TORTS AND DAMAGES

Provisions on Intentional torts

I.GENERAL CONSIDERATION Ch2- Human Relations, NCC

TORT Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
 From the French word, torquere, meaning to twist. duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

 Common law definition
 An unlawful violation of private right, not created by contract, and which gives
rise to an action for damages.
 It is an act or omission producing an injury to another, without any previous
existing lawful relation of which the said act or omission may be said to be a
natural outgrowth or incident.
Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.

 Black’s Law Dictionary
 Private or civil wrong or injury, other than breach of contract,’’ for which the court
will provide a remedy in the form of an action for damages.
 It is a violation of a duty imposed by general law or otherwise upon all persons
occupying the relation to each other which is involved in a given transaction.
 There must always be violation of some duty that must arise by operation of law
and not by mere agreement of the parties.
Article 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other
means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without
just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.
Article 23. Even when an act or event causing damage to another's property was not due
to the fault or negligence of the defendant, the latter shall be liable for indemnity if through
the act or event he was benefited.

Classes of Tort/Kinds of tort liabilities Article 24. In all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a
disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness,
Intentional torts Negligence or Strict liability tort tender age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection.
negligent torts
Include conduct Involves voluntary where the person is Article 25. Thoughtless extravagance in expenses for pleasure or display during a period
where the actor acts or omissions made liable of acute public want or emergency may be stopped by order of the courts at the instance of
desires to cause the which result in independent of fault any government or private charitable institution.
consequences of his injury to others, or negligence upon
act or believes the without intending to submission of proof Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind
consequences are cause the same. of certain of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not
substantially certain fact constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and
to result from it. The actor fails to other relief:
exercise due care in
It includes: performing such (1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence;
 assault, acts or omissions
 battery, (2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;
 false
imprisonment, (3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
and
 defamation, (4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life,
 invasion of place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition.
privacy and
 interference of Article 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or
property. employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an
action for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary
administrative action that may be taken.

Article 28. Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in
labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust,
oppressive or highhanded method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who
thereby suffers damage.
Article 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his
guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same
act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence.
Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer
for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court
shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from
the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
Article 30. When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a
criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil
case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained
of.
Article 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or
omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the
criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
Article 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or
indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the
following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
1. Freedom of religion;
2. Freedom of speech;
3. Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;
4. Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
5. Freedom of suffrage;
6. The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
7. The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;
8. The right to the equal protection of the laws;
9. The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures;
10. The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
11. The privacy of communication and correspondence;
12. The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not
contrary to law;
13. The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the Government for
redress of grievances;
14. The right to be a free from involuntary servitude in any form;
15. The right of the accused against excessive bail;
16. The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial,
to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witness in his behalf;
17. Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from being
forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward
to make such confession, except when the person confessing becomes a State
witness;
18. Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same
is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been judicially
declared unconstitutional; and
19. Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or omission
constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely
separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be
proved by a preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or
omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party.
Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence.
Article 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render aid
or protection to any person in case of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be
primarily liable for damages, and the city or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible
therefor. The civil action herein recognized shall be independent of any criminal
proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such action.
Article 35. When a person, claiming to be injured by a criminal offense, charges another
with the same, for which no independent civil action is granted in this Code or any special
law, but the justice of the peace finds no reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has
been committed, or the prosecuting attorney refuses or fails to institute criminal
proceedings, the complaint may bring a civil action for damages against the alleged
offender. Such civil action may be supported by a preponderance of evidence. Upon the
defendant's motion, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to indemnify the
defendant in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
If during the pendency of the civil action, an information should be presented by the
prosecuting attorney, the civil action shall be suspended until the termination of the criminal
proceedings.
Provisions on Negligence or negligent torts
CHAPTER 2; Quasi-delicts
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)
Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code.
But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant.(n)
Article 2178. The provisions of articles 1172 to 1174 are also applicable to a quasi-delict.
(n)
Article 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause
of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the
immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the
plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
(n)
Article 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own
acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the
damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are
under their authority and live in their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for
damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are
employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in
any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when
the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in
which case what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages
caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned
prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
(1903a)
Article 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may
recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim. (1904)
Article 2182. If the minor or insane person causing damage has no parents or guardian,
the minor or insane person shall be answerable with his own property in an action against
him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed. (n)
Article 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is
responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This
responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or from
the fault of the person who has suffered damage. (1905)
Article 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the
former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the
misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found
guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next
preceding two months.
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of article 2180 are applicable. (n)
Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a
motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic
regulation. (n)
Article 2186. Every owner of a motor vehicle shall file with the proper government office a
bond executed by a government-controlled corporation or office, to answer for damages to
third persons. The amount of the bond and other terms shall be fixed by the competent
public official. (n)
Article 2187. Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar
goods shall be liable for death or injuries caused by any noxious or harmful substances
used, although no contractual relation exists between them and the consumers. (n)
Article 2188. There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant
if the death or injury results from his possession of dangerous weapons or substances, such
as firearms and poison, except when the possession or use thereof is indispensable in his
occupation or business. (n)
Article 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death
of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets,
bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision. (n)
Article 2190. The proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damages
resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary
repairs. (1907)
Article 2191. Proprietors shall also be responsible for damages caused:
(1) By the explosion of machinery which has not been taken care of with due diligence, and
the inflammation of explosive substances which have not been kept in a safe and adequate
place;
(2) By excessive smoke, which may be harmful to persons or property;
(3) By the falling of trees situated at or near highways or lanes, if not caused by force
majeure;
(4) By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or deposits of infectious matter, constructed
without precautions suitable to the place. (1908)
Article 2192. If damage referred to in the two preceding articles should be the result of
any defect in the construction mentioned in article 1723, the third person suffering
damages may proceed only against the engineer or architect or contractor in accordance
with said article, within the period therein fixed. (1909)
Article 2193. The head of a family that lives in a building or a part thereof, is responsible
for damages caused by things thrown or falling from the same. (1910)
Article 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for quasi-delict is
solidary. (n)
Provisions on Strict liability tort
TITLE VIII; NUISANCE
Article 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of
property, or anything else which:
(1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or
(2) Annoys or offends the senses; or
(3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or
(4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any
body of water; or
(5) Hinders or impairs the use of property.
Article 695. Nuisance is either public or private. A public nuisance affects a community or
neighborhood or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the
annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal. A private nuisance is one
that is not included in the foregoing definition.
Article 696. Every successive owner or possessor of property who fails or refuses to abate
a nuisance in that property started by a former owner or possessor is liable therefor in the
same manner as the one who created it.
Article 697. The abatement of a nuisance does not preclude the right of any person
injured to recover damages for its past existence.
Article 698. Lapse of time cannot legalize any nuisance, whether public or private.
Article 699. The remedies against a public nuisance are:
(1) A prosecution under the Penal Code or any local ordinance: or
(2) A civil action; or
(3) Abatement, without judicial proceedings.
Article 700. The district health officer shall take care that one or all of the remedies
against a public nuisance are availed of.
Article 701. If a civil action is brought by reason of the maintenance of a public nuisance,
such action shall be commenced by the city or municipal mayor.
Article 702. The district health officer shall determine whether or not abatement, without
judicial proceedings, is the best remedy against a public nuisance.
Article 703. A private person may file an action on account of a public nuisance, if it is
specially injurious to himself.
Article 704. Any private person may abate a public nuisance which is specially injurious to  Other provisions that are considered “tort” provisions can be found in other titles of
him by removing, or if necessary, by destroying the thing which constitutes the same, the Code and in special laws.
without committing a breach of the peace, or doing unnecessary injury. But it is necessary:
Scope and Applicable Laws (See; arts. 19-21)
(1) That demand be first made upon the owner or possessor of the property to abate the
nuisance;

(2) That such demand has been rejected;

(3) That the abatement be approved by the district health officer and executed with the
assistance of the local police; and

(4) That the value of the destruction does not exceed three thousand pesos.

Article 705. The remedies against a private nuisance are:

(1) A civil action; or

(2) Abatement, without judicial proceedings.

NEGLIGENCE
Article 706. Any person injured by a private nuisance may abate it by removing, or if
necessary, by destroying the thing which constitutes the nuisance, without committing a Statutory Basis and Requisites.
breach of the peace or doing unnecessary injury. However, it is indispensable that the  There are five sources of obligations under Article 1157 of the NCC—law, contracts,
procedure for extrajudicial abatement of a public nuisance by a private person be followed. quasi-contracts, delict and quasi-delict.
 “No obligation will be recognized and enforced by our courts unless the plaintiff can
Article 707. A private person or a public official extrajudicially abating a nuisance shall be justify said obligation as arising from one of the sources enumerated in Article 1157.
liable for damages:  Fault or negligence is an indispensable requirement of an obligation based on quasi
delict under Art 2176, NCC and the crime defined under Art. 365 RPC.
(1) If he causes unnecessary injury; or
KINDS OF NEGLIGENCE
(2) If an alleged nuisance is later declared by the courts to be not a real nuisance. CULPA CONTRACTUAL CULPA AQUILIANA
contractual fault quasi-delict
PHILIPPINE TORT LAW

Article 1157 of the NCC is the primary statute that governs torts in the Philippines.  Art. 2176 NCC. “Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, thee being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
Article 1157. Obligations arise from: there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict
1. Law; and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
2. Contracts;
3. Quasi-contracts;  Requisites of Quasi-delict:Taylor vs Mla Electric Co.16 Phil 8
4. Acts or omissions punished by law; and FACTS:
5. Quasi-delicts. (1089a)  The defendant left some twenty or thirty fulminating caps used for blasting charges
of dynamite scattered in the premises behind its power plant.
 Art. 1157 of the NCC includes quasi-delict as a source of obligation.  The plaintiff, a boy 15 years of age, in company with another boy 12 years age,
 This source of obligation is classified as “extra-contractual obligation” and is entered the premises of the defendant, saw the fulminating caps and carried them
governed by Chapter XVII, Chapter 2 of the Code consisting of Arts. 2176 to 2194. away. Upon reaching home they made a series of experiments with the caps.
  They thrust the ends of the wires into an electric light socket and obtained no result. performance.
They next tried to break the cap with a stone and failed.
 They then opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a  For instance, when breach of contract was committed through the negligence of an
yellowish substance they got matches, and the plaintiff held the cap while the other employee, the employer cannot erase his primary and direct liability by setting up the
boy applied a lighted match to the contents. defense of the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of
 An explosion followed causing injuries to the boys. This action was brought by the the employee.
plaintiff to recover damages for the injuries which he suffered.
the cap, and that having ‘contributed to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining That is to say the employer’s liability is direct and immediate, differing essentially from
factors, he cannot recover’.” Plaintiff’s action dismissed. his presumptive responsibility for the negligence of his servants based on quasi-delict
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which can be rebutted by proof of the exercise of
ISSUE: due care in their selection and supervision.
1. W/N the elements of quasi-delict to make Manila Electric Railroad And Light Company
liable - NO Distinction between culpa aquiliana from crimes
2. W/N Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co. sufficiently proved that they employed all CULPA AQUILIANA/QUASI- CRIMES/DELICT
the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage – NO DELICT
only of private concern affect the public interest
Held: “It is clear that the accident could not have happened had not the fulminating caps means of indemnification, merely punishes or corrects criminal act
been left exposed at the point where they were found, or if their owner had exercised due repairs the damage
care in keeping them in an appropriate place; but it is equally clear that plaintiff would not include all acts in which any kind of not as broad as quasi-delicts
have been injured had he not, for his own pleasure and convenience, entered upon fault or negligence intervenes; because it punished only if there is
defendant’s premises, and strolled around thereon with the express permission of the a penal law clearly covering them
defendant, and had he not picked up and carried away the property of the defendant which Liability of the employer is direct The liability of the employer of the
he found on its premises, and had he not thereafter deliberately cut open one of the caps and primary in quasi-delict. actor-employee is subsidiary
and applied a match to its contents. x xxxx

“But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant’s property with defendant’s
express invitation or permission would not have relieved defendant from responsibility for
injuries incurred thereby plaintiff, without other fault on his part, if such injury were
attributable to the negligence of the defendant, we are of the opinion that under all the
circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on
its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff, which
therefore was not, properly speaking, ‘attributable to the negligence of the defendant’, and,
on the other hand, we are satisfied that plaintiff’s action in cutting open the detonating cap
and putting a match to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the
resulting injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore, is not civilly
responsible for the injuries thus incurred.”
Distinction between culpa aquiliana from culpa contractual
CULPA AQUILIANA CULPA CONTRACTUAL
a separate source of obligation The foundation of the liability of
independent of contract. the defendant is the contract.
Cases:
 Rakes v. The Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company
Facts:
Rakes, respondent’s employee, was at work transporting iron rails from a barge in the
harbour to the company’s yard. At a certain spot near the water’s edge, the track sagged,
the car canted, the rails slid off and caught Rakes. He was amputated at about the knee.
Rakes claims that only one hand car was used in his work. Atlantic has proved that there
were two, so that the end of the rails lay upon sills secured to the cars, but without side
pieces to prevent them from slipping off.
Issue:
Whether there is contributory negligence on the part of petitioner
Held:
While Atlantic was negligent in failing to repair the bed of the track, Rakes was guilty of
contributory negligence in walking at the side instead of being in front or behind. The
amount of damages should be reduced.

The obligation to answer for the
damage that the plaintiff has
suffered arises from breach of the
contract by reason of defendant’s
failure to exercise due care in its
 Wright vs. Manile Electric, 28 Phil 122
Facts: Defendant was operating an electric street railway in the City of Manila and its
suburbs, including the municipality of Caloocan. Plaintiff’s residence in Caloocan fronted the
street along which defendant’s tracks ran, so that to enter his premises from the street
plaintiff was obliged to cross defendant’s tracks. On the night of August 8, 1909 plaintiff
drove home in a calesa and in crossing the tracks to enter his premises the horse stumbled,
leaped forward, and fell, causing the vehicle to strike one of the rails with great force. The
fall of the horse and the collision of the vehicle with the rails, resulting in a sudden stop,
threw plaintiff from the vehicle and caused the injuries complained of. It was found that at
the point where plaintiff crossed the tracks on the night in question not only the rails were
above-ground, but that the ties upon which the rails rested projected from one-third to one-
half of their depth out of the ground, thus making the tops of the rails rise some 5 to 6
inches or more above the level of the street.
Held: “A street car company which maintains its tracks in the public highway, at a point
where they are crossed by travelers, in such condition that the rails and a considerable
portion of the ties are above the level of the street, is negligent and is responsible to a
person who, having to pass over said tracks at right angles with a vehicle in the nighttime,
is injured by reason of the condition of the tracks, he using ordinary care and prudence in
making the crossing”.
 Samson vs. Dionisio, 11 Phil 538
Facts: The defendants constructed a dam closing the southern end of the Magos Creek
which empties into the Bocaue River. In consequence, the water rose during the rainy
season for lack of an outlet, and the neighboring lands, including the plaintiff’s fishpond,
became flooded. About two thousand fishes valued at P100 escaped and plaintiff filed an
action for damages against the defendants.
Held: “Hence, upon the theory already proven, that the creek in question was of public
ownership, and not the property of the defendants, it is clear that the latter had no right
whatever to construct the aid dam, closing its entrance into and communication with the
Bocaue River; and, inasmuch as they did it without any authority to the loss and prejudice
of the plaintiff, they are under obligation to indemnify the latter for the reasons alleged by
him in his complaint, in accordance with the provisions of Article 1902 of the Civil Code.”
Defendants were, therefore, condemned to pay the plaintiff P100.
 Tenchavez vs. Escano, 15 SCRA 355
Facts: Pastor Tenchavez and VicentaEscaño married secretly. They, however, did not live
together and Vicenta continued living with her parents. Vicenta cooled off and they became
estranged. Later Vicenta went to the United States. She obtained a divorce in Nevada from
Tenchavez on the ground of extreme cruelty entirely mental in character. She married an
American in Nevada, lived with him in California and had several children with him and
acquired American citizenship. Tenchavez filed an action against Vicenta in Cebu asking for
legal separation and P1, 000,000 damages. Vicenta interposed her divorce and her marriage
to her American husband as defenses.
Held: “From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a necessary
consequence that in this jurisdiction VicentaEscaño’s divorce and second marriage are not
entitled to recognition as valid; for her previous union to plaintiff Tenchavez must be
declared to be existent and undissolved. It follows likewise, that her refusal to perform her
wifely duties, and her denial of consortium and her desertion of her husband constitute in
law a wrong caused through her fault, for which the husband is entitled to the
corresponding indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176…)…” Plaintiff was held entitled to legal
separation from VicentaEscaño who was ordered to pay plaintiff P25,000 damages.
Test to determine whether or not person is negligent
 The test to determine the existence of negligence is to ask if the defendant used
reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used.
 However, to determine what a reasonable man would have done requires the
application of the test of foreseeability.
 As stated in Picart vs. Smith, the question is “Could a prudent man, in the case under
consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued?”
 In determining whether or not the actor was negligent, the court will place itself in the
position of the actor and see if a prudent man could have foreseen the harm that
would result if the conduct is pursued.
 However, the courts should look more on the possibility of hazard of some form than
the particular chance that happened.
 In other words, even if the particular injury was not foreseeable, the risk is still
foreseeable if possibility of injury is foreseeable.
Requisites of quasi-delict:
1. There must be an act or omission constituting fault or negligence;
2. Damage caused by the said act or omission; and
3. Causal relation between the damage and the act or omission.
 In relation to the discussion on quasi-delict or negligence, reference must also be made
to Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. Article 365, Imprudence and Negligence.
Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence
Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been
intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in
its maximum period to prisioncorreccional in its medium period; if it would have
constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and
medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the
penalty of arrestomenor in its maximum period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would
otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its
medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the
penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in
damage to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging
from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times such value, but
which shall in no case be less than twenty-five pesos.
 A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any
person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if
done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion,
without regard to the rules prescribed in Article sixty-four.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided
in the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the court shall impose the
penalty next lower in degree than that which should be imposed in the period which
they may deem proper to apply.
2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, to
death of a person shall be caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished by
prisioncorreccional in its medium and maximum periods.
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or falling to do an
act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on
the part of the person performing of failing to perform such act, taking into
consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition
and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which
the damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.
The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed
upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may
be in this hand to give. (As amended by R.A. 1790, approved June 21, 1957).
 In Article 365 of the RPC, there is reference not only to negligence but also to
imprudence.
 As a matter of fact, imprudence precedes negligence in Article 365.
Elements of Article 365 as provided in Cruz vs Court of Appeals GR No.
122445 November 18, 1997
Facts: On March 22, 1991, prosecution witness, Rowena Umali de Ocampo, accompanied
her mother to the Perpetual Help Clinic and General Hospital situated in Balagtas Street,
San Pablo City, Laguna. They arrived at the said hospital at around 4:30 in the afternoon of
the same day. Prior to March 22, 1991, Lydia was examined by the petitioner who found a
“Myoma” in her uterus, and scheduled her for a hysterectomy operation on March 23, 1991.
Rowena and her mother slept in the clinic on the evening of March 22, 1991 as the latter
was to be operated on the next day at 1pm. According to Rowena, she noticed that the
clinic was untidy and the windows and the floor were very dusty prompting her to ask the
attendant fora rag to wipe the window and floor with. Prior to the operation, Rowena tried
to convince her mother to not proceed with the operation and even asked petitioner for it to
be postponed, however it still pushed through after the petitioner told Lydia that operation
must be done as scheduled. During the operation, the assisting doctor of the petitioner, Dr.
Ercillo went out of the operating room and asked that tagmet ampules be bought which
was followed by another instruction to buy a bag of blood. After the operation, when Lydia
came out of the OR, another bag of blood was requested to be bought, however, the same
was not bought due to unavailability of type A from the blood bank. Thereafter a person
arrived to donate blood which was later transferred to Lydia. Rowena then noticed her
mother, who was attached to an oxygen tank, gasping for breathe apparently, the oxygen
tank is empty, so her husband and petitioner’s driver bought an oxygen. Later, without the
knowledge of Lydia’s relatives,she was decided by the doctors to be transferred to San
Pablo District Hospital were she was supposed to be re-operated. After Lydia experienced
shocks, she died.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner has been negligent which caused the death of Lydia
Umali.
Held: Yes. Whether or not a physician has committed an “inexcusable lack of precaution” in
the treatment of his patient to be determined according to the standard of care observed by
other members of the profession in good standing under similar circumstances bearing in
mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment or the present state of
medical science. A doctor in effect represents that, having the needed training and skill
possessed by physicians and surgeons practicing in the same field, he will employ such
training, care and skill in the treatment of his patients. He therefore has a duty to use at
least the same level of care that any other reasonably competent doctor would use to treat
a condition under the same circumstances. It is in this aspect of medical malpractice that
expert testimony is essential to establish not only the standard of care of the profession but
also that the physician’s conduct in the treatment and care falls below such standard.
Further, in as much as the causes of the injuries involved in malpractice actions are
determinable only in the light of scientific knowledge, it has been recognized that expert
testimony is usually necessary to the conclusion as to causation.
In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing
appellant’s negligence and for a reasonable conclusion of negligence, there must be proof
of breach of duty on the part of the surgeon as well as causal connection of such breach
and the resulting death of his patient.
In order that there may be recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the
injury for which recovery is sought must be legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the
connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural reference of
events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes. In other words, the negligence must be
the proximate cause of the injury. For negligence, no matter what it consists, cannot create
a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of and the
proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the
result would have occurred.
The elements of reckless imprudence are:
1. That the offender does or fails to do an act;
2. That the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary;
3. That it be without malice;
4. That material damage results from the reckless imprudence; and
5. That there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender, taking into
consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical
condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time, and place.
The possible causes of hemorrhage during an operation are: 1.) the failure of the surgeon
to tie or suture a cut blood vessel; 2.) allowing a cut blood vessel to get out of control; 3.)
the subsequent loosening of the tie or suture applied to a cut blood vessel; and 4.)and a
clotting defect known as DIC.
Important:
While the rule in Article 2176 requires that to be liable for damages based on
quasi-delict, there must be no pre-existing contractual relationship between the
parties, this rule is not absolute.
For on to be liable for tort even if there is a contract, there must be an act
independent of the contract that violates the contract.
 Air France vs. Carrascoso
Facts: Plaintiff Rafael Carrascoso, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino
pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes, France on March 30, 1948. On March 28, 1948 Air
France, through its agent the Philippine Air Lines, issued a ‘first class’ round trip airplane
ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff traveled ‘first class’ but at
Bangkok, the Manager of Air France forced plaintiff to vacate the ‘first class’ seat that he
was occupying because there was a ‘white man’ who, the Manager alleged, had a better
right to the seat. Carrascoso refused but notwithstanding his protests he was forced to
transfer to the ‘tourist class’. He brought this action for damages against Air France.
Held: “It is really correct to say that the Court of Appeals in the quoted portion first
transcribed did not use the term ‘bad faith’. But can it be doubted that the recital of facts
therein points to bad faith? The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his
right to a first class seat; worst, he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him from
his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to the tourist class compartment –
just to give way to another passenger whose right thereto has not been established.
Certainly, this is bad faith. Unless of course, bad faith has assumed a meaning different
from what is understood in law. For ‘bad faith’ contemplates a ‘state of mind affirmatively
operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill-will or for ulterior
purpose’ “.
Air France was, therefore, held liable to Carrascoso in the amounts of Pesos 25,000.00 as
moral damages, Pesos 10,000.00 as exemplary damages, and Pesos 3,000.00 as attorney’s
fees.
Important point again:
In an action for damages based on quasi delict, it is the burden of the plaintiff to
prove the negligence of the defendant. Absent proof, the defendant cannot be
held liable, no damage no injury.
Doctrine of Last Clear Chance
 is that the negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of
the defendant where it appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and
prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff
notwithstanding the plaintiffs negligence.
 In other words, the doctrine of last clear chance means that even though a person’s
own acts may have placed him in a position of peril, and an injury results, the
injured person isentitled to recovery.
 As the doctrine is usually stated, a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity
of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or that of a
third person imputed to the opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the
consequences of the accident.
 The practical import of the doctrine is that a negligent defendant is held liable to a
negligent plaintiff, or even to a plaintiff who has been grossly negligent in placing
himself in peril, if he, aware of the plaintiffs peril, or according to some authorities,
should have been aware of it in the reasonable exercise of due case, had in fact an
opportunity later than that of the plaintiff to avoid an accident.
Doctrine of Proximate Cause
 “that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.”
Principle of Res Ipsa Loquitur
 Res ipsa loquitur is literally translated as "the thing or the transaction speaks for itself."
 The doctrine res ipsa loquitur means that "where the thing which causes injury is
shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in
the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use
proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the
defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.
 It is simply "a recognition of the postulate that, as a matter of common knowledge and
experience, the very nature of certain types of occurrences may justify an inference of
negligence on the part of the person who controls the instrumentality causing the
injury in the absence of some explanation by the defendant who is charged with
negligence.
 It is grounded in the superior logic of ordinary human experience and on the basis of
such experience or common knowledge, negligence may be deduced from the mere
occurrence of the accident itself.
 Hence, res ipsa loquitur is applied in conjunction with the doctrine of common
knowledge.
Cases:
 Africa, et al. vs. Caltex 16 SCRA 448
Facts: A fire broke out at the Caltex service station. It started while gasoline was being
hosed form a tank into the underground storage. The fire spread and burned several
houses, among which was a house owned by the plaintiffs. The cause of the fire was not
shown by the evidence. The question is whether or not, without proof as to the cause and
origin of the fire, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should apply so as to presume negligence
on the part of the defendant.
Held: “This case is strikingly similar to the case of Jones vs. Shell Petroleum Corporation,
171 So. 447 wherein the Supreme Court of Louisiana held: “Predicated on these
circumstances and the further circumstances of defendant’s failure to explain the cause of
the fire or to show its lack of knowledge of the cause, plaintiff has evoked the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur. There are many cases in which the doctrine may be successfully invoked
and this, we think is one of them. ‘Where the thing which cause the injury complained of is
shown to be under the management of defendant or his servants and the accident is such
as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those how have its management or
control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in absence of explanation by
defendant, that the accident arose from want of care. (45 C.J. no. 768, p. 1193,. ‘This
statement of the rule of res ipsa loquitur has been widely approved and adopted by the
courts of last resort.’ “The principle enunciated in the aforequoted case applies with equal
force here. The gasoline station with all its appliances, equipments and employees, was
under the control of appellees (defendants). A fire occurred therein and spread to and
burned the neighboring houses. The persons who knew or could have known how the fire
started were appellees and their employees, but they gave no explanation thereof
whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference that the incident happened because of
want of care.” Defendants held liable.
 Republic vs Luzon Stevedoring
Facts: In the afternoon of August 17, 1960 a barge owned by defendant was being towed
down the Pasig River by two tugboats also owned by said defendant. The barge rammed
against one of the wooden piles of the Nagtahanbailey bridge, smashing the posts and
causing the bridge to list. The river, at the time was swollen and the current swift on
account of heavy downpour of rain in Manila and surrounding provinces on August 15 and
16, 1960. One of the defenses was that the collision of the barge with the supports of the
Nagtahanbridge was due to force majeure.
Held: “As to the first question, considering that the Nagtahan bridge was an immovable
and stationary object and uncontrovertibly provided with adequate openings for the
passage of water craft, including barges like that of the appellant’s, it is undeniable that the
unusual event that the barge, exclusively controlled by appellant, rammed the bridge
supports raises a presumption of negligence on the part of appellant or its employees
manning the barge or the tugs that towed it. For in the ordinary course of events, such a
thing does not happen if proper care is used. In Anglo American Jurisprudence, the
inference arises by what is known as the ‘res ipsa loquitur’ rule.” Defendant held liable.
Doctrine of Damnum Absque Injuria (Damge without injury)
 Almost all conduct may, under certain circumstances, be considered tortious.
 In all these cases, the presence of damage caused to the defendant is required. It
does not mean however that a person is always liable in each and every case that
there is damage.
 In some cases, there is no liability even if there is damage because there was no
injury — Damnum Absque Injuria.
 Where the case is one of damnum absque injuria, the conjunction of damages and
wrong is absent there can be no actionable wrong if either one or the other is wanting.
Thus, if the damage resulted because a person exercised his legal rights (like the filing
of a Complaint in good faith) it is damnum absqueinjura.
 In the above-cited Custodio case which is reproduced hereunder, Justice Florenz D.
Regalado explained the difference between damage and injury.
 He explained that mere damage without injury does not result in liability. The
explanation in Custodio was reiterated in a fairly recent case in this wise:
“x xx However, there is a material distinction between between damages and
injury. Injury is the legal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm
which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation
awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in
those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal
duty. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone,
the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not
amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations are often called damnum
absque injuria. In other words, in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for
the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted
from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff — a concurrence of
injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it. The
underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual
was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be a breach before
 damages may be awarded; and the breach of such duty should be the proximate
cause of the injury.”
PRINCIPLE OF FORTUITOUS EVENT
Article 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise
declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of
risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which,
though foreseen, were inevitable. (1105a)
Under Article 1174 of the New Civil Code, a person is not liable if the cause of damage was
fortuitous; an event which could not be foreseen, or which though foreseen, was inevitable.
(Article 2181).
Fortuitous event is
 same as what is known in the Partidas as casofortuito —
 an event which takes place by accident and could not have been foreseen.
 “Escriche defines casofortuitoas an ‘unexpected event or act of God which could
neither be foreseen nor resisted, such as floods, torrents, shipwrecks, conflagrations,
lightning, compulsion, insurrections, destruction of buildings by unforeseen accidents
and other occurrences of similar nature.
 Blackstone definition: ‘Inevitable accident or casualty; an accident produced by any
physical cause which is irresistible; such as lightning, tempest, perils of the sea,
inundation, or earthquake; the sudden illness or death of a person
 Escriche definition: ‘The event which we could neither foresee nor resist; as, for
example, the lightning stoke, hall, inundation, hurricane, public enemy, attack by
robbers;
 Bouvier definition: Any accident due to natural causes, directly, exclusively without
human intervention, such as could not have been prevented by any kind of oversight,
pains, and care reasonably to have been expected.’
ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF FORTUITOUS EVENT
1. the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the
debtor to comply with his obligation, must be independent of the human will;
2. it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the ‘casofortuito,’ or if it
can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid;
3. the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his
obligation in a normal manner;
4. the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury
resulting to the creditor.”
 the negligence of the defendant which concurred with the fortuitous event or which
resulted in the aggravation of the injury of the plaintiff will make him liable even if
there was a fortuitous event.
 When an act of God combines or concurs with the negligence of the defendant to
produce an injury, the defendant is liable if the injury would not have resulted but for
his own negligent conduct or omission.
 The whole occurrence is humanized and removed from the rules applicable to acts of
God.
 it is believed that even if the defendant is still liable, courts may equitably mitigate the
damages if the loss, even in part, would have resulted in any event because of the
fortuitous event.
 any aggravation of the injury due to fortuitous event should be taken into consideration
in the assessment of liability of the defendant.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code.
But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant. (n)
APPLICATION OF ART. 2177 IN RELATION TO /SECS. 1-4 RULE 111 RRC
RULE 111Prosecution of Civil Action
Section 1.Institution of criminal and civil actions. — (a) When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged
shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the
civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to
the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the
prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended
party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral,
nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages without specifying the amount thereof in the
complaint or information, the filing fees thereof shall constitute a first lien on the judgment
awarding such damages.
Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or
information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing
thereof in court.
Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual
damages.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the
criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be
litigated in a separate civil action. (1a)
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas PambansaBlg. 22 shall be deemed to include
the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be
allowed.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in
full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as
the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover
liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay
additional filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so
alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees
based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.
party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.
(3a)
Section 4.Effect of death on civil actions. — The death of the accused after arraignment
and during the pendency of the criminal action shall extinguish the civil liability arising from
the delict. However, the independent civil action instituted under section 3 of this Rule or
which thereafter is instituted to enforce liability arising from other sources of obligation may
be continued against the estate or legal representative of the accused after proper
substitution or against said estate, as the case may be. The heirs of the accused may be
substituted for the deceased without requiring the appointment of an executor or
administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it
may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the
latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in
accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal
actions. (cir. 57-97)
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be
substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.
A final judgment entered in favor of the offended party shall be enforced in the manner
especially provided in these rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of the deceased.

Section 2.When separate civil action is suspended. — After the criminal action has been If the accused dies before arraignment, the case shall be dismissed without prejudice to
commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final any civil action the offended party may file against the estate of the deceased. (n)
judgment has been entered in the criminal action.
DIFFERENTIATE CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM QUASI-DELICT FROM CIVIL
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted, the latter LIABILITY ARISING FROM CRIME
shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found before judgment on the merits. The
suspension shall last until final judgment is rendered in the criminal action. Nevertheless,
before judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil action, the same may, upon motion of DIFFERENCE QUASI DELICT CRIME
the offended party, be consolidated with the criminal action in the court trying the criminal Liability of employer solidary subsidiary
action. In case of consolidation, the evidence already adduced in the civil action shall be ReservationRequirement Civil aspect of the Civil aspect is
deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal action without prejudice to the right of the quasi-delict is Impliedly instituted
prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses presented by the offended party in the criminal impliedly instituted with criminal
case and of the parties to present additional evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil with criminal action, action
actions shall be tried and decided jointly. but under 2000
CrimproRules it is
independent and
During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period of prescription of the
separate
civil action which cannot be instituted separately or whose proceeding has been suspended
Effect of judgement of acquittal in Not a bar to recover Not a bar to
shall be tolled. (n)
acriminalcaseinvolvingsameact/omission civil damages recover civil
EXCEPT when damages
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action. judgement
However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding pronounces that the
in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil negligence from
liability may arise did not exist. (2a) which damage arise
is non-existent
Section 3.When civil action may proceeded independently. — In the cases provided for in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action Art. 2178. The provisions of Articles 1172 to 1174 are also applicable to a quasi-delict. (n)
may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended
Article 1172. Responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of every kind of
obligation is also demandable, but such liability may be regulated by the courts, according
to the circumstances. (1103)
Article 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that
diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad
faith, the provisions of articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the
performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required. (1104a)
Article 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise
declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of
risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which,
though foreseen, were inevitable. (1105a)
Cases:
1. Bachelor Express vs. Court of Appeals
FACTS:
–On Aug 1980, a bus owned by Bachelor Express, Inc. (BEI) and driven by Cresencio Rivera
came from Davao City on its way to Cagayan de Oro City passing Butuan City.
–While at Tabon-Tabon, Butuan City, the bus picked up a passenger and about 15 mins
later, a passenger at the rear portion suddenly stabbed a PC soldier which caused
commotion and panic among the passengers.
–When the bus stopped, passengers OrnominioBeter and NarcisaRautraut were found lying
down the road, the former already dead as a result of head injuries and the latter also
suffering from severe injuries which caused her death later.
–The passenger assailant alighted from the bus and ran toward the bushes but was killed
by the police. Thereafter, the heirs of OrnominioBeter and NarcisaRautraut, private
respondents herein the parents of Beter and Rautraut.
–RTC dismissed the complaint. Upon appeal, the decision was reversed and set aside. CA
found BEI and Rivera solidarily liable to pay the private respondents herein.
ISSUE:
1. What was the proximate cause of the whole incident?
2. Whether or not the petitioner’ common carrier observed extraordinary diligence to
safeguard the lives of its passengers? NO
RULING:
1. Petitioner, in order to overcome the presumption of fault/negligence under the law,
states that the vehicular incident resulting in the death of the passengers Beter and
Rautraut was caused by force majeure/casa fortuito.
The following essential characteristics of casa fortuito are: (1) The cause of the unforeseen
and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation,
must be independent of the human will; (2) It must be impossible to foresee the event
which constitutes the casofortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid;
(3) The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his
obligation in a normal manner. and (4) the obligor (debtor) must be free from any
participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor.
The running amuck of the passenger was the proximate cause of the incident as it triggered
off a commotion and panic among passengers started running to the sole exit shoving each
other resulting in the falling off the passengers Beter and Rautraut causing them fatal
injuries. The sudden act of the passenger who stabbed another passenger in the bus is
within context of force majeure.
2. NPC et. al. vs Court of Appeals
This is a consolidated case comprising of four separate complaints., filed against NPC and a
particular Chavez.
Plaintiffs filed a complaint against respondent for the lost of lives and destruction of
properties due to the negligence of the latter in releasing water from Angat dam during the
typhoon “Kading”
Benjamin Chavez, being the supervisor at that time of a multi-purpose hydroelectric plant in
the Angat River at Hilltop, Norzagaray, Bulacan, failed to exercise due diligence in
monitoring the water level at the dam.
NPC’s allegations were as follows:
1) the NPC exercised due care, diligence and prudence in the operation and maintenance of
the hydroelectric plant;
2) the NPC exercised the diligence of a good father in the selection of its employees; 3)
written notices were sent to the different municipalities of Bulacan warning the residents
therein about the impending release of a large volume of water with the onset of typhoon
"Kading" and advise them to take the necessary precautions;
4) the water released during the typhoon was needed to prevent the collapse of the dam
and avoid greater damage to people and property;
5) in spite of the precautions undertaken and the diligence exercised, they could still not
contain or control the flood that resulted and;
6) the damages incurred by the private respondents were caused by a fortuitous event or
force majeure and are in the nature and character of damnum absque injuria. By way of
special affirmative defense, the defendants averred that the NPC cannot be sued because it
performs a purely governmental function.

The trial court dismissed the complaints as against the NPC on the ground that the
provision of its charter allowing it to sue and be sued does not contemplate actions based
on tort. Its decision on 30 April 1990 dismissing the complaints "for lack of sufficient and
credible evidence."
Court of Appeals reversed the appealed decision and awarded damages in favor of the
private respondents. Based on the findings that From the mass of evidence extant in the
record, We are convinced, and so hold that the flash flood on October 27, 1978, was
caused not by rain waters (sic), but by stored waters (sic) suddenly and simultaneously
released from the Angat Dam by defendants-appellees, particularly from midnight of
October 26, 1978 up to the morning hours of October 27, 1978.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not respondent is negligent?
2. Whether or not the notices of warning were insufficient?
3. Whether or not The damages suffered was not DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA?
HELD: We declared therein that the proximate cause of the loss and damage sustained by
the plaintiffs therein — who were similarly situated as the private respondents herein —
was the negligence of the petitioners, and that the 24 October 1978 "early warning notice"
supposedly sent to the affected municipalities, the same notice involved in the case at bar,
was insufficient.
The petitioners were guilty of "patent gross and evident lack of foresight, imprudence and
negligence in the management and operation of Angat Dam," and that "the extent of the
opening of the spillways, and the magnitude of the water released, are all but products of
defendants-appellees' headlessness, slovenliness, and carelessness."
To exempt the obligor from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, for a breach of an
obligation due to an "act of God," the following must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of
the obligation must be independent of the will of the debtor; (b) the event must be either
unforseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the
debtor to fulfill his obligation in a moral manner; and (d) the debtor must be free from any
participation in, or aggravation of the injury to the creditor. (Vasquez v. Court of Appeals,
138 SCRA 553; Estrada v. Consolacion, 71 SCRA 423; Austria v. Court of Appeals, 39 SCRA
527; Republic of the Phil. v. Luzon Stevedoring Corp., 21 SCRA 279; Lasam v. Smith, 45
Phil. 657).
Accordingly, petitioners cannot be heard to invoke the act of God or force majeure to
escape liability for the loss or damage sustained by private respondents since they, the
petitioners, were guilty of negligence. The event then was not occasioned exclusively by an
act of God or force majeure; a human factor — negligence or imprudence — had
intervened. The effect then of the force majeure in question may be deemed to have, even
if only partly, resulted from the participation of man. Thus, the whole occurrence was
thereby humanized, as it were, and removed from the laws applicable to acts of God.
3. Juan Nakpil& Sons vs. Court of Appeals
Facts:
 Philippine Bar Association (PBA) decided to construct an office building at Intramuros,
Manila.
 The construction was undertaken by the United Construction, Inc. (United) on an
“administration basis”, on the suggestion of Juan J. Carlos (Carlos), the president and
general manager of United.
 Plans and specifications for the building were prepared by the third-party defendants
Juan F. Nakpil& Sons(Nakpil)
 The building was completed on June 1966.
 On August 2, 1968, an unusually strong earthquake hit Manila and its environs and
the building in question sustained major damage.
 PBA commenced an action for the recovery of damages arising from the partial
collapse of the building against United. In turn, United filed a third-party complaint
against the architects (Nakpil) who prepared the plans and specifications.
 Parties agreed to refer the technical issues involved in the case to a Commissioner,
Mr. Andres O. Hizon (Hizon).
 On April 30, 1979 the building was authorized to be demolished at the expense of
United and Nakpil.
 Hizon submitted his report with the findings that while the damage sustained by the
PBA building was caused by the earthquake, they were also caused by the (1) defects
in the plans and specifications prepared by the architects, (2) deviations from said
plans and specifications by United and (3) failure of United to observe the requisite
workmanship in construction of the building and of the contractors and architects to
exercise the requisite degree of supervision in the construction of the said building.
 The United Architects of the Philippines, the Association of Civil Engineers, and the
Philippine Institute of Architects filed with the Court a motion to intervene as amicus
curiae.
 The amicus curiae gave the opinion that the plans and specifications of the Nakpils
were not defective. (In contradiction to the opinion of Hizon)
Issue/s: Whether or not an act of God – an unusually strong earthquake – which caused
the failure of the building, exempts from liability, parties who are otherwise liable because
of their negligence.
Ruling: No, they are not exempted from liability. There is no dispute that the earthquake is
a fortuitous event or an act of god. But, if upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an
act of God, here concurs a corresponding fraud, negligence, delay or violation or
contravention in any manner of the tenor of the obligation, which results in loss or damage,
the obligor cannot escape liability.
The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must be one
occasioned exclusively by the violence of nature and all human agencies are to be excluded
from creating or entering into the cause of the mischief. When the effect, the cause of
which is to be considered, is found to be in part the result of the participation of man,
whether it be from active intervention or neglect, or failure to act, the whole occurrence is
thereby HUMANIZED, as it were, and removed from the rules applicable to the acts of God.
United was found to have made substantial deviations from the plans and specifications and
to have failed to observe the requisite workmanship in the construction as well as to
exercise the requisite degree of supervision. And the Nakpins were found to have
inadequacies or defects in the plans and specifications prepared by them. The deviations
made by United caused indirectly the damage sustained and that those deviations not only
added but also aggravated the damage caused by the defects made by the Nakpins.
Thus, one who negligently creates a dangerous condition cannot escape liability for the
natural and probably consequences thereof, although the act of a third person, or an act of
God for which he is not responsible, intervenes to precipitate the loss. The destruction was
not purely an act of God. Truth to tell hundreds of ancient buildings in the vicinity were
hardly affected by the earthquake. Only one thing spells out the fatal difference; gross
negligence and evident bad faith, without which the damage would not have occurred.
ARE THERE INSTANCES WHEN ONE CAN BE HELD LIABLE INSPITE OF
FORTUITOUS EVENT/S?
1. Art. 1942
The bailee is liable for the loss of the thing, even if it should be through a
fortuitous event:
(1) If he devotes the thing to any purpose different from that for which it has been
loaned;
(2) If he keeps it longer than the period stipulated, or after the accomplishment of
the use for which the commodatum has been constituted;
(3) If the thing loaned has been delivered with appraisal of its value, unless there
is a stipulation exempting the bailee from responsibility in case of a fortuitous
event;
(4) If he lends or leases the thing to a third person, who is not a member of his
household;
(5) If, being able to save either the thing borrowed or his own thing, he chose to
save the latter. (1744a and 1745)
2. Art. 1979
The depositary is liable for the loss of the thing through a fortuitous event:
(1) If it is so stipulated;
(2) If he uses the thing without the depositor's permission;
(3) If he delays its return;
(4) If he allows others to use it, even though he himself may have been authorized
to use the same. (n)
3. Art. 147
The bailor may demand the thing at will, and the contractual relation is called a
precarium, in the following cases:
(1) If neither the duration of the contract nor the use to which the thing loaned
should be devoted, has been stipulated; or
(2) If the use of the thing is merely tolerated by the owner. (1750a)
4. Art. 2148
Except when the management was assumed to save property or business from
imminent danger, the officious manager shall be liable for fortuitous events:
(1) If he is manifestly unfit to carry on the management;
(2) If by his intervention he prevented a more competent person from taking up
the management. (n)
WHY MAY A PARTY BE LIABLE DESPITE THE HAPPENING OF A FORTUITOUS
EVENT?
Even if the fortuitous event is the proximate case of the loss or injury, if there was an
intervening fault, negligence or fraud, delay, contravention of the tenor of the obligation,
still there should attach some liablity to the person (Art. 1170).
Art. 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of
his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the
immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the
plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
(n)
Two doctrines/principles under this Article:
1. Proximate Cause
 that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.
 acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by settling other events in
motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close
causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately affecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which
first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event
 should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to
expect at the moment his act or default that an injury to some person might probably
result therefrom.”
 any cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the result complained of and without which would not
have occurred and from which it ought to have been foreseen or reasonably
anticipated by a person of ordinary case that the injury complained of or some similar
injury, would result therefrom as a natural and probable consequence.”
2 TESTS OF PROXIMATE CAUSE
1. cause-in-fact tests
2. policy tests
In determining the proximate cause of the injury, it is first necessary to determine if
defendant’s negligence was the cause-in-fact of the damage to the plaintiff. If
defendant’s negligence was not a cause-in-fact, the inquiry stops; but if it is a cause-
in-fact, the inquiry shifts to the question of limit of liability of the defendant. The
latter determination of the extent of liability involves a question of policy. Considerations of
public policy may be given due weight in fixing the limits of legal liability and practical
considerations must at times determine the bounds of correlative rights and duties as well
as the point beyond which the courts will decline causal connection.
2. Contributory Negligence
 as conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm
he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for
his own protection
 conduct on the part of the plaintiff which falls below the standard to which he should
conform for his own protection and which is legally contributing cause, cooperating
with the negligence of the defendant in bringing about the plaintiff’s harm
 In the Philippines, the rule is that the contributory negligence of the plaintiff will bar
his right to recover damages if his negligence “contributes to the principal occurrence
as one of its determining factors.” Where, however, his negligence, in conjunction
with the occurrence, contributes only to his own injury, he may recover from the
defendant less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own imprudence.
1. Ramos vs C.O.L. Realty, GR No. 184905, August 28, 2009
Facts: Petitioner Ramos is the employer of RodelIlustrisimo. While Rodel was driving the
Ford Expedition of petitioner an accident ensued, wherein it bumped with a CorrollaAltis
driven by AquilinoLarin and owned by Respondent COL Realty. Due to the impact of the
vehicular mishap, the passenger of the sedan was injured.
A case was filed against Ramos making him solidarily liable with his driver. Ramos in his
opposition argued that he cannot be held solidarily liable since it is Aquilnio's negligence
that is the proximate cause of the accident. He further argued that when the accident
happened, Aquilino violated an MMDA order, i.e. prohibiting the crossing is the place where
the accident happened.
Issue Whether or not Ramos may be held liable since the proximate cause of the accident
is his employee's negligence.
Ruling: No. There is no doubt that Aquilino’s violation of the MMDA prohibition against
crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street was the proximate cause of the
accident.
Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is
that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in
motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately
effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under
such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act
or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
If Aquilino heeded the MMDA prohibition against crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah
Matanda, the accident would not have happened. This specific untoward event is exactly
what the MMDA prohibition was intended for. Thus, a prudent and intelligent person who
resides within the vicinity where the accident occurred, Aquilino had reasonable ground to
expect that the accident would be a natural and probable result if he crossed Katipunan
Avenue since such crossing is considered dangerous on account of the busy nature of the
thoroughfare and the ongoing construction of the Katipunan-Boni Avenue underpass. It
was manifest error for the Court of Appeals to have overlooked the principle embodied in
Article 2179 of the Civil Code, that when the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate
and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages.
As to the alleged Rodel's contributory negligence- the court finds it unnecessary to delve
into it, since it cannot overcome or defeat Aquilino’s recklessness which is the immediate
and proximate cause of the accident. Rodel’s contributory negligence has relevance only in
the event that Ramos seeks to recover from respondent whatever damages or injuries he
may have suffered as a result; it will have the effect of mitigating the award of damages in
his favor.
2. Pilipinas Bank vs Ca, G.R. No. 97873 August 12, 1993
Obligations; Interest Rates; CB Circular No. 416.—Note that Circular No. 416, fixing the rate
of interest at 12% per annum, deals with (1) loans; (2) forbearance of any money, goods
or credit; and (3) judgments. In Reformina v. Tomol, Jr., 139 SCRA 260 [1985], the Court
held that the judgments spoken of and referred to in Circular No. 416 are ‘judgments in
litigation involving loans or forbearance of any money, goods or credits. Any other kind of
monetary judgment which has nothing to do with nor involving loans or forbearance of any
money, goods or credits does not fall within the coverage of the said law for it is not, within
the ambit of the authority granted to the Central Bank.”
Civil Code, Art. 2209; Obligation arising from contract of purchase and sale.—What then is
the nature of the judgment ordering petitioner to pay private respondent the amount of
P2,300,000.00? The said amount was a portion of the P7,776,335.69 which petitioner was
obligated to pay Greatland as consideration for the sale of several parcels of land by
Greatland to petitioner. The amount of P2,300,000.00 was assigned by Greatland in favor of
private respondent. The said obligation therefore arose from a contract of purchase and
sale and not from a contract of loan or mutuum. Hence, what is applicable is the rate of 6%
per annum as provided in Article 2209 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and not the rate
of 12% per annum as provided in Circular No. 416.
Restitution contemplated by Sec. 5 of Rule 39, Rules of Court.—Under Section 5 of Rule 39
of the Revised Rules of Court where “the judgment executed is reversed totally or partially
on appeal, the trial court, on motion, after the case is remanded to it, may issue such
orders of restitution, as equity and justice may warrant under the circumstances.” It was to
guarantee the restitution contemplated by Section 5 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of
Court that private respondent was required by the trial court to post a bond before the writ
of advance execution was issued. In the case before us, the excess amount ordered to be
refunded by private respondent falls within the ruling in Viloria and Buiser that Circular No.
416 applies to cases where money is transferred from one person to another and the
obligation to return the same or a portion thereof is subsequently adjudged.
3. Phoenix Construction vs. IAC, GR. No. 65295, March 10, 1987
FACTS: In the early morning of November 15 1975 at about 1:30 am private respondent
Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home, he lived in 1214-B Zamora Street, Bangkal, Makati
from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss, the general manager of marketing
corporation. During these cocktails phase of the evening, Dionisio had taken“a shot or two”
of liquor. Dionisio was driving his Volkswagen car and had just crossed the intersection of
General Lacuna and General Santos Streets at Bangkal, Makati, not far from his home, and
was proceeding down General Lacuna Street, when his car headlights suddenly failed. He
switched his headlights on “bright” and thereupon he saw a Ford dumptruck, owned by and
registered in the name of petitioner Phoenix Construction Inc., was parked on the right
hand side of General Lacuna Street facing the oncoming traffic. The dumptruck was parked
askew in such a manner as to stick out onto the street, partly blocking the way of oncoming
traffic. There were no lights nor any so-called “early warning” reflector devices set
anywhere near the dumptruck, front or rear. The dumptruck had earlier that evening been
driven home by petitioner Armando U. Carbonel, its regular driver, with the permission of
his employer Phoenix, in view of work scheduled to be carried out early the following
morning, Dioniso claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but
it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. As a result of the collision, Dionisio
suffered some physical injuries including some permanent facial scars, a “nervous
breakdown” and loss of two gold bridge dentures. Dionisio commenced an action for
damages in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga.
ISSUE: Whether or not the collision is caused by the way the ford dumptruck was parked
or by the negligence of the respondent?
HELD: Both were negligent but the cause of accident of Dionisio was the wrongful and
negligent manner in which the truck was parked without any early warning reflector devices
anywhere near it front or rear. The collision of the car and the truck is a natural and
foreseeable consequences of the truck driver’s negligence. The negligence of the truck
driver is far from being “passive and static condition” it is an indispensable and efficient
cause. The improper parking of the dumptruck created an unreasonable risk of injury for
anyone driving down General Lacuna Street and for having so created this risk, the truck
driver must be held responsible. The respondents negligence is merely contributory and the
damages therefore that he will recover is subject to mitigation by the courts
4. Cadiente vs. Macas, G.R. No. 161946, Nov. 14, 2008
FACTS:BithuelMacas while standing on the shoulder of the road was bumped and run over
by a Ford Fiera, driven by Cimafranca which resulted to the amputation of both legs up to
the groins of the victim. Records showed that the Ford Fiera was registered in the name of
Atty. Cadiente, who However, claimed that when the accident happened, he was no longer
the owner of the Ford Fiera since he already sold it to Engr. Jalipa on March 28, 1994. The
victim's father, filed a complaint for torts and damages against Cimafranca and Cadiente
before the RTC of Davao City. Cadiente later filed a third-party complaint against Jalipa.
Jalipa, however, filed a fourth-party complaint against Abubakar, to whom Jalipa allegedly
sold the vehicle on June 20, 1994. The RTC rendered in favor of the plaintiff declaring Atty.
Medardo Ag. Cadiente and Engr. Rogelio Jalipa jointly and severally liable for damages to
the plaintiff for their own negligence. The Court of Appeals denied their appeal and
subsequent motion for reconsideration.
ISSUES:
1. Whether there was contributory negligence on the part of the victim, hence not entitled
to recover damages.
2. Whether the petitioner and third-party defendant Jalipa are jointly and severally liable to
the victim.
HELD:
1. NONE. Records show that when the accident happened, the victim was standing on the
shoulder, which was the uncemented portion of the highway. As noted by the trial court,
the shoulder was intended for pedestrian use alone. Only stationary vehicles, such as those
loading or unloading passengers may use the shoulder. Running vehicles are not supposed
to pass through the said uncemented portion of the highway. However, the Ford Fiera in
this case, without so much as slowing down, took off from the cemented part of the
highway, inexplicably swerved to the shoulder, and recklessly bumped and ran over an
innocent victim. The victim was just where he should be when the unfortunate event
transpired.
2. The registered owner of any vehicle, even if he had already sold it to someone else, is
primarily responsible to the public for whatever damage or injury the vehicle may cause. In
the case of Villanueva v. Domingo, we said that the policy behind vehicle registration is the
easy identification of the owner who can be held responsible in case of accident, damage or
injury caused by the vehicle. This is so as not to inconvenience or prejudice a third party
injured by one whose identity cannot be secured. Therefore, since the Ford Fiera was still
registered in the petitioner's name at the time when the misfortune took place, the
petitioner cannot escape liability for the permanent injury it caused the respondent, who
had since stopped schooling and is now forced to face life with nary but two remaining
limbs.
5. NPC vs. Heirs of Casionan, GR No. 165969, Nov. 27, 2008
Facts:
Respondents are the parents of Noble Casionan who was 19 years old at the time of the
incident that claimed his life on June 27, 1995. Noble worked as a pocket miner in Dalicno,
Ampucao, Itogon, Benguet.
A trail leading to Sangilo, Itogon, existed in Dalicno and this trail was regularly used by
members of the community. Sometime in the 1970’s, petitioner NPC installed high-tension
electrical transmission lines of 69 kilovolts (KV) traversing the trail. Eventually, some of the
transmission lines sagged and dangled reducing their distance from the ground to only
about 8 to 10 feet.
As early as 1991, the leaders of Ampucao, Itogon made verbal and written requests for NPC
to institute safety measures to protect users of the trail from their high tension wires. In a
letter, Engr. Banayot informed Itogon Mayor CresencioPacalso that NPC had installed nine
additional poles on their Beckel-Philex 60 KV line. They likewise identified a possible
rerouting scheme with an estimated total cost of 1.7 million pesos to improve the distance
from its deteriorating lines to the ground.
Noble and his co-pocket miner, Melchor Jimenez, were at Dalicno. They cut two bamboo
poles for their pocket mining. One was 18 to 19 feet long and the other was 14 feet long.
Each man carried one pole horizontally on his shoulder: Noble carried the shorter pole while
Melchor carried the longer pole. Noble walked ahead as both passed through the trail
underneath the NPC high tension transmission lines on their way to their work place.
As Noble was going uphill and turning left on a curve, the tip of the bamboo pole he was
carrying touched one of the dangling high tension wires. Melchor, who was walking behind
him, narrated that he heard a buzzing sound when the tip of Noble’s pole touched the wire
for only about one or two seconds. Thereafter, he saw Noble fall to the ground. Melchor
rushed to Noble and shook him but the latter was already dead. Their co-workers heard
Melchor’s shout for help and together they brought the body of Noble to their camp.
Police investigators who visited the site of the incident confirmed that portions of the high
tension wires above the trail hung very low, just about 8 to 10 feet above the ground. They
noted that the residents, school children, and pocket miners usually used the trail and had
to pass directly underneath the wires. The trail was the only viable way since the other side
was a precipice. In addition, they did not see any danger warning signs installed in the trail.
The elders and leaders of the community, through Mayor CresencioPacalso, informed the
General Manager of NPC in Itogon of the incident. After learning of the electrocution, NPC
repaired the dangling and sagging transmission lines and put up warning signs around the
area. Consequently, the heirs of the deceased Noble filed a claim for damages against the
NPC before the RTC in Benguet.
ISSUE: W/N the award for damages should be deleted/mitigated in view of the
contributory negligence of the victim.
RULING: No. The finding of liability on the part of petitioner NPC must stay.
As a rule, only questions of law may be entertained on appeal by certiorari under Rule 45.
The finding of negligence on the part of petitioner by the trial court and affirmed by the CA
is a question of fact which the SC cannot pass upon since it would entail going into factual
matters on which the finding of negligence was based. The finding by both courts of the
lack of contributory negligence on the part of the victim is a factual issue which is deemed
conclusive upon this Court absent any compelling reason for it to rule otherwise.
The sagging high tension wires were an accident waiting to happen. As established during
trial, the lines were sagging around 8 to 10 feet in violation of the required distance of 18
to 20 feet. If the transmission lines were properly maintained by NPC, the bamboo pole
carried by Noble would not have touched the wires. He would not have been electrocuted.
Petitioner cannot excuse itself from its failure to properly maintain the wires by attributing
negligence to the victim. In Ma-ao Sugar Central Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, it was held
that the responsibility of maintaining the rails for the purpose of preventing derailment
accidents belonged to the company. The company should not have been negligent in
ascertaining that the rails were fully connected than to wait until a life was lost due to an
accident.
Moreover, We find no contributory negligence on Noble’s part. Negligence is the failure to
observe, for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury. On the other hand, contributory negligence is conduct on the part of
the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls
below the standard which he is required to conform for his own protection. There is
contributory negligence when the party’s act showed lack of ordinary care and foresight
that such act could cause him harm or put his life in danger. It is an act or omission
amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of the person injured which, concurring with
the defendant’s negligence, is the proximate cause of the injury.
The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly
responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must
bear the consequences of his own negligence. If indeed there was contributory negligence
on the part of the victim, then it is proper to reduce the award for damages.
Art. 2179 of the Civil Code is explicit on this score:
When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury,
he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and
proximate cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may
recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
In Ma-ao Sugar Central, it was held that to hold a person as having contributed to his
injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in
disregard of warnings or signs on an impending danger to health and body.
In this case, the trail where Noble was electrocuted was regularly used by members of the
community. There were no warning signs to inform passersby of the impending danger to
their lives should they accidentally touch the high tension wires. Also, the trail was the only
viable way from Dalicon to Itogon. Hence, Noble should not be faulted for simply doing
what was ordinary routine to other workers in the area.
SC ruled that the violation of a statute is not sufficient to hold that the violation was the
proximate cause of the injury, unless the very injury that happened was precisely what was
intended to be prevented by the statute (Añonuevo v. Court of Appeals). That the pocket
miners were unlicensed was not a justification for petitioner NPC to leave their transmission
lines dangling.
In sum, the victim was not guilty of contributory negligence. Hence, petitioner NPC is not
entitled to a mitigation of its liability.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own
acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the
damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are
under their authority and live in their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for
damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are
employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in
any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when
the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in
which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages
caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned
prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
(1903a)
Degree of Proof required in trial involving vicarious liability of employers
Important Note:
Under Article 2180, where the injury is cause by the negligence of the employee, there
instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or
employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in the supervision over him
after selection or both.
Important:
There has been a drastic change in our jurisprudence insofar as liability of teachers and
heads and establishments of arts and trades.
In the cases of Exconde vs. Capuno(101 Phil. 843), Mercado vs. CA(108 Phil 414), Palisoc
vs. Brillantes, cases decided by the Supreme Court a long time ago, the Supreme Court has
uniformly held that the liability of the teacher for the tortious act of his student or pupil to
attach, he must be a teacher of a school of arts and trades.
This rule no longer applies. The provision should now apply to all schools, academic or
non-academic, school of arts or trade. There is no more distinction between the academic
and the non-academic schools insofar as torts committed by their students are concerned.
The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the students under his control and
supervision, whatever the nature of the school where he is teaching.
The Court no longer recognizes that there must be a different degree of vigilance
that should be exercised by the school authorities on the basis of the nature of their
respective schools. The injury subject of liability is caused by the school and not by
the school itself nor is it a result of the operations of the school or the equipment.
Explanation on the legal basis of this responsibility
 Cuadra vs. Monfort, 35 SCRA 160, 162-163
Facts: Plaintiff's daughter Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and defendant's daughter Maria Teresa
Monfort, 13, were classmates and friends in Grade Six. On July 9, 1962 their teacher
assigned them to weed the grass in the school premises. While thus engaged defendant's
daughter fount a plastic headband and jokingly she said aloud that she found an
earthworm. To frighten plaintiff's daughter she tossed the object at her and hit her right
eye. Plaintiff's daughter rubbed her eye and treated it with some powder. The eye became
swollen and although she underwent medical treatment and surgical operation she lost the
eye. Plaintiff instituted this action for damages against the father of Monfort.
Issue: W/N Alfonso Monfort (Maria Teresa’s father) is liable for the action of her daughter
that caused damage to her classmate (causing blindness in one eye)?
Ruling: The SC ruled that there was nothing from which it may be inferred that the
defendant could have prevented the damage by the observance of due care, or that he was
in any way remiss in the exercise of his parental authority in failing to foresee such
damage, or the act which caused it.
If the defendant is at all obligated to compensate her (Ms. Cuadra’s) suffering, the
obligation has no legal sanction enforceable in court, but only the moralcompulsion of good
conscience.
The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint is dismissed, without
pronouncement as to costs.
RATIO:
The underlying basis of the liability imposed by Article 2176 is the fault or negligence
accompanying the act or the omission, there being no willfulness or intent to cause damage
thereby. When the act or omission is that of one person for whom another is responsible,
the latter then becomes himself liable under Article 2180, such as that of the father or the
mother under the circumstances above quoted.
The basis of this vicarious, although primary, liability is, as in Article 2176, fault or
negligence, which is presumed from that which accompanied the causative act or omission.
The presumption is merelyprima facie and may therefore be rebutted. This is the clear and
logical inference that may be drawn from the last paragraph of Article 2180, which states
"that the responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage."
Since the fact thus required to be proven is a matter of defense, the burden of proof
necessarily rests on the defendant. But what is the exact degree of diligence contemplated,
and how does a parent prove it in connection with a particular act or omission of a minor
child, especially when it takes place in his absence or outside his immediate company?
Obviously there can be no meticulously calibrated measure applicable; and when the law
simply refers to "all the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage," it
implies a consideration of the attendant circumstances in every individual case, to
determine whether or not by the exercise of such diligence the damage could have been
prevented.
In the present case there is nothing from which it may be inferred that the defendant could
have prevented the damage by the observance of due care, or that he was in any way
remiss in the exercise of his parental authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the act
which caused it. On the contrary, his child was at school, where it was his duty to send her
and where she was, as he had the right to expect her to be, under the care and supervision
of the teacher. And as far as the act which caused the injury was concerned, it was an
innocent prank not unusual among children at play and which no parent, however careful,
would have any special reason to anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it reveal any
mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the child's character which would reflect
unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed to her parents.
The victim, no doubt, deserves no little commiseration and sympathy for the tragedy that
befell her. But if the defendant is at all obligated to compensate her suffering, the
obligation has no legal sanction enforceable in court, but only the moral compulsion of good
conscience.
Cases:
 NPC vs. CA, GR No. 96410 July 3, 1992
FACTS: In the early morning hours of October 27, 1978, at the height of typhoon "Kading",
a massive flood covered the towns near Angat Dam, particularly the town of Norzagaray,
causing several deaths and the loss and destruction of houses, farms, plants, working
animals and other properties of the people residing near the Angat River. Private
respondents blamed the sudden rush of water to the reckless and imprudent opening of all
the three (3) floodgates of the Angat Dam spillway, without prior warning to the people
living near or within the vicinity of the dam. In view of these, an action for damages was
filed by respondents. The trial court ruled in favor of the latter. Likewise the Court of
Appeals affirmed with said decision. Hence, a petition for review on certiorari was instituted
by the National Power Corporation (NPC) and Benjamin Chavez, Plant Superintendent of
NPC.
Petitioners denied private respondents' allegations and, by way of defense,
contended that they have maintained the water in the Angat Dam at a safe level and that
the opening of the spillways was done gradually and after all precautionary measures had
been taken. Petitioner NPC further contended that it had always exercised the diligence of a
good father in the selection of its officials and employees and in their supervision. It also
claimed that written warnings were earlier sent to the towns concerned, and that there was
no direct causal relationship between the alleged damages suffered by the respondents and
the acts and omissions attributed to the former. That it was the respondents who assumed
the risk of residing near the Angat River, and even assuming that respondents suffered
damages, the cause was due to a fortuitous event and such damages are of the nature and
character of damnum absque injuria, hence, respondents have no cause of action against
them.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners can escape civil liability by invoking force majeure as
theproximate cause of the loss and damage.
HELD: No. Petitioners cannot escape liability because their negligence is the proximate
cause of the loss and damage. Act of God or force majeure, by definition, are extraordinary
events not foreseeable or avoidable, events that could not be foreseen, or which, though
foreseen, are inevitable. It is therefore not enough that the event should not have been
foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed, but it must be one impossible to foresee
or to avoid. 7As a general rule, no person shall be responsible for those events which could
not be foreseen or which though foreseen, were inevitable.
However, the principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that
the act must be occasioned solely by the violence of nature. Human intervention is to be
excluded from creating or entering into the cause of the mischief. When the effect is found
to be in part the result of the participation of man, whether due to his active intervention or
neglect or failure to act, the whole occurrence is then humanized and removed from the
rules applicable to the acts of God.
Generally it cannot be said that damage, injury or loss is due to an act of God
where it was caused merely by excessive or heavy rainfall, storms and to weather
conditions which are not unusual in character, those which could have been reasonably
anticipated or where the injury complained of is due rather to the negligence or
mismanagement of man than to the disturbance of the elements or where such damage,
injury or loss might have been mitigated or prevented by diligence exercised after the
occurrence.
In the case at bar, although the typhoon "Kading" was an act of God, petitioners
can not escape liability because their negligence was the proximate cause of the loss and
damage. The Court of Appeals found that the defendants failed to take the necessary
safeguards to prevent the danger that the Angat Dam posed in a situation of such nature as
that of typhoon "Kading". The representative of the "PAG-ASA" who testified in these
proceedings, Justo Iglesias, Jr., stated that based on their records the rainfall on October
26 and 27, 1978 is classified only as moderate, and could not have caused flash floods. He
testified that flash floods exceeds 50 millimeters per hour and lasts for at least two (2)
hours. He stated that typhoon "Yaning" which occurred on October 7 to 14, 1978 gave a
much heavier rainfall than "Kading", and so did other previous typhoons.
Also, despite of the announcements of the newspaper of the expected occurrence
of a powerful typhoon code-named "Kading", the water level in the dam was maintained at
its maximum from October 21, until midnight of October 26, 1978.
It has been held in several cases that when the negligence of a person concurs
with an act of God producing a loss, such person is not exempt from liability by showing
that the immediate cause of the damage was the act of God. To be exempt he must be free
from any previous negligence or misconduct by which the loss or damage may have been
occasioned.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the Decision appealed from, the same
is hereby affirmed in toto, with cost against petitioner.
 Libi vs. IAC GR No. 70890, Sept. 18, 1992
FACTS: Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were a sweetheart until the former broke up
with the latter after she found out the Wendell was irresponsible and sadistic. Wendell
wanted reconciliation but was not granted by Julie so it prompted him to resort to threats.
One day, there were found dead from a single gunshot wound each coming from the same
gun. The parents of Julie herein private respondents filed a civil case against the parents of
Wendell to recover damages. Trial court dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of
evidence but was set aside by CA.
ISSUE: WON the parents should be held liable for such damages.
HELD:
The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed
under Art 2180 of the Civil Code and Art. 101 of Revised Penal Code covered obligations
arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses. The court held that the civil liability of
the parents for quasi-delict of their minor children is primary and not subsidiary and that
responsibility shall cease when the persons can prove that they observe all the diligence of
a good father of a family to prevent damage. However, Wendell’s mother testified that her
husband owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box inside a drawer in their
bedroom. Each of the spouses had their own key. She likewise admitted that during the
incident, the gun was no longer in the safety deposit box. Wendell could not have gotten
hold of the gun unless the key was left negligently lying around and that he has free access
of the mother’s bag where the key was kept. The spouses failed to observe and exercise
the required diligence of a good father to prevent such damage.
 Spouses Jaime vs. Apostol, et.al. GR No. 163609, Nov. 27, 2008
FACTS:
Fidel Loano, an employee of the Municipality of Koronadal, borrowed the pick-up truck
owned by Rodrigo Apostol from its current possessor Ernesto Simbulan to ferry Mayor
Miguel of Koronadal to Buayan Airport. The pick-up accidentally hit a minor, Marvin C.
Jayme, who was crossing the National Highway. The intensity of the collision sent Marvin 50
meters away from point of impact, a clear indication that Lozano was driving at a very high
speed at the time of the accident. Despite medical treatment, Marvin died six days after the
accident.
Marvin’s parents filed a complaint for damages with the RTC against the driver, the mayor,
the owner of the pick-up, Simbulan and the Municipality of Koronadal (now City), pointing
out that the proximate cause was Lozano’s negligent and reckless operation of the vehicle.
And that applying the doctrine of vicarious liability or imputed liability, Mayor Miguel should
be liable for his employee’s negligent acts. On the other hand, Apostol and Simbulan
averred that Lozano took the pick-up without their consent. Mayor Miguel and Lozano
pointed that Marvin’s sudden sprint across the highway made it impossible to avoid the
accident.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Marvin’s parents, absolving Simbulan and the
Municipality of Koronadal from liability. Fidel, Rodrigo and Mayor Miguel are ordered jointly
and severally liable to pay Marvin’s parents damages. In his appeal, Mayor Miguel claims
that the real employer of Lozano was the Municipality of Koronadal and not him. The CA
granted his appeal and dismissed the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal mayor be held solidarily liable for the negligent acts of
the driver assigned to him, which resulted in the death of a minor pedestrian.
RULING: NO. PETITION DENIED.
Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides that a person is not only liable for one's own quasi-
delictual acts, but also for those persons for whom one is responsible for. This liability is
popularly known as vicarious or imputed liability. To sustain claims against employers for
the acts of their employees, the following requisites must be established: (1) That the
employee was chosen by the employer personally or through another; (2) That the service
to be rendered in accordance with orders which the employer has the authority to give at
all times; and (3) That the illicit act of the employee was on the occasion or by reason of
the functions entrusted to him.
Significantly, to make the employee liable under paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article 2180, it must
be established that the injurious or tortuous act was committed at the time the employee
was performing his functions.
Indeed, it was the Municipality of Koronadal who is the lawful employer of Lozano at the
time of accident. Though Mayor Miguel, also an employee of the municipality, “loaned”
Lozano to drive him to the airport, the Municipality of Koronadal remains to be Lozano’s
employer.
Significantly, no negligence may be imputed against a fellow employee although the person
may have the right to control the manner of the vehicle's operation. In the absence of an
employer-employee relationship establishing vicarious liability, the driver's negligence
should not be attributed to a fellow employee who only happens to be an occupant of the
vehicle. Whatever right of control the occupant may have over the driver is not sufficient by
itself to justify an application of the doctrine of vicarious liability.
 St. Francis High School et. al vs. CA, GR No. 82465, Feb. 25, 1991
FACTS:
 Ferdinand Castillo, a 13-year-old freshman student of Section 1-C at the St. Francis
High School (SFHS) wanted to join a school picnic at Talaan Beach, Sariaya,
Quezon. However, his parents, Dr. Romulo Castillo and Lilia Castillo, because of
short notice, did not allow him.
 He was only allowed to bring food (adobo) to the teachers for the picnic. However,
the teachers persuaded him to go with them to the beach.
 During the picnic, a teacher was apparently drowning. Some students, including
Ferdinand, came to her rescue, but in the process, it was Ferdinand himself who
drowned. He was brought to Mt. Cannel General Hospital but was pronounced
dead on arrival.
 Ferdinand’s parents filed a case for damages against SFHS and the teachers.
 The CA declared that the teachers failed to exercise the diligence of a good father
of the family to guard against the foreseen harm. Also, SFHS and principal
Benjamin Illumin was declared jointly and solidarily liable with the teachers for the
death of Ferdinand, under Art 2180.
ISSUE: WON the school SFHS, principal and teachers were liable for the death of
Ferdinand? – NO.
HELD:
 NO. petitioners were able to prove that they had exercised the required diligence.
 It is the rule in Art 2180 that the negligence of the employees in causing the injury
or damage gives rise to a presumption of negligence on the part of SFHS and its
principal; and while this presumption is not conclusive, it may be overthrown only
by clear and convincing proof that the owner and/or manager (SFHS and principal)
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and/or supervision of the employee or employees causing the injury or damage (in
this case, the defendants-teachers).
 Art 2180, par. 4 provides:
 “The obligation imposed by Art 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.”
 “Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry.”
 SC found that CA committed an error in applying Art 2180 of the Civil Code in
rendering SFHS liable for the death of respondent's son.
 SC found that the teachers are neither guilty of their own negligence nor guilty of
the negligence of those under them. Consequently they cannot be held liable for
damages of any kind.
 At the outset, it should be noted that respondent spouses, parents of the victim
Ferdinand, allowed their son to join the excursion. The fact that he gave money to
his son to buy food for the picnic even without knowing where it will be held, is a
sign of consent for his son to join the same.
 In the case at bar, the teachers were not in the actual performance of their
assigned tasks. The incident happened outside the school premises, not on a
school day and most importantly while the teachers and students were holding a
purely private affair, a picnic. This picnic had no permit from the school head or its
principal, because this picnic is not a school-sanctioned activity or an extra-
curricular activity. Mere knowledge by the principal of the planning of the picnic by
the students and teachers does not in any way show acquiescence or consent to
the holding of the same.
 It was shown that Connie Arquio, the class adviser of I-C, did her best and
exercised diligence of a good father of a family to prevent any untoward incident
or damages to all the students who joined the picnic.
a. Connie invited co-petitioners Tirso de Chavez (who conducted first aid on
Ferdinand) and LuisitoVinas who are both P.E. instructors and scout masters
who have knowledge in First Aid application and swimming.
b. Even respondents' witness, Segundo Vinas, testified that the teachersbrought
life savers in case of emergency.
c. The records also show that both petitioners Chavez and Vinas did all what is
humanly possible to save the child.
 Moreover, as already pointed out hereinabove, the teachers are not guilty of any
fault or negligence, hence, no moral damages can be assessed against them.
 “Art. 2217. Moral Damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral
damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's
wrongful act or omission.”
 While it is true that Ferdinand’s parents did give their consent to their son to join
the picnic, this does not mean that the school and teachers were already relieved
of their duty to observe the required diligence of a good father of a family in
ensuring the safety of the children. But in the case at bar, petitioners were able to
prove that they had exercised the required diligence. Hence, the claim for moral or
exemplary damages becomes baseless.
 As for YolyJaro and NidaAragones, the two teachers who came to the picnic late
and after the drowning because they previously conducted entrance examinations
in said school, they had noparticipation in the alleged negligence. Accordingly, they
must be absolved from any liability.

SEPARATE OPINIONS:
 Other SC members dissented, saying that the teachers failed to exercise diligent
supervision over the students, including the two late teachers. Their negligent acts
are the proximate cause of the death.
 Estacion vs. Bernardo, GR No. 144723, Fe. 27, 2006
FACTS:
On October 16, 1982 in the afternoon, respondent Noe Bernardo was going home
to Dumaguete from Cebu. He boarded a Ford Fiera jeepney driven by Quinquillera and
owned by Bandoquillo. He was seated on the extension seat at the center of the Fiera.
From San Jose, an old woman wanted to ride so Noe offered his seat and hung/stood on
the left rear carrier of the vehicle. The Fiera slowed down and stopped to pick up more
passengers.
Suddenly, an Isuzu cargo truck owned by the petitioner Larry Estacion and driven
by Gerosano, which was travelling in the same direction, hit the rear portion of the jeepney.
The Fiera crushed Bernardo’s legs and feet, and he was brought to Silliman University
Medical Center where his lower left leg was amputated. Police report showed that there
were 10 more who were injured by the accident.
On February 18, 1993, Bernardo, and his guardian ad litem Arlie Bernardo, filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete a complaint for damages arising from quasi-
delict against petitioner as owner of the truck and his driver. RTC ruled that Gerosano was
negligent and it was the direct and proximate cause of the incident. It also held petitioner
liable as employer. CA affirmed in toto the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is liable and whether or not Bernardo was guilty of
contributory negligence
HELD:
YES.
RATIO:
From the way the truck reacted to the application of the brakes, it can be shown
that Gerosano was driving at a fast speed because the brakes skidded a lengthy 48 ft. as
shown in the sketch of the police. There was also only one tire mark which meant that the
brakes of the truck were not aligned properly, otherwise, there would have been 2 tire
marks. It is the negligent act of the petitioner’s driver of driving the cargo truck at a fast
speed coupled with faulty brakes which was the proximate cause of the respondent
Bernardo’s injury. As employer of Gerosano, petitioner is primarily and solitarily liable for
the quasi-delict committed by the former. He is presumed to be negligent in the selection of
his employee which petitioner failed to overcome. He failed to show that he examined
driver Gerosano as to his qualifications, experience and records.
Bernardo is guilty of contributory negligence by standing at the rear portion of the
jeep. Contributory Negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a
legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is
required to conform for his own protection. Bernardo’s act of standing on the left rear
portion showed his lack of ordinary care and foresight that such act could cause him harm
or put his life in danger. To hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be
shown that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warning or
signs of an impending danger to health and body. Quinquillera (jeepney driver) was also
negligent because there was overloading which is in violation of traffic rules and
regulations. He also allowed Bernardo to stand on the left rear of his jeep. There is also a
presumption of negligence on the part of the owner of the jeep, Bandoquillo, to which she
did not rebut.
 City Government of Tagaytay vs. Guerrero, GR No. 140743&140745, Sept 17,
2009
FACTS: Tagaytay-Taal Tourist Development Corporation (TTTDC) is the registered owner
of two parcels of land and it incurred real estate tax liabilities on the said properties for the
tax years 1976 to 1983. The City Government of Tagaytay offered the properties for sale at
a public auction. Being the only bidder, a certificate of sale was executed in favor of the
City of Tagaytay and was correspondingly inscribed on the titles of the lands . The City of
Tagaytay filed an unnumbered petition for entry of new certificates of title in its favor
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cavite. RTC granted the petition. The TTTDC
appealed to the CA. The subject properties were later purchased by AmuerfinaMelencio-
Herrera and EmilianaMelencio-Fernando (Melencios) for the amount equivalent to the taxes
and penalties due to the same. Meanwhile, during the pendency of the case before the CA,
TTTDC filed a petition for nullification of the public auction involving the disputed properties
on the ground that the properties were not within the jurisdiction of the City of Tagaytay
and thus, beyond its taxing authority. On the other hand, the City of Tagaytay averred that
based on its Charter, said properties are within its territorial jurisdiction. The RTC denied
this motion.
ISSUE: WON the City of Tagaytay is liable for damages to the Melencios
HELD: YES. The City of Tagaytay acted in bad faith when it levied real estate taxes on the
subject properties, and should be held accountable for all the consequences thereof,
including the void sale of the properties to the Melencios. The City of Tagaytay is
accountable for erroneously assessing taxes on properties outside its territorial jurisdiction.
The failure of the city officials in this case to verify if the property is within its jurisdiction
before levying taxes on the same constitutes gross negligence. The negligence of its officers
in the performance of their official functions gives rise to an action ex contractu and quasi
ex-delictu. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the City of Tagaytay is liable for all
the necessary and natural consequences of the negligent acts of its city officials. It is liable
for the tortious acts committed by its agents who sold the properties to the Melencios
despite the clear mandate of RA No 1418, separating Barrio Birinayan from its jurisdiction
and transferring the same to the Province of Batangas. The City of Tagaytay is liable to
return the full amount paid by the Melencios during the auction sale of the subject
properties by way of actual damages. Moral damages are awarded to enable the injured
party to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral
suffering the person has undergone, by reason of defendant's culpable action. The award is
aimed at restoration, as much as possible, of the spiritual status quo ante. Thus, it must be
proportionate to the suffering inflicted. The Melencios are likewise entitled to exemplary
damages. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of example or correction
for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated, or compensatory
damages.
 Art. 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees
may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim.
(1904)
Reason for the rule: It should be the person who caused the injury who should pay for the
damage done. The fact that another person paid the obligation does not exempt him from
liability because of the principle that no one shall enrich himself at the expense of another.
 Art. 2182. If the minor or insane person causing damage has no parents or
guardian, the minor or insane person shall be answerable with his own property in an action
against him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed. (n)
Important: There must be the appointment of a guardian ad litem in case minor has no
parents before child can be made to pay from his own funds.
Question:
What if the child has no money or resources? Will the damage done remain without relief?
Civil judgment can be enforced within a period of five years by execution, by filing a motion
for issuance of writ of execution. If after five but within 10 years, revivial of judgment
(Rules of Court!!!!)
 Art. 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is
responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This
responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or
from the fault of the person who has suffered damage. (1905)
Important: The possessor need not be the owner of the animal
 Art. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if
the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented
the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found
guilty or reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next
preceding two months.
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of Article 2180 are applicable. (n)
Nature of liability of employer
Important:
Liability of employer is purely civil and not criminal, as the criminal without a showing that
the other participated directly or constructively in the act or that the act was done in
furtherance of common design or purpose for which the parties were united in intention.
Cases:
 Manlangit vs. Urgel
Facts: On August 13, 1994, the jeepney owned by complainant and driven by Edgardo
Castillo, plied its usual route going to Virac, Catanduanes. While approaching a blind curve,
the jeepney driver occupied the wrong lane. At the curve, they suddenly saw a parked
dump truck and in order to avoid collision driver swerved to the right and accidentally
plunged into the river. The passengers sustained some injuries.
Consequently, a criminal complaint against Castillo and complainant was filed before the
sala of respondent judge who then issued a warrant for the arrest of both Castillo and
complainant.
Issue: WON complainant can be held criminally liable.
Ruling: It is a basic postulate in criminal law that the criminal act of one person cannot be
charged to another without a showing that the other participated directly or constructively
in the act or that the act was done in furtherance of a common design or purpose for which
the parties were united in intention. In cases of employer-employee relations, an employer
is not criminally liable for the criminal acts of his employee or agent unless he, in some
way, participates in, counsels or abets his employee's acts or omissions. In such case, the
employer himself becomes a participant to the criminal act of his employee. His liability
under the circumstances is direct and criminal. However, under Article 102, in relation to
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, the employer's liability for the criminal negligence of
his employee is subsidiary in nature and is limited only to civil indemnity. Thus, an employer
is party to a criminal case for the criminal negligence of his employee only by reason of his
subsidiary civil liability under the law.
n the case at bar, we carefully reviewed the transcript of the preliminary examination
conducted by respondent judge. Nowhere does it show that complainant/jeepney owner
participated in, abetted or even approved the negligent and reckless manner in which his
driver maneuvered the vehicle on that blind curve. Moreover, it does not appear that
complainant's driver continuously pursued a reckless and thoughtless control of the
wheel throughout the journey, with nary an admonition or reproof on the part of
complainant/jeepney owner. It is evident that the driver's decision to go on the wrong
lane while approaching a blind curve was a split second judgment which left neither the
complainant nor any of the passengers time to react to the perilous maneuver.
 Caedo vs. Yu Khe Tai, L-20392, Dec. 18, 1968
FACTS:
Plaintiff Caedo was driving his Mercury car at about 5:30 in the morning of March 24, 1958
along E. de los Santos Ave., in the vicinity of San LorenzoVillage bound for the airport.
Several members of his family were in the car. Coming from the opposite direction was the
Cadillac car of defendant Yu Khe Thai driven by his driver Rafael Bernardo. The two cars
were traveling at a moderate speed with their headlights on. Ahead of the Cadillac was a
caretela. Defendant’s driver did not notice it until he was about eight (8) meters away.
Instead of slowing down behind the caretela defendant’s driver veered to the left with
the intention of passing by the caretela but in doing so its rear bumper caught the ream of
thecaretela’s left wheel wrenching it off. Defendant’s car skidded obliquely to the other end
and collided with the on-coming vehicle of the plaintiff. The plaintiff on his part, slackened
his speed and tried to avoid the collision by veering to the right but the collision occurred
just the same injuring the plaintiff and members of his family. Plaintiff brought an action for
damages against both the driver and owner of the Cadillac car. There was no question that
defendant’s driver was negligent and liable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not defendant Yu Khe Thai, owner of the car, who was in the car, was solidarily
liable with the driver under Art. 2184, of the Civil Code.
RULING:
The applicable law is Article 2184 of the Civil Code. Under the said provision, if the
causative factor was the driver’s negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was present is
likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due diligence.
The basis of the master’s liability in civil law is not respondent superior but rather the
relationship of paterfamilias. The theory is that ultimately the negligence of the servant, if
known to the master and susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his own
negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury or damage.
Negligence on the part of the owner, if any, must be sought in the immediate setting and
circumstances of the accident, that is, in his failure to detain the driver from pursuing a
course which not only gave him clear notice of the danger but also sufficient time to act
upon it. We do not see that such negligence may be imputed. The car, as has been stated,
was not running at an unreasonable speed. The road was wide and open, and devoid of
traffic that early morning. There was no reason for the car owner to be in any special state
of alert. He had reason to rely on the skill and experience of his driver. He became aware of
the presence of the carretela when his car was only twelve meters behind it, but then his
failure to see it earlier did not constitute negligence, for he was not himself at the wheel.
And even when he did see it at that distance, he could not have anticipated his driver’s
sudden decision to passthe carretela on its left side in spite of the fact that another car was
approaching from the opposite direction. The time element was such that there was no
reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks involved and warn the
driver accordingly. The thought that entered his mind, he said, was that if he sounded a
sudden warning it might only make the other man nervous and make the situation worse. It
was a thought that, wise or not, connotes no absence of that due diligence required by law
to prevent the misfortune. Under the facts the owner of the car was not liable.
Liability of Owners of Motor Vehicles
Art. 2185 —Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a
motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic
regulation. (n)
- This provision establishes a disputable presumption that the driver is negligent if, at the
time of the mishap, he was found violating any traffic regulation or had been found guilty of
reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two
months.
- The object of the law is establishing such a presumption is to require owners of motor
vehicles to exercise greater care and diligence in selecting careful and competent drivers
and in supervising over their acts.
note: If the owner is not in the vehicle at the time of the mishap his liability is governed by
the provisions of Art. 2180.
note: Owners of motor vehicles are required to file a bond executed by a government-
controlled corporation to answer for the damages that may be caused to third persons. (Art.
2184)
CASE: Guillanget. al vs. Bedania et. al.
GR NO. 162987, May 21, 2009
Facts:
Sometime in October 1994, Antero Guillang, accompanied by 3 other people, was driving
his Corolla along Aguinaldo Highway in Cavite when it was hit by a turning 10-wheeler truck
driven by Rodolfo Bedania and owned by Rodolfo de Silva. The passengers of the car were
rushed to the Medical Center in Dasmariñas, Cavite for treatment. Because of severe
injuries, Antero, one of the passengers, was later transferred to the Philippine General
Hospital. However, on 3 November 1994, Antero died due to the injuries he sustained from
the collision. The car was a total wreck while the truck sustained minor damage.
This prompted the heirs of Antero to institute a complaint for damages based on quasi-
delict against respondents Bedania and De Silva. The trial court rendered a decision in favor
of petitioners and found Bedania grossly negligent for recklessly maneuvering the truck by
making a sudden U-turn in the highway without due regard to traffic rules and the safety of
other motorist while De Silva was held grossly negligent in the selection and supervision of
his driver, Bedania.
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the lower court and dismissed the civil case for
lack of merit. Petitioners then filed a MR but to no avail.
Issue:
Whether or not Bedania and De Silva may be held liable for gross negligence?
Held:
The trial court held Bedania and De Silva, as Bedania’s employer, liable because the
proximate cause of the collision was the sudden U-turn executed by Bedania without any
signal lights. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision and
held Genaro liable because the proximate cause of the collision was Genaro’s failure to stop
the car despite seeing that Bedania was making a U-turn.
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another
person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly
demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. In Picart v. Smith, we held that the test
of negligence is whether the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act used that
reasonable care and caution which an ordinary person would have used in the same
situation.
Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, a person
driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any
traffic regulation.
In this case, the report showed that the truck, while making the U-turn, failed to signal, a
violation of traffic rules. The police records also stated that, after the collision, Bedania
escaped and abandoned the petitioners and his truck. This is another violation of a traffic
regulation. Therefore, the presumption arises that Bedania was negligent at the time of the
mishap.
The evidence presented in this case also does not support the conclusion of the Court of
Appeals that the truck had already executed the U-turn before the impact occurred. If the
truck had fully made the U-turn, it should have been hit on its rear. If the truck had already
negotiated even half of the turn and is almost on the other side of the highway, then the
truck should have been hit in the middle portion of the trailer or cargo compartment. But
the evidence clearly shows, and the Court of Appeals even declared, that the car hit the
truck’s gas tank, located at the truck’s right middle portion, which disproves the conclusion
of the Court of Appeals that the truck had already executed the U-turn when it was hit by
the car.
Contrary to the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, the sheer size of the truck does not
make it improbable for the truck to execute a sudden U-turn. The trial court’s decision did
not state that the truck was traveling at a fast speed when it made the U-turn. The trial
court said the truck made a "sudden" U-turn, meaning the U-turn was made unexpectedly
and with no warning, as shown by the fact that the truck’s signal lights were not turned on.
Clearly, Bedania’s negligence was the proximate cause of the collision which claimed the life
of Antero and injured the petitioners. Proximate cause is that which, in the natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the result would not have occurred.The cause of the collision is traceable
to the negligent act of Bedania for if the U-turn was executed with the proper precaution,
the mishap in all probability would not have happened. The sudden U-turn of the truck
without signal lights posed a serious risk to oncoming motorists. Bedania failed to prevent
or minimize that risk. The truck’s sudden U-turn triggered a series of events that led to the
collision and, ultimately, to the death of Antero and the injuries of petitioners.
We agree with the trial court that de Silva, as Bedania’s employer, is also liable for the
damages suffered by petitioners. De Silva failed to prove that he exercised all the diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employees.
The Decision was reversed and it ordered Rodolfo Bedania and Rodolfo de Silva, jointly and
severally, to pay the Funeral and Burial expenses of Antero, hospitalization expenses and
moral damages to the other passengers
___________________________________________________
Liability of Manufacturers and Processors
Art. 2186 —Every owner of a motor vehicle shall file with the proper government office a
bond executed by a government-controlled corporation or office, to answer for damages to
third persons. The amount of the bond and other terms shall be fixed by the competent
public official. (n)
Art. 2187 — Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar
goods shall be liable for death or injuries caused by any noxious or harmful substances
used, although no contractual relation exists between them and the consumers. (n)
- The provision is limited only to manufacturers of: liability under this
a.) foodstuffs
b.) drinks
c.) toilet articles
d.) similar goods for death or injuries caused by any obnoxious or harmful
substances used
Possession of Dangerous Weapons and Substances
Art. 2188 — There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant if
the death or injury results from his possession of dangerous weapons or substances, such
as firearms and poison, except when the possession or use thereof is indispensable in his
occupation or business. (n)
- Dangerous weapons and substances, such as firearms and poison, always constitute
danger to human life and limb. Therefore, they should be possessed or used only by
persons who need them in their occupation or business hence the passage of this new
provision to discourage carrying said weapons and substances
note: How can prima facie presumption of negligence be overcome in this case?
- it must be sufficiently proven by the person who was caught in possession of any
dangerous weapon or substances that such was possession or use thereof is indispensable
in his occupation or business.
Liability of Municipal Corporations in certain cases
Art. 2189 — Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death
of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets,
bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision. (n)
- Municipal corporations exercise both governmental and business or corporate powers.
a.) Exercise of governmental power - municipal corporations are NOT liable to private
person
b.) Wrongful exercise of business or corporate powers - municipal corporations are liable to
private persons in the same manner as a private corporation or individual is liable
note: The rationale for imposing liability in the instance mentioned in the provision is that
such are considered functions of municipal corporations in connection with such public
works as corporate and not governmental
___________________________________________________
CASE: City of Manila vs. Teotico
(L-23052, Jan. 29, 1968)
Facts:
At about 8:00 in the evening, private respondent Genaro Teotico was at the corner of the
Old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, within a loading and unloading zone, waiting for
a jeepney when one came along to stop. As he stepped down from the curb to board the
jeepney and took a few steps, he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted manhole.
The fall caused Teotico’s head to hit the rim and break his eyeglasses and the broken
pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid. Hewas then brought to PGH to be treated of his
injuries. Respondent suffered contusions in various parts of his body and allergic eruptions
caused by the anti-tetanus injections administered to him which required further medical
treatment and payment of these charges.
Thus, respondent filed a complaint for damages against the City of Manila, its mayor, city
engineer, city health officer, city treasurer and chief of police. The trial court dismissed the
complaint. On appeal, the City of Manila was sentenced to pay the damages. City of Manila
filed a certiorari before the Supreme Court
Issue:
Whether or not the City of Manila should be held liable for the damages?
Held:
Instead on Art. 2189 of the Civil Code, petitioner rests its argument on the provision of
Republic Act No. 409 (Charter of the City of Manila which reads:
“The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or property arising
from the failure of the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other city officer, to enforce the
provisions of this chapter, or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence of said Mayor,
Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions.”
Being a special law, the petitioner contends that the provisions of their chapter should apply
to them exclusively and in this case. The Supreme Court find their contention untenable.
It is true that, insofar as its territorial application is concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a
special law and the Civil Code a general legislation; but, as regards the subject-matter of
the provisions above quoted, Section 4 of Republic Act 409 establishes a general rule
regulating the liability of the City of Manila for: “damages or injury to persons or property”.
Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a particular prescription
making “provinces, cities and municipalities . . . liable for damages for the death of, or
injury suffered by any person by reason” — specifically — “of the defective condition of
roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other-public works under their control or
supervision.”
In other words, said section 4 refers to liability arising from negligence, in general,
regardless of the object thereof, whereas Article 2189 governs liability due to “defective
streets,” in particular. Since the present action is based upon the alleged defective condition
of a road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.
At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability
therein established to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city
or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the
province, city or municipality have either “control or supervision” over said street or road.
Even if P. Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would not
necessarily detract from its “control or supervision” by the City of Manila under Republic Act
409.
In its answer to the amended complaint, the City, in turn, alleged that “the streets
aforementioned were and have been constantly kept in good condition and regularly
inspected and the storm drains and manholes thereof covered by the defendant City and
the officers concerned” who “have been ever vigilant and zealous in the performance of
their respective functions and duties as imposed upon them by law.” Thus, the City had, in
effect, admitted that P. Burgos Avenue was and is under its control and supervision.
___________________________________________________
CASE: Quezon City Government and Engr. Timazon vs. Dacara,
GR No. 150304, June 15, 2005
Facts:
Sometime in February 1900, FulgencioDacara, Jr., son of Fulgencio P. Dacara, Sr. and
owner of '87 Toyota Corolla 4-door Sedan with Plate No. 877 (sic) the said vehicle, rammed
into a pile of earth/street diggings found at Matahimik Street, Quezon City, which was then
being repaired by the Quezon City Government thereby causing the vehicle to turtle.
As a result, Dacara Jr. sustained bodily injuries and his vehicle was extensively damaged.
FulgencioDacaraSr, in behalf of his minor son, filed a claim for damages against the Local
Government of Quezon City and Engr. Ramir J. Thompson before the RTC.
The LGU contended that the fault is on the driver, since the LGU have out up warning signs.
The trial court ruled that the LGU is liable. The petitioners appealed to the higher court but
the Court of Appeals affirmed the rulings of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not EngrRamir Thompson and the Quezon City Government be held liable for
damages due to the injuries suffered by Dacara Jr?
Held:
Yes. The negligence of EngrRamir J Thompson as an instrumentality of the Quezon City
Government is the proximate cause of the injuries and damage to property suffered by
FulgencioDacara’s (respondent) son, which make the LGU subsidiarily liable for the damage
incurred.
The petitioner’s claim that they were not negligent insisting that they placed all the
necessary precautionary signs to alert the public of the roadside construction, but none
were presented, gave a more substantial support to the report of the policeman who
responded to the scene of incident that no precautionary signs were found on the said
place of incident.
Thus, the LGU and Engr. Ramir J Thompson as its instrumentality were held negligent in
the exercise of their functions capsulized under Article 2189 of the New Civil Code that
Local Government and its employees should be responsible not only for the maintenance
roads/ streets but also for the safety of the public.
The facts of the case show a complete disregard by petitioners of any adverse consequence
of their failure to install even a single warning device at the area under renovation.
Considering further that the street was dimly lit, the need for adequate... precautionary
measures was even greater. By carrying on the road diggings without any warning or
barricade, petitioners demonstrated a wanton disregard for public safety. Indeed, the
incident was bound to happen due to their gross negligence. It is clear that under the
circumstances, there is sufficient factual basis for a finding of gross negligence on their
part.
______________________________________________________
Liability of Proprietors
Art. 2190 —The proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damages
resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary
repairs. (1907)
a.) If damages results from its total or partial collapse due to lack of necessary repairs - the
proprietor of a building or structure is liable
b.) If the collapse is due to fortuitous event - the proprietor is NOT liable.
note: The person claiming the damage has the burden of proving that the collapse was due
to lack of necessary repairs. On the other hand, the burden of proving that the collapse was
due to fortuitous event rests upon the proprietor.
c.) If a building collapses due to the failure of the lessee to give a notice to the owner of
the need to make repairs as required under Art. 1663 of the Civil Code - the owner is still
liable to the person damaged by the collapse of such building BUT the owner may recover
from the lessee the damage which he may have paid.
d.) If the collapse of the building is caused by the fault of a third person, as in the case
where the owner has entrusted the repair to a contractor who delays the work resulting in
the collapse of the building - the owner may recover from the contractor the damage that
he might have paid to the injured party.
Art. 2191 —Proprietors shall also be responsible for damages caused:
(1) By the1 explosion of machinery which has not been taken care of with due diligence,
and the inflammation of explosive substances which have not been kept in a safe and
adequate place;
(2) By excessive smoke, which may be harmful to persons or property;
(3) By the falling of trees situated at or near highways or lanes, if not caused by force
majeure;
(4) By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or deposits of infectious matter, constructed
without precautions suitable to the place. (1908)
Art. 2192 — If damage referred to in the two preceding articles should be the result of any
defect in the construction mentioned in Article 1723, the third person suffering damages
may proceed only against the engineer or architect or contractor in accordance with said
article, within the period therein fixed. (1909)
_____________________________________________________
CASE: De Roy vs. CA,
G.R. No. 80718, Jan. 29, 1988.
Facts:
The firewall of a burned-out building owned by Feliza De Roy collapsed and destroyed the
tailoring shop occupied by the family of Luis Bernal, resulting in injuries to private
respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter.
Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its
proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do so. Private respondents filed a
case before the RTC, and the latter ruled in their favor finding petitioners guilty of gross
negligence. The petitioners appealed to the CA, which affirmed the ruling of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that petitioner should be held liable for damages?
Held:
No. The Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion in affirming the trial
court’s decision holding petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which
provides that “the proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damage
resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary
repairs.” Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private respondents had
the “last clear chance” to avoid the accident if only they heeded the warning to vacate the
tailoring shop and, therefore, petitioners prior negligence should be disregarded, since the
doctrine of “last clear chance,” which has been applied to vehicular accidents, is
inapplicable to this case.
_____________________________________________________
Art. 2193. The head of a family that lives in a building or a part thereof, is responsible for
damages caused by things thrown or falling from the same. (1910)
- The liability is based on the lack of care on the part of the head of the family in not
preventing the members of his household from throwing things from his house or to his lack
of care in preventing things from falling from his house
______________________________________________________
CASE: Dingcong vs. Kanaan
72 Phil 14
Facts:
Loreto Dingcong and Jose Dingcong were lessees of the upper storey of a building which
they used as a hotel. The lower floor of the same house was also leased by Kanaan and
used by him as a store for general merchandise. Room No. 10 of Dingcong’s hotel was
leased to Francisco Echevarria. Because the water pipes were under repair, Dingcong
provided Echevarria’s room with an ordinary basin which was placed under the faucet. One
night, when Echevarria retired to sleep, he inadvertently left the faucet open with the water
falling on the basin. After the basin became filled, the water fell, seeped through the floor,
and damaged the merchandise of Kanaan.
This action was brought by Kanaan to recover damages from Dingcong and Echevarria. The
lower court condemned Echevarria but absolved Dingcong. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
reversed the lower court’s decision and held Dingcong also liable. Dingcong appealed to the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner should be held liable to pay for the damages caused by
Echavaria
Held:
Jose Dingcong being co-lessee and manager of the hotel and in complete possession of the
upper floor, must answer for the damage caused by things that were thrown or fell
therefrom (Art. 1910, Civil Code). Echevarria was a guest of the hotel and it was he who by
his inadvertence left the faucet open causing the water to fall into the floor, seep through it
and damaged Kanaan’s goods. Dingcong did not exercise the diligence of a good father of
the family in preventing such damage. Since the water pipes were under repair and since
he knew that Echevarria would use the faucet, he should have provided the faucet with a
receptacle with drainage and not content himself with merely providing an ordinary basin
which, upon being filled, will overflow and seep through the floor.” Dingcong was,
therefore, held liable
____________________________________________________
Article 2192 and Article 1723
Under Article 1723 of the Civil Code it is provided that the engineer or architect who drew
up the plans and specifications for a building is liable for damages if within 15 years from
the completion of the structure, the same should collapse by reason of a defect in those
plans and specifications, or to defects in the ground.
The contractor is likewise responsible for damages if the edifice collapses within the same
period on account of defects in the construction or the use of materials of inferior quality
furnished by him, or to any violation of the terms of the contract. If the engineer or
architect supervises the construction he shall be solidarily liable with the contractor
Liability of Joint Tort-Feasors
Art. 2194 —The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for quasi-delict is
solidary.
- Joint tort-feasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. The
person injured may sue all of them or any number less than all. Each is liable for the whole
damage caused by all and all together are jointly liable for the whole damage
Requisites for Solidary Liability under this Article:
a.) When there are two ro more persons who are joint tortfeasors; and
b.) When they are guilty of only one quasi delict
- a person who has the last chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding
the negligent acts of his opponent or the negligence of a third person which is imputed to
his opponent, is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident
4. ASSUMPTION OF RISK
- one who voluntarily assumed the risk of injury from a known danger is debarred from
recovery is recognized in negligence cases
- a plaintiff who, by his conduct, has brought himself within the operation of the maxim,
“volenti non fit injuria,” cannot recover on the basis of the defendant’s negligence
5. DEFENSE OF DILIGENCE IN THE SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF
EMPLOYEES
6. FORCE MAJERURE
7. PRESCRIPTION
8. FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE OF ENGINEER, ARCHITECT OF CONTRACTOR

note: An action for damages based on a quasi-delict must be filed within four (4) years
from the date the quasi-delict is committed (Art. 1146, par.2, Civil Code)

Article 2194 and Article 2184 of the Civil Code

What are the defenses that can be raised in quasi-delict

1. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
- defendant may claim that plaintiff’s own negligence contributed to the injury.

- conduct on the part of the plaintiff which falls below the standard to which he should
conform for his own protection and which is legally contributing cause, cooperating with the
negligence of the defendant in bringing about the plaintiff’s harm

note: contributory negligence of the plaintiff will bar his right to recover damages if his
negligence “contributes to the principal occurrence as one of its determining factors.”
Where, however, his negligence, in conjunction with the occurrence, contributes only to his
own injury, he may recover from the defendant less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for
his own imprudence.

2. PROXIMATE CAUSE
3. LAST CLEAR CHANCE
- otherwise known as the “doctrine of discovered peril”, the “doctrine of supervening
negligence” or the “humanitarian doctrine”

- the negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recover for the negligence of the
defendant where it appears that the defendant by exercising reasonable care and prudence
might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff’s
negligence