ILONA HAPITAN v. SPS.

JIMMY LAGRADILLA AND WARLILY LAGRADILLA AND ESMERALDA BLACER, GR

No. 170004, 2016-01-13

Facts:

September to December 1994, respondent Esmeralda Blacer Hapitan (Esmeralda) issued thirty-one (31)
United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) checks in various amounts in the total amount of P510,463.98,
payable to the order of respondent Warlily Lagradilla (Warlily). The... checks were dishonored by UCPB
for reasons of "account closed" when presented for payment by Warlily.

On January 6, 1995, Warlily, with her husband Jimmy Lagradilla (Jimmy), filed a civil case for sum of
money against Nolan (Nolan) and Esmeralda Hapitan, Ilona Hapitan (llona), and Spouses Jessie and Ruth
Terosa (Spouses Terosa), with a prayer that a writ for preliminary... attachment be issued against the
real property of Esmeralda and Nolan, consisting of a house and lot, as security for the satisfaction of
any judgment that might be recovered.[

Jimmy and Warlily alleged that they made several demands on Nolan and Esmeralda for the latter to
settle their outstanding obligations. The latter spouses promised to convey and transfer to Jimmy and
Warlily the title of their house... and lot, located at Barangay M. V. Hechanova, Jaro, Iloilo City.[8] The lot
was covered by TCT No. T-103227 in the name of Nolan and Esmeralda.[9] Jimmy and Warlily later found
out that Nolan and Esmeralda separately executed a Special

Power of Attorney (SPA) designating Ilona, Nolan's sister, as their attorney-in-fact for the sale of the
same property.[10] Jimmy and Warlily alleged that the property was fraudulently sold to Spouses
Terosa,[11] and that Nolan and

Esmeralda were about to depart from the Philippines with the intent to defraud their creditors; thus, the
prayer for the issuance of preliminary attachment of the house and lot.

Esmeralda filed an Answer with Cross-Claim,[13] admitting her indebtedness to Warlily. She alleged that
due to the failure of Nolan, who was a seaman at that time, to send her substantial amounts and on
account of the losses she sustained in her jewelry... business, she failed to fund the checks she
issued.[14] Also, although she executed an SPA in favor of Ilona authorizing the latter to sell the house
and lot owned by her and Nolan, she subsequently revoked the said SPA.[15]
Nolan and Ilona denied the allegations of Jimmy and Warlily.[16] They argued that the debts were
incurred solely by Esmeralda and were not intended to benefit the conjugal partnership.[17] They
further stated that Esmeralda has... abandoned her only son with Nolan and that Nolan has filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage with Esmeralda

RTC, in its Order[19] dated March 31, 1995, declared the Spouses Terosa in default for failure to file
their Answer within the reglementary period.

February 13, 1996, the RTC rendered its Decision[20], ruling in favor of Jimmy and Warlily.

judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants:

Declaring the Deed of Sale in favor of spouses Jessie P. Terosa and Ruth O. Terosa covering the property
in question. Lot 19-A- covered by TCI No. T-103227 and the house thereon, in the name of the
defendants Nolan Hapitan and Esmeralda Blacer Hapitan null and void;... consequently, TCT No. T-
107509 in the name of the spouses Jessie P. Terosa and Ruth O. Terosa is ordered cancelled;

Ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P510,463.98 with interest
at the legal rate from the filing of this complaint until fully paid;

Ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiffs:

P30,000.00 as moral damages;

P30,000.00 as attorney's fees;

P20,000.()0 as exemplary damages

Dismissing the counterclaims.

On the cross-claim, defendants Nolan llapitan, Ilona Hapitan and the spouses Jessie P. Terosa and Ruth
O. Terosa are ordered jointly and severally to pay cross-claimant Esmeralda Blacer Hapitan:
P30,000.00 as moral damages;

P30,000.00 as attorney's fees;

P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.

No pronouncement as to costs.

RTC ruled that the house and lot is part of Nolan and Esmeralda's conjugal property, having been built
from the amounts sent by Nolan to Esmeralda as well as the income from Esmeralda's business

The SPA provided that the proceeds of the sale of Esmeralda's share in the property shall be applied
specifically in payment of her obligations. This limited authority was acknowledged by Nolan in his SPA
to

Ilona.[22]

CA agreed with the RTC ruling.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, and finding no reversible error in the appealed Decision dated
February 13, 1996 in Civil Case No. 22150 of Branch 37 of the Regional Trial Court of lloilo City, said
Decision is hereby AFFIRMED in toto and the... appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

CA reconsider its finding that: 1) the sale to the Spouses Terosa was fraudulent, and 2) Esmeralda is
entitled to damages.

November 20, 2003, Jimmy and Warlily, and Nolan and Ilona filed a Motion for Approval of Amicable
Settlement.[28] The terms of the Amicable Settlement stater[29... laintiffs-appellees and defendants-
appellants Nolan Bienvenido Hapitan and Ilona Hapitan hereby agree to the full, final and complete
settlement of the liability of the latter and that of defendants-appellants Sps. Jessie P. Terosa and Ruth
O. Terosa to the former under the
Decision rendered by the court a quo dated February 13, 1996 and affirmed by this Court in its Decision
dated October 14, 2003 with the herein defendants-appellants paying the former the amount of Four
Hundred Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P 425.000.00), Three Hundred Thousand

Pesos (P 300,000.00) in cash receipt of which is acknowledged by the plaintiffs-appellees Lagradilla in

this amicable settlement and the amount of One Hundred Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P 125,000.00)
received by plaintiff-appellee Warlily Lagradilla as mentioned in the

Affidavit of Waiver, Quitclaim and Satisfaction of Claim dated 22 October 2003 attached to the Motion
for Reconsideration/Modification dated November 6, 2003 and submitted to this Honorable Court which
amount of P 125.000.00 they acknowledge as part payment of the said agreed... settlement of P
425,000.00. It is understood that this payment of defendants - appellants include their share and that of
defendant Esmeralda Blacer and defendants -appellants Terosa.

We decide whether the Waiver and the Amicable Settlement can modify the Decision of the CA.

Issues:

We decide whether the Waiver and the Amicable Settlement can modify the Decision of the CA.

Ruling:

The Waiver is invalid

The nullity of the Deed of Sale could not be affected by the subsequent waiver of Warlily.

Warlily's Waiver cannot cover the issue of the validity of the sale of the property to the Spouses Terosa
since the property is neither a right nor a benefit she is entitled to. Moreover, the declaration of nullity
due to the existence of fraud was both a finding of fact and of... law by the lower courts, and the parties
cannot agree amongst themselves and decide otherwise.

A compromise agreement is defined as a contract whereby the parties make reciprocal concessions in
order to resolve their differences and thus avoid or put an end to a lawsuit.[43] To have the force of law
between the parties, a compromise agreement must... comply with the requisites and principles of
contracts.[44] Thus, it must have the following elements: 1) the consent of the parties to the
compromise; 2) an object certain that is the subject matter of the compromise; and 3) the cause of the
obligation... that is established.

A compromise agreement is defined as a contract whereby the parties make reciprocal concessions in
order to resolve their differences and thus avoid or put an end to a lawsuit.[43] To have the force of law
between the parties, a compromise agreement must... comply with the requisites and principles of
contracts.[44] Thus, it must have the following elements: 1) the consent of the parties to the
compromise; 2) an object certain that is the subject matter of the compromise; and 3) the cause of the
obligation... that is established.[4

We note that much has been said by the parties on the validity of the Amicable Settlement, specifically
on the element of consent. Jimmy and Warlily consistently maintained that they were deceived into
executing the Waiver and the Amicable Settlement, and that they were not... properly assisted by
counsel. They insist that the settlement was proposed and forged by Nolan and llona in bad faith, having
advance knowledge of the decision of the CA.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated October 14, 2003 and the Resolution dated
October 7, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 53301 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION

Principles:

Waiver is defined as "a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known existing
legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege, which except for such waiver the party would have
enjoyed x x x."

[I]t is the general rule that a person may waive any matter which affects his property, and any alienable
right or privilege of which he is the owner or which belongs to him or to which he is legally entitled,
whether secured by contract, conferred with statute, or guaranteed by... constitution, provided such
rights and privileges rest in the individual, are intended for his sole benefit, do not infringe on the rights
of others, and further provided the waiver of the right or privilege is not forbidden by law, and does not
contravene public policy x x... x.[41]

Warlily's Waiver cannot cover the issue of the validity of the sale of the property to the Spouses Terosa
since the property is neither a right nor a benefit she is entitled to. Moreover, the declaration of nullity
due to the existence of fraud was both a finding of fact and of... law by the lower courts, and the parties
cannot agree amongst themselves and decide otherwise.

A compromise agreement is defined as a contract whereby the parties make reciprocal concessions in
order to resolve their differences and thus avoid or put an end to a lawsuit.[43] To have the force of law
between the parties, a compromise agreement must... comply with the requisites and principles of
contracts.[44] Thus, it must have the following elements: 1) the consent of the parties to the
compromise; 2) an object certain that is the subject matter of the compromise; and 3) the cause of the
obligation... that is established.
SPOUSES AGGABAO V. PARULAN, JR. AND PARULAN

G.R. No. 165803, [September 1, 2010]

DOCTRINE(S):

The sale was made on March 18, 1991, or after Au-gust 3, 1988, the effectivity of the Family Code. The
proper law to apply is, therefore, Article 124 of the Family Code, for it is settled that any alienation or
encumbrance of conjugal property made during the effectivity of the Family Code is governed by Article
124 of the Family Code.

According to Article 256 of the Family Code, the pro-visions of the Family Code may apply retroactively
provided no vested rights are impaired. In Tumlos v. Fernandez, 330 SCRA 718 (2000), the Court rejected
the petitioner’s argument that the Family Code did not apply because the acquisition of the contested
property had occurred prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, and pointed out that Article 256 pro-
vided that the Family Code could apply retroactively if the application would not prejudice vested or ac-
quired rights existing before the effectivity of the Family Code. Herein, however, the petitioners did not
show any vested right in the property acquired prior to August 3, 1988 that exempted their situation
from the retroactive application of the Family Code.

FACTS:

In January 1991, real estate broker Marta K.Atanacio offered 2 lots located in Parañaque to the
petitioners. On February 2, 1991, the petitioners met up with Elena Parulan at the site of the property
and showed them the following documents: (a.) Owner’s original copy of the TCT of the 2 lots; (b.) tax
declarations; (c.) a copy of the special power of attorney dated January 7, 1991 executed by Dionisio
authorizing Elena to sell the property. The petitioners paid P200,000.00 as earnest money for which
Elena executed a handwritten Receipt of Earnest Money which stipulated that the peitioners would pay
an additional payment of P130, 000.00 on February 4, 1991; P650,000.00 on or before February 15,
1991 and P700, 000.00 on March 31, 1991 once Elena turned over the property.

On February 4, 1991, the petitioners, accompanied by the broker, went to the Office of the Register of
Deeds to verify the TCTs shown by Elena. There they discovered that one of the lots had been
encumbered to Banco Filipino, but that the encumbrance had been cancelled due to the full payment of
the obligation. They noticed that the loan was effected through and SPA executed by Dionisio in favor of
Elena. The other lot on the other hand had an annotation of an existing mortgage in favor of Los Baños
Rural Bank, with the same SPA with a court order authorizing Elena to mortgage the lot to secure the
loan.
The petitioners and the broker next inquired about the mortgage and the court order at the Los Baños
Rural Bank. There, they met with Atty. Zarate, related that the bank had asked for the court order
because the lot involved was conjugal property.

Following their verification, the petitioners delivered P130,000.00 as additional down payment on
February 4, 1991; and P650,000.00 to the Los Baños Rural Bank on February 12, 1991, which then
released the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT to them.

On March 18, 1991, the petitioners delivered the final amount of P700,000.00 to Elena, who executed a
deed of absolute sale in their favor. However, Elena did not turn over the owner’s duplicate copy of the
TCT claiming that said copy was in the possession of a relative who was then in Hongkong. She assured
them that the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT would be turned over after a week.

On March 19, 1991, TCT was cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of the petitioners. Elena
did not turn over the duplicate owner’s copy of TCT as promised. In due time, the petitioners learned
that the duplicate owner’s copy of TCT had been all along in the custody of Atty. Jeremy Z. Parulan, who
appeared to hold an SPA executed by his brother Dionisio authorizing him to sell both lots. At Atanacio’s
instance, the petitioners met on March 25, 1991 with Atty. Parulan at the Manila Peninsula. They were
accompanied by one Atty. Olandesca. They recalled that Atty. Parulan “smugly demanded P800,000.00”
in exchange for the duplicate owner’s copy of TCT, because Atty. Parulan represented the current value
of the property to be P1.5 million. As a counter-offer, however, they tendered P250,000.00, which Atty.
Parulan declined, giving them only until April 5, 1991 to decide. Hearing nothing more from the
petitioners, Atty. Parulan decided to call them on April 5, 1991, but they informed him that they had
already fully paid to Elena.

Thus, on April 15, 1991, Dionisio, through Atty. Parulan, commenced an action (Civil Case No. 91-1005
entitled Dionisio Z. Parulan, Jr., represented by Jeremy Z. Parulan, as attorney in fact, v. Ma. Elena
Parulan, Sps. Rex and Coney Aggabao), praying for the declaration of the nullity of the deed of absolute
sale executed by Ma. Elena, and the cancellation of the title issued to the petitioners by virtue thereof.
In turn, the petitioners filed on July 12, 1991 their own action for specific performance with damages
against the respondents. Both cases were consolidated for trial and judgment in the RTC.

On July 26, 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 136, in Makati City annulled the deed of
absolute sale executed in favor of the petitioners covering two parcels of registered land the
respondents owned for want of the written consent of respondent husband Dionisio Parulan, Jr. The CA
affirmed the RTC decision.

ISSUE:
Which between Article 173 of the Civil Code and Article 124 of the Family Code should apply to the sale
of the conjugal property executed without the consent of Dionisio?

HELD:

Article 124, Family Code, applies to sale of conjugal properties made after the effectivity of the Family
Code

RATIO:

The petitioners submit that Article 173 of the CivilCode, not Article 124 of the Family Code, governed
the property relations of the respondents because they had been married prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code; and that the second paragraph of Article 124 of the Family Code should not apply because
the other spouse held the administration over the conjugal property. They argue that notwithstanding
his absence from the country Dionisio still held the administration of the conjugal property by virtue of
his execution of the SPA in favor of his brother; and that even assuming that Article 124 of the Family
Code properly applied, Dionisio ratified the sale through Atty. Parulan’s counter-offer during the March
25, 1991 meeting.

To start with, Article 25427 the Family Code has expressly repealed several titles under the Civil Code,
among them the entire Title VI in which the provisions on the property relations between husband and
wife, Article 173 included, are found.

Secondly, the sale was made on March 18, 1991, or after August 3, 1988, the effectivity of the Family
Code. The proper law to apply is, therefore, Article 124 of the Family Code, for it is settled that any
alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property made during the effectivity of the Family Code is
governed by Article 124 of the Family Code.

Article 124 of the Family Code provides:

“Article 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to
both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to
the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the
contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of
the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do
not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the
other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse
and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.”

Thirdly, according to Article 256 of the Family Code, the provisions of the Family Code may apply
retroactively provided no vested rights are impaired. In Tumlos v. Fernandez, the Court rejected the
petitioner’s argument that the Family Code did not apply because the acquisition of the contested
property had occurred prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, and pointed out that Article 256
provided that the Family Code could apply retroactively if the application would not prejudice vested or
acquired rights existing before the effectivity of the Family Code. Herein, however, the petitioners did
not show any vested right in the property acquired prior to August 3, 1988 that exempted their situation
from the retroactive application of the Family Code.

Fourthly, the petitioners failed to substantiate their contention that Dionisio, while holding the
administration over the property, had delegated to his brother, Atty. Parulan, the administration of the
property, considering that they did not present in court the SPA granting to Atty. Parulan the authority
for the administration.

Nonetheless, we stress that the power of administration does not include acts of disposition or
encumbrance, which are acts of strict ownership. As such, an authority to dispose cannot proceed from
an authority to administer, and vice versa, for the two powers may only be exercised by an agent by
following the provisions on agency of the Civil Code (from Article 1876 to Article 1878). Specifically, the
apparent authority of Atty. Parulan, being a special agency, was limited to the sale of the property in
question, and did not include or extend to the power to administer the property.

Lastly, the petitioners’ insistence that Atty. Parulan’s making of a counter-offer during the March 25,
1991 meeting ratified the sale merits no consideration. Under Article 124 of the Family Code, the
transaction executed sans the written consent of Dionisio or the proper court order was void; hence,
ratification did not occur, for a void contract could not be ratified. On the other hand, we agree with
Dionisio that the void sale was a continuing offer from the petitioners and Ma. Elena that Dionisio had
the option of accepting or rejecting before the offer was withdrawn by either or both Ma. Elena and the
petitioners. The last sentence of the second paragraph of Article 124 of the Family Code makes this
clear, stating that in the absence of the other spouse’s consent, the transaction should be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a
binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or upon authorization by the court before the
offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
FLORES V. LINDO

G.R. No. 183984, [April 13, 2011]

FACTS:

Respondent Edna Lindo obtained a loan from Petitioner Arturo Flores amounting to P400,000 and
secured it with a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage. The mortgage covered property in the name of Edna
and her husband, co-respondent Enrico Lindo, Jr. Edna likewise signed a Promissory Note and the Deed
for herself and for Enrico as his attorney-in-fact.

She issued three checks as partial loan payments, all of which were dishonored for insufficiency of
funds. Flores therefore filed a complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage with damages. The RTC ruled
that petitioner was not entitled to judicial foreclosure as the Deed was without consent and authority of
Edna’s husband. The Deed was executed on October 31, 1995, while the Special Power of Attorney was
executed by Enrico only on November 4, 1995. Accordingly, the mortgage is void pursuant to Article 96
of the Family Code. The RTC, however, ruled that petitioner may still recover the loan through a
personal action against Edna, but that it had no jurisdiction over the said personal action which should
be filed where plaintiff or defendant resides.

Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money and damages. The respondents alleged that Enrico was
not a party to the loan because it was contracted by Edna without Enrico’s signature. They also prayed
for the dismissal of the case on grounds of improper venue, res judicata and forum-shopping. The RTC
ruled that res judicata will not apply to rights, claims or demands which, though growing out of the same
subject matter, constitute separate or distinct causes of action.

The Court of Appeals set aside the RTC ruling. It noted that petitioner allowed the earlier decision of the
RTC to become final and executory without asking the courts for an alternative relief. The Court of
Appeals stated that petitioner merely relied on the declarations of these courts that he could file a
separate personal action and thus failed to observe the rules and settled jurisprudence on multiplicity of
suits, closing petitioner’s avenue for recovery of the loan.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether the promissory note and deed of mortgage are void
(2) Whether there remains an available remedy for petitioner

HELD:

(1) NO. Article 124 of the Family Code provides:

Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the
court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of
contract implementing such decision.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of
the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do
not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the
other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse
and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (Emphasis
supplied)

Article 124 of the Family Code of which applies to conjugal partnership property, is a reproduction of
Article 96 of the Family Code which applies to community property.

Both Article 96 and Article 127 of the Family Code provide that the powers do not include disposition or
encumbrance without the written consent of the other spouse. Any disposition or encumbrance without
the written consent shall be void. However, both provisions also state that “the transaction shall be
construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be
perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse x x x beforethe offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors.”

In this case, the Promissory Note and the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage were executed on 31 October
1995. The Special Power of Attorney was executed on 4 November
1995. The execution of the SPA is the acceptance by the other spouse that perfected the continuing
offer as a binding contract between the parties, making the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage a valid
contract.

(2) YES. In Chieng v. Santos, this Court ruled that a mortgage-creditor may institute against the
mortgage-debtor either a personal action for debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage. The Court
ruled that the remedies are alternative and not cumulative and held that the filing of a criminal action
for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was in effect a collection suit or a suit for the recovery of the
mortgage-debt. In that case, however, this Court pro hac vice, ruled that respondents could still be held
liable for the balance of the loan, applying the principle that no person may unjustly enrich himself at
the expense of another.

The principle of unjust enrichment is provided under Article 22 of the Civil Code which provides:

Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or
comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall
return the same to him.

There is unjust enrichment “when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a
person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and
good conscience.” The principle of unjust enrichment requires two conditions: (1) that a person is
benefited without a valid basis or justification, and (2) that such benefit is derived at the expense of
another. The main objective of the principle against unjust enrichment is to prevent one from enriching
himself at the expense of another without just cause or consideration. The principle is applicable in this
case considering that Edna admitted obtaining a loan from petitioners, and the same has not been fully
paid without just cause. The Deed was declared void erroneously at the instance of Edna, first when she
raised it as a defense before the RTC, Branch 33 and second, when she filed an action for declaratory
relief before the RTC, Branch 93. Petitioner could not be expected to ask the RTC, Branch 33 for an
alternative remedy, as what the Court of Appeals ruled that he should have done, because the RTC,
Branch 33 already stated that it had no jurisdiction over any personal action that petitioner might have
against Edna.

Edna should not be allowed to unjustly enrich herself because of the erroneous decisions of the two trial
courts when she questioned the validity of the Deed.
HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO, SR. et. al. v. SERVACIO and GO

G.R. No. 157537, [September 7, 2011]

FACTS:

Gaviola and Protacio, Jr. entered into a contract ofsale of a parcel of land. 23 years later, Protacio, Jr
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver affirming under oath that it was his father Protacio
Go, Sr.(Married to Marta Go) who purchased the said property. Subsequently, Protacio Go together with
his son Rito Go sold a portion of the property to herein respondent Ester Servacio. On March 2, 2001,
the petitioners demanded the return of the property, but Servacio refused to heed their demand; hence
this case for the annulment of sale of the property. The contention of the petitioner was that following
Protacio, Jr.’s renunciation, the property became conjugal property; and that the sale of the property to
Servacio without the prior liquidation of the community property between Protacio, Sr. and Marta was
null and void pursuant to Article 130 of the Family Code. Servacio and Rito countered that Article 130 of
the Family Code was inapplicable; that the want of the liquidation prior to the sale did not render the
sale invalid, because the sale was valid to the extent of the portion that was finally allotted to the
vendors as his share; and that the sale did not also prejudice any rights of the petitioners as heirs,
considering that what the sale disposed of was within the aliquot portion of the property that the
vendors were entitled to as heirs.

The RTC declared that the property was the conjugal property of Protacio, Sr. and Marta, not the
exclusive property of Protacio, Sr. Nonetheless, the RTC affirmed the validity of the sale of the property.
Aggrieved, the petitioners went all the way up to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether Article 130 of the Family Code was applicable.

HELD:

The appeal lacks merit.

Under Article 130 in relation to Article 105 of the Family Code,any disposition of the conjugal property
after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership must be made only after the liquidation; otherwise, the
disposition is void. Upon Marta’s death in 1987, the conjugal partnership was dissolved, pursuant to
Article 175 (1) of the Civil Code, and an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Protacio, Sr. and
the other heirs of Marta with respect to her share in the assets of the conjugal partnership pending a
liquidation following its liquidation.

Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of Marta’s share in the conjugal
partnership, could not yet assert or claim title to any specific portion of Marta’s share without an actual
partition of the property being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. Until then, all that
he had was an ideal or abstract quota in Marta’s share. Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided
share; hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the
interest of his co-owners. Consequently, the sale by Protacio, Sr. and Rito as co-owners without the
consent of the other co-owners was not necessarily void, for the rights of the selling co-owners were
thereby effectively transferred, making the buyer (Servacio) a co-owner of Marta’s share. Article 105 of
the Family Code, supra, expressly provides that the applicability of the rules on dissolution of the
conjugal partnership is “without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws.”

The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for the recovery of possession
of the thing owned in common from the third person who substituted the co-owner or co-owners who
alienated their shares, but the DIVISION of the common property as if it continued to remain in the
possession of the co-owners who possessed and administered it [Mainit v. Bandoy, supra] In the
meanwhile, Servacio would be a trustee for the benefit of the co-heirs of her vendors in respect of any
portion that might not be validly sold to her.
MELECIO DOMINGO v. SPS. GENARO MOLINA AND ELENA B. MOLINA, GR No. 200274, 2016-04-20

Facts:

he spouses Anastacio and Flora Domingo bought a property in Camiling, Tarlac, consisting of a one-half
undivided portion over an 18,164 square meter parcel of land.

During his lifetime, Anastacio borrowed money from the respondent spouses Genaro and Elena Molina
(spouses Molina). On September 10, 1978 or 10 years after Flora's death

, Anastacio sold his interest over the land to the spouses Molina to answer for his debts. The sale to the
spouses Molina was annotated at the OCT of the subject property

In 1986, Anastacio died.

In May 19, 1995, the sale of Anastacio's interest was registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 272967... and transferred the entire one-half undivided portion of the land to the spouses Molina.

Melecio, one of the children of Anastacio and Flora, learned of the transfer and filed a Complaint for
Annulment of Title and Recovery of Ownership (Complaint) against the spouses Molina on May 17,
1999.

Melecio claims that Anastacio gave the subject property to the spouses Molina to serve as collateral for
the money that Anastacio borrowed. Anastacio could not have validly sold the interest over the subject
property without Flora's consent, as Flora was already dead at the time of the sale.

Melecio also claims that Genaro Molina must have falsified the document transferring Anastacio and
Flora's one-half undivided interest over the land. Finally, Melecio asserts that he occupied the subject
property from the time of Anastacio's death up to the time he filed the Complaint.

Melecio presented the testimonies of the Records Officer of the Register of Deeds of Tarlac, and of
Melecio's nephew, George Domingo (George).
The Records Officer testified that he could not locate the instrument that documents the transfer of the
subject property ownership from Anastacio to the spouses Molina. The Records Officer also testified
that the alleged sale was annotated at the time when Genaro Molina's brother was the Register of
Deeds for Camiling, Tarlac.

George, on the other hand, testified that he has been living on the subject property owned by Anastacio
since 1986. George testified, however, that aside from himself, there were also four other occupants on
the subject property, namely Jaime Garlitos, Linda Sicangco, Serafio Sicangco and Manuel Ramos.

The spouses Molina asserted that Anastacio surrendered the title to the subject property to answer for
his debts and told the spouses Molina that they already own half of the land. The spouses Molina have
been in possession of the subject property before the title was registered under their names and have
religiously paid the property's real estate taxes.

The spouses Molina also asserted that Melecio knew of the disputed sale since he accompanied
Anastacio several times to borrow money. The last loan was even used to pay for Melecio's wedding.
Finally, the spouses Molina asserted that Melecio built his nipa hut on the subject property only in 1999,
without their knowledge and consent.

The spouses Molina presented Jaime Garlitos (Jaime) as their sole witness and who is one of the
occupants of the subject lot.Jaime testified that Elena Molina permitted him to build a house on the
subject property in 1993. Jaime, together with the other tenants, planted fruit bearing trees on the
subject property and gave portions of their harvest to Elena Molina without any complaint from
Melecio. Jaime further testified that Melecio never lived on the subject property and that only George
Domingo, as the caretaker of the spouses Molina, has a hut on the property.

Meanwhile, the spouses Molina died during the pendency of the case and were substituted by their
adopted son, Cornelio Molina.

Issues:

(1) whether the sale of a conjugal property to the spouses Molina without Flora's consent is valid and
legal

Ruling:
Melecio argues that the sale of the disputed property to the spouses Molina is void without Flora's
consent.We do not find Melecio's argument meritorious.Anastacio and Flora's conjugal partnership was
dissolved upon Flora's death.

There is no dispute that Anastacio and Flora Domingo married before the Family Code's effectivity on
August 3, 1988 and their property relation is a conjugal partnership.

The conjugal partnership of Anastacio and Flora was dissolved when Flora died in 1968

Article 130 of the Family Code requires the liquidation of the conjugal partnership upon death of a
spouse and prohibits any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property prior to the conjugal
partnership liquidation,... Article 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal
partnership property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased.If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the
conjugal partnership property either judicially or extra-judicially within one year from the death of the
deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six month period no liquidation is made, any disposition or
encumbrance involving the conjugal partnership property of the terminated marriage shall be void. x x x

While Article 130 of the Family Code provides that any disposition involving the conjugal property
without prior liquidation of the partnership shall be void, this rule does not apply since the provisions of
the Family Code shall be "without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the
Civil Code or other laws.

An implied co-ownership among Flora's heirs governed the conjugal properties pending liquidation and
partition.

An implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Flora's surviving heirs, including Anastacio, with
respect to Flora's share of the conjugal partnership until final liquidation and partition; Anastacio, on the
other hand, owns one-half of the original conjugal partnership properties as his share, but this is an
undivided interest.

Article 493 of the Civil Code on co-ownership provides:Article 493. Each co-owner shall have the full
ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate,
assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights
are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be
limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership.

Thus, Anastacio, as co-owner, cannot claim title to any specific portion of the conjugal properties
without an actual partition being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. Nonetheless,
Anastacio had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest in the subject property.

The spouses Molina became co-owners of the subject property to the extent of Anastacio's interest.

At the time of the sale, Anastacio's undivided interest in the conjugal properties consisted of: (1) one-
half of the entire conjugal properties; and (2) his share as Flora's heir on the conjugal properties.

Anastacio, as a co-owner, had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the
interest of his co-owners. Consequently, Anastactio's sale to the spouses Molina without the consent of
the other co-owners was not totally void, for Anastacio's rights or a portion thereof were thereby
effectively transferred, making the spouses Molina a co-owner of the subject property to the extent of
Anastacio's interest.

Melecio's recourse as a co-owner of the conjugal properties, including the subject property, is an action
for partition under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court. As held in the case of Heirs of Protacio Go, Sr.,
"it is now settled that the appropriate recourse of co-owners in cases where their consent were not
secured in a sale of the entire property as well as in a sale merely of the undivided shares of some of the
co-owners is an action for PARTITION under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court."
Buado v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 145222, 24 April 2009

FACTS:

On April 30 1984, Spouses Roberto and Venus Buado, petitioners, filed a complaint for damages against
Erlinda Nicol for her civil liability arising from criminal offense of slander filed by petitioners. Trial court
rendered a decision to let Erlinda Nicol pay for damages. Finding Erlinda Nicol‘s personal properties
insufficient to satisfy the judgment. The sheriff levied and auctioned the property of Erlinda. An auction
sale was held with the petitioners as the highest bidder. A certificate of sale was issued in favor of Mr.
and Mrs. Buado. After almost one year, the husband of Erlinda, Romulo Nicol, filed a complaint for the
annulment of certificate of sale and damages with preliminary injunction against petitioners and deputy
sheriff. He argued that there was no proper publication and posting for the auction sale. He also claimed
that the judgment obligation of Erlinda Nicol amounted to P40,000 only. The spouses Buado obtained
the P500, 000 worth of property for only P51,685. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition of
Romulo Nicol.

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and held that Branch 21 has jurisdiction to act on
the complaint filed by the respondent in this case. The petitioners filed a petition where they said that
the Court of Appeals committed a grave abuse of discretion for reversing the decision given by the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the obligation of Erlinda Nicol arising from her criminal liability is chargeable to the
conjugal partnership.

RULING:

NO. Erlinda Nicol‟s liability is not chargeable to the conjugal partnership.

There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in nature. Article 122 of the Family Code
explicitly provides that payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or
during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded
to the benefit of the family.Unlike in the system of absolute community where liabilities incurred by
either spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute community of property,
in the absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the same advantage is
not accorded in the system of conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal partnership of gains has no
duty to make advance payments for the liability of the debtor-spouse.

Petitioners argue that the obligation of the wife arising from her criminal liability is chargeable to the
conjugal partnership. In Guadalupe v. Tronco, this Court held that the car which was claimed by the third
party complainant to be conjugal property was being levied upon to enforce “a judgment for support”
filed by a third person, the third-party claim of the wife is proper since the obligation which is personal
to the husband is chargeable not on the conjugal property but on his separate property. Hence, the
filing of a separate action by Romulo Nicol was proper. The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
DEWARA vs SPS. LAMELA

G.R. No. 179010

2011

DOCTRINE:

Even after having classified a property as a conjugal it does not necessarily follow that it may
automatically be levied upon in an execution to answer for debts, obligations, fines, or indemnities of
one of the spouses. Before debts and obligations may be charged against the conjugal partnership, it
must be shown that the same were contracted for, or the debts and obligations should have redounded
to, the benefit of the conjugal partnership.

FACTS:

Eduardo Dewara and petitioner Elenita were married before the enactment of the Family Code. Thus,
the Civil Code governed their marital relations. Husband and wife were separated-in-fact because
Elenita went to work in California, United States of America, while Eduardo stayed in Bacolod City.

On January 20, 1985, Eduardo, while driving a private jeep registered in the name of Elenita, hit
respondent Ronnie Lamela (Ronnie). Ronnie filed a criminal case for serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence against Eduardo before the MTCC in Bacolod City. The MTCC found Eduardo guilty
of the charge and to pay civil indemnity P62,598.70 as actual damages and Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00) as moral damages. On appeal, the RTCaffirmed the decision and it became final and
executory.

The writ of execution on the civil liability was served on Eduardo, but it was returned unsatisfied
because he had no property in his name. Ronnie requested the City Sheriff to levy on Lot No. 234-C, Psd.
26667 of the Bacolod Cadastre in the name of ELENITA M. DEWARA. Ronnie then caused the
consolidation of title in a Cadastral Proceeding before the RTC, which ordered the cancellation of TCT
No. T-80054 in the name of Elenita and the issuance of a new certificate of title in the name of
respondent spouses.

The levy on execution, public auction, issuance of certificate of sale, and cancellation of title of the lot in
the name of Elenita were done while Elenita was working in California. Thus, Elenita, represented by her
attorney-in-fact, Ferdinand Magallanes, filed a case for annulment of sale and for damages.
On the other hand, respondent spouses averred that the subject lot was the conjugal property of
petitioner Elenita and Eduardo. They asserted that the property was acquired by Elenita during her
marriage to Eduardo; that the property was acquired with the money of Eduardo because, at the time of
the acquisition of the property, Elenita was a plain housewife; that the jeep involved in the accident was
registered in the name of petitioner.

RTC’s RULING:

The RTC declared that said property was paraphernal in nature. It arrived at this conclusion by tracing
how Elenita acquired the subject property. Based on the documentary evidence submitted, Elenitas
grandfather originally owned Lot No. 234-C.

On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The CA elucidated that the gross inadequacy of the
price alone does not affect a contract of sale, except that it may indicate a defect in the consent, or that
the parties really intended a donation or some other act or contract. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

W/N the subject property is the paraphernal/exclusive property of Elenita or the conjugal property of
spouses Elenita and Eduardo.

RULING:

Conjugal property. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership,
unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Registration in the name of
the husband or the wife alone does not destroy this presumption. The separation-in-fact between the
husband and the wife without judicial approval shall not affect the conjugal partnership. The lot retains
its conjugal nature. Moreover, the presumption of conjugal ownership applies even when the manner in
which the property was acquired does not appear. The use of the conjugal funds is not an essential
requirement for the presumption to arise.

However, even after having declared that Lot No. 234-C is the conjugal property of spouses Elenita and
Eduardo, it does not necessarily follow that it may automatically be levied upon in an execution to
answer for debts, obligations, fines, or indemnities of one of the spouses. Before debts and obligations
may be charged against the conjugal partnership, it must be shown that the same were contracted for,
or the debts and obligations should have redounded to, the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Ravina v. Villa Abrille G.R. No. 160708

G.R. No. 160708, October 16, 2009

PATROCINIA RAVINA AND WILFREDO RAVINA VS. MARY ANN P. VILLA ABRILLE, FOR HERSELF AND IN
BEHALF OF INGRID D’LYN P. VILLA ABRILLE, INGREMARK D’WIGHT VILLA ABRILLE, INGRESOLL DIELS
VILLA ABRILLE AND INGRELYN DYAN VILLA ABRILLE

QUISUMBING, ACTING C.J.:

FACTS:

Respondent Mary Ann Pasaol Villa Abrille and Pedro Villa Abrille are husband and wife. They have four
children, who are also parties to the instant case and are represented by their mother, Mary Ann.

In 1982, the spouses acquired a 555-square meter parcel of land denominated as Lot 7, located in Davao
City, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-88674 in their names. Said lot is adjacent to
a parcel of land which Pedro acquired when he was still single and which is registered solely in his name
under TCT No. T-26471.

Through their joint efforts and the proceeds of a loan from the Development Bank of the Philippines
(DBP), the spouses built a house on Lot 7 and Pedro’s lot. The house was finished in the early 1980’s but
the spouses continuously made improvements, including a poultry house and an annex.

In 1991, Pedro got a mistress and began to neglect his family. Mary Ann was forced to sell or mortgage
their movables to support the family and the studies of her children. By himself, Pedro offered to sell
the house and the two lots to herein petitioners, Patrocinia and Wilfredo Ravina. Mary Ann objected
and notified the petitioners of her objections, but Pedro nonetheless sold the house and the two lots
without Mary Ann’s consent, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale[5]. It appears on the said deed that Mary
Ann did not sign on top of her name.

On July 5, 1991 while Mary Ann was outside the house and the four children were in school, Pedro
together with armed members of the Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) and acting in
connivance with petitioners[6] began transferring all their belongings from the house to an apartment.

When Mary Ann and her daughter Ingrid Villa Abrille came home, they were stopped from entering it.
They waited outside the gate until evening under the rain. They sought help from the Talomo Police
Station, but police authorities refused to intervene, saying that it was a family matter. Mary Ann alleged
that the incident caused stress, tension and anxiety to her children, so much so that one flunked at
school.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioners patrocin[i]a ravina and wilfredo ravina are liable for damages, the same being
contrary to law and evidence.[10]

RULING:
The claim is erroneous to say the least. The manner by which respondent and her children were
removed from the family home deserves our condemnation. While respondent was out and her children
were in school, Pedro Villa Abrille acting in connivance with the petitioners[21] surreptitiously
transferred all their personal belongings to another place. The respondents then were not allowed to
enter their rightful home or family abode despite their impassioned pleas.

Firmly established in our civil law is the doctrine that: “Every person must, in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith.”[22] When a right is exercised in a manner that does not conform with such norms and
results in damages to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrong doer must be
held responsible. Similarly, any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damages caused.
[23] It is patent in this case that petitioners’ alleged acts fall short of these established civil law
standards.