STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (CASE DIGESTS)
CASE TITLE
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS
GR No. 122156, Feb 3, 1997
DOCTRINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
SUPREMACY
Abakada Guro Party List v.
Purisima
GR. No. 166715, Aug 14, 2008
DOCTRINE OF SUBORDINATE
LEGISLATION
FACTS
II. SUBJECT OF CONSTRUCTION
The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) decided to Whether the provisions of the
sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and Constitution, particularly Article XII
outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC). Section 10, are self-executing.
In a close bidding, two bidders participated: Manila Prince
Hotel Corporation (MPHC), a Filipino corporation, which
offered to buy 51% of the MHC at P41.58 per share, and
Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel
operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00
per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning
bidder and the execution of the contracts, the MPHC matched
the bid price in a letter to GSIS. MPHC sent a manager’s check
to the GSIS in a subsequent letter, which GSIS refused to
accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS
has disregarded the tender of the matching bid, MPHC came to
the Court on prohibition and mandamus.
Contention of Peititoner: Invoking Sec. 10(2), Art. XII, of the
1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been
identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a
historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine
heritage and culture.
Sec. 10(2), Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipino
Contention of Respondent: Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the
1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle and policy
since it is not a self-executing provision and requires
implementing legislation(s).
Petitioners seeks to prevent respondents from implementing
and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335. R.A. 9335 was enacted
to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of
Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC
officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by
providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the
creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a
Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all
officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six
months of service, regardless of employment status.
Contention of Petitioner: Invoking their right as taxpayers filed
this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax
reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system
of rewards and incentives, the law “transforms the officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and
ISSUE
WON the MHC shares should be sold to
MPHC?
1. WON the scope of the system of
rewards and incentives limitation to
officials and employees of the BIR and
the BOC violates the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection.
2. WON there was an unduly delegation
of power to fix revenue targets to the
President.
3. WON the doctrine of separation of
powers has been violated in the creation
of a congressional oversight committee.
DOCTRINE/RULING
1. YES. Sec 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.
A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and
becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which
supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected,
is self-executing. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to
enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the
constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring
legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and
practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. In fine, Sec 10(2), Art. XII of the
1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which
needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its
very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation.
2. YES. The FILIPINO FIRST POLICY is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is embodied in
the 1987 Constitution not merely to be used as a guideline for future legislation but
primarily to be enforced; so must it be enforced.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the
winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be
declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts,
and secured the requisite approvals. Since the "Filipino First Policy provision of the
Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid
is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly,
respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter
into one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents are mandated
to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to
be known to all the bidders and other interested parties.
Adhering to the doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy, the subject constitutional provision is,
as it should be, impliedly written in the bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the
bidding rules be nullified for being violative of the Constitution. It is a basic principle in
constitutional law that all laws and contracts must conform with the fundamental law of
the land. Those which violate the Constitution lose their reason for being.
1. NO. The Court referred to the ruling of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, which
states that “the guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the
application of the laws upon all citizens of the State.”
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification.
Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping
of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain
particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is
that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no
manner determines the matter of constitutionality.
2. NO. The Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is
based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. “
To determine the validity of delegation of legislative power, it needs the following: (1) the
completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth
therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate. It lays down a

People v. Reyes
GR No. 115022, Aug 14, 1995
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF
LAWS NOT APPLICAPLE WHEN
PENAL IN NATURE
bounty hunters” as they will do their best only in consideration
of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and incentives
invites corruption and undermines the constitutionally
mandated duty of these officials and employees to serve the
people with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency.
Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of
rewards and incentives only to officials and employees of the
BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection. There is no valid basis for classification or
distinction as to why such a system should not apply to officials
and employees of all other government agencies.
In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the
power to fix revenue targets to the President as it lacks a
sufficient standard on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of
RA 9335 provides that BIR and BOC officials may be dismissed
from the service if their revenue collections fall short of the
target by at least 7.5%, the law does not, however, fix the
revenue targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of revenue
targets has been delegated to the President without sufficient
standards. It will therefore be easy for the President to fix an
unrealistic and unattainable target in order to dismiss BIR or
BOC personnel.
Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional
oversight committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine
of separation of powers. While the legislative function is
deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment
and approval of the law, the creation of the congressional
oversight committee permits legislative participation in the
implementation and enforcement of the law.
The facts reveal that respondent Buenaventura C. Maniego,
Collector of Customs, Collection District II, Bureau of Customs,
Manila International Container Port (MICP), issued MICP
Customs Personnel Order No. 21-92 dated January 10, 1992
assigning Jovencio D. Ebio, Customs Operation Chief, MICP to
the Office of the Deputy Collector of Customs for Operations as
Special Assistant.1 The actual transfer of Ebio was made on
January 14, 1992.
On May 4, 1992, Ebio filed with the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) a letter-complaint protesting his transfer. Ebio
claimed that his new assignment violated COMELEC Resolution
sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out
the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To
be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate’s authority, announce the
legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.
Based from the ruling under Macalintal v. Commission on Elections, it is clear that
congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily
constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor undermines
the constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances
inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact even enhance the separation
of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive branch.
The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has
a reasonable foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary.22 With respect to RA 9335, its
expressed public policy is the optimization of the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the BIR and the BOC.23 Since the subject of the law is the revenue- generation
capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided
in the law should logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the
BIR and the BOC because they have the common distinct primary function of generating
revenues for the national government through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees
and charges.
Both the BIR and the BOC principally perform the special function of being the
instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions –
taxation. Indubitably, such substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to the
purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the
BOC under R.A. 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal protection.
RA. 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing
revenue targets and the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law
under Sec 2 and 4 of the said Act. Moreover, the Court has recognized the following as
sufficient standards: “public interest,” “justice and equity,” “public convenience and
welfare” and “simplicity, economy and welfare.”33 In this case, the declared policy of
optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC is
infused with public interest.
The court declined jurisdiction on this case. The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in
RA 9335 was created for the purpose of approving the implementing rules and regulations
(IRR) formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it approved
the said IRR. From then on, it became functus officio and ceased to exist. Hence, the issue
of its alleged encroachment on the executive function of implementing and enforcing the
law may be considered moot and academic.
WON Maniego is liable It ought to be immediately obvious that Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881 does not per se
outlaw the transfer of a government officer or employee during the election period. To be
sure, the transfer or detail of a public officer or employee is a prerogative of the appointing
authority.
Prescinding from this predicate, two (2) elements must be established to prove a violation
of Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881, viz: (1) The fact of transfer or detail of a public officer or
employee within the election period as fixed by the COMELEC, and (2) the transfer or detail
was effected without prior approval of the COMELEC in accordance with its implementing
rules and regulations.
In the case at bench, respondent Maniego transferred Ebio, then the Customs Operation

Gutierrez v. HR
GR No. 193459, Feb 15, 2011
PROMULGATION AND
PUBLICATION, DISTINGUISHED
INVALIDITY OF RETROACTIVE
APPLICATION ONLY APPLIES TO
CRIMINAL OR PENAL MATTERS
No. 2333 and section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881,
After a preliminary investigation, the COMELEC filed on May 6,
1995 an information with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36,
Manila charging respondent Maniego with a violation of
Section 261 (h) of B. P. Blg. 881
Before the arraignment, respondent Maniego moved to quash
the information on the ground that the facts alleged do not
constitute an offense. On September 23, 1993, the trial court
granted private respondent's motion to quash and dismissed
Criminal Case No. 93-120275.3 Petitioner moved to reconsider
but the same was denied on January 25, 1995. Petitioner
forthwith elevated the case to this Court on a pure question of
law.
Petitioner-Ombudsman challenges House Resolutions of Sept.
1 and 7, 2010 finding two impeachment complaints against the
petitioner, simultaneously referred to the House Committee on
Justice, sufficient in form and substance on grounds that she
was denied due process and that the said resolutions violated
the one-year bar rule on initiating impeachment proceedings
for impeachable officers. Court dismissed the petition.
22July2010: 4 days before the 15th Congress opened its first
session, private respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo
Lim and spouses Pestaño (Baraquel group) filed an
impeachment complaint against Gutierrez upon endorsement
of Party-List Representatives Walden Bello and Arlene Bag-ao
27July2010: HOR Sec-Gen transmitted the complaint to House
Speaker Belmonte who then, on August 2, directed the
Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business
3Aug2010: private respondents Renato Reyes Jr., Mother Mary
John Mananzan, Danilo Ramos, Edre Olalia, Ferdinand Gaite
and James Terry Ridon (Reyes group) filed an impeachment
complaint againsta herein petitioner endorsed by
Representatives Colmenares, Casiño, Mariano, Ilagan, Tinio and
De Jesus
HOR provisionally adopted the Rules of Procedure on
Impeachment Proceedings of the 14th Congress and HOR
Sec-Gen transmitted the complaint to House Speaker Belmonte
who then, on August 9, directed the Committee on Rules to
include it in the Order of Business
11Aug2010: HOR simultaneously referred the two complaints
to the House Committee on Justice (HCOJ for brevity)
After hearing, HCOJ by Resolution of September 1, 2010, found
both complaints sufficient in form
2Sept2010: The Rules of Procedure of Impeachment
WON the case presents a justiciable
controversy
WON the belated publication of the
Rules of Procedure of Impeachment
Proceedings of the 15th Congress
denied due process to the Petitioner
WON the simultaneous referral of the
two complaints violated the Constitution
Chief, MICP to the Office of the Deputy Collector of Customs for Operations as Special
Assistant on January 14, 1992. On this date, January 14, 1992, the election period for the
May 11, 1992 synchronized elections had already been fixed to commence January 12,
1992 until June 10, 1992. As aforestated, this election period had been determined by the
COMELEC in its Resolution No. 2314 dated November 20, 1991 and Resolution No. 2328
January 2, 1992. Nonetheless, it was only in Resolution No. 2333 which took effect on
January 15, 1992 that COMELEC promulgated the necessary rules on how to get its
approval on the transfer or detail of public officers or employees during the election period.
Before the effectivity of these rules, it cannot be said that Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881, a
penal provision, was already enforceable. Needless to state, respondent Maniego could not
be charged with failing to secure the approval of the COMELEC when he transferred Ebio
on January 14, 1992 as on that day, the rules of the COMELEC on the subject were yet in
existent.
1. YES
(Francisco Jr. vs HOR) Judicial review is not only a power but a duty of the judiciary
The 1987 Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power
to initiate impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of such
power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations
include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the
impeachment of one and the same official.
The Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion
of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker
v. Carr, “judicially discoverable standards” for determining the validity of the exercise of
such discretion, through the power of judicial review
2. NO
The determination of sufficiency of form and exponent of the express grant of rule-making
power in the House of Representatives
The Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing the constitutional requirements and providing
that there must be a “verified complaint or resolution”, and that the substance
requirement is met if there is “a recital of facts constituting the offense charged and
determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee.” The Constitution itself did not provide
for a specific method of promulgating the Rules. Impeachment is primarily for the
protection of the people as a body politic, and not for the punishment of the offender
3. THE ONE-YEAR BAR RULE
(P): start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first impeachment complaint against her
on July 22, 2010 or four days before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th Congress. She
posits that within one year from July 22, 2010, no second impeachment complaint may be
accepted and referred to public respondent.
INITIATIVE: Filing of impeachment complaint coupled with Congress’ taking initial action of
said complaint (referral of the complaint to the Committee on Justice)
IMPEACH: to file the case before the Senate
Rationale of the one-year bar: “that the purpose of the one-year bar is two-fold: 1)”to

Lokin v. COMELEC
GR No. 179431-32, Jun 22, 2010
IRR MUST CONFORM TO THE
STANDARS PRESRCIBED BY LAW
Proceedings of the 15th Congress was published
After hearing, HCOJ by Resolution of September 7, 2010 found
the two complaints, which both allege culpable violation of the
Constitution and betrayal of public trust, sufficient in substance
Petitioner filed petitions for certiorari and prohibition
challenging Resolutions of September 1 and 7 alleging that she
was denied due process and that these violated the one-year
bar rule on initiating impeachment proceedings
The Citizen’s Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), a duly
registered party-list organization, manifested their intent to
participate in the May 14, 2004 synchronized national and local
elections. They submitted a list of five nominees from which its
representatives would be chosen should CIBAC obtain the
number of qualifying votes. However, prior to the elections,
the list of nominees was amended: the nominations of the
petitioner Lokin, Sherwin Tugna and Emil Galang were
withdrawn; Armi Jane Borje was substituted; and Emmanuel
Joel Villanueva and Chinchona Cruz-Gonzales were retained.
Election results showed that CIBAC was entitled to a second
seat and that Lokin, as second nominee on the original list, to a
proclamation, which was opposed by Villanueva and
Cruz-Gonzales.
The COMELEC resolved the matter on the validity of the
amendment of the list of nominees and the withdrawal of the
nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang. It approved the
amendment of the list of nominees with the new order as
follows:
1. Emmanuel Joel Villanueva
2. Cinchona Cruz-Gonzales
3. Armi Jane Borje
The COMELEC en banc proclaimed Cruz-Gonzales as the official
second nominee of CIBAC. Cruz-Gonzales took her oath of
office as a Party-List Representative of CIBAC.
Lokin filed a petition for mandamus to compel respondent
COMELEC to proclaim him as the official second nominee of
CIBAC. Likewise, he filed another petition for certiorari assailing
Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 alleging that it expanded
Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 by allowing CIBAC to change its
nominees.
1. WON the Court has jurisdiction over
the controversy;
2. WON Lokin is guilty of forum
shopping;
3. WON Section 13 of Resolution No.
7804 is unconstitutional and violates the
Party-List System Act; and
4. WON the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in approving the
withdrawal of the nominees of CIBAC
and allowing the amendment of the list
of nominees of CIBAC without any basis
in fact or law and after the close of polls.
prevent undue or too frequent harassment; and 2) to allow the legislature to do its
principal task [of] legislation,”
“…that there should only be ONE CANDLE that is kindled in a year, such that once the
candle starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can no longer rekindle the candle.”
(Gutierrez vs. HOR, 2011)
1. YES. The Court ruled that it had jurisdiction over the case. Lokin’s case is not an election
protest nor an action for quo warranto.
Election protest - a contest between the defeated and the winning candidates, based
on the grounds of electoral frauds and irregularities, to determine who obtained the
higher number of votes entitling them to hold the office.
Special civil action for quo warranto - questions the ineligibility of the winning
candidate.
This is a special civil action for certiorari against the COMELEC to seek the review of the
resolution of the COMELEC in accordance with Section 7 of Article IX-A of the 1987
Constitution.
2. NO. Petitioner is not guilty of forum shopping because the filing of the action for
certiorari and the action for mandamus are based on different causes of action and the
reliefs they sought were different.
Forum shopping - consists of the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for
the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively to obtain a favorable
judgment.
3. YES. The Court held that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 was invalid. The COMELEC
issued Resolution No. 7804 as an implementing rules and regulations in accordance with
the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code and the Party-List System Act. As an
administrative agency, it cannot amend an act of Congress nor issue IRRs that may enlarge,
alter or restrict the provisions of the law it administers and enforces. Section 8 of R.A. No.
7941 provides that: Each registered party, organization or coalition shall submit to the
COMELEC not later than forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not less
than five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the
required number of votes.
A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent
in writing may be named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate of any elective
office or a person who has lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding
election. No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shal be allowed after
the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee
dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes incapacitated in which case the
name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral
representatives in the House of Representatives who are nominated in the party-list system
shall not be considered resigned.
The above provision is clear and unambiguous and expresses a single and definite meaning,
there is no room for interpretation or construction but only for application. Section 8
clearly prohibits the change of nominees and alteration of the order in the list of nominees’
names after submission of the list to the COMELEC. It enumerates only three instances in

Rubi v. Provincial Board, 39 Phil.
660, 702 (1919)
LOCAL LEGISLATION
Legaspi v. City of Cebu
GR No. 159110, Dec 10, 2013
BILL OF ATTAINDER ONLY
APPLICABLE TO PENAL IN
NATURE
This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and
other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that
the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by
the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his
companions are said to be held on the reservation established
at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said
to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the
prison at Calapan for having run away form the reservation.
The Philippine Legislature has, by the enactment of Section
2145 of the Administrative Code, conferred authority upon the
Province of Mindoro to be exercised by the provincial governor
and the provincial board.
On January 27, 1997 the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of
Cebu enacted Ordinance No. 1664 to authorize the traffic
enforcers of Cebu City to immobilize any motor vehicle
violating the parking restrictions and prohibitions defined in
the Traffic Code of Cebu City.
On July 29, 1997, Atty. Bienvenido Jaban (Jaban,Sr.) and his son
Atty. Bienvenido Douglas Luke Bradbury Jaban (Jaban,Jr.)
brought suit in the RTC against the City of Cebu, then
represented by Hon. Alvin Garcia, its City Mayor, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cebu City and its Presiding Officer,
Hon. Renato V. Osme, and the chairman and operatives or
officers of the City Traffic Operations Management
(CITOM),seeking the declaration of Ordinance No. 1644 as
unconstitutional for being in violation of due process and for
being contrary to law, and damages.
WON the provision in question is an
unlawful delegation of legislative power
WON Ordinance No. 1664 is valid and
constitutional.
which an organization can substitute another person in place of the nominee whose name
has been submitted to the COMELEC : (1) when the nominee dies; (2) when the nominee
withdraws in writing his nomination; and (3) when the nominee becomes incapacitated.
When the statute enumerates the exception to the application of the general rule, the
exceptions are strictly but reasonably construed.
Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 expanded the exceptions under Section 8 of R.A. No.
7941 when it provided four instances by adding “nomination is withdrawn by the party” as
statutory ground for substituting a nominee. COMELEC had no authority to expand, extend,
or add anything to law it seeks to implement. An IRR should remain consistent with the law
it intends to carry out not override, supplant or modify it. An IRR adopted pursuant to the
law is itself law but in case of conflict between the law and the IRR, the law prevails.
The petitions for certiorari and mandamus were granted. Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804
was declared invalid and of no effect to the extent that it authorizes a party-list
organization to withdraw its nomination of a nominee once it has submitted the
nomination to the COMELEC.
NO. Discretion may be committed by the Legislature to an executive department or
official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments of subordinate
official thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions
of fact. The growing tendency in the decision is to give prominence to the "necessity" of the
case.
In the case at bar, the Legislature merely conferred upon the Provincial Governor, with the
approval of the Provincial Board and the Department Head, discretionary authority as to
the execution of law. Who, but the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the
official representatives of the province, are better qualified to judge "when such as course
is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order." As officials charged with the
administration of the province and the protection of its inhabitants, who but they are
better fitted to select sites which have the conditions most favorable for improving the
people who have the misfortune of being in a backward state.
Delegation of Legislative Powers to Local Governments. An exception to the general rule
against the delegation of legislative power sanctioned by immemorial practice permits the
central legislative body to make such delegation to local authorities. "Necessary in the
interest of law and order" is a standard held sufficient.
The Court of Appeals decision is sustained.
Tests for a valid ordinance
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005 the Court restates the tests
of a valid ordinance thusly:
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that for
an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by
law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive;(3) must
not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be
general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
As jurisprudence indicates, the tests are divided into the formal (i.e., whether the ordinance
was enacted within the corporate powers of the LGU, and whether it was passed in

City of Davao v. RTC
GR No. 127383, Aug 18, 2005
CONGRESS CANNOT PASS
IRREPEALABLE LAWS
Their complaint alleged that on June 23, 1997, Jaban Sr. had
properly parked his car in a paying parking area on Manalili
Street, Cebu City to get certain records and documents from
his office and after less than 10 minutes, he had found his car
being immobilized by a steel clamp. His car was impounded for
three days, and was informed at the office of the CITOM that
he had first to pay P4,200.00 as a fine to the City Treasurer of
Cebu City for the release of his car but such imposition the fine
was without any court hearing and without due process of law.
He was also compelled to payP1,500.00 (itemized as P500.00
for the clamping andP1,000.00 for the violation) without any
court hearing and final judgment;
That on May 19, 1997, Jaban, Jr. parked his car in a very
secluded place where there was no sign prohibiting parking;
that his car was immobilized by CITOM operative and that he
was compelled to pay the total sum ofP1,400.00 for the release
of his car without a court hearing and a final judgment
rendered by a court of justice.
On August 11, 1997, Valentino Legaspi (Legaspi) likewise sued
in the RTC the City of Cebu, demanded the delivery of personal
property, declaration of nullity of theTraffic Code of Cebu City,
and damages.
He averred that on the morning of July 29, 1997, he had left his
car occupying a portion of the sidewalk and the street outside
the gate of his house to make way for the vehicle of
theanayexterminator, upon returning outside, his car was
towed by the group even if it was not obstructing the flow of
traffic.
The cases were consolidated. The RTC rendered its decision
declaring Ordinance No. 1664 as null and void
The City of Cebu and its co-defendants appealed to the CA. The
CA reversed the decision of the RTC declaring the Ordinance
No. 1664 valid.
Upon the denial of their respective motions for reconsideration
the Jabans and Legaspi came to the Court via separate
petitions for review on certiorari. The appeals were
consolidated.
DOCTRINE/S: Reading together Secs. 133, 232, and 234 of the
LGC, as a general rule, as laid down in Sec 133, the taxing
powers of LGUs cannot extend to the levy of, inter alia, “taxes,
fees and charges of any kind on the National Governments, its
agencies and instrumentalities, and LGUs”; however, pursuant
to Sec 232, provinces, cities, and municipalities in the
Metropolitan Manila Area may impose the real property tax
except on, inter alia, “real property owned by the Republic of
the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions except when
the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration
WON the LGC has effectively repealed
Sec 33 of PD 1146, as amended by PD
1981, thus GSIS is no longer exempt
from realty taxes
accordance with the procedure prescribed by law), and the substantive (i.e., involving
inherent merit, like the conformity of the ordinance with the limitations under the
Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and
its consistency with public policy).
InMetropolitan Manila Development Authorityv. Bel-Air Village Association,Inc., G.R. No.
135962, March 27, 2000the Court cogently observed that police power is lodged primarily
in the National Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not
possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power
to the President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal
corporations or local government units. Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such
legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body. (emphasis
supplied)
In the present case, delegated police power was exercised by the LGU of the City of Cebu.
The CA opined, and correctly so, that vesting cities like the City of Cebu with the legislative
power to enact traffic rules and regulations was expressly done through Section 458 of the
LGC, and also generally by virtue of the General Welfare Clause embodied in Section 16 of
the LGC.
The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with utmost
observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the law. Such
power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically as its exercise is subject
to a qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the respect and regard due to the
prescription of the fundamental law, particularly those forming part of the Bill of Rights.
Individual rights, it bears emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the extent that may
fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. Due
process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person
to his life, liberty and property.
Judged according to the foregoing enunciation of the guaranty of due process of law, the
contentions of the petitioners cannot be sustained. Even under strict scrutiny review,
Ordinance No. 1664 met the substantive tests of validity and constitutionality by its
conformity with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the
requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy.
The subject of Ordinance No. 1664 is to ensure "a smooth flow of vehicular traffic in all the
streets in the City of Cebu at all times".
To reiterate, the clamping of the illegally parked vehicles was a fair and reasonable way to
enforce the ordinance against its transgressors; otherwise, the transgressors would evade
liability by simply driving away. DENIED.
HELD: YES. The conditions set forth in Sec 33 cannot be given effect for they are in the form
of the prohibited irrepealable laws.
RATIO: PD 1146 was enacted in 1977 by Pres. Marcos in the exercise of his legislative
powers. Sec 33 merely provided a general rule exempting GSIS from all taxes. Then, he
enacted PD 1931 which withdrew all tax exemptions granted to GOCCs. But Pres. Marcos
immediately reconsidered the withdrawal of exemptions on the GSIS and thus enacted PD
1146 which expressly stated that GSIS remained tax exempt despite the passage of PD
1931. But PD 1146 did not merely restore GSIS’s previous exemptions but also proscribed
future attempts to alter the tax-exempt status of GSIS by imposing unorthodox conditions[
or otherwise, to a taxable person,” as provided in item (a) of
the 1st paragraph of Sec 234.
Petitioners are the taxing authorities while respondent is a
government owned and controlled corporation with branch in
Davao City
BRIEF FACTS: Davao City imposed realty taxes against GSIS.
Because GSIS failed to pay from 1992-1994, a Notice of Public
Auction scheduling the public bidding of GSIS properties was
issued. GSIS also received Warrants of Levy and Notices of Levy
on three parcels of land it owned. Thus, GSIS filed a Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus and/or Declaratory Relief
before the RTC on the ground that it is exempt from taxes.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: LGC, particulary Secs 193 and 294,
has withdrawn the exemption previously granted to GOCCs
including the GSIS. Under Sec 534 (f) of the LGC, even special
laws such as the GSIS Charter, which are inconsistent with the
LGC are repealed or modified accordingly.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: Its exemption was not
withdrawn by the LGC. Under Sec 33 of PD 1146 (GSIS Charter),
as amended by PD 1981, the following conditions must be met
in order for the GSIS tax exemption be effectively withdrawn:
1.That Sec 33 be expressly and categorically repealed by law;
and,
2.That a provision be enacted to substitute the declared policy
of exemption from any and all taxes as an essential factor for
the solvency of the GSIS fund.
GSIS contended that had it been the intention of the legislature
to repeal Sec 33 through the LGC, LGC should have included
the appropriate retraction in its repealing clause in Sec 534 (f).
However, Sec 534 is a general repealing provision which is
afforded less weight in light of the rule that implied repeals are
not favored.
RTC ruled for GSIS, holding that the LGC failed to satisfy both
conditions. It also gave weight to the legal opinion of the Sec of
Justice concluding that Sec 33 was not repealed by the LGC and
a memo from the Office of the President expressing the same
opinion.
Moreover, these exemptions shall not be affected by subsequent laws to the contrary, such
as the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1931 and other similar laws that have been or
will be enacted, unless this section is expressly and categorically repealed by law and a
provision is enacted to substitute the declared policy of exemption from any and all taxes
as an essential factor for the solvency of the fund.] for its future repeal.
The Court looked at the decision in Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA)
and held that Sec 133 of the LGC was not intended to be an absolute prohibition on the
power of the LGUs to tax the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities as
evidenced by the ff provisions which “otherwise provided”:
The foregoing sections of the LGC speak of:
a) the limitations on the taxing powers of local government units and the exceptions
to such limitations; and
b) the rule on tax exemptions and the exceptions thereto.
(1) "unless otherwise provided herein" in the opening paragraph of Section 133;
(2) "Unless otherwise provided in this Code" in Section 193;
(3) "not hereafter specifically exempted" in Section 232; and
(4) "Except as provided herein" in the last paragraph of Section 234
Thus, reading together Sections 133, 232, and 234 of the LGC, we conclude that as a
general rule, as laid down in Section 133, the taxing powers of local government units
cannot extend to the levy of, inter alia, "taxes, fees and charges of any kind on the National
Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and local government units"; however,
pursuant to Section 232, provinces, cities, and municipalities in the Metropolitan Manila
Area may impose the real property tax except on, inter alia, "real property owned by the
Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions except when the beneficial use
thereof has been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person," as provided
in item (a) of the first paragraph of Section 234.
As to tax exemptions or incentives granted to or presently enjoyed by natural or judicial
persons, including government-owned and controlled corporations, Section 193 of the LGC
prescribes the general rule, viz., they are withdrawn upon the effectivity of the LGC, except
those granted to local water districts, cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6938,
non-stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions, and unless otherwise
provided in the LGC. The latter proviso could refer to Section 234 which enumerates the
properties exempt from real property tax. But the last paragraph of Section 234 further
qualifies the retention of the exemption insofar as real property taxes are concerned by
limiting the retention only to those enumerated therein; all others not included in the
enumeration lost the privilege upon the effectivity of the LGC. Moreover, even as to real
property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions
covered by item (a) of the first paragraph of Section 234, the exemption is withdrawn if the
beneficial use of such property has been granted to a taxable person for consideration or
otherwise.
The Court looked at the specific conditions provided in Sec 33 of PD 1146 as amended and
conceded that there is, indeed, no provision enacted to substitute the declared policy of
exemption from any and all taxes as an essential factor for the solvency of the fund of GSIS.
However, the Court held that this provision effectively imposes restrictions on the
competency of the Congress to enact future legislation on the taxability of the GSIS. This
places an undue restraint on the plenary power of the legislature to amend or repeal laws,
especially considering that it is a lawmaker’s act that imposes such burden. Only the

Tolentino v. Secretary of Petitioners (Tolentino, Kilosbayan, Inc., Philippine Airlines,
Finance, Roco, and Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association)
235 SCRA 630 seek reconsideration of the Court’s previous ruling dismissing
the petitions filed for the declaration of unconstitutionality of
R.A. No. 7716, the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law. Petitioners
contend that the R.A. did not “originate exclusively” in the HOR
as required by Article 6, Section 24 of the Constitution. The
Senate allegedly did not pass it on second and third readings,
instead passing its own version. Petitioners contend that it
should have amended the House bill by striking out the text of
the bill and substituting it with the text of its own bill, so as to
conform with the Constitution.
WON the R.A. is unconstitutional for
having “originated” from the Senate,
and not the HOR.
Constitution may operate to preclude or place restrictions on the amendment or repeal of
laws. Constitutional dicta is of higher order than legislative statutes, and the latter should
always yield to the former in cases of irreconcilable conflict.
The Court, citing Duarte v. Dade, held:
A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all subjects, whether pertaining to
persons or things, within its territorial jurisdiction, either to introduce new laws or repeal the
old, unless prohibited expressly or by implication by the federal constitution or limited or
restrained by its own. It cannot bind itself or its successors by enacting irrepealable laws
except when so restrained. Every legislative body may modify or abolish the acts passed by
itself or its predecessors. This power of repeal may be exercised at the same session at
which the original act was passed; and even while a bill is in its progress and before it
becomes a law. This legislature cannot bind a future legislature to a particular mode of
repeal. It cannot declare in advance the intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect of
subsequent legislation upon existing statutes.
Although it could be argued that Sec 33 of PD 1146 as amended does not preclude the
repeal of the tax-exempt status of GSIS, but merely imposes conditions for such to validly
occur; yet, these conditions, if honored, have the precise effect of limiting the powers of
Congress. Thus, the same rationale for prohibiting irrepealable laws applies in prohibiting
restraints on future amendatory laws.
Thus, the two conditionalities of Section 33 cannot bear relevance on whether the Local
Government Code removed the tax-exempt status of the GSIS. The express withdrawal of
all tax exemptions accorded to all persons, natural or juridical, as stated in Section 193 of
the Local Government Code, applies without impediment to the present case. Such position
is bolstered by the other cited provisions of the Local Government Code, and by the
Mactan ruling.
In addition, Sec 5 of the LGC provides that any provision on a power of a LGU shall be
liberally interpreted in its favor in case of doubt. As to the Sec of Justice legal opinion and
memo from the Office of the President, the Court said that these interpretations are not
binding upon the Court but are merely persuasive.
NO. Petition is unmeritorious. The enactment of the Senate bill has not been the first
instance where the Senate, in the exercise of its power to propose amendments to bills
(required to originate in the House), passed its own version. An amendment by substitution
(striking out the text and substituting it), as urged by petitioners, concerns a mere matter of
form, and considering the petitioner has not shown what substantial difference it would
make if Senate applied such substitution in the case, it cannot be applied to the case at bar.
While the aforementioned Constitutional provision states that bills must “originate
exclusively in the HOR,” it also adds, “but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.” The Senate may then propose an entirely new bill as a substitute measure.
Petitioners erred in assuming the Senate version to be an independent and distinct bill.
Without the House bill, Senate could not have enacted the Senate bill, as the latter was a
mere amendment of the former. As such, it did not have to pass the Senate on second and
third readings.
Petitioners question the signing of the President on both bills, to support their contention
that such are separate and distinct. The President certified the bills separately only because
the certification had to be made of the version of the same revenue bill which AT THE
MOMENT was being considered.

Astorga v. Villegas House Bill No. 9266 was passed from the House of
GR No L-23475 Representatives to the Senate. Senator Arturo Tolentino made
substantial amendments which were approved by the Senate.
DOCTRINE OF ENROLLED BILLS The House, without notice of said amendments,
ARE NOT ABSOLUTE thereafter signed its approval until all the presiding officers of
both houses certified and attested to the bill. The President
also signed it and thereupon became RA 4065.
Senator Tolentino made a press statement that the enrolled
copy of House Bill No. 9266 was a wrong version of the bill
because it did not embody the amendments introduced by him
and approved by the Senate. Both the Senate President and
the President withdrew their signatures and denounced RA
4065 as invalid. Petitioner argued that the authentication of
the presiding officers of the Congress is conclusive proof of
a bill’s due enactment.
Lambino vs. COMELEC On 25 August 2006, Lambino et. al. filed a petition with the
GR. No. 174153 Oct 25 2006 COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their INITIATIVE
PETITION to change the 1987 Constitution under Section 5(b)
and (c)2 and Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the
Initiative and Referendum Act.
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support
of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelve per centum
(12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district
represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its registered
voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC
election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million
individuals.
WON House Bill No. 9266 is considered
enacted and valid.
WON the proposed changes constitute
an amendment or revision
WON the initiative petition is sufficient
compliance with
the constitutional requirement on direct
proposal by the people
Petitioners question the power of the Conference Committee to insert new provisions. The
jurisdiction of the conference committee is not limited to resolving differences between
the Senate and the House. It may propose an entirely new provision, given that such are
germane to the subject of the conference, and that the respective houses of Congress
subsequently approve its report.
Petitioner PAL contends that the amendment of its franchise by the withdrawal of its
exemption from VAT is not expressed in the title of the law, thereby violating the
Constitution. The Court believes that the title of the R.A. satisfies the Constitutional
Requirement.
Petitioners claim that the R.A. violates their press freedom and religious liberty, having
removed them from the exemption to pay VAT. Suffice it to say that since the law granted
the press a privilege, the law could take back the privilege anytime without offense to the
Constitution. By granting exemptions, the State does not forever waive the exercise of its
sovereign prerogative.
Lastly, petitioners contend that the R.A. violates due process, equal protection and contract
clauses and the rule on taxation. Petitioners fail to take into consideration the fact that the
VAT was already provided for in E.O. No. 273 long before the R.A. was enacted. The latter
merely EXPANDS the base of the tax. Equality and uniformity in taxation means that all
taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class be taxed at the same rate, the taxing
power having authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of
taxation. It is enough that the statute applies equally to all persons, forms and corporations
placed in s similar situation.
Since both the Senate President and the Chief Executive withdrew their signatures therein,
the court declared that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become a
law. The Constitution requires that each House shall keep a journal. An importance of
having a journal is that in the absence of attestation or evidence of the bill’s
due enactment, the court may resort to the journals of the Congress to verify such. “Where
the journal discloses that substantial amendment were introduced and approved and were
not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President for signature, the court can
declare that the bill has not been duly enacted and did not become a law.”
Initiative petition does not comply with Sec. 2, Art. XVII on direct proposal by people
Sec. 2, Art. XVII is the governing provision that allows a people’s initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution. While this provision does not expressly state that the
petition must set forth the full text of the proposed amendments, the deliberations of the
framers of our Constitution clearly show that:
1. the framers intended to adopt relevant American jurisprudence on people’s initiative;
and
2. in particular, the people must first see the full text of the proposed amendments before
they sign, and that the people must sign on a petition containing such full text.
The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition” is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two
essential elements must be present.

The Lambino Group’s initiative petition changes the 1987
Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative
Department) and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive
Department) and by adding Article XVIII entitled “Transitory
Provisions.” These proposed changes will shift the present
Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary
form of government.
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended
Petition with the COMELEC indicating modifications in the
proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.
The COMELEC denied the petition citing Santiago v. COMELEC
declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement the initiative.
2 Elements of Initiative
1.First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or
representative can sign on their behalf.
2.Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is
first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a
petition. The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of
the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must stated the fact of such
attachment. This is an assurance that everyone of the several millions of signatories to the
petition had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before – not after – signing.
Moreover, “an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the nature and
effect of that which is proposed” and failure to do so is “deceptive and misleading” which
renders the initiative void.
In the case of the Lambino Group’s petition, there’s not a single word, phrase, or sentence
of text of the proposed changes in the signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet
state that the text of the proposed changes is attached to it. The signature sheet merely
asks a question whether the people approve a shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the
Unicameral- Parliamentary system of government. The signature sheet does not show to
the people the draft of the proposed changes before they are asked to sign the
signature sheet. This omission is fatal.
An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the people
the full text of the proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as a
gigantic fraud on the people. That’s why the Constitution requires that an initiative must be
“directly proposed by the people x x x in a petition” - meaning that the people must sign on
a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. On so vital an issue as
amending the nation’s fundamental law, the writing of the text of the proposed
amendments cannot be hidden from the people under a general or special power of
attorney to unnamed, faceless, and unelected individuals.
The initiative violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution disallowing revision through
initiatives
Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution. The
first mode is through Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The second
mode is through a constitutional convention. The third mode is through a
people’s initiative.
Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to “any
amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution.” In contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII,
referring to the third mode, applies only to “amendments to this Constitution.” This
distinction was intentional as shown by the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
A people’sinitiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the
Constitution and not to its revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can
propose both amendments and revisions to the Constitution.
Does the Lambino Group’s initiative constitute a revision of the Constitution?
Yes. By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of the Office of the President and
the abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere
amendment.

Amendment vs. Revision

Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a revision of a
constitution. Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the
constitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of
checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety
of the constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions of the
constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces,
or deletes without altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several
provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally affects only the specific
provision being amended.

Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the Constitution without
affecting any other section or article, the change may generally be considered an
amendment and not a revision. For example, a change reducing the voting age from 18
years to 15 years is an amendment and not a revision. Similarly, a change reducing Filipino
ownership of mass media companies from 100% to 60% is an amendment and not a
revision. Also, a change requiring a college degree as an additional qualification for election
to the Presidency is an amendment and not a revision.

The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of sections or articles of the
Constitution other than the specific provision being amended. These changes do not also
affect the structure of government or the system of checks-and-balances among or within
the three branches.

However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a revision. A

change in a single word of one sentence of the Constitution may be a revision and not an
amendment. For example, the substitution of the word “republican” with “monarchic” or
“theocratic” in Section 1, Article II of the Constitution radically overhauls the entire
structure of government and the fundamental ideological basis of the Constitution. Thus,
each specific change will have to be examined case-by-case, depending on how it affects
other provisions, as well as how it affects the structure ofgovernment, the carefully crafted
system of checks-and-balances, and the underlying ideological basis of the existing
Constitution.

Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several provisions of a

constitution, a deliberative body with recorded proceedings is best suited to undertake a
revision. A revision requires harmonizing not only several provisions, but also the altered
principles with those that remain unaltered. Thus, constitutions normally authorize
deliberative bodies like constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions to undertake
revisions. On the other hand, constitutions allow people’s initiatives, which do not have
fixed and identifiable deliberative bodies or recorded proceedings, to undertake only
amendments and not revisions.

Tests to determine whether amendment or revision

In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the
constitution just like in our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: the
quantitative test and the qualitative test. The quantitative test asks whether the proposed
change is so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the substantial entirety of the

Romualldez v. Sandiganbayan
GR. No. 152259. July 29, 2004
People of the Philippines, through PCGG, filed a petition
charging the accused with violation of Section 5, RA. 3019 as
amended. Said petitioner, brother-in-law of former President
Marcos and therefore, related by affinity within the third civil
degree, did then and there willfully and unlawfully, and with
evident bad faith, for the purpose of promoting his
self-interested sic and/or that of others, intervene directly or
indirectly, in a contract between the National Shipyard and
Steel Corporation (NASSCO), a government-owned and
controlled corporation and the Bataan Shipyard and
Engineering Company (BASECO), a private corporation, the
WON petitioner enjoys derivative
immunity from suit.
constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions. The court
examines only the number of provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the
change.
The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the
constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will accomplish such far reaching
changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision. Whether
there is an alteration in the structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, a
change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan includes change in its fundamental
framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches. A change in the nature of the basic
governmental plan also includes changes that jeopardize the traditional form of
government and the system of check and balances.
Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group’s initiative is a
revision and not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group’s proposed
changes overhaul two articles - Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive
- affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire Constitution. Qualitatively, the proposed
changes alter substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential to
parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.
A change in the structure of government is a revision
A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the three
great co-equal branches of government in the present Constitution are reduced into two.
This alters the separation of powers in the Constitution. A shift from the present
Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision of the
Constitution. Merging the legislative and executive branches is a radical change in the
structure of government. The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of
Executive Power alters the separation of powers and thus constitutes a revision of the
Constitution. Likewise, the abolition alone of one chamber of Congress alters the system of
checks-and-balances within the legislature and constitutes a revision of the Constitution.
The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between amendment and revision is only
one of procedure, not of substance. The Lambino Group posits that when a deliberative
body drafts and proposes changes to the Constitution, substantive changes are called
revisions because members of the deliberative body work full-time on the changes. The
same substantive changes, when proposed through an initiative, are called amendments
because the changes are made by ordinary people who do not make an occupation,
profession, or vocation out of such endeavor. The SC, however, ruled that the express
intent of the framers and the plain language of the Constitution contradict the Lambino
Group’s theory. Where the intent of the framers and the language of the Constitution are
clear and plainly stated, courts do not deviate from such categorical intent and language.
In Estrada vs. Desierto, the SC exhaustively traced the origin of executive immunity in order
to determine the extent of its applicability. Executive immunity applied only during the
incumbency of a President. It could not be used to shield a non-sitting President from
prosecution for alleged criminal acts done while sitting in office. The reasoning of
petitioner must therefore fail, since he derives his immunity from one who is no longer
sitting as President. Verily, the felonious acts of public officials and their close relatives are
not acts of the State, and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands on
the same footing as any other trespasser.

TANADA VS TUVERA
G.R. No. L-63915 December 29,
1986
[Effectivity and Application of
Laws]
Tatad vs. Energy & Finance
Secretary
GR No. 124360, Nov 5, 1997
majority stocks of which is owned by former President Marcos,
whereby the NASSCO sold, transferred and conveyed to the
BASECO its ownership and all its titles and interests over all
equipment and facilities including structures, buildings, shops,
quarters, houses, plants and expendable and semi-expendable
assets, located at the Engineer Island known as the Engineer
Island Shops including some of its equipment and machineries
from Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte needed by BASECO in
its shipbuilding and ship repair program for the amount of
P5,000,000.00.
Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked due process in
demanding the disclosure of a number of Presidential Decrees
which they claimed had not been published as required by Law.
The government argued that while publication was necessary
as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise provided, as
when the decrees themselves declared that they were to
become effective immediately upon approval. The court
decided on April 24, 1985 in affirming the necessity for
publication of some of the decrees. The court ordered the
respondents to publish in the official gazette all unpublished
Presidential Issuances which are of general force and effect.
The petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction
between laws of general applicability and those which are not.
The publication means complete publication, and that
publication must be made in the official gazette.
The petitioner question the constitutionality of RA No. 8180
“An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For
Other Purposes.” The deregulation process has two phases: (a)
the transition phase and the (b) full deregulation phase
through EO No. 372.
The petitioner claims that Sec. 15 of RA No. 8180 constitutes
an undue delegation of legislative power to the President and
the Sec. of Energy because it does not provide a determinate
or determinable standard to guide the Executive Branch in
determining when to implement the full deregulation of the
downstream oil industry, and the law does not provide any
specific standard to determine when the prices of crude oil in
the world market are considered to be declining nor when the
exchange rate of the peso to the US dollar is considered stable.
WON all laws shall be published in the
official gazette.
WON Sec 5(b) of R.A. 8180 violates the
one title one subject requirement of the
Constitution.
WON Sec 15 of R.A. 8180 violates the
constitutional prohibition on undue
delegation of power.
WON R.A. No. 8180 violates the
constitutional prohibition against
monopolies, combinations in restraint of
trade and unfair competition
The court held that all statute including those of local application shall be published as
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
The publication must be full or no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public
of the content of the laws. The clause “unless otherwise provided” in Article 2 of the new
Civil Code meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative, that the
publication when necessary, did not have to be made in the official gazette.
The Court consistently ruled that the title need not mirror, fully index or catalogue all
contents and minute details of a law. A law having a single general subject indicated in the
title may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as
they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in
furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the
general subject.
Adopting the ruling from Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. POEA, the Court states that:
“There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of
legislative power, viz: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first
test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislative
such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it.
Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the
law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from
running riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority
to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a
power essentially legislative.
A monopoly is a privilege or peculiar advantage vested in one or more persons or
companies, consisting in the exclusive right or power to carry on a particular business or
trade, manufacture a particular article, or control the sale or the whole supply of a
particular commodity. It is a form of market structure in which one or only a few firms
dominate the total sales of a product or service. On the other hand, a combination in
restraint of trade is an agreement or understanding between two or more persons, in the
form of a contract, trust, pool, holding company, or other form of association, for the
purpose of unduly restricting competition, monopolizing trade and commerce in a certain
commodity, controlling its production, distribution and price, or otherwise interfering with

LAMP vs. Secretary of Budget &
Management
GR No. 164987, Apr 24, 2012
Chaves vs. JBC
GR No. 202242, Apr 16, 2013
For consideration of the Court is an original action for certiorari
assailing the constitutionality and legality of the
implementation of the Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF) as provided for in Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the
General Appropriations Act for 2004 (GAA of 2004).
Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP), a
group of lawyers who have banded together with a mission of
dismantling all forms of political, economic or social monopoly
in the country. According to LAMP, the above provision is silent
and, therefore, prohibits an automatic or direct allocation of
lump sums to individual senators and congressmen for the
funding of projects. It does not empower individual Members
of Congress to propose, select and identify programs and
projects to be funded out of PDAF.
For LAMP, this situation runs afoul against the principle of
separation of powers because in receiving and, thereafter,
spending funds for their chosen projects, the Members of
Congress in effect intrude into an executive function. Further,
the authority to propose and select projects does not pertain
to legislation. “It is, in fact, a non-legislative function devoid of
constitutional sanction,” and, therefore, impermissible and
must be considered nothing less than malfeasance.
RESPONDENT’S POSITION: the perceptions of LAMP on the
implementation of PDAF must not be based on mere
speculations circulated in the news media preaching the evils
of pork barrel.
A body representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial
appointment process was conceived and called the Judicial and
Bar Council (JBC) and its composition, term and functions are
provided under Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
which also indicates that the JBC shall be composed of seven
(7) members.
WON the mandatory requisites for the
exercise of judicial review are met in this
case - YES
WON the implementation of PDAF by
the Members of Congress is
unconstitutional and illegal - NO
(1) Whether or not the conditions sine
qua non for the exercise of the power of
judicial review have been met in this
case; and
(2) Whether or not the current practice
freedom of trade without statutory authority. Combination in restraint of trade refers to
the means while monopoly refers to the end.
Ripeness - In this case, the petitioner contested the implementation of an alleged
unconstitutional statute, as citizens and taxpayers. The petition complains of illegal
disbursement of public funds derived from taxation and this is sufficient reason to say that
there indeed exists a definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy before the Court.
Locus Standi - Here, the sufficient interest preventing the illegal expenditure of money
raised by taxation required in taxpayers’ suits is established. Thus, in the claim that PDAF
funds have been illegally disbursed and wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law, LAMP should be allowed to sue.
Lastly, the Court is of the view that the petition poses issues impressed with paramount
public interest. The ramification of issues involving the unconstitutional spending of PDAF
deserves the consideration of the Court, warranting the assumption of jurisdiction over the
petition.
The Court rules in the negative
In determining whether or not a statute is unconstitutional, the Court does not lose sight of
the presumption of validity accorded to statutory acts of Congress. To justify the
nullification of the law or its implementation, there must be a clear and unequivocal, not a
doubtful, breach of the Constitution. In case of doubt in the sufficiency of proof establishing
unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain legislation because “to invalidate [a law] based
on baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it
but also of the executive which approved it.”
The petition is miserably wanting in this regard. No convincing proof was presented
showing that, indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who
actually spend them according to their sole discretion. Devoid of any pertinent evidentiary
support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a common exercise
of unscrupulous Members of Congress, the Court cannot indulge the petitioner’s request
for rejection of a law which is outwardly legal and capable of lawful enforcement.
PORK BARREL:
The Members of Congress are then requested by the President to recommend projects and
programs which may be funded from the PDAF. The list submitted by the Members of
Congress is endorsed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives to the DBM, which
reviews and determines whether such list of projects submitted are consistent with the
guidelines and the priorities set by the Executive.” This demonstrates the power given to
the President to execute appropriation laws and therefore, to exercise the spending per se
of the budget.
As applied to this case, the petition is seriously wanting in establishing that individual
Members of Congress receive and thereafter spend funds out of PDAF. So long as there is
no showing of a direct participation of legislators in the actual spending of the budget, the
constitutional boundaries between the Executive and the Legislative in the budgetary
process remain intact.
(1) Yes. The Courts’ power of judicial review is subject to several limitations, namely: (a)
there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b)
the person challenging the act must have “standing” to challenge; he must have a personal
and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury
as a result of its enforcement; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest possible opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota

In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth
member was added to the JBC as two representatives from
Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having
one-half (1/2) of a vote. In separate meetings held in 2000 and
2001, the JBC En Banc decided to allow the representatives
from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full
vote each. At present, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and
Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit
in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. Francisco I.
Chavez, (petitioner) questioned this practice in this petition.
The Supreme Court granted the petition.
Garvida v. Sales Petitioner Garvida applied for registration as member and
GR No. 124893, Apr 1, 1997 voter of the Katipunan ng Kabataan of a certain barangay.
However the Board of election tellers denied her application on
the ground that she is already 21 years and 10 months old. She
already exceeded the age limit for membership as laid down in
Sec 3(b) of COMELEC resolution no. 2824.
The municipal circuit trial court found her to be qualified and
ordered her registration as member and voter in the Katipunan
ng Kabataan. The Board of Election Tellers appealed to the RTC,
but the presiding judge inhibited himself from acting on the
appeal due to his close association with petitioner.
However, private respondent Sales a rival candidate, filed with
the COMELEC en banc a “Petition of Denial and/or Cancellation
of Certificate of Candidacy” against Garvida for falsely
representing her age qualification in her certificate of
of the JBC to perform its functions with
eight (8) members, two (2) of whom are
members of Congress, runs counter to
the letter and spirit of the 1987
Constitution.
Whether or not Garvida can assume
office as the elected SK official
of the case.
The Court disagrees with the respondents’ argument that petitioner lost his standing to sue
because he is not an official nominee for the post of Chief Justice. To question the JBC
composition for being unconstitutional is not limited to official nominees for the post of
Chief Justice.
The court recognizes the petitioner’s right to sue in this case and that he has the legal
standing to bring the present action because he has a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy. According to petitioner, “since the JBC derives financial support for its
functions, operation and proceedings from taxes paid, petitioner possesses as taxpayer
both right and legal standing to demand that the JBC’s proceedings are not tainted with
illegality and that its composition and actions do not violate the Constitution”.
The legality of the very process of the nominations to the positions in the judiciary is the
nucleus of the controversy which is considered by the court as a constitutional issue that
must be passed upon and that the allegations are substantiated by facts and, therefore,
deserve an evaluation from the court.
(2) Yes. The word “Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in
its basic sense, and not pertaining to either House of Representatives or Senate is referred
to, but that, can only have one representative. The practical purpose of the seven-member
composition of the JBC is solution to stalemate voting.
Bicameralism of “Congress” refers to its legislative function in the government. The
Constitution is clear in the distinction of the role of each house in the process of lawmaking.
In the JBC, since there is no need for a liaison between the Senate and House of
Representatives when nominating judicial officers. “Congress” must therefore refer to the
entire Legislative department. It is clear that the Constitution orders that the JBC be
composed of seven (7) members only.
Even though finding the current composition of the JBC as unconstitutional, all its prior
official actions are valid. Actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are
legally recognized under the doctrine of operative facts. These official actions are not
nullified.
In the case at bar, petitioner was born on June 11, 1974. On March 16, 1996, the day she
registered as voter for the May 6, 1996 SK elections, petitioner was twenty-one (21) years
and nine (9) months old. On the day of the elections, she was 21 years, 11 months and 5
days old. When she assumed office on June 1, 1996, she was 21 years, 11 months and 20
days old and was merely ten (10) days away from turning 22 years old. Petitioner may have
qualified as a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan but definitely, petitioner was over the
age limit for elective SK officials set by Section 428 of the Local Government Code and
Sections 3 [b] and 6 of Comelec Resolution No. 2824.
Thus, she is ineligible to run as candidate for the May 6, 1996 Sangguniang Kabataan
elections.
candidacy. He claimed that Garvida is disqualified to become a
voter and a candidate for the SK for the reason that she will be
more than twenty-one (21) years of age on May 6, 1996; that
she was born on June 11, 1974 as can be gleaned from her
birth certificate.