ELECTION LAW ADDITIONAL CASES

G.R. Nos. 206844-45, July 23, 2013

Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizen in the Philippines, Inc. vs COMELEC

Facts:

March 2007, COMELEC accredited Senior Citizen as a party-list organization. Senior Citizen then
participated in the May 2007 elections, however failed to get the 2% total votes cast. In accordance with
the procedure set forth in BANAT for the allocation of additional seats under the party-list system,
Senior Citizen was given one seat.

Subsequently, Senior Citizen was allowed to participate in the May 2010 elections. After the conduct of
the May 10, 2010 elections, SENIOR CITIZENS ranked second among all the party-list candidates and was
allocated two seats in the House of Representatives. The first seat was occupied by its first nominee,
Rep. Arquiza, while the second was given to its second nominee, David L. Kho (Rep. Kho).

Later, David Kho tendered his resignation letter as representative which was followed by a board
resolution of Senior Citizen accepting such resignation in accordance with the term-sharing agreement
made between the nominees of the party-list. COMELEC, however, did not recognize the resignation
saying that it is against public policy. The term of public offcials cannot be made subject to any
agreement of private parties for public office is not a commodity that can be shared, apportioned or be
made subject to any private agreement. COMELEC resolved to cancel the registration of the Senior
Citizens as party-list.

December 11, 2012, SC initially granted status quo ante orders of Senior Citizens and directed COMELEC
to include the name of Senior Citizens in the printing of offcial ballots for the May 2013 elections. SC
later ruled that the cancellation of registration was in order. Thus, this petition.

Ruling:

We find merit.

(1) In the instant case, the review of the registration of SENIOR CITIZENS was made pursuant to
COMELEC Resolution No. 9513 through a summary evidentiary hearing carried out on August 24, 2012 in
SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM). In this hearing, both the Arquiza Group and the Datol
Group were indeed given the opportunity to adduce evidence as to their continuing compliance with the
requirements for party-list accreditation. Nevertheless, the due process violation was committed when
they were not apprised of the fact that the term-sharing agreement entered into by the nominees of
SENIOR CITIZENS in 2010 would be a material consideration in the evaluation of the organization’s
qualifications as a party-list group for the May 13, 2013 elections. As it were, both factions of SENIOR
CITIZENS were not able to answer this issue squarely. In other words, they were deprived of the
opportunity to adequately explain their side regarding the term-sharing agreement and/or to adduce
evidence, accordingly, in support of their position.

In its Comment to the petitions, the COMELEC countered that petitioners were actually given the
opportunity to present their side on the issue of the term-sharing agreement during the hearing on April
18, 2012. Said hearing was allegedly conducted to determine petitioners’ continuing compliance for
accreditation as a party-list organization.

The Court is not persuaded. It is true that during the April 18, 2012 hearing, the rival groups of SENIOR
CITIZENS admitted to the existence of the term-sharing agreement. Contrary to the claim of COMELEC,
however, said hearing was conducted for purposes of discussing the petition of the Arquiza Group in
E.M. No. 12-040. To recall, said petition asked for the confirmation of the replacement of Rep. Kho, who
 ELECTION LAW ADDITIONAL CASES

had tendered his resignation effective on December 31, 2011. More specifically, the transcript of the
hearing reveals that the focus thereof was on the petition filed by the Arquiza group and its subsequent
manifestation, praying that the group be allowed to withdraw its petition. Also, during the hearing,
COMELEC Chairman Brillantes did admonish the rival factions of SENIOR CITIZENS about their conflicts
and warned them about the complications brought about by their term-sharing agreement. However,
E.M. No. 12-040 was not a proceeding regarding the qualifications of SENIOR CITIZENS as a party-list
group and the issue of whether the term-sharing agreement may be a ground for disqualification was
neither raised nor resolved in that case. Chairman Brillantes’s remonstration was not sufficient as to
constitute a fair warning that the term-sharing agreement would be considered as a ground for the
cancellation of SENIOR CITIZENS’ registration and accreditation.

(2) The term-sharing agreement among the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS, was not implemented. This
fact was manifested by the Arquiza Group even during the April 18, 2012 hearing conducted by the
COMELEC En Banc in E.M. No. 12-040 wherein the Arquiza Group manifested that it was withdrawing its
petition for confirmation and approval of Rep. Kho’s replacement. Thereafter, in its Resolution dated
June 27, 2012 in E.M. No. 12-040, the COMELEC En Banc itself refused to recognize the term-sharing
agreement and the tender of resignation of Rep. Kho. The COMELEC even declared that no vacancy was
created despite the execution of the said agreement. Subsequently, there was also no indication that
the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS still tried to implement, much less succeeded in implementing, the
term-sharing agreement. Before this Court, the Arquiza Group and the Datol Group insist on this fact of
non-implementation of the agreement. Thus, for all intents and purposes, Rep. Kho continued to hold
his seat and served his term as a member of the House of Representatives, in accordance with COMELEC
Resolution No. 9366 and the COMELEC En Banc ruling in E.M. No. 12-040. Curiously, the COMELEC is
silent on this point.

Indubitably, if the term-sharing agreement was not actually implemented by the parties thereto, it
appears that SENIOR CITIZENS, as a party-list organization, had been unfairly and arbitrarily penalized by
the COMELEC En Banc. Verily, how can there be disobedience on the part of SENIOR CITIZENS when its
nominees, in fact, desisted from carrying out their agreement? Hence, there was no violation of an
election law, rule, or regulation to speak of. Clearly then, the disqualification of SENIOR CITIZENS and the
cancellation of its registration and accreditation have no legal leg to stand on.

OLIVIA DA SILVA CERAFICA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. 205136, DECEMBER 2, 2014

COMELEC has the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of COCs. The question of
eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is thus beyond the usual and proper cognizance of the COMELEC.
On October 2012, Kimberly filed her certificate of candidacy (COC) for Councilor, City of Taguig for the
2013 Elections. Her COC stated that she was born on 29 October 1992, or that she will be twenty (20)
years of age on the day of the elections, in contravention of the requirement that one must be at least
twenty-three (23) years of age on the day of the elections. As such, Kimberly was summoned to a
clarificatory hearing due to the age qualification. Instead of attending the hearing, Kimberly opted to file
a sworn Statement of Withdrawal of COC. Simultaneously, Olivia filed her own COC as a substitute of
Kimberly. The COMELEC rendered a decision ordering the cancellation of Kimberly’s COC, and the denial
of the substitution of Kimberly by Olivia. COMELEC argued that Olivia cannot substitute Kimberly as the
latter was never an official candidate because she was not eligible for the post by reason of her age, and
that; moreover, the COC that Kimberly filed was invalid because it contained a material
misrepresentation relating to her eligibility for the office she seeks to be elected to. Olivia countered
that although Kimberly may not be qualified to run for election because of her age, it cannot be denied
that she still filed a valid COC and was, thus, an official candidate who may be substituted. Olivia also
claimed that there was no ground to cancel or deny Kimberly’s COC on the ground of lack of
qualification and material misrepresentation because she did not misrepresent her birth date to qualify
 ELECTION LAW ADDITIONAL CASES

for the position of councilor, and as there was no deliberate attempt to mislead the electorate, which is
precisely why she withdrew her COC upon learning that she was not qualified.

ISSUE: Was there a valid substitution?

HELD: Yes, in declaring that Kimberly, being under age, could not be considered to have filed a valid COC
and, thus, could not be validly substituted by Olivia, we find that the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion. Firstly, subject to its authority over nuisance candidates and its power to deny due course to
or cancel COCs under Sec. 78, Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 881, the COMELEC has the ministerial duty to
receive and acknowledge receipt of COCs. The question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is thus
beyond the usual and proper cognizance of the COMELEC. The next question then is whether Olivia
complied with all of the requirements for a valid substitution; we answer in the affirmative. First, there
was a valid withdrawal of Kimberly’s COC after the last day for the filing of COCs; second, Olivia belongs
to and is certified to by the same political party to which Kimberly belongs; and third, Olivia filed her
COC not later than mid-day of Election Day.

ALROBEN J. GOH v. HON. LUCILO R. BAYRON and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. 212584,
NOVEMBER 25, 2014

Alroben Goh filed a recall petition against Puerto Princesa Mayor Lucilo Bayron for loss of confidence
due to “gross violations of the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act and the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials”, among others. COMELEC issued Res. 9864, finding the petition sufficient
in form & substance, but suspended any recall elections until they determined where to get the funds
for it. Sec. 75, Local Government Code & Sec. 31, COMELEC Res. 7505: states all expenses incidental to
recall elections are to be borne by COMELEC, and mandates a contingency fund included in the GAA for
it.

Finance Services Department (FSD) questioned if COMELEC should bear the burden of funding the entire
process of any and all recall elections, stalling the proceedings, including the verification process.
COMELEC issued Res. 9882, stating that while Recall is one of its constitutional mandates (A9-C, S2[9]), it
cannot proceed with elections since it doesn’t have legal authority to commit public funds for it (A6,
S29), and they have no contingency fund to do so:

While the Commission has a line item for the “Conduct & supervision of elections, referenda, recall
votes, and plebiscites under the program category of its 2014 budget in the amount of P1.4B”, it cannot
be considered as “an appropriation made by law” nor as a contingency fund; legally intended to finance
basic continuing staff support and administrative operations

Sec. 32, Revised Administrative Code: “All moneys appropriated...shall be available solely for the specific
purposes for which these are appropriated.” Previous GAA’s had a line item “Conduct & Supervision of
Elections & Other Political Exercises”, but was never utilized for the actual conduct of any elections or
other political exercises separate line items were provided by Congress for the conduct of the National &
Local, SK & Barangay Elections, and Overseas Absentee Voting, under the Locally Funded Projects
(Project) Category

Funds intended for Program can be used for Project only when there is a valid augmentation (A6S25[5])
 ELECTION LAW ADDITIONAL CASES

There must be a law authorizing the Chairman to augment (Sec 67, GAA)

 There must be a deficient existing line item in the GAA to be augmented (there is none)

 There must be savings on the part of the Commission

Assuming augmentation is possible, recall elections is not one of the specific purposes and priorities for
augmentation under the 2014 GAA

Sec. 69, GAA: priority given to compensation, personnel benefits, and other sections of the GAA.

Allowing the present petition to push through will open the floodgates for numerous other recall
petitions which will result in multiple counts of violation of existing appropriation laws, and may
adversely affect ongoing preparations for the conduct of National, Local, and ARMM Elections.

Only solution is the enactment of a law that will appropriate funds for the conduct of recall elections
inclusion in the 2015 GAA of a contingency fund that may be used for the conduct of recall 617 elections
passage by Congress of a supplemental appropriations law for the FY 2014 for the conduct of recall
elections.

Hence this Petition by Goh asking to compel COMELEC to act on its constitutional mandate of recall

ISSUE:

Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing Res. Nos. 9864 & 9882, suspending
recall elections

HELD:

Yes. The 2014 GAA expressly provides a line item for recall elections, which was admitted by COMELEC
in Res. 9882: “Conduct & supervision of elections, referenda, recall votes, and plebiscites”.

i. When the COMELEC receives a budgetary appropriation for its “Current Operating
Expenditures, despite not being a specific appropriation, it is sufficient for COMELEC to carry
out its constitutional functions, including the conduct of recall elections.
ii. Socrates v COMELEC: recall elections were conducted even without a specific appropriation
for recall elections in the 2002 GAA, where COMELEC drew funds from “Conduct &
Supervision of Elections & Other Political Exercises”, which is even less specific than the
current line
iii. COMELEC has the authority to augment Recall Elections from savings and does not need to
defer to a supplemental appropriations law passed by Congress.
iv. In Chairman Brillantes’ opening statement before the Senate Committee on Finance, he
revealed that COMELEC had savings of somewhere between P2.8-10b. Hence, there are
savings.
v. As admitted by COMELEC, since there is a line item appropriation for recall elections, there
is no clash between COMELEC & Congress – there is an actual deficiency in an item provided
for in the GAA’s budget, which can be prioritized by savings.
vi. That the budget for such recall elections must be loaded in a “Contingency Fund” has no
basis – Congress has the plenary power to lodge such appropriation in current operating
expenditures.
vii. The distinction between “Project” and “Program” is irrelevant: the Constitutional test for
validity of augmentation is not how itemized the appropriation is, but whether or not the
purpose of the appropriation is specific enough to allow the President to exercise his line-
veto power.
 ELECTION LAW ADDITIONAL CASES

G.R. No. 207851, July 8, 2014

Angel Naval vs COMELEC and Nelson Julia

Facts:

Naval had served as member of the Sanggunian, 2nd District of CamSur. On October 12, 2009, RA 9716
was approved, reapportioning the legislative district of Province of CamSur.

Notably, 8 out of 10 towns were taken from the old Second District to form the present Third District.
The present Second District is composed of the two remaining towns, Gainza and Milaor, merged with
five towns from the old First District.

In the 2010 elections, Naval once again won as among the members of the Sanggunian, Third District. He
served until 2013.

In the 2013 elections, Naval ran anewand was re-elected as Member of the Sanggunian, Third District.

Julia was likewise a Sanggunian Member candidate from the Third District in the 2013 elections. On
October 29, 2012, he invoked Section 7810 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) and filed before the
COMELEC a Verified Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Naval. Julia
posited that Naval had fully served the entire Province of Camarines Sur for three consecutive terms as a
member of the Sanggunian, irrespective of the district he had been elected from. The three-term limit
rule’s application is more with reference to the same local elective post, and not necessarily in
connection with an identical territorial jurisdiction. Allowing Naval to run as a Sanggunian member for
the fourth time is violative of the inflexible three-term limit rule enshrined in the Constitution and the
LGC, which must be strictly construed.

COMELEC cancelled Naval's COC.

The conditions for the application of the three-term limit rule are present in the instant case as the
records clearly establish that [Naval] is running for the 4th time for the same government post. To put
things in a proper perspective, it is imperative to review and discuss the salient points in the case of
Latasa v. [COMELEC]. The case involves the question of whether or not a municipal mayor, having been
elected and had already served for three (3) consecutive terms, canrun as city mayor in light of the
conversion of the municipality to a city. In applying the three-term limit rule, the Court pointed out that
the conversion of the municipality into a city did not convert the office of the municipal mayor into a
local government post different from the office of the city mayor. The Court took into account the
following circumstances: (1) That the territorial jurisdiction of [the] city was the same as that of the
municipality; (2) That the inhabitants were the same group of voters who elected the municipal mayor
for three (3) consecutive terms; and (3) That the inhabitants were the same group of voters [over]
whom he held power and authority as their chief executive for nine years.

Ruling:

Court denies the petition.

A republic is a representative government, a government run by and for the people. It is not a pure
democracy where the people govern themselves directly. The essence of republicanism is
representation and renovation, the selection by the citizenry of a corps of public functionaries who
 ELECTION LAW ADDITIONAL CASES

derive their mandate from the people and act on their behalf, serving for a limited period only, after
which they are replaced or retained, at the option of their principal.

R.A.No. 9716 plainly state that the new Second Districtis to be created, but the Third Districtis to be
renamed. Verba legis non est recedendum. The terms used in a legal provision to be construed compels
acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers
mean what they say.

The rationale behind reapportionment is the constitutional requirement to achieve equality of

representation among the districts. It is with this mindset that the Court should consider Naval’s
argument anent having a new set of constituents electing him into office in 2010 and 2013.

Naval’s ineligibility to run, by reason of violation of the three-term limit rule, does not undermine the
right to equal representation of any of the districts in Camarines Sur. With or without him, the renamed
Third District, which he labels as a new set of constituents, would still be represented, albeit by another
eligible person.

Villarosa v Festin

GR NO. 212953

August 5, 2014

Topic: Judicial Review and Remedies

Petitioners: Jose Tapales Villarosa

Respondents: Romulo De Mesa Festin and COMELEC

Ponente: Velasco, J., Jr.

FACTS:

 Petitioner and Respondent were two out of four rival candidates for the mayoral office in San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro during the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections.
 On May 15, Respondent was proclaimed the victor with 20,761 votes, edging Petitioner who got 19,557 votes.
 With a difference of 1,204 votes, Petitioner filed a Petition for Protest Ad Cautelam before the RTC, alleging
irregularities in the conduct of the election. Specifically, Petitioner raised the complaints of various voters who
claimed that some ballots were pre-marked or that the ovals appearing on the ballots corresponding to Petitioner’s
name were embossed to prevent them from being shaded.
 As a consequence of the electoral fraud in the 92 clustered precincts of San Jose, Petitioner claims that Respondent
was illegally proclaimed.
 Respondent answered, also impugning the election results, specifically the number of votes awarded to Petitioner.
 Both parties raised an issue in the accuracy of the votes; hence, a physical recount was conducted in the RTC.
 RTC: Declared proclamation of Respondent void. Petitioner is the duly elected mayor. The Court deducts 2,050 votes
from Respondent due to pre-marking and tampering.
 Petitioner filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal.
 Respondent then elevated the case to COMELEC via a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief.
 Petitioner moved for its dismissal on the ground that Respondent’s verification is defective.
 COMELEC: On Feb. 13, through its First Division, issued a TRO over the RTC from implementing its decision during the
pendency of the case. On Apr. 14, through its Special First Division, also granted Respondent’s request for a
preliminary injunction, enjoining the RTC’s decision execution pending appeal.
 Petitioner filed an urgent motion praying for its quashal, but was denied by the First Division.
 Petitioner questioned the issuance of the injunction since it was issued by a newly-constituted Special First Division,
which was allegedly formed due to the absence of several COMELEC Commissioners, who were attending to overseas
absentee voter issues. Petitioner points out that the special division was constituted only on April 8, 2014 and it only
had two members, Chairman Brillantes and Commissioner Parreño.
ISSUE:

W/N the formation of the Special First Division and the orders handed down by it is lawful? YES

HELD/RATIO:

Petitioner insists that the COMELEC First Division acquired jurisdiction over the case on Feb. 13, 2014 when it directed him to
file an answer and when it issued a TRO enjoining the execution. Hence, Petitioner argues that this precluded the Special First
 ELECTION LAW ADDITIONAL CASES

Division from acquiring jurisdiction over the same case and issuing the writ of preliminary injunction. Additionally, Petitioner
argues that the absence of two commissioners in the division is not sufficient to remove it from its jurisdiction and confer it to a
new one.

The Court does not agree. It finds Petitioner’s argument both unsound and procedurally defective.

Petitioner’s procedural lapse becomes manifest with the availability of a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at his disposal, his
hasty resort to certiorari to the SC cannot be justified. On this ground alone, his petition should be dismissed outright.

Taking the facts into consideration, however, the Court rules that the assailed order by the COMELEC Special First Division was
not issued in grave abuse of discretion.

COMELEC’s action in this case finds constitutional basis under Sec. 3, Art. IX-C, wherein it is stated that the COMELEC may sit en
banc in two divisions. Pursuant to this mandate, COMELEC promulgated Resolution 7808, wherein Sec. 6, Rule 3 states that
substitution of members of a division and the designation of a special first division for pending cases. This rule was then
amended by Resolution 9636 and eventually Resolution 9868, wherein it addressed the temporary vacancies in the divisions of
the COMELEC due to pressing election concerns.

Due to the vacancies, and to constitute a quorum for the Divisions, Chairman Brillantes sat as presiding Chairman for both
divisions. Hence, special divisions were created to address pending cases.

It then becomes indisputable that the formation of the Special Divisions is sanctioned by both COMELEC Rules and the
Constitution.

Therefore, no grave abuse can be ascribed to the COMELEC when the Special First Division issued the writ of preliminary
injunction, which was questioned by Petitioner. It cannot be said that the First Division and the Special First Division are two
distinct bodies and there has been a transfer of jurisdiction.

In other words, COMELEC did not create a separate Division but merely filled the vacancies in both of its divisions. The word
“Special” in its title just shows that the commissioners are only sitting in the division in a temporary capacity or as a substitute.
The jurisdiction over cases assumed by the First Division was not lost by the formation of the Special First Division since this
only entails a change in the composition of magistrates assigned to it. The case was not reassigned or re-raffled. Simply put, it is
still the same jurisdiction since jurisdiction was never lost to begin with.

Petitioner’s cry over violation of due process has no ground to stand on.

Wherefore, Petition is dismissed.

MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO, SR., v. COMISSION ON ELECTIONS and

ERNESTO R. VEGA

G.R. No. 20171, 8 January 2013, EN BANC (Velasco, Jr., J.)

For 4 successive regular elections, Abundo vied for the position of municipal mayor of Viga,
Catanduanes. In the 2004 electoral derby, the Viga municipal board of canvassers initially proclaimed as
winner one Torres, who, in due time, performed the functions of the office of mayor. Abundo protested
and was eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest. Then came the 2010
elections where Abundo and Torres again opposed each other and Torres lost no time in seeking the
former’s disqualification to run, predicated on the 3-consecutive term limit rule. COMELEC First Division
ruled in favor of Abundo. Vega commenced a quo warranto action before the RTC to unseat Abundo on
essentially the same grounds Torres raised. RTC declared Abundo ineligible to serve as municipal mayor
because he has already served 3 consecutive terms. COMELEC’s 2nd division and en banc affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether or not Abundo is deemed to have served three (3) consecutive terms.

RULING:
 ELECTION LAW ADDITIONAL CASES

No. As stressed in Socrates v. COMELEC(G.R. No. 154512, 2002), the principle behind the three-term
limit rule covers only consecutive terms and that what the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth
term. An elective local official cannot, following his third consecutive term, seek immediate reelection
for a fourth term, albeit he is allowed to seek a fresh term for the same position after the election where
he could have sought his fourth term but prevented to do so by reason of the prohibition. There has, in
fine, to be a break or interruption in the successive terms of the official after his or her third term. An
interruption usually occurs when the official does not seek a fourth term, immediately following the
third.

As is clearly provided in Sec. 8, Art. X of the Constitution as well as in Sec. 43(b) of the LGC,
voluntary renunciation of the office by the incumbent elective local official for any length of time shall
not, in determining service for three consecutive terms, be considered an interruption in the continuity
of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected. This qualification was
made as a deterrent against an elective local official intending to skirt the three-term limit rule by
merely resigning before his or her third term ends. This is a voluntary interruption as distinguished from
involuntary interruption which may be brought about by certain events or causes.

The almost two-year period during which Abundo’s opponent actually served as Mayor is and ought to
be considered an involuntary interruption of Abundo’s continuity of service. An involuntary interrupted
term, cannot, in the context of the disqualification rule, be considered as one term for purposes of
counting the three-term threshold. It cannot be overemphasized that pending the favorable resolution
of his election protest, Abundo was relegated to being an ordinary constituent since his opponent, as
presumptive victor in the 2004 elections, was occupying the mayoralty seat. In other words, during
which his opponent actually assumed the mayoralty office, Abundo was a private citizen warming his
heels while awaiting the outcome of his protest. Hence, even if declared later as having the right to
serve the elective position such declaration would not erase the fact that prior to the finality of the
election protest, Abundo did not serve in the mayor’s office and, in fact, had no legal right to said
position.

ALCANTARA V COMELEC

G.R. No. 203646 APRIL 16, 2013

FACTS:

Petitioners are members of ABAKADA Guro Partylist. In May 2007 election ABAKADA
participated and won a seat, Jonathan dela Cruz , its first nominee become the party’s sole
representative in the Congress.

Petitioners filed a petition with the COMELEC when the respondents proceeded to hold a
Supreme Assembly that resulted to the approval and ratification of the revised ABAKADA CBL and the
ouster and expulsion of petitioners from their positions and to the party.

Petitioners in their petition alleged that the meeting held was void for the holding of the said
Supreme Assembly(SA) were contrary to the CBL for not having been authorized by the president and
the party’s National Executive Board. And Alcantara has no authority to send communication since he is
not the secretary.

Respondent defended the validity of the meeting contending that Dela Cruz made several
communications to Alcantara to urge him to call for SA.

COMELEC dismissed the petition and ruled that the respondents had good cause to initiate the
holding of the meeting. Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the ruling, questioning the Division’s
 ELECTION LAW ADDITIONAL CASES

failure to address the issue of validity of SA based on the non-membership status of the several
meetings participants. COMELEC En Banc denied the motion. Hence, an appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Supreme Assembly is void for it not convened in accordance with party`s
CBL.

HELD:

The Supreme Assembly is valid. As the COMELEC correctly observed, ABAKADA`s constitution
expressly requires the convening of SA once every three years for the purposes of electing the members
of National Executive Board-the governing body of ABAKADA-headed by petitioner Alcantara. In
contravention of the ABAKADA`s own constitution, no SA was ever held since the ABAKADA came into
existence in 2003, prompting the respondents to communicate with the petitioner to call for and
assemble the leaders. This call, was in fact a practical approach to a coming political exercise.

The petition is dismissed for failure of the petitioner to establish grave abuse of discretion on the part of
COMELEC, this Court can do no less than to dismiss the petition and allow the ABAKADA as sectoral
party to determine its own affairs under its present leadership.

DIOCESE OF BACOLOD v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 205278, 21 July 2015, EN BANC (Leonen, J.)

On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San
Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6′) by ten feet (10′) in size.
They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the
message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No.
10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading
“Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a check mark, or “(ProRH)
Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the
adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing
of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted against it
form “Team Buhay.” Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by
any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names of candidates for the 2013
elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not candidates for
that election.

ISSUES:
 ELECTION LAW ADDITIONAL CASES

1. Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the tarpaulin is a political question,

No. The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the exercise of prudence or modesty. There
is no political question. It can be acted upon by this court through the expanded jurisdiction granted to
this court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution.. The concept of a political question never
precludes judicial review when the act of a constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental individual
or collective right. Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC did have the discretion to choose the
manner of regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by abridging the fundamental right to
expression. Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an issue involves a
truly political and non-justiciable question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then
our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government
properly acted within such limits. 631 A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are
no constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. Hence, the
existence of constitutionally imposed limits justifies subjecting the official actions of the body to the
scrutiny and review of this court. In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to
free speech. Any instance that this right may be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It does not fall
squarely into any doubt that a political question brings.

2. Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as the
case was not brought first before the COMELEC En Banc or any if its divisions.

No. The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not proper in this
case. Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that the controversy is
already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is the “prerequisite that something had by then been
accomplished or performed by either branch or in this case, organ of government before a court may
come into the picture.” Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the message and their
medium, had understandable relevance especially during the elections. COMELEC’s letter threatening
the filing of the election offense against petitioners is already an actionable infringement of this right.
The impending threat of criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners’ speech. In the context of this
case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as COMELEC suggested in their pleadings prolongs the
violation of their freedom of speech.

3. Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private citizens.

No. Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their position that they had
the power to regulate the tarpaulin. However, the Court held that all of these provisions pertain to
candidates and political parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do they belong to any political
party. COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to
freedom of expression exercised by a non-candidate in this case.

4. Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin violated petitioners’
fundamental right to freedom of expression

Yes. The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political consequences enjoys a high degree of
protection. Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is election propaganda, being
petitioners’ way of endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting those who voted
for it, holds no water.

5. Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or content-neutral regulation.

It is content-based regulation. Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions “based on the

subject matter of the utterance or speech.” In contrast, content-neutral regulation includes controls
merely on the incidents of the speech such as time, place, or manner of the speech. The Court held that
 ELECTION LAW ADDITIONAL CASES

the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The tarpaulin content is not easily divorced from the size
of its medium. Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this court has
used the clear and present danger rule as measure. Under this rule, “the evil consequences sought to be
prevented must be substantive, ‘extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.’” “Only
when the challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional
muster, with the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.” Even
with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the regulation. There is no
compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify
curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. There is no reason for the state to minimize the right
of non-candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the tarpaulin
does not affect anyone else’s constitutional rights.

6. Whether or not there was violation of petitioners’ right to property

Yes. The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the tarpaulin remains
the private property of petitioners. Their right to use their property is likewise protected by the
Constitution. Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private property
or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property rights is void, because it is
repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection of the laws. The Court in
Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates where decals and stickers should be posted is “so
broad that it encompasses even the citizen’s private property.” Consequently, it violates Article III,
Section 1 of the Constitution which provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without
due process of law.

7. Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious speech.

No. The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not binding upon this court.
The position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify
the posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis. The
enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech
with political consequences and not religious speech. With religion looked upon with benevolence and
not hostility, benevolent neutrality allows accommodation of religion under certain circumstances.
Accommodations are government policies that take religion specifically into account not to promote the
government’s favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion
without hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise
of, a person’s or institution’s religion. As Justice Brennan explained, the “government may take religion
into account . . . to exempt, when possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation
individuals whose religious beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create
without state involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may flourish.”

GMA NETWORK, INC., et al v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R.Nos. 205357, 205374, 205592, 205852
& 206360, SEPTEMBER 2, 2014

Political speech is one of the most important expressions protected by the Fundamental Law. “Freedom
of speech, of expression, and of the press are at the core of civil liberties and have to be protected at all
costs for the sake of democracy.” The “aggregate-based” airtime limits is unreasonable and arbitrary as
it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and political parties to reach out and
communicate with the people. Resolution 9615 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) changed the
airtime limitations for political campaign from “per station” basis, as used during the 2007 and 2010
elections, to a “total aggregate” basis for the 2013. Various broadcast networks such as ABS-CBN, ABC,
GMA, MBC, NBN, RMN and KBP questioned the interpretation of the COMELEC on the ground that the
 ELECTION LAW ADDITIONAL CASES

provisions are oppressive and violative of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression and of
the press. Collectively, they question the constitutionality of Section 9 (a), which provides for an
“aggregate total” airtime instead of the previous “per station” airtime for political campaigns or
advertisements, and also required prior COMELEC approval for candidates' television and radio
guesting’s and appearances. Petitioners claim that Section 9(a) limits the computation of “aggregate
total” airtime and imposes unreasonable burden on broadcast media of monitoring a candidate’s or
political party’s aggregate airtime. On the other hand, COMELEC alleges that the broadcast networks do
not have locus standi, as the limitations are imposed on candidates, not on media outlets. Comelec
maintains that the per candidate rule or total aggregate airtime limit is in accordance with the Fair
Election Act as this would truly give life to the constitutional objective to equalize access to media during
elections. It sees this as a more effective way of "levelling the playing field" between candidates/political
parties with enormous resources and those without much.

ISSUES:

1. Does Section 9(a) of Comelec Resolution No. 9615 on airtime limit violate the constitutional guaranty
of freedom of expression, of speech and of the press?

2. Does resolution No. 9165 impose unreasonable burden on the broadcast industry?

HELD:

1. Yes, Section 9(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, with its adoption of the “aggregatebased”
airtime limits unreasonably restricts the guaranteed freedom of speech and of the press.
Political speech is one of the most important expressions protected by the Fundamental Law.
“Freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press are at the core of civil liberties and have to
be protected at all costs for the sake of democracy.” GMA came up with its analysis of the
practical effects of such a regulation: Given the reduction of a candidate’s airtime minutes in the
New Rules, petitioner GMA estimates that a national candidate will only have 120 minutes to
utilize for his political advertisements in television during the whole campaign period of 88 days,
or will only have 81.81 seconds per day TV exposure allotment. If he chooses to place his
political advertisements in the 3 major TV networks in equal allocation, he will only 582 have
27.27 seconds of airtime per network per day. This barely translates to 1 advertisement spot on
a 30-second spot basis in television. The Court agrees. The assailed rule on “aggregate-based”
airtime limits is unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of
candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate with the people. Here, the
adverted reason for imposing the “aggregate-based” airtime limits – leveling the playing field –
does not constitute a compelling state interest which would justify such a substantial restriction
on the freedom of candidates and political parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies,
platforms and programs of government.
2. No, Resolution No. 9615 does not impose an unreasonable burden on the broadcast industry.
The Court cannot agree with the contentions of GMA. The apprehensions of COMELEC appear
more to be the result of a misappreciation of the real import of the regulation rather than a real
and present threat to its broadcast activities. The Court is more in agreement with COMELEC
when it explained that the legal duty of monitoring lies with the COMELEC. Broadcast stations
are merely required to submit certain documents to aid the COMELEC in ensuring that
candidates are not sold airtime in excess of the allowed limits. There is absolutely no duty on the
broadcast stations to do monitoring, much less monitoring in real time. GMA grossly
exaggerates when it claims that the nonexistent duty would require them to hire and train an
astounding additional 39,055 personnel working on