. 57079, Sept. 29, 1989
FACTS:
Private respondents spouses Esteban instituted a

case against petitioner company for the injuries
they sustained in the evening of July 30, 1968
when their jeep ran over a mound of earth and fell
into an open trench, an excavation allegedly
undertaken by PLDT. The complaint alleged that
respondent Antonio Esteban failed to notice the
open trench which was left uncovered because of
the creeping darkness and the lack of any warning
light or signs.
The trial court issued a decision in favor of the

private respondents. The CA reversed the decision
of the trial court. However, after granting a second
motion for reconsideration, the CA set aside its
original decision and affirmed in toto the decision of
the lower court. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioner company is liable to private

respondents for the injuries sustained by the latter.
HELD:

hit the accident mound. Petitioner company and retrieved the apparently lifeless body of
cannot be held liable to the private respondents. Dominador Ong from the bottom. Manual artificial
The accident had not occurred due to the respiration was applied. Despite medical attention
absence of warning signals but rather the abrupt by the nurse and Dr. Ayuyao of UP, the boy died.
swerving of the jeep from the inside lane.
Plaintiffs instituted a case to recover damages
Secondly, the jeep was not running at 25kph from defendant for the death of their son in the
when the accident occurred, otherwise it would said swimming pool operated by defendant. After
not have hit the accident mound since at that trial, the lower court dismissed the complaint.
speed, it could easily apply its brakes on time. Hence, this petition.
From the above findings, the negligence of

respondent Antonio Esteban was not only
contributory but rather the very cause of the
occurrence of the accident and thereby precludes
their right to recover damages. The only purpose
of warning signs was to inform and warn the
public of the presence of excavations on the site.
The private respondents already knew of the
presence of said excavations. It is basic that
private respondents cannot charge PLDT for their
injuries where their own failure to exercise due
and reasonable care was the cause thereof.
Furthermore, respondent Antonio Esteban had
the last clear chance or opportunity to avoid the
accident, notwithstanding the negligence he
imputes to petitioner PLDT. As a resident of
Lacson Street, he passed on that street almost
everyday and had knowledge of the presence
and location of the excavations there. It was his
negligence that exposed him and his wife to
danger; hence he is solely responsible for the
consequences of his imprudence.
ONG vs. MCWD, 104 Phil
397 FACTS:
Defendant owns and operates three recreational

swimming pools at its Balara filters in Diliman,
Quezon City to which people are invited and
nominal fees are charged.
In the afternoon of July 5, 1952, Dominador Ong,

a 14- year old boy, and his brothers Ruben and
Eusebio, arrived at the defendant's swimming
pools. This has been the 5th or 6th time that the
three brothers had gone to said natatorium. After
paying the requisite admission fee, they
immediately went to one of the small pools where
the water was shallow. Later on, Dominador Ong
told his brothers that he was going to the locker
room in an adjoining building to drink a bottle of
coke. Upon hearing this, Ruben and Eusebio
went to the bigger pool leaving Dominador in the
small pool and so they did not see the latter when
he left the pool to get a bottle of coke. In that
afternoon, there were two lifeguards on duty in
the pool compound, namely, Manuel Abaño and
Mario Villanueva.
Between 4:40 to 4:45 p.m., some boys who were

in the pool area informed one Andres Hagad, Jr.,
that somebody was swimming under water for
quite a long time. Another boy informed lifeguard
Abaño of the same happening and Abaño
immediately jumped into the big swimming pool

ISSUE: the application of the doctrine now invoked by
appellants to impute liability to appellee..
Whether the death of minor Dominador Ong can be
attributed to the negligence of defendant and/or its ECHEVARA vs. RAMOS, GR No. 175172, Sept.
employees so as to entitle plaintiffs to recover 29, 2009
damages.
FACTS:
HELD:
Respondents Elvira Ramos and her two minor
The trial court’s decision is hereby affirmed. children filed with the RTC of Ilocos Sur a Complaint
for damages
Although the proprietor of a natatorium is liable for
injuries to a patron, resulting from lack of ordinary
care in providing for his safety, without the fault of
the patron, he is not in any sense deemed to be the
insurer of the safety of patrons. And the death of a
patron within his premises does not cast upon him
the burden of excusing himself from any
presumption of negligence. Thus in Bertalot vs.
Kinnare, supra, it was held that there could be no
recovery for the death by drowning of a fifteen- year
boy in defendant's natatorium, where it appeared
merely that he was lastly seen alive in water at the
shallow end of the pool, and some ten or fifteen
minutes later was discovered unconscious, and
perhaps lifeless, at the bottom of the pool, all efforts
to resuscitate him being without avail.
Appellee has taken all necessary precautions to

avoid danger to the lives of its patrons or prevent
accident which may cause their death.
Appellant posits that even if it be assumed that the

deceased is partly to be blamed for the unfortunate
incident, still appellee may be held liable under the
doctrine of "last clear chance" for the reason that,
having the last opportunity to save the victim, it
failed to do so.
We do not see how this doctrine may apply

considering that the record does not show how
minor Ong came into the big swimming pool. The
doctrine of last clear chance simply means that the
negligence of a claimant does not preclude a
recovery for the negligence of defendant where it
appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable
care and prudence, might have avoided injurious
consequences to claimant notwithstanding his
negligence. Or, "As the doctrine usually is stated, a
person who has the last clear chance or opportunity
of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the
negligent acts of his opponent or the negligence of
a third person which is imputed to his opponent, is
considered in law solely responsible for the
consequences of the accident."
Since it is not known how minor Ong came into the

big swimming pool and it being apparent that he
went there without any companion in violation of
one of the regulations of appellee as regards the
use of the pools, and it appearing that lifeguard
Abaño responded to the call for help as soon as his
attention was called to it and immediately after
retrieving the body all efforts at the disposal of
appellee had been put into play in order to bring
him back to life, it is clear that there is no room for

against petitioners Cresencia Achevara, Alfredo place of collision. However, SPO2 Marvin Valdez,
Achevara and Benigno Valdez for the death of who investigated the incident, found that the
Arnulfo Ramos, husband of Elvira Ramos and collision took place on the western lane of the
father of her two children, in a vehicular accident national highway or the lane of the passenger
that happened on April 22, 1995 at the national jeep driven by Benigno Valdez. It was the owner-
highway along Barangay Tablac, Candon, Ilocos type jeep driven by Arnulfo Ramos that
Sur. Crescencia Achevara was sued as the encroached on the lane of the passenger jeep.
operator of the passenger jeep which was
involved in the vehicular accident. Alfredo Foreseeability is the fundamental test of
Achevara was impleaded as the husband of the negligence. To be negligent, a defendant must
operator. have acted or failed to act in such a way that an
ordinary reasonable man would have realized
Respondents alleged that Benigno Valdez was that certain interests of certain
driving a passenger jeep in a reckless, careless,
and negligent manner. He tried to overtake a
motorcycle, causing the passenger jeep to
encroach on the opposite lane and bump the
oncoming vehicle driven by Arnulfo Ramos. The
injuries sustained by Arnulfo Ramos caused his
death. Respondents alleged that Crescencia
Achevara failed to exercise due diligence in the
selection and supervision of Benigno Valdez as
driver of the passenger jeep.
Petitioners denied Benigno Valdez overtook a

motorcycle and bumped the vehicle driven by
Arnulfo Ramos. They alleged that Benigno
Valdez was driving southward at a moderate
speed when he saw an owner- type jeep coming
from the south and heading north, running in a
zigzag manner, and encroaching on the west
lane of the road. To avoid a collision, Valdez
drove the passenger jeep towards the shoulder of
the road, west of his lane, but the owner-type
jeep continued to move toward the western lane
and bumped the left side of the passenger jeep.
Petitioners alleged that it was Arnulfo Ramos who
was careless and negligent in driving a motor
vehicle, which he very well knew had a
mechanical defect.
Both the RTC and CA ruled in favor of respondents.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioners are liable to respondents for the

damages incurred as a result of the vehicular
accident.
HELD:
The petition is meritorious.
The testimony of respondents’ witness, Gamera,

that the vehicular accident occurred because the
passenger jeep driven by Valdez tried to overtake
the motorcycle driven by PO3 de Peralta and
encroached on the lane of the owner-type jeep,
which resulted in the collision, was refuted by
PO3 de Peralta, who testified that the passenger
jeep did not overtake his motorcycle since he was
the one following behind the passenger jeep.
Gamera also testified that the collision took place

on the lane of the owner-type jeep, and one of its
wheels was detached and stayed immobile at the

persons were unreasonably subjected to a general immediate and proximate cause of the injury
but definite class of risks. being the defendant’s lack of due care, the
Seeing that the owner-type jeep was wiggling and
running fast in a zigzag manner as it travelled on
the opposite side of the highway, Benigno Valdez In this case, both Ramos and Valdez failed to
was made aware of the danger ahead if he met the exercise reasonable care and caution. Since the
owner-type jeep on the road. Yet he failed to take gross negligence of Arnulfo Ramos and the
precaution by immediately veering to the rightmost inexcusable negligence of Benigno Valdez were the
portion of the road or by stopping the passenger proximate cause of the
jeep at the right shoulder of the road and letting the
owner-type jeep pass before proceeding
southward; hence, the collision occurred. The CA
correctly held that Benigno Valdez was guilty of
inexcusable negligence by neglecting to take such
precaution, which a reasonable and prudent man
would ordinarily have done under the
circumstances and which proximately caused injury
to another.
On the other hand, the Court also finds Arnulfo

Ramos guilty of gross negligence for knowingly
driving a defective jeep on the highway.
The acts of negligence of Arnulfo Ramos and

Benigno Valdez were contemporaneous when
Ramos continued to drive a wiggling vehicle on the
highway despite knowledge of its mechanical
defect, while Valdez did not immediately veer to the
rightmost side of the road upon seeing the wiggling
vehicle of Ramos. However, when the owner-type
jeep encroached on the lane of the passenger jeep,
Valdez realized the peril at hand and steered the
passenger jeep toward the western shoulder of the
road to avoid a collision. It was at this point that it
was perceivable that Ramos must have lost control
of his vehicle, and that it was Valdez who had the
last opportunity to avoid the collision by swerving
the passenger jeep towards the right shoulder of
the road.
The doctrine of last clear chance applies to a

situation where the plaintiff was guilty of prior or
antecedent negligence, but the defendant − who
had the last fair chance to avoid the impending
harm and failed to do so
− is made liable for all the consequences of the
accident, notwithstanding the prior negligence of
the plaintiff. However, the doctrine does not apply
where the party charged is required to act
instantaneously, and the injury cannot be avoided
by the application of all means at hand after the
peril is or should have been discovered.
The doctrine of last clear chance does not apply

to this case, because even if it can be said that it
was Valdez who had the last chance to avoid the
mishap when the owner-type jeep encroached on
the western lane of the passenger jeep, Valdez no
longer had the opportunity to avoid the collision.
Article 2179 of the Civil Code provides:
When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the

immediate and proximate cause of his injury,
he cannot recover damages. But if his
negligence was only contributory, the

vehicular accident, respondents cannot recover negligence.
damages pursuant to Article 2179 of the Civil
Code. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part
of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS V. to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the
VIZCARA G.R. NO. 190022 FEBRUARY 15, standard to which he is required to conform for his
2012 own protection. Based on the foregoing definition,
the standard or act to which, according to
petitioner Li, Valenzuela ought to have conformed
a.4. Emergency Rule
for her own protection was not to park at all at any
point of Aurora Boulevard, a no parking zone. We
VALENZUELA vs. CA, 253 SCRA 303 cannot agree.
FACTS:
At around 2:00 in the morning of June 24, 1990,

plaintiff Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving a
blue Mitsubishi lancer from her restaurant to her
home. Before reaching
A. Lake Street, she noticed something wrong with
her tires; she stopped at a lighted place where
there were people, to solicit help if needed since
rear right tire was flat and that she cannot reach
her home in that car's condition, she parked
along the sidewalk, put on her emergency lights,
alighted from the car, and went to the rear to
open the trunk. She was standing at the left side
of the rear of her car pointing to the tools to a
man who will help her fix the tire when she was
suddenly bumped by a 1987 Mitsubishi Lancer
driven by defendant Richard Li. Because of the
impact plaintiff was thrown against the windshield
of the car of the defendant and then fell to the
ground. Plaintiff's left leg was severed up to the
middle of her thigh and was eventually fitted with
an artificial leg.
Defendant Richard Li denied that he was

negligent and alleged that when he was driving
along the inner portion of the right lane of Aurora
Blvd. he was suddenly confronted, in the vicinity
of A. Lake Street, with a car coming from the
opposite direction, travelling at 80 kph, with "full
bright lights". Temporarily blinded, he instinctively
swerved to the right to avoid colliding with the
oncoming vehicle, and bumped plaintiff's car,
which he did not see because it was midnight
blue in color, with no parking lights or early
warning device, and the area was poorly lighted.
He alleged in his defense that the plaintiff's car
was improperly parked.
Both the trial court and the CA found for

petitioner. However, the latter modified the
former’s decision in reducing the amount of
damages. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioner Valenzuela is guilty of contributory

negligence to preclude her from claiming
damages.
HELD:
We agree with the respondent court that

Valenzuela was not guilty of contributory

Courts have traditionally been compelled to A vehicular collision occurred on January 3, 1953 in
recognize that an actor who is confronted with an Apalit, Pampanga which involved a Pepsi-Cola
emergency is not to be held up to the standard of delivery truck driven by Jon Elordi and a private car
conduct normally applied to an individual who is in driven by Capuno. The collision proved fatal to the
no such situation. latter as well as to his passengers, the spouses
Florencio Buan and Rizalina Paras.
Under the "emergency rule", an individual who
suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and
is required to act without much time to consider the
best means that may be adopted to avoid the
impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he
fails to undertake what subsequently and upon
reflection may appear to be a better solution,
unless the emergency was brought by his own
negligence.
A woman driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a

flat tire on a rainy night will not be faulted for
stopping at a point which is both convenient for her
to do so and which is not a hazard to other
motorists. She is not expected to run the entire
boulevard in search for a parking zone or turn on a
dark street or alley where she would likely find no
one to help her. It would be hazardous for her not
to stop and assess the emergency because the
hobbling vehicle would be both a threat to her
safety and to other motorists.
Under the circumstances described, Valenzuela did

exercise the standard reasonably dictated by the
emergency and could not be considered to have
contributed to the unfortunate circumstances which
eventually led to the amputation of one of her lower
extremities. The emergency which led her to park
her car on a sidewalk in Aurora Boulevard was not
of her own making, and it was evident that she had
taken all reasonable precautions.
Obviously in the case at bench, the only negligence

ascribable was the negligence of Li on the night of
the accident. The circumstances established by the
evidence adduced in the court below plainly
demonstrate that Li was grossly negligent in driving
his Mitsubishi Lancer. It bears emphasis that he
was driving at a fast speed at about 2:00 A.M. after
a heavy downpour had settled into a drizzle
rendering the street slippery. There is ample
testimonial evidence on record to show that he was
under the influence of liquor. Under these
conditions, his chances of effectively dealing with
changing conditions on the road were significantly
lessened.
ORIX METRO LEASING V. MANGALINAO G.R.

NO. 174089 JANUARY 25, 2012
a.5. Prescription
Art. 1150. “The time for prescription for all kinds of

actions, when there is no special provision which
ordains otherwise, shall be counted from the day
they may be brought.”
CAPUNO vs. PEPSI, GR No. L-19331, Apr. 30,
1965 FACTS:

Elordi was charged with triple homicide through b. Incomplete/Partial Defense
reckless imprudence. The information was
subsequently amended to include claims for b.1. Doctrine of Contributory Negligence
damages by the heirs of the three victims.
Art. 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence
The appearance and intervention of Prosecutor was the immediate and proximate cause of his
Atty. Navarro for presentation of evidence for injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his
damages was disallowed. No appeal was taken negligence was only contributory, the immediate
from the order. and proximate cause of the injury being the
defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff
Judgment on the criminal case was rendered on
April 15, 1959, acquitting the accused Elordi.
Prior thereto, or on September 26, 1958,
however, herein appellants commenced a civil
action for damages against the Pepsi Company
and Elordi. Appellee moved to dismiss the said
action relying on the ground of prescription
among others. The motion was dismissed by the
Court a quo. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
W/N the action for damages has prescribed.
HELD:
The action has prescribed.
The present action is one for recovery of

damages based on a quasi-delict, which action
must be instituted within four (4) years (Article
1146, Civil Code). Appellants' intervention in the
original action was disallowed and they did not
appeal from the Court's order. And when they
commenced the present civil action on
September 26, 1958 the criminal case was still
pending, showing that appellants then chose to
pursue the remedy afforded by the Civil Code
In filing the civil action, appellants considered it

as entirely independent of the criminal action,
pursuant to Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil Code.
In other words, the civil action for damages could

have been commenced by appellants
immediately upon the death of their decedent,
Capuno and the same would not have been
stayed by the filing of the criminal action for
homicide through reckless imprudence. But the
complaint here was filed only on September 26,
1958, or after the lapse of more than five years.
The contention that the four-year period of

prescription in this case was interrupted by the
filing of the criminal action against Jon Elordi is
incorrect notwithstanding that appellants had
neither waived the civil action nor reserved the
right to institute it separately. Such reservation
was not necessary; as without having made it
they could still file — as in fact they did — a
separate civil action even during the pendency of
the criminal case; and consequently, the
institution of a criminal action cannot have the
effect of interrupting the institution of a civil action
based on a quasi-delict.

may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate CO..supra.(See under DOCTRINE OF
the damages to be awarded. ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE)
PHIL. NATIONAL RAILWAYS vs. TUPANG, GR BANAL & ENVERSO vs. TACLOBAN ELECTRIC
No. 55347, Oct. 4, 1985 & HOUSE PLANT, 54 Phil 327
FACTS: FACTS:
On September 10, 1972, Winifredo Tupang,

husband of plaintiff Rosario Tupang, boarded 'Train
No. 516 of appellant at Libmanan, Camarines Sur,
as a paying passenger bound for Manila. Due to
some mechanical defect, the train stopped at
Sipocot, Camarines Sur, for repairs, taking some
two hours before the train could resume its trip to
Manila. Unfortunately, upon passing Iyam Bridge at
Lucena, Quezon, Winifredo Tupang fell off the train
resulting in his death.
Both the CFI and the CA held PNR liable for

damages for breaching the contract of carriage.
ISSUE:
W/N deceased Tupang was guilty of contributory

negligence.
HELD:
The appellate court found that the train boarded by

the deceased Winifredo Tupang was so over-
crowded that he and many other passengers had
no choice but to sit on the open platforms between
the coaches of the train. It is likewise undisputed
that the train did not even stop, despite the alarm
raised by other passengers that a person had fallen
off the train at lyam Bridge.
The petitioner has the obligation to transport its

passengers to their destinations and to observe
extraordinary diligence in doing so. Death or any
injury suffered by any of its passengers gives rise
to the presumption that it was negligent in the
performance of its obligation under the contract of
carriage.
But while petitioner failed to exercise extraordinary

diligence as required by law, it appears that the
deceased was chargeable with contributory
negligence. Since he opted to sit on the open
platform between the coaches of the train, he
should have held tightly and tenaciously on the
upright metal bar found at the side of said platform
to avoid falling off from the speeding train. Such
contributory negligence, while not exempting the
PNR from liability, nevertheless justified the
deletion of the amount adjudicated as moral
damages. By the same token, the award of
exemplary damages must be set aside.
RAKES vs. ATLANTIC GULF, supra.(See under

ACT OR OMISSION)
TAYLOR vs. MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD &

LIGHT

On the evening of April 10, 1925, a procession signing her credit card slip at the payment and
was held in Tacloban, Leyte attended by verification counter when she felt a sudden gust of
Fortunata Enverso with her daughter Purificacion wind and heard a loud thud. She looked behind
Bernal. After the procession was over, the her and saw her daughter’s body on the floor
woman and her daughter, passed along a public pinned by the store's gift-wrapping counter.
street. The little girl was allowed to get a short ZHIENETH was quickly rushed to the Makati
distance in advance of her mother and her Medical Center but died a few days later. The
mother’s friends. When in front of the offices of cause of her death was attributed to the injuries
the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., an she sustained.
automobile appeared from the opposite direction
Petitioners denied any liability claiming that
which frightened the child that she turned to run,
CRISELDA was negligent in exercising care and
with the result that she fell into the street gutter.
diligence over her daughter by allowing her to
At that time there was hot water in this gutter
freely roam around in a store
coming from the Electric Ice Plant of J.V. House.
When the mother and her companions reached
the child, they found her face downward in the
hot water. She was taken to the provincial
hospital but thereafter died. Dr. Benitez, who
attended the child, certified that the cause of
death was "Burns, 3rd Degree, whole Body.”
The trial court found that the company was

negligent but dismissed the case having ruled
that plaintiffs were guilty of contributory
negligence.
ISSUE:
W/N Enverso was guilty of contributory negligence.
HELD:
We are shown no good reason for the departing

from the conclusion of the trial judge to the effect
that the sudden death of the child Purification
Bernal was due principally to the nervous shock
and organic calefaction produced by the
extensive burns from the hot water.
The mother and her child had a perfect right to be

on the principal street of Tacloban, Leyte, on the
evening when the religious procession was held.
There was nothing abnormal in allowing the child
to run along a few paces in advance of the
mother. No one could foresee the coincidence of
an automobile appearing and of a frightened child
running and falling into a ditch filled with hot
water. The contributory negligence of the child
and her mother, if any, does not operate as a bar
to recovery, but in its strictest sense could only
result in reduction of the damages.
JARCO MARKETING CORP. vs. CA, 321 SCRA
377 FACTS:
On 9 May 1983, CRISELDA and ZHIENETH

AGUILAR
were at the 2nd floor of Syvel's Department Store
owned by herein petitioner. CRISELDA was

filled with glassware and appliances. ZHIENETH discernment, and is, on that account, exempt from
too, was guilty of contributory negligence since she criminal liability. Since negligence may be a felony
climbed the counter, triggering its eventual and a quasi-delict and required discernment as a
collapse. Petitioners also emphasized that the condition of liability, either criminal or civil, a child
counter was made of sturdy wood with a strong under nine years of age is, by analogy, conclusively
support; it never fell nor collapsed for the past presumed to be incapable of negligence.
fifteen years since its construction.
Private respondents asserted that ZHIENETH

should be entitled to the conclusive presumption
that a child below nine years is incapable of
contributory negligence. And even if ZHIENETH, at
six years old, was already capable of contributory
negligence, still it was physically impossible for her
to have propped herself on the counter. Also, the
testimony of one of the store's former employees,
Gerardo Gonzales, who accompanied ZHIENETH
when she was brought to the emergency room of
the Makati Medical Center belied petitioners' theory
that ZHIENETH climbed the counter. Gonzales
claimed that when ZHIENETH was asked by the
doctor what she did, ZHIENETH replied, "Nothing, I
did not come near the counter and the counter just
fell on me."
The Trial Court ruled in favor of herein petitioners

finding that the proximate cause of ZHIENETH’s
injuries was the negligence of the latter and that of
her mother. Upon appeal, the CA reversed the
decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioners should be absolved from liability

because of private respondent’s negligence.
HELD:
We deny the petition.Under the circumstances, it is

unthinkable for ZHIENETH, a child of such tender
age and in extreme pain, to have lied to a doctor
whom she trusted with her life. We therefore accord
credence to Gonzales' testimony on the matter.
Gonzales' earlier testimony on petitioners'

insistence to keep and maintain the structurally
unstable gift-wrapping counter proved their
negligence. Petitioner was informed of the danger
posed by the unstable counter. Yet, it neither
initiated any concrete action to remedy the situation
nor ensure the safety of the store's employees and
patrons as a reasonable and ordinary prudent man
would have done.
Anent the negligence imputed to ZHIENETH, we

apply the conclusive presumption that favors
children below nine years old in that they are
incapable of contributory negligence.
In our jurisdiction, a person under nine years of age

is conclusively presumed to have acted without

Even if we attribute contributory negligence to lines were sagging around 8 to 10 feet in violation
ZHIENETH and assume that she climbed over of the required distance of 18 to 20 feet. If the
the counter, no injury should have occurred if we transmission lines were properly maintained by
accept petitioners' theory that the counter was petitioner, the bamboo pole carried by Noble
stable and sturdy. For if that was the truth, a frail would not have touched the wires. He would not
six-year old could not have caused the counter to have been electrocuted.
collapse.
Moreover, We find no contributory negligence on
CRISELDA too, should be absolved from any Noble’s part.
contributory negligence. Initially, ZHIENETH held
on to CRISELDA's waist, later to the latter's hand.
CRISELDA momentarily released the child's
hand from her clutch when she signed her credit
card slip. It was reasonable and usual for
CRISELDA to let go of her child.
NAPOCOR vs. CASIONAN, GR No. 165969,

Nov. 27, 2008
FACTS:
Respondents are the parents of Noble Casionan,

19 years old at the time of the incident that
claimed his life. He worked as a pocket miner.
A trail existed in Dalicno and this trail was

regularly used by members of the community.
Sometime in the 1970’s, petitioner NPC installed
high-tension electrical transmission lines
traversing the trail. Eventually, some of the
transmission lines sagged and dangled reducing
their distance from the ground to only about eight
to ten feet.
On June 27, 1995, Noble and his co-pocket

miner, Melchor Jimenez, were at Dalicno. They
cut two bamboo poles for their pocket mining.
Noble carried the shorter pole while Melchor
carried the longer pole. Noble walked ahead as
both passed through the trail underneath the
NPC high tension transmission lines on their way
to their work place.
As Noble was going uphill, the tip of the bamboo

pole he was carrying touched one of the dangling
high tension wires. Thereafter, Melchor saw
Noble fall to the ground. He rushed to Noble and
shook him but the latter was already dead.
Both the RTC and the CA ruled in favor of

respondents.
ISSUE:
W/N Noble Casionan is guilty of contributory

negligence so as to mitigate NAPOCOR’s
liability.
HELD:
The sagging high tension wires were an accident

waiting to happen. As established during trial, the

Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of
HELD:
the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to
the harm he has suffered, which falls below the The petition is without merit.
standard which he is required to conform for his
own protection. There is contributory negligence In this case, records show that when the accident
when the party’s act showed lack of ordinary care happened, the victim was standing on the shoulder,
and foresight that such act could cause him harm
or put his life in danger.
In this case, the trail where Noble was electrocuted

was regularly used by members of the community.
There were no warning signs to inform passersby
of the impending danger to their lives should they
accidentally touch the high tension wires. Also, the
trail was the only viable way from Dalicon to Itogon.
Hence, Noble should not be faulted for simply
doing what was ordinary routine to other workers in
the area.
In sum, the victim was not guilty of contributory

negligence. Hence, petitioner is not entitled to a
mitigation of its liability.
CADIENTE vs. MACAS, GR No. 161846, Nov. 14,
2008 FACTS:
Rosalinda Palero testified that on July 19, 1994, , at

the intersection of Buhangin and San Vicente
Streets in Davao City, 15-year old high school
student Bithuel Macas was standing on the
shoulder of the road. Rosalinda was about two and
a half meters away from the respondent when the
latter was bumped and run over by a Ford Fiera,
driven by Cimafranca. Respondent was rushed to
the hospital where both his legs were amputated in
order to save his life.
Cimafranca had since absconded and disappeared.

Records showed that the Ford Fiera was registered
in the name of herein petitioner, Atty. Cadiente.
However, Cadiente claimed that when the accident
happened, he was no longer the owner of the Ford
Fiera. He alleged that he sold the vehicle to Engr.
Jalipa with the understanding that the latter would
be the one to cause the transfer of the registration.
The victim's father filed a complaint for torts and

damages against Cimafranca and Cadiente before
the RTC. Cadiente later filed a third-party complaint
against Jalipa.
The RTC held Cadiente and Jalipa jointly and

severally liable to respondent. Such decision was
affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
W/N victim is guilty of contributory negligence.
W/N petitioner is absolved from liability by the fact

that he was no longer the owner of said vehicle.

which was the uncemented portion of the indemnity in the amount of P1,903,335.39.
highway. As noted by the trial court, the shoulder
ISSUE:
was intended for pedestrian use alone. Only
stationary vehicles, such as those loading or W/N Loadmasters be legally considered as an
unloading passengers may use the shoulder. Agent of respondent Glodel.
Running vehicles are not supposed to pass
through the said uncemented portion of the HELD:
highway. However, the Ford Fiera in this case,
without so much as slowing down, took off from Based on the aforecited definition, Loadmasters is
the cemented part of the highway, inexplicably a common carrier because it is engaged in the
swerved to the shoulder, and recklessly bumped business of transporting goods by land, through
its trucking service.
and ran over an innocent victim.
The respondent cannot be expected to have

foreseen that the Ford Fiera, erstwhile speeding
along the cemented part of the highway would
suddenly swerve to the shoulder, then bump and
run him over. Thus, we are unable to accept the
petitioner's contention that the respondent was
negligent.
Coming now to the second issue, this Court has

recently reiterated in PCI Leasing and Finance,
Inc. v. UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc.,that the
registered owner of any vehicle, even if he had
already sold it to someone else, is primarily
responsible to the public for whatever damage or
injury the vehicle may cause.
VI. LIABILITY FOR ACT OR OMISSION
a. By tortfeasor
LOADMASTERS CUSTOMS SERVICES V.

GLODEL BROKERAGE G.R. NO. 179446
JANUARY 10, 2011
FACTS:
On August 28, 2001, R&B Insurance issued

Marine Policy No. MN-00105/2001 in favor of
Columbia to insure the shipment of 132 bundles
of electric copper cathodes against All Risks. On
August 28, 2001, the cargoes were shipped on
board the vessel "Richard Rey" from Isabela,
Leyte, to Pier 10, North Harbor, Manila. They
arrived on the same date.
Columbia engaged the services of Glodel for the

release and withdrawal of the cargoes from the
pier and the subsequent delivery to its
warehouses/plants. Glodel, in turn, engaged the
services of Loadmasters for the use of its delivery
trucks to transport the cargoes to Columbia's
warehouses/plants in Bulacan and Valenzuela
City.
Later on, the said truck, an Isuzu with Plate No.

NSD- 117, was recovered but without the copper
cathodes. Because of this incident, Columbia
filed with R&B Insurance a claim for insurance

It is a common carrier as distinguished from a damages caused by their
private carrier wherein the carriage is generally employees and household
undertaken by special agreement and it does not helpers acting within the scope of
hold itself out to carry goods for the general public. their assigned tasks, even though
The distinction is significant in the sense that "the the former are not engaged in any
rights and obligations of the parties to a contract of business or industry.
private carriage are governed principally by their
stipulations, not by the law on common carriers." What then is the extent of the respective liabilities of
Loadmasters and Glodel? Each wrongdoer is liable
In the present case, there is no indication that the for
undertaking in the contract between Loadmasters
and Glodel was private in character. There is no
showing that Loadmasters solely and exclusively
rendered services to Glodel.
In fact, Loadmasters admitted that it is a common

carrier.
With respect to the time frame of this extraordinary

responsibility, the Civil Code provides that the
exercise of extraordinary diligence lasts from the
time the goods are unconditionally placed in the
possession of, and received by, the carrier for
transportation until the same are delivered, actually
or constructively, by the carrier to the consignee, or
to the person who has a right to receive them.
Premises considered, the Court is of the view that

both Loadmasters and Glodel are jointly and
severally liable to R & B Insurance for the loss of
the subject cargo. Under Article 2194 of the New
Civil Code, "the responsibility of two or more
persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is
solidary."
Loadmasters' claim that it was never privy to the

contract entered into by Glodel with the consignee
Columbia or R&B Insurance as subrogee, is not a
valid defense. It may not have a direct contractual
relation with Columbia, but it is liable for tort under
the provisions of Article 2176 of the Civil Code on
quasi-delicts which expressly provide:
ART. 2176.Whoever by act or

omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a
quasi- delict and is governed by
the provisions of this Chapter.
In connection therewith, Article 2180 provides:
ART. 2180.The obligation

imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's
own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom
one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the

the total damage suffered by R&B Insurance. sweethearts until December, 1978 when Julie Ann
Where there are several causes for the resulting broke up her relationship with Wendell after she
damages, a party is not relieved from liability, supposedly found him to be sadistic and
even partially. It is sufficient that the negligence irresponsible. During the first and second weeks
of a party is an efficient cause without which the of January, 1979, Wendell kept pestering Julie
damage would not have resulted. It is no defense Ann with demands for reconciliation but the latter
to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the
damage would not have resulted from his persisted in her refusal, prompting the former to
negligence alone, without the negligence or resort to threats against her. In order to avoid him,
wrongful acts of the other concurrent tortfeasor. Julie Ann stayed in the house of her best friend,
As stated in the case of Far Eastern Shipping v. Malou Alfonso, at the corner of Maria Cristina and
Court of Appeals, Juana Osmeña Streets, Cebu City, from January
7 to 13, 1978.
. . . . Where several causes
producing an injury are
concurrent and each is an
efficient cause without which
the injury would not have
happened, the injury may be
attributed to all or any of the
causes and recovery may be
had against any or all of the
responsible persons although
under the circumstances of the
case, it may appear that one of
them was more culpable, and
that the duty owed by them to
the injured person was not the
same. No actor's negligence
ceases to be a proximate
cause merely because it does
not exceed the negligence of
other actors. Each wrongdoer
is responsible for the entire
result and is liable as though
his acts were the sole cause of
the injury.
There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors

whose liability is solidary since both of them are
liable for the total damage. Where the concurrent
or successive negligent acts or omissions of two
or more persons, although acting independently,
are in combination the direct and proximate
cause of a single injury to a third person, it is
impossible to determine in what proportion each
contributed to the injury and either of them is
responsible for the whole injury. Where their
concurring negligence resulted in injury or
damage to a third party, they become joint
tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the
resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil
Code.
b. Vicarious Liability
b.1. By parents
LIBI vs. IAC, GR No. 70880, Sept. 18,
1992 FACTS:
For more than two (2) years before their deaths,

Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were
Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page

100
On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann and Wendell died, Article 2180 of the Civil Code for the reasons well
expressed in Salen and adopted in the cases
each from a single gunshot wound inflicted with the
hereinbefore enumerated that to hold that the civil
same firearm, a Smith and Wesson revolver liability under Article 2180 would apply only to
licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi, quasi-delicts and not to criminal offenses would
which was recovered from the scene of the crime result in the absurdity that in an act involving mere
inside the residence of private respondents at the negligence the parents would be liable but not
corner of General Maxilom and D. Jakosalem where the damage is caused with criminal intent. In
streets of the same city. said cases, however, there are unfortunate
variances resulting in a regrettable inconsistency in
ISSUE: the Court's determination of whether the liability of
the parents, in cases involving
W/N Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly
interpreted by respondent court to make petitioners
liable for vicarious liability.
HELD:
We believe that the civil liability of parents for

quasi- delicts of their minor children, as
contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, is
primary and not subsidiary. In fact, if we apply
Article 2194 of said code which provides for
solidary liability of joint tortfeasors, the persons
responsible for the act or omission, in this case the
minor and the father and, in case of his death of
incapacity, the mother, are solidarily liable.
Accordingly, such parental liability is primary and
not subsidiary, hence the last paragraph of Article
2180 provides that "(t) he responsibility treated of in
this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damages."
Thus, for civil liability ex quasi delicto of minors,

Article 2182 of the Civil Code states that "(i)f the
minor causing damage has no parents or guardian,
the minor . . . shall be answerable with his own
property in an action against him where a guardian
ad litem shall be appointed." For civil liability ex
delicto of minors, an equivalent provision is found in
the third paragraph of Article 101 of the Revised
Penal Code.
The civil liability of parents for felonies committed

by their minor children contemplated in the
aforesaid rule in Article 101 of the Revised Penal
Code in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code
has, aside from the aforecited case of Fuellas,
been the subject of a number of cases adjudicated
by this Court, viz.: Exconde vs.
Capuno, et al., Araneta vs. Arreglado, Salen, et al.
vs. Balce, Paleyan, etc., et al. vs. Bangkili, et al.,
and Elcano, et al, vs. Hill, et al. Parenthetically, the
aforesaid cases were basically on the issue of the
civil liability of parents for crimes committed by
their minor children over 9 but under 15 years of
age, who acted with discernment, and also of
minors 15 years of age or over, since these
situations are not covered by Article 101, Revised
Penal Code. In both instances, this Court held that
the issue of parental civil liability should be
resolved in accordance with the provisions of

101
either crimes or quasi-delicts of their minor children, And as far as the act which caused the injury was
is primary or subsidiary. concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual
among children at play and which no parent,
CUADRA vs. MONFORT, GR No. L-24101, however careful, would have any special reason
Sept. 30, 1970 to anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it
reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed any
FACTS: trait in the child's character which would reflect
unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the
Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Maria Teresa blame could be attributed to her parents.
Monfort, 13, were classmates in Grade Six at the
Mabini Elementary School. On July 9, 1962 they TAMARGO vs. CA, GR No. 85044, June 3, 1992
were assigned to weed the grass in the school
premises. While thus engaged Monfort found a
plastic headband. Jokingly she said aloud that
she had found an earthworm and, evidently to
frighten Cuadra, tossed the object at her. At that
precise moment the latter turned around, and the
object hit her right eye. Smarting from the pain,
she rubbed the injured part and treated it with
some powder. The next day, the eye became
swollen and had to undergo surgical operation
twice. Despite the medical efforts, however,
Maria Teresa Cuadra completely lost the sight of
her right eye.
The parents instituted a suit in behalf of their

minor daughter against Alfonso Monfort, Maria
Teresa Monfort's father. The RTC ruled in favor
of plaintiff to which the defendant appealed to SC
on pure questions of law.
ISSUE:
W/N Alfonso Monfort can be held liable for the

acts of his child which caused damage to the
Cuadra daughter.
HELD:
The underlying basis of the liability imposed by

Article 2176 is the fault or negligence
accompanying the act or the omission, there
being no willfulness or intent to cause damage
thereby. When the act or omission is that of one
person for whom another is responsible, the latter
then becomes himself liable under Article 2180
under the principle of vicarious liability. The
presumption of liability is merely prima facie and
may therefore be rebutted by proving that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage."
In the present case there is nothing from which it

may be inferred that the defendant could have
prevented the damage by the observance of due
care, or that he was in any way remiss in the
exercise of his parental authority in failing to
foresee such damage, or the act which caused it.
On the contrary, his child was at school, where it
was his duty to send her and where she was
under the care and supervision of the teacher.

102
FACTS: and the presumption can be overturned under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code by proof that the
On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a parents had exercised all the diligence of a good
minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo father of a family to prevent the damage.
with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in
her death. Accordingly, a complaint for damages In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by
was filed against respondent spouses Victor and Adelberto with an air rifle occured when parental
Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with authority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc
whom he was living at the time of the tragic spouses, the natural parents of the minor Adelberto.
incident. It would thus follow that
Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981, the

spouses Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the
minor Adelberto Bundoc. This petition for adoption
was granted on, 18 November 1982, that is, after
Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.
Respondent spouses Bundoc, reciting the result of

the foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that not
they, but rather the adopting parents, the spouses
Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the action
since parental authority had shifted to the adopting
parents from the moment the successful petition for
adoption was filed.
Petitioners contended that since Adelberto Bundoc

was then actually living with his natural parents,
parental authority had not ceased nor been
relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a
petition for adoption.
The trial court dismissed petitioners' complaint,

ruling that respondent natural parents of Adelberto
indeed were not indispensable parties to the action.
The CA dismissed the appeal having been filed out
of time. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the natural parents of Adelberto are liable

for the damages sustained by Jennifer Tamargo.
HELD:
This principle of parental liability is a specie of

vicarious liability or the doctrine of imputed
negligence where a person is not only liable for
torts committed by himself, but also for torts
committed by others with whom he has a certain
relationship and for whom he is responsible. Thus,
parental liability is made a natural or logical
consequence of the duties and responsibilities of
parents
— their parental authority — which includes the
instructing, controlling and disciplining of the child.
The civil law assumes that when an unemancipated

child living with its parents commits a tortious acts,
the parents were negligent in the performance of
their legal and natural duty closely to supervise the
child who is in their custody and control. The
parental dereliction is, of course, only presumed

103
the natural parents who had then actual custody United States. Per the tickets, Spouses Viloria
of the minor Adelberto, are the indispensable were scheduled to leave for Newark on August
parties to the suit for damages. 13, 1997 and return to San Diego on August 21,
1997.
We do not believe that parental authority is
properly regarded as having been retroactively Subsequently, Fernando requested Mager to
transferred to and vested in the adopting parents, reschedule their flight to Newark to an earlier date
the Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle or August 6, 1997. Mager informed him that flights
shooting happened. We do not consider that to Newark via Continental Airlines were already
retroactive effect may be given to the decree of fully booked and offered the alternative of a round
adoption so as to impose a liability upon the trip flight via Frontier Air. Since flying with Frontier
adopting parents accruing at a time when Air called for a higher fare of US$526.00 per
adopting parents had no actual or physically passenger and would mean traveling by night,
custody over the adopted child. To hold that Fernando opted to request for a refund. Mager,
parental authority had been retroactively lodged
in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them
with liability for a tortious act that they could not
have foreseen and which they could not have
prevented would be unfair and unconscionable.
Accordingly, we conclude that respondent

Bundoc spouses, Adelberto's natural parents,
were indispensable parties to the suit for
damages brought by petitioners, and that the
dismissal by the trial court of petitioners'
complaint, the indispensable parties being
already before the court, constituted grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
b.2. By Guardians
ART. 217 (FC) - In case of foundlings,

abandoned neglected or abused children and
other children similarly situated, parental authority
shall be entrusted in summary judicial
proceedings to heads of children's homes,
orphanages and similar institutions duly
accredited by the proper government agency.
(314a)
b.3. By Owners and Managers of

Establishments
SPS. VILORIA V. CONTINENTAL AIRLINES

G.R. NO. 188288 JANUARY 16, 2012
FACTS:
On or about July 21, 1997 and while in the United

States, Fernando purchased for himself and his
wife, Lourdes, two (2) round trip airline tickets
from San Diego, California to Newark, New
Jersey on board Continental Airlines. Fernando
purchased the tickets at US$400.00 each from a
travel agency called "Holiday Travel" and was
attended to by a certain Margaret Mager (Mager).
According to Spouses Viloria, Fernando agreed
to buy the said tickets after Mager informed them
that there were no available seats at Amtrak, an
intercity passenger train service provider in the

104
however, denied his request as the subject tickets the subject tickets were issued, Fernando claimed
are non-refundable and the only option that that CAI's act of charging him with US$1,867.40 for
Continental Airlines can offer is the re-issuance of a round trip ticket to Los Angeles, which other
new tickets within one (1) year from the date the airlines priced at US$856.00, and refusal to allow
subject tickets were issued. Fernando decided to him to use Lourdes' ticket, breached its undertaking
reserve two (2) seats with Frontier Air. under its March 24, 1998 letter.
As he was having second thoughts on traveling via ISSUE:

Frontier Air, Fernando went to the Greyhound
Station where he saw an Amtrak station nearby.
Fernando made inquiries and was told that there
are seats available and he can travel on Amtrak
anytime and any day he pleased. Fernando then
purchased two (2) tickets for Washington, D.C.
From Amtrak, Fernando went to Holiday Travel and

confronted Mager with the Amtrak tickets, telling
her that she had misled them into buying the
Continental Airlines tickets by misrepresenting that
Amtrak was already fully booked. Fernando
reiterated his demand for a refund but Mager was
firm in her position that the subject tickets are non-
refundable.
Upon returning to the Philippines, Fernando sent a

letter to CAI on February 11, 1998, demanding a
refund and alleging that Mager had deluded them
into purchasing the subject tickets.
In a letter dated February 24, 1998, Continental

Micronesia informed Fernando that his complaint
had been referred to the Customer Refund
Services of Continental Airlines at Houston, Texas.
In a letter dated March 24, 1998, Continental

Micronesia denied Fernando's request for a refund
and advised him that he may take the subject
tickets to any Continental ticketing location for the
re-issuance of new tickets within two (2) years from
the date they were issued. Continental Micronesia
informed Fernando that the subject tickets may be
used as a form of payment for the purchase of
another Continental ticket, albeit with a re- issuance
fee.
On June 17, 1999, Fernando went to Continental's

ticketing office at Ayala Avenue, Makati City to
have the subject tickets replaced by a single round
trip ticket to Los Angeles, California under his
name. Therein, Fernando was informed that
Lourdes' ticket was non- transferable, thus, cannot
be used for the purchase of a ticket in his favor. He
was also informed that a round trip ticket to Los
Angeles was US$1,867.40 so he would have to pay
what will not be covered by the value of his San
Diego to Newark round trip ticket. aTSEcA
In a letter dated June 21, 1999, Fernando

demanded for the refund of the subject tickets as
he no longer wished to have them replaced. In
addition to the dubious circumstances under which

105
Is CAI bound by the acts of Holiday Travel’s Mager's alleged fraudulent misrepresentation is
clearly one of tort or quasi-delict, there being no
agents and employees such as Mager?
pre-existing contractual relationship between
them. Therefore, it was incumbent upon Spouses
HELD:
Viloria to prove that CAI was equally at fault.
In actions based on quasi-delict, a
principal can only be held liable for the However, the records are devoid of any evidence
tort committed by its agent's employees if by which CAI's alleged liability can be
it has been established by preponderance substantiated. Apart from their claim that CAI
of evidence that the principal was also at must be held liable for Mager's supposed fraud
fault or negligent or that the principal because Holiday Travel is CAI's agent, Spouses
exercise control and supervision over Viloria did not present evidence that CAI was a
them. party or had contributed to Mager's complained
act
Considering that Holiday Travel is CAI's agent,
does it necessarily follow that CAI is liable for the
fault or negligence of Holiday Travel's
employees? Citing China Air Lines, Ltd. v. Court
of Appeals, et al., CAI argues that it cannot be
held liable for the actions of the employee of its
ticketing agent in the absence of an employer-
employee relationship.
An examination of this Court's pronouncements

in China Air Lines will reveal that an airline
company is not completely exonerated from any
liability for the tort committed by its agent's
employees. A prior determination of the nature of
the passenger's cause of action is necessary. If
the passenger's cause of action against the
airline company is premised on culpa aquiliana or
quasi-delict for a tort committed by the employee
of the airline company's agent, there must be an
independent showing that the airline company
was at fault or negligent or has contributed to the
negligence or tortuous conduct committed by the
employee of its agent. The mere fact that the
employee of the airline company's agent has
committed a tort is not sufficient to hold the airline
company liable. There is no vinculum juris
between the airline company and its agent's
employees and the contractual relationship
between the airline company and its agent does
not operate to create a juridical tie between the
airline company and its agent's employees.
Article 2180 of the Civil Code does not make the
principal vicariously liable for the tort committed
by its agent's employees and the principal-
agency relationship per se does not make the
principal a party to such tort; hence, the need to
prove the principal's own fault or negligence.
On the other hand, if the passenger's cause of

action for damages against the airline company is
based on contractual breach or culpa contractual,
it is not necessary that there be evidence of the
airline company's fault or negligence. As this
Court previously stated in China Air Lines and
reiterated in Air France vs. Gillego, "in an action
based on a breach of contract of carriage, the
aggrieved party does not have to prove that the
common carrier was at fault or was negligent. All
that he has to prove is the existence of the
contract and the fact of its non-performance by
the carrier."
Spouses Viloria's cause of action on the basis of

106
either by instructing or authorizing Holiday Travel supplied)
and Mager to issue the said misrepresentation.
It is incumbent upon Spouses Viloria to prove that
It may seem unjust at first glance that CAI would CAI exercised control or supervision over Mager by
consider Spouses Viloria bound by the terms and preponderant evidence. The existence of control or
conditions of the subject contracts, which Mager supervision cannot be presumed and CAI is under
entered into with them on CAI's behalf, in order to no obligation to prove its denial or nugatory
deny Spouses Viloria's request for a refund or assertion. Citing Belen v. Belen, this Court ruled in
Fernando's use of Lourdes' ticket for the re- Jayme v. Apostol, that:
issuance of a new one, and simultaneously claim
that they are not bound by Mager's supposed In Belen v. Belen, this Court ruled
misrepresentation for purposes of avoiding that it was enough for defendant
Spouses Viloria's claim for damages and to deny an alleged employment
maintaining the validity of the subject contracts. It relationship. The defendant is
may likewise be argued that CAI cannot deny under no obligation
liability as it benefited from Mager's acts, which
were performed in compliance with Holiday Travel's
obligations as CAI's agent.
However, a person's vicarious liability is anchored

on his possession of control, whether absolute or
limited, on the tortfeasor. Without such control,
there is nothing which could justify extending the
liability to a person other than the one who
committed the tort. As this Court explained in
Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co.:
With respect to extra-

contractual obligation arising
from negligence, whether of
act or omission, it is competent
for the legislature to elect
— and our Legislature has so elected
— to limit such liability to cases
in which the person upon whom
such an obligation is imposed is
morally culpable or, on the
contrary, for reasons of public
policy, to extend that liability,
without regard to the lack of
moral culpability, so as to
include responsibility for the
negligence of those persons
whose acts or omissions are
imputable, by a legal fiction, to
others who are in a position to
exercise an absolute or limited
control over them. The
legislature which adopted our
Civil Code has elected to limit
extra- contractual liability — with
certain well-defined exceptions
— to cases in which moral
culpability can be directly
imputed to the persons to be
charged. This moral
responsibility may consist in
having failed to exercise due
care in one's own acts, or in
having failed to exercise due
care in the selection and control
of one's agent or servants, or in
the control of persons who, by
reasons of their status, occupy a
position of dependency with
respect to the person made liable
for their conduct. (emphasis

107
to prove the negative averment. whom one is responsible.
This Court said:
xxx xxx xxx
"It is an old and well-
The owners and managers of an establishment or
settled rule of the
courts that the burden enterprise are likewise responsible for damages
of proving the action is caused by their employees in the service of the
upon the plaintiff, and branches in which the latter are employed or on
that if he fails the occasion of their functions.
satisfactorily to show
the facts upon which
he bases his claim, the
defendant is under no
obligation to prove his
exceptions. This [rule]
is in harmony with the
provisions of Section
297 of the Code of
Civil Procedure holding
that each party must
prove his own
affirmative allegations,
etc." (citations omitted)
Therefore, without a modicum of evidence that

CAI exercised control over Holiday Travel's
employees or that CAI was equally at fault, no
liability can be imposed on CAI for Mager's
supposed misrepresentation.
PHIL. RABBIT LINES, INC. vs. PHIL-

AMERICAN FORWARDERS, INC. G.R. No. L-
25142 March 25, 1975
FACTS:
On November 24, 1962, Pineda drove recklessly

a freight truck, owned by Phil-American
Forwarders, Inc., along the national highway at
Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. The truck bumped the
bus driven by Pangalangan, which was owned by
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. As a result of
the bumping, Pangalangan suffered injuries and
the bus was damaged. Balingit was the manager
of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc.
As a result of the incident, a complaint for

damages was filed against Phil-American
Forwarders, Inc., Balingit and Pineda. The CFI
dismissed the case as to Balingit citing that the
latter was not the manager of an establishment
contemplated in article 2180 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
What is the meaning of “manager” as used in

Art.2180 of the NCC?
HELD:
The Civil Code provides:
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by article

2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts
or omissions, but also for those of persons for

108
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused former.
by their employees and household helpers acting
ISSUE:
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any business Whether an employer may be held vicariously liable
or industry. for the death resulting from the negligent operation
by a managerial employee of a company-issued
xxx xxx xxx
vehicle.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall
HELD:
cease when the persons herein mentioned prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent damage. (1903a)
We are of the opinion that the term manager does

not include the manager of a corporation. It may be
gathered from the context of article 2180 that the
term "manager" ("director" in the Spanish version)
is used in the sense of "employer".
Hence, under the allegations of the complaint, no

tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened
on Balingit as manager of Phil-American
Forwarders, Inc., in connection with the vehicular
accident already mentioned because he himself
may be regarded as an employee or dependiente
of his employer, Phil-American Forwarders, Inc.
CASTILEX INDUSTRIAL CORP. vs. VASQUEZ

G.R.
No. 132266 December 21,
1999 FACTS:
On 28 August 1988, at around 1:30 to 2:00 in the

morning, Vasquez, was driving a Honda motorcycle
around Fuente Osmeña Rotunda. He was traveling
counter-clockwise, (the normal flow of traffic in a
rotunda) but only carrying a Student's Permit to
Drive at the time. Upon the other hand, Benjamin
Abad was manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial
Corporation, registered owner of a Toyota Hi-Lux
Pick-up. On the same date and time, Abad drove
the said company car out of a parking lot but
instead of going around the Osmeña rotunda he
made a short cut against the flow of the traffic in
proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St. or to
Belvic St.
In the process, the motorcycle of Vasquez and the

pick- up of Abad collided with each other causing
severe injuries to the former. Abad stopped his
vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern
Islands Hospital and later to the Cebu Doctor's
hospital where he died a few days after.
An action for damages was commenced by the

parents of the deceased against Abad and
Castilex. The trial court ruled in favor of private
respondents. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the
ruling of the trial court holding ABAD and
CASTILEX liable but held that the liability of the
latter is "only vicarious and not solidary" with the

109
Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, whether b.4. By Employers
or not engaged in any business or industry, an
MAMARIL V. BOY SCOUT OF THE
employer is liable for the torts committed by
PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 179382 JANUARY 14,
employees within the scope of his assigned
2013
tasks. But it is necessary to establish the
employer-employee relationship; once this is FACTS:
done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the
employer liable, that the employee was acting Spouses Benjamin C. Mamaril and Sonia P.
within the scope of his assigned task when the Mamaril (Sps. Mamaril) are jeepney operators
tort complained of was committed. It is only then since 1971. They would park their six (6)
that the employer may find it necessary to passenger jeepneys every night at the Boy Scout
interpose the defense of due diligence in the of the Philippines' (BSP) compound
selection and supervision of the employee.
The court a quo and the Court of Appeals were

one in holding that the driving by a manager of a
company- issued vehicle is within the scope of
his assigned tasks regardless of the time and
circumstances.
We do not agree. The mere fact that ABAD was

using a service vehicle at the time of the injurious
incident is not of itself sufficient to charge
petitioner with liability for the negligent operation
of said vehicle unless it appears that he was
operating the vehicle within the course or scope
of his employment.
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that ABAD did

some overtime work at the petitioner's office,
which was located in Cabangcalan, Mandaue
City. Thereafter, he went to Goldie's Restaurant
in Fuente Osmeña, Cebu City where he had
snacks with friends. It was when ABAD was
leaving the restaurant that the incident in
question occurred. A witness then testified that at
the time of the incident, ABAD was with a woman
inside his car.
To the mind of this Court, ABAD was engaged in

affairs of his own not in line with his duties at the
time he figured in a vehicular accident which was
about 2:00
a.m. of 28 August 1988. ABAD's working day had
ended; his overtime work had already been
completed. His being at a place which, as
petitioner put it, was known as a "haven for
prostitutes, pimps, and drug pushers and
addicts," had no connection to petitioner's
business; neither had it any relation to his duties
as a manager.
Since there is paucity of evidence that ABAD was

acting within the scope of the functions entrusted
to him, petitioner CASTILEX had no duty to show
that it exercised the diligence of a good father of
a family in providing ABAD with a service vehicle.
Thus, justice and equity require that petitioner be
relieved of vicarious liability for the consequences
of the negligence of ABAD in driving its vehicle.

110
located at 181 Concepcion Street, Malate, Manila assigned in its premises. Consequently, the latter's
for a fee of P300.00 per month for each unit. On negligence cannot be imputed against BSP but
May 26, 1995 at 8 o'clock in the evening, all these should be attributed to AIB, the true employer of
vehicles were parked inside the BSP compound. Peña and Gaddi.
The following morning, however, one of the
In the case of Soliman, Jr. v. Tuazon, the Court
vehicles with Plate No. DCG 392 was missing and
enunciated thus:
was never recovered. According to the security
guards Cesario Peña (Peña) and Vicente Gaddi
(Gaddi) of AIB Security Agency, Inc. (AIB) with
whom BSP had contracted for its security and
protection, a male person who looked familiar to
them took the subject vehicle out of the compound.
ISSUE:
W/N Boy Scout of the Philippines can be held liable

as an employer.
HELD:
The petition lacks merit.
Article 20 of the Civil Code provides that every

person, who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently
causes damage to another, shall indemnify the
latter for the same. Similarly, Article 2176 of the
Civil Code states:

damage to another, there being fault or negligence,
is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
In this case, it is undisputed that the proximate

cause of the loss of Sps. Mamaril's vehicle was the
negligent act of security guards Peña and Gaddi in
allowing an unidentified person to drive out the
subject vehicle. Proximate cause has been defined
as that cause, which, in natural and continuous
cause, produces the injury or loss, and without
which the result would not have occurred.
Moreover, Peña and Gaddi failed to refute Sps.

Mamaril's contention that they readily admitted
being at fault during the investigation that ensued.
On the other hand, the records are bereft of any

finding of negligence on the part of BSP. Hence, no
reversible error was committed by the CA in
absolving it from any liability for the loss of the
subject vehicle based on fault or negligence.
Neither will the vicarious liability of an employer

under Article 2180 of the Civil Code apply in this
case. It is uncontested that Peña and Gaddi were
assigned as security guards by AIB to BSP
pursuant to the Guard Service Contract. Clearly,
therefore, no employer- employee relationship
existed between BSP and the security guards

111
It is settled that where the security agency, as HELD:
here, recruits, hires and assigns the work of its
The petition must fail. The circumstances clearly
watchmen or security guards, the agency is the
show that the proximate cause of the death of
employer of such guards and watchmen. Liability
Dionisio was the negligence of driver Fidel when
for illegal or harmful acts committed by the
he failed to take the necessary precaution to
security guards attaches to the employer agency,
prevent the accident. Driver Fidel should have
and not to the clients or customers of such
parked the bus properly and safely. After alighting
agency. As a general rule, a client or customer of
from the bus to tell the gasman to fill the tank, he
a security agency has no hand in selecting who
should have placed a stopper or any hard object
among the pool of security guards or watchmen
employed by the agency shall be assigned to it;
the duty to observe the diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection of the guards cannot,
in the ordinary course of events, be demanded
from the client whose premises or property are
protected by the security guards. The fact that a
client company may give instructions or directions
to the security guards assigned to it, does not, by
itself, render the client responsible as an
employer of the security guards concerned and
liable for their wrongful acts or omissions. Those
instructions or directions are ordinarily no more
than requests commonly envisaged in the
contract for services entered into with the security
agency.
BALIWAG TRANSIT INC. vs. CA G.R. No. 116624

September 20,
1996 FACTS:
On 2 November 1990, petitioner's Baliwag

Transit Bus No. 117 was driven by Juanito Fidel
to its terminal for repair of its brake system. Fidel
told mechanic Mario Dionisio to inform the
headman about the matters so that proper order
to the mechanics could be made. Fidel then
alighted from the bus and told the gasman to fill
up the gas tank.
Shortly after, Fidel returned to the bus and sat on

the driver's seat. Suddenly the bus moved; he felt
something was hit. When he went down to
investigate he saw Mario Dionisio lying on the
ground bleeding and convulsive, sandwiched
between Bus No. 117 and another bus parked
thereat. Mario Dionisio was rushed to the hospital
but died a few days after.
Thereafter a complaint for damages was lodged

by private respondents Divina Vda. de Dionisio,
for herself and in behalf of her minor children.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of
private respondents. Upon appeal, the CA
affirmed the decision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
W/N Baliwag Transit is liable solidarily with Fidel

for the death of Dionisio.

112
against a tire or two of the bus. But without taking
W/N St. Francis High School is liable for the death
the necessary precaution he boarded Bus No. 117
of Ferdinand Castillo by applying Art. 2180 of the
causing it to move and roll, pinning down the
NCC.
deceased which resulted in his eventual death. The
reckless imprudence of Fidel makes him liable to HELD:
the heirs of offended party for damages together
with his employer. The petition is impressed with merit. In the instant
case, petitioners are neither guilty of their own
When an injury is caused by the negligence of an negligence nor guilty of the negligence of those
employee there instantly arises a presumption of under them.
the law that there was negligence on the part of the
employer either in the selection of his employee or
in the selection of his employee or in the
supervision over him after such selection. The
presumption however may be rebutted by a clear
showing on the part of the employer that it had
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of
a family in the selection and supervision of his
employee. Hence, to escape solidary liability for
quasi-delict committed by an employee, the
employer must adduce sufficient proof that it
exercised such degree of care. Petitioner's failure
to prove that it exercised the due diligence of a
supervision of its driver Juanito Fidel will make it
solidarily liable with the latter for damages caused
by him.
ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL vs. CA, G.R. No.

82465
February 25,
1991 FACTS:
Ferdinand Castillo, then a freshman student of

Section 1-C at the St. Francis High School, joined a
school picnic undertaken by Class I-B and Class I-
C at Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon.
During the picnic and while the students were in the

water, one of the female teachers was apparently
drowning. Some of the students, including
Ferdinand, came to her rescue, but in the process,
it was Ferdinand himself who drowned. His body
was recovered but efforts to resuscitate him ashore
failed.
Thereupon, respondent spouses filed a complaint

for damages against the St. Francis High School
and the teachers, contending that the death of their
son was due to the failure of the petitioners to
exercise the proper diligence of a good father of the
family in preventing their son's drowning.
The trial court found in favor of the respondents but

absolved the school from liability. The CA, upon
appeal, ruled in favor of respondents and held the
school liable under the doctrine in Art. 2180 of the
NCC.
ISSUE:

113
Hence, it cannot be said that they are guilty at all
FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE vs. CA, G.R.
of any negligence. Consequently they cannot be No.
held liable for damages of any kind. 75112 October
Article 2180, par. 4 states that: 16, 1990 FACTS:
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is Private respondent Potenciano Kapunan, Sr., an
demandable not only for one's own acts or 82-year old retired schoolteacher, was struck by
omissions, but also for those of persons for the Pinoy jeep owned by petitioner Filamer and
whom one is responsible. driven by its alleged
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages

caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are
not engaged in any business or industry.
Under this paragraph, it is clear that before an

employer may be held liable for the negligence of
his employee, the act or omission which caused
damage or prejudice must have occurred while
an employee was in the performance of his
assigned tasks.
In the case at bar, the teachers were not in the

actual performance of their assigned tasks. The
incident happened not within the school
premises, not on a school day and most
importantly while the teachers and students were
holding a purely private affair, a picnic. This
picnic had no permit from the school head or its
principal because this picnic is not a school
sanctioned activity neither is it considered as an
extra-curricular activity.
As earlier pointed out by the trial court, mere

knowledge by the principal of the planning of the
picnic by the students and their teachers does not
in any way or in any manner show acquiescence
or consent to the holding of the same. The
application therefore of Article 2180 has no basis
in law and neither is it supported by any
jurisprudence.
Finally, no negligence could be attributable to the

petitioners-teachers to warrant the award of
damages to the respondents-spouses. Petitioners
Connie Arquio the class adviser of I-C, the
section where Ferdinand belonged, did her best
and exercised diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent any untoward incident or
damages to all the students who joined the
picnic. In fact, Connie invited co-petitioners Tirso
de Chavez and Luisito Vinas who are both P.E.
instructors and scout masters who have
knowledge in First Aid application and swimming.
The records also show that both petitioners
Chavez and Vinas did all what is humanly
possible to save the child.

114
employee, Funtecha, as Kapunan, Sr. was walking employee on Funtecha, still the primary
along Roxas Avenue, Roxas City at 6:30 in the responsibility for his wrongdoing cannot be imputed
evening of October 20, 1977. As a result of the to petitioner Filamer for the plain reason that at the
accident, Kapunan, Sr. suffered multiple injuries for time of the accident, it has been satisfactorily shown
which he was hospitalized. that Funtecha was not acting within the scope of his
supposed employment. His duty was to sweep the
Funtecha, who only had a student driver's permit, school passages for two hours every morning
was driving after having persuaded Allan Masa, the before his regular classes. Taking the wheels of the
authorized driver, to turn over the wheels to him. jeep from the authorized driver and then driving the
The two fled from the scene after the incident. vehicle in a reckless manner resulting in multiple
injuries
Kapunan, Sr. commenced a civil case for damages.
The trial court rendered judgment finding not only
petitioner Filamer and Funtecha to be at fault but
also Allan Masa, a non-party to the case. The
Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's decision in
toto.
ISSUE:
W/N the term "employer" as used in Article 2180 is

applicable to petitioner Filamer with reference to
Funtecha.
HELD:
It is petitioner Filamer's basic contention that it

cannot be held responsible for the tortious act of
Funtecha on the ground that there is no existing
employer-employee relationship between them. We
agree.
In disclaiming liability, petitioner Filamer has

invoked the provisions of the Labor Code, 7
specifically Section 14, Rule X of Book III which
reads:
Sec. 14.Working scholars. — There is no

employer-employee relationship between
students on the one hand, and schools,
colleges or universities on the other, where
students work for the latter in exchange for the
privilege to study free of charge; provided the
students are given real opportunity, including
such facilities as may be reasonable,
necessary to finish their chosen court under
such arrangement.
It is manifest that under the just-quoted provision of

law, petitioner Filamer cannot be considered as
Funtecha's employer. Funtecha belongs to that
special category of students who render service to
the school in exchange for free tuition Funtecha
worked for petitioner for two hours daily for five
days a week. He was assigned to clean the school
passageways from 4:00 a.m. to 6:00
a.m. with sufficient time to prepare for his 7:30 a.m.
classes. As admitted by Agustin Masa in open
court, Funtecha was not included in the company
payroll.
But even if we were to concede the status of an

115
to a third person were certainly not within the supervision over Venturina after his selection.
Petitioner did not present any proof that she
ambit of his assigned tasks. It is but fair therefore
drafted and implemented training programs and
that Funtecha should bear the full brunt of his guidelines on road safety for her employees. In
tortious negligence. fact, the record is bare of any showing that
petitioner required Venturina to attend periodic
YAMBAO vs. ZUIGA, G.R. No. 146173. seminars on road safety and traffic efficiency.
December 11, 2003 Hence, petitioner cannot claim exemption from
any liability arising from the recklessness or
FACTS: negligence of Venturina.
Petitioner Yambao is the registered owner of

Lady Cecil and Rome Trans passenger bus. On
May 6, 1992, the bus owned by the petitioner was
being driven by Venturina along EDSA.
Suddenly, the bus bumped Zuiga, a pedestrian.
Zuiga thereafter died despite being given medical
attention.
Private respondents, as legal heirs of Zuiga, filed

a Complaint against petitioner and her driver,
Venturina, for damages. Both the trial court and
the CA ruled in favor of private respondents.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner exercised the diligence of a

supervision of her employees, thus absolving her
from any liability.
HELD:
Petitioner’s claim that she exercised due

diligence in the selection and supervision of her
driver deserves but scant consideration. Her
allegation that before she hired Venturina she
required him to submit his drivers license and
clearances is worthless, in view of her failure to
offer in evidence certified true copies of said
license and clearances. Moreover, as the court a
quo aptly observed, petitioner contradicts
herself. She declared that Venturina applied with
her sometime in January 1992 and she then
required him to submit his license and
clearances. However, the record likewise shows
that she did admit that Venturina submitted the
said requirements only on May 6, 1992, or on the
very day of the fatal accident itself. In other
words, petitioners own admissions clearly and
categorically show that she did not exercise due
diligence in the selection of her bus driver.
In any case, assuming arguendo that Venturina

did submit his license and clearances when he
applied with petitioner, the latter still fails the test
of due diligence in the selection of her bus driver.
Petitioner failed to present convincing proof that
she went to the extent of verifying Venturinas
qualifications, safety record, and driving history.
The presumption juris tantum that there was
negligence in the selection of her bus driver, thus,
remains unrebutted.
Nor did petitioner show that she exercised due

116
In sum, petitioner’s liability to private respondents except the one in question.
for the negligent and imprudent acts of her driver,
Venturina, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is Petitioner, however, never presented the alleged
both manifest and clear. police clearance given to him by Sablayan, nor the
results of Sablayan’s driving test. Petitioner also did
SYKI vs. BEGASA, G.R. No. 149149 October 23, not present records of the regular inspections that
2003 his mechanic allegedly conducted. The
unsubstantiated and self- serving testimonies of
FACTS: petitioner and his mechanic are,
On June 22, 1992, respondent Salvador Begasa

and his three companions flagged down a
passenger jeepney driven by Espina and owned by
Pisuena. While respondent was boarding the
passenger jeepney (his right foot already inside
while his left foot still on the boarding step of the
passenger jeepney), a truck driven by Sablayan
and owned by petitioner Syki bumped the rear end
of the passenger jeepney. Respondent fell and
fractured his left thigh bone.
Respondent filed a complaint for damages for

breach of common carrier’s contractual obligations
and quasi-delict against Pisuena, the owner of the
passenger jeepney;, herein petitioner Syki, the
owner of the truck;, and Sablayan, the driver of the
truck.
The trial court dismissed the complaint against

Pisuena but ordered petitioner Syki and Sablayan,
to pay respondent Begasa, jointly and severally,
actual and moral damages plus attorney’s fees.
The CA affirmed the decision in toto.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioner exercised due diligence of a good

father in the selection and supervision of his
employees as to absolve him from liability.
HELD:
Petitioner’s attempt to prove its "deligentissimi

patris familias" in the selection and supervision of
employees through oral evidence must fail as it
was unable to buttress the same with any other
evidence, object or documentary, which might
obviate the apparent biased nature of the
testimony.
Petitioner testified that before he hired Sablayan,

he required him to submit a police clearance in
order to determine if he was ever involved in any
vehicular accident. He also required Sablayan to
undergo a driving test with conducted by his
mechanic, Esteban Jaca.
Petitioner’s mechanic, Esteban Jaca, on the other

hand, testified that Sablayan passed the driving
test and had never figured in any vehicular accident

117
without doubt, insufficient to overcome the legal registered owner or possessor-operator of the
presumption that petitioner was negligent in the van, respectively, are solidarily liable in
selection and supervision of his driver. accordance with Article 2180 in relation to Articles
Accordingly, we affirm the ruling of the Court of 2184 and 2194 of the Civil Code.
Appeals that petitioner is liable for the injuries
suffered by respondent. SPS. JAYME vs. APOSTOL, G.R. No. 163609
November 27,
AGUILA vs. BALDOVISO, G.R. No. 163186
February 28, 2007 2008 FACTS:
FACTS:
On April 19, 1993, Lisbos was driving, along

EDSA in Caloocan City, a van, registered under
the name of petitioner Reyes. The van
sideswiped Fausto who was walking along the
pedestrian lane and crossing EDSA. Fausto fell
on the pavement and suffered injuries, and was
brought to the hospital but subsequently died.
Fausto’s wife, Carmen R. Baldovizo, and children

filed before the RTC a complaint for damages
against Lisbos, Reyes, Emerlito F. Aguila, the
actual operator and possessor of the van, and
Times Surety and Insurance Company, the
insurer of the van under a third-party liability
insurance contract.
The trial court ruled in favor of respondents. The

CA denied the appeal ruling that Reyes and
Aguila has lost their right to appeal.
ISSUE:
Do the petitioners have the right to appeal the

amended decision after the original decision had
become final and executory?
HELD:
We find petitioners’ contentions devoid of merit.
While the Resolution dated August 13, 2001,

correcting the March 7, 2000 Decision, stated
that the name of Lisbos was inadvertently
included in the dispositive portion, hence, said
name was ordered stricken off, the ensuing
Amended Decision rendered on August 13, 2001
is null and void because any amendment or
alteration made which substantially affects the
final and executory judgment is null and void.
Besides, it is not necessary to amend the original

decision holding the petitioners, Lisbos, and the
insurance company solidarily liable. In an action
based on quasi-delict, the liability of the employer
is direct and primary, subject to the defense of
due diligence in the selection and supervision of
the employee. Thus, even if the driver was
included albeit not served with summons,
petitioners are directly and primarily liable. Thus,
petitioners Aguila and Reyes as employer and

118
On February 5, 1989, Mayor Miguel of Koronadal, municipality. That he was subsequently assigned to
South Cotabato was on board the Isuzu pick-up Mayor Miguel during the time of the accident is of no
truck driven by Fidel Lozano, an employee of the moment.
Municipality. The pick- up truck was registered
under the name of Rodrigo Apostol, but it was then Even assuming arguendo that Mayor Miguel had
in the possession of Ernesto Simbulan. authority to give instructions or directions to Lozano,
he still can not be held liable. Mere giving of
The pick-up truck accidentally hit Marvin C. Jayme, directions to the driver does not establish that the
a minor, who was then crossing the National passenger has control over the vehicle.
Highway in Poblacion, Polomolok, South Cotabato.
Marvin sustained severe head injuries. Despite

medical attention, Marvin expired six (6) days after
the accident.
Petitioners spouses Jayme, the parents of Marvin,

filed a complaint for damages against respondents.
The RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. However, the

CA absolved Miguel from liability upon appeal,
citing that the latter was not the employer of
Lozano. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
May a municipal mayor be held solidarily liable for

the negligent acts of the driver assigned to him,
which resulted in the death of a minor pedestrian?
HELD:
The doctrine of vicarious liability or imputed liability

finds no application in the present case.
To sustain claims against employers for the acts of

their employees, the following requisites must be
established:
(1) That the employee was chosen by the employer
personally or through another; (2) That the service
to be rendered in accordance with orders which the
employer has the authority to give at all times; and
(3) That the illicit act of the employee was on the
occasion or by reason of the functions entrusted to
him.
Furthermore, the employer-employee relationship

cannot be assumed. It is incumbent upon the
plaintiff to prove the relationship by preponderant
evidence
In resolving the present controversy, it is imperative

to find out if Mayor Miguel is, indeed, the employer
of Lozano and therefore liable for the negligent acts
of the latter. To determine the existence of an
employment relationship, We rely on the four-fold
test. This involves:
(1) the employer's power of selection; (2) payment
of wages or other remuneration; (3) the employer's
right to control the method of doing the work; and
(4) the employer's right of suspension or dismissal.
Applying the foregoing test, it was the Municipality

of Koronadal which was the lawful employer of
Lozano at the time of the accident. It is uncontested
that Lozano was employed as a driver by the

119
Verily, liability attaches to the registered owner, While the second kind is governed by Articles
the negligent driver and his direct employer. 2176, 2177 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
Compare: Subsidiary Liability under Art. 103 Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code,
of the RPC liability originates from a delict committed by the
employee who is primarily liable therefor and upon
SPS. FRANCO vs. IAC, G.R. No. 71137 whose primary liability his employer's subsidiary
October 5, 1989 liability is to be based.
FACTS:
On October 18, 1974, Macario Yuro swerved the

northbound Franco Bus he was driving to the left
to avoid hitting a truck parked along the
cemented pavement of the MacArthur Highway at
Barrio Talaga, Capas Tarlac, thereby taking the
lane of an incoming Isuzu Mini Bus driven by one
Magdaleno Lugue and making a collision
between the two vehicles an unavoidable and
disastrous eventuality.
The collision resulted in the deaths of the two

drivers and two passengers of the mini bus,
Romeo Bue and Fernando Chuay.
Consequently, Antonio Reyes, the registered

owner of the Isuzu Mini Bus, Mrs. Susan Chuay,
the wife of victim Fernando Chuay, and Mrs.
Lolita Lugue, the wife of driver-victim Magdaleno
Lugue, filed an action for damages.
The trial court in its decision said that the act of

the Franco Bus driver was a negligent act
punishable by law resulting in a civil obligation
arising from Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code and not from Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
Said decision was affirmed by the IAC.
ISSUE:
Whether the action for recovery of damages

instituted by herein private respondents was
predicated upon crime or quasi-delict.
HELD:
We find merit in this contention. Distinction

should be made between the subsidiary liability of
the employer under the RPC and the employer's
primary liability under the NCC which is quasi-
delictual or tortious in character. The first type of
liability is governed by Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code which provide as follows:
Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons.

— The subsidiary liability established in the next
preceding article shall also apply to employers,
teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in
any kind of industry for felonies committed by the
servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or
employees in the discharge of their duties;

120
Before the employer's subsidiary liability may be appellants is founded on crime or on quasi-delict.
proceeded against, it is imperative that there should
HELD:
be a criminal action whereby the employee's
criminal negligence or delict and corresponding We find the appeal meritorious.
liability therefor are proved. If no criminal action
was instituted, the employer's liability would not be To begin with, obligations arise from law, contract,
predicated under Article 103. quasi- contract, crime and quasi-delict. According to
appellant, her action is one to enforce the civil
In the case at bar, no criminal action was instituted. liability arising from
Thus, petitioners' subsidiary liability has no leg to
stand on considering that their liability is merely
secondary to their employee's primary liability.
Logically therefore, recourse under this remedy is
not possible.
To hold the employer liable under Article 103 of the

RPC sans prior conviction is erroneous. It is
erroneous because the conviction of the employee
primarily liable is a condition sine qua non for the
employer's subsidiary liability and, at the same
time, absurd because we will be faced with a
situation where the employer is held subsidiarily
liable even without a primary liability being
previously established.
Thus the present case must be decided on the

basis of civil liability of the employer as a result of
the tortious act of its employee and not subsidiary
liability under Art. 103 of the RPC.
BERMUDEZ vs. HON. MELENCIO-HERRERA,

G.R.
No. L-32055 February 26,
1988 FACTS:
A cargo truck, driven by Pontino and owned by

Cordova Ng Sun Kwan, bumped a jeep on which
Rogelio, a six- year old son of plaintiffs-appellants,
was riding. The boy sustained injuries which
caused his death. As a result, a criminal case filed
against Pontino. Plaintiffs-appellants filed in the
said criminal case "A Reservation to File Separate
Civil Action."
On July 28,1969, the plaintiffs-appellants filed a

civil case for damages. Finding that the plaintiffs
instituted the action "on the assumption that
defendant Pontino's negligence constituted a quasi-
delict," the trial court stated that plaintiffs had
already elected to treat the accident as a "crime" by
reserving in the criminal case their right to file a
separate civil action. That being so, the trial court
decided to order the dismissal of the complaint
against defendant Cordova Ng Sun Kwan and to
suspend the hearing of the case against Pontino
until after the criminal case is finally terminated.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the civil action filed by the plaintiffs-

121
crime. It is now settled that for an employer to be defense against such subsidiary liability. Due
subsidiarily liable, the following requisites must regard to due process and observance of
be present: procedural requirements demand that a
separate action should be filed against the
(1) that an employee has committed a crime in supposed employer to enforce the subsidiary
the discharge of his duties; liability under Article 103 of the RPC.
(2) that said employee is insolvent and has not The CA’s decision was not appealed. Meanwhile,
satisfied his civil liability; on 14 December 1978, Pajarito v. Seneris was
decided by this Court, holding inter alia that--
(3) that the employer is engaged in some kind of
industry.
Without the conviction of the employee, the

employer cannot be subsidiarily liable.
In cases of negligence, the injured party or his

heirs has the choice between an action to enforce
the civil liability arising from crime under Article
100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action for
quasi- delict under Article 2176-2194 of the Civil
Code. If a party chooses the latter, he may hold
the employer solidarily liable for the negligent act
of his employee, subject to the employer's
defense of exercise of the diligence of a good
father of the family.
In the case at bar, the action filed b appellant was

an action for damages based on quasi-delict. The
fact that appellants reserved their right in the
criminal case to file an independent civil action
did not preclude them from choosing to file a civil
action for quasi-delict.
ALVAREZ vs. CA, G.R. No. L-59621 February

23, 1988
FACTS:
Renato Ramos was charged with Double

Homicide in the CFI of Quezon Province. After
trial, the court rendered judgment against the
accused.
The accused appealed to the CA which affirmed

the trial court's decision but deleted that part
thereof making herein petitioner, as employer of
Renato Ramos, subsidiarily liable for payment of
the adjudged indemnities to the offended parties,
ruling that --
Maximiliano Alvarez is not a party in this

action. It is true that the judgment of
conviction in the criminal case binds the
person subsidiarily liable with the accused,
and it is therefore the duty of the employer to
participate in the defense. The law, however,
does not authorize that the subsidiary liability
of the employer be adjudged in the criminal
action. This is because, in the criminal
proceeding, the employer, not being a party,
is denied the opportunity to present his

122
Considering that the judgment of conviction,
On 26 June 1993, a Country Bus Lines passenger
sentencing a defendant employee to pay an
collided with a tricycle. On 1 October 1993, tricycle
indemnity under Articles 102 and 103 of the
driver Tuazon filed a complaint for damages against
Revised Penal Code, is conclusive upon the
Mrs. Cerezo, as owner of the bus line and bus driver
employer not only with regard to the latter's civil
Foronda.
liability but also with regard to its amount, . . . in
the action to enforce the employer's subsidiary
liability, the court has no other function than to
render decision based upon the indemnity
awarded in the criminal case and has no power
to amend or modify it even if in its opinion an
error has been committed in the decision.
In view of the foregoing principles, it would

serve no important purpose to require petitioner
to file a separate and independent action
against the employer for the enforcement of the
latter's subsidiary civil liability. At any rate, the
proceeding for the enforcement of the
subsidiary civil liability may be considered as
part of the proceeding for the execution of the
judgment.
After finality of the CA judgment, the case was

remanded to the RTC for execution on the strength
of the Pajarito decision.
ISSUE:
W/N a separate civil action is necessary to enforce

the employer’s subsidiary liability.
HELD:
The petition is not impressed with merit.
The subsidiary liability of an employer automatically

arises upon his employee's conviction, and
subsequent proof of inability to pay. In this light, the
application of Pajarito is merely the enforcement of
a procedural remedy designed to ease the burden
of litigation for recovery of indemnity by the victims
of a judicially- declared criminally negligent act.
A separate civil action may be warranted where

additional facts have to be established or more
evidence must be adduced or where the criminal
case has been fully terminated and a separate
complaint would be just as efficacious or even more
expedient than a timely remand to the trial court
where the criminal action was decided for further
hearings on the civil aspects of the case. These do
not exist in this case. Considering moreover the
delays suffered by the case in the trial, appellate,
and review stages, it would be unjust to the
complainants in this case to require at this time a
separate civil action to be filed.
CEREZO vs. TUAZON, G.R. No. 141538

March 23, 2004
FACTS:

123
The trial court ruled in Tuazon’s favor. The trial corresponding primary liability are established. If
court made no pronouncement on Foronda’s the present action proceeds from a delict, then the
liability because there was no service of trial court’s jurisdiction over Foronda is necessary.
summons on him. The trial court held Mrs. However, the present action is clearly for the
Cerezo solely liable for the damages sustained quasi-delict of Mrs. Cerezo and not for the delict
by Tuazon arising from the negligence of Mrs. of Foronda.
Cerezo’s employee, pursuant to Article 2180 of
L.G. FOODS CORPORATION vs. HON.
the Civil Code.
PAGAPONG- AGRAVIADOR, G.R. No.
Mrs. Cerezo resorted to petition for relief from 158995
judgment, petition for certiorari and annulment of Sept
judgment. Mrs. Cerezo insisted that trial court ember 26, 2006
never acquired jurisdiction over the case
FACTS:
considering there was no service of summons on
Foronda, whom the Cerezo spouses claimed was
an indispensable party. All of the actions were
denied for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
W/N Foronda was an indispensable party to the

action so as to enforce Mrs. Cerezo’s liability.
HELD:
Mrs. Cerezo’s contention proceeds from the point

of view of criminal law and not of civil law, while
the basis of the present action of Tuazon is
quasi-delict under the Civil Code, not delict under
the Revised Penal Code.
The same negligent act may produce civil liability

arising from a delict under Article 103 of the RPC,
or may give rise to an action for a quasi-delict
under Article 2180 of the NCC. An aggrieved
party may choose between the two remedies.
Tuazon chose to file an action for damages

based on a quasi-delict. Contrary to Mrs.
Cerezo’s assertion, Foronda is not an
indispensable party to the case.
Moreover, an employer’s liability based on a

quasi-delict is primary and direct, while the
employer’s liability based on a delict is merely
subsidiary. Although liability under Article 2180
originates from the negligent act of the employee,
the aggrieved party may sue the employer
directly. When an employee causes damage, the
law presumes that the employer has himself
committed an act of negligence in not preventing
or avoiding the damage.
In contrast, an action based on a delict seeks to

enforce the subsidiary liability of the employer for
the criminal negligence of the employee as
provided in Article 103 of the RPC. To hold the
employer liable in a subsidiary capacity under a
delict, the aggrieved party must initiate a criminal
action where the employee’s delict and

124
On February 26, 1996, Charles Vallereja, a 7-year was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the
due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is
old son of the spouses Vallejera, was hit by a Ford
disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if
Fiera van owned by the petitioners and driven at he had been found guilty or reckless driving or
the time by their employee, Yeneza. Charles died violating traffic regulations at least twice within the
as a result of the accident. next preceding two months.
A criminal case was filed against the driver. If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the
Unfortunately, before the trial could be concluded, provisions of Article 2180 are applicable. (n)
the accused driver committed suicide. On account
thereof, the MTCC dismissed the criminal case.
Thereafter, the spouses Vallejera filed a complaint

for damages against the petitioners as employers
of the deceased driver, basically alleging that as
such employers, they failed to exercise due
diligence in the selection and supervision of their
employees.
The defendant petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss,

principally arguing that the complaint is basically a
"claim for subsidiary liability against an employer"
under the provision of Article 103 of the RPC.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss for lack

of merit. The CA denied the petition for certiorari
and upheld the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether the spouses Vallejeras' cause of action is

founded on Article 103 of the RPC or derived from
Article 2180 of the NCC.
HELD:
The complaint did not explicitly state that plaintiff

Vallejeras were suing the defendant petitioners for
damages based on quasi-delict. Clear it is,
however, from the allegations of the complaint that
quasi-delict was their choice of remedy against the
petitioners. To stress, the plaintiff spouses alleged
in their complaint gross fault and negligence on the
part of the driver and the failure of the petitioners,
as employers, to exercise due diligence in the
selection and supervision of their employees, which
diligence, if exercised, could have prevented the
vehicular accident that resulted to the death of their
7-year old son.
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the liability of

the employer is direct or immediate. It is not
conditioned upon prior recourse against the
negligent employee and a prior showing of
insolvency of such employee.
b.5 Owner of
Vehicle In the
vehicle
Not in the vehicle
Art. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is

solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who

125
Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it denies having employed the driver Sabiniano or
is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle even having authorized the latter to drive his jeep.
has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, The jeep was virtually stolen from the petitioner's
he was violating any traffic regulation. (n) garage. To hold, therefore, the petitioner liable for
the accident caused by the negligence of
Art. 2186. Every owner of a motor vehicle shall Sabiniano who was neither his driver nor
file with the proper government office a bond employee would be absurd as it would be like
executed by a government-controlled corporation
or office, to answer for damages to third persons.
The amount of the bond and other terms shall be
fixed by the competent public official. (n)
DUAVIT vs. CA, G.R. No. 82318 May 18,
1989 FACTS:
On July 28, 1971 plaintiffs Sarmiento and Catuar

were aboard a jeep. Catuar was driving the said
jeep and while approaching Roosevelt Avenue,
Catuar slowed down. Suddenly, another jeep
driven by defendant Sabiniano hit and bumped
plaintiff's jeep. Catuar was thrown to the middle
of the road; his wrist was broken and he
sustained contusions on the head; that likewise
plaintiff Sarmiento was trapped inside the fallen
jeep, and one of his legs was fractured.
The plaintiffs have filed this case both against

Sabiniano as driver, and against Duavit as owner
of the jeep.
Defendant Duavit, while admitting ownership of

the other jeep, denied that the other defendant
(Sabiniano) was his employee.
Defendant Sabiniano categorically admitted that

he took the jeep from the garage of defendant
Duavit without the consent or authority of the
latter
The trial court found Sabiniano negligent but

absolved Duavit from liability. Upon appeal, the
CA rendered the decision holding the petitioner
jointly and severally liable with Sabiniano.
ISSUE:
W/N the owner of a private vehicle which figured

in an accident can be held liable under Article
2180 of the NCC when the said vehicle was
neither driven by an employee of the owner nor
taken with the consent of the latter.
HELD:
As early as in 1939, we have ruled that an owner

of a vehicle cannot be held liable for an accident
involving the said vehicle if the same was driven
without his consent or knowledge and by a
person not employed by him.
Herein petitioner does not deny ownership of the

vehicle involved in tire mishap but completely

126
holding liable the owner of a stolen vehicle for an 1998
accident caused by the person who stole such
FACTS:
vehicle.
On 21 April 1987, 2 vehicles, cruising along EDSA,
JUANIZA vs. JOSE, G.R. No. L-50127-28
figured in a traffic accident. The car owned by
March 30, 1979
Soriano was being driven by Jacildone, while the
FACTS: other car, owned by respondent FILCAR, was
driven by Dahl- Jensen as lessee. Upon
Jose was the registered owner and operator of the approaching the corner of Pioneer Street, the car
passenger jeepney involved in an accident of owned by FILCAR swerved to the right hitting the
collision with a freight train of the Philippine left side of the car of Soriano.
National Railways which resulted in the death to 7
and physical injuries to 5 of its passengers. At the
time of the accident, Jose was legally married to
Socorro Ramos but had been cohabiting with
defendant-appellant, Arroyo, for 16 years in a
relationship akin to that of husband and wife.
The CFI rendered a decision against Jose and

Arroyo. The lower court based her liability on the
provision of Article 144 of the Civil Code which
reads:
When a man and woman living together as

husband and wife, but they are not married, or their
marriage is void from the beginning, the property
acquired by either or both of them through their
work or industry or their wages and salaries shall
be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
ISSUE:
W/N Arroyo who is not a registered owner of the

jeepney can be held jointly and severally liable for
damages with the registered owner of the same.
HELD:
The co-ownership contemplated in Article 144 of

the NCC requires that the man and the woman
living together must not in any way be incapacitated
to contract marriage. Since Jose is legally married
to Socorro Ramos, there is an impediment for him
to contract marriage with Arroyo. Under the
aforecited provision of the Civil Code, Arroyo
cannot be a co-owner of the jeepney. There is
therefore no basis for the liability of Arroyo for
damages arising from the death of, and physical
injuries suffered by, the passengers of the jeepney.
It is settled in our jurisprudence that only the
registered owner of a public service vehicle is
responsible for damages that may arise from
consequences incident to its operation, or maybe
caused to any of the passengers therein.
ANONUEVO vs. CA, supra.
FGU INSURANCE CORP. vs. CA, G.R. No.

118889
March 23,

127
As a consequence, petitioner FGU Insurance Ildefonso Ortiz instituted a case against the
Handong Irrigation Association, Inc. to recover
Corporation, in view of its insurance contract with
possession, with damages, of a lot located in
Soriano, paid the latter. By way of subrogation, it Camarines Sur, which the Irrigation Association
sued Dahl-Jensen and respondent FILCAR for allegedly entered and occupied.
quasi-delict. Unfortunately, summons was not
served on Dahl-Jensen since he was no longer The Solicitor General, on behalf of the Republic,
staying at his given address. Both the RTC and filed an urgent motion to lift the order of
CA dismissed the complaint for failure of garnishment against the deposits and/or pump
petitioner to substantiate its claim of subrogation. irrigation trust fund in the account of the Irrigation
Service Unit at the PNB, Manila, for the
ISSUE:
May an action based on quasi-delict prosper

against a rent-a-car company for fault or
negligence of the car lessee in driving the rented
vehicle?
HELD:
We find no reversible error committed by

respondent court in upholding the dismissal of
petitioner's complaint.
To sustain a claim based on Art. 2176, the

following requisites must concur:
(a) damage suffered by the plaintiff;
(b) fault or negligence of the defendant; and,
(c) connection of cause and effect between

the fault or negligence of the defendant and
the damage incurred by the plaintiff.
We agree with respondent court that petitioner

failed to prove the existence of the second
requisite, i.e., fault or negligence of FILCAR,
because only the fault or negligence of Dahl-
Jensen was sufficiently established. It is plain that
the negligence was solely attributable to Dahl-
Jensen thus making the damage suffered by the
other vehicle his personal liability. FILCAR did not
have any participation therein.
Art. 2180 is not applicable in this case. FILCAR

being engaged in a rent-a-car business was only
the owner of the car leased to Dahl-Jensen. As
such, there was no vinculum juris between them
as employer and employee. Respondent FILCAR
cannot in any way be responsible for the
negligent act of Dahl-Jensen, the former not
being an employer of the latter.
CADIENTE vs. MACAS, supra.
b.6. By State
REPUBLIC vs. HON. PALACIO, G.R. No.

L-20322 May 29, 1968
FACTS:

128
reason that the funds subject matter thereof are ."
public funds and exempt from attachment or
execution. Upon denial of this motion, the Solicitor Plaintiff claims that by the enactment of this law the
General commenced the present certiorari and legislature admitted liability on the part of the state
prohibition proceeding in the CA. The appellate for the acts of its officers, and that the suit now
court sustained the propriety of the said order. stands just as it would stand between private
Hence, this petition for review. parties. It is difficult to see how the act does, or was
intended to do, more than remove the state's
ISSUE: immunity from suit. It simply gives authority to
commence suit for the purpose of settling
W/N the pump irrigation trust fund may be
garnished to satisfy a money-judgment against the
Handog Irrigation Asso.
HELD:
An infirmity of the decision under appeal originates

from its ignoring the fact that the initial complaint
against the Irrigation Service Unit was that it had
induced the Handong Irrigation Association, Inc., to
invade and occupy the land of the plaintiff Ildefonso
Ortiz. The ISU liability thus arose from tort and not
from contract; and it is a well-entrenched rule in this
jurisdiction, embodied in Article 2180 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, that the State is liable only
for torts caused by its special agents, specially
commissioned to carry out the acts complained of
outside of such agent's regular duties There being
no proof that the making of the tortious inducement
was authorized, neither the State nor its funds can
be made liable therefor.
MERITT vs. GOV’T OF THE PHIL. ISLANDS, G.R.

No. L-11154 March 21, 1916
FACTS:
Plaintiff was riding a motorcycle along Taft Avenue

when the General Hospital ambulance turned
suddenly and unexpectedly and long before
reaching the center of the street, into the right side
of Taft Avenue, without having sounded any whistle
or horn and in violation of the Motor Vehicle Act, by
which movement it struck the plaintiff.
By reason of the resulting collision, the plaintiff was

so severely injured that, as a consequence, plaintiff
suffered in the efficiency of his work as a
contractor.
ISSUE:
W/N the gov’t can be held liable for the damages

resulting from the negligence of the chauffeur.
HELD:
The plaintiff was authorized to bring this action

against the Government by virtue of Act No. 2457
“in order to fix the responsibility for the collision
between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the
General Hospital and to determine the amount of
the damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is
entitled on account of said collision, . . .

129
plaintiff's controversies with the estate. It did not
Delfin Capuno contends that he is not liable for
pass upon the question of liability, but left the suit
damages since at the time of the incident, he was
just where it would be in the absence of the
not in supervision, custody and control of his son.
state's immunity from suit.
The RTC sustained the defense and the case was
Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads: certified by the CA to the SC on the ground of
pure questions of law.
The state is liable in this sense when it acts
through a special agent, but not when the ISSUE:
damage should have been caused by the
official to whom properly it pertained to do the
act performed, in which case the provisions
of the preceding article shall be applicable.
That the responsibility of the state is limited by

article 1903 to the case wherein it acts through a
special agent (and a special agent, in the sense
in which these words are employed, is one who
receives a definite and fixed order or commission,
foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if
he is a special official) so that in representation of
the state and being bound to act as an agent
thereof, he executes the trust confided to him.
This concept does not apply to any executive
agent who is an employee of the acting
administration and who on his own responsibility
performs the functions which are inherent in and
naturally pertain to his office and which are
regulated by law and the regulations."
It is, therefore, evidence that the is only liable for

the acts of its agents, officers and employees
when they act as special agents within the
meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903, supra,
and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the
General Hospital was not such an agent.
b.7.. By Teachers
EXCONDE vs. CAPUNO, G.R. No. L-10134

June 29, 1957
FACTS:
Dante Capuno was a student of the Bilintawak

Elementary School and on March 31, 1949 he
attended a parade upon instruction of the city
school's supervisor. From the school, Dante, with
other students, boarded a jeep and when the
same started to run, he took hold of the wheel
and drove it while the driver sat on his left side.
They have not gone far when the jeep turned
turtle and two of its passengers, Amado Ticzon
and Isidore Caperiña, died as a consequence. It
further appears that Delfin Capuno, father of
Dante, was not with his son at the time of the
accident, nor did he know that his son was going
to attend a parade. He only came to know it when
his son told him after the accident that he
attended the parade upon instruction of his
teacher.

130
W/N Delfin Capuno can be held civilly liable, jointly moderation". The only way by which they can
and severally with his son Dante, for damages relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that
resulting from the death of Isidoro Caperiña. they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent the damage. This, defendants
HELD: failed to prove.
Article 1903 of the Spanish Civil Code, paragraph 1 SPS.PALISOC vs. BRILLANTES, G.R. No. L-
and 5, provide: 29025
October 4,
ART. 1903. The obligation impossed by the
next preceding articles is enforceable not only 1971
for personal acts and omissions, but also for
FACTS:
those of persons for whom another is
responsible.
The father, and, in case of his death or

incapacity, the mother, are liable for any
damages caused by the minor children who live
with them.
xxx xxxxxx
Finally, teachers or directors of arts and trades

are liable for any damages caused by their
pupils or apprentices while they are under their
custody.
Plaintiff contends that defendant Delfin Capuno is

liable for the damages in question because at the
time the Dante committed the negligent act which
resulted in the death of the victim, he was a minor
and was then living with his father, and inasmuch
as these facts are not disputed, the civil liability of
the father is evident.
We find merit in this claim. It is true that under the

law above quoted, "teachers or directors of arts and
trades are liable for any damages caused by their
pupils or apprentices while they are under their
custody", but this provision only applies to an
institution of arts and trades and not to any
academic educational institution. Here Dante
Capuno was then a student of the Balintawak
Elementary School and as part of his extra-
curricular activity, he attended the parade in honor
of Dr. Jose Rizal upon instruction of the city
school's supervisor. In the circumstances, it is clear
that neither the head of that school, nor the city
school's supervisor, could be held liable for the
negligent act of Dante because he was not then a
student of an institute of arts and trades as
provided by law.
The civil liability which the law imposes upon the

father is obvious. This is necessary consequence of
the parental authority they exercise over them
which imposes upon the parents the "duty of
supporting them, keeping them in their company,
educating them and instructing them in proportion
to their means", while, on the other hand, gives
them the "right to correct and punish them in

131
The deceased Dominador Palisoc and the called upon to "exercise reasonable supervision
defendant Virgilio Daffon were classmates in over the conduct of the child." In the law of torts,
Manila Technical Institute. On March 10, 1966, the governing principle is that the protective
they, together with another classmate Desiderio custody of the school heads and teachers is
Cruz were in the laboratory room. Desiderio Cruz mandatorily substituted for that of the parents, and
and Virgilio Daffon were working on a machine hence, it becomes their obligation as well as that
while Dominador Palisoc was merely looking on of the school itself to provide proper supervision of
at them. Daffon made a remark to the effect that the students' activities during the whole time that
Palisoc was acting like a foreman. Because of they are at attendance in the school, including
this remark Palisoc slapped slightly Daffon on the recess time, as well
face. Daffon, in retaliation, gave Palisoc a strong
flat blow on the face, which was followed by other
fist blows on the stomach. Palisoc retreated
apparently to avoid the fist blows, but Daffon
followed him and both exchanged blows until
Palisoc stumbled on an engine block which
caused him to fall face downward. First aid was
administered to him but he was not revived, so he
was immediately taken to a hospital where he
eventually died.
Plaintiff-appellants, as parents of the deceased,

filed a case against Daffon, Brillantes as member
of the Board of Directors of the Institute, Valenton
as president and Quibulue as instructor thereof.
The trial court found defendant Daffon liable for

the quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code. The trial court, however, absolved from
liability the three other defendants-officials of the
Manila Technical Institute, ruling that teachers or
heads of establishments of arts and trades shall
be only liable for damages caused by their pupils
and students and apprentices where the latter are
under their custody.
ISSUE:
W/N defendants-school officials are liable as

tortfeasors with defendant Daffon for damages
resulting from Palisoc’s death.
HELD:
The Court holds that under the Art. 2180 of the

NCC, defendants head and teacher of the Manila
Technical Institute are liable jointly and severally
for damages to plaintiffs-appellants for the death
of the latter's minor son at the hands of defendant
Daffon at the school's laboratory room. No liability
attaches to defendant Brillantes as a mere
member of the school's board of directors. The
school itself cannot be held similarly liable, since
it has not been properly impleaded as party
defendant.
The rationale of such liability of school heads and

teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and
students, so long as they remain in their custody,
is that they stand, to a certain extent, as to their
pupils and students, in loco parentis and are

132
as to take the necessary precautions to protect the The Court has come to the conclusion that the
students in their custody from dangers and hazards provision in question should apply to all schools,
that would reasonably be anticipated, including academic as well as non-academic. Where the
injuries that some student themselves may inflict school is academic rather than technical or
willfully or through negligence on their fellow vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort
students. . committed by the student will attach to the teacher
in charge of such student, following the first part of
The lower court therefore erred in law in absolving the provision. This is the general rule. In the case of
defendants-school officials on the ground that they
could be held liable under Article 2180, Civil Code,
only if the student who inflicted the fatal fistblows
on his classmate and victim "lived and boarded with
his teacher or the other defendants officials of the
school." As stated above, the phrase used in the
cited article — "so long as (the students) remain in
their custody" means the protective and
supervisory custody that the school and its heads
and teachers exercise over the pupils and students
for as long as they are at attendance in the school.
There is nothing in the law that requires that for
such liability to attach the pupil or student who
commits the tortious act must live and board in the
school, as erroneously held by the lower court, and
the dicta in Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on
which it relied, must now be deemed to have been
set aside by the present decision. .
AMADORA vs. CA, G.R. No. L-47745 April 15,
1988 FACTS:
Alfredo Amadora was a graduating student of

Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos. On April 13, 1972,
while they were in the auditorium of their school, a
classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a gun that mortally
hit Alfredo.
The herein petitioners, as the victim's parents, filed

a civil action for damages under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code against the Colegio de San Jose-
Recoletos, its rector the high school principal, the
dean of boys, and the physics teacher, together
with Damon and two other students, through their
respective parents. The complaint against the
students was later dropped. The trial court held the
remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs. On
appeal to the CA, however, the decision was
reversed and all the defendants were completely
absolved.
ISSUE:
W/N Art. 2180 was applicable as the Colegio de

San Jose-Recoletos was not a school of arts and
trades but an academic institution of learning.
W/N the students were in the custody of the school

at the time of the incident as the semester had
already ended.
HELD:

133
establishments of arts and trades, it is the head was there for a legitimate purpose.
thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as
During all these occasions, it is obviously the
an exception to the general rule.
teacher-in- charge who must answer for his
There is really no substantial distinction between students' torts. It is not necessary that at the time
the academic and the non-academic schools of the injury, the teacher be physically present and
insofar as torts committed by their students are in a position to prevent it. Custody does not
concerned. The same vigilance is expected from connote immediate and actual physical control but
the teacher over the students under his control refers more to the influence exerted on the child
and supervision, whatever the nature of the and the discipline instilled in him as a result of
school where he is teaching. The suggestion in such influence. Thus, for the injuries caused by
the Exconde and Mercado Cases is that the the
provision would make the teacher or even the
head of the school of arts and trades liable for an
injury caused by any student in its custody but if
that same tort were committed in an academic
school, no liability would attach to the teacher or
the school head.
These questions, though, may be asked: If the

teacher of the academic school is to be held
answerable for the torts committed by his
students, why is it the head of the school only
who is held liable where the injury is caused in a
school of arts and trades? And in the case of the
academic or non- technical school, why not apply
the rule also to the head thereof instead of
imposing the liability only on the teacher?
The reason for the disparity can be traced to the

fact that historically the head of the school of arts
and trades exercises a closer tutelage over his
pupils than the head of the academic school. By
contrast, the head of the academic school is not
as involved with his students and exercised only
administrative duties over the teachers who were
the persons directly dealing with the students.
Consequently, while he could not be directly
faulted for the acts of the students, the head of
the school of arts and trades, because of his
closer ties with them, could be so blamed.
It is conceded that the custody requirement

signify that that the student should be within the
control of the school authorities at the time of the
occurrence of the injury. However, this does not
necessarily mean that such, custody be co-
terminous with the semester.
As long as it can be shown that the student is in

the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate
student objective, the responsibility of the school
authorities over the student continues. At the time
Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot, he was still in
the custody of the authorities of Colegio de San
Jose-Recoletos notwithstanding that the fourth
year classes had formally ended. It was
immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to
finish his physics experiment or merely to submit
his physics report for what is important is that he

134
student, the teacher and not the parent shall be appointed armorer. As armorer of the ROTC Unit,
held responsible if the tort was committed within the Abon received his appointment from the AFP and
premises of the school at any time when its received his salary from the AFP, as well as orders
authority could be validly exercised over him. from Captain Ungos, the Commandant of the
Baguio Colleges Foundation ROTC Unit. Abon was
The rector, the high school principal and the dean also a commerce student of the BCF.
of boys cannot be held liable because none of them
was the teacher-in-charge. Each of them was On 3 March 1977, Abon shot Napoleon Castro a
exercising only a general authority over the student student of the University of Baguio with an
body and not the direct control and influence unlicensed firearm
exerted by the teacher placed in charge of
particular classes or sections and thus immediately
involved in its discipline. The evidence of the
parties does not disclose who the teacher-in-
charge of the offending student was. The mere fact
that Alfredo Amadora had gone to school that day
in connection with his physics report did not
necessarily make the physics teacher, respondent
Celestino Dicon, the teacher-in-charge of Alfredo's
killer.
At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-in-

charge, there is no showing that Dicon was
negligent in enforcing discipline upon Damon or
that he had waived observance of the rules and
regulations of the school or condoned their non-
observance. His absence when the tragedy
happened cannot be considered against him
because he was not supposed or required to report
to school on that day. And while it is true that the
offending student was still in the custody of the
teacher-in-charge even if the latter was physically
absent when the tort was committed, it has not
been established that it was caused by his laxness
in enforcing discipline upon the student. On the
contrary, the private respondents have proved that
they had exercised due diligence, through the
enforcement of the school regulations, in
maintaining that discipline.
Finally, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos cannot

be held directly liable under the article because
only the teacher or the head of the school of arts
and trades is made responsible for the damage
caused by the student or apprentice. Neither can it
be held to answer for the tort committed by any of
the other private respondents for none of them has
been found to have been charged with the custody
of the offending student or has been remiss in the
discharge of his duties in connection with such
custody.
SALVOSA vs. IAC, G.R. No. 70458 October 5,
1988 FACTS:
Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF) is an academic

institution. However, it is also an institution of arts
and trade.
The BCF ROTC Unit had Jimmy B. Abon as its duly

135
which the former took from the armory of the engaged in child are shall have special parental
ROTC Unit of the BCF. As a result, Napoleon authority and responsibility over the minor child
Castro died and Abon was prosecuted for, and while under their supervision, instruction or
convicted of the crime of Homicide. custody.
Subsequently, the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued Authority and responsibility shall apply to all
for damages, impleading Abon, Ungos (ROTC authorized activities whether inside or outside the
Commandant), school officials and the BCF as premises of the school, entity or institution. (349a)
party defendants. The Trial Court rendered a
ART. 219. Those given the authority and
decision in favor of Castro. On appeal by
responsibility under the preceding Article shall be
petitioners, the respondent Court affirmed with
principally and solidarily liable for damages
modification the decision of the Trial Court.
caused by the acts or
ISSUE:
W/N petitioners can be held solidarity liable with

Abon for damages under Art. 2180 of the Civil
Code.
HELD:
In line with the case of Palisoc, a student not "at

attendance in the school" cannot be in "recess"
thereat. A "recess," as the concept is embraced
in the phrase "at attendance in the school,"
contemplates a situation of temporary
adjournment of school activities where the
student still remains within call of his mentor and
is not permitted to leave the school premises, or
the area within which the school activity is
conducted. Recess by its nature does not include
dismissal. Likewise, the mere fact of being
enrolled or being in the premises of a school
without more does not constitute "attending
school" or being in the "protective and
supervisory custody' of the school, as
contemplated in the law.
Upon the foregoing considerations, we hold that

Abon cannot be considered to have been "at
attendance in the school," or in the custody of
BCF, when he shot Napoleon Castro. Logically,
therefore, petitioners cannot under Art. 2180 of
the Civil Code be held solidarity liable with Abon
for damages resulting from his acts.
Besides, the record shows that before the

shooting incident, Ungos, ROTC Unit
Commandant, had instructed Abon "not to leave
the office and to keep the armory well guarded."
Apart from negating a finding that Jimmy B. Abon
was under the custody of the school when he
committed the act for which the petitioners are
sought to be held liable, this circumstance shows
that Abon was supposed to be working in the
armory with definite instructions from his superior,
the ROTC Commandant, when he shot Napoleon
Castro.
ART. 218. The school, its administrators and

teachers, or the individual, entity or institution

136
omissions of the unemancipated minor. The However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a
parents, judicial guardians or the persons finding that the act or omission considered as
exercising substitute parental authority over said negligent was the proximate cause of the injury
minor shall be subsidiarily liable. caused because the negligence must have a causal
connection to the accident. In this case, the
The respective liabilities of those referred to in the respondents failed to show that the negligence of
preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is proved petitioner was the proximate cause of the death of
that they exercised the proper diligence required the victim.
under the particular circumstances.
All other cases not covered by this and the

preceding articles shall be governed by the
provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. (n)
ST. MARY’S ACADEMY vs. CARPITANOS, G.R.

No.
143363. February 6, 2002
FACTS:
St. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City conducted an

enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996. As
a student of St. Mary’s Academy, Sherwin
Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group.
Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin, along with
other high school students were riding in a
Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant Vivencio
Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary
School. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II
then 15 years old and a student of the same
school. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a
reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned
turtle. Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the
injuries he sustained from the accident.
Thereafter, his parents filed a case for damages

against James Daniel II and his parents, Villanueva
and St. Mary’s Academy. The RTC found the St.
Mary’s Academy liable while Daniel’s parents were
subsidiarily liable. Villanueva was absolved from
liability. Said decision was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioner is liable for the death of Carpitanos.
HELD:
Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following

shall have special parental authority over a minor
child while under their supervision, instruction or
custody: (1) the school, its administrators and
teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or institution
engaged in child care.
Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person

under custody is a minor, those exercising special
parental authority are principally and solidarily
liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions
of the unemancipated minor while under their
supervision, instruction, or custody.

137
Evidence shows, and this the respondents did walk around in crutches. His injury prevented him
not dispute, that the immediate cause of the from attending to the school buses he is
accident was not the negligence of petitioner or operating.
the reckless driving of James Daniel II, but the
Petitioner sued for damages the City of Manila
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the
and the Asiatic Integrated Corporation under
jeep.
whose administration the Sta. Ana Public Market
Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused had been placed. The trial court dismissed the
by the negligence of the minor driver or complaint. Upon appeal, the IAC held the Asiatic
mechanical detachment of the steering wheel Integrated Corporation liable for damages but
guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the minor’s absolved respondent City of Manila.
parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner St.
Mary’s Academy was only a remote cause of the
accident.
Incidentally, there was no question that the

registered owner of the vehicle was respondent
Villanueva. The registered owner of any vehicle,
even if not used for public service, would
primarily be responsible to the public or to third
persons for injuries caused the latter while the
vehicle was being driven on the highways or
streets.” Hence, with the overwhelming evidence
presented by petitioner and the respondent
Daniel spouses that the accident occurred
because of the detachment of the steering wheel
guide of the jeep, it is not the school, but the
registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held
responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin
Carpitanos.
b.8. Defense: Diligence of a Good Father

of Family
c. Provinces, Cities and Municipalities
Art. 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities

shall be liable for damages for the death of, or
injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the
defective condition of roads, streets, bridges,
public buildings, and other public works under
their control or supervision. (n)
JIMENEZ vs. CITY OF MANILA, G.R. No. 71049

May 29, 1987
FACTS:
Petitioner alleged that on August 15, 1974 he,

together with his neighbors, went to Sta. Ana
public market to buy "bagoong" at the time when
the public market was flooded with ankle deep
rainwater. On his way home, he stepped on an
uncovered opening obscured by the dirty
rainwater, causing a dirty and rusty four-inch nail,
stuck inside the uncovered opening, to pierce the
left leg of petitioner. After administering first aid
treatment at a nearby drugstore, his companions
helped him hobble home. Petitioner became ill
and his leg swelled with great pain and was
thereafter hospitalized. After discharge, he had to

138
ISSUE: control of the former.
W/N the IAC erred in not ruling that respondent City There is no argument that it is the duty of the City of
of Manila should be jointly and severally liable with Manila to exercise reasonable care to keep the
Asiatic Integrated Corporation for the injuries public market reasonably safe for people
petitioner suffered. frequenting the place for their marketing needs.
HELD: Petitioner had the right to assume that there were

no openings in the middle of the passageways and
The petition is impressed with merit. if any, that they were adequately covered. Had the
opening
Respondent City of Manila maintains that it cannot
be held liable for the injuries sustained by the
petitioner because under the Management and
Operating Contract, Asiatic Integrated Corporation
assumed all responsibility for damages which may
be suffered by third persons for any cause
attributable to it.
It has also been argued that the City of Manila

cannot be held liable under the Revised Charter of
Manila which provides:
The City shall not be liable or held for damages or

injuries to persons or property arising from the
failure of the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any
other City Officer, to enforce the provisions of this
chapter, or any other law or ordinance, or from
negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board, or any
other officers while enforcing or attempting to
enforce said provisions.
Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code

of the Philippines provides that:
Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable

for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by
any person by reason of defective conditions of
roads, streets, bridges, public buildings and other
public works under their control or supervision.
Thus, it is clear that the Revised Charter of Manila

refers to liability arising from negligence, in general,
regardless of the object, thereof, while Article 2189
of the Civil Code governs liability due to "defective
streets, public buildings and other public works" in
particular and is therefore decisive on this specific
case.
Under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not

necessary for the liability therein established to
attach, that the defective public works belong to the
province, city or municipality from which
responsibility is exacted. What said article requires
is that the province, city or municipality has either
"control or supervision" over the public building in
question.
In the case at bar, there is no question that the Sta.

Ana Public Market, despite the Management and
Operating Contract between respondent City and
Asiatic Integrated Corporation remained under the

139
been covered, petitioner could not have fallen GUILATCO vs. CITY OF DAGUPAN, G.R. No.
61516
into it. Thus the negligence of the City of Manila
March
is the proximate cause of the injury suffered. The
City is therefore liable for the injury suffered by 21, 1989
the petitioner.
FACTS:
CITY OF MANILA vs. TEOTICO, G.R. No. L-23052
January 29, Guilatco was about to board a motorized tricycle
at a sidewalk located at Perez Blvd. (a National
1968 FACTS: Road, under the control and supervision of the
City of Dagupan) when she accidentally fell into a
Genaro Teotico fell inside an uncovered and
manhole. As a result thereof, she had to be
unlighted manhole on P. Burgos Avenue as he
hospitalized and operated on. From the
stepped down from the curb of the street to board
a jeepney. Teotico suffered serious injuries due
to the fall.
As a consequence thereof, Teotico filed a

complaint for damages against the City of Manila,
its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city
treasurer and chief of police. The complaint was
dismissed by the CFI. The decision was affirmed
by the CA except insofar as the City of Manila
was concerned which was ordered to indemnify
Teotico. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
W/N the City of Manila is liable for the damages

incurred by Teotico.
HELD:
The CA applied the Civil Code instead of Act. No.

409 (Charter of Manila), and, we think, correctly.
It is true that, insofar as its territorial application is
concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a special law
and the Civil Code a general legislation; but, as
regards the subject-matter of the provisions
above quoted, Section 4 of Republic Act 409
establishes a general rule regulating the liability
of the City of Manila. Upon the other hand, Article
2189 constitutes a particular prescription making
"provinces, cities and municipalities . . . liable for
damages for the death of, or injury suffered by
any person by reason" — specifically — "of the
defective condition of roads, streets, bridges,
public buildings, and other-public works under
their control or supervision.
Under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not

necessary for the liability therein established to
attach that the defective roads or streets belong
to the province, city or municipality from which
responsibility is exacted. What said article
requires is that the province, city or municipality
have either "control or supervision" over said
street or road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue were,
therefore, a national highway, this circumstance
would not necessarily detract from its "control or
supervision" by the City of Manila.

140
time of the mishap on July 25, 1978 up to the over the sidewalk where the open drainage hole
present, plaintiff has not yet reported for duty as is located.
court interpreter, as she has difficulty of locomotion.
d. Proprietors of building, engineer, architect,
The trial court ruled in favor of herein petitioner. On contractor
appeal, the appellate court reversed the lower court
Art. 2190. The proprietor of a building or structure is
findings on the ground that no evidence was
responsible for the damages resulting from its total
presented by the plaintiff- appellee to prove that the
or
City of Dagupan had "control or supervision" over
Perez Boulevard.
ISSUE:
W/N control or supervision over a national road by

the City of Dagupan exists, in effect binding the city
to answer for damages in accordance with article
2189 of the Civil Code.
HELD:
We grant the petition.
Under Art. 2189, it is not necessary for the

defective road or street to belong to the province,
city or municipality for liability to attach. The article
only requires that either control or supervision is
exercised over the defective road or street.
In the case at bar, this control or supervision is

provided for in the charter of Dagupan and is
exercised through the City Engineer who has the
following duties:
Sec. 22.The City Engineer--His powers, duties

and compensation-There shall be a city
engineer, who shall be in charge of the
department of Engineering and Public Works.
He shall receive a salary of not exceeding three
thousand pesos per annum. He shall have the
following duties:
xxx
(j) He shall have the care and custody of the

public system of waterworks and sewers, and
all sources of water supply, and shall control,
maintain and regulate the use of the same, in
accordance with the ordinance relating thereto;
shall inspect and regulate the use of all private
systems for supplying water to the city and its
inhabitants, and all private sewers, and their
connection with the public sewer system.
xxx
The same charter of Dagupan also provides

that the laying out, construction and
improvement of streets, avenues and alleys
and sidewalks, and regulation of the use
thereof, may be legislated by the Municipal
Board. Thus the charter clearly indicates that
the city indeed has supervision and control

141
partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of
necessary repairs. (1907)
Art. 2191. Proprietors shall also be responsible

for damages caused:
(1) By the explosion of machinery which has not

been taken care of with due diligence, and the
inflammation of explosive substances which have
not been kept in a safe and adequate place;
(2) By excessive smoke, which may be harmful

to persons or property;
(3) By the falling of trees situated at or near

highways or lanes, if not caused by force
majeure;
(4) By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or

deposits of infectious matter, constructed without
precautions suitable to the place. (1908)
Art. 2192. If damage referred to in the two

preceding articles should be the result of any
defect in the construction mentioned in Article
1723, the third person suffering damages may
proceed only against the engineer or architect or
contractor in accordance with said article, within
the period therein fixed. (1909)
DE ROY V. CA, SUPRA

142
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PART I.

TORTS for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only

Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 1

Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 2

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to

In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article

COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC. VS. CA,

Geronimo, herein private respondent, filed a

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We have repeatedly held, however, that the

Liability for quasi-delict may still exist despite the

NAVIDA V. DIZON ET. AL G.R. NO. 125078,

Beginning 1993, a number of personal injury suits

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Second, the RTC of General Santos City declared

W/N DOLE Inc., should be held liable for damages

Quite evidently, the allegations in the Amended

Moreover, the injuries and illnesses, which

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W/N CLC is guilty under Article 2176 of the Civil

In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the

(1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff;

(2) the fault or negligence of the defendant

(3) the connection of cause and effect

Difference between fault and negligence:

 voluntary act or omission which causes

 requires the execution of a positive act

 failure to observe for the protection of

 Consists of the omission to do acts

The fact that Timothy fell out through the window

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Whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil

The same negligent act causing damages may

Some of the differences between crimes under the

(1) That crimes affect the public interest, while

(2)That, consequently, the Penal Code

(3) That delicts are not as broad as quasi-

The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the

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Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against

Was the trial court correct to dismiss the case for

The argument that there are two causes of action

The trial court was, therefore, correct in holding

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RAFAEL REYES TRUCKING CORPORATION V.

Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation is a domestic

May Reyes Trucking be held subsidiarily liable for

Reyes Trucking, as employer of the accused who

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Once the choice is made, the injured party can

In the instant case, the offended parties elected

Under the law, the vicarious liability of the

Art. 2176 in relation to Article 103 of the

 Preponderance of  Proof Beyond

 Employer and  Liability attaches

SPS. SANTOS, EL. AL. V. PIZARDO, ET. AL.,

Dionisio M. Sibayan (Sibayan) was charged with

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An act or omission causing damage to another may

At the time of the filing of the complaint for

MANLICLIC V. CALAUNAN, GR NO.150157,

Petitioner Manliclic is a driver of Philippine Rabbit

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