CLARENCE TIU Torts Notes Last Edit Jan20181 PDF

TORTS AND
DAMAGES
CODAL — CIVIL CODE PROVISIONS ON THE LAW ON TORTS AND DAMAGES

COMPREHENSIVE NOTES ON PROF. JESS LOPEZ’S LECTURES [ITALICIZED]
JURISPRUDENCE BASED ON PROF. JESS LOPEZ’S SYLLABUS
NOTES FROM PROF. AQUINO’S BOOK [ITALICIZED]
IT BEGINS WITH FAITH & CONVICTION, PERSEVERES WITH HARD WORK & DISCIPLINE, AND
ENDS WITH AN IMPASSIONED TRIUMPH WITHIN, WHEN WE REALIZE THAT WE CAN DO ANYTHING
[SEE EPH. 3:20]
#EMBRACETHEGRIND
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION 4
A. SOURCES OF OBLIGATION UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW 4
B. QUASI-DELICT DISTINGUISHED FROM OTHER SOURCES OF OBLIGATION 5
1. QUASI-DELICT VS CONTRACT 5
2. QUASI-DELICT VS DELICT 10
II. QUASI-DELICT 14
A. ELEMENTS 14
B. NO DOUBLE RECOVERY RULE 18
C. PERSONS LIABLE; NATURE OF LIABILITY 20
III. NEGLIGENCE 24
A. CONCEPT 24
B. NEGLIGENCE AS PROXIMATE CAUSE 33
C. PROOF OF NEGLIGENCE 35
D. PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE 36
1. RES IPSA LOQUITUR 36
2. VIOLATION OF RULES AND STATUTES 41
3. DANGEROUS WEAPONS AND SUBSTANCES 49
IV. DEFENSES 50
A. PLAINTIFF’S NEGLIGENCE IS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF INJURY 50
B. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 53
C. ASSUMPTION OF RISK 56
D. LAST CLEAR CHANCE 56
E. PRESCRIPTION 59
F. FORTUITOUS EVENT 61
G. WAIVER 63
H. EMERGENCY 64
I. DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA 66
V. VICARIOUS LIABILITY 69
A. PARENTS AND GUARDIANS 69
B. OWNERS AND MANAGERS OF ENTERPRISES/EMPLOYERS 76
C. THE STATE 91
D. TEACHERS AND HEADS OF ESTABLISHMENTS 94
E. RIGHT TO REIMBURSEMENT 100
F. DISTINGUISHED FROM SUBSIDIARY LIABILITY UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE 101
CLARENCE TIU TORTS AND DAMAGES

ATENEO LAW 3B, BATCH 2017 2 OF 200 ATTY. JESS LOPEZ
TABLE OF CONTENTS
VI. PRIMARY LIABILITY 104

A. POSSESSORS/USERS OF ANIMALS 105
B. OWNERS OF MOTOR VEHICLES 105
C. MANUFACTURERS AND PROCESSORS 106
D. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 107
E. BUILDING PROPRIETORS 108
F. ENGINEERS/ARCHITECTS/CONTRACTORS 109
G. STRICT LIABILITY TORTS 110
VII. SPECIAL TORTS (HUMAN RELATIONS) 112

A. ABUSE OF RIGHTS AND ACTS CONTRA BONUS MORES 112
B. UNJUST ENRICHMENT 121
C. JUDICIAL VIGILANCE 123
D. THOUGHTLESS EXTRAVAGANCE 123
E. DISRESPECT OF PERSONS 123
F. DERELICTION OF DUTY 125
G. UNFAIR COMPETITION 127
H. VIOLATION OF CIVIL/POLITICAL RIGHTS 128
VIII. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS 134
IX. CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM CRIMES 138
X. DAMAGES 155
A. IN GENERAL 155
B. ACTUAL DAMAGES 156
C. MORAL DAMAGES 180
D. NOMINAL DAMAGES 190
E. TEMPERATE DAMAGES 191
F. LIQUIDATED DAMAGES 193
G. EXEMPLARY DAMAGES 195
H. MITIGATION OF DAMAGES 199

I. INTRODUCTION
I. INTRODUCTION
A. SOURCES OF OBLIGATION UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW
The first step in this subject is the “step of characterization”, properly characterizing the situation as to what sources of
obligation are involved. Different rules apply to different sources of obligation. Knowing the source of the obligation or the
juridical tie determines a lot of things, such as:
1. From the Plaintiff’s point of view:
a. Cause of action to base his complaint
b. Facts to allege in his complaint
c. Damages to claim
d. What presumptions would apply
2. From the Defendant’s point of view:
‣ What defenses to invoke in his answer
‣ What presumptions to overcome
Article 1156. An obligation is a juridical necessity to give, to do or not to do. (n)
Article 1157. Obligations arise from:

1. Law;
2. Contracts;
3. Quasi-contracts;
4. Acts or omissions punished by law; and
5. Quasi-delicts. (1089a)
Article 1158. Obligations derived from law are not presumed. Only those expressly determined in this Code or in special
laws are demandable, and shall be regulated by the precepts of the law which establishes them; and as to what has not
been foreseen, by the provisions of this Book. (1090)
Article 1159. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be
complied with in good faith. (1091a)
Article 1160. Obligations derived from quasi-contracts shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter 1, Title XVII, of this
Book. (n)
Article 1161. Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses shall be governed by the penal laws, subject to the provisions
of article 2177, and of the pertinent provisions of Chapter 2, Preliminary Title, on Human Relations, and of Title XVIII of
this Book, regulating damages. (1092a)
Article 1162. Obligations derived from quasi-delicts shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this
Book, and by special laws. (1093a)
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)

I. INTRODUCTION
MEMORIZE: ART. 1157 AND 2176
REPORT OF THE CODE COMMISSION, PP. 161 TO 162

‣ Summary: The Code Commission which prepared the draft of the New Civil Code of the Philippines contemplated the
possibility of adopting the word “tort” in lieu of quasi-delict as a separate source of obligation. The Commission later
decided against the use of the word “tort” because the members believed that such use would not be accurate because
“tort” in Anglo-American law “is much broader than the Spanish-Philippine concept of obligations arising from non-
contractual negligence. ‘Tort’ in Anglo-American jurisprudence includes not only negligence, but also intentional criminal
acts such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit.
REVIEW: CAUSES OF ACTION (RULES OF COURT)
RULE 2: Cause of Action

SECTION 1. Ordinary civil actions, basis of . - Every ordinary civil action must be based on a cause of action. (n)
SECTION 2. Cause of action, defined. - A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of
another.
B. QUASI-DELICT DISTINGUISHED FROM OTHER SOURCES OF OBLIGATION
Quasi-Delicts, Contracts and Delicts are distinct and independent sources of obligations as provided by law with each a set of
provisions respectively governing them. BUT, they are not completely independent spheres, one act or omission may give rise
to multiple causes of action. Some or all of them may arise, simultaneously in a given factual matrix or circumstances. They
can be independently pursued and availed of by the plaintiff in the appropriate cases.
1. QUASI-DELICT VS CONTRACT
QUASI-DELICT (CULPA AQUILIANA) VS CONTRACT (CULPA CONTRACTUAL)
QUASI-DELICT BREACH OF CONTRACT
Basis of the Wrongful or negligent act or omission creates The contract itself
Vinculum Juris the vinculum juris
or Juridical Tie
Scope (as to the Broader (than contractual relations), it covers Very limited, it covers only the obligations of the
obligations the whole extent of juridicial human relations parties arising from the contract
involved)
Characterization Negligence is direct, substantive and Negligence is merely incidental to the

of negligence as independent performance of the contractual obligation.
an element Negligence is only one of the ways of how to
breach a contract.
Elements for a Plaintiff must assert the elements of quasi- Plaintiff needs to merely assert the existence of
Cause of Action delict. He must allege that the defendant or a contract and a breach of such contract
persons to whose acts he must respond
(employees, etc) were negligent and such
negligence was the proximate cause of the
plaintiff’s damage
Presumption of Generally, there is no presumption of Negligence is presumed so long as it can be

Negligence negligence and it is incumbent upon the injured proved that there was breach of the contract
party to prove the negligence of the defendant, and the burden is on the defendant to prove
otherwise, the former’s complaint will be that there was no negligence in the carrying out
dismissed (subject to several exceptions) of the terms of the contract

I. INTRODUCTION
QUASI-DELICT BREACH OF CONTRACT
Nature of Based on the relationship of Paterfamilias. Based on the common law principle of
Liability of Liability of employer is personal and direct Respondeat Superior (Let the master answer for
Employers with because it is his own negligence in the the acts of the servant)
respect to its selection and supervision of his employees
Employees (Art. 2180)
Defenses The defense of "good father of a family" (in the The defense of "good father of a family” is NOT
available for selection and supervision of employees, etc) is a complete and proper defense in the selection
Employers or a complete and proper defense insofar as and supervision of employees. (Rules of
other persons parents, guardians and employers are respondeat superior is followed)
liable for acts of concerned (Rules on Vicarious Liability is
others followed)
Damages 1. Actual Damages (Art. 2202)

1. Actual Damages (Art. 2201)
recoverable
‣ Defendant is liable for all damages which a. Breach in Good Faith: Defendant is
are the natural and probable liable shall be those that are the natural
consequences of the act or omission and probable consequences of the
complained of. It is NOT necessary that breach of the obligation, and which the
such damages have been foreseen or parties have foreseen or could have
could have reasonably been foreseen by reasonably foreseen at the time the
the defendant.
obligation was constituted.
2. Moral Damages (Art. 2219[2])

b. Breach in Bad Faith: Defendant is liable
for all damages which may be
‣ For quasi-delicts involving physical
reasonably attributed to the non-
injuries
performance of the obligation
‣ EXCEPTION: If the act is wanton or

2. Moral Damages (Art. 2220)
wilful, moral damages can still be

awarded even if there is no physical ‣ In case of bad faith or fraud
injuries, but there should be mental
anguish (Bagumbayan vs IAC)
1. CANGCO V. MANILA RAILROAD CO., 38 PHIL. 768 (1918)

‣ Contract (culpa contractual, contractual fault) and Quasi-Delict (culpa aquiliana, extra-contractual fault) as two
independent sources of obligations; the former based on obligations already existing (from the contract) and
the other based on obligations which do not arise from contractual relations
‣ Every legal obligation must of necessity be extra-contractual or contractual. Extra-contractual obligation has its
source in the breach or omission of those mutual duties which civilized society imposes upon it members, or
which arise from these relations, other than contractual, of certain members of society to others, generally
embraced in the concept of status. The legal rights of each member of society constitute the measure of the
corresponding legal duties, mainly negative in character, which the existence of those rights imposes upon all
other members of society. The breach of these general duties whether due to willful intent or to mere inattention, if
productive of injury, give rise to an obligation to indemnify the injured party. The fundamental distinction between
obligations of this character and those which arise from contract, rests upon the fact that in cases of non-
contractual obligation it is the wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which creates the vinculum juris, whereas
in contractual relations the vinculum exists independently of the breach of the voluntary duty assumed by the
parties when entering into the contractual relation.
‣ With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from negligence, whether of act or omission, it is competent for
the legislature to elect — and our Legislature has so elected — whom such an obligation is imposed is morally
culpable, or, on the contrary, for reasons of public policy, to extend that liability, without regard to the lack of moral
culpability, so as to include responsibility for the negligence of those person who acts or mission are imputable, by
a legal fiction, to others who are in a position to exercise an absolute or limited control over them. The legislature
which adopted our Civil Code has elected to limit extra-contractual liability — with certain well-defined exceptions
— to cases in which moral culpability can be directly imputed to the persons to be charged. This moral
responsibility may consist in having failed to exercise due care in the selection and control of one's agents or
servants, or in the control of persons who, by reason of their status, occupy a position of dependency with respect
to the person made liable for their conduct.
‣ In this case, it is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of
carriage, and that the obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all, from the

I. INTRODUCTION
breach of that contract by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its performance. That is to say,
its liability is direct and immediate, differing essentially, in legal viewpoint from that presumptive responsibility for
the negligence of its servants, imposed by Article 1903 of the Civil Code (Art. 1903 of the old civil code is now Art.
2180) which can be rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care in their selection and supervision.
‣ Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to obligations arising ex contractu, but only to extra-contractual
obligations — or to use the technical form of expression, that article relates only to culpa aquiliana and not to
culpa contractual.
‣ Under Art. 1903, culpa, substantive and independent, which of itself constitutes the source of an obligation
between persons not formerly connected by any legal tie" this is to be distinguished from culpa considered as an
accident in the performance of an obligation already existing
‣ Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to acts of negligence which constitute the breach of a contract. This
is clear from the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil. rep., 359) where the Court said that the
acts to which these articles (1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code) are applicable are understood to be those not
growing out of pre-existing duties of the parties to one another.
‣ But where relations already formed give rise to duties, whether springing from contract or quasi-contract, then
breaches of those duties are subject to article 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the same code
‣ The Court distinguishes between obligations arising from a contract and those arising from Art. 1903 of the old
code which pertains to quasi-delicts. Different rules apply to each.
‣ Relationship of Contractual Obligations and Extra-Contractual Obligations as independent sources of
obligations
‣ The true explanation of such cases is to be found by directing the attention to the relative spheres of contractual
and extra-contractual obligations. The field of non- contractual obligation is much more broader than that of
contractual obligations, comprising, as it does, the whole extent of juridical human relations. These two fields,
figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say, the mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does
not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor
may break the contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes the source of an extra-
contractual obligation had no contract existed between the parties.
‣ Note that the field of extra-contractual obligations is bigger than contractual obligations is much more broader
since the latter is limited to the mere contract, however a person is bound by both at the same time. The
relationship is thus, described as CONCENTRIC, two concepts which overlap, though one may be bigger than the
other.
‣ Importance of the distinction between culpa contractual and culpa aquiliana
‣ This distinction is of the utmost importance. The liability, which, under the Spanish law, is, in certain cases
imposed upon employers with respect to damages occasioned by the negligence of their employees to persons to
whom they are NOT bound by contract, is NOT based, as in the English Common Law, upon the principle of
respondeat superior — if it were, the master would be liable in every case and unconditionally — BUT based upon
the principle announced in article 1902 of the Civil Code, which imposes upon all persons who by their fault or
negligence, do injury to another, the obligation of making good the damage caused.
‣ Thus, the principle of respondeat superior (master-servant rule) does NOT apply to culpa aquiliana. In culpa
contractual, the employer is automatically liable for the negligence of his employees based on respondeat
superior. Due diligence in the employees’ selection and supervision is NOT a complete defense
‣ One who places a powerful automobile in the hands of a servant whom he knows to be ignorant of the method of
managing such a vehicle, is himself guilty of an act of negligence which makes him liable for all the consequences
of his imprudence. The obligation to make good the damage arises at the very instant that the unskillful servant,
while acting within the scope of his employment causes the injury. The liability of the master is personal and direct.
But, if the master has not been guilty of any negligence whatever in the selection and direction of the servant, he is
not liable for the acts of the latter, whatever done within the scope of his employment or not, if the damage done
by the servant does not amount to a breach of the contract between the master and the person injured.
‣ It is not accurate to say that proof of diligence and care in the selection and control of the servant relieves the
master from liability for the latter's acts — on the contrary, that proof shows that the responsibility has never
existed. As Manresa says the liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is always based upon a voluntary act
or omission which, without willful intent, but by mere negligence or inattention, has caused damage to another.
A master who exercises all possible care in the selection of his servant, taking into consideration the
qualifications they should possess for the discharge of the duties which it is his purpose to confide to them,
and directs them with equal diligence, thereby performs his duty to third persons to whom he is bound by no
contractual ties, and he incurs no liability whatever if, by reason of the negligence of his servants, even within
the scope of their employment, such third person suffer damage. True it is that under article 1903 of the Civil

I. INTRODUCTION
Code the law creates a presumption that he has been negligent in the selection or direction of his servant, but
the presumption is rebuttable and yield to proof of due care and diligence in this respect.
‣ If it is a case of culpa aquiliana, the employer is still liable to the injured party, NOT on the basis of respondeat
superior but on the basis of his own personal negligence in the selection and supervision of such employee.
And therefore, the employer can raise the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of
employees as a defense.
‣ The position of a natural or juridical person who has undertaken by contract to render service to another, is wholly
different from that to which article 1903 relates. When the sources of the obligation upon which plaintiff's cause of
action depends is a negligent act or omission, the burden of proof rests upon plaintiff to prove the negligence — if
he does not his action fails. But when the facts averred show a contractual undertaking by defendant for the
benefit of plaintiff, and it is alleged that plaintiff has failed or refused to perform the contract, it is not necessary for
plaintiff to specify in his pleadings whether the breach of the contract is due to willful fault or to negligence on the
part of the defendant, or of his servants or agents. Proof of the contract and of its nonperformance is sufficient
prima facie to warrant a recovery.
‣ As a general rule, it is logical that in case of extra-contractual culpa, a suing creditor should assume the burden
of proof of its existence, as the only fact upon which his action is based; while on the contrary, in a case of
negligence which presupposes the existence of a contractual obligation, if the creditor shows that it exists and
that it has been broken, it is not necessary for him to prove negligence (Manresa)
‣ If an action is based on culpa aquiliana, the plaintiff must prove the negligence of the defendant or his
employees to warrant recovery of damages. If an action is based on culpa contractual, the plaintiff must merely
prove the existence of the contract and its breach, this already creates a prima facie case for him to recover
damages.
‣ Application of Art. 1902 and 1903 of the old Civil Code (now Art. 2176 and 2180 respectively) exclusively to
culpa aquiliana or extra-contractual fault
‣ The supreme court of Porto Rico, in interpreting identical provisions, as found in the Porto Rico Code, has held
that these articles are applicable to cases of extra-contractual culpa exclusively. This distinction was again made
patent by this Court in its decision in the case of Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes, (30 Phil. rep., 624), which was an
action brought upon the theory of the extra-contractual liability of the defendant to respond for the damage
caused by the carelessness of his employee while acting within the scope of his employment.
‣ From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or
employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or
employer either in selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or both; and
(2) that that presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It follows
necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he
has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is
relieved from liability.
‣ This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of his
servant. This is the notable peculiarity of the Spanish law of negligence. It is, of course, in striking contrast to
the American doctrine that, in relations with strangers, the negligence of the servant in conclusively the
negligence of the master.
‣ The opinion there expressed by this Court, to the effect that in case of extra-contractual culpa based upon
negligence, it is necessary that there shall have been some fault attributable to the defendant personally, and
that the last paragraph of article 1903 merely establishes a rebuttable presumption, is in complete accord with
the authoritative opinion of Manresa, who says (vol. 12, p. 611) that the liability created by article 1903 is
imposed by reason of the breach of the duties inherent in the special relations of authority or superiority
existing between the person called upon to repair the damage and the one who, by his act or omission, was
the cause of it.
‣ On the other hand, the liability of masters and employers for the negligent acts or omissions of their servants or
agents, when such acts or omissions cause damages which amount to the breach of a contact, is not based
upon a mere presumption of the master's negligence in their selection or control, and proof of exercise of the
utmost diligence and care in this regard does not relieve the master of his liability for the breach of his contract.
‣ This part is a reiteration that obligations arising from contracts and quasi-delicts are indeed distinct and
different. Article 2176 and 2180 only refers to the latter.
‣ Test of Negligence
‣ Was there anything in the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff at the time he alighted from the train which
would have admonished a person of average prudence that to get off the train under the conditions then existing
was dangerous? If so, the plaintiff should have desisted from alighting; and his failure so to desist was contributory
negligence.

I. INTRODUCTION
‣ Court cited the test of negligence in Picard vs Smith as the basis in absolving the plaintiff of negligence, particularly
contributory negligence in this case.
2. AIR FRANCE V. CARRASCOSO, 18 SCRA 155 (1966)
‣ Action for damages may be based on both breach of contract and quasi-delict; An injured person may file an
action based on quasi-delict notwithstanding the existence of a contractual relation between the parties; An
act that breaks a contract may also be a tort
‣ In this case, the relationship of the parties was governed by a contract of air carriage. Court held the defendant to
be liable for damages based on breach of contract and quasi-delict hinged on Art. 21
‣ Although the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature" nevertheless "the act that
breaks the contract may be also a tort
‣ Note that in Art. 2176, an essential element of a quasi-delict is that there should be “no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties.” In holding a defendant liable for quasi-delict despite the existence of a contract between
them must be considered as an exception. It only applies when it is a tort which breaches a contract and the
circumstances surrounding the tortious act must be impelling and extra-ordinary. Such as in this case where the court
ruled that the defendant (because of its racist policies) exercised their rights with bad faith and against public policy.
3. SINGSON V. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, G.R. NO. L-24837; 23 SCRA 1117 (1968)
‣ Lower court in this case refused to apply the rules on quasi-delicts and dismissed the case because the relationship
of the parties was governed by a contract but the action was based on quasi-delict. The Court held that the lower
court erred, and cited the Air France case
‣ The existence of a contract between the parties does NOT bar the commission of a tort by the one against the order
and the consequent recovery of damages therefor. Although the relationship of the parties is contractual both in origin
and nature, the act that breaks the contract may also be a tort.
4. PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 84698, FEBRUARY 4, 1992
‣ In this case, the Court held that the defendant was not liable for quasi-delict but was liable for breach of contract
‣ A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual
obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied. However, this
impression has not prevented this Court from determining the existence of a tort even when there obtains a
contract.
‣ The field of non-contractual obligation is much broader than that of contractual obligation, comprising, as it does,
the whole extent of juridical human relations. These two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say, the
mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such
person. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the
same act which constitutes a breach of the contract would have constituted the source of an extra-contractual
obligation had no contract existed between the parties. (Cangco vs. Manila Railroad)
‣ Re- examining the Air France Case
‣ In the Air France case, the Court penalized the racist policy of the airline which emboldened the petitioner's
employee to forcibly oust the private respondent to cater to the comfort of a white man who allegedly "had a
better right to the seat." In the public embarrassment caused to the passenger was the justification for the court to
award damages to the latter. From the foregoing, it can be concluded that should the act which breaches a
contract be done in bad faith and be violative of Article 21, then there is a cause to view the act as constituting a
quasi-delict.
‣ In this case, however, there is, as yet, no finding that the contract between the school and Bautista had been
breached thru the former's negligence in providing proper security measures. This would be for the trial court to
determine. And, even if there be a finding of negligence, the same could give rise generally to a breach of
contractual obligation only. Using the test of Cangco, supra, the negligence of the school would not be relevant
absent a contract. In fact, that negligence becomes material only because of the contractual relation between
PSBA and Bautista. In other words, a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the school's liability. The
negligence of the school cannot exist independently of the contract, unless the negligence occurs under the
circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.

I. INTRODUCTION
‣ It seems that the Court concludes here that if a contract governs the relationship of the parties, an action based on
quasi-delict cannot prosper, unless the act that breaches a contract is a tort, and such negligent act must violate
Art. 21 as well. The act must be more than a breach of the contract, it must be repulsive to morals, good customs,
or public policy.
5. FABRE V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 111127, JULY 26, 1996
‣ Court held that is unnecessary for our purpose to determine whether to decide this case on the theory that the
defendants are liable for breach of contract of carriage or culpa contractual or on the theory of quasi delict or culpa
aquiliana for although the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature," nevertheless
"the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort.” In either case, the question is whether the defendant, was
negligent.
6. LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY V. NAVIDAD, 397 SCRA 75 (2003)

‣ Application of Rules on Quasi-Delict (Art. 2194 on solidary liability) to a Breach of Contract Situation
‣ Court asked and answered the question of how must the liability of the common carrier, on the one hand, and an
independent contractor, on the other hand, be described? It would be solidary under the rules on quasi delict, Art.
2194.
‣ Note that the relationship between the plaintiff and the common carrier is governed by contract but the former’s
relationship with the independent contractor of the common carrier is not.
‣ A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the injury, one
resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194 of the Civil Code can well apply. In fine,
a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract. Stated differently,
when an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual
liability had no contract existed between the parties, the contract can be said to have been breached by tort,
thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.
2. QUASI-DELICT VS DELICT
QUASI-DELICT (CULPA AQUILIANA) VS DELICT
QUASI-DELICT DELICT
Interests affected Private interest Public interest
Purpose Reparation of damage by means of Punishment of a criminal act

indemnification
Scope (as to the All acts or omissions in which any kind of fault or Only where there is a (penal) law punishing the act
obligations involved) negligence intervenes or omission. Nullum crimen sine lege, no crime
without a law.
Quantum of Evidence Preponderance of Evidence Proof beyond reasonable doubt
Possibility of Compromise allowed, in fact it is encouraged as Generally, compromise is NOT allowed since the act
Compromise this is a civil case. is against the state, except in the case of private
crimes
Nature of Liability of Personal, direct and solidary liability(Art. 2180) Subsidiary liability (Art. 102 and 103 of the RPC)
Employers with respect
to its Employees
1. BARREDO V. GARCIA, 73 PHIL. 607 (1942)

‣ Quasi-Delicts and Delicts as two independent sources of obligations for civil liability
‣ It will thus be seen that while the terms of articles 1902 of the Civil Code seem to be broad enough to cover the
driver's negligence in the instant case, nevertheless article 1093 limits cuasi-delitos to acts or omissions "not
punishable by law." But inasmuch as article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes not only reckless but even
simple imprudence or negligence, the fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code has apparently been
crowded out. It is this overlapping that makes the "confusion worse confounded."

I. INTRODUCTION
‣ Art. 1093 of the old civil code is now Art. 1162

‣ However, a closer study shows that such a concurrence of scope in regard to negligent acts does not destroy the
distinction between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for cuasi-delitos or culpa extra-
contractual. The same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under
article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual under
articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
‣ The individuality of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual looms clear and unmistakable. This legal institution is of
ancient lineage, one of its early ancestors being the Lex Aquilia in the Roman Law. In fact, in Spanish legal
terminology, this responsibility is often referred to as culpa aquiliana.
‣ The distinctive nature of cuasi-delitos survives in the Civil Code. According to article 1089, one of the five sources
of obligations is this legal institution of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual. Then article 1093 provides that this
kind of obligation shall be governed by Chapter II of Title XVI of Book IV, meaning articles 1902-0910. This portion
of the Civil Code is exclusively devoted to the legal institution of culpa aquiliana.
‣ Distinctions between Quasi-Delicts and Delicts

‣ Differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito under the Civil Code are:
1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of private concern.
2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the Civil Code, by means of
indemnification, merely repairs the damage.
3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are punished only if there is a penal law
clearly covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which "any kind of fault or negligence
intervenes."
‣ NOT all liability for Delict (violations of penal law), amount to a liability for Quasi-Delict
‣ It should be noted that not all violations of the penal law produce civil responsibility, such as begging in
contravention of ordinances, violation of the game laws, infraction of the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt.
‣ Not all crimes give rise to liability for quasi-delicts because not all crimes involve injury to third persons. Remember
that the purpose of actions for quasi-delict is indemnification.
‣ Primary liability of employers under Quasi-Delicts (Art. 2180) but mere subsidiary liability under Delicts (Art. 102
and 103, revised penal code)
‣ Under article 20 of the Penal Code the responsibility of an employer may be regarded as subsidiary in respect of
criminal actions against his employees only while they are in process of prosecution, or in so far as they determine
the existence of the criminal act from which liability arises, and his obligation under the civil law and its
enforcement in the civil courts is not barred thereby unless by the election of the injured person. Inasmuch as no
criminal proceeding had been instituted, growing our of the accident in question, the provisions of the Penal Code
can not affect this action. This construction renders it unnecessary to finally determine here whether this subsidiary
civil liability in penal actions has survived the laws that fully regulated it or has been abrogated by the American
civil and criminal procedure now in force in the Philippines.
‣ The difficulty in construing the articles of the code above cited in this case appears from the briefs before us to
have arisen from the interpretation of the words of article 1093, "fault or negligence not punished by law," as
applied to the comprehensive definition of offenses in articles 568 and 590 of the Penal Code. It has been shown
that the liability of an employer arising out of his relation to his employee who is the offender is not to be regarded
as derived from negligence punished by the law, within the meaning of articles 1902 and 1093. More than this,
however, it cannot be said to fall within the class of acts unpunished by the law, the consequence of which are
regulated by articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code. The acts to which these articles are applicable are
understood to be those not growing out of pre-existing duties of the parties to one another. But where relations
already formed give rise to duties, whether springing from contract or quasi contract, then breaches of those
duties are subject to articles 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the same code. A typical application of this distinction may
be found in the consequences of a railway accident due to defective machinery supplied by the employer. His
liability to his employee would arise out of the contract of employment, that to the passengers out of the contract
for passage, while that to the injured bystander would originate in the negligent act itself.
‣ Court made an exhaustive discussion of this topic in this case which is very long but to summarize, the liability of
employers for the negligence of their employees based on delict is merely subsidiary under the penal code, it is
primary and direct under breach of contracts based on the principle of respondeat superior, and primary and direct
under quasi-delict based on their negligence in the selection and supervision of such negligent employees
2. ELCANO V. HILL, G.R. NO. L-24803, MAY 26, 1977
‣ Quasi-Delicts and Delicts as two independent sources of obligations for civil liability

I. INTRODUCTION
‣ In this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil Code has been fully
and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted
and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil
liability arising from his crime.
‣ A defendant could have been criminally prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence and not only punished but
also made civilly liable because of his criminal negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an
independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code (now Art. 2176).
‣ Intent of Lawmakers for injured person to have independent remedies, one for Delict and another for Quasi-
Delicts
‣ The Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple negligence. If we were to hold
that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law, accordingly to the
literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope
and application in actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property- through any degree of
negligence - even the slightest - would have to be Idemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising from
a crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to
impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the
interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not
use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such
full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902
to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
‣ Note: Art. 1902-1910 are the provisions on quasi-delicts under the old civil code
‣ Injured person has better chance to recover under Quasi-Delicts than in Delicts since standard of proof is
lower
‣ To find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil
case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous
cases of criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a
preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil action
under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise. there would be many instances of unvindicated civil
wrongs. "Ubi jus Idemnified remedium.”
‣ Common practice is to recover damages in the civil action arising from Delict, Court wants to encourage and
start a trend for recovery under Quasi-Delict as satisfactory remedy
‣ Because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil Code on this subject, which
has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack of understanding of
the character and efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek
damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is another remedy, which
is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by, our laws, it has
nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa
aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But we
believe it is high time we pointed out to the harms done by such practice and to restore the principle of
responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we
caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters may no
longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code.
‣ This will, it is believed, make for the better safeguarding or private rights because it realtor, an ancient and
additional remedy, and for the further reason that an independent civil action, not depending on the issues,
limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is more
likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress.
‣ Quasi-Delict covers intentional and voluntary acts, and not merely negligent acts
‣ Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of the foregoing excerpts from the opinion in
Garcia that the concurrence of the Penal Code and the Civil Code therein referred to contemplate only acts of
negligence and not intentional voluntary acts - deeper reflection would reveal that the thrust of the
pronouncements therein is not so limited, but that in fact it actually extends to fault or culpa. This can be seen in
the reference made therein to the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of February 14, 1919, supra, which
involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a negligent act.
‣ Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force here at the time of Garcia, provided textually that
obligations "which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or negligence, not punishable by law,
intervene shall be the subject of Chapter II, Title XV of this book (which refers to quasi-delicts.)" And it is precisely
the underline qualification, "not punishable by law", that Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead to an ultimo
construction or interpretation of the letter of the law that "killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth lift- hence, the
ruling that "(W)e will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such

I. INTRODUCTION
ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or quasi-delito, which is conserved and made
enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code." And so, because Justice Bacobo was Chairman of
the Code Commission that drafted the original text of the new Civil Code, it is to be noted that the said Code,
which was enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no longer uses the term, 11 not punishable by law," thereby making it
clear that the concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or in violation of the penal
law, whether voluntary or matter.
‣ Thus, the corresponding provisions to said Article 1093 in the new code, which is Article 1162, simply says,
"Obligations derived from quasi-delicto shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book,
(on quasi-delicts) and by special laws." More precisely, a new provision, Article 2177 of the new code provides:
“Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same
act or omission of the defendant.”
‣ Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of negligence, the same argument of
Justice Bacobo about construction that upholds "the spirit that giveth lift- rather than that which is literal that
killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. And considering that the preliminary
chapter on human relations of the new Civil Code definitely establishes the separability and independence of
liability in a civil action for acts criminal in character (under Articles 29 to 32) from the civil responsibility arising
from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2
and 3 (c), Rule 111, contemplate also the same separability, it is "more congruent with the spirit of law, equity and
justice, and more in harmony with modern progress"- to borrow the felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs.
Atlantic. Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or
negligencia covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional
and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether
or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if
he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.
‣ In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers
exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability
for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not estinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been
committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana
includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law
‣ This Elcano case is the main authority which provides that a person injured by intentional and voluntary felonies
(based on dolo), may recover based on quasi-delict. Quasi-delicts cover not only negligent acts but also voluntary
and intentional acts. 

II. QUASI-DELICT
II. QUASI-DELICT
A. ELEMENTS
1. ANDAMO V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, G.R. NO. 74761, NOVEMBER 6, 1990

‣ Elements of a Quasi-Delict
1. Damages suffered by the plaintiff
2. Fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and
3. The connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred
by the plaintiff.
‣ “There must be no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties” should be regarded as the fourth element
of a quasi-delict. This is because it is still part of the statutory definition of a quasi-delict under Art. 2176. Although
the jurisprudence has seemingly dispensed with this requisite in a number of cases, the general rule is that this
element is still an essential requisite of a quasi-delict. It is only in exceptional circumstances that the rules on quasi-
delict may apply in contract situations (where act that breaks a contract is a tort itself). And remember that such act
must be in the nature as to violate Art. 21, in that it must be against morals, good customs, and public policy (See
Air France and PSBA cases)
‣ “Fault or negligence” as an element in quasi-delicts covers intentional, voluntary, or negligent criminal acts
‣ Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts
criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies
against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted,
provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally), to recover
damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming
the awards made in the two cases vary
‣ Quasi-Delicts and Delicts as independent sources of obligations

‣ The distinctness of quasi-delicts is shown in Article 2177 of the Civil Code, which states: “Responsibility for fault
or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of
the defendant.”
‣ According to the Report of the Code Commission "the foregoing provision though at first sight startling, is not so
novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation
of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, which is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-
delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence.
Such distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa extra-contractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained
by decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain
‣ A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own,
and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime — a distinction exists between the
civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same
negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an
action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in the
criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case, unless, of course, in the event of an acquittal where the court
has declared that the fact from which the civil action arose did not exist, in which case the extinction of the
criminal liability would carry with it the extinction of the civil liability. (Castillo vs. Court of Appeals)
‣ In quasi-delicts, the civil action is entirely independent of the criminal case according to Articles 33 and 2177 of
the Civil Code. There can be no logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil action contemplated in the
said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution — whether it be conviction or acquittal — would render
meaningless the independent character of the civil action and the clear injunction in Article 31, that his action may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. (Azucena vs.
Potenciano)
2. HUANG V. PHILIPPINE HOTELIERS INC., G.R. NO. 180440, DECEMBER 5, 2012

‣ Quasi-Delicts and Contract as independent sources of obligations

II. QUASI-DELICT
‣ Court finds it significant to take note of the following differences between quasi-delict (culpa aquilina) and breach
of contract (culpa contractual).
‣ In quasi-delict, negligence is direct, substantive and independent, while in breach of contract, negligence is merely
incidental to the performance of the contractual obligation; there is a pre-existing contract or obligation.
‣ In quasi-delict, the defense of "good father of a family" is a complete and proper defense insofar as parents,
guardians and employers are concerned, while in breach of contract, such is not a complete and proper defense in
the selection and supervision of employees.
‣ In quasi- delict, there is no presumption of negligence and it is incumbent upon the injured party to prove the
negligence of the defendant, otherwise, the former’s complaint will be dismissed, while in breach of contract,
negligence is presumed so long as it can be proved that there was breach of the contract and the burden is on the
defendant to prove that there was no negligence in the carrying out of the terms of the contract; the rule of
respondeat superior is followed.
‣ Elements of a Quasi-Delict
‣ As petitioner’s cause of action is based on quasi-delict, it is incumbent upon her to prove the presence of the
following requisites before the defendant can be held liable:
1. Damages suffered by the plaintiff;
2. Fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and
3. The connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages
incurred by the plaintiff.
‣ Burden of Proof of the Plaintiff in establishing the elements as part of his cause of action; Standard of Proof
‣ Further, since petitioner’s case is for quasi-delict , the negligence or fault should be clearly established as it is the
basis of her action. The burden of proof is upon petitioner.
‣ Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides that "burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on
the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law." It is then
up for the plaintiff to establish his cause of action or the defendant to establish his defense.
‣ Therefore, if the plaintiff alleged in his complaint that he was damaged because of the negligent acts of the
defendant, he has the burden of proving such negligence. It is even presumed that a person takes ordinary care
of his concerns.
‣ The quantum of proof required is preponderance of evidence
3. LUCAS V. TUAÑO, G.R. NO. 178763, APRIL 21, 2009

‣ Elements of a Quasi-Delict in relation to Medical Negligence Cases
‣ In medical negligence cases, also called medical malpractice suits, there exist a physician-patient relationship
between the doctor and the victim. But just like any other proceeding for damages, four essential (4) elements
must be established by the plaintiff. All the four (4) elements must co-exist in order to find the physician negligent
and, thus, liable for damages.
1. Duty
2. Breach
3. Injury
4. Proximate causation
‣ Why is the element of “duty” not cited as one of the elements of a quasi-delict in general. The element of
“duty” is one of the elements of a quasi-delict in general, but it is deemed impliedly so, it is a “presumed”
element in every action based on quasi-delict. The duty in such case, is the duty every owes to the public in
general, a duty to exercise the conduct of due diligence expected of reasonable persons in society. This
conduct may be said to be based on Art. 19 where it requires that every must act with honesty and good
faith, give every man his due, and to act with justice.
1. Duty
‣ When a patient engages the services of a physician, a physician-patient relationship is generated. And in
accepting a case, the physician, for all intents and purposes, represents that he has the needed training and
skill possessed by physicians and surgeons practicing in the same field; and that he will employ such training,
care, and skill in the treatment of the patient.
‣ Thus, in treating his patient, a physician is under a duty to the former to exercise that degree of care, skill and
diligence which physicians in the same general neighborhood and in the same general line of practice ordinarily
possess and exercise in like cases.

II. QUASI-DELICT
‣ Stated otherwise, the physician has the duty to use at least the same level of care that any other reasonably
competent physician would use to treat the condition under similar circumstances.
‣ This standard level of care, skill and diligence is a matter best addressed by expert medical testimony, because
the standard of care in a medical malpractice case is a matter peculiarly within the knowledge of experts in the
field
2. Breach and Injury

‣ There is breach of duty of care, skill and diligence, or the improper performance of such duty, by the attending
physician when the patient is injured in body or in health and this constitutes the actionable malpractice.
‣ Proof of such breach must likewise rest upon the testimony of an expert witness that the treatment accorded
to the patient failed to meet the standard level of care, skill and diligence which physicians in the same
general neighborhood and in the same general line of practice ordinarily possess and exercise in like cases.
3. Proximate Causation
‣ Even so, proof of breach of duty on the part of the attending physician is insufficient, for there must be a causal
connection between said breach and the resulting injury sustained by the patient.
‣ Put in another way, in order that there may be a recovery for an injury, it must be shown that the “injury for
which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the
negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient
causes”; that is, the negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. And the proximate cause of an injury
is that cause, which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred
‣ Just as with the elements of duty and breach of the same, in order to establish the proximate cause of the
injury by a preponderance of the evidence in a medical malpractice action, the patient must similarly use expert
testimony, because the question of whether the alleged professional negligence caused the patient’s injury is
generally one for specialized expert knowledge beyond the ken of the average layperson; using the specialized
knowledge and training of his field, the expert’s role is to present to the court a realistic assessment of the
likelihood that the physician’s alleged negligence caused the patient’s injury
‣ Indispensability of the Testimony of Expert Witnesses in Actions of Medical Negligence

‣ From the foregoing elements, it is apparent that medical negligence cases are best proved by opinions of expert
witnesses belonging in the same general neighborhood and in the same general line of practice as defendant
physician or surgeon. The deference of courts to the expert opinion of qualified physicians or surgeons stems from
the former’s realization that the latter possess unusual technical skills which laymen in most instances are
incapable of intelligently evaluating; hence, the indispensability of expert testimonies.
‣ Expert witness is required to prove the existence of the elements of quasi-delict pertaining to medical negligence,
particularly the elements of breach, injury, and proximate causation.
‣ In this case, the court said that the action based on quasi-delict failed because of the failure to present expert
witnesses to prove the existence of the elements
‣ Burden of Proof of the Plaintiff in establishing the elements as part of his cause of action; Standard of Proof
‣ The plaintiff in a civil case has the burden of proof as he alleges the affirmative of the issue. However, in the course
of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or the burden of evidence
shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiff’s prima facie case; otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of
plaintiff.
‣ The party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence.
‣ The concept of “preponderance of evidence” refers to evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than
that which is offered in opposition to it; in the last analysis, it means probability of truth. It is evidence which is
more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.
‣ Rule 133, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the guidelines for determining preponderance of
evidence, thus; “In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of
evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies the
court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their
intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts
to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also
their personal credibility so far as the same legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the
number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.”
4. CASUMPANG VS CORTEJO, G.R. NO. 171127, MARCH 11, 2015

‣ Medical Malpratice Suit as a Specialized Area of Tort Law

II. QUASI-DELICT
‣ The claim for damages is based on the petitioning doctors’ negligence in diagnosing and treating the deceased
Edmer, the child of the respondent. It is a medical malpractice suit, an action available to victims to redress a
wrong committed by medical professionals who caused bodily harm to, or the death of, a patient. As the term is
used, the suit is brought whenever a medical practitioner or health care provider fails to meet the standards
demanded by his profession, or deviates from this standard, and causes injury to the patient.
‣ To successfully pursue a medical malpractice suit, the plaintiff (in this case, the deceased patient’s heir) must
prove that the doctor either failed to do what a reasonably prudent doctor would have done, or did what a
reasonably prudent doctor would not have done; and the act or omission had caused injury to the patient. The
patient’s heir/s bears the burden of proving his/her cause of action.
‣ Shouldn’t medical malpractice/negligence fall under breach of contract, given that the a person enters into an
agreement with the doctor for medical treatment? This seems to be the case, but currently, there has been no case
of medical negligence which is based on breach of contract, nor has there any been jurisprudential support on this
point.
‣ Elements of a Medical Malpractice Suit
‣ The elements of medical negligence are: (1) duty; (2) breach; (3) injury; and (4) proximate causation.
1. Duty refers to the standard of behavior that imposes restrictions on one's conduct. It requires proof of
professional relationship between the physician and the patient. Without the professional relationship, a physician
owes no duty to the patient, and cannot therefore incur any liability.
‣ A physician-patient relationship is created when a patient engages the services of a physician, and the latter
accepts or agrees to provide care to the patient. The establishment of this relationship is consensual, and the
acceptance by the physician essential. The mere fact that an individual approaches a physician and seeks
diagnosis, advice or treatment does not create the duty of care unless the physician agrees
‣ The consent needed to create the relationship does not always need to be express. In the absence of an
express agreement, a physician-patient relationship may be implied from the physician’s affirmative action to
diagnose and/or treat a patient, or in his participation in such diagnosis and/or treatment. The usual illustration
would be the case of a patient who goes to a hospital or a clinic, and is examined and treated by the doctor. In
this case, we can infer, based on the established and customary practice in the medical community that a
patient-physician relationship exists.
‣ Once a physician-patient relationship is established, the legal duty of care follows. The doctor accordingly
becomes duty-bound to use at least the same standard of care that a reasonably competent doctor would use
to treat a medical condition under similar circumstances.
2. Breach of duty occurs when the doctor fails to comply with, or improperly performs his duties under professional
standards. This determination is both factual and legal, and is specific to each individual case.
‣ A determination of whether or not the petitioning doctors met the required standard of care involves a question
of mixed fact and law; it is factual as medical negligence cases are highly technical in nature, requiring the
presentation of expert witnesses to provide guidance to the court on matters clearly falling within the domain of
medical science, and legal, insofar as the Court, after evaluating the expert testimonies, and guided by medical
literature, learned treatises, and its fund of common knowledge, ultimately determines whether breach of duty
took place.
3. If the patient, as a result of the breach of duty, is injured in body or in health, actionable malpractice is
committed, entitling the patient to damages
4. To successfully claim damages, the patient must lastly prove the causal relation between the negligence and the
injury. This connection must be direct, natural, and should be unbroken by any intervening efficient causes. In
other words, the negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury.
‣ The injury or damage is proximately caused by the physician’s negligence when it appears, based on the
evidence and the expert testimony, that the negligence played an integral part in causing the injury or damage,
and that the injury or damage was either a direct result, or a reasonably probable consequence of the
physician’s negligence
‣ Criteria in Qualifying as an Expert Witness in Medical Malpractice Suits

‣ The competence of an expert witness is a matter for the trial court to decide upon in the exercise of its discretion.
‣ The test of qualification is necessarily a relative one, depending upon the subject matter of the investigation, and
the fitness of the expert witness.
‣ In our jurisdiction, the criterion remains to be the expert witness’ special knowledge experience and practical
training that qualify him/her to explain highly technical medical matters to the Court.

II. QUASI-DELICT
B. NO DOUBLE RECOVERY RULE
Article 1161. Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses shall be governed by the penal laws, subject to the provisions
of article 2177, and of the pertinent provisions of Chapter 2, Preliminary Title, on Human Relations, and of Title XVIII of
this Book, regulating damages. (1092a)
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)
Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the
civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same
act or omission of the defendant.(n)
MEMORIZE: ART. 2177
1. JOSEPH V. BAUTISTA, 170 SCRA 540 (1989)

‣ Nature of a Cause of Action
‣ A cause of action is understood to be the delict or wrongful act or omission committed by the defendant in
violation of the primary rights of the plaintiff. It is true that a single act or omission can be violative of various rights
at the same time, as when the act constitutes juridically a violation of several separate and distinct legal
obligations. However where there is only one delict or wrong, there is but a single cause of action regardless of the
number of rights that may have been violated belonging to one person. 4
‣ The singleness of a cause of action lies in the singleness of the- delict or wrong violating the rights of one person.
Nevertheless, if only one injury resulted from several wrongful acts, only one cause of action arises.
‣ In the case at bar, there is no question that the petitioner sustained a single injury on his person. That vested in
him a single cause of action, albeit with the correlative rights of action against the different respondents through
the appropriate remedies allowed by law.
‣ The pronouncement of the Court in this case is erroneous. This is the only case where the Court says that a single
act or omission can only give rise to one cause of action. In fact, the Court has affirmed in multiple rulings that a
single act or omission can give rise to multiple cause of actions, this is because a single act or omission may violate
several rights at the same time.
‣ Application of the Prohibition on Double Recovery Rule
‣ In this case, the plaintiff filed an action based on two cases of action, against two defendants, one based on quasi-
delict and the other based on breach of contract. The defendant sought to be liable for quasi-delict settled the
case and paid the plaintiff. Later, the plaintiff still wanted to collect against the defendant who was sought to be
liable for breach of contract. The plaintiff based his claim on the independence of the causes of actions.
‣ A recovery by the petitioner under one remedy necessarily bars recovery under the other. This, in essence, is the
rationale for the proscription in our law against double recovery for the same act or omission which, obviously,
stems from the fundamental rule against unjust enrichment.
‣ Also, the defendants having been found to be solidarity liable to the plaintiff, the full payment made by some of the
solidary debtors and their subsequent release from any and all liability to petitioner inevitably resulted in the
extinguishment and release from liability of the other solidary debtor
2. PADUA V. ROBLES, G.R. NO. L-40486, AUGUST 29, 1975

‣ Application of the Prohibition on Double Recovery Rule
‣ Civil liability coexists with criminal responsibility. In negligence cases the offended party (or his heirs) has the
option between an action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal under article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code and an action for recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana under article 2177 of the Civil Code.
‣ The action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
deems simultaneously instituted with the criminal action, unless expressly waived or reserved for a separate

II. QUASI-DELICT
application by the offended party. Article 2177 of the Civil Code, however, precludes recovery of damages twice
for the same negligent act or omission
‣ In the case at bar, the Court finds it immaterial that the plaintiffs chose, in the first instance, an action for recovery
of damages based on culpa aquiliana under articles 2176, 2177, and 2180 of the Civil Code, which action proved
ineffectual. The Court also takes note of the absence of any inconsistency between the aforementioned action
priorly availed of by the plaintiffs and their subsequent application for enforcement of civil liability arising from the
offense committed by the defendant employee and consequently, for exaction of the employers' subsidiary
responsibility.
‣ Allowance of the latter application involves no violation of the proscription against double recovery of damages
for the same negligent act or omission. For, as hereinbefore stated, the corresponding officer of the court a quo
returned unsatisfied the writ of execution issued against the defendant employer to satisfy the amount of
indemnity awarded to the plaintiff in the civil case for quasi-delict. Article 2177 of the Civil Code forbids actual
double recovery of damages for the same negligent act or omission.
‣ Note the plaintiff has the option of what remedy to avail of, he can choose to pursue either of two remedies (quasi-
delict or delict) or even pursue both simultaneously. This is because the law itself allows this, in fact the law
describes the civil case as an independent and separate action (under Art. 31). The plaintiff is even allowed to win
and have two judgments, both in his favour in the two remedies simultaneously pursued. BUT, he is not allowed to
actually recover from both remedies. Once he has recovered and successfully executed on one remedy, he can no
longer recover and execute the judgment on the other.
‣ What if the amounts awarded in the cases involved differ? Plaintiff is entitled to the bigger amount. What if he had
already recovered the smaller amount? He is entitled to the difference, this does not violate Art. 2177 (check legal
basis, but I’m sure this is the rule)
3. ATLANTIC GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY OF MANILA, INC., V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 114841-42, OCTOBER 20,
1995
‣ Inapplicability of the Prohibition on Double Recovery Rule
‣ In this case, the defendant was adjudged to be liable for damage to the plaintiff’s land and rentals for unauthorized
used of such land. The defendant argued that such judgment violated the rule on double recovery. Court said that
the defendant was guilty of two culpable transgressions on the property rights of the plaintiffs, that is, for the
ruination of the agricultural fertility or utility of the soil of their property and, further, for the unauthorized use of said
property as a dump rile or depot or petitioner's heavy equipment and trucks. Consequently, albeit with differing
amounts, both courts correctly awarded damages both for the destruction of the land and for the unpaid rentals,
or more correctly denominated, for the reasonable value of its use and occupation of the premises. There is
consequently no merit in said objection of petitioner.
4. LIM V. PING, G.R. NO. 175256, AUGUST 23, 2012

‣ Single act or omission producing several causes of action which may be pursued independently of each other
‣ A single act or omission that causes damage to an offended party may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on
the part of the offender (1) civil liability ex delicto, that is, civil liability arising from the criminal offense under Article
100 of the Revised Penal Code, and (2) independent civil liability, that is, civil liability that may be pursued
independently of the criminal proceedings.
‣ The independent civil liability may be based on "an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained
of as a felony," as provided in Article 31 of the Civil Code (such as for breach of contract or for tort). It may also
be based on an act or omission that may constitute felony but, nevertheless, treated independently from the
criminal action by specific provision of Article 33 of the Civil Code ("in cases of defamation, fraud and physical
injuries”).
‣ The civil liability arising from the offense or ex delicto is based on the acts or omissions that constitute the criminal
offense; hence, its trial is inherently intertwined with the criminal action. For this reason, the civil liability ex delicto
is impliedly instituted with the criminal offense.
‣ If the action for the civil liability ex delicto is instituted prior to or subsequent to the filing of the criminal action, its
proceedings are suspended until the final outcome of the criminal action.
‣ The civil liability based on delict is extinguished when the court hearing the criminal action declares that "the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.”
‣ On the other hand, the independent civil liabilities are separate from the criminal action and may be pursued
independently, as provided in Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil Code, which state that:
‣ ART. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a
felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of
the latter.

II. QUASI-DELICT
‣ ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
‣ Pursuing remedies based on different causes of action arising from a single act or omission does not violate
the rules against forum shopping, litis pendentia, or res judicata BUT it is subject to the rule against double
recovery
‣ Because of the distinct and independent nature of the two kinds of civil liabilities, jurisprudence holds that the
offended party may pursue the two types of civil liabilities simultaneously or cumulatively, without offending the
rules on forum shopping, litis pendentia, or res judicata
‣ One of the elements of res judicata is identity of causes of action. In the instant case, it must be stressed that the
action filed by petitioner is an independent civil action, which remains separate and distinct from any criminal
prosecution based on the same act. Not being deemed instituted in the criminal action based on culpa criminal, a
ruling on the culpability of the offender will have no bearing on said independent civil action based on an entirely
different cause of action, i.e., culpa contractual. (Cancio, Jr. v. Isip)
‣ In the same vein, the filing of the collection case after the dismissal of the estafa cases against the offender did
not amount to forum-shopping. The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same
parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment.
Although the cases filed by [the offended party] arose from the same act or omission of the offender, they are,
however, based on different causes of action. The criminal cases for estafa are based on culpa criminal while
the civil action for collection is anchored on culpa contractual. Moreover, there can be no forum-shopping in
the instant case because the law expressly allows the filing of a separate civil action which can proceed
independently of the criminal action (Cancio, Jr. v. Isip)
‣ Since civil liabilities arising from felonies and those arising from other sources of obligations are authorized by law
to proceed independently of each other, the resolution of the present issue hinges on whether the two cases herein
involve different kinds of civil obligations such that they can proceed independently of each other. The answer is in
the affirmative.
‣ In this case, the Civil Case involves only the obligations arising from contract and from tort, whereas the appeal in
the estafa case involves only the civil obligations of Co arising from the offense charged. They present different
causes of action, which under the law, are considered "separate, distinct, and independent” from each other. Both
cases can proceed to their final adjudication, subject to the prohibition on double recovery under Article 2177 of
the Civil Code.
‣ In this case, the causes of action in the cases filed by the plaintiff was based on delict (under estafa), quasi-delict
(under abuse of rights and unjust enrichment), and breach of contract (under the contract of sale of cement bags).
Note that one of the causes of action was based on a breach of contract. The rule against double recovery under Art.
2177, though the provision only mentions quasi-delicts and delicts, applies to breach of contract as well
C. PERSONS LIABLE; NATURE OF LIABILITY
Article 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for quasi-delict is solidary. (n)
When does Joint-Tortfeasor Rule apply? It must pertain to one injury or one set of events, there is one injury but multiple
defendants
1. Against 2 or more persons based on quasi-delict
2. Against 2 or more persons, 1 based on breach of contract, the other on quasi-delict (LRTA obiter and Sps. Perena,
but no reference to Art. 2194)
MEMORIZE: ART. 2194
1. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 159270, AUGUST 22, 2005
‣ Solidary Liability of Joint Tortfeasors under Quasi-Delict

II. QUASI-DELICT
‣ According to the great weight of authority, where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omission of two or
more persons, although acting independently of each other, are, in combination, the direct and proximate cause of
a single injury to a third person and it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury,
either is responsible for the whole injury, even though his act alone might not have caused the entire injury, or the
same damage might have resulted from the acts of the other tortfeasor. (Sabido v. Custodio)
‣ It may be said, as a general rule, that negligence in order to render a person liable need not be the sole cause of
an injury. It is sufficient that his negligence, concurring with one or more efficient causes other than plaintiff's, is
the proximate cause of the injury. Accordingly, where several causes combine to produce injuries, a person is not
relieved from liability because he is responsible for only one of them, it being sufficient that the negligence of the
person charged with injury is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have resulted to as great an
extent, and that such cause is not attributable to the person injured.
‣ It is no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would not have resulted from his negligence
alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent tortfeasors. Where several causes
producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have
happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against any or all of
the responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was more
culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the same.
‣ No actor's negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other
actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of
the injury.
‣ There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of them are liable for the
total damage. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons, although
acting independently, are in combination with the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, it
is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for
the whole injury. Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third party, they become joint
tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code.
‣ In this case, the defendants were both held to be liable as joint-tortfeasors. Note that in this case, the defendants were
both made liable on the basis of quasi-delict. This is thus a classic example of Art. 2194, two or more persons held
solidary liable based on quasi-delict.
2. RUKS KONSULT AND CONSTRUCTION V. ADWORLD SIGN AND ADVERTISING CORP., G.R. NO. 204866, JANUARY 21,
2015
‣ Court held that the defendants were joint tortfeasors as the two (2) successive acts (done by them respectively)
were the direct and proximate cause of the damages sustained by the plaintiff. As joint tortfeasors, therefore, they
are solidarily liable to the plaintiff.
‣ Joint tortfeasors are those who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid
or abet the commission of a tort, or approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit. They are also referred to
as those who act together in committing wrong or whose acts, if independent of each other, unite in causing a
single injury.
‣ Under Article 2194 of the Civil Code, joint tortfeasors are solidarily liable for the resulting damage. In other words,
joint tortfeasors are each liable as principals, to the same extent and in the same manner as if they had performed
the wrongful act themselves
‣ Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the injury
would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had
against any or all of the responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that one
of them was more culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not same. No actor's
negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors.
Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the
injury.
‣ There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of them are liable for the
total damage.Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons, although
acting independently, are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, it is
impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for the
whole injury
‣ This is also a classic example of Art. 2194, where two or more persons held solidary liable, both their liability were
based on quasi-delict.
3. CHAN, JR., V. IGLESIA NI CRISTO, INC., G.R. NO. 160283, OCTOBER 14, 2005

II. QUASI-DELICT
‣ Requisites of a Quasi-Delict
1. There must be an act or omission;
2. Such act or omission causes damage to another;
3. Such act or commission is caused by fault or negligence; and
4. There is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties
‣ Court neglected to put the most important element, the causal connection between the negligence and the
damage
‣ As a general rule, joint tortfeasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise,
countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for
their benefit.
‣ In this case, the defendants were held liable as joint tortfeasors for cooperating in the commission of the tort
‣ This is also a classic example of Art. 2194, where two or more persons held solidary liable, both their liability were
based on quasi-delict.
4. SPOUSES PEREÑA V. SPOUSES ZARATE, G.R. NO. 157917, AUGUST 29, 2012
‣ Solidary Liability of defendants based on Quasi-Delict and Breach of Contract
‣ Court said that although the basis of the right to relief of the Zarates (i.e., breach of contract of carriage) against
the Pereñas was distinct from the basis of the Zarates’ right to relief against the PNR (i.e., quasi-delict under
Article 2176, Civil Code), they nonetheless could be held jointly and severally liable by virtue of their respective
negligence combining to cause the death of Aaron
‣ As you can see in this case, the Court held that the two defendants were solidary liable even though their liabilities
arose from different sources of obligations. One from breach of contract (the common carrier) and the other from
quasi-delict. Note that, however, the court did NOT refer to Art. 2194 as the basis. It just made this pronouncement by
itself.
‣ BUT, remember the LRTA case? in that case the plaintiff was claiming damages from the common carrier (LRTA)
and the carrier’s private contractor (the security agency). Court said (in obiter) that both defendants can be held
solidary liable on the basis of Art. 2194 even though their liabilities arose from different sources of obligations. The
common carrier from contract and the private contractor from quasi-delict.
5. CEREZO V. TUAZON, G.R. NO. 141538, MARCH 23, 2004
‣ Employee is NOT an indispensable party in an action based on quasi-delict against the employer under Art.
2180
‣ In this case, the plaintiff filed an action for quasi-delict against the employee (driver) and employer of the bus
company. The court, however, failed to acquire jurisdiction over the employee as summons was not successfully
served on him. One of the defences of the employer was that the employee is an indispensable party since the
basis of the employer’s negligence is the negligence of such employee.
‣ Court said that the employee is NOT an indispensable party to the action based on quasi-delict. It said that the
contention of the employer (that the employee is an indispensable party) proceeds from the point of view of
criminal law and not of civil law, while the basis of the present action of the plaintiff is quasi-delict under the Civil
Code, not delict under the Revised Penal Code.
‣ The same negligent act may produce civil liability arising from a delict under Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code, or may give rise to an action for a quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. An aggrieved party may
choose between the two remedies. An action based on a quasi-delict may proceed independently from the
criminal action.There is, however, a distinction between civil liability arising from a delict and civil liability arising
from a quasi-delict. The choice of remedy, whether to sue for a delict or a quasi-delict, affects the procedural and
jurisdictional issues of the action.
‣ The employee driver is NOT an indispensable party to the action based on quasi-delict, but he is an indispensable
party if the action is based on delict. An indispensable party is one whose interest is affected by the courts action
in the litigation, and without whom no final resolution of the case is possible. In actions based on quasi-delict, the
liability of an employer is not only solidary, it is also primary and direct. In actions based on delict, the liability of
the employer is merely subsidiary under Art. 102 and 103 of the penal code.
‣ The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. Where there is a solidary
obligation on the part of debtors, as in this case, each debtor is liable for the entire obligation. Hence, each debtor
is liable to pay for the entire obligation in full. There is no merger or renunciation of rights, but only mutual
representation.Where the obligation of the parties is solidary, either of the parties is indispensable, and the other is

II. QUASI-DELICT
not even a necessary party because complete relief is available from either. Therefore, jurisdiction over the
employee driver is not even necessary as the plaintiff may collect damages from the employer alone.
‣ Meoreover, an employers liability based on a quasi-delict is primary and direct, while the employers liability based
on a delict is merely subsidiary. The words primary and direct, as contrasted with subsidiary, refer to the remedy
provided by law for enforcing the obligation rather than to the character and limits of the obligation. Although
liability under Article 2180 originates from the negligent act of the employee, the aggrieved party may sue the
employer directly. When an employee causes damage, the law presumes that the employer has himself committed
an act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage. This is the fault that the law condemns. While the
employer is civilly liable in a subsidiary capacity for the employees criminal negligence, the employer is also civilly
liable directly and separately for his own civil negligence in failing to exercise due diligence in selecting and
supervising his employee. The idea that the employers liability is solely subsidiary is wrong
‣ This really points to the distinction of quasi-delict and delict as independent sources of obligation. In quasi-delict, the
liability of an employer is primary and direct under Art. 2180 (for his own negligence in the selection and supervision of
his employees); in delict, his liability is merely subsidiary under Art. 102 and 103 of the penal code. Moreover, under
quasi-delict, the liability of employers and his employees are solidary. Therefore, applying the rules on solidary
obligations, the plaintifff may choose to run after and collect or satisfy the entire obligation against only one of the
solidary debtors. Thus, if the chosen action of the plaintiff is based quasi-delict, jurisdiction over the employee is NOT
necessary, it is NOT indispensable since he may obtain complete relief from the employer as a solidary debtor
(although he must still prove the employees’ negligence). If the chosen action is based on delict, however, jurisdiction
over the employee is necessary and indispensable since the liability of the employer in such case is merely subsidiary

III. NEGLIGENCE
III. NEGLIGENCE
Determination of Negligence is always a fact-driven exercise. It would always depend on the facts and circumstances of each
case. It is context-specific. There are a lot of cases involving different facts and circumstances to prove this point.
Also relate the concept of negligence with “due diligence” or the standard of care or conduct. Negligence is the failure to
observe the standard of care/conduct required depending on the circumstances. Jurisprudence helps us determine the
standard of care depending on what is involved. Generally, the standard of care is that of a good father of a family, this is so,
unless the law or the contract provides otherwise (Art. 1173).
3 things to look at:
1. Fault
‣ Defined in Elcano, this is the intentional doing of a wrong
2. Negligence
‣ Test of Negligence: This is an objective test. The test is in Picart vs Smith, “what would an ordinarily reasonable
prudent man would do or not do?” sometimes it’s easy to determine (by common sense), sometimes hard (such as in
medical negligence cases), and sometimes the standard is higher (like in the case of banks and common carriers)
‣ Negligence is defined in Art. 1173, this is the statutory definition but Picart defines it as something a reasonably
prudent man would do or not do
3. Diligence
‣ This is a relative concept it involves looking at the facts of the case and determining whether the defendant exercised
the standard of due diligence
A. CONCEPT
Article 2178. The provisions of articles 1172 to 1174 are also applicable to a quasi-delict. (n)
Article 1172. Responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of every kind of obligation is also demandable,
but such liability may be regulated by the courts, according to the circumstances. (1103)
Article 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the
nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When
negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that which is expected of a
good father of a family shall be required. (1104a)
Article 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the
nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not
be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable. (1105a)
Article 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them,
according to all the circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and 1745, Nos. 5,
6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756.
MEMORIZE: ART. 1172, 1173, 1174

III. NEGLIGENCE
1. PICART V. SMITH, 37 PHIL. 809 (1918)

‣ The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the
defendant, in doing the alleged negligent act, use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent
person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence
‣ The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet
paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to
the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless,
blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.
‣ The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be
always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case.
Abstract speculations cannot here be of much value but this much can be profitably said: Reasonable men govern
their conduct by the circumstances which are before them or known to them. They are not, and are not supposed
to be, omniscient of the future. Hence they can be expected to take care only when there is something before
them to suggest or warn of danger.
‣ Reasonable foresight of harm and failure to take necessary precautions as essential elements of Negligence
‣ Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If
so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm.
‣ Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary
before negligence can be held to exist.
‣ Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this:
Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an
effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its
consequences.
‣ 2 things which must always exist in Negligence:

1. Reasonable foresight of harm
2. Failure to take necessary precautions
2. UNITED STATES V. BONIFACIO, G.R. NO. L-10563, MARCH 2, 1916
‣ Reasonable foresight of harm and failure to take necessary precautions as essential elements of Negligence
‣ In this case, a train ran over a person who later turned out to be a deaf-mute. The train driver didn’t stop
immediately, he tried to blow his whistle to signal the person to get out of the way.
‣ Court said that there is no obligation on an engine driver to stop, or even to slow down his engine, when he sees
an adult pedestrian standing or walking on or near the track, unless there is something in the appearance or
conduct of the person on foot which would cause a prudent man to anticipate the possibility that such person
could not, or would not avoid the possibility of danger by stepping aside. Ordinarily, all that may properly be
required of an engine driver under such circumstances is that he give warning of his approach, by blowing his
whistle or ringing his bell until he is assured that the attention of the pedestrian has been attracted to the
oncoming train.
‣ In the absence of “telltale” signs that the person crossing the railroad tracks was a deaf-mute, the court held that a
reasonably prudent man can expect that such person could hear and therefore would get out of the way when the
whistle of the train was blown. In short, the court absolved the train driver of liability since there was no reasonable
foresight of harm in this case. The driver did not immediately foresee the harm.
3. CUSI V. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS, G.R. NO. L-29889, MAY 31, 1979
‣ Definition of Negligence
‣ Negligence has been defined by Judge Cooley in his work on Torts 3d ed sec. 1324 as "the failure to observe for
the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury." By such a test, it can readily be seen that
there is no hard and fast rule whereby such degree of care and vigilance is measured, it is dependent upon the
circumstances in which a person finds himself so situated.
‣ All that the law requires is that it is always incumbent upon a person to use that care and diligence expected of
reasonable men under similar circumstances.
4. WRIGHT V. MANILA ELECTRIC R.R. & LIGHT CO., G.R. NO. 7760, OCTOBER 1, 1914
‣ Negligence in relation to Intoxication

III. NEGLIGENCE
‣ Mere intoxication is NOT negligence, nor does the mere fact of intoxication establish a want of ordinary care. It is
but a circumstance to be considered with the other evidence tending to prove negligence
‣ It is a general rule that it is immaterial whether a man is drunk or sober if no want of ordinary care or prudence can
be imputed to him, and no greater degree of care is required to be exercised by an intoxicated man for his own
protection than by a sober one.
‣ If one’s conduct is characterised by a proper degree of care and prudence, it is immaterial whether he is drunk or
sober
5. PEOPLE V. DE LOS SANTOS, G.R. NO. 131588, MARCH 27, 2001

‣ Test for Negligence; Reasonable foresight of harm and failure to take necessary precautions as essential
elements of Negligence
‣ The test for determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the
person or property of another is this: “Could a prudent man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is
attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course actually pursued?” If
so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that course or to take precautions to guard against its
mischievous results, and the failure to do so constitutes negligence.
‣ Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by ignoring of the admonition born of this prevision, is always
necessary before negligence can be held to exist.
6. JARCO MARKETING CORPORATION V. COURT OF APPEALS, 321 SCRA 375 (1999)
‣ “Accident” vs “Negligence”
‣ Accident
‣ An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence attaches to the defendant.
‣ It is a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening, an event happening without any human agency, or if
happening wholly or partly through human agency an even which under the circumstances is unusual or
unexpected by the person to whom it happens.
‣ It occurs when the person concerned is exercising ordinary care, which is not caused by fault of any person
and which could not have been prevented by any means suggested by common prudence.
‣ Negligence
‣ Is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily
regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable
man would not do
‣ It is the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution
and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.
‣ Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory, one cannot exist with the other.
‣ Picard vs Smith: Did the defendant, in doing the alleged negligent act, use that reasonable care and caution which
an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence
‣ Negligence of Minors
‣ The conclusive presumption that favors children below nine (9) years old in that they are incapable of contributory
negligence
‣ In our jurisdiction, a person under nine years of age is conclusively presumed to have acted without discernment,
and is, on that account, exempt from criminal liability. The same presumption and a like exemption from criminal
liability obtains in a case of a person over nine and under fifteen years of age, unless it is shown that he has acted
with discernment.
‣ Since negligence may be a felony and a quasi-delict and required discernment as a condition of liability, either
criminal or civil, a child under nine years of age is, by analogy, conclusively presumed to be incapable of
negligence; and that the presumption of lack of discernment or incapacity for negligence in the case of a child
over nine but under fifteen years of age is a rebuttable one, under our law.
‣ The rule, therefore, is that a child under nine years of age must be conclusively presumed incapable of
contributory negligence as a matter of law.
‣ Now the law has been amended as to raise the age of 9 years old to 15. Thus, children below 15 years of age are
incapable of negligence, and those 15 and above to below 18 are only capable if they acted with discernment
‣ Atty. Lopez: I don’t agree with this rule. The better rule is that supported by Aquino in that the negligence of minors
should be determined by a case-to-case basis irrespective of an arbitrary age standard. This is because the age

III. NEGLIGENCE
where minors have discernment is relative, especially now in this time and age where minors have become more
advanced intellectually early in their years. In fact, under Criminal Law, in Art. 12 where the exempting
circumstance of minority can be found, the law merely exempts such minor from criminal liability, NOT from the civil
liability arising from the delict.
7. HIDALGO ENTERPRISES, INC. V. BALANDAN, G.R. NO. L-3422, JUNE 13, 1952
‣ Doctrine of Attractive Nuisance
‣ Says that one who maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to
attract children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or
resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a
trespasser in the premises
‣ Reason for the doctrine is that the condition or appliance in question, although its danger is apparent to those of
age, is so enticing or alluring to children of tender years as to induce them to approach, get on or use it, and this
attractiveness is an implied invitation to such children
‣ Elements:
1. Person maintains dangerous instrumentalities or appliances on his premises
2. Such instrumentalities are likely to attract children to approach, get on or use it
3. Failure to exercise ordinary care to prevent children getting attracted
4. Such children, even if he may be a trespasser, gets injured
‣ A mere body of water is NOT an attractive nuisance
‣ According to US jurisprudence, children are instructed at an early age to know the danger of drowning in waters
8. SARMIENTO V. CABRIDO, 401 SCRA 122 (2003)

‣ Negligence in the performance of obligations based on Contract
‣ Those who, in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay and those who in any
manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages (Art. 1170)
‣ The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of
the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place (Art. 1173)
‣ Note that this statutory definition of negligence in contractual obligations also apply to negligence in quasi-
delicts (Art. 2178)
9. FRANCISCO V. CHEMICAL BULK CARRIERS, INCORPORATED, G.R. NO. 193577, SEPTEMBER 7, 2011
‣ Standard of Conduct (In General)
‣ Standard of conduct is the level of expected conduct that is required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponding to the circumstances of the person, time and place
‣ In other words, it is the “required diligence” or the “degree of care”
‣ The most common standard of conduct is that of a good father of a family or that of a reasonable prudent
person
‣ To determine the diligence which must be required of all persons, we use as basis the abstract average standard
corresponding to a normal orderly person
‣ Standard of Conduct of a Blind Person

‣ One who is physically disabled is required to use the same degree of care that a reasonably careful person who
has the same physical disability would use.
‣ Physical handicaps and infirmities, such as blindness or deafness, are treated as part of the circumstances under
which a reasonable person must act. Thus, the standard of conduct for a blind person becomes that of a
reasonable person who is blind.
10. PACIS V. MORALES, G.R. NO. 169467, FEBRUARY 25, 2010

‣ Higher degree of care of person in possession of dangerous instrumentalities
‣ A higher degree of care is required of someone who has in his possession or under his control an
instrumentality extremely dangerous in character, such as dangerous weapons or substances.
‣ Such person in possession or control of dangerous instrumentalities has the duty to take exceptional precautions
to prevent any injury being done thereby. Unlike the ordinary affairs of like or business which involve little or no
risk, a business dealing with dangerous weapons requires the exercise of a higher degree of care
11. MAKATI SHANGRI-LA HOTEL AND RESORT, INC. V. HARPER, G.R. NO. 189998, AUGUST 29, 2012

III. NEGLIGENCE
‣ Definition of Negligence
‣ Negligence is defined as the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations
which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and
reasonable man would not do.
‣ Negligence is want of care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an absolute, term and
its application depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the
circumstances reasonably require.
‣ Did the defendant, in doing the alleged negligent act, use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily
prudent person would have used in the same situation? It not, the person is guilty of negligence.
‣ The law, in effect, adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet pater
familias of the roman law
‣ The test of negligence is objective. One must measure the act or omission of the tortfeasor with a perspective as
that of an ordinary reasonable person who is similarly situated.
‣ Standard of Care of Hotels

‣ The hotel business is imbued with public interest. Catering to the public, hotelkeepers are bound to provide not
only lodging for their guests but also security to the person and belongings of their guests. The twin duty
constitutes the essence of their business
‣ Applying by analogy Art. 2000, 2001 and 2002 (provisions pertaining to hotelkeepers’ degree of care and
responsibility as to the personal effects of their guests), the Court held that there is much greater reason to apply
the same, if not a greater degree, of care and responsibility when the lives and personal safety of their guests are
involved.
12. THE CONSOLIDATED BANK AND TRUST CORPORATION V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 138569, SEPTEMBER 11, 2003
‣ Standard of Diligence of Banks
‣ The law imposes on banks, high standards in view of the fiduciary nature of banking.
‣ Sec. 2 of the General Banking Law (RA 8791) declares that the State recognises the “fiduciary nature of banking
that requires high standards of integrity and performance”
‣ The bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind
the fiduciary nature of their relationship
‣ This fiduciary relationship means that the bank’s obligation to observe “high standards of integrity and
performance” is deemed written into every deposit agreement between a bank and its depositor.
‣ The fiduciary nature of banking requires banks to assume a degree of diligence higher than that of a good
father of a family.
‣ Art. 1172 states that the degree of diligence required of an obligor is that prescribed by law or contract, and
absence such stipulation, then the diligence of a good father of a family. Sec. 2 of the General Banking Law
prescribes the statutory diligence required from banks, that banks must observe “high standards of integrity
and performance” in servicing their depositors.
‣ Bank’s Negligence in its Contractual Obligations

‣ Art. 1172 provides that “responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of every kind of obligation is
demandable.” For breach of the savings deposit agreement due to negligence or culpa contractual, the bank is
liable to depositors.
‣ In culpa contractual, once the plaintiff proves a breach of contract, there is a presumption that the defendant was
at fault or negligent. The burden is on the defendant to prove that he was not at fault or negligent.
‣ In contract, in culpa aquiliana, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant was negligent
‣ In culpa contractual, the bank may be bound by the negligence of its employees under the principle of respondent
superior or command responsibility. The defense of exercising the required diligence in the selection and
supervision of employees is NOT a complete defense in culpa contractual, unlike in culpa aquiliana
‣ So for contractual negligence, it is a defense, but it’s not enough, or its not a complete defense
‣ The degree of diligence required of banks extends to its employees as well
‣ Doctrine of Last Clear Chance

III. NEGLIGENCE
‣ The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is
appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused the
loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so, is chargeable with the loss.
‣ Stated differently, the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff does NOT preclude him from recovering damages
caused by the supervening negligence of the defendant, who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending
harm by the exercise of due diligence.
‣ In this case, Court refused to apply the doctrine as the bank was liable for breach of contract due to negligence in
the performance of its contractual obligation to its depositor. This is a case of culpa contractual where neither the
contributory negligence of the plaintiff nor his last clear chance to avoid the loss would exonerate the defendant
form liability.
‣ Such contributory negligence or last clear chance by the plaintiff merely serves to reduce the recovery
of damages by the plaintiff but does not exclpate the defendant from his breach of contract
13. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK V. SANTOS, G.R. NO. 208293 & 208295, DECEMBER 10, 2014
‣ Standard of Diligence of Banks
‣ The default standard of diligence in the performance of obligations is the “diligence of a good father of a family.”
This requires only that diligence which an ordinarily prudent person would do under similar circumstances.
‣ Other industries, because of their nature, are bound by law to observe higher standards of diligence. Common
carriers, for example, must observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of
their passengers because it is considered a business affected with public interest.
‣ Extraordinary diligence with respect to passenger safety is further qualified as “carrying the passengers safely
as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence o very cautious persons, with due
regard for all the circumstances (Art. 1755)”
‣ Similar to common carriers, banking is a business that is impressed with public interest. It affects economies
anyplace a significant role in business and commerce. The public reposes faith and confidence upon banks, such
that “even the humble wage-earner has not hesitated to entrust his life’s savings to the bank of his choice,
knowing that they will be safe in its custody and even will earn some interest for him.” This is why the Court has
recognized the fiduciary nature of banks’ functions and attached a special standard of diligence for the exercise
of their functions
‣ In every case, the depositor expects that the bank will treat his account with utmost fidelity, whether such account
consists only of a few hundred or of millions. The point is that as a business affected with public interest and
because of the nature of its functions, the bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with
meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship.
‣ Fiduciary nature of banking is affirmed in Sec. 2 of the General Banking Law (RA 8791)
‣ Consolidated Bank and Trust Corp vs CA: This fiduciary relationship means that the bank’s obligation to
observe “high standards of integrity and performance” is deemed written into every deposit agreement
between a bank and its depositor. The fiduciary nature of banking requires banks to assume a degree of
diligence higher than that of a good father of a family. Art. 1172 states that the degree of diligence required of an
obligor is that prescribed by law or contract, and absence such stipulation, then the diligence of a good father of a
family. Sec. 2 of the General Banking Law prescribes the statutory diligence required from banks, that banks must
observe “high standards of integrity and performance” in servicing their depositors.”
14. DELA TORRE V. IMBUIDO, G.R. NO. 192973, SEPTEMBER 29, 2014
‣ Lucas vs Tuano: In medical negligence cases, there is a physician-patient relationship between the doctor and victim,
but just like any other proceeding for damages, four essential elements must be established by the plaintiff namely:
1. Duty
2. Breach
3. Injury
4. Proximate Causation
‣ All four elements must be present in order to find the physician negligent and thus, liable for damages
‣ Duty
‣ The physician’s duty to his patient relates to his exercise of the degree of care, skill and diligence which
physicians in the same general neighbourhood, and in the same general line of practice, ordinarily possess
and exercise in like cases.
‣ Breach/ Injury

III. NEGLIGENCE
‣ There is breach of this duty when the patient is injured in body or in health. Proof of this breach rests upon the
testimony of an expert witness that the treatment accorded to the patient failed to meet the standard level of
care, skill and diligence.
‣ It must be established and proven that the expert witness possesses specialisation and competence to testify on
the degree of care, skill and diligence needed for the treatment of the patient.
‣ The expert witness must NOT be restricted by limitations that denied his full evaluation of the victim. He must be
sufficiently informed
‣ Proximate Causation
‣ To justify an award of damages, the negligence of the doctor must be established to be the proximate cause of the
injury.
‣ Spouses Flores vs Spouses Pineda: The critical and clinching factor in a medical negligence case is proof of the
causal connection between the negligence and the injuries. The claimant must prove not only the injury but also
the defendant’t fault, and such fault caused the injury. A verdict in a malpractice action cannot be based on
speculation or conjecture
‣ Causation must be proven within a reasonable medical probability based upon competent expert testimony.
15. LI V. SOLIMAN, G.R. NO. 165279, JUNE 7, 2011
‣ Requirements of Medical Negligence Cases
‣ The type of lawsuit which has been called “medical malpractice” or more appropriately, “medical negligence”, is
that type of claim which a victim has available to him or her to redress a wrong committed by a medical
professional which has caused bodily harm.
‣ In order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient must prove that a health care provider, in most cases, a
physician, either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or that
he did something that a reasonably prudent provider would not have done; and that failure or action caused injury
to the patient
‣ Medical negligence cases are best proved by opinions of expert witnesses belonging in the same general
neighbourhood and in the same general line of practice as defendant physician or surgeon.
‣ The deference of courts to the expert opinion of qualified physicians stems from the former’s realisation that
the latter possess unusual technical skills which laymen in most instances are incapable of intelligently
evaluating, hence the indispensability of expert testimonies
‣ The expert witness must also be sufficiently informed of the victim’s case and medical records in order to
make a sufficient and competent evaluation
‣ Doctrine of Informed Consent (within the context of physician-patient relationships); Tort of “Battery”
‣ Goes as far back into English Common Law
‣ As early as 1767, doctors were charged with the tort of “battery” (such as an unauthorised physical contract with a
patient) if they have not gained the consent of their patients prior to performing a surgery or procedure.
‣ Schoendorff vs Society of New York Hospital (US Case): This upheld the basic right of a patient to give consent to
any medical procedure or treatment. In that, every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his
patient’s consent, commits an assault, for which he is liable for damages
‣ From a purely ethical norm, informed consent has evolved into a general principle of law that a physician has
a duty to disclose what a reasonably prudent physician in the medical community in the exercise of
reasonable care would disclose to his patient as to whatever grave risks of injury might be incurred from a
proposed course of treatment, so that a patient, exercising ordinary care for his own welfare, and faced with a
choice of undergoing the proposed treatment, or alternative treatment, or none at all, may intelligently exercise his
judgment by reasonably balancing the probable risks against the probable benefits.
‣ Canterbury vs Spence (US Case): The duty to disclose should not be limited to medical usage as to arrogate the
decision on revelation to the physician alone. Thus, respect for the patient’s right of self-determination on
particular therapy demands a standard set by law for physicians rather than one which physicians may or may not
impose upon themselves. The scope of disclosure is premised on the fact that patients ordinarily are persons
unlearned in the medical sciences. Proficiency in diagnosis and therapy is not the full measure of a physician’s
responsibility. It is also his duty to warn of the dangers lurking in the proposed treatment and to impart
information which the patient has the right to expect. Indeed, the patient’s reliance upon the physician is a trust
of the kind which traditionally has exacted obligations beyond those associated with arms-length transactions.

III. NEGLIGENCE
‣ The physician is not expected to give the patient a short medical education, the disclosure rule only
requires of him a reasonable explanation, which means generally informing the patient in nontechnical
terms as to what is at stake:
1. The therapy alternatives open to him
2. The goals expectably to be achieve, and
3. The risks that may ensue from particular treatment or no treatment
‣ Cobbs vs Grant (US Case): an integral part of physician’s overall obligation to the patient, is the duty of
reasonable disclosure of available choices with respect to proposed therapy and of dangers inherently and
potentially involved in each. However, the physician is not obliged to discuss relatively minor risks inherent in
common procedures when it is common knowledge that such risks inhere in procedure is of very low incidence.
‣ Exceptions to this rule is:

1. When the patient is unable to evaluate data, as when the patient is a child or incompetent.
2. Emergency cases
3. Therapeutic Privilege
‣ The patient’s right to self-decision can only be effectively exercised if the patient possesses adequate
information to enable him in making an intelligent choice.
‣ The scope of the physicians’s communications to the patient, then must be measured by the patient’s
need, and that need is whatever information is material to the decision. The test therefore for
determining whether a potential peril must be divulged is its materiality to the patient’s decision
‣ For liability of the physician for failure to inform patient, there must be a causal relationship between the
physicians failure to inform and the injury to patient and such connection arises only if it is established
that, had revelation been made, consent to treatment would not have been given,
‣ Essential elements a plaintiff must prove in a malpractice action based upon the doctrine of informed
consent:
1. DUTY- The physician had a duty to disclose material risks
2. BREACH- He failed to disclose or inadequately disclosed those risks
3. INJURY- Plaintiff was injured by the proposed treatment
4. PROXIMATE CAUSATION- As a direct and proximate result of the failure to disclose, the patient consented to
treatment he otherwise would not have consented to
‣ So, you still go back to the basic elements of a malpractice case

‣ The gravamen in an informed consent case requires the plaintiff to point to a significant undisclosed
information relating to the treatment which would have altered her decision to undergo it.
‣ In a medical malpractice action based on lack of informed consent, the plaintiff must prove both the duty
and breach through expert testimony.
‣ Such expert testimony must show the customary standard of care of physicians in the same practice as that of
the defendant doctor
‣ As society has grappled with the juxtaposition between personal autonomy and the medical profession's intrinsic
impetus to cure, the law defining "adequate" disclosure has undergone a dynamic evolution. A standard once
guided solely by the ruminations of physicians is now dependent on what a reasonable person in the patient’s
position regards as significant. This change in perspective is especially important as medical breakthroughs move
practitioners to the cutting edge of technology, ever encountering new and heretofore unimagined treatments for
currently incurable diseases or ailments. An adaptable standard is needed to account for this constant
progression. Reasonableness analyses permeate our legal system for the very reason that they are determined by
social norms, expanding and contracting with the ebb and flow of societal evolution.
‣ As we progress toward the twenty-first century, we now realize that the legal standard of disclosure is not subject
to construction as a categorical imperative. Whatever formulae or processes we adopt are only useful as a
foundational starting point; the particular quality or quantity of disclosure will remain inextricably bound by the
facts of each case. Nevertheless, juries that ultimately determine whether a physician properly informed a patient
are inevitably guided by what they perceive as the common expectation of the medical consumer—"a reasonable
person in the patient’s position when deciding to accept or reject a recommended medical procedure."
16. ADARNE V. ALDABA, A.C. NO. 801, JUNE 27, 1978
‣ Standard of Diligence of Lawyers

III. NEGLIGENCE
‣ An attorney is NOT bound to exercise extraordinary diligence, but only a reasonable degree of care and skill,
having reference to the character of the business he undertakes to do.
‣ Prone to err like any other human being, he is not answerable for every error or mistake, and will be protected as
long as he acts honestly and in good faith to the best of his skill and knowledge
17. ISAAC V. A.L. AMMEN TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., G.R. NO. L-9671, AUGUST 23, 1957
‣ Standard of Diligence of Common Carriers
‣ Law on Common Carrier (in relation to Carrier and Passenger) has been substantially modified by the New Civil
Code
‣ Article 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to
observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers
transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case. Such extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance over the goods is further expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the
extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756.
‣ Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can
provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.
‣ Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at
fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed
in articles 1733 and 1755.
‣ The Code Commission, in justifying the “extraordinary diligence” required of a common carrier said that “A
common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using
utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all circumstances. This extraordinary diligence
required of common carriers is calculated to protect the passengers from the tragic mishaps that frequently
occur in connection with rapid modern transportation. This high standard of care is imperatively demanded by
the preciousness of life and by the consideration that every person must in every way be safeguarded against all
injury
‣ Principles governing liability of common carrier:
1. The liability of a carrier is contractual and arises upon breach of its obligation.
2. There is breach if it fails to exert extraordinary diligence according to all the circumstances of each case
3. A carrier is obliged to carry its passenger with the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, having due
regard for all the circumstances
4. A carrier is presumed to be at fault or to have acted negligently in case of death of, or injury to, passengers, it
being its duty to prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence
5. The carrier is not an insurer against all risks of travel
‣ “Emergency” Rule
‣ There is authority to the effect that where failure to observe the same degree of care that as ordinary prudent
man would exercise under ordinary circumstances when confronted with a sudden emergency was held to be
warranted and a justification to exempt the carrier from liability
‣ Where a carrier’s employee is confronted with a sudden emergency, the fact that he is obliged to act
quickly and without a chance for deliberation must be taken into account, and he is NOT held to the
same degree of care that he would otherwise be required to exercise in the absence of such emergency
but must exercise only such care as any ordinary prudent person would exercise under like circumstances and
conditions, and the failure on his part to exercise the best judgment the case renders possible does not
establish lack of care and skill on his part which renders his employer liable
18. CALVO V. UCPB GENERAL INSURANCE CO., INC., G.R. NO. 148496, MARCH 19, 2002
‣ Definition of Common Carriers
‣ Article 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of
carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for compensation, offering their
services to the public.
‣ Art. 1732 does NOT make any distinction between:
1. One whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such
carrying only as an ancillary activity.
2. A person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such
service on an occasional, episodic, or unscheduled basis

III. NEGLIGENCE
3. A carrier offering its services to the “general public” and one who offers services or solicits business only from
a narrow segment of the general population.
‣ Court said that Art. 1732 deliberately refrained from making such distinctions
‣ The concept of “common carrier” under Art. 1732 may be seen to coincide neatly with the notion of “public
service” under the Public Service Act which at least partially supplements the law on common carriers in the civil
code.
‣ Sec. 13, paragraph (b) of the Public Service Act: “Public Service” includes “xxxxx every person that now or
hereafter may own, operate, manage, or control in the Philippines, for hire or compensation, with general or
limited clientele, whether permanent, occasional, or accidental, and done for general business
purposes, any common carrier, railroad, street railway, xxxxxxx”
‣ Standard of Diligence of Common Carriers

‣ Article 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to
observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers
transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case. Such extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance over the goods is further expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the
extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756.
‣ Compania Maritima vs CA: The “extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over goods” tendered for shipment
requires the common carrier to know and to follow the required precaution for avoiding damage to, or destruction
of the goods entrusted to it for sale, carriage, and delivery. It requires common carriers to render service with the
greatest skill and foresight and to “use all reasonable means to ascertain the nature and characteristic of goods
tendered for shipment, and to exercise due care in the handling and stowage, including such methods as their
nature requires”
‣ To prove extraordinary diligence, petitioner must do more than merely show the possibility that some other
party could be responsible for the damage.
‣ It must prove that it used “all reasonable means to ascertain the nature and characteristic of goods
tendered for transport and that it exercised due care in the handling thereof”
19. RIDJO TAPE & CHEMICAL CORP., V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 126074, FEBRUARY 24, 1998
‣ Standard of Care of Public Utilities
‣ Public utilities should be put on notice, as a deterrent, that if they completely disregard their duty of keeping their
electric meters in serviceable condition, they run the risk for forfeiting, by reason of their negligence, amounts
originally due from their customers.
‣ Being a public utility vested with public interest, MERALCO is impressed with certain obligations towards its
customers and any omission on its part to perform such duties would be prejudicial to its interest. Those who do
not exercise such prudence in the discharge of their duties shall be made to bear the consequences of such
oversight.
B. NEGLIGENCE AS PROXIMATE CAUSE
This is the most important element of quasi-delicts. Not only must there be damage suffered by the plaintiff and the defendant
being negligent, such negligence must be proven to be the proximate cause for such damage. Ultimately, it is a test of logic
and context specific, it would always depend on the factual circumstances of each case
1. BATACLAN V. MEDINA, 102 PHIL. 181 (1957)

‣ Definition of Proximate Cause
‣ That cause, which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces
the injury and without which the result would not have occurred.
‣ The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events
in motion, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which the first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event, should, as an ordinarily prudent, and intelligent
person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might
probably result therefrom

III. NEGLIGENCE
‣ Note that in this case, the doctrine of Proximate Cause, which is generally applicable on to quasi-delicts was used by
the court in a breach of contract case in order to assess the extent of damages to be awarded (to assess the extent of
liability of the defendant)
‣ Take this point in conjunction with the ruling of the Court in the Calalas case later where the court said that the
doctrine of proximate cause is immaterial in actions based on breach of contract. This is erroneous
‣ The doctrine of proximate cause, while generally only applicable to quasi-delict cases is relevant to breach of contract
cases for the following purposes:
1. Assessing the extent of liability of the defendant (as applied in the Bataclan case)
‣ This is supported by Article 2201. “In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who
acted in good faith is liable shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the
obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation
was constituted.”
2. As a matter of the defendant’s defense in proving that the proximate cause of the damage was the plaintiff’s own
negligence (as applied in the Isaac and Teh Le Kim cases which will be taken later)
‣ This is supported by Art. 1761 and 1762 where the common carrier may invoke, as a matter of defense, that the
plaintiff’s negligence was the proximate cause of his injury (in a breach of contract of carriage)
‣ Article 1761. The passenger must observe the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid injury to
himself.
‣ Article 1762. The contributory negligence of the passenger does not bar recovery of damages for his death
or injuries, if the proximate cause thereof is the negligence of the common carrier, but the amount of
damages shall be equitably reduced.
2. URBANO V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, 157 SCRA 1 (1988)
‣ Application of Doctrine of Proximate Cause to Delicts
‣ Court used same definition of proximate cause as that cited in Bataclan
‣ Definition of proximate cause in quasi-delict applies in delicts, particularly in Art. 4 of the Revised Penal Code,
where it provides that “Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1) By any person committing a felony (delito) although
the wrongful be different from that which he intended. xxxxxxx”
‣ Pursuant to this provision, an accused is criminal responsible not just for acts committed by him in
violation of law, but also for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom
3. PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC., V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, G.R. NO. 65295, MARCH 10, 1987
‣ Foreseeable Intervening Causes
‣ If the intervening cause is one which in ordinary human experience is reasonably to be anticipated, or one
which the defendant has reason to anticipate under the particular circumstances, the defendant may be
negligent, among other reasons, because of failure to guard against it; or the defendant may be negligent only
for that reason.
‣ Thus, one who sets a fire may be required to foresee that an ordinary, usual and customary wind arising later
will spread it beyond the defendant’s own property, and therefore to take precautions to prevent that event.
‣ The person who leaves the combustible or explosive material exposed in a public place may foresee the risk of
fire from some independent source
‣ In these cases, there is an intervening cause combining with the defendant’s conduct to produce the result,
and in each case the defendant’s negligence consists in failure to protect the plaintiff against that very
risk.
‣ Foreseeable intervening causes will NOT supersede the defendant’s responsibility
‣ In other words, if the intervening cause is foreseeable (by the defendant), then it will not free the defendant from
liability. It is NOT an efficient intervening cause.
‣ Rejection of the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance in Philippine Jurisdiction
‣ The historical function of the “doctrine of last clear chance.” The common law rule of contributory negligence
prevented any recovery at all by a plaintiff who was also negligent, even if the plaintiff's negligence was relatively
minor as compared with the wrongful act or omission of the defendant. The common law notion of last clear
chance permitted courts to grant recovery to plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that the defendant
had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so. Accordingly it is difficult to see what role, if
any, the common law last clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law
concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected,
as it has been in Art. 2179 of our Civil Code.

III. NEGLIGENCE
‣ “Is there perhaps a general concept of last clear chance that may be extracted from its common law matrix and
utilizing as general rule in negligence cases in a civil law jurisdiction like ours? We do not believe so”
‣ Under Art. 2179, the task of a court is to determine whose negligence (the plaintiff’s or defendant’s) was the legal
or proximate cause of the injury. The task is not simply or even primarily an exercise in chronology or physics. The
relative location in the continuum of time of the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s negligent acts or omissions,
is only one of the relevant factors that may be taken into account. Of more fundamental importance are the
nature of the negligent act or omission of each part and the character and gravity of the risks created by
such act or omission for the rest of the community.
4. AUSTRIA V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 133323, MARCH 9, 2000

‣ This case involved almost the same facts as the Phoenix Case (A vehicle hit another vehicle because the latter was
improperly parked, as part of it was protruding). But in this case, the court ruled that the driver of the car which hit the
improperly parked car was negligent as he was the immediate and proximate cause of the collision. In the Phoenix
Case, the driver of the car which hit the improperly parked car was merely contributorily liable, this was because the
improperly parked car was the proximate cause of the injury.
‣ The difference is that in this case, the driver would not have hit the parked car if he was not speeding. In the
Phoenix Case, the driver had no opportunity to avoid the collision, any car would have hit the parked car, even if
the driver was not negligent.
5. UMALI V. BACANI, G.R. NO. L-40570, JANUARY 30, 1976
‣ Article 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot
recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury
being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the
damages to be awarded.
‣ When the plaintiffs negligence is NOT the proximate cause of his own injury, but is merely a contributory cause, such
contributory negligence does NOT exempt the defendant from liability, and. it merely mitigates it.
6. CALALAS V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 122039, MAY 31, 2000

‣ Proximate Cause Immaterial in Actions based on Breach of Contract
‣ The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, NOT in actions involving breach
of contract.
‣ The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is NO relation between him and another party.
In such case, the obligation is created by the law itself. But where there is a pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to
regulate the relation thus created.
‣ The conclusion of the court in this case is erroneous. The doctrine of proximate cause can be relevant in breach of
contract cases. See comments under the Bataclan Case taken up earlier
C. PROOF OF NEGLIGENCE
Generally, the burden of proof in each action based on quasi-delict rests on the plaintiff because of the presumption that all
persons take ordinary care of his concerns. He may prove the existence of the negligence and proximate cause by the use of
ordinary witnesses (fact witnesses) for ordinary negligence or expert witnesses for specialized negligence (such as medical
negligence)
Rule 131, Sections 1, 2 and 3(d) of Rules of Court

Section 1. Burden of proof. — Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary
to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law. (1a, 2a)
Section 2. Conclusive presumptions. — The following are instances of conclusive presumptions:

(a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led to another to
believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration,
act or omission, be permitted to falsify it;
(b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of commencement of the relation of landlord
and tenant between them. (3a)

III. NEGLIGENCE
Section 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be
contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
(d) That a person takes ordinary care of his concerns;
1. ONG V. METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT, 104 PHIL. 397 (1958)

‣ Proof of Negligence
‣ Since the action is one for damages founded on culpable negligence (based on Art. 2176), the principle to be
observed is that the person claiming damages has the burden of proving that the damage is caused by the fault or
negligence of the person from whom the damage is claimed, or of one of his employees.
‣ The question that arises is: “Whether the plaintiff has established by sufficient evidence, the existence of fault
or negligence on the part of the defendant so as to render it liable for damages for the injury”
‣ Doctrine of Last Clear Chance

‣ The doctrine of last clear chance simply means that the negligence of a claimant does not preclude a recovery for
the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable care and prudence,
might have avoided injurious consequences to the claimant notwithstanding his negliegnce.
‣ A person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligence
acts of his opponent or the negligence of a third person which is imputed to his opponent, is considered in law,
solely responsible for the consequences of the accident
‣ The last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously,
and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have
been discovered; at least in cases in which any previous negligence of the party charged cannot be said to
have contributed to the injury.
D. PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE
Generally, the burden of proof in each action based on quasi-delict rests on the plaintiff. But, there are certain exceptions
when the plaintiff need not prove the existence of negligence as an element of quasi-delicts. In certain cases, negligence is
disputably presumed, provided that the facts giving rise to such presumption are proved and established. In such exceptional
cases, the burden is on the defendant to overcome the presumption of negligence. Note that, however, the presumption only
extends to the element of negligence, the plaintiff still needs to prove the element of proximate cause. The exceptional cases
giving rise to a presumption of negligence are:
1. Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur
2. Violation of ordinance, statute, or traffic rules and regulations (negligence per se)
3. Possession of dangerous weapons or substances
4. Vicarious liability (but this will be taken up later)
1. RES IPSA LOQUITUR
Application of Res Ipsa Loquitur creates a presumption or inference of negligence on the part of the defendant. Given the
following requisites are present:
1. The accident was given of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent;
2. That the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with
the negligence
3. The injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.
4. It must appear that the injured party had no knowledge or means of knowledge as to the cause of the accident, or that
the party to be charged with negligence has superior knowledge or opportunity for explanation of the accident.
NOTE — The 4th element has not been consistently strictly applied by the SC, strict in Huang, not strict in Cebu Shipyard.

III. NEGLIGENCE
1. AFRICA V. CALTEX, 16 SCRA 448 (1966)

‣ Definition and Applicability of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur
‣ While it is the rule, that in case of non-contractual negligence or culpa aquiliana, the burden of proof is on the
plaintiff to establish that the proximate cause of his injury was the negligence of the defendant, it is also a
recognised principle that where the thing which caused the injury, without fault of the injured person, is under the
exclusive control of the defendant and the injury is such as in the ordinary course of things does not occur if he
having such control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of the explanation, that the
injury arose from defendant’s want of care. The burden of evidence is shifted to the defendant to establish that he
has observed due care and diligence.
‣ This rule is known by the name of res ipsa loquitur or the “thing or transaction speaks for itself”.
‣ How does the defendant know if the plaintiff has successfully established the requisites of res ipsa, such that it has to
rebut a presumption of negligence? File a demurrer to evidence, if it is granted, then plaintiff has not successfully
established it.
2. DM CONSUNJI V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 137873, APRIL 20, 2001
‣ The effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is to warrant a presumption or inference that the instrumentalities
which led to the injury was a result of the person having charge of the instrumentality was negligent
‣ As a rule of evidence, the doctrine is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognises that prima facie
negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence.
‣ While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and while the mere happening of an accidence or injury
will not generally give rise to an inference or presumption that it was due to negligence on defendant's part, under
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which means, literally, the thing or transaction speaks for itself, or in one
jurisdiction, that the thing or instrumentality speaks for itself, the facts or circumstances accompanying an injury
may be such as to raise a presumption, or at least permit an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant,
or some other person who is charged with negligence
‣ Where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which caused the injury complained of was under the control or
management of the defendant, and that the occurrence resulting in the injury was such as in the ordinary course of
things would not happen if those who had its control management used proper care, there is sufficient evidence,
or, as sometimes stated, reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the injury
arose from or as caused by the defendant’s want of care.
‣ Doctrine of Necessity in the application of Res Ipsa Loquitur

‣ The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is based in part upon the theory that the defendant in charge of the instrumentality
which cause the injury either knows the case of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and that
the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and therefore is compelled to allege negligence is general terms and to rely
upon the proof of the happening of the accident in order to establish negligence. The inference which the
doctrine permits is grounded upon the fact that the chief evidence of the true cause, whether culpable or
innocent, is practically accessible to the defendant, but inaccessible to the injured person.
‣ It has been said that the doctrine furnishes a bridge by which a plaintiff, without knowledge of the cause, reaches
over to defendant, who knows or should know the cause, for any explanation of care exercised by the defendant in
respect of the matter of which the plaintiff complains.
‣ The doctrine is a rule of necessity, in that it proceeds on the theory that under the peculiar circumstances
in which the doctrine is applicable, it is within the power of the defendant to show that there was no
negligence on his part, and direct proof of the defendant’s negligence is beyond the plaintiff’s power.
‣ Accordingly, some courts add to the three pre-requisites for the application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine the
further requirement that for the res ipsa loquitur doctrine to apply, it must appear that the injured party had no
knowledge or means of knowledge as to the cause of the accident, or that the party to be charged with
negligence has superior knowledge or opportunity for explanation of the accident.
‣ Application of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur

‣ The negligence of defendant is presumed or inferred when the plaintiff establishes the requisites for the application
of res ipsa loquitur. Once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of all the elements, the burden shifts to
defendant to explain. The presumption or inference may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence, and under
appropriate circumstances a disputable presumption, such as that of due care or innocence, may outweigh the
inference.
‣ It is not for the defendant to explain or prove its defense to prevent the presumption of inference from arising.
Evidence of defendant of say, due care, comes into play only after the circumstances for the application of the
doctrine has been established.

III. NEGLIGENCE
3. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 124378, MARCH 8, 2005
‣ In the absence of any clear explanation on what other factors could have explained the flooding in the neighboring
properties of the dam, it is fair to reasonably infer that the incident happened because of want of care on the part
of the NPC to maintain the water level of the dam within the benchmarks at the maximum normal lake elevation of
702 meters. An application on the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur, the thing speaks for itself comes into for.
‣ Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is
such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have management use proper case, it
affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want
of care
4. CEBU SHIPYARD AND ENGINEERING WORKS, INC., V. WILLIAM LINES, INC., 306 SCRA 762 (1999)
‣ Elements of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur
‣ For the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to apply to a given situation, the following conditions must concur:
1. The accident was given of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; and
2. That the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person
charged with the negligence
‣ In this case, the court concluded that the direct evidence substantiates the negligence of the defendant. Thus,
even without applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, in light of the direct evidence, the defendant is liable.
5. PERLA COMPANIA DE SEGUROS, INC., V. SPOUSES SARANGAYA, G.R. NO. 147746, OCTOBER 25, 2005
‣ The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur provides a means by which a plaintiff can pin liability on a defendant who, if innocent,
should be able to explain that care he exercised to prevent the incident complained of. Thus, it is the defendant’s
responsibility to show that there was no negligence.
‣ Elements/Requisites of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur

1. The accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent
‣ “Ordinary” refers to the usual course of events
2. The cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge
‣ Where the circumstances which caused the accident are shown to have been under the management or
control of a certain person and, in the normal course of events, the incident would not have happened had that
person used proper care, the inference is that it occurred because of lack of such care.
‣ The burden of evidence is thus shifted to defendant to establish that he observed all that was necessary to
prevent the accident from happening.
3. The injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the
person injured.
6. HUANG V. PHILIPPINE HOTELIERS INC., G.R. NO. 180440, DECEMBER 5, 2012
‣ Definition and Applicability of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur; Elements
‣ Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means "the thing or the transaction speaks for itself." It relates to
the fact of an injury that sets out an inference to the cause thereof or establishes the plaintiff’s prima facie case.
‣ The doctrine rests on inference and not on presumption. The facts of the occurrence warrant the supposition of
negligence and they furnish circumstantial evidence of negligence when direct evidence is lacking.
‣ Simply stated, this doctrine finds no application if there is direct proof of absence or presence of negligence. If
there is sufficient proof showing the conditions and circumstances under which the injury occurred, then the
creative reason for the said doctrine disappears.
‣ Further, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies where:
1. The accident was of such character as to warrant an inference that it would not have happened except for the
defendant’s negligence;
2. The accident must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive management or
control of the person charged with the negligence complained of; and
3. The accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.
‣ Inapplicability of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur

III. NEGLIGENCE
‣ The doctrine relates to the fact on an injury that sets out an inference to the cause thereof or establishes the
plaintiff’s prima facie case. It relates to the fact of an injury that sets out an inference to the cause thereof or
establishes the plaintiff’s prima facie case.
‣ The doctrine rests on inference and not on presumption. The facts of the occurrence warrant the supposition of
negligence and they furnish circumstantial evidence of negligence when direct evidence is lacking.
‣ The doctrine finds no application if there is direct proof of absence or presence of negligence. If there is
sufficient proof showing the conditions and circumstances under which the injury occurred, then the
creative reason for the said doctrine disappears.
7. BATIQUIN V. COURT OF APPEALS, 258 SCRA 334 (1996)
‣ Nature of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur
‣ The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognises that
prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of
negligence.
‣ The doctrine is not a rule of substantive law, but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience.
‣ The rule, when applicable to facts and circumstances of a particular case, is not intended to and does not
dispense with the requirement of proof of culpable negligence on the party charged. It merely determines
and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof and facilitates the burden of plaintiff of proving a
breach of the duty of due care.
‣ The doctrine can be involved when and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent
and not readily available.
8. CANTRE V. GO, G.R. NO. 160889, APRIL 27, 2007

‣ Application of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur in Medical Negligence Cases
‣ In cases involving medical negligence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur allows the mere existence of an injury to
justify a presumption of negligence on the part of the person who controls the instrument causing the injury,
provided that the following requisites concur:
1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence
2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; and
3. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated
‣ Captain of the Ship doctrine in relation to the requisite of Exclusive Control or Management
‣ Doctrine holds that the surgeon in charge of an operation liable for the negligence of his assistants during the time
when those assistants are under surgeon control.
9. PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC., V. AGANA, 513 SCRA 478 (2007)

‣ Elements/Requisites of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur
1. The occurrence of an injury
2. The thing which caused the injury was under the control and management of the defendant
3. The occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things, would not have happened if those who had
control or management used proper care; and
4. The absence of explanation by the defendant
‣ The most instrumental is the control and management of the thing which caused the injury.
‣ Captain of the Ship doctrine in relation to the requisite of Exclusive Control or Management
‣ Under the “Captain of the Ship” rule, the operating surgeon is the person in complete charge of the surgery room
and all personnel connected with the operation. Their duty is to obey his orders.
‣ Nature of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur

‣ In this jurisdiction, res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law, hence, does not per se create or constitute an
independent or separate ground of liability, being a mere evidentiary rule. In other words, mere invocation and
application of the doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence.
10. RAMOS V. COURT OF APPEALS, 321 SCRA 584 (1999) AND RAMOS V. COURT OF APPEALS, 380 SCRA 467 (2002)
‣ Nature of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur; Elements/Requisites of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur
‣ The doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur is not a rule of substantive law and, as such, does not create or constitute an
independent or separate ground of liability. Instead, it considered as merely evidence or in the nature of a
procedural rule. It is regarded as a mode of proof or mere procedural convenience since it furnishes a substitute

III. NEGLIGENCE
for, and relives a plaintiff of, the burden of producing specific proof of negligence. In other words, mere invocation
and application of the doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence. It is simply a step in
the process of such proof, permitting the plaintiff to present along with the proof of the accident, enough of the
attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine, creating an inference or presumption of negligence may be
allowed, the following requisites must be satisfactorily shown:
1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence
2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; and
3. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated
‣ The fundamental element is the “control of instrumentality” which caused the damage. Such element of
control must be shown to be within the dominion of the defendant. In order to have the benefit of the rule, a
plaintiff, in addition to proving injury or damage, must show a situation where it is applicable, and must
establish that the essential elements of the doctrine were present in a particular incident.

‣ Medical malpractice cases do not escape the application of this doctrine. Thus res ipsa loquitur has been applied
when the circumstances attendant upon the harm are themselves of such a character as to justify an inference of
negligence as the cause of that harm.
‣ The application of res ipsa loquitur in medical negligence cases presents a question of law, since it is a judicial
function to determine whether a certain set of circumstance does, as a matter of law permit a given inference.
‣ Generally, expert medical testimony is relief upon in malpractice suits to prove that a physician has done a
negligence act or that he has deviated from the standard medical procedure, when the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert medical testimony is dispensed with with because the
injury itself provides the proof of negligence.
‣ The reason is that the general rule on the necessity of expert testimony applies only to such mattes
clearly within the domain of medical science, not to matters that are within the common knowledge of
manking which be testified to by anyone familiar with the facts.
‣ Ordinarily, only physicians and surgeons of skill are experience are competent to testify as to whether a patient
has been treated or operated upon with a reasonable degree of care and skill. However, testimony as to the
statements and acts of physicians and surgeons, external appearances, and manifest conditions which are
observable by any one ay be given by non-expert witnesses
‣ Expert testimony is not necessary for the proof of negligence in non-technical matters or those of which
an ordinary person may be expected to have knowledge, or where the lack of skill or want of care is so
obvious as to render expert testimony unncessary.
‣ Hence, in cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon
proper proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where the court form its fund of common
knowledge can determine the proper standard of care.
‣ Where common knowledge and experience teach that a resulting injury would not have occurred to the patient if
due care had been exercised, an inference of negligence may be drawn given rise to an application of the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur without medical evidence, which is ordinarily required to show not only whatt occurred but how
and why it occurred. When the doctrine is appropriate, all that the patient must do is prove a nexus between the
particular act or omission complained of and the injury sustained while under the custody and management of the
defendant without need to produce expert medical testimony to establish the standard of care. Resort to res ipsa
loquitur is allowed because there is no other way, under usual and ordinary conditions, by which the patient can
obtain redress for injury suffered by him.
‣ Courts of other jurisdictions have applied the doctrine in the following situations:
1. Leaving of a foreign object in the body of a patient after an operation
2. Injuries sustained on a healthy part of the body which was not under, or in the area, of treatment
3. Removal of the wrong part of the body when another part was intended
4. Knocking out a tooth while a patient’s jaw was under aesthetic for the removal of his tonsils
5. Loss of an eye while the patient plaintiff was under the influence of aesthetic, during or following an opeation
for appendicitis
‣ Limitations on the Application of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur in Medical Negligence Cases
‣ Nevertheless, despite the fact that the scope of res ipsa loquitur has been measurably enlarged, it does not
automatically apply to all cases of medical negligence as to mechanically shift the burden of proof to the
defendant to show that he is not guilty of the ascribed negligence. Res Ipsa Loquitur is not a rigid or

III. NEGLIGENCE
ordinary doctrine to be perfunctorily used but a rule to be cautiously applied, depending upon the
circumstances of each case. It is generally restricted to situations in malpractice cases where a layman is able to
say, as a matter of common knowledge and observation, that the consequences of professional care were not as
such as would ordinarily have followed if due care had been exercised.
‣ A distinction must be made between the failure to secure results, and the occurrence of something more unusual
and not ordinarily found if the service or treatment rendered followed the usual procedure of those skilled in that
particular practice. It must be coded that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no application in a suit against
a physician or surgeon which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific treatment.
‣ The physician is not required at his peril to explain why any particular diagnosis was not correct, or why any
particular scientific treatment did not produce the desired result. Thus, res ipsa loquitur is not available in a
malpractice suit if the only showing is that the desired result of an operation or treatment was not accomplished.
‣ The real question, therefore, is whether or not in the process of the operation, any extraordinary incident
or unusual event outside the routine performance occurred which is beyond the regular scope of
customary professional activity in such operations, which, if unexplained would themselves reasonably
speak to the average man as the negligent cause or causes of the untoward consequence. If there was
such extraneous interventions, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, may be utilised and the defendant is called
upon to explain the mater, by evidence of exculpation, if he could.
6. REYES V. SISTERS OF MERCY HOSPITAL, 341 SCRA 760 (2000)

‣ Quoted the Ramos Case
‣ Limitations on the Application of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur in Medical Negligence Cases
‣ Quoted the Ramos Case
‣ Standard of Care required from the Medical Profession
‣ The practice of medicine is a profession engaged in only by qualified individuals. It is a right earned through years
of education, training and by first obtaining a license from the state through professional board examinations. Such
license may, at any time, and for cause, be revoked by the government. In addition to state regulation, the conduct
of doctors is also strictly regulate by the Hippocratic Oath, an ancient code of discipline and ethical rules which
doctors have imposed upon themselves in recognition and acceptance of their great responsibility to society.
‣ Given these safeguards, there is no need to expressly require of doctors the observance of “extraordinary”
diligence. As it is now, the practice of medicine is already conditioned upon the highest degree of diligence.
The standard contemplated for doctors is simply the reasonable average merit among ordinarily good
physicians. That is reasonable diligence for doctors or, the reasonable skill and competence that a physician in
the same or similar locality should apply.
2. VIOLATION OF RULES AND STATUTES
Remember that violation of rules and statutes give rise to negligence per se meaning a presumption of negligence arises. This
is because the standard of conduct in such particular circumstance is already defined by the ordinance or statute. Also, the
presumption only pertains to “negligence” as an element of quasi-delict, the plaintiff still has to prove the element of proximate
cause.
A. TRAFFIC RULES
Article 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle,
could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was
negligent, if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next
preceding two months.
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of article 2180 are applicable. (n)
Article 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom one is responsible. XXXXXX
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. XXXXXX

III. NEGLIGENCE
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a)
Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent
if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. (n)
MEMORIZE: ART. 2184 AND 2185
B. REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10586, SECTION 13, AND IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS
RA 10586: “Anti-Drunk and Drugged Driving Act of 2013”

SEC. 13. Direct Liability of Operator and/or Owner of the Offending Vehicle. – The owner and/or operator of the vehicle
driven by the offender shall be directly and principally held liable together with the offender for the fine and the award
against the offender for civil damages unless he or she is able to convincingly prove that he or she has exercised
extraordinary diligence in the selection and supervision of his or her drivers in general and the offending driver in
particular.
This section shall principally apply to the owners and/or operators of public utility vehicles and commercial vehicles such
as delivery vans, cargo trucks, container trucks, school and company buses, hotel transports, cars or vans for rent, taxi
cabs, and the like.
ART. 2184 VS SEC. 13 OF RA 10586
Art. 2184 Sec. 13 of RA 10586
Type of Motor vehicles Motor Vehicles

Vehicle
(Note that it covers all motor vehicles whether public or
private, but it principally applies to the owners and/or
operators of public utility vehicles and commercial
vehicles such as delivery vans, cargo trucks, container
trucks, school and company buses, hotel transports, cars
or vans for rent, taxi cabs, and the like.
Persons liable Owner and driver solidarily liable Owner and/or operator directly and principally held liable
together with the driver
Defenses 1. When owner is in the vehicle at the time of the Extraordinary diligence in the selection and supervision
available mishap: Ability by the use of due diligence to to of his or her drivers in general and the offending driver in
prevent the misfortune particular.
2. When owner is not in the vehicle at the time of
the mishap (Art. 2180): Observance of all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage
Extent of Damages Fines and Damages

Liability
(Fines are, by nature, penalties payable to the state.
Damages are compensation payable to the offended
party. Note that in the penal code, the owner is not liable
for a fine, only subsidiary liability for damages)
1. UNITED STATES V. JUANILLO, 23 PHIL. 212 (1912)

‣ Standard of Care of Motor Vehicle Drivers
‣ It is generally held that the rights and duties of pedestrians and vehicles are equal. Each may use the highway, and
each must exercise such care and prudence as the circumstances demand.

III. NEGLIGENCE
‣ Owners of automobiles have the same rights in the streets and highways that pedestrians and drivers of horses
have. Automobile drivers or the drivers of animals are not to use the means of locomotion without regard to the
rights of others having occassion to travel on the highway.
‣ While an automobile is a lawful means of conveyance and has equal rights upon the roads with pedestrians,
horses, and carriages, its use cannot be lawfully countenanced unless accompanied with that degree of prudence
in management and consideration for the rights of others which is consistent with safety.
‣ Individuals as well as corporations in the use and operation of dangerous machines, should have a due regard to
the preservation of the rights of the public in the use of the public streets, as well as the protection of persons
using such streets from injury, and if they fail in this, and should in the operation of a vehicle which is always
attended with more or less danger, negligently, carelessly and recklessly destroy human life, it is but in keeping
with the proper and impartial administration of justice that the penalties should be suffered for the commission of
such acts.
‣ When one comes through the highways with a machine of such power as an automobile, it is incumbent upon the
driver to use great care not to drive against or over pedestrians. An automobile is much more dangerous than a
street car or even a railway car. These are propelled along the fixed rails and all the traveling public has to do to be
safe is to keep off the track. But the automobile can be turned as easily as an individual, and for this reason is far
more dangerous to the traveling public than either the street car or the railway train
2. CHAPMAN V. UNDERWOOD, G.R. NO. 9010, MARCH 28, 1914

‣ Applicability of Art. 2184; Liability of owner of the motor vehicle who was in the vehicle for the negligence of
his driver
‣ In this case it does not appear that, from the time the automobile took the wrong side of the road to the
commission of the injury, sufficient time intervened to give the defendant an opportunity to correct the act of his
driver. Instead, it appears with fair clearness that the interval between the turning out to meet and pass the street
car and the happening of the accident was so small as not to be sufficient to charge defendant with the negligence
of the driver.
‣ Court did NOT hold the owner (who was in the motor vehicle at the time of the mishap) liable for the negligence of
his driver since he did not have sufficient time and reasonable opportunity to prevent the negligent acts or its
continuance. The act complained of must be continued in the presence of the owner for such a length a time that
the owner, by his acquiescence, makes his driver's act his own.
‣ The owner who was in the vehicle is not liable unless the negligent act of the driver are continued for such a
length of time as to give the owner a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct his driver to desist
therefrom, and the owner, with the use of due diligence, failed to do so.
3. CAEDO V. YU KHE THAI, 26 SCRA 410 (1968)

his driver
‣ Issue in this case is whether or not the owner, who was in the motor vehicle, is solidarily liable with his driver.
‣ The Court held that the owner was not liable as he had no reasonable opportunity to assess the risks involved and
warn the driver accordingly.
‣ Under Art. 2184, if the causative factor was the driver's negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was present is
likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due diligence.
‣ The same rule applies where the owner is present, unless the negligent acts of the driver are continued for
such a length of time as to give the owner a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct his driver to
desist therefrom. An owner who sits in his automobile, or other vehicle, and permits his driver to continue in a
violation of the law by the performance of negligent acts, after he has had a reasonable opportunity to observe
them and to direct that the driver cease therefrom, becomes himself responsible for such acts. The owner of an
automobile who permits his chauffeur to drive up the Escolta, for example, at a speed of 60 miles an hour,
without any effort to stop him, although he has had a reasonable opportunity to do so, becomes himself
responsible, both criminally and civilly, for the results produced by the acts of the chauffeur. On the other hand,
if the driver, by a sudden act of negligence, and without the owner having a reasonable opportunity to prevent
the act or its continuance, injures a person or violates the criminal law, the owner of the automobile, although
present therein at the time the act was committed, is not responsible, either civilly or criminally, therefor. The
act complained of must be continued in the presence of the owner for such a length of time that the owner, by
his acquiescence, makes his driver act his own. (Chapman vs Underwood)
‣ The basis of the master's liability in civil law is not respondent superior but rather the relationship of paterfamilias.
The theory is that ultimately the negligence of the servant, if known to the master and susceptible of timely
correction by him, reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury or damage.

III. NEGLIGENCE
‣ The test of imputed negligence under Article 2184 of the Civil Code is, to a great degree, necessarily subjective.
Car owners are not held to a uniform and inflexible standard of diligence as are professional drivers. In many cases
they refrain from driving their own cars and instead hire other persons to drive for them precisely because they are
not trained or endowed with sufficient discernment to know the rules of traffic or to appreciate the relative dangers
posed by the different situations that are continually encountered on the road. What would be a negligent omission
under aforesaid Article on the part of a car owner who is in the prime of age and knows how to handle a motor
vehicle is not necessarily so on the part, say, of an old and infirm person who is not similarly equipped.
‣ The law does not require that a person must possess a certain measure of skill or proficiency either in the
mechanics of driving or in the observance of traffic rules before he may own a motor vehicle. The test of his
intelligence, within the meaning of Article 2184, is his omission to do that which the evidence of his own
senses tells him he should do in order to avoid the accident. And as far as perception is concerned, absent a
minimum level imposed by law, a maneuver that appears to be fraught with danger to one passenger may appear
to be entirely safe and commonplace to another. Were the law to require a uniform standard of perceptiveness,
employment of professional drivers by car owners who, by their very inadequacies, have real need of drivers'
services, would be effectively proscribed.
4. SERRA V. MUMAR, G.R. NO. 193861, MARCH 14, 2012

his driver
‣ Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, employers are liable for the damages caused by their employees acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks. Whenever an employees negligence causes damage or injury to another,
there instantly arises a presumption that the employer failed to exercise the due diligence of a good father of the
family in the selection or supervision of its employees.The liability of the employer is direct or immediate. It is not
conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of insolvency of such
employee.
‣ Moreover, under Article 2184 of the Civil Code, if the causative factor was the drivers negligence, the owner of the
vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due
diligence.
‣ In this case, the owner failed to show that she exercised the level of diligence required in supervising her driver in
order to prevent the accident. She admitted that the driver had only been her driver for one year and she had no
knowledge of his driving experience or record of previous accidents. She also admitted that it was the driver who
maintained the vehicle and would even remind her to pay the installment of the car
‣ Note that Art. 2184 applies if the owner of the motor vehicle was in the vehicle with his driver, at the time of the
mishap. If he was NOT, then Art. 2180 applies
5. MALLARI V. COURT OF APPEALS, 324 SCRA 147 (2000)
‣ Presumption of Negligence (under Art. 2185) for violation of traffic regulations
‣ In this case, the defendant was found to have violated traffic rules prohibiting over-taking when a motor vehicle is
approaching a curve. Court ruled that he failed to overcome the presumption of negligence under Art. 2185
‣ The rule is settled that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of overtaking another vehicle in an
ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that the road is clear and not to proceed if he cannot do so in safety.
‣ When a motor vehicle is approaching or rounding a curve, there is special necessity for keeping to the right side of
the road and the driver does not have the right to drive on the left hand side relying upon having time to turn to the
right if a car approaching from the opposite direction comes into view
‣ Under Art. 2185 of the Civil Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor
vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he was violating a traffic regulation.
6. FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 118889, MARCH 23, 1998
‣ Inapplicability of Art. 2180 and Art. 2184 in the case where the registered owner was a rent-a-car company
‣ Court in this case held that the lessor of a motor vehicle which was a rent-a-car company was NOT liable for the
negligent acts of the lessee-driver, even though the former was the registered owner of the vehicle.
‣ The liability imposed by Art. 2180 arises by virtue of a presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the
persons made responsible thereunder, derived from their failure to exercise due care and vigilance over the acts of
subordinates to prevent them from causing damage.
‣ Art. 2180 is hardly applicable because none of the circumstances mentioned therein obtains in the case under
consideration. The owner of the vehicle being engaged in a rent-a-car business was only the owner of the car
leased to the driver. As such, there was no vinculum juris between them as employer and employee. The owner
cannot in any way be responsible for the negligent act of driver, the former not being an employer of the latter.

III. NEGLIGENCE
‣ Obviously, this provision of Art. 2184 is neither applicable because of the absence of master-driver relationship
between the owner rent-a-car company and the lessee.
‣ BUT, an exception would be if the lease was a mere disguise effected by the corporation to relieve itself of the
burdens and responsibilities of an employer
‣ Note that in the next PCI Leasing Case, the registered owner/lessee of a motor vehicle, is liable, by virtue of the motor
vehicle registration law, for the injury caused by such vehicle, regardless of who was driving. BUT because of this case,
rent-a-car companies are NOT liable for the negligence of their lessees, even though they were the registered owner. If
they were, then no such company would be in business. It can also be said that the lease contracts involved in rent-a-
car companies are merely short term, and thus, registration of the lease is not required
7. PCI LEASING AND FINANCE, INC., V. UCPB GENERAL INSURANCE CO., INC., 557 SCRA 141 (2008)
‣ Motor Vehicle Registration Rule
‣ The principle of holding the registered owner of a vehicle liable for quasi-delicts resulting from its use is well-
established in jurisprudence
‣ Registration is required not to make said registration the operative act by which ownership in vehicles is
transferred, as in land registration cases, because the administrative proceeding of registration does not bear any
essential relation to the contract of sale between the parties, but to permit the use and operation of the vehicle
upon any public highway (section 5 [a], Act No. 3992, as amended.)
‣ The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident happens, or that any
damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the public highways, responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite
individual, the registered owner. Instances are numerous where vehicles running on public highways caused
accidents or injuries to pedestrians or other vehicles without positive identification of the owner or drivers, or with
very scant means of identification. It is to forestall these circumstances, so inconvenient or prejudicial to the
public, that the motor vehicle registration is primarily ordained, in the interest of the determination of persons
responsible for damages or injuries caused on public highways.
‣ One of the principal purposes of motor vehicles legislation is identification of the vehicle and of the operator, in
case of accident; and another is that the knowledge that means of detection are always available may act as a
deterrent from lax observance of the law and of the rules of conservative and safe operation. Whatever purpose
there may be in these statutes, it is subordinate at the last to the primary purpose of rendering it certain that the
violator of the law or of the rules of safety shall not escape because of lack of means to discover him.'
‣ The purpose of the statute is thwarted, and the displayed number becomes a 'snare and delusion,' if courts would
entertain such defenses as that put forward by appellee in this case. No responsible person or corporation could
be held liable for the most outrageous acts of negligence, if they should be allowed to place a 'middleman'
between them and the public, and escape liability by the manner in which they recompense their servants.
‣ In an action for quasi-delict against the registered owner of the motor vehicle, such registered owner is
NOT allowed to raise as a defense and prove who the actual and real owner is.
‣ The law does not allow him to do so; the law, with its aim and policy in mind, does not relieve him directly of
the responsibility that the law fixes and places upon him as an incident or consequence of registration. Were a
registered owner allowed to evade responsibility by proving who the supposed transferee or owner is, it would
be easy for him, by collusion with others or otherwise, to escape said responsibility and transfer the same to an
indefinite person, or to one who possesses no property with which to respond financially for the damage or
injury done.
‣ A victim of recklessness on the public highways is usually without means to discover or identify the person
actually causing the injury or damage. He has no means other than by a recourse to the registration in the
Motor Vehicles Office to determine who is the owner. The protection that the law aims to extend to him would
become illusory were the registered owner given the opportunity to escape liability by disproving his
ownership.
‣ If the policy of the law is to be enforced and carried out, the registered owner should not be allowed to prove
the contrary to the prejudice of the person injured, that is, to prove that a third person or another has become
the owner, so that he may thereby be relieved of the responsibility to the injured person.
‣ The above policy and application of the law may appear quite harsh and would seem to conflict with truth and
justice. We do not think it is so. A registered owner who has already sold or transferred a vehicle has the
recourse to a third-party complaint, in the same action brought against him to recover for the damage or injury
done, against the vendee or transferee of the vehicle. The inconvenience of the suit is no justification for
relieving him of liability; said inconvenience is the price he pays for failure to comply with the registration that
the law demands and requires.
‣ Actions available against the Registered Owner of Motor Vehicles

III. NEGLIGENCE
‣ For damage or injuries arising out of negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle, the registered owner may
be held civilly liable with the negligent driver either 1) subsidiarily, if the aggrieved party seeks relief based on a
delict or crime under Articles 100 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code; or 2) solidarily, if the complainant seeks
relief based on a quasi-delict under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
‣ It is the option of the plaintiff whether to waive completely the filing of the civil action, or institute it with the
criminal action, or file it separately or independently of a criminal action; his only limitation is that he cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
‣ In case a separate civil action is filed, the long-standing principle is that the registered owner of a motor vehicle
is primarily and directly responsible for the consequences of its operation, including the negligence of the
driver, with respect to the public and all third persons.
‣ In contemplation of law, the registered owner of a motor vehicle is the employer of its driver, with the actual
operator and employer, such as a lessee, being considered as merely the owner's agent. This being the case,
even if a sale has been executed before a tortious incident, the sale, if unregistered, has no effect as to the
right of the public and third persons to recover from the registered owner. The public has the right to
conclusively presume that the registered owner is the real owner, and may sue accordingly
‣ Are there any exceptions to the Motor Vehicle Registration Rule as established in this case? Yes, see footnote 18
referring to the previous case of FGU Insurance. The only known exception to motor vehicle registration rule is that
enunciated in FGU Insurance Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 351 Phil. 219, 225 (1998), where it was held that a rent-a-car
company is not liable for the damages caused by the negligence of its lessee, who drove the subject vehicle. Here, it
was established that between a rent-a-car company and a client who drove a leased vehicle, there was a clear
absence of vinculum juris as employer and employee. An exception to this exception would be if fraud is involved, as
when the lease is merely a disguise for the company to relieve itself of liability
8. AÑONUEVO V. COURT OF APPEALS, 441 SCRA 24 (2004)
‣ Scope of Art. 2185: Covers only “Motorized” Vehicles; Standard of Care of Drivers of Motor Vehicles
‣ The defendant in this case argues that Article 2185 should apply by analogy to all types of vehicles (motorized and
non-motorised). He points out that modern-day travel is more complex now than when the Code was enacted, the
number and types of vehicles now in use far more numerous than as of then. He even suggests that at the time of
the enactment of the Code, the legislators must have seen that only motor vehicles were of such public concern
that they had to be specifically mentioned, yet today, the interaction of vehicles of all types and nature has
inescapably become matter of public concern so as to expand the application of the law to be more responsive to
the times
‣ Court held that Art. 2185 cannot be construed in such a manner as to include non-motorised vehicles.
‣ At the time Article 2185 was formulated, there existed a whole array of non-motorized vehicles ranging from
human-powered contraptions on wheels such as bicycles, scooters, and animal-drawn carts such as calesas
and carromata. These modes of transport were even more prevalent on the roads of the 1940s and 1950s than
they are today, yet the framers of the New Civil Code chose then to exclude these alternative modes from the
scope of Article 2185 with the use of the term motorized vehicles.
‣ If the defendant seriously contends that the application of Article 2185 be expanded due to the greater
interaction today of all types of vehicles, such argument contradicts historical experience. The ratio of
motorized vehicles as to non-motorized vehicles, as it stood in 1950, was significantly lower than as it stands
today. This will be certainly affirmed by statistical data, assuming such has been compiled, much less
confirmed by persons over sixty. The defendant’s characterization of a vibrant intra-road dynamic between
motorized and non-motorized vehicles is more apropos to the past than to the present.
‣ There is a fundamental flaw in the defendant’s analysis of Art. 2185, as applicable today. He premises that the
need for the distinction between motorized and non-motorized vehicles arises from the relative mass of
number of these vehicles. The more pertinent basis for the segregate classification is the difference in type of
these vehicles. A motorized vehicle operates by reason of a motor engine unlike a non-motorized vehicle,
which runs as a result of a direct exertion by man or beast of burden of direct physical force. A motorized
vehicle, unimpeded by the limitations in physical exertion. is capable of greater speeds and acceleration than
non-motorized vehicles. At the same time, motorized vehicles are more capable in inflicting greater injury or
damage in the event of an accident or collision. This is due to a combination of factors peculiar to the motor
vehicle, such as the greater speed, its relative greater bulk of mass, and greater combustability due to the fuels
that they use
‣ There long has been judicial recognition of the peculiar dangers posed by the motor vehicle. As far back as
1912, in the U.S. v. Juanillo, the Court has recognized that an automobile is capable of great speed, greater
than that of ordinary vehicles hauled by animals, and beyond doubt it is highly dangerous when used on
country roads, putting to great hazard the safety and lives of the mass of the people who travel on such roads

III. NEGLIGENCE
‣ A driver of an automobile, under such circumstances, is required to use a greater degree of care than
drivers of animals, for the reason that the machine is capable of greater destruction, and furthermore, it is
absolutely under the power and control of the driver; whereas, a horse or other animal can and does to
some extent aid in averting an accident.
‣ It is not pleasant to be obliged to slow down automobiles to accommodate persons riding, driving, or
walking. It is probably more agreeable to send the machine along and let the horse or person get out of the
way in the best manner possible; but it is well to understand, if this course is adopted and an accident
occurs, that the automobile driver will be called upon to account for his acts. An automobile driver must at
all times use all the care and caution which a careful and prudent driver would have exercised under the
circumstances
‣ American jurisprudence has had occasion to explicitly rule on the relationship between the motorist and the
cyclist. Motorists are required to exercise ordinary or reasonable care to avoid collision with bicyclists. While
the duty of using ordinary care falls alike on the motorist and the rider or driver of a bicycle, it is obvious, for
reasons growing out of the inherent differences in the two vehicles, that more is required from the former to
fully discharge the duty than from the latter
‣ The Code Commission was cognizant of the difference in the natures and attached responsibilities of
motorized and non-motorized vehicles. Art. 2185 was not formulated to compel or ensure obeisance by all to
traffic rules and regulations. If such were indeed the evil sought to be remedied or guarded against, then the
framers of the Code would have expanded the provision to include non-motorized vehicles or for that matter,
pedestrians. Yet, that was not the case; thus the need arises to ascertain the peculiarities attaching to a
motorized vehicle within the dynamics of road travel.
‣ The fact that there has long existed a higher degree of diligence and care imposed on motorized vehicles,
arising from the special nature of motor vehicle, leads to the inescapable conclusion that the qualification
under Article 2185 exists precisely to recognize such higher standard. Simply put, the standards applicable
to motor vehicle are not on equal footing with other types of vehicles.
‣ Violation of Traffic Rules and Regulations; Negligence Per Se

‣ The generally accepted view is that the violation of a statutory duty constitutes negligence, negligence as a matter
of law, or negligence per se
‣ The mere fact of violation of a statute is not sufficient basis for an inference that such violation was the proximate
cause of the injury complained. However, if the very injury has happened which was intended to be prevented by
the statute, it has been held that violation of the statute will be deemed to be the proximate cause of the injury.
‣ The generally accepted view is that violation of a statutory duty constitutes negligence, negligence as a matter of
law, or, according to the decisions on the question, negligence per se, for the reason that non-observance of what
the legislature has prescribed as a suitable precaution is failure to observe that care which an ordinarily prudent
man would observe, and, when the state regards certain acts as so liable to injure others as to justify their absolute
prohibition, doing the forbidden act is a breach of duty with respect to those who may be injured thereby; or, as it
has been otherwise expressed, when the standard of care is fixed by law, failure to conform to such standard is
negligence, negligence per se or negligence in and of itself, in the absence of a legal excuse. According to this
view it is immaterial, where a statute has been violated, whether the act or omission constituting such violation
would have been regarded as negligence in the absence of any statute on the subject or whether there was, as a
matter of fact, any reason to anticipate that injury would result from such violation.
‣ But the existence of an ordinance changes the situation. If a driver causes an accident by exceeding the speed
limit, for example, we do not inquire whether his prohibited conduct was unreasonably dangerous. It is enough
that it was prohibited. Violation of an ordinance intended to promote safety is negligence. If by creating the hazard
which the ordinance was intended to avoid it brings about the harm which the ordinance was intended to prevent,
it is a legal cause of the harm. This comes only to saying that in such circumstances the law has no reason to
ignore the causal relation which obviously exists in fact. The law has excellent reason to recognize it, since it is the
very relation which the makers of the ordinance anticipated. This court has applied these principles to speed limits
and other regulations of the manner of driving.
‣ However, the fact that other happenings causing or contributing toward an injury intervened between the violation
of a statute or ordinance and the injury does not necessarily make the result so remote that no action can be
maintained. The test is to be found not in the number of intervening events or agents, but in their character and in
the natural and probable connection between the wrong done and the injurious consequence. The general
principle is that the violation of a statute or ordinance is not rendered remote as the cause of an injury by the
intervention of another agency if the occurrence of the accident, in the manner in which it happened, was the very
thing which the statute or ordinance was intended to prevent.
‣ Mere Violation of Traffic Rules and Regulations being Negligence Per Se does NOT automatically gives rise to
liability, in the absence of causal connection between the negligence and the damage to the plaintiff

III. NEGLIGENCE
‣ Despite the presumption of negligence under the doctrine of negligence per se for violation of traffic rules and
regulations, the plaintiff still has the burden of showing a causal connection between the injury received and the
violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code.
‣ He must show that the violation of the statute was the proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially
contributed thereto. Negligence consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law, like any other negligence, is
without legal consequence unless it is a contributing cause of the injury.
‣ Mere violation of traffic rules at the time of the mishap are not determinative of the defendant’s negligence in
relation to the accident. Negligence is relative or comparative, dependent upon the situation of the parties and the
degree of care and vigilance which the particular circumstances reasonably require. To determine if the defendant
was negligent, it is not sufficient to rely solely on the violations of the municipal ordinance, but imperative to
examine the defendant’s behavior in relation to the contemporaneous circumstances of the accident.
‣ The rule on negligence per se must admit qualifications that may arise from the logical consequences of
the facts leading to the mishap. The doctrine (and Article 2185, for that matter) is undeniably useful as a
judicial guide in adjudging liability, for it seeks to impute culpability arising from the failure of the actor to
perform up to a standard established by a legal fiat. But the doctrine should not be rendered inflexible so as
to deny relief when in fact there is no causal relation between the statutory violation and the injury
sustained. Presumptions in law, while convenient, are not intractable so as to forbid rebuttal rooted in fact.
After all, tort law is remunerative in spirit, aiming to provide compensation for the harm suffered by those
whose interests have been invaded owing to the conduct of others
‣ Remember that violations of rules and statutes, being one of the means where a presumption of negligence arises
against the defendant, only pertains to or takes care of the element of negligence as one of the elements of a quasi-
delict. The plaintiff still has to prove the element of causal connection between the negligence of the defendant and
the damage caused to him
C. STATUTES AND ORDINANCES/ADMINISTRATIVE RULES
*Note: There is no distinction between statutes and ordinances when it comes to negligence per se
1. MARINDUQUE IRON MINES AGENTS, INC., V. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, 99 PHIL. 480 (1956)
‣ Private rule of conduct (such as rules imposed by employers on their employees) distinguished from public
rule of conduct (such as ordinances and statutes)
‣ In this case the plaintiff violated company rules by riding on haulage truck or stealing a ride which was prohibited.
‣ Court said that such act is not negligence, ordinarily. It couldn’t be, because transportation by truck is not
dangerous per se. It is argued that there was notorious negligence in this particular instance because there was
the employer’s prohibition. Does violation of this order constitute negligence? Many courts hold that violation of a
statute or ordinance constitutes negligence per se. Others consider the circumstances.
‣ However there is practical unanimity in the proposition that violation of a rule promulgated by a Commission or
board is not negligence per se; but it may be evidence of negligence.
ry
‣ This order of the employer (prohibition rather) couldn’t be of a greater obligation than the rule of a Commission
or board. And the referee correctly considered this violation as possible evidence of negligence; but it declared
y
that under the circumstance, the laborer could not be declared to have acted with negligence. Correctly, it is
believed, since the prohibition had nothing to do with personal safety of the riders.
‣ Violation of ordinance and statutes as public rules of conduct is negligence per se, giving rise to a presumption of
negligence. This is based on the fact that the legislature (national or local) has already determined the proper
standard of care in a particular circumstance. However, when what is involved is a mere violation of rules and
regulations by an employer (as a private rule of conduct), such is NOT negligence per se, it does not give rise to a
presumption of negligence and is merely considered an evidence of negligence
2. FF CRUZ AND CO., INC., V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 52732, AUGUST 29, 1988
‣ Failure to Comply with City Ordinances as an Act of Negligence
‣ In this case, the defendant’s failure to construct a firewall in accordance with city ordinances was suffice to
support a finding of negligence. The failure to comply with an ordinance providing for safety regulations had been
ruled by the Court as an act of negligence.
3. CIPRIANO V. COURT OF APPEALS, 263 SCRA 711

‣ Failure to Comply with Law as an Act of Negligence

III. NEGLIGENCE
‣ In this case, the defendant failed to comply with statutory requirements in registering his business with the DTI and
procuring insurance coverage for its customers was held to be a negligence act rendering him liable to the plaintiff
for damage to the latter’s property.
‣ While the cause of the damage was itself a fortuitous event, such cannot exempt the defendant from liability since
the precise purpose of the law he violated was to prevent risk of loss to the plaintiff
4. SANITARY STEAM LAUNDRY V. COURT OF APPEALS, 300 SCRA 20 (1998)

‣ Violation of Statute not giving rise to liability if such violation was NOT the proximate cause of the damage
‣ The defendant in this case was claiming that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent because he was in violation
of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code by driving an overloaded vehicle with only one functioning headlight
during nighttime.
‣ Court said that the plaintiff was NOT contributory negligent notwithstanding his violations of traffic rules and
regulations since the element of proximate cause has not been established.
‣ The one claiming negligence has the burden of showing a causal connection between the injury received and
the violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. He must show that the violation of the statute was
the proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially contributed thereto.
‣ Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law, like any other negligence, is without legal
consequence unless it is a contributing cause of the injury.
‣ The defendant says that driving an overloaded vehicle with only one functioning headlight during nighttime
certainly increases the risk of accident, that because the car of the plaintiff had only one headlight, there was
decreased visibility, and that the fact that the vehicle was overloaded and its front seat overcrowded decreased its
maneuverability. However, mere allegations such as these are not sufficient to discharge its burden of proving
clearly that such alleged negligence was the contributing cause of the injury.
3. DANGEROUS WEAPONS AND SUBSTANCES
A person must be injured or killed in order for the presumption of negligence to arise from possession of dangerous weapons
or substances. An exception would be if such weapons or substances is indispensable to the possessor’s business. Note that,
however, if the case falls under such exception, the plaintiff can still prove that the defendant was negligent and liable, only the
presumption does not arise.
Article 2188. There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant if the death or injury results from
his possession of dangerous weapons or substances, such as firearms and poison, except when the possession or use
thereof is indispensable in his occupation or business. (n)
MEMORIZE: ART. 2188
1. ARANETA V. ARREGLADO, 104 PHIL. 529 (1958)

‣ Standard of Care of Possessor of Dangerous Weapons or Substances
‣ Licensed possessors of firearms has a peremptory duty to adequately safeguard such dangerous weapons at all
times, and to take all requisite measures to prevent minors and other unauthorized parties from having access
thereto.
‣ Competent observers have recently called attention to the fact that the growing teen-age hooliganism in our
society is principally due to parent’s complacency in and neglect of their progeny.

IV. DEFENSES
IV. DEFENSES
Under “defenses” the perspective of negligence now shifts from that of the plaintiff to that of the defendant. One must now
look at negligence from the eyes of the defendant, so that he may invoke it as part of his defense. These are the defences
which may be invoked by the defendant to absolve or mitigate his liability:
1. When plaintiff’s own negligence was the proximate cause of his injury
2. When the plaintiff is contributorily negligent
3. When the plaintiff has waived future negligence
4. When the damage is caused by fortuitous events (force majeure)
5. When the action has prescribed
6. When the plaintiff has assumed the risk of injury
7. When the defendant is in an emergency situation (emergency rule)
The Doctrine of Last Clear Chance on the other hand, is a defense of the plaintiff, in that he can hold the defendant liable
despite his own negligence; but only as long as his negligence is not the proximate cause of his own injury and that it is
impossible to determine whose negligence is the proximate cause. Courts have used the doctrine of last clear chance to
absolve the plaintiff of liability completely, despite of his antecedent negligence, in holding the defendant to be completely
liable for the damage (without regard to the plaintiff’s negligence as seen in the Picart Case) or to mitigate the liability of the
defendant (with regard to plaintiff’s negligence as contributory negligence as seen in the Bank of America case)
The Emergency Rule is also a defense available to the plaintiff to prove he was not guilty of negligence in assuming the risks of
his own acts (INELCO vs CA) and not guilty of contributory negligence (Valenzuela vs CA)
A. PLAINTIFF’S NEGLIGENCE IS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF INJURY

Note that once it is established that the plaintiff’s negligence was the proximate cause of his own injury, he cannot recover
damages. This is an absolute rule. He cannot even be excused by the doctrine of last clear chance. He cannot recover
damages even if the defendant is contributorily negligent.
Article 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover
damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the
defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be
awarded. (n)
MEMORIZE: ART. 2179
1. TAYLOR V. MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD AND LIGHT CO., 16 PHIL. 8 (1910)

‣ Plaintiff’s own negligence was the proximate cause of his own injury
‣ But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant's property without defendant's express invitation or
permission would not have relieved defendant from responsibility for injuries incurred there by plaintiff, without
other fault on his part, if such injury were attributable to the negligence of the defendant, we are of opinion that
under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its
premises was not the proximate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff, which therefore was not, properly
speaking, "attributable to the negligence of the defendant," and, on the other hand, we are satisfied that plaintiffs
action in cutting open the detonating cap and putting match to its contents was the proximate cause of the
explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore is not civilly
responsible for the injuries thus incurred.
‣ While it is the general rule in regard to an adult that to entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting from
the fault or negligence of another he must himself have been free from fault, such is not the rule in regard to an
infant of tender years. The care and caution required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only, and
this is to be determined in each case by the circumstances of the case." As we think we have shown, under the
reasoning on which rests the doctrine of the Turntable and Torpedo cases, no fault which would relieve defendant
of responsibility for injuries resulting from its negligence can be attributed to the plaintiff, a well-grown boy of 15
years of age, because of his entry upon defendant's uninclosed premises without express permission or invitation'
but it is wholly different question whether such youth can be said to have been free from fault when he willfully and

IV. DEFENSES
deliberately cut open the detonating cap, and placed a match to the contents, knowing, as he undoubtedly did,
that his action would result in an explosion
‣ In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally
and physically than the average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day
as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred; and the record discloses throughout that he
was exceptionally well qualified to take care of himself. The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that,
despite his denials on the witness stand, he well knew the explosive character of the cap with which he was
amusing himself. The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion, as described by
the little girl who was present, admit of no other explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of
electricity, followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final success of his endeavors
brought about by the application of a match to the contents of the caps, show clearly that he knew what he was
about. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the explosion might be
dangerous, in view of the fact that the little girl, 9 years of age, who was within him at the time when he put the
match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and ran away.
‣ When the Plaintiff’s own negligence was the proximate cause of his own injury, he CANNOT recover, even if the
defendant was contributory negligent
‣ Right of recovery is denied when the acts of the injured party were the immediate causes of the accident.
‣ Test in determining if the plaintiff’s negligence was the proximate cause of his own injury
‣ Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured party shall be considered immediate
causes of the accident.
‣ The test is simple. Distinction must be made between the accident and the injury, between the event itself, without
which there could have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but
contributing to his own proper hurt. For instance, the cause of the accident under review was the displacement of
the crosspiece or the failure to replace it. This produces the event giving occasion for damages—that is, the
sinking of the track and the sliding of the iron rails. To this event, the act of the plaintiff in walking by the side of the
car did not contribute, although it was an element of the damage which came to himself. Had the crosspiece been
out of place wholly or partly through his act or omission of duty, that would have been one of the determining
causes of the event or accident, for which he would have been responsible.
‣ Where he contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not recover.
Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the
amount that the defendant responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a
suitable equivalent for his own imprudence.
‣ We think it is quite clear that under the doctrine thus stated, the immediate cause of the explosion, the accident
which resulted in plaintiff's injury, was in his own act in putting a match to the contents of the cap, and that having
"contributed to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not recover."
2. FERNANDO V. COURT OF APPEALS, 208 SCRA 714 (1992)

‣ Negligence must be the Proximate Cause of the Injury
‣ To be entitled to damages for an injury resulting from the negligence of another, a claimant must establish the
relation between the omission and the damage. He must prove under Article 2179 of the New Civil Code that the
defendant's negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury.
‣ Proximate cause has been defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred (Vda. de
Bataclan, et al. v. Medina, 102 Phil. 181, 186).
‣ Proof of such relation of cause and effect is not an arduous one if the claimant did not in any way contribute to the
negligence of the defendant. However, where the resulting injury was the product of the negligence of both parties,
there exists a difficulty to discern which acts shall be considered the proximate cause of the accident.
‣ Test in determining whose negligence was the proximate cause of the injury
‣ The test is simple. Distinction must be made between the accident and the injury, between the event itself,
without which there could have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it,
independent of it, but contributing to his own proper hurt. (Taylor vs Manila Electric Railroad)
‣ For instance, the cause of the accident under review was the displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to
replace it. This produced the event giving occasion for damages — that is, the sinking of the track and the sliding
of the iron rails. To this event, the act of the plaintiff in walking by the side of the car did not contribute, although it
was an element of the damage which came to himself. Had the crosspiece been out of place wholly or partly

IV. DEFENSES
through his act or omission of duty, that would have been one of the determining causes of the event or accident,
for which he would have been responsible.
‣ Where he contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not recover. Where, in
conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the amount that the
defendant responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his
own imprudence.
‣ How to determine whose negligence is the proximate cause of the injury, given that both parties were negligent?
1. Plaintiff’s negligence was the proximate cause: When his negligence contributes to the principal occurrence as
one of its determining factors
‣ Effect: Plaintiff CANNOT recover
2. Plaintiff’s negligence was merely contributory: When his negligence contributes only to his own injury, in
conjunction with the occurrence.
‣ Effect: Plaintiff can still recover, but the liability of the defendant is mitigated.
3. PLDT V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 57079, SEPTEMBER 12, 1989

‣ The facts show that the negligence of the plaintiff was not only contributory to his injuries and those of his wife but
goes to the very cause of the occurrence of the accident, as one of its determining factors, and thereby precludes
their right to recover damages
4. KIM V. PHILIPPINE AERIAL TAXI CO., INC., G.R. NO. 39309, NOVEMBER 24, 1933
‣ By sheer common sense, the plaintiff ought to know that a propeller, be it that of a ship or of an aeroplane, is
dangerous while in motion and that to approach it is to run the risk of being caught and injured thereby. He ought
to know furthermore that inasmuch as the plane was on the water, he had to wait for a banca to take him ashore.
‣ Notwithstanding the shouts and warning signals given him from the shore by the representatives of the consignee
firm, the plaintiff herein, not being a man of ordinary prudence, hastily left the cabin of the plane, walked along one
of the pontoons and directly into the revolving propeller, while the banca which was to take him ashore was still
some distance away and the pilot was instructing the boatman to keep it at a safe distance from the plane.
‣ Under such circumstances, it is not difficult to understand that the plaintiff-appellant acted with reckless
negligence in approaching the propeller while it was still in motion, and when the banca was not yet in a position to
take him. That the plaintiff-appellant's negligence alone was the direct cause of the accident, is so clear that it is
not necessary to cite authoritative opinions to support the conclusion that the injury to his right arm and the
subsequent amputation thereof were due entirely and exclusively to his own imprudence and not to the slightest
negligence attributable to the defendant entity or to its agents. Therefore, he alone should suffer the consequences
of his act.
5. AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC., V. CORDERO, G.R. NO. 138550, OCTOBER 14, 2005
‣ In this case, the identity of a credit card holder was made an issue to the credit card company, thus when the
cardholder used his card, the company wanted to verify his identity through a phone call, but the cardholder
refused to talk to the company’s representative. The transaction was not authorised and he sued the company for
embarrassment and humiliation
‣ Court said that the failure of the plaintiff to talk to the company was the proximate cause of his own injury. he
could have used his card upon verification by the sales clerk of the store that indeed he is the authorized
cardholder. This could have been accomplished had the plaintiff cardholder talked to the company’s
representative, enabling the latter to determine that respondent is indeed the true holder of the card. Clearly, no
negligence which breaches the contract can be attributed to the company. If at all, the cause of the plaintiff's
humiliation and embarrassment was his refusal to talk to petitioners representative.
6. BJDC CONSTRUCTION V. LANUZO, G.R. NO. 161151, MARCH 24, 2014

‣ By the time of the accident, the project, had been going on for more than a month and was already in the
completion stage. Plaintiff Balbino, who had passed there on a daily basis in going to and from his residence and
the school where he then worked as the principal, was thus very familiar with the risks at the project site. Nor
could the plaintiff’s heirs justly posit that the illumination was not adequate, for it cannot be denied that Balbino’s
motorcycle was equipped with headlights that would have enabled him at dusk or night time to see the condition
of the road ahead. That the accident still occurred surely indicated that he himself did not exercise the degree of
care expected of him as a prudent motorist.

IV. DEFENSES
7. CAGAYAN II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. V. RAPANAN, G.R. NO. 199886, DECEMBER 3, 2014
‣ There is no negligence on the part of the defendant that was allegedly the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s death
From the testimonies of defendant’’s employees and the excerpt from the police blotter, this Court can reasonably
conclude that, at the time of that fatal mishap, said wires were quietly sitting on the shoulder of the road, far
enough from the concrete portion so as not to pose any threat to passing motor vehicles and even pedestrians.
Hence, if the victims of the mishap were strangled by said wires, it can only mean that either the motorcycle
careened towards the shoulder or even more likely, since the police found the motorcycle not on the shoulder but
still on the road, that the three passengers were thrown off from the motorcycle to the shoulder of the road and
caught up with the wires. As to how that happened cannot be blamed on defendant but should be attributed to
plaintiff’s over speeding as concluded by the police after it investigated the mishap.
‣ The motorcycle was probably running too fast that it lost control and started tilting and sliding eventually which
made its foot rest cause the skid mark on the road. Therefore, the mishap already occurred even while they were
on the road and away from petitioner's electric wires and was not caused by the latter as alleged by the plaintiff. It
just so happened that after the motorcycle tilted and slid, the passengers were thrown off to the shoulder where
the electric wires were. This most likely even aggravated the situation because the motorcycle was overloaded
which made it harder to drive and control.
‣ When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover
damages.
B. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
Article 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover
damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the
defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be
awarded. (n)
MEMORIZE: ART. 2179
1. RAKES V. THE ATLANTIC, GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY, 7 PHIL. 359 (1907)
‣ Contributory Negligence NOT a bar to plaintiff recovering damages
‣ Although the defendant's' negligence may have been the primary cause of the injury complained of, yet an action
for such injury can not be maintained if the proximate and immediate cause of the injury can be traced to the want
of ordinary care and caution in the person injured; subject to this qualification, which has grown up in recent years
that the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the action if it be shown that the
defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the
injured party's negligence.
‣ Test in determining if the plaintiff’s negligence was the proximate cause of his own injury or merely contributing
‣ The test is simple. Distinction must be between the accident and the injury, between the event itself, without which
there could have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but
contributing under review was the displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it. this produced the
event giving occasion for damages — that is, the shinking of the track and the sliding of the iron rails.
‣ To this event, the act of the plaintiff in walking by the side of the car did not contribute, although it was an element
of the damage which came to himself. Had the crosspiece been out of place wholly or partly thorough his act of
omission of duty, the last would have been one of the determining causes of the event or accident, for which he
would have been responsible. Where he contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors,
he can not recover.
‣ Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the amount that
the defendant responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his
own imprudence.
2. BERNAL V. HOUSE AND TACLOBAN ELECTRIC & ICE PLANT, LTD., 54 PHIL. 327 (1930)

IV. DEFENSES
‣ Contributory Negligence NOT a bar to plaintiff recovering damages

‣ The contributory negligence of the plaintiffs, if any, does NOT operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense
could only result in reduction of the damages.
3. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION V. CASIONAN, G.R. NO. 165969, NOVEMBER 27, 2008
‣ Contributory Negligence distinguished from Negligence in General
‣ Negligence is the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.
‣ On the other hand, contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal
cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard which he is required to conform for his own
protection
‣ There is contributory negligence when the party’s act showed lack of ordinary care and foresight that such act
could cause him harm or put his life in danger.
‣ It is an act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of the person injured which, concurring
with the defendants negligence, is the proximate cause of the injury
‣ Application of Contributory Negligence

‣ The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury
should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the consequences of his own negligence.
‣ If indeed there was contributory negligence on the part of the victim, then it is proper to reduce the award for
damages.
‣ This is in consonance with the Civil Code provision that liability will be mitigated in consideration of the
contributory negligence of the injured party. Article 2179 of the Civil Code is explicit on this score: “When the
plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages.
But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the
defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to
be awarded.”
‣ In Ma-ao Sugar Central, it was held that to hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown
that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs on an impending danger
to health and body.
‣ This Court held then that the victim was not guilty of contributory negligence as there was no showing that the
caboose where he was riding was a dangerous place and that he recklessly dared to stay there despite
warnings or signs of impending danger
‣ No Contributory Negligence in this Case

‣ In this case, the trail where the plaintiff-victim Noble was electrocuted was regularly used by members of the
community. There were no warning signs to inform passersby of the impending danger to their lives should they
accidentally touch the high tension wires. Also, the trail was the only viable way from Dalicon to Itogon. Hence,
Noble should not be faulted for simply doing what was ordinary routine to other workers in the area.
‣ One of the defenses of the defendant was that Noble was negligent per se because he was engaging in pocket
mining, which is prohibited by the DENR in the area. But the Court held that such negligence was not the
proximate cause of his injury
‣ Aonuevo Case: Court ruled that the violation of a statute is not sufficient to hold that the violation was the
proximate cause of the injury, unless the very injury that happened was precisely what was intended to be
prevented by the statute
‣ The pocket miners, although they have no permit to do pocket mining in the area, are also human beings who
have to eke out a living in the only way they know how. The fact that they were not issued a permit by the
DENR to do pocket mining is no justification for NPC to simply leave their transmission lines dangling or
hanging 8 to 10 feet above the ground posing danger to the life and limb of everyone in said community.
4. LAMBERT V. HEIRS OF REY CASTILLON, 452 SCRA 285 (2005)

‣ Basis of Contributory Negligence
‣ The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury
should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the consequences of his own negligence. The
defendant must thus be held liable only for the damages actually caused by his negligence.
‣ Determination of the Amount of Mitigation in Contributory Negligence

‣ The determination of the mitigation of the defendants liability varies depending on the circumstances of each case.

IV. DEFENSES
‣ In this case, it was established that the plaintiff, at the time of the mishap: (1) was driving the motorcycle at a high
speed; (2) was tailgating the Tamaraw jeepney; (3) has imbibed one or two bottles of beer; and (4) was not wearing
a protective helmet.
‣ These circumstances, although not constituting the proximate cause of his demise and injury, contributed to
the same result. The contribution of these circumstances are all considered and determined in terms of
percentages of the total cause. Hence, pursuant to Rakes v. AG & P, the heirs of the plaintiff shall recover
damages only up to 50% of the award. In other words, 50% of the damage shall be borne by the plaintiff; the
remaining 50% shall be paid by the defendant.
5. ESTACION V. BERNARDO, G.R. NO. 144723, FEBRUARY 27, 2006

‣ Definition of Contributory Negligence
‣ Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he
has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection
‣ It has been held that "to hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an
act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warning or signs of an impending danger to health and body.

‣ In this case, the Court held that the plaintiff-victim Noe’s act of standing on the rear of the jeepney was an act of
contributory negligence. It has been established that Noe was with four or five other persons standing on the rear
carrier of the Fiera since it was already full. Respondent Noe’s act of standing on the left rear carrier portion of the
Fiera showed his lack of ordinary care and foresight that such act could cause him harm or put his life in danger.
‣ Noe’s act of hanging on the Fiera is definitely dangerous to his life and limb.
6. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS V. BRUNTY, G.R. NO. 169891, NOVEMBER 2, 2006

‣ Standard of Care of Railroad Companies
‣ It may broadly be stated that railroad companies owe to the public a duty of exercising a reasonable degree of
care to avoid injury to persons and property at railroad crossings, which duties pertain both in the operation of
trains and in the maintenance of the crossings.
‣ Moreover, every corporation constructing or operating a railway shall make and construct at all points where such
railway crosses any public road, good, sufficient, and safe crossings and erect at such points, at a sufficient
elevation from such road as to admit a free passage of vehicles of every kind, a sign with large and distinct letters
placed thereon, to give notice of the proximity of the railway, and warn persons of the necessity of looking out for
trains
‣ This Court has previously determined the liability of the PNR for damages for its failure to put a cross bar, or signal
light, flagman or switchman, or semaphores. Such failure is evidence of negligence and disregard of the safety of
the public, even if there is no law or ordinance requiring it because public safety demands that said device or
equipment be installed
‣ Definition of Contributory Negligence

has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection.
‣ To hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act that brought
about his injuries in disregard of warning or signs of an impending danger to health and body.
‣ To prove contributory negligence, it is still necessary to establish a causal link, although not proximate, between
the negligence of the party and the succeeding injury. In a legal sense, negligence is contributory only when it
contributes proximately to the injury, and not simply a condition for its occurrence.

‣ Court held that the driver of the vehicle (Mercelita) in which the plaintiff was on was negligent, BUT it didn’t apply
his negligence to mitigate the damages to be awarded to the plaintiff since the relationship of the driver and the
plaintiff was not alleged and proven.
‣ The court below found that there was a slight curve before approaching the tracks; the place was not properly
illuminated; one’s view was blocked by a cockpit arena; and Mercelita was not familiar with the road. Yet, it was
also established that Mercelita was then driving the Mercedes Benz at a speed of 70 km/hr and, in fact, had
overtaken a vehicle a few yards before reaching the railroad track. Mercelita should not have driven the car the
way he did.
‣ The record is, likewise, bereft of any allegation and proof as to the relationship between Mercelita (the driver) and
the plaintiff. Hence, the earlier finding of contributory negligence on the part of Mercelita, which generally has the
effect of mitigation of liability, does not apply.

IV. DEFENSES
C. ASSUMPTION OF RISK
AQUINO: A person who, knowing that he is exposed to a dangerous condition, voluntarily assumes the risk of such dangerous
condition may not recover from the defendant who maintained such dangerous conditions.
The defense of “assumption of risk” is, in essence, an implied waiver by the plaintiff with the ordinary risks associated with a
particular event. Waiver itself (made expressly) is also a defense which will be taken up later. Note that assumption of risk only
covers the “ordinary risks” which can be reasonably associated or imputed to an activity or to a particular course of action.
Elements of assumption of risk as a defense:
1. The plaintiff must know that the risk is present
2. He must further understand its nature; and
3. He choice to incur it is free and voluntary
1. AFIALDA V. HISOLE, 85 PHIL. 67 (1949)

‣ In this case, the injury suffered by the plaintiff was held as one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily
assumed and for which he must take the consequences.
2. ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC COMPANY V. COURT OF APPEALS, 179 SCRA 5, (1989)

‣ Assumption of Risk Defense inapplicable if the Emergency Rule applies
‣ Court held that the defense of Defendant that the Plaintiff assumed the risk of injury because of her own negligent
acts was untenable because of the Emergency Rule
‣ The maxim "volenti non fit injuria” (“to a willing person, injury is not done”) relied upon by defendant finds no
application in the case at barIt is imperative to note the surrounding circumstances which impelled the deceased
to leave the comforts of a roof and brave the subsiding typhoon. The plaintiff was on her way to the latter's grocery
store "to see to it that the goods were not flooded." As such, shall we punish her for exercising her right to protect
her property from the floods by imputing upon her the unfavorable presumption that she assumed the risk of
personal injury? Definitely not. For it has been held that a person is excused from the force of the rule, that
when he voluntarily assents to a known danger he must abide by the consequences, if an emergency is
found to exist or if the life or property of another is in peril or when he seeks to rescue his endangered
property. Clearly, an emergency was at hand as the deceased's property, a source of her livelihood, was faced
with an impending loss. Furthermore, the deceased, at the time the fatal incident occurred, was at a place where
she had a right to be without regard to petitioner's consent as she was on her way to protect her merchandise
3. TRANSPORTO V. MIJARES, 1 CAR 2S 860 (1961)

‣ Applicability of the Assumption of Risk Defense
‣ This case should, therefore, be governed by the doctrine of “volenti non fit injuria” (no wrong is done to him who
consents), that is, “that to which a person assents is not esteemed, in law, an injury,” the facts and circumstances
being such as to warrant the conclusion that the plaintiff, freely and voluntarily, with full knowledge of the nature
and extent of the risk he ran impliedly agreed to incur it.
‣ When a person, knowing and appreciating the danger and the risk, elects voluntarily to encounter them, he can no
more maintain an action founded upon the statute than he can in cases to which the statute has no application.
‣ “The principle that one who voluntarily assumed the risk of injury from a known danger is debarred from a recovery
is recognized in negligence cases. As stated, a plaintiff who by his conduct, has brought himself within the
operation of the maxim, ‘volenti non fit injuria,’ cannot recover on the basis of the defendant’s negligence. In the
words of the maxim as translated, ‘that to which a person assents is not esteemed in law was injury.’ It is said that
one who knows, appreciates, and deliberately exposes himself to a danger ‘assumes the risk’ thereof. One cannot
deliberately incur an obvious risk of personal injury, especially when preventive measures are at hand, and then
hold the author of the danger for the ensuing injury.”
D. LAST CLEAR CHANCE

The Doctrine of Last Clear Chance on the other hand, is a defense of the plaintiff, in that he can hold the defendant liable
despite his own negligence; but only as long as his negligence is not the proximate cause of his own injury and that it is
impossible to determine whose negligence is the proximate cause. Courts have used the doctrine of last clear chance to
absolve the plaintiff of liability completely, despite of his antecedent negligence, in holding the defendant to be completely
liable for the damage (without regard to the plaintiff’s negligence as seen in the Picart Case) or to mitigate the liability of the

IV. DEFENSES
defendant (with regard to plaintiff’s negligence as contributory negligence as seen in the Bank of America case). The doctrine
of last clear chance has thus, taken the complexion of the doctrine of contributory negligence, as recent cases use it as a
basis merely to mitigate the liability of the defendant, same effect as that of plaintiff being contributorily negligent.
Elements of the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance:
1. Both the plaintiff and defendant was negligent
2. Plaintiff’s negligence was not the proximate cause, it being impossible whose negligence was the proximate cause of the
damage
3. Plaintiff’s negligence was antecedent to the subsequent negligence of the defendant
4. Defendant had the opportunity to observe the circumstances and avoid the damage done to the plaintiff
1. PICART V. SMITH, 37 PHIL. 809 (1918)

‣ Applicability of the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance to absolve the plaintiff from liability even if he was negligent
‣ It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in
planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have already stated, the defendant was also negligent;
and in such case the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will be
noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant
succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that
the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with
the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.
‣ This is the case which incorporated the doctrine of last clear chance in Philippine Jurisdiction (as well as the test of
negligence)
‣ The Court applied the doctrine of last clear chance here in its purest form. The parties (plaintiff and defendant) were
both negligence, yet the Court absolved the plaintiff of liability and held the defendant liable for the entire damage,
no mitigation. The rationale is that the plaintiff’s negligence, becomes a “condition" attendant to the circumstances
to which the defendant must “respond” to. The plaintiff’s antecedent negligence does NOT bar recovery UNLESS
such negligence is the proximate cause of his injury, in which case, the doctrine of last clear chance does NOT
even apply.
2. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS CORPORATION V. VIZCARA, G.R. NO. 190022, FEBRUARY 15, 2012
‣ Contributory Negligence
has suffered, which falls below the standard which he is required to conform for his own protection.
‣ It is an act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of the person injured which, concurring with
the defendant’s negligence, is the proximate cause of the injury
‣ In this case, the Court absolved the plaintiffs of contributory negligence as they were not even aware of the
forthcoming danger. They had no reason to anticipate the impending danger.
‣ Standard of Care of Railroad Companies

‣ At this age of modern transportation, it behooves the PNR to exert serious efforts to catch up with the trend,
including the contemporary standards in railroad safety. As an institution established to alleviate public
transportation, it is the duty of the PNR to promote the safety and security of the general riding public and provide
for their convenience, which to a considerable degree may be accomplished by the installation of precautionary
warning devices.
‣ Every railroad crossing must be installed with barriers on each side of the track to block the full width of the road
until after the train runs past the crossing. To even draw closer attention, the railroad crossing may be equipped
with a device which rings a bell or turns on a signal light to signify the danger or risk of crossing. It is similarly
beneficial to mount advance warning signs at the railroad crossing, such as a reflectorized crossbuck sign to
inform motorists of the existence of the track, and a stop, look and listen signage to prompt the public to take
caution. These warning signs must be erected in a place where they will have ample lighting and unobstructed
visibility both day and night.
‣ Railroad companies owe to the public a duty of exercising a reasonable degree of care to avoid injury to persons
and property at railroad crossings, which duties pertain both to the operation of trains and to the maintenance of
the crossings. Moreover, every corporation constructing or operating a railway shall make and construct at all
points where such railway crosses any public road, good, sufficient, and safe crossings, and erect at such points,
at sufficient elevation from such road as to admit a free passage of vehicles of every kind, a sign with large and
distinct letters placed thereon, to give notice of the proximity of the railway, and warn persons of the necessity of
looking out for trains.

IV. DEFENSES
‣ The maintenance of safety equipment and warning signals at railroad crossings is equally important as their
installation since poorly maintained safety warning devices court as much danger as when none was installed at
all. The presence of safety warning signals at railroad crossing carries with it the presumption that they are in good
working condition and that the public may depend on them for assistance. If they happen to be neglected and
inoperative, the public may be misled into relying on the impression of safety they normally convey and eventually
bring injury to themselves in doing so.
‣ Definition of the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance

‣ The doctrine of last clear chance provides that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is
appreciably later in point of time than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or
negligence brought about the occurrence of the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the
impending harm but failed to do so, is chargeable with the consequences arising therefrom.
‣ Stated differently, the rule is that the antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude recovery of damages
caused by the supervening negligence of the latter, who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by
the exercise of due diligence.
‣ Inapplicability of the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance if the Plaintiff is NOT Negligent
‣ In this case the proximate cause of the collision was the defendants’ negligence in ensuring that motorists and
pedestrians alike may safely cross the railroad track. The plaintiffs did not have any participation in the occurrence
of the unfortunate incident which befell them. Likewise, they did not exhibit any overt act manifesting disregard for
their own safety. Thus, absent preceding negligence on the part of the plaintiffs, the doctrine of last clear
chance cannot be applied.
3. ACHEVARA V. RAMOS, G.R. NO. 175172, SEPTEMBER 29, 2009

‣ Application of the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance
‣ The doctrine of last clear chance applies to a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of prior or antecedent
negligence, but the defendant − who had the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so − is
made liable for all the consequences of the accident, notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff.
‣ Inapplicability of the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance in case of emergency and the defendant had no
opportunity to avoid the cause of the injury
‣ However, the doctrine does not apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and the
injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been
discovered.
‣ The doctrine of last clear chance does not apply to this case, because even if it can be said that it was Defendant
who had the last chance to avoid the mishap when the plaintiff encroached on the lane of the defendant, the latter
no longer had the opportunity to avoid the collision. Considering that the time the plaintiff encroached on the lane
of the defendant to the time of impact was only a matter of seconds, the latter no longer had the opportunity to
avoid the collision. Hence, the doctrine of last clear chance does not apply to this case.
‣ It can be said that the application of the emergency rule prevents the application of the doctrine of last clear
chance since the person has no opportunity to ascertain the best means to avoid injury. Doctrine of LCC cannot
apply in emergency situations where person is required to act instantaneously. Rules on proximate cause and
contributory negligence applies
4. BANK OF AMERICA NT & SA V. PHILIPPINE RACING CLUB, G.R. NO. 150228, JULY 30, 2009
‣ Standard of Care of Banks
‣ It is well-settled that banks are engaged in a business impressed with public interest, and it is their duty to protect
in return their many clients and depositors who transact business with them. They have the obligation to treat their
clients account meticulously and with the highest degree of care, considering the fiduciary nature of their
relationship. The diligence required of banks, therefore, is more than that of a good father of a family
‣ Applicability of the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance to hold defendant liable even if both parties were negligent
but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the other, but plaintiff is still contributorily liable
‣ Even if we assume that both parties were guilty of negligent acts that led to the loss, the defendant will still emerge
as the party foremost liable in this case. In instances where both parties are at fault, this Court has
consistently applied the doctrine of last clear chance in order to assign liability.
‣ In this case, considering the circumstances, the bank had the chance to avert the injury caused and was thus, held
principally liable, the plaintiff merely contributorily liable, even though the injury can be said to be a result also (as a
proximate cause it seems) of the plaintiff’s negligence.
‣ Notice that unlike in the Picart Case (where the court applied LCC to hold defendant liable for the entire injury), the
Court in this case held the defendant liable but mitigated his liability due to the plaintiff’s negligence. The doctrine
of last clear chance thus, has taken a complexion similar to the rule on contributory negligence.

IV. DEFENSES
‣ The court its seems has modified the definition of LCC in the Picart Case where the court said that the law is that
the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the
consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party. The court in this Bank of America
case referred to the prior negligence of the plaintiff in mitigating the liability of the defendant.
5. LAPANDAY AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION V. ANGALA, G.R. NO. 153076, JUNE 21, 2007
‣ Applicability of the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance to hold Defendant liable even if both parties were negligent,
where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused the loss
‣ Since both parties are at fault in this case, the doctrine of last clear chance applies.
‣ The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is
appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused the
loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so is chargeable with the loss. In
this case, the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the collision.
‣ Since he was driving the rear vehicle, he had full control of the situation since he was in a position to observe the
vehicle in front of him. The defendant had the responsibility of avoiding bumping the vehicle in front of him. He
could have avoided the vehicle if he was not driving very fast while following the pick-up. He was not only driving
fast, he also admitted that he did not step on the brakes even upon seeing the pick-up. He only stepped on the
brakes after the collision.
6. TIU V. ARRIESGADO, 437 SCRA 426 (2004)

‣ Inapplicability of the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance in Breach of Contract Cases
‣ The principle of last clear chance is inapplicable in the instant case, as it only applies in a suit between the
owners and drivers of two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility
from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations, for it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver
and its owner on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence.
‣ The common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who has also been
negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so.
Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law of last clear chance doctrine has to play in a
jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the
plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code
‣ But remember, it can apply even in breach of contract situation but only for purpose of assessing the extent of liability.
E. PRESCRIPTION
What if the injury or damage to the plaintiff was only discovered at a future time, it was not immediately apparent. Such as for
example, a case of HIV/AIDS? The Doctrine of Relations or the Relations Back Theory can apply. Under this doctrine, an act
done may, by fiction of law, deemed to be done at an earlier time. Note that it does not extend the prescriptive period.
The Relations Back Theory is that principle of law by which an act done at one time is considered by fiction of law to have
been done at some antecedent period. It is a doctrine which, although of equitable origin, has a well recognized application to
proceedings at law; a legal fiction invented to promote the ends of justice or prevent injustice and occurrence of injuries where
otherwise there would be no remedy.The doctrine, when invoked, must have connection with actual fact, must be based on
some antecedent lawful rights. It has also been referred to as ‘the doctrine of relation back.’” ( Allied Banking Corporation vs.
Court of Appeals (178 SCRA 526 [1989])
AQUINO: It should be noted, however, that the Supreme Court did not totally reject the doctrine of relations. The Supreme
Court did not rule that the doctrine is inapplicable in this jurisdiction. It is believed that the same may be applied under certain
exceptional circumstances. For example, the doctrine should be applied where the injury was discovered long after the
accident. The offended party should not be prejudiced in such case and the prescriptive period should commence to run only
upon discovery of the injury. It is not unusual that the effect of the negligent act is latent and may become apparent only after
quite some time. Thus, if the injury becomes apparent only after several years, the prescriptive period should commence to
run only after discovery. For example, a doctor negligently transfused blood to a patient that was contaminated with HIV. If the
effect became apparent only after five (5) years, the four (4) year prescriptive period should commence only when it was
discovered after five (5) years and not when the negligent act was committed. At the very least, the filing of an action after the
expiration of the prescriptive period should, by fiction of law, be considered as having been filed within said period.
Article 1146. The following actions must be instituted within four years:
(1) Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff;

IV. DEFENSES
(2) Upon a quasi-delict;

However, when the action arises from or out of any act, activity, or conduct of any public officer involving the exercise of
powers or authority arising from Martial Law including the arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be
brought within one (1) year. (As amended by PD No. 1755, Dec. 24, 1980.)
1. FERRER V. ERICTA, G.R. NO. L-41767, AUGUST 23, 1978

‣ Prescription NOT waived by failure to raise it in the answer or in a motion to dismiss
‣ Issue in this case is whether the defense of prescription had been deemed waived by defendant’s failure to allege
the same in their answer, in fact, they filed no answer and was declared in default.
‣ Court said that the defense of prescription, even if not raised in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, is not
deemed waived unless such defense raises issues of fact not appearing upon the preceding pleading.
‣ It is true that the defense of prescription can only be considered if the same is invoked as such in the answer of
the defendant and that in this particular instance no such defense was invoked because the defendants had been
declared in default, but such rule does not obtain when the evidence shows that the cause of action upon which
plaintiff's complaint is based is already barred by the statute of limitations.
‣ In one case, the Court sustained the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of prescription, although such
defense was not raised in the answer, overruling the appellants' invocation of Section 2 of Rule 9 of the Rules of
Court that "defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in tile answer are deemed
waived." We held therein that "... the fact that the plaintiff's own allegation in the complaint or the evidence it
presented shows clearly that the action had prescribed removes this case from the rule regarding waiver of the
defense by failure to plead the same.”
‣ Note that under Rule 9, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court: “Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on
record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the
same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the
court shall dismiss the claim”
‣ So prescription, if it appears from the pleadings (such as a complaint), or the evidence on record, is NOT
waived by the non-filing of a motion to dismiss. It even gives the court the power to dismiss the case motto
proprio
2. KRAMER V. COURT OF APPEALS, 178 SCRA 518 (1989)
‣ When the Cause of Action based on Quasi-Delict accrues
‣ Under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, an action based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within four (4) years.
The prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed
‣ In a previous case the Court ruled that, in an action for damages arising from the collision of two (2) trucks, the
action being based on a quasi-delict, the four (4) year prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the
collision.
‣ The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which consists of 3 elements, namely: a) a right in
favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; b) an obligation on the part
of defendant to respect such right; and c) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of
the plaintiff
‣ It is only when the last element occurs or takes place that it can be said in law that a cause of action has arisen
‣ The prescriptive period must be counted when the last element occurs or takes place, that is, the time of the
commission of an act or omission violative of the right of the plaintiff, which is the time when the cause of
action arises.
‣ It is therefore clear that in this action for damages arising from the collision of two (2) vessels the four (4) year
prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision. The aggrieved party need not wait for a
determination by an administrative body like a Board of Marine Inquiry, that the collision was caused by the fault or
negligence of the other party before he can file an action for damages
3. SANTOS V. PIZARDO, G.R. NO. 151452, JULY 29, 2005

‣ Actions based on Delict vs those based on Quasi-Delict
‣ In this case, a reading of the complaint reveals that the allegations therein are consistent with petitioners’ claim
that the action was brought to recover civil liability arising from crime. Although there are allegations of negligence
on the part of the defendants, such does not necessarily mean that petitioners were pursuing a cause of action

IV. DEFENSES
based on quasi delict, considering that at the time of the filing of the complaint, the cause of action ex quasi
delicto had already prescribed.
‣ Besides, in cases of negligence, the offended party has the choice between an action to enforce civil liability
arising from crime under the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi delict under the Civil Code.
‣ An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the
offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent civil
liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or
obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa
aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action
independent and distinct from the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code.
‣ Either of these liabilities may be enforced against the offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the
Civil Code that the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant and
the similar proscription against double recovery under the Rules above-quoted.
‣ At the time of the filing of the complaint for damages in this case, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had
already prescribed. Nonetheless, petitioners can pursue the remaining avenue opened for them by their
reservation, i.e., the surviving cause of action ex delicto. This is so because the prescription of the action ex
quasi delicto does not operate as a bar to an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime especially
as the latter action had been expressly reserved.
‣ The dismissal of the action based on culpa aquiliana is not a bar to the enforcement of the subsidiary liability of the
employer. Once there is a conviction for a felony, final in character, the employer becomes subsidiarily liable if the
commission of the crime was in the discharge of the duties of the employees. This is so because Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code operates with controlling force to obviate the possibility of the aggrieved party being deprived
of indemnity even after the rendition of a final judgment convicting the employee.
4. DE GUZMAN V. TOYOTA CUBAO, INC., G.R. NO. 141480, NOVEMBER 29, 2006
‣ Inapplicability of the 4-year prescriptive period under Art. 1146
‣ In this case, the action was held to have prescribed since it was not based on quasi-delict, but rather, more
specific provisions on implied warranties for hidden defects and faults under the law on sales, which has its own
prescriptive period.
‣ In actions of damages, there may also be other prescriptive periods established by law. Art. 1146 does not always
apply, such as in this case where the law on sales sets a prescriptive period of only 6 months for violation of implied
warranties against hidden faults or defects.
F. FORTUITOUS EVENT
Fortuitous Events are those events which are unforeseen or inevitable. They are generally “acts of god” meaning it is caused
independent of human will or intervention. But the better rule is to include “acts of men”(such as terrorists highjacking an
airplane)
Elements of Fortuitous Events or Force Majeure

1. The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation,
must be independent of the human will
2. It must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the 'caso fortuito', or if it can be foreseen, it must be
impossible to avoid
3. The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and
4. The obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor.
AQUINO:
Under Article 1174 of the New Civil Code, a person is not liable if the cause of damage was fortuitous; an event which could
not be foreseen, or which though foreseen, was inevitable. (Article 2181). Fortuitous event is therefore the same as what is
known in the Partidas as caso fortuito — an event which takes place by accident and could not have been foreseen. “Escriche
defines caso fortuito as an ‘unexpected event or act of God which could neither be foreseen nor resisted, such as floods,
torrents, shipwrecks, conflagrations, lightning, compulsion, insurrections, destruction of buildings by unforeseen accidents
and other occurrences of similar nature.”
The essential characteristics that resulted in the rule that the defendant will not be excused from liability if the fortuitous event
is not the sole cause of the injury. In other words, the negligence of the defendant which concurred with the fortuitous event or

IV. DEFENSES
which resulted in the aggravation of the injury of the plaintiff will make him liable even if there was a fortuitous event. When an
act of God combines or concurs with the negligence of the defendant to produce an injury, the defendant is liable if the injury
would not have resulted but for his own negligent conduct or omission. The whole occurrence is humanized and removed
from the rules applicable to acts of God.
Nevertheless, it is believed that even if the defendant is still liable, courts may equitably mitigate the damages if the loss, even
in part, would have resulted in any event because of the fortuitous event. (Article 2215[4], New Civil Code). Otherwise stated,
any aggravation of the injury due to fortuitous event should be taken into consideration in the assessment of liability of the
defendant.
Article 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the
nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not
be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable. (1105a)
MEMORIZE: ART. 1174
1. GOTESCO V. CHATTO, 210 SCRA 18 (1992)

‣ Definition of “Force Majeure” or Fortuitous Events
‣ Blackstone, in his Commentaries on English Law, defines it as —“Inevitable accident or casualty; an accident
produced by any physical cause which is irresistible; such as lightning. tempest, perils of the sea, inundation, or
earthquake; the sudden illness or death of a person.”
‣ Escriche, in his Diccionario de Legislacion y Jurisprudencia, defines fuerza mayor as follows. “The event which we
could neither foresee nor resist; as for example, the lightning stroke, hail, inundation, hurricane, public enemy,
attack by robbers; Vis major est, says Cayo, ea quae consilio humano neque provideri neque vitari potest. Accident
and mitigating circumstances.”
‣ Bouvier defines the same as —“Any accident due to natural cause, directly exclusively without human intervention,
such as could not have been prevented by any kind of oversight, pains and care reasonably to have been
expected.”
‣ Corkburn, chief justice, in a well considered English case, said that were a captain — “Uses all the known means
to which prudent and experienced captains ordinarily have recourse, he does all that can be reasonably required
of him; and if, under such circumtances, he is overpowered by storm or other natural agency, he is within the rule
which gives immunity from the effects of such vis major.”
‣ The term generally applies, broadly speaking, to natural accidents, such as those caused by lightning,
earthquake, tempests, public enemy, etc.
‣ Force Majeure must be independent of Defendant’s Negligence
‣ Even assuming for the sake of argument that, as petitioner vigorously insists, the cause of the injury was due to
force majeure, the defendant would still be liable because it was guilty of negligence, which the trial court
denominated as gross. As gleaned from Bouvier's definition of and Cockburn's elucidation on force majeure for
one to be exempt from any liability because of it, he must have exercised care, i.e., he should not have been
guilty of negligence.
2. SERVANDO V. PHILIPPINE STEAM NAVIGATION CO., 117 SCRA 832 (1982)

‣ Definition of “Force Majeure” or Fortuitous Events; Elements of Fortuitous Events
‣ The Partidas, the antecedent of Article 1174 of the Civil Code, defines 'caso fortuito' as 'an event that takes place
by accident and could not have been foreseen. Examples of this are destruction of houses, unexpected fire,
shipwreck, violence of robbers
‣ In its dissertation of the phrase 'caso fortuito' the Enciclopedia Juridicada Espanola says: "In a legal sense and,
consequently, also in relation to contracts, a 'caso fortuito' presents the following essential characteristics:
1. The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply with his
obligation, must be independent of the human will
2. It must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the 'caso fortuito', or if it can be foreseen, it must
be impossible to avoid
3. The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal
manner; and
4. The obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor."

IV. DEFENSES
‣ Applicability of “Force Majeure” or Fortuitous Events

‣ Where fortuitous event or force majeure is the immediate and proximate cause of the loss, the obligor is exempt
from liability for non-performance.
3. EDGAR COKALIONG SHIPPING LINES V. UCPB GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, G.R. NO. 146018, JUNE 25, 2003
‣ Definition of “Force Majeure” or Fortuitous Events
‣ Broadly speaking, force majeure generally applies to a natural accident, such as that caused by a lightning, an
earthquake, a tempest or a public enemy
‣ It arises almost invariably from some act of man or by human means. It does not fall within the category of an act
of God unless caused by lighting or by other natural disaster or calamity. It may even be caused by the actual fault
or privity of the carrier.
‣ Inapplicability of “Force Majeure” or Fortuitous Events in case of Negligence

‣ Where loss of cargo results from the failure of the officers of a vessel to inspect their ship frequently so as to
discover the existence of cracked parts, that loss cannot be attributed to force majeure, but to the negligence of
those officials
G. WAIVER
AQUINO: The “express consent perspective” contemplates the most basic sense of the doctrine. Under this perspective, there
is assumption of risk if the plaintiff, in advance, has expressly waived his right to recover damages for the negligent act of the
defendant. He has given his express consent to relieve the defendant of an obligation of conduct toward him, and to take his
chances of injury from a known risk arising from what the defendant is to do or leave undone. For instance, if the plaintiff was
warned that it is still dangerous to take the vehicle from the repair shop because the repairs are still untested, there would be
an express assumption of risk if he nevertheless took the vehicle from the shop with the express waiver of liability in favor of
the proprietor. It should be noted, that the waiver contemplated here is the waiver of the right to recover before the negligent
act was committed. It cannot be stipulated in the contract that one of the parties therein is barred from claiming damages
based on negligence. If the waiver was made after the cause of action accrued, the waiver is valid and may be construed as
condonation of the obligation.
Article 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs,
or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. (4a)
Article 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in
any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages. (1101)
Article 1171. Responsibility arising from fraud is demandable in all obligations. Any waiver of an action for future fraud is
void. (1102a)
Article 1172. Responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of every kind of obligation is also demandable,
but such liability may be regulated by the courts, according to the circumstances
Article 1173. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
Article 2201. In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor (in a contract or quasi contract) shall be
responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation.
1. GATCHALIAN V. DELIM, 203 SCRA 126 (1991)

‣ Validity of Waiver of Rights; How should waivers be made
‣ A waiver, to be valid and effective, must in the first place be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave
no doubt as to the intention of a person to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him.
‣ A waiver may not casually be attributed to a person when the terms thereof do not explicitly and clearly evidence
an intent to abandon a right vested in such person.

IV. DEFENSES
‣ If what is involved is the liability of a common carrier for injuries sustained by passengers in respect of whose
safety a common carrier must exercise extraordinary diligence, we must construe any such purported waiver most
strictly against the common carrier.
‣ For a waiver to be valid and effective, it must not be contrary to law, morals, public policy or good customs
(Art. 6)
‣ Note that the waiver may be invalid for vitiation of consent

2. SABENA BELGIAN WORLD AIRLINES V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 104685, MARCH 14, 1996
‣ Liability for Gross Negligence cannot be waived
‣ The attendance of gross negligence (given the equivalent of fraud or bad faith) holds the common carrier liable for
all damages which can be reasonably attributed, although unforeseen, to the non-performance of the obligation
‣ The Warsaw Convention General Conditions of Carriers (which limits the liability of international air carriers in
relation to luggage loss) is deemed a limit of liability only in those cases where the cause of the death or injury to
person, or destruction, loss or damage to property or delay in its transport is not attributable to or attended by
any wilful misconduct, bad faith, recklessness, or otherwise improper conduct on the part of any official or
employee for which the carrier is responsible, and there is otherwise no special or extraordinary form of resulting
injury. The Convention's provisions, in short, do not regulate or exclude liability for other breaches of contract by
the carrier or misconduct of its officers and employees, or for some particular or exceptional type of damage.
Otherwise, an air carrier would be exempt from any liability for damages in the event of its absolute refusal, in bad
faith, to comply with a contract of carriage, which is absurd
‣ While liability for future ordinary negligence may be waived (as in the next case of Valenzuela), liability for gross
negligence (negligence with bad faith, see Art. 1173) cannot be waived. This is because gross negligence amounts
to fraud and bad faith which cannot be waived under Art. 1171.
3. VALENZUELA HARDWOOD AND INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY, INC. V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 102316, JUNE 30, 1997
‣ Liability for (ordinary) Negligence can be waived
‣ This case pertains to the validity of a stipulation waiving liability for negligence of obligor’s employees arising from
loss or deterioration of cargo in the case of contract of private carriage
‣ In a contract of private carriage, the parties may validly stipulate that responsibility for the cargo rests solely on the
charterer, exempting the shipowner from liability for loss of or damage to the cargo caused even by the negligence
of the ship captain. Pursuant to Article 1306 of the Civil Code, such stipulation is valid because it is freely entered
into by the parties and the same is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.
Indeed, their contract of private carriage is not even a contract of adhesion.
‣ We stress that in a contract of private carriage, the parties may freely stipulate their duties and obligations which
perforce would be binding on them. Unlike in a contract involving a common carrier, private carriage does not
involve the general public.
‣ Hence, the stringent provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers protecting the general public cannot
justifiably be applied to a ship transporting commercial goods as a private carrier. Consequently, the public policy
embodied therein is not contravened by stipulations in a charter party that lessen or remove the protection given
by law in contracts involving common carriers
‣ As a private carrier, a stipulation exempting the owner from liability for the negligence of its agent is not
against public policy, and is deemed valid.
‣ Article 6 of the Civil Code provides that "rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order,
public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a person with a right recognized by law." As a general rule,
patrimonial rights may be waived as opposed to rights to personality and family rights which may not be made the
subject of waiver.
H. EMERGENCY
Hindsight is always 20:20, looking back, it’s always easy to see the best course of action given a particular circumstance. The
emergency rule defense is based on the fact that it cannot be reasonably expected that a person should act with a cooled in
case of imminent danger, unless, of course, the danger is caused by his own negligence.
AQUINO: “Who can be wise, temperate and furious, loyal and neutral, in a moment? No man.” (McBeth, Act I, Scene III).
McBeth may not have been answering a legal question when he uttered that line, but the line certainly describes the basis of
what is known in tort law as the “Emergency Rule.” With respect to the circumstance of time, jurisprudence likewise requires
courts to consider the presence of an emergency.

IV. DEFENSES
1. GAN V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-44264, SEPTEMBER 19, 1988

‣ Definition of the Emergency Rule
‣ Under that rule, one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to
consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails
to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency
in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence.
‣ Applicability of the Emergency Rule

‣ In this case, defendant was excused and was held as not negligent in light of the emergency rule. The defendant
certainly could not be expected to act with all the coolness of a person under normal conditions. The danger
confronting petitioner was real and imminent, threatening her very existence. She had no opportunity for rational
thinking but only enough time to heed the very powerful instinct of self-preservation
2. MCKEE V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, 211 SCRA 517 (1992)

‣ Under that rule, one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to
to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency
in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence.

‣ In this case, considering the circumstances, Court found that the plaintiff adopted the best means possible in the
given situation to avoid hitting them. Applying the above test, therefore, it is clear that he was not guilty of
negligence
‣ Court used the emergency rule as the basis of the plaintiff’s due diligence and not being negligent
3. VALENZUELA V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NOS. 115024 & 117944, FEBRUARY 7, 1996
‣ Under the "emergency rule" adopted by this Court in Gan vs. Court of Appeals, an individual who suddenly finds
himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be
adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and
upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence

‣ Courts have traditionally been compelled to recognize that an actor who is confronted with an emergency is not to
be held up to the standard of conduct normally applied to an individual who is in no such situation. The law takes
stock of impulses of humanity when placed in threatening or dangerous situations and does not require the same
standard of thoughtful and reflective care from persons confronted by unusual and oftentimes threatening
conditions.
‣ While the emergency rule applies to those cases in which reflective thought, or the opportunity to adequately
weigh a threatening situation is absent, the conduct which is required of an individual in such cases is dictated not
exclusively by the suddenness of the event which absolutely negates thoroughful care, but by the over-all nature of
the circumstances
‣ In this case, Court used the emergency rule as the basis in finding that the plaintiff was NOT contributorily
negligent
4. DELSAN TRANSPORT LINES, INC., V. C&A CONSTRUCTION, INC., G.R. NO. 156034, OCTOBER 1, 2003
‣ Under this rule, one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to
to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the danger in
which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence
‣ Inapplicability of the Emergency Rule

‣ Clearly, the emergency rule is not applicable to the instant case because the danger where the defendant found
himself was caused by his own negligence.
5. ORIX METRO LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION V. MANGALINAO, G.R. NOS. 174089 & 174266, JANUARY 25, 2012
‣ Inapplicability of the Emergency Rule
‣ In this case, Court refused to apply the emergency rule because the danger was caused by the negligence of the
defendant himself

IV. DEFENSES
I. DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA

AQUINO: Almost all conduct may, under certain circumstances, be considered tortious. In all theses cases, the presence of
damage caused to the defendant is required. It does not mean however that a person is always liable in each and every case
that there is damage. In some cases, there is no liability even if there is damage because there was no injury — Damnum
Absque Injuria. Where the case is one of damnum absque injuria, the conjunction of damages and wrong is absent there can
be no actionable wrong if either one or the other is wanting. Thus, if the damage resulted because a person exercised his legal
rights (like the filing of a Complaint in good faith) it is damnum absque injuria. Related to such rule is the maxim qui jure suo
utitur nullum damnum facit — one who exercises a right does no injury. This maxim is often applied to cases where the Court
rejects claims for damages of the winning defendant in a case. The Court often reiterates the rule that the adverse result of an
action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to payment of damages
The principle of Damnum Absque Injuria is based on “GOOD FAITH”. Relate it with the abuse of rights doctrine (Art. 19-21).
When the right is exercised with abuse or bad faith, then defense of damnum absque injuria cannot be availed of. This is
because when rights are exercised in bad faith, then the right ceases or disappears.
Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter
for the same.
Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
1. FAROLAN V. SOLMAC MARKETING CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 83589, MARCH 13, 1991
‣ Good Faith Defined
‣ Good faith is always presumed and it is upon him who alleges the contrary that the burden of proof lies.
‣ It is the state of the mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the honest
intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another. It is the opposite of
fraud, and its absence should be established by convincing evidence
‣ Principle of Damnum Absque Injuria applied in relation to the Performance of Official Functions of Public
Officers
‣ It is the duty of the Court to see to it that public officers are not hampered in the performance of their duties or in
making decisions for fear of personal liability for damages due to honest mistake.
1âwphi1
‣ Whatever damage they may have caused as a result of such an erroneous interpretation, if any at all, is in the
nature of a damnum absque injuria. Mistakes concededly committed by public officers are not actionable
absent any clear showing that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith.
After all, "even under the law of public officers, the acts of the petitioners are protected by the presumption of
good faith.
2. BPI EXPRESS CARD CORPORATION V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 120639, SEPTEMBER 25, 1998
‣ Principle of Damnum Absque Injuria applied when there is no legal injury and no breach of duty.
‣ There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is
the loss, hurt or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded
for the damage suffered.
‣ Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the results
of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone, the
law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. These
situations are often called damnum absque injuria
‣ In other words, in order that the plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complaints, he must
establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff a concurrence
of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it.

IV. DEFENSES
‣ The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation
of law. Thus, there must first be a breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before
damages may be awarded; and the breach of such duty should be the proximate cause of the injury
3. CUSTODIO V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 116100, FEBRUARY 9, 1996

‣ Principle of Damnum Absque Injuria applied when there is no legal injury and no breach of duty.
‣ In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such
injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff a concurrence of injury to
the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it.
‣ The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation
of law. Thus, there must first be the breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before
damages may be awarded; it is not sufficient to state that there should be tort liability merely because the plaintiff
suffered some pain and suffering.
‣ Many accidents occur and many injuries are inflicted by acts or omissions which cause damage or loss to another
but which violate no legal duty to such other person, and consequently create no cause of action in his favor. In
such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone. The law affords no remedy for
damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong
‣ In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, that act must be not only hurtful,
but wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria. If, as may happen in many cases, a person sustains actual
damage, that is, harm or loss to his person or property, without sustaining any legal injury, that is, an act or
omission which the law does not deem an injury, the damage is regarded as damnum absque injuria
4. AMONOY V. GUTIERREZ, G.R. NO. 140420, FEBRUARY 15, 2001

‣ Inapplicability of the principle of damnum absque injuria when the right exercised ceases
‣ In this case, a writ of demolition had already been issued by the trial court and was already being executed,
however, the appellate court granted a TRO to enjoin the demolition. The petitioner still continued with the
demolition. Being sought liable for damages, he invoked the defense of the principle of damnum absque injuria. He
invokes this legal precept in arguing that he is not liable for the demolition of respondents house. He maintains that
he was merely acting in accordance with the Writ of Demolition ordered by the RTC.
‣ Court said that the principle finds no application in this case.
‣ Well-settled is the maxim that damage resulting from the legitimate exercise of a persons rights is a loss without
injury -- damnum absque injuria, for which the law gives no remedy. In other words, one who merely exercises
ones rights does no actionable injury and cannot be held liable for damages.
‣ The petitioner should have stopped the demolition upon receipt of the TRO. Although the acts of petitioner may
have been legally justified at the outset, their continuation after the issuance of the TRO amounted to an insidious
abuse of his right. Indubitably, his actions were tainted with bad faith. Had he not insisted on completing the
demolition, respondents would not have suffered the loss that engendered the suit before the RTC. Verily, his acts
constituted not only an abuse of a right, but an invalid exercise of a right that had been suspended when he
received the TRO. By then, he was no longer entitled to proceed with the demolition.
‣ The exercise of a right ends when the right disappears, and it disappears when it is abused, especially to
the prejudice of others. The mask of a right without the spirit of justice which gives it life, is repugnant to the
modern concept of social law. It cannot be said that a person exercises a right when he unnecessarily prejudices
another. Over and above the specific precepts of positive law are the supreme norms of justice; and he who
violates them violates the law. For this reason, it is not permissible to abuse our rights to prejudice others
‣ Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain
standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of ones rights but also in the performance of ones
duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and
good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights: that in their exercise, the norms of
human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or
granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a
manner which does not conform with norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal
wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible
5. DOLE PHILIPPINES, INC., V. RODRIGUEZ, G.R. NO. 174646, AUGUST 22, 2012
‣ Inapplicability of the principle of damnum absque injuria when the right exercised is abused
‣ The Court also found that the principle of damnum absque injuria to be inapplicable in this case, because while the
petitioner was only exercising a right (which arose from the contract between the parties), he abused such right to
the prejudice of the respondent.

IV. DEFENSES
‣ Under the principle of damnum absque injuria, the legitimate exercise of a person’s rights, even if it causes loss to
another, does not automatically result in an actionable injury. The law does not prescribe a remedy for the loss.
‣ This principle, however, does not apply when there is an abuse of a person’s right as in this case. While the
right to remove the improvements on the subject plantation is recognized (by the contract). The petitioner
exercised such right arbitrarily, unjustly, and excessively resulting in damage to respondent’s plantation. The
exercise of a right, though legal by itself, must nonetheless be in accordance with the proper norm. When the
right is exercised arbitrarily, unjustly, or excessively and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is
committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.
‣ The exercise of a right ends when the right disappears, and it disappears when it is abused, especially to the
prejudice of others. The mask of a right without the spirit of justice which gives it life is repugnant to the modern
concept of social law. It cannot be said that a person exercises a right when he unnecessarily prejudices another
or offends morals or good customs. Over and above the specific precepts of positive law are the supreme norms
of justice which the law develops and which are expressed in three principles: honeste vivere, alterum non laedere,
and jus sum quique tribuere; and he who violates them violates the law. For this reason it is not permissible to
abuse our rights to prejudice others.
‣ The three latin terms are the three justinian precepts to which Justinian reduced the whole doctrine of the law
‣ Honeste vivere, to live honorably, creditably, or virtuously; alterum non laedere, not to injure others; jus
sum quique tribuere, to render to every man his due
‣ In the sphere of our law on human relations, the victim of a wrongful act of omission, whether done wilfully or
negligently, is not left without any remedy or recourse to obtain relief for the damage or injury he sustained.
Incorporated into our civil law are not only principles of equity but also universal moral precepts which are
designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience and which are meant to serve
as guides for human conduct.
‣ Abuse of Right under Art. 19 of the New Civil Code provides: “Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and
in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.”
‣ The above provision sets the standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also
in the performance of one’s duties.
‣ When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Art. 19 and results
in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.
‣ One is not allowed to exercise his right in a manner which would cause unnecessary prejudice to another or if
he would thereby offender morals or good customs.
‣ Thus, a person should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is when he
acts in prudence and good faith, but not when he acts with negligence or abuse.
‣ The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established, and must not be
excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to injure another.
‣ The responsibility arising from abuse of right has a mixed character because it implies a reconciliation between
an act, which is the result of an individual juridical will, and the social function of right. The exercise of a right,
which is recognized by some specific provision of law. may nevertheless be contrary to law in the general and
more abstract sense. The theory is simply a step in the process of tempering law with equity.
‣ While Art. 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of social
order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Complementing the principle of abuse of rights are the
provisions of Art. 20 and 21 of the Civil Code.
‣ Art. 20 and 21 provide the legal bedrock for the award of damages to a party who suffers damage whenever
one commits an act in violation of some legal provision, or an act which though not constituting a transgression
of positive law, nevertheless violates certain rudimentary rights of the party aggrieved.
‣ Art. 20 pertains to damages arising from a violation of law. Art. 21 refers to acts contra bonus mores (contrary
to morals). The act is within the article only when it is done wilfully. The act is wilful only if it is done with
knowledge of its injurious effect; it is not required that the act be done purposely to produce injury

V. VICARIOUS LIABILITY
AQUINO:
‣ There is vicarious liability where a person is not only liable for torts committed by himself, but also for torts committed by
others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is responsible.
‣ The doctrine is also called the doctrine of “imputed negligence” in Anglo- American tort law. In Anglo-American law,
vicarious liability consists mainly of the liability of the employer for the tort conduct of the employee committed in the
performance of the latter’s assigned task. The applicable doctrine is respondeat superior. Under the said doctrine, the
liability is strictly imputed, that is, the employer is liable not because of his act or omission but because of the act or
omission of the employee. What is material is not whether the employer exercised due care but the conduct of the
employee. Consequently, the employer cannot escape liability by claiming that he exercised due diligence in the selection
or supervision of the employee.
‣ In the Philippines, vicarious liability is generally not governed by the doctrine of respondeat superior. The employers or the
parents are being made liable not only because of the negligent or wrongful act of the person for whom they are
responsible but also because of their own negligence. Liability is imposed on the employer because he failed to exercise
due diligence in the selection and supervision of his employee while parents are made liable because they failed to
exercise diligence in the supervision of their child who lives in their company. Nevertheless, the liability is still vicarious or
imputed because there is no direct link between their act or omission and the injury. The employers or the parents, no
matter how negligent in supervising their employee or child, would not be liable were it not for the act or omission of the
said employee or child. The operative act or omission is still the act or omission of the employee or child and the
negligence or wrongful conduct is imputed to the person responsible for them.
‣ The exceptional cases when the doctrine of Respondeat Superior is applicable include the liability of employers under
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The liability of the employer under the said statute is not determined by the
exercise of diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee. In other words, he is being held liable for the
negligence of another irrespective of his exercise of due care.
‣ There is also an opinion to the effect that respondeat superior is present with respect to the liability of the partnership for
the tort committed by the partner. (Arts. 1182 and 1183)
A. PARENTS AND GUARDIANS
those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor
children who live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in
their company. XXXXXXXXX
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and
students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
Article 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he
has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim. (1904)
Article 2182. If the minor or insane person causing damage has no parents or guardian, the minor or insane person shall
be answerable with his own property in an action against him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed. (n)
FAMILY CODE
Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. In
case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.

Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court.
The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age,
unless the parent chosen is unfit. (n)
Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the
surviving grandparent. In case several survive, the one designated by the court, taking into account the same
consideration mentioned in the preceding article, shall exercise the authority. (355a)
Art. 216. In default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the following person shall exercise substitute parental
authority over the child in the order indicated:
(1) The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art. 214;
(2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified; and
(3) The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified.
Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child are shall have
special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school,
entity or institution. (349a)
Art. 219. Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable
for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons
exercising substitute parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable.
The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised
the proper diligence required under the particular circumstances.
All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on
quasi-delicts. (n)
Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages
caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental
authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law. (2180(2)a and (4)a)
Art. 236. Emancipation shall terminate parental authority over the person and property of the child who shall then be
qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life, save the exceptions established by existing laws in special cases.
Contracting marriage shall require parental consent until the age of twenty-one.
Nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate from the duty or responsibility of parents and guardians for children
and wards below twenty-one years of age mentioned in the second and third paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
Art. 234. Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority. Unless otherwise provided, majority commences at the
age of eighteen years. (as amended by RA 6809 passed in 1989)
REVISED PENAL CODE

Art. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. — The exemption from criminal liability established in subdivisions
1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of Article 12 and in subdivision 4 of Article 11 of this Code does not include exemption from civil liability,
which shall be enforced subject to the following rules:
First. In cases of subdivisions 1, 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil liability for acts committed by an imbecile or insane
person, and by a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted
without discernment, shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal authority or control, unless it appears
that there was no fault or negligence on their part.
Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his authority, legal guardianship or control, or if
such person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own property, excepting property
exempt from execution, in accordance with the civil law.

Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of Article 11, the persons for whose benefit the harm has been prevented
shall be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they may have received.
The courts shall determine, in sound discretion, the proportionate amount for which each one shall be liable.
When the respective shares cannot be equitably determined, even approximately, or when the liability also attaches to the
Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and, in all events, whenever the damages have been
caused with the consent of the authorities or their agents, indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed by
special laws or regulations.
Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of Article 12, the persons using violence or causing the fears shall be
primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be no such persons, those doing the act shall be liable, saving always to the
latter that part of their property exempt from execution.
Art. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of establishments. — In default of the
persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other persons or corporations shall be civilly liable for
crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or
special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within their houses from
guests lodging therein, or for the payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in advance
the innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore
have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them with respect to the care
and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons
unless committed by the innkeeper’s employees.
Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. — The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall
also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by
their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.
MEMORIZE- ART. 2180, 2181, 2182
RULES ON VICARIOUSLY LIABILITY FOR CHILDREN IN NCC AND FC
NEW CIVIL CODE FAMILY CODE
Tortfeasor Persons below 21 years of age living in the

company of their parents or guardians (Art.
2180)
Unemancipated minors or persons below 18 years of age
*Note that in light of the Family Code this
provision still applies but it should be limited to
persons above 18 but below 21 years of age
(Last paragraph of Art. 219 of FC)
Persons 1. The father and, in case of his death or 1. Both parents who are exercising parental authority jointly (Art.
Vicariously incapacity, the mother, are responsible for 211)
Liable the damages caused by the minor children 2. Persons exercising substitute parental authority:
who live in their company. (Art. 2180[2]) a. Parents (Art. 219)
2. Guardians are liable for damages caused b. Judicially approved guardians (Art. 219)
by the minors or incapacitated persons who c. Grandparents (Art. 216)
are under their authority and live in their d. Siblings (Art. 216)
company. (Art. 2180[3]) e. Actual custodian (Art. 216)
3. Teachers or heads of establishments of 3. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual,
arts and trades for pupils and students or entity or institution engaged in child who have special parental
apprentices (Art. 2180[7]) authority over the minor child while under their supervision,
instruction or custody (Art. 218)
If a child commits a tort, who can be held vicariously liable?

1. Child below 18 years of age
‣ Family Code governs

‣ Generally, the parents exercising joint parental authority or the parent exercising sole parental authority is primarily and
solidarily liable
‣ Others:
a. Persons exercising substitute parental authority are primarily and solidarily liable (Art. 216, 219 of FC)
b. Persons exercising special parental authority are primarily and solidarily liable, parents exercising substitute
parental authority merely subsidiarily liable (Art. 218, 219 of FC)
2. Child above 18 but below 21 years of age
‣ Civil Code governs
‣ Generally, only the parents (the father first, and in case of his death or incapacity the mother), can be held vicariously
liable
‣ Others:
a. The guardians
b. Teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades for pupils and students or apprentices
AQUINO: (On liability of parents under the civil code, the family code, and even the penal code; also the defences available to
them)
‣ It should be emphasized that paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 2180 of the Civil Code were NOT rendered ineffective by the
Family Code. The provisions remain effective subject to the modifications resulting from the operation of the provisions of
the Family Code. Thus, the provisions with respect to parents in the second paragraph of Article 2180 is modified by
Article 221 of the Family Code by removing the alternative qualification of the liability of the father and the mother. (Libi vs.
IAC). The liability of teachers and heads of institutions under Article 2180 are likewise modified by making the school itself
liable. The liability extends to acts committed even outside the school so long as it is an official activity of the school.
(Valenzuela vs. CA). Also, note that the he Revised Penal Code likewise contains provisions providing for vicarious civil
liability arising from delict. See Articles 101, 102 and 103.
‣ Liability based on parental authority is not limited to parents; the same is also imposed on those exercising substitute
parental authority and special parental authority. In other words, parents and other persons exercising parental authority
shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in
their company and under their parental authority. (Article 221, Family Code). Other persons exercising parental authority
include the adopter and a court-appointed guardian.
‣ Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the obligation of the parents are alternative — the father shall be primarily liable and
the mother shall be liable in his absence. However, under the Family Code, this civil liability is now, without such
alternative qualification. (Libi vs. IAC). In other words, both parents are primarily liable for the damages caused by their
child. It should be emphasized that the liability is primary and not subsidiary.
‣ Logically, the liability of the parents should cease upon emancipation. This is not the case, however, because the last
paragraph of Article 236 of the Family Code as amended by RA 6809 provides that nothing in said Code “shall be
construed to derogate from the duty or responsibility of parents and guardians for children and wards below twenty-one
years of age mentioned in the second and third paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code.” Thus, the parents or
guardians can be still be held liable even if the minor is already emancipated provided that he is below twenty-one years of
age.
‣ The first paragraph of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code imposes liability on parents and other persons exercising
legal authority over minors. Under the said provision, parents are primarily liable for the civil liability arising from criminal
offense committed by their minor children under their legal authority or control or who live in their company. As stated in
Article 101, the liability arises with respect to damages ex delicto caused by their children nine (9) years of age or under, or
over nine (9) but under fifteen (15) years of age who acted without discernment. (Libi vs. IAC). Article 101 does not cover
cases involving minors over nine who acted with discernment. However, prevailing jurisprudence is to the effect that
parents and other persons exercising parental authority are also liable for the acts of their children over nine (9) but under
fifteen (15) years of age who acted with discernment pursuant to Article 2180. The same persons who are exercising legal
authority are likewise primarily liable for acts of their children who are fifteen (15) years or over but under twenty-one (21)
years of age. Such liability shall be imposed pursuant to Article 2180.
‣ Parents and other persons exercising parental authority can escape liability by proving that they observed all the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (Article 2180, Civil Code). The defense is retained under Article 221 of the
Family Code because it provides that the liability is “subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.” The rule is
likewise applicable to the liability of the parents for damages ex delicto caused by their children because Article 101 of the
Revised Penal Code expressly provides that parents are liable “unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence on
their part.”

‣ The Congress seems to have used the “deep pocket” policy of imposing vicarious liability on parents of persons who are
above eighteen (18) and below twenty-one (21). The parents are still being made liable because they are the persons who
are financially capable of satisfying any judgment obligation. It should be noted that such policy is not novel and is
considered by some as the basis of responsibility of employer in American Law.
1. EXCONDE V. CAPUNO, 101 PHIL. 843 (1957)

‣ Vicarious Liability of Parents
‣ The civil liability which the law impose upon the father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any
damages that may be caused by the minor children who live with them, is obvious. This is necessary consequence
of the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the "duty of supporting them,
keeping them in their company, educating them and instructing them in proportion to their means", while, on the
other hand, gives them the "right to correct and punish them in moderation" (Articles 154 and 155, Spanish Civil
Code).
‣ The only way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage(Article 1903, last paragraph, Spanish Civil Code)
2. TAMARGO V. COURT OF APPEALS, 209 SCRA 518 (1992)

‣ The law imposes civil liability upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages
that may be caused by a minor child who lives with them
‣ Article 2180 of the Civil Code reads:
‣ The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom one is responsible.
‣ The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the
minor children who live in their company.
‣ The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the person herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
‣ This principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently designated as vicarious liability, or the
doctrine of "imputed negligence" under Anglo-American tort law, where a person is not only liable for torts
committed by himself, but also for torts committed by others with whom he has a certain relationship and
for whom he is responsible. Thus, parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the duties
and responsibilities of parents — their parental authority — which includes the instructing, controlling and
disciplining of the child.
‣ The basis for the doctrine of vicarious liability was explained by the Court in Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co. in the
following terms:
‣ With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from negligence, whether of act or omission, it is
competent for the legislature to elect — and our Legislature has so elected — to limit such liability to cases in
which the person upon whom such an obligation is imposed is morally culpable or, on the contrary, for reasons
of public policy. to extend that liability, without regard to the lack of moral culpability, so as to include
responsibility for the negligence of those persons whose acts or omissions are imputable, by a legal fiction, to
others who are in a position to exercise an absolute or limited control over them.
‣ The legislature which adopted our Civil Code has elected to limit extra-contractual liability — with certain well-
defined exceptions — to cases in which moral culpability can be directly imputed to the persons to be charged.
This moral responsibility may consist in having failed to exercise due care in one's own acts, or in having failed
to exercise due care in the selection and control of one's agent or servants, or in the control of persons who, by
reasons of their status, occupy a position of dependency with respect to the person made liable for their
conduct
‣ The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor children living with them, may be seen to be
based upon the parental authority vested by the Civil Code upon such parents. The civil law assumes that when an
unemancipated child living with its parents commits a tortious acts, the parents were negligent in the performance
of their legal and natural duty closely to supervise the child who is in their custody and control. Parental liability is,
in other words, anchored upon parental authority coupled with presumed parental dereliction in the discharge of
the duties accompanying such authority. The parental dereliction is, of course, only presumed and the
presumption can be overtuned under Article 2180 of the Civil Code by proof that the parents had exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.
‣ “Supervision” and “Control” as essential elements of Parental Liability for Torts of a Minor

‣ Under the Civil Code, the basis of parental liability for the torts of a minor child is the relationship existing between
the parents and the minor child living with them and over whom, the law presumes, the parents exercise
supervision and control.
‣ Article 58 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, re-enacted this rule: Article 58 Torts — Parents and guardians are
responsible for the damage caused by the child under their parental authority in accordance with the civil Code.
‣ Article 221 of the Family Code of the Philippines has similarly insisted upon the requisite that the child, doer of the
tortious act, shall have beer in the actual custody of the parents sought to be held liable for the ensuing damage:
”Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages
caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental
authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.”
‣ Parental Authority does NOT retroactively transfer to adoptive parents as to make them liable for torts of
minors, committed prior to a decree of adoption
‣ We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as having been retroactively transferred to and
vested in the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle shooting happened.
‣ We do not consider that retroactive effect may be giver to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon
the adopting parents accruing at a time when adopting parents had no actual or physically custody over the
adopted child.
‣ Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential to
permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child.
‣ In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses
so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they could not
have prevented (since they were at the time in the United States and had no physical custody over the child
Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable.
‣ Such a result, moreover, would be inconsistent with the philosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine of
vicarious liability. Put a little differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the adopting parents,
the Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort
was committed.
3. LIBI V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, 214 SCRA 16 (1992)

‣ Vicarious Liability of Parents for Quasi-Delicts committed by their Children
‣ The civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of their minor children, as contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, is primary and not subsidiary.
‣ In fact, if we apply Article 2194 of said code which provides for solidary liability of joint tortfeasors, the persons
responsible for the act or omission, in this case the minor and the father and, in case of his death of incapacity, the
mother, are solidarily liable.
‣ Accordingly, such parental liability is primary and not subsidiary, hence the last paragraph of Article 2180 provides
that ”the responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages.”
‣ Primary Liability of Parents for Delicts Committed by their Children

‣ The liability of the parents for felonies committed by their minor children is likewise primary, not subsidiary.
‣ Accordingly, just like the rule in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, under the Art. 101 of the RPC the civil liability of the
parents for crimes committed by their minor children is likewise direct and primary, and also subject to the
defense of lack of fault or negligence on their part, that is, the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a
family.
‣ That in both quasi-delicts and crimes the parents primarily respond for such damages is buttressed by the
corresponding provisions in both codes that the minor transgressor shall be answerable or shall respond with
his own property only in the absence or in case of insolvency of the former.
‣ Thus, for civil liability ex quasi delicto of minors, Article 2182 of the Civil Code states that" if the minor causing
damage has no parents or guardian, the minor . . . shall be answerable with his own property in an action against
him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed."
‣ For civil liability ex delicto of minors, an equivalent provision is found in the third paragraph of Article 101 of the
Revised Penal Code, to wit: ”Should there be no person having such . . . minor under his authority, legal
guardianship or control, or if such person be insolvent, said . . . minor shall respond with his own property,
excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance with civil law.”
‣ On the issue of the civil liability of parents for crimes committed by their minor children over 9 but under 15 years
of age, who acted with discernment, and also of minors 15 years of aye or over, since these situations are not

covered by Article 101, Revised Penal Code. In both instances, this Court held that the issue of parental civil
liability should be resolved in accordance with the provisions of Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
‣ To hold that the civil liability under Article 2180 would apply only to quasi-delicts and not to criminal offenses
would result in the absurdity that in an act involving mere negligence the parents would be liable but not where the
damage is caused with criminal intent.
‣ The parents are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability arising from criminal offenses committed by
their minor children under their legal authority or control, or who live in their company, unless it is proven that the
former acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent such damages. That primary liability is
premised on the provisions of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code with respect to damages ex delicto caused
by their children 9 years of age or under, or over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted without discernment; and,
with regard to their children over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted with discernment, or 15 years or over but
under 21 years of age, such primary liability shall be imposed pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code
‣ Under the Family Code, this civil liability is now, without such alternative qualification, the responsibility of the
parents and those who exercise parental authority over the minor offender. For civil liability arising from quasi-
delicts committed by minors, the same rules shall apply in accordance with Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil
Code, as so modified.
‣ Standard of Diligence of Parents

‣ The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent and child relationship consists, to a large
extent, of the instruction and supervision of the child.
‣ In this case, the parents were gravely remiss in their duties as parents in not diligently supervising the activities of
their son, despite his minority and immaturity, so much so that it was only at the time of Wendell’s death that they
allegedly discovered that he was a CANU agent and that Cresencio’s gun was missing from their safety deposit
box. Both parents were sadly wanting in their duty and responsibility in monitoring and knowing the activities of
their children who, for all they know, may be engaged in dangerous work such as being drug informers, 17 or even
drug users. Neither was a plausible explanation given for the photograph of Wendell, with a handwritten dedication
to Julie Ann at the back thereof, 18 holding upright what clearly appears as a revolver and on how or why he was
in possession of that firearm.
‣ It is still the duty of parents to know the activity of their children who may be engaged in this dangerous activity
involving the menace of drugs. Had the parents been diligent in supervising the activities of their son, Wendell,
and in keeping said gun from his reach, they could have prevented Wendell from killing Julie Ann Gotiong
‣ The parentsutterly failed to exercise all the diligence of a good father of the family in preventing their minor son
from committing this crime by means of the gun of defendants-appellees which was freely accessible to
Wendell Libi for they have not regularly checked whether said gun was still under lock, but learned that it was
missing from the safety deposit box only after the crime had been committed
4. CUADRA V. MONFORT, G.R. NO. L-24101, SEPTEMBER 30, 1970

‣ When the act or omission is that of one person for whom another is responsible, the latter then becomes himself
liable under Article 2180, in the different cases enumerated therein, such as that of the father or the mother under
the circumstances above quoted.
‣ The basis of this vicarious, although primary, liability is, as in Article 2176, fault or negligence, which is presumed
from that which accompanied the causative act or omission.
‣ The presumption is merely prima facie and may therefore be rebutted. This is the clear and logical inference that
may be drawn from the last paragraph of Article 2180, which states "that the responsibility treated of in this Article
shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage
‣ Defense of Observance of all the Diligence of a Good Father of a Family to Prevent Damage
‣ Since the fact thus required to be proven is a matter of defense, the burden of proof necessarily rests on the
defendant. But what is the exact degree of diligence contemplated, and how does a parent prove it in connection
with a particular act or omission of a minor child, especially when it takes place in his absence or outside his
immediate company?
‣ Obviously there can be no meticulously calibrated measure applicable; and when the law simply refers to "all the
diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage," it implies a consideration of the attendant
circumstances in every individual case, to determine whether or not by the exercise of such diligence the damage
could have been prevented.
‣ If damage cannot be prevented, even with the exercise of due diligence, parent cannot be held vicariously
liable

‣ In the present case there is nothing from which it may be inferred that the defendant could have prevented
the damage by the observance of due care, or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his parental
authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the act which caused it.
‣ On the contrary, his child was at school, where it was his duty to send her and where she was, as he had the right
to expect her to be, under the care and supervision of the teacher. And as far as the act which caused the injury
was concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual among children at play and which no parent, however
careful, would have any special reason to anticipate much less guard against.
‣ Nor did it reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the child's character which would reflect
unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed to her parents.
‣ The parent was found to be not negligence because the child was under the custody of the school at the time the
damage was caused.
5. ST. MARY’S ACADEMY V. CARPITANOS, G.R. NO. 143363, FEBRUARY 6, 2002
‣ Vicarious Liability of Schools; Proximate Cause as an Essential Element of Negligence
‣ Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental authority over a minor child while
under their supervision, instruction or custody:
1. The school, its administrators and teachers; or
2. The individual, entity or institution engaged in child care.
‣ This special parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized activities, whether inside or
outside the premises of the school, entity or institution.
‣ Thus, such authority and responsibility applies to field trips, excursions and other affairs of the pupils and
students outside the school premises whenever authorized by the school or its teachers.
‣ Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor, those exercising special
parental authority are principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the
unemancipated minor while under their supervision, instruction, or custody.
‣ However, for the school to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as
negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence must have a causal
connection to the accident.
‣ In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the ‘injury for which recovery
is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the negligence and
the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes.

‣ Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical detachment
of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the minor’s parents primarily. The negligence of the
school was only a remote cause of the accident.
‣ Between the remote cause and the injury, there intervened the negligence of the minor’s parents or the
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep
‣ This decision is defective because it held the parents liable even though it found the child to be not. The parents
cannot be held vicariously liable unless the child was at fault or negligence under Art. 2176.
B. OWNERS AND MANAGERS OF ENTERPRISES/EMPLOYERS
those of persons for whom one is responsible. XXXXXXXXXXX
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their
employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. XXXXXXXXXXX

Article 1869. Agency may be express, or implied from the acts of the principal, from his silence or lack of action, or his
failure to repudiate the agency, knowing that another person is acting on his behalf without authority.
Article 1911. Even when the agent has exceeded his authority, the principal is solidarily liable with the agent if the former
allowed the latter to act as though he had full powers. (n)
What must the plaintiff generally prove against the employer in order make him liable acts/omissions of employees?
1. That the employee is liable under Art. 2176 (Dela Llana vs Biong)
2. An employer-employee relationship exists
3. That the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned tasks
Meaning of “acting within the scope of his assigned tasks”

‣ This includes any act done by the employee in furtherance of the interest of the employer at the time of the infliction of the
injury or damage. It is not necessary that the task performed by the employee is his regular job or that which was expressly
given to him by the employer. It is enough that the task is indispensable to the business or beneficial to the employer
(Filamer Christian Institute vs. IAC) In other words, “the vicarious liability attaches only when the tortious conduct of the
employee relates to, or is in the course of his employment. The question to ask should be whether, at the time of the
damage or injury, the employer is engaged in the affairs or concerns of the employer, or, independently, in that of his own.
While the employer incurs no liability when an employee’s conduct, act or omission is beyond the range of employment, a
minor deviation from the assigned task of an employee, however, does not affect the liability of an employer. The
requirement that the employee must be performing his functions is due to the fact that the employer is not expected to
exercise supervision over their employee’s private activity or during the performance of tasks either unsanctioned by the
former or unrelated to the employee’s task (Valenzuela vs CA)
Must the plaintiff prove that the employer was negligent or failed to exercise due diligence over the selection and supervision
of his employees?
‣ NO, this is already presumed once the plaintiff proves the three things above. It is the employer who is required to
prove due diligence on its part in the selection and supervision of his employees, to overcome this presumption of
negligence. The employer can escape liability if he can establish that he exercised proper diligence in the selection and
supervision of his negligent employee. The facts indicating exercise of due diligence must be shown by concrete proof,
including documentary evidence
Liability of the employer and employee?

‣ The employer and the employee are solidarily liable. The aggrieved party may choose to sue either of them or both of
them. If only the employer is sued and made liable for the damages caused by his employee, he may recover from the
employee what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of his claim (Article 2181, Civil Code). If the plaintiff decides to sue
only the employee, no right of reimbursement accrues. If the offended party sues both of them, the court may hold them
solidarily liable subject to the same right of reimbursement given to the employer under Article 2181 of the Civil Code. As
a consequence, the employee is not an indispensable party in a suit against an employer. In a solidary obligation, each
debtor is liable to pay for the entire obligation, either party indispensable and it is not necessary to join the other. (Cerezo
v. Tuazon)
EXCEPTION: In these cases, the plaintiff need NOT prove all the three elements above
1. Registered owner rule (in case of motor vehicle liability)
‣ This dispenses with proof of the E/E relationship and that the employee is acting within the scope of his assigned
tasks, as this is presumed under the motor vehicle registration law
‣ The registered owner is presumed to be the employer of the driver in contemplation of the law, the actual owner is
merely his agent
‣ What are the defenses available to the registered owner? In these cases, the registered owner is absolved:

1. Driver was NOT negligent

2. Unauthorized use
3. Vehicle was stolen
‣ What are NOT defenses available to the registered owner?
1. No existence of employment relationship
2. Drive was not acting within the scope of his assigned tasks
3. Due diligence in selection and supervision
2. Hospital liability
‣ How do you make hospitals liable for acts/omissions of its doctors and physicians? 3 recognized ways
a. Existence of Employment Relationship
b. Doctrine of Apparent Authority (Ostensible Agency) (Art. 1869, 1911)
‣ Elements:
i. “Holding out” element
ii. “Reliance” element
c. Doctrine of Corporate Negligence (PSI vs Agana)
‣ Unlike “a” and “b”, this is does not involve vicarious liability. This is when the hospital, as a corporation, has
defined its own standards and failed to abide by such.
1. DELA LLANA V. BIONG, G.R. NO. 182356, DECEMBER 4, 2013

‣ Vicarious Liability of Employers; Existence of the Elements of Quasi-Delicts Required
‣ Plaintiff must first establish by preponderance of evidence the three elements of quasi-delict before the liability of
an employer for the negligence of the employee may be determined
‣ Only after the elements are quasi-delict are established, particularly the element of causal connection, can the
presumption that the employer did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of the employee arise.
‣ Once negligence, the damages and the proximate causation are established, this Court can then proceed with the
application and the interpretation of the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code
‣ Under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, in relation with the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, "an action predicated on
an employee’s act or omission may be instituted against the employer who is held liable for the negligent act or
omission committed by his employee.
‣ The rationale for these graduated levels of analyses is that it is essentially the wrongful or negligent act or omission
itself which creates the vinculum juris in extra-contractual obligations
2. JOSEFA V. MERALCO, G.R. NO. 182705, JULY 18, 2014
‣ Requirement of Employee-Employer Relationship; Registered Owner Rule
‣ In quasi-delict cases, the registered owner of a motor vehicle is the employer of its driver in contemplation of law.
‣ The registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the
public or to third persons for injuries caused while the vehicle was being driven on highways or streets.
‣ The purpose of motor vehicle registration is precisely to identify the owner so that if any injury is caused by the
vehicle, responsibility can be imputed to the registered owner
‣ Note that the CA held that “ the law presumes that the registered owner has control of his vehicle and its driver at
the time of the accident.” This was affirmed by the SC.
‣ Due Diligence of Good Father of a Family in the Selection and Supervision of Employees as Employer’s
Defense
‣ In order for the employer to be relieved of his vicarious liability, he must show that he exercised due diligence in
the selection and supervision of his driver.
‣ In concrete terms, the employer should show by competent object or documentary evidence that he examined the
driver as to the latter’s qualifications, experience and service records prior to employment. He should likewise
prove by competent objector documentary evidence that he formulated standard operating procedures, monitored
their implementation and imposed disciplinary measures for breach of these procedures

3. CASTILEX INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION V. VASQUEZ, 321 SCRA 393 (1999)

‣ Vicarious Liability of Employers; “Even though the employer is not engaged in any business or industry”
‣ The phrase "even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry" found in the fifth paragraph
should be interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in any business or industry
to be liable for the negligence of his employee who is acting within the scope of his assigned task
‣ Distinctions between the 4th and 5th paragraph of Art. 2180

‣ A distinction must be made between the two provisions to determine what is applicable. Both provisions apply to
employers
‣ This court has applied the fifth paragraph to cases where the employer was engaged in a business or industry
such as truck operators and banks
DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN THE 4TH AND 5TH PARAGRAPH OF ART. 2180
4th Paragraph 5th Paragraph
Codal The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
Provision are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope
employees in the service of the branches in which the latter of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
are employed or on the occasion of their functions. engaged in any business or industry.
Employers Owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise Employers in general, whether or not engaged in any
Covered business or industry.
Negligence Negligent acts of employees committed either in the service Negligent acts of employees acting within the scope of
Acts Covered of the branches or on the occasion of their functions their assigned task
‣ Vicarious Liability of Employers; 5th paragraph of Art. 2180

‣ The negligence acts covered by the 5th paragraph of Art. 2180 is broader, it is an expansion of the acts in the 4th
paragraph of Art. 2180 in both employer coverage and acts included. Negligent acts of employees, whether or not
the employer is engaged in a business or industry, are covered so long as they were acting within the scope of
their assigned task, even though committed neither in the service of the branches nor on the occasion of their
functions. For, admittedly, employees oftentimes wear different hats. They perform functions which are beyond
their office, title or designation but which, nevertheless, are still within the call of duty.eUnder the fifth paragraph of
Article 2180, whether or not engaged in any business or industry, an employer is liable for the torts committed by
employees within the scope of his assigned tasks. But it is necessary to establish the employer-employee
relationship; once this is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable, that the employee was acting
within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed.
‣ It is only then that the employer may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection
and supervision of the employee
‣ Determination whether an Employee is Acting Within the Scope of is Assigned Task

‣ No absolutely hard and fast rule can be stated which will furnish the complete answer to the problem of whether at
a given moment, an employee is engaged in his employer's business in the operation of a motor vehicle, so as to
fix liability upon the employer because of the employee's action or inaction; but rather, the result varies with each
state of facts.
‣ Filamer Christian Institute v. Intermediate Appellant Court: this Court had the occasion to hold that acts done
within the scope of the employee's assigned tasks includes "any act done by an employee in furtherance of the
interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damages.
‣ The mere fact that the employee was using a service vehicle (a company car) at the time of the injurious
incident is not of itself sufficient to charge the employer with liability for the negligent operation of said
vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his employment.
‣ The following are principles in American Jurisprudence on the employer's liability for the injuries inflicted
by the negligence of an employee in the use of an employer's motor vehicle:
1. Operation of Employer's Motor Vehicle in Going to or from Meals
‣ An employee who uses his employer's vehicle in going from his work to a place where he intends to eat or
in returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his employment in the absence
of evidence of some special business benefit to the employer.

‣ Evidence that by using the employer's vehicle to go to and from meals, an employee is enabled to reduce
his time-off and so devote more time to the performance of his duties supports the finding that an
employee is acting within the scope of his employment while so driving the vehicle
2. Operation of Employer's Vehicle in Going to or from Work

‣ Traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or concern of the employee, and
not a part of his services to his employer. Hence, in the absence of some special benefit to the employer
other than the mere performance of the services available at the place where he is needed, the employee is
not acting within the scope of his employment even though he uses his employer's motor vehicle
‣ The employer may, however, be liable where he derives some special benefit from having the employee
drive home in the employer's vehicle as when the employer benefits from having the employee at work
earlier and, presumably, spending more time at his actual duties.
‣ Where the employee's duties require him to circulate in a general area with no fixed place or hours of work,
or to go to and from his home to various outside places of work, and his employer furnishes him with a
vehicle to use in his work, the courts have frequently applied what has been called the "special errand" or
"roving commission" rule, under which it can be found that the employee continues in the service of his
employer until he actually reaches home.
‣ However, even if the employee be deemed to be acting within the scope of his employment in going to or
from work in his employer's vehicle, the employer is not liable for his negligence where at the time of the
accident, the employee has left the direct route to his work or back home and is pursuing a personal errand
of his own.
3. Use of Employer's Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours

‣ An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latter's personal use outside of regular
working hours is generally not liable for the employee's negligent operation of the vehicle during the period
of permissive use, even where the employer contemplates that a regularly assigned motor vehicle will be
used by the employee for personal as well as business purposes and there is some incidental benefit to the
employer.
‣ Even where the employee's personal purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished and he has
started the return trip to his house where the vehicle is normally kept, it has been held that he has not
resumed his employment, and the employer is not liable for the employee's negligent operation of the
vehicle during the return trip
‣ The foregoing (American) principles and jurisprudence are applicable in our jurisdiction albeit based on the
doctrine of respondent superior, not on the principle of bonus pater familias as in ours. Whether the fault or
negligence of the employee is conclusive on his employer as in American law or jurisprudence, or merely gives
rise to the presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the employer as in ours, it is indispensable that
the employee was acting in his employer's business or within the scope of his assigned task
‣ In this case, the employee was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in
line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident. It was not proven that the employee was
acting within the scope of the functions entrusted to him, thus, the employer had no duty to show that it
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in providing the employee with a service vehicle. Thus,
justice and equity require that petitioner be relieved of vicarious liability for the consequences of the
negligence of ABAD in driving its vehicle
4. JOSE V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NOS. 118441-42, JANUARY 18, 2000
‣ Vicarious Liability of Employers; Due Diligence of Good Father of a Family in the Selection and Supervision of
Employees as Employer’s Defense
‣ The responsibility of employers is premised upon the presumption of negligence of their employees. This is the
presumed negligence in the selection and supervision of the employee.
‣ The theory of presumed negligence, in contrast with the American doctrine of respondent superior, where the
negligence of the employee is conclusively presumed to be the negligence of the employer, is clearly deducible
from the last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code which provides that the responsibility therein mentioned
shall cease if the employers prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damages
‣ Therefore, before the presumption of the employer's negligence in the selection and supervision of its employees
can arise, the negligence of the employee must first be established.
‣ While the allegations of negligence against the employee and that of an employer-employee relation in the
complaint are enough to make out a case of quasi-delict under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, the failure to prove the
employee's negligence during the trial is fatal to proving the employer's vicarious liability.

‣ Requirement of Allegation and Proof of Employer-Employee Relationship for Vicarious Liability of Employers
‣ Art. 2180 of the Civil Code makes the persons specified therein responsible for the quasi-delicts of others. The
burden is upon the plaintiff to prove that the employer is one of those specified persons who are vicariously liable
for the negligence of the employee
‣ In this case, MCL (the plaintiff) alleged that Juanita Macarubo was the registered owner of the Ford Escort car and
that John Macarubo was the "authorized driver" of the car. Nowhere was it alleged that John Macarubo was the
son, ward, employee or pupil of private respondent Juanita Macarubo so as to make the latter vicariously liable for
the negligence of John Macarubo.
‣ The allegation that John Macarubo was "the authorized driver" of the Ford Escort is not equivalent to an
allegation that he was an employee of Juanita Macarubo. That John Macarubo was the "authorized driver" of
the car simply means that he drove the Ford Escort with the permission of Juanita Macarubo.
‣ Nor did MCL present any evidence to prove that Juanita Macarubo was the employer of John Macarubo or that
she is in any way liable for John Macarubo's negligence under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. For failure to discharge
its burden, MCL's complaint should be dismissed.
5. BAHIA V. LITONJUA, 30 PHIL. 624 (1915)

Defense
‣ While it may be said that, at the time of the accident, the chauffeur who was driving the machine was a servant of
the employer Leynes, in as much as the profits derived from the trips of the automobile belonged to him and the
automobile was operated under his direction, nevertheless, this fact is not conclusive in making him responsible
for the negligence of the chauffeur or for defects in the automobile itself.
‣ Article 1903 of the Civil Code not only establishes liability in cases of negligence, but also provides when that
liability shall cease. It says: “The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein
prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damages.”
‣ From this article two things are apparent:
1. That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a
presumption of a law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the
selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or both; and
2. That presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted.
‣ It follows necessarily that if the employees shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision
he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is
relieved from liability.
‣ This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of his
servant. This is the notable peculiarly of the Spanish law negligence.
‣ It is, of course, in striking contrast to the American doctrine that, in relations with strangers, the negligence of
the servant is conclusively the negligence of the master.
6. PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., V. PHIL-AMERICAN FORWARDERS, INC., G.R. NO. L-25142, MARCH 25, 1975
‣ Managerial Employees NOT covered in Art. 2180 as “Employers”
‣ The terms "employers" and "owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise” used in article 2180 of the
Civil Code, formerly article 1903 of the old Code, do NOT embrace the manager of a corporation owning a truck,
the reckless operation of which allegedly resulted in the vehicular accident from which the damage arose.
‣ Such terms do not include the manager of a corporation. It may be gathered from the context of article
2180 that the term "manager" ("director" in the Spanish version) is used in the sense of “employer"
‣ No tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened on the manager of an employer because he himself may be
regarded as an employee or dependiente of his employer
7. MARTIN V. COURT OF APPEALS, 205 SCRA 591 (1992)

‣ Requirement of Allegation and Proof of Employer-Employee Relationship
‣ Art. 2180(5) is applicable only if there is an employer-employee relationship although it is not necessary that the
employer be engaged in any business or industry.
‣ It differs in this sense from Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, which requires that the employer be engaged in
an industry to be subsidiarily liable for the felony committed by his employee in the course of his employment.
‣ Whether or not engaged in any business or industry, the employer under Article 2180 is liable for the torts
committed by his employees within the scope of their assigned task. But it is necessary first to establish the

employment relationship. Once this is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable, that the
employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. It
is only then that the defendant, as employer, may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence
in the selection and supervision of the employee as allowed in that article
‣ Employer-Employee Relationship is NOT presumed
‣ A presumption is defined as an inference as to the existence of a fact not actually known, arising from its usual
connection with another which is known, or a conjecture based on past experience as to what course human
affairs ordinarily take. It is either a presumption juris, or of law, or a presumption hominis, or of fact.
‣ There is no law directing the deduction made by the courts below from the particular facts presented to them by
the parties. Such deduction is not among the conclusive presumptions under Section 2 or the disputable
presumptions under Section 3 of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court. In other words, it is not a presumption juris.
‣ Neither is it a presumption hominis, which is a reasonable deduction from the facts proved without an express
direction of law to that effect
‣ In this case, as the employment relationship between the owner of the vehicle and the driver could NOT be
presumed, it was necessary for the plaintiff to establish it by evidence. The plaintiff had the burden of proof, or the
duty "to present evidence on the fact in issue necessary to establish his claim" as required by Rule 131, Section 1
of the Revised Rules of Court. Failure to do this was fatal to its action.
‣ It was enough for the defendant to deny the alleged employment relationship, without more, for he was
not under obligation to prove this negative averment.
8. ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 82465, FEBRUARY 25, 1991
‣ Act or omission causing damage must have occurred while the employee was in the performance of his
assigned task
‣ Under Art. 2180(5), it is clear that before an employer may be held liable for the negligence of his employee, the
act or omission which caused damage or prejudice must have occurred while an employee was in the
performance of his assigned tasks.
‣ In the case at bar, the teachers/petitioners were not in the actual performance of their assigned tasks. The incident
happened not within the school premises, not on a school day and most importantly while the teachers and
students were holding a purely private affair, a picnic. It is clear from the beginning that the incident happened
while some members of the I-C class of St. Francis High School were having a picnic at Talaan Beach. This picnic
had no permit from the school head or its principal, Benjamin Illumin because this picnic is not a school
sanctioned activity neither is it considered as an extra-curricular activity.
‣ As earlier pointed out by the trial court, mere knowledge by petitioner/principal Illumin of the planning of the
picnic by the students and their teachers does not in any way or in any manner show acquiescence or
consent to the holding of the same.
‣ The application therefore of Article 2180 has no basis in law and neither is it supported by any jurisprudence. If we
were to affirm the findings of respondent Court on this score, employers will forever be exposed to the risk and
danger of being hailed to Court to answer for the misdeeds or omissions of the employees even if such act or
omission he committed while they are not in the performance of their duties.
9. MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION V. HUANG, G.R. NO. 172122, JUNE 22, 2007
‣ Vicarious Liability of Employers
‣ The liability of the employer under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code is direct or immediate. It is not conditioned on a prior
recourse against the negligent employee, or a prior showing of insolvency of such employee. It is also joint and
solidary with the employee
Defense
‣ To be relieved of liability, the employers should show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family,
both in the selection of the employee and in the supervision of the performance of his duties.
‣ Standard of Diligence in “Selection” of Employees

‣ In the selection of its prospective employees, the employer is required to examine them as to their qualifications,
experience, and service records.
‣ Standard of Diligence in “Supervision” of Employees

‣ With respect to the supervision of its employees, the employer should formulate standard operating procedures,
monitor their implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for their breach.

‣ To establish compliance with these requirements, employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary
evidence.
10.SANITARY STEAM LAUNDRY V. COURT OF APPEALS, 300 SCRA 20 (1998)

‣ Standard of Diligence in the “Selection” of Employees
‣ Indeed, driving exacts a more than usual toll on the senses. Accordingly, it behooves employers to exert extra care
in the selection and supervision of their employees.
‣ They must go beyond the minimum requirements fixed by law.

11.CARTICIANO V. NUVAL, G.R. NO. 138054, SEPTEMBER 28, 2000
assigned task
‣ The facts established in the case at bar show that Darwin (the driver) was acting within the scope of the authority
given him when the collision occurred. That he had been hired only to bring respondent’s children to and from
school must be rejected. True, this may have been one of his assigned tasks, but no convincing proof was
presented showing that it was his only task. His authority was to drive Nuval’s (owner/employer) vehicle.
‣ Third parties are not bound by the allegation that the driver was authorized to operate the jeep only when the
employer’s children were on board the vehicle. Giving credence to this outlandish theory would enable employers
to escape their legal liabilities with impunity. Such loophole is easy to concoct and is simply unacceptable.
Defense
‣ The claim of respondent that he had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family is not borne out by the
evidence. Neither is it supported by logic. His main defense that at the time of the accident Darwin was no
longer his employee, having been merely hired for a few days, is inconsistent with his other argument of
due diligence in the selection of an employee.
12.UNIVERSAL AQUARIUS, INC., V. Q.C. HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 155990, SEPTEMBER
12, 2007
assigned task
‣ With regard to plaintiff’s claim for damages, the Court finds that she has no cause of action against the defendant.
A thorough reading of the allegations of the Complaint reveals that the claim for damages clearly springs from the
strike effected by the employees of the defendant.
‣ It is settled that an employer's liability for acts of its employees attaches only when the tortious conduct of
the employee relates to, or is in the course of, his employment. The question then is whether, at the time of
the damage or injury, the employee is engaged in the affairs or concerns of the employer or, independently,
in that of his own.
‣ An employer incurs no liability when an employee’s conduct, act or omission is beyond the range of
employment.
‣ Unquestionably, when the defendant's employees staged a strike, they were acting on their own, beyond the
range of their employment. Thus, it cannot be held liable for damages caused by the strike staged by its
employees
13.FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 75112, OCTOBER 16, 1990
‣ Student Working for the School not an Employee under the Labor Code
‣ The issue in this case was whether or not a student (Funtecha) working for the school (Filamer) as a janitor in
exchange for free tuition is an employee of such school
‣ Labor Code, Section 14, Rule X of Book III, Working scholars. — There is no employer-employee relationship
between students on the one hand, and schools, colleges or universities on the other, where students work for the
latter in exchange for the privilege to study free of charge; provided the students are given real opportunity,
including such facilities as may be reasonable, necessary to finish their chosen court under such arrangement
‣ It is manifest that under the just-quoted provision of law, petitioner Filamer cannot be considered as
Funtecha's employer. Funtecha belongs to that special category of students who render service to the school
in exchange for free tuition Funtecha worked for petitioner for two hours daily for five days a week. He was
assigned to clean the school passageways from 4:00 a.m. to 6:00 a.m. with sufficient time to prepare for his
7:30 a.m. classes. As admitted by Agustin Masa in open court, Funtecha was not included in the company
payroll

‣ The wording of Section 14 is clear and explicit and leaves no room for equivocation. To dismiss the implementing
rule as one which governs only the "personal relationship" between the school and its students and not where
there is already a third person involved, as espoused by private respondents, is to read into the law something that
was not legislated there in the first place.
‣ The provision of Section 14 is obviously intended to eliminate an erstwhile gray area in labor relations and seeks to
define in categorical terms the precise status of working scholars in relation to the learning institutions in which
they work for the privilege of a free education.
assigned task
‣ But even if we were to concede the status of an employee on Funtecha, still the primary responsibility for his
wrongdoing cannot be imputed to petitioner Filamer for the plain reason that at the time of the accident, it has
been satisfactorily shown that Funtecha was not acting within the scope of his supposed employment.
‣ His duty was to sweep the school passages for two hours every morning before his regular classes. Taking the
wheels of the Pinoy jeep from the authorized driver at 6:30 in the evening and then driving the vehicle in a
reckless manner resulting in multiple injuries to a third person were certainly not within the ambit of his
assigned tasks.
‣ In other words, at the time of the injury, Funtecha was not engaged in the execution of the janitorial services
for which he was employed, but for some purpose of his own. It is but fair therefore that Funtecha should bear
the full brunt of his tortious negligence. Petitioner Filamer cannot be made liable for the damages he had caused
14.FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 75112, AUGUST 17, 1992
assigned task
‣ Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school president where both Allan and Funtecha reside is an act in
furtherance of the interest of the petitioner-school.
‣ The Court is constrained to conclude that the act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one done for
and in behalf of his employer for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it
was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties. The clause "within the scope of their assigned tasks" for
purposes of raising the presumption of liability of an employer, includes any act done by an employee, in
furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction
of the injury or damage.
‣ Even if somehow, the employee driving the vehicle derived some benefit from the act, the existence of a
presumptive liability of the employer is determined by answering the question of whether or not the servant
was at the time of the accident performing any act in furtherance of his master's business
‣ Student Working for the School not an Employee under the Labor Code but an Employee under Art. 2180
‣ Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules implementing the Labor Code, was promulgated only for the purpose of
administering and enforcing the provisions of the Labor Code on conditions of employment. Particularly, Rule X of
Book III provides guidelines on the manner by which the powers of the Labor Secretary shall be exercised; on
what records should be kept; maintained and preserved; on payroll; and on the exclusion of working scholars
from, and inclusion of resident physicians in the employment coverage as far as compliance with the substantive
labor provisions on working conditions, rest periods, and wages, is concerned.
‣ In other words, Rule X is merely a guide to the enforcement of the substantive law on labor. The Court, thus,
makes the distinction and so holds that Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules is not the decisive law in a
civil suit for damages instituted by an injured person during a vehicular accident against a working student
of a school and against the school itself.
‣ The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of employment between an alleged employee
and an alleged employer. It invokes a claim brought by one for damages for injury caused by the patently negligent
acts of a person, against both doer-employee and his employer. Hence, the reliance on the implementing rule
on labor to disregard the primary liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is misplaced.
An implementing rule on labor cannot be used by an employer as a shield to avoid liability under the
substantive provisions of the Civil Code.
‣ Funtecha is an employee of petitioner Filamer. He need not have an official appointment for a driver's position in
order that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act, it being sufficient that the act of
driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the petitioner
Defense

‣ An employer is expected to impose upon its employees the necessary discipline called for in the performance of
any act indispensable to the business and beneficial to their employer.
‣ In this case, the school has not shown that it has set forth such rules and guidelines as would prohibit any one of
its employees from taking control over its vehicles if one is not the official driver or prohibiting the driver and son of
the Filamer president from authorizing another employee to drive the school vehicle. Furthermore, the school has
failed to prove that it had imposed sanctions or warned its employees against the use of its vehicles by persons
other than the driver.
‣ In the absence of evidence that the petitioner had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
supervision of its employees, the law imposes upon it the vicarious liability for acts or omissions of its
employees. The liability of the employer is, under Article 2180, primary and solidary. However, the employer
shall have recourse against the negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the
plaintiff.
15.JAYME V. APOSTOL, G.R. NO. 163609, NOVEMBER 27, 2008

‣ Determining the Existence of an Employee-Employer Relationship
‣ To determine the existence of an employment relationship, We rely on the four-fold test. This involves:
1. The employer's power of selection;
2. Payment of wages or other remuneration;
3. The employer's right to control the method of doing the work; and
4. The employer's right of suspension or dismissal
‣ This Court has, on several occasions, held that an employer-employee relationship still exists even if the employee
was loaned by the employer to another person or entity because control over the employee subsists
‣ Employee NOT an employer of a subordinate employee

‣ Mere giving of directions to the driver does not establish that the passenger has control over the vehicle.
Neither does it render one the employer of the driver.
‣ The fact that a client company may give instructions or directions to the security guards assigned to it, does
not, by itself, render the client responsible as an employer of the security guards concerned and liable for
their wrongful acts and omissions. Those instructions or directions are ordinarily no more than requests
commonly envisaged in the contract for services entered into with the security agency. (Soliman, Jr. v. Tuazon)
‣ Significantly, no negligence may be imputed against a fellow employee although the person may have the right to
control the manner of the vehicle's operation. In the absence of an employer-employee relationship
establishing vicarious liability, the driver's negligence should not be attributed to a fellow employee who
only happens to be an occupant of the vehicle. Whatever right of control the occupant may have over the driver
is not sufficient by itself to justify an application of the doctrine of vicarious liability.
‣ Registered Owner Rule

‣ Settled is the rule that the registered owner of a vehicle is jointly and severally liable with the driver for damages
incurred by passengers and third persons as a consequence of injuries or death sustained in the operation of said
vehicles.
‣ Regardless of who the actual owner of the vehicle is, the operator of record continues to be the operator of the
vehicle as regards the public and third persons, and as such is directly and primarily responsible for the
consequences incident to its operation
16.FILCAR TRANSPORT SERVICES V. ESPINAS, G.R. NO. 174156, JUNE 20, 2012
‣ Vicarious Liability of Employers
‣ As a general rule, one is only responsible for his own act or omission. Thus, a person will generally be held liable
only for the torts committed by himself and not by another. This general rule is laid down in Article 2176. Based on
the Art. 2176, the obligation to indemnify another for damage caused by ones act or omission is imposed upon the
tortfeasor himself, i.e., the person who committed the negligent act or omission.
‣ The law, however, provides for exceptions when it makes certain persons liable for the act or omission of another.
One exception is an employer who is made vicariously liable for the tort committed by his employee under Art.
2180
‣ Under Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code, an action predicated on an employees act or
omission may be instituted against the employer who is held liable for the negligent act or omission committed by
his employee.

‣ Although the employer is not the actual tortfeasor, the law makes him vicariously liable on the basis of the civil law
principle of pater familias for failure to exercise due care and vigilance over the acts of ones subordinates to
prevent damage to another.
‣ In the last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the employer may invoke the defense that he observed all
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
‣ Registered Owner Rule; Registered Owner as the Employer of the Driver in Contemplation of Law
‣ It is well settled that in case of motor vehicle mishaps, the registered owner of the motor vehicle is considered
as the employer of the tortfeasor-driver, and is made primarily liable for the tort committed by the latter under
Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180.
‣ The registered owner of the motor vehicle is the employer of the negligent driver, and the actual employer
is considered merely as an agent of such owner.
‣ In contemplation of law, the owner/operator of record is the employer of the driver, the actual operator and
employer being considered as merely its agent
‣ Thus, it is clear that for the purpose of holding the registered owner of the motor vehicle primarily and directly
liable for damages under Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code, the existence of an employer-
employee relationship, as it is understood in labor relations law, is not required. t is sufficient to establish that the
defendant is the registered owner of the motor vehicle causing damage in order that it may be held vicariously
liable under Article 2180
‣ This does not mean, however, that the registered owner is left without any recourse against the actual
employer of the driver and the driver himself. Under the civil law principle of unjust enrichment, the
registered owner of the motor vehicle has a right to be indemnified by the actual employer of the driver of
the amount that he may be required to pay as damages for the injury caused to another.
‣ Rationale for holding the registered owner vicariously liable
‣ The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident happens, or that
any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the public highways, responsibility therefor can be fixed
on a definite individual, the registered owner.
‣ Instances are numerous where vehicles running on public highways caused accidents or injuries to pedestrians or
other vehicles without positive identification of the owner or drivers, or with very scant means of identification. It is
to forestall these circumstances, so inconvenient or prejudicial to the public, that the motor vehicle registration is
primarily ordained, in the interest of the determination of persons responsible for damages or injuries caused on
public highways.
‣ Thus, whether there is an employer-employee relationship between the registered owner and the driver is
irrelevant in determining the liability of the registered owner who the law holds primarily and directly
responsible for any accident, injury or death caused by the operation of the vehicle in the streets and
highways.
‣ The general public policy involved in motor vehicle registration is the protection of innocent third persons who may
have no means of identifying public road malefactors and, therefore, would find it difficult if not impossible to seek
redress for damages they may sustain in accidents resulting in deaths, injuries and other damages; by fixing the
person held primarily and directly liable for the damages sustained by victims of road mishaps, the law ensures
that relief will always be available to them.
‣ To identify the person primarily and directly responsible for the damages would also prevent a situation where a
registered owner of a motor vehicle can easily escape liability by passing on the blame to another who may have
no means to answer for the damages caused, thereby defeating the claims of victims of road accidents. We take
note that some motor vehicles running on our roads are driven not by their registered owners, but by employed
drivers who, in most instances, do not have the financial means to pay for the damages caused in case of
accidents.
‣ The public interest involved in this case must not be underestimated. Road safety is one of the most common
problems that must be addressed in this country. We are not unaware of news of road accidents involving reckless
drivers victimizing our citizens.
‣ The set-up may be inconvenient for the registered owner of the motor vehicle, but the inconvenience cannot
outweigh the more important public policy being advanced by the law in this case which is the protection of
innocent persons who may be victims of reckless drivers and irresponsible motor vehicle owners.
17.DEL CARMEN V. BACOY, G.R. NO. 173870, APRIL 25, 2012

‣ Registered Owner Rule

‣ The operator on record of a vehicle is primarily responsible to third persons for the deaths or injuries consequent
to its operation, regardless of whether the employee drove the registered owner’s vehicle in connection with his
employment.
‣ The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident happens, or that any
damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the public highways, responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite
individual, the registered owner. Instances are numerous where vehicles running on public highways caused
accidents or injuries to pedestrians or other vehicles without positive identification of the owner or drivers, or with
very scant means of identification.
‣ It is to forestall these circumstances, so inconvenient or prejudicial to the public, that the motor vehicle registration
is primarily ordained, in the interest of the determination of persons responsible for damages or injuries caused on
public highway
‣ Defenses available to the Registered Owner

‣ Absent the circumstance of unauthorized use or that the subject vehicle was stolen which are valid defenses
available to a registered owner, the defendant cannot escape liability for quasi-delict resulting from his jeep’s use
18.MARANAN V. PEREZ, G.R. NO. L-22272, JUNE 26, 1967

‣ Liability of Common Carriers for Intentional Assault by its Employees on Passengers
‣ Unlike the old Civil Code, the new Civil Code of the Philippines expressly makes the common carrier liable for
intentional assaults committed by its employees upon its passengers, by the wording of Art. 1759 which
categorically states that “Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the
negligence or willful acts of the former's employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope
of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers.”
‣ The Civil Code provisions on the subject of Common Carriers are new and were taken from Anglo-American Law.
There, the basis of the carrier's liability for assaults on passengers committed by its drivers rests either on (1) the
doctrine of respondeat superior or (2) the principle that it is the carrier's implied duty to transport the passenger
safely.
‣ Under the first, which is the minority view, the carrier is liable only when the act of the employee is within the
scope of his authority and duty. It is not sufficient that the act be within the course of employment only
‣ Under the second view, upheld by the majority and also by the later cases, it is enough that the assault
happens within the course of the employee's duty. It is no defense for the carrier that the act was done
in excess of authority or in disobedience of the carrier's orders. The carrier's liability here is absolute in
the sense that it practically secures the passengers from assaults committed by its own employees.
‣ As can be gleaned from Art. 1759, the Civil Code of the Philippines evidently follows the rule based on the
second view.
‣ At least three very cogent reasons underlie this rule
1. The special undertaking of the carrier requires that it furnish its passenger that full measure of protection
afforded by the exercise of the high degree of care prescribed by the law, inter alia from violence and insults at
the hands of strangers and other passengers, but above all, from the acts of the carrier's own servants
charged with the passenger's safety;
2. Said liability of the carrier for the servant's violation of duty to passengers, is the result of the formers
confiding in the servant's hands the performance of his contract to safely transport the passenger, delegating
therewith the duty of protecting the passenger with the utmost care prescribed by law; and
3. As between the carrier and the passenger, the former must bear the risk of wrongful acts or negligence of the
carrier's employees against passengers, since it, and not the passengers, has power to select and remove
them.
‣ Accordingly, it is the carrier's strict obligation to select its drivers and similar employees with due regard
not only to their technical competence and physical ability, but also, no less important, to their total
personality, including their patterns of behavior, moral fibers, and social attitude.
19.RAMOS V. COURT OF APPEALS, 321 SCRA 584 (1999)
‣ Liability of Hospitals as Employers; Existence of Employer-Employee Relationship
‣ The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the negligence of its employee is found in Article 2180
of the Civil Code which considers a person accountable not only for his own acts but also for those of others
based on the former's responsibility under a relationship of patria potestas.
‣ Such responsibility ceases when the persons or entity concerned prove that they have observed the diligence of a
good father of the family to prevent damage. In other words, while the burden of proving negligence rests on the

plaintiffs, once negligence is shown, the burden shifts to the respondents (parent, guardian, teacher or employer)
who should prove that they observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
‣ Private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending and visiting "consultant" staff.
While "consultants" are not, technically employees, a point which respondent hospital asserts in denying all
responsibility for the patient's condition, the control exercised, the hiring, and the right to terminate
consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship, with the exception of
the payment of wages. In assessing whether such a relationship in fact exists, the control test is
determining. Accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing, we rule that for the purpose of allocating
responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between
hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians.
‣ Hospitals exercise significant control in the hiring and firing of consultants and in the conduct of their work within
the hospital premises. Doctors who apply for "consultant" slots, visiting or attending, are required to submit proof
of completion of residency, their educational qualifications; generally, evidence of accreditation by the appropriate
board (diplomate), evidence of fellowship in most cases, and references. These requirements are carefully
scrutinized by members of the hospital administration or by a review committee set up by the hospital who either
accept or reject the application.
‣ After a physician is accepted, either as a visiting or attending consultant, he is normally required to attend clinico-
pathological conferences, conduct bedside rounds for clerks, interns and residents, moderate grand rounds and
patient audits and perform other tasks and responsibilities, for the privilege of being able to maintain a clinic in the
hospital, and/or for the privilege of admitting patients into the hospital. In addition to these, the physician's
performance as a specialist is generally evaluated by a peer review committee on the basis of mortality and
morbidity statistics, and feedback from patients, nurses, interns and residents. A consultant remiss in his duties, or
a consultant who regularly falls short of the minimum standards acceptable to the hospital or its peer review
committee, is normally politely terminated.
20.RAMOS V. COURT OF APPEALS, 380 SCRA 467 (2002)

‣ Liability of Hospitals as Employers; Non-Existence of Employer-Employee Relationship
‣ There is NO employer-employee relationship between DLSMC and Drs. Gutierrez and Hosaka which would
hold DLSMC solidarily liable for the injury suffered by petitioner Erlinda under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
‣ As explained by respondent hospital, that the admission of a physician to membership in DLSMC’s medical
staff as active or visiting consultant is first decided upon by the Credentials Committee thereof, which is
composed of the heads of the various specialty departments such as the Department of Obstetrics and
Gynecology, Pediatrics, Surgery with the department head of the particular specialty applied for as chairman.
The Credentials Committee then recommends to DLSMC's Medical Director or Hospital Administrator the
acceptance or rejection of the applicant physician, and said director or administrator validates the committee's
recommendation
‣ Similarly, in cases where a disciplinary action is lodged against a consultant, the same is initiated by the
department to whom the consultant concerned belongs and filed with the Ethics Committee consisting of the
department specialty heads. The medical director/hospital administrator merely acts as ex-officio member of
said committee.
‣ Neither is there any showing that it is DLSMC which pays any of its consultants for medical services rendered
by the latter to their respective patients. Moreover, the contract between the consultant in respondent hospital
and his patient is separate and distinct from the contract between respondent hospital and said patient. The
first has for its object the rendition of medical services by the consultant to the patient, while the second
concerns the provision by the hospital of facilities and services by its staff such as nurses and laboratory
personnel necessary for the proper treatment of the patient.
21.NOGALES V. CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER, G.R. NO. 142625, DECEMBER 19, 2006
‣ Liability of Hospitals for Acts/Omissions of Doctors; Employer-Employee Relationship; Ostensible Agency
‣ The Court had the occasion to determine the relationship between a hospital and a consultant or visiting physician
and the liability of such hospital for that physicians negligence in Ramos v. Court of Appeal.
‣ While the Court in Ramos did not expound on the control test, such test essentially determines whether an
employment relationship exists between a physician and a hospital based on the exercise of control over the
physician as to details. Specifically, the employer (or the hospital) must have the right to control both the means
and the details of the process by which the employee (or the physician) is to accomplish his task.
‣ In this case, the court found that there was no employment relationship between the physician and the hospital. It
found that the defendant doctor was an independent contractor-physician.

‣ In general, a hospital is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor-physician. There is,
however, an exception to this principle. The hospital may be liable if the physician is the ostensible agent of
the hospital. This exception is also known as the doctrine of apparent authority.
‣ Under the doctrine of apparent authority a hospital can be held vicariously liable for the negligent acts of a
physician providing care at the hospital, regardless of whether the physician is an independent contractor, unless
the patient knows, or should have known, that the physician is an independent contractor. The elements of the
action have been set out as follows:
‣ For a hospital to be liable under the doctrine of apparent authority, a plaintiff must show that:
1. The hospital, or its agent, acted in a manner that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the
individual who was alleged to be negligent was an employee or agent of the hospital;
2. Where the acts of the agent create the appearance of authority, the plaintiff must also prove that the hospital
had knowledge of and acquiesced in them; and
3. Plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of the hospital or its agent, consistent with ordinary care and
prudence.
‣ The element of holding out on the part of the hospital does not require an express representation by the hospital
that the person alleged to be negligent is an employee. Rather, the element is satisfied if the hospital holds itself
out as a provider of emergency room care without informing the patient that the care is provided by independent
contractors.
‣ The element of justifiable reliance on the part of the plaintiff is satisfied if the plaintiff relies upon the hospital to
provide complete emergency room care, rather than upon a specific physician.
‣ The doctrine of apparent authority essentially involves two factors to determine the liability of an independent-
contractor physician.
1. The first factor focuses on the hospitals manifestations

‣ This is sometimes described as an inquiry whether the hospital acted in a manner which would lead a
reasonable person to conclude that the individual who was alleged to be negligent was an employee or
agent of the hospital.
‣ In this regard, the hospital need not make express representations to the patient that the treating physician
is an employee of the hospital; rather a representation may be general and implied.
2. The second factor focuses on the patients reliance

‣ It is sometimes characterized as an inquiry on whether the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of
the hospital or its agent, consistent with ordinary care and prudence
‣ The doctrine of apparent authority is a species of the doctrine of estoppel. Article 1431 of the Civil Code provides
that through estoppel, an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and
cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon. Estoppel rests on this rule: Whenever a party
has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing
true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be
permitted to falsify it
22.PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC., V. AGANA, 513 SCRA 478 (2007)

‣ Liability of Hospitals for Acts/Omissions of Doctors; Doctrine of Corporate Negligence
‣ Court reiterated the doctrines in previous cases involving the liability of hospitals for the act/omissions of its
doctors under an employment relationship and the doctrine of apparent authority (we know this by now, so focus
on corporate negligence)
‣ In this case, the hospital (PSI) publicly displays in the lobby of the Medical City Hospital the names and
specializations of the physicians associated or accredited by it, including those of Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes.
We concur with the Court of Appeals conclusion that it is now estopped from passing all the blame to the
physicians whose names it proudly paraded in the public directory leading the public to believe that it vouched
for their skill and competence. Indeed, PSIs act is tantamount to holding out to the public that Medical City
Hospital, through its accredited physicians, offers quality health care services. By accrediting Dr. Ampil and Dr.
Fuentes and publicly advertising their qualifications, the hospital created the impression that they were its
agents, authorized to perform medical or surgical services for its patients. As expected, these patients,
Natividad being one of them, accepted the services on the reasonable belief that such were being rendered by
the hospital or its employees, agents, or servants.
‣ Recent years have seen the doctrine of corporate negligence as the judicial answer to the problem of
allocating hospitals liability for the negligent acts of health practitioners, absent facts to support the
application of respondeat superior (employment relationship dapat) or apparent authority.

‣ Its formulation proceeds from the judiciary’s acknowledgment that in these modern times, the duty of providing
quality medical service is no longer the sole prerogative and responsibility of the physician. The modern hospitals
have changed structure. Hospitals now tend to organize a highly professional medical staff whose competence
and performance need to be monitored by the hospitals commensurate with their inherent responsibility to provide
quality medical care
‣ The doctrine has its genesis in Darling v. Charleston Community Hospital. There, the Supreme Court of Illinois held
that the jury could have found a hospital negligent, inter alia, in failing to have a sufficient number of trained nurses
attending the patient; failing to require a consultation with or examination by members of the hospital staff; and
failing to review the treatment rendered to the patient. On the basis of Darling, other jurisdictions held that a
hospitals corporate negligence extends to permitting a physician known to be incompetent to practice at the
hospital. With the passage of time, more duties were expected from hospitals, among them: (1) the use of
reasonable care in the maintenance of safe and adequate facilities and equipment; (2) the selection and retention
of competent physicians; (3) the overseeing or supervision of all persons who practice medicine within its walls;
and (4) the formulation, adoption and enforcement of adequate rules and policies that ensure quality care for its
patients. Thus, in Tucson Medical Center, Inc. v. Misevich, it was held that a hospital, following the doctrine of
corporate responsibility, has the duty to see that it meets the standards of responsibilities for the care of patients.
Such duty includes the proper supervision of the members of its medical staff. And in Bost v. Riley, the court
concluded that a patient who enters a hospital does so with the reasonable expectation that it will attempt to cure
him. The hospital accordingly has the duty to make a reasonable effort to monitor and oversee the treatment
prescribed and administered by the physicians practicing in its premises.
‣ Basically, corporate negligence involves a situation where the hospital itself, as a corporate body, has set its own
standards of diligence and has violated such standards, it is not really based on vicarious liability
23.PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC., V. AGANA, G.R. NOS. 126297, 126467, 127590, FEBRUARY 2, 2010
‣ Liability of Hospitals for Acts/Omissions of Doctors
‣ Where an employment relationship exists, the hospital may be held vicariously liable under Article 2176 in
relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code or the principle of respondeat superior.
‣ Even when no employment relationship exists but it is shown that the hospital holds out to the patient that the
doctor is its agent, the hospital may still be vicariously liable under Article 2176 in relation to Article 143 and Article
1869 of the Civil Code or the principle of apparent authority.
‣ Moreover, regardless of its relationship with the doctor, the hospital may be held directly liable to the patient for
its own negligence or failure to follow established standard of conduct to which it should conform as a
corporation
24.CASUMPANG V. CORTEJO, G.R. NOS. 171127, 171217 & 17122, MARCH 11, 2015
‣ Liability of Hospitals for Acts/Omissions of Doctors; Employer-Employee Relationship
‣ In determining whether an employer-employee relationship exists between the parties, the following elements must
be present
1. Selection and engagement of services;
2. Payment of wages;
3. The power to hire and fire; and
4. The power to control not only the end to be achieved, but the means to be used in reaching such an end
‣ Liability of Hospitals for Acts/Omissions of Doctors; Doctrine of Apparent Authority

‣ As a rule, hospitals are not liable for the negligence of its independent contractors. However, it may be found liable
if the physician or independent contractor acts as an ostensible agent of the hospital. This exception is also known
as the “doctrine of apparent authority
‣ A hospital can be held vicariously liable for the negligent acts of a physician (or an independent contractor)
providing care at the hospital if the plaintiff can prove these two factors:
1. The hospital’s manifestations

‣ Involves an inquiry on whether the hospital acted in a manner that would lead a reasonable person to
conclude that the individual alleged to be negligent was an employee or agent of the hospital. The
hospital need not make express representations to the patient that the physician or independent
contractor is an employee of the hospital; representation may be general and implied.
‣ Such as:
b. The hospital, by providing emergency room care and by failing to advise patients that they were being
treated by the hospital’s agent and not its employee, has created the appearance of agency; and

c. Patients entering the hospital through the emergency room, could properly assume that the treating
doctors and staff of the hospital were acting on its behalf.
2. The patient’s reliance

‣ It involves an inquiry on whether the plaintiff acted in reliance on the conduct of the hospital or its agent,
consistent with ordinary care and prudence
‣ The important consideration in determining the patient’s reliance is: whether the plaintiff is seeking
care from the hospital itself or whether the plaintiff is looking to the hospital merely as a place for
his/her personal physician to provide medical care.
‣ Thus, this requirement is deemed satisfied if the plaintiff can prove that he/she relied upon the hospital to
provide care and treatment, rather than upon a specific physician.
25.RAMOS V. COL REALTY CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 184905, AUGUST 28, 2009
‣ The Doctrine of Imputed Negligence (vicarious liability) ordinarily means that the fault or negligence of the employee
(Art. 2176) is “imputed” to the employer (Art. 2180). But in Ramos vs COL Realty, it was applied differently, in this case,
the contributory negligence of the employee of the plaintiff, was imputed to the plaintiff, as the employer, which
mitigated his claim for damages against the defendant employer for the negligence of his own employee. We see here
that “imputed negligence” cuts both ways, it not only applies against defendant-employers but also to plaintiff-
employers as well.
SEE ALSO: THE CONSOLIDATED BANK AND TRUST CORPORATION V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 138569, SEPTEMBER 11,
2003.
‣ Same comment with Ramos vs COL, imputed negligence cuts both ways. Under Article 1172, liability (for culpa
contractual) may be regulated by the courts, according to the circumstances. This means that if the defendant
exercised the proper diligence in the selection and supervision of its employee, or if the plaintiff was guilty of
contributory negligence, then the courts may reduce the award of damages. In this case, L.C. Diaz (plaintiff through its
employee) was guilty of contributory negligence in allowing a withdrawal slip signed by its authorized signatories to fall
into the hands of an impostor. Thus, the liability of Solidbank should be reduced.
C. THE STATE
AQUINO:
‣ It is a basic Constitutional rule that the State cannot be sued without its consent. Consent of the State to be sued can be
manifested through a special law or general law allowing the State to be sued.
‣ An example of such law is the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, the liability under such provision is limited to acts of special
agents. A special agent is one who receives definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of
his office if he is a special official
Two Aspects of State Liability

1. State exercising Governmental/Public Functions
‣ Generally, the state cannot be held liable for acts of its employees/agents unless it acts through a special agent, in
which case it may be held vicariously liable
2. State exercising Propriety/Private Functions
‣ State may be held vicariously liable as an ordinary employer
SUMMARY OF THE RULES ON STATE LIABILITY FOR PUBLIC OFFICERS OR PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS
STATE LIABILITY TORTFEASOR FUNCTION
1. State NOT liable, only the public Governmental functions inherent in office
officer is liable under Art. 2176
Public Officer
Governmental functions foreign to the usual
functions of the office
2. State may be held liable, as acting
through as Special Agent (Art. 2180, [6])

STATE LIABILITY TORTFEASOR FUNCTION

2. State may be held liable, as acting
through as Special Agent (Art. 2180, [6]) Governmental functions specifically
commissioned by the State
Private Individual
Proprietary functions on behalf of the state
3. State may be held liable as an
Ordinary Employer (Art. 2180, [4,5]) Public Officer Proprietary functions
*See Fontanilla Case
those of persons for whom one is responsible.XXXXXXXXXXXXX
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused
by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable.
XXXXXXXXXXXXX
1. MERRITT V. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, G.R. NO. 11154, MARCH 21, 1916
‣ Law passed by the Legislature merely waive state immunity, it does NOT concede liability
‣ In this case, the Legislature passed an act where it authorized the plaintiff to “bring suit in the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila against the Government of the Philippine Islands in order to fix the responsibility for
the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital, and to determine the amount of
the damages, if any, to which the plaintiff is entitled on account of said collision, and the Attorney-General of the
Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and directed to appear at the trial on the behalf of the Government of said
Islands, to defendant said Government at the same.”
‣ The issue asks the question, did the government, in enacting the above quoted Act, simply waive its immunity
from suit or did it also concede its liability to the plaintiff? If only the former, then it cannot be held that the Act
created any new cause of action in favor of the plaintiff or extended the defendant's liability to any case not
previously recognized.
‣ The issue was whether or not the government simply waived its immunity to be sued or did it admit liability as well?
‣ US Jurisprudence on the Topic
‣ In the United States the rule that the state is not liable for the torts committed by its officers or agents whom it
employs, except when expressly made so by legislative enactment, is well settled.
‣ The Government does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it
employs, since that would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses,
which would be subversive of the public interest.
‣ No claim arises against any government is favor of an individual, by reason of the misfeasance, laches, or
unauthorized exercise of powers by its officers or agents.
‣ By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability
to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously
recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the
court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense.
‣ It is difficult to see how the act does, or was intended to do, more than remove the state's immunity from suit.
It simply gives authority to commence suit for the purpose of settling plaintiff's controversies with the estate.
Nowhere in the act is there a whisper or suggestion that the court or courts in the disposition of the suit shall
depart from well established principles of law, or that the amount of damages is the only question to be settled.
The act opened the door of the court to the plaintiff. It did not pass upon the question of liability, but left the
suit just where it would be in the absence of the state's immunity from suit. If the Legislature had intended
to change the rule that obtained in this state so long and to declare liability on the part of the state, it would not
have left so important a matter to mere inference, but would have done so in express terms.
‣ This statute has been considered by this court in at least two cases, arising under different facts, and in both it
was held that said statute did not create any liability or cause of action against the state where none

existed before, but merely gave an additional remedy to enforce such liability as would have existed if
the statute had not been enacted
‣ The statute we are discussing disclose no intention to create against the state a new and heretofore
unrecognized class of liabilities, but only an intention to provide a judicial tribunal where well recognized
existing liabilities can be adjudicated.
‣ In this case, the act passed by the legislature does NOT operate to extend the Government's liability to any
cause not previously recognized
‣ Vicarious Liability of the State
‣ Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads:” The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special
agent, but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the
act performed, in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable.”
‣ That the obligation to indemnify for damages which a third person causes to another by his fault or negligence is
based, on that the person obligated, by his own fault or negligence, takes part in the act or omission of the third
party who caused the damage.
‣ It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of law, is NOT responsible for the damages
suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the
functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part
of the state in the organization of branches of public service and in the appointment of its agents; on the
contrary, we must presuppose all foresight humanly possible on its part in order that each branch of
service serves the general weal an that of private persons interested in its operation. Between these latter
and the state, therefore, no relations of a private nature governed by the civil law can arise except in a case where
the state acts as a judicial person capable of acquiring rights and contracting obligations.
‣ That although in some cases the state might by virtue of the general principle set forth in article 1902 respond for
all the damage that is occasioned to private parties by orders or resolutions which by fault or negligence are made
by branches of the central administration acting in the name and representation of the state itself and as an
external expression of its sovereignty in the exercise of its executive powers, yet said article is not applicable in
the case of damages said to have been occasioned to the petitioners by an executive official, acting in the
exercise of his powers, in proceedings to enforce the collections of certain property taxes owing by the owner of
the property which they hold in sublease.
‣ That the responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case wherein it acts through a special
agent (and a special agent, in the sense in which these words are employed, is one who receives a definite
and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official) so
that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to
him. This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the acting administration
and who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his
office and which are regulated by law and the regulations
‣ The responsibility of the state is limited to that which it contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a
definite order or commission to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the
claim, and not where the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public official charged with some
administrative or technical office who can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law
of civil responsibility.
‣ Generally the state in the exercising of its governmental functions cannot be sued without its consent (the exception if
it acts through a special agent), but, even if the state gives consent to be sued (such as passing a law), it does not
necessarily mean it can be held liable automatically if a court finds against its favor. Suability is different from liability,
even if the state gives consent and the plaintiff wins in the courts, the state should also give consent to be held liable.
There’s this special mechanism for such claims governed by law (don’t know what law this is but Atty. Lopez says there
is)
2. FONTANILLA V. MALIAMAN, G.R. NO. 55963, DECEMBER 1, 1989
‣ Vicarious Liability of the State; Limited State Liability for Torts Committed Only by a Special Agent
‣ The liability of the State has two aspects. namely:
1. Its public or governmental aspects where it is liable for the tortious acts of special agents only.
2. Its private or business aspects (as when it engages in private enterprises) where it becomes liable as an
ordinary employer
‣ In this jurisdiction, the State assumes a limited liability for the damage caused by the tortious acts or conduct of its
special agent.

‣ Under paragraph 6 of Art. 2180, the State has voluntarily assumed liability for acts done through special
agents. The State's agent, if a public official, must not only be specially commissioned to do a particular
task but that such task must be foreign to said official's usual governmental functions. Where the
government commissions a private individual for a special governmental task, it is acting through a special
agent within the meaning of the provision
‣ State Immunity from Suit only applies when it Exercises Governmental Functions, NOT Proprietary Functions
‣ If the State's agent is not a public official, and is commissioned to perform non-governmental functions,
then the State assumes the role of an ordinary employer and will be held liable as such for its agent's tort.
‣ Certain functions and activities, which can be performed only by the government, are more or less generally
agreed to be "governmental" in character, and so the State is immune from tort liability. On the other hand, a
service which might as well be provided by a private corporation, and particularly when it collects revenues from it,
the function is considered a "proprietary" one, as to which there may be liability for the torts of agents within the
scope of their employment.
3. FONTANILLA V. MALIAMAN, G.R. NO. 55963 & 61045, FEBRUARY 27, 1991
‣ State Immunity from Suit only applies when it Exercises Governmental Functions, NOT Proprietary Functions
‣ The functions of government have been classified into governmental or constituent and proprietary or ministrant.
The former involves the exercise of sovereignty and considered as compulsory; the latter connotes merely the
exercise of proprietary functions and thus considered as optional.
‣ In this MR, court affirmed its previous ruling that the National Irrigation Administration was not created for
purposes of local government. While it may be true that the NIA was essentially a service agency of the
government aimed at promoting public interest and public welfare, such fact does not make the NIA essentially
and purely a "government-function" corporation. NIA was created for the purpose of "constructing, improving,
rehabilitating, and administering all national irrigation systems in the Philippines, including all communal and pump
irrigation projects." Certainly, the state and the community as a whole are largely benefited by the services the
agency renders, but these functions are only incidental to the principal aim of the agency, which is the irrigation of
lands.
D. TEACHERS AND HEADS OF ESTABLISHMENTS
those of persons for whom one is responsible. XXXXXXXXXXXXX
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and
students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
FAMILY CODE
Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child are shall have
special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school,
entity or institution. (349a)
Art. 219. Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable
for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons
exercising substitute parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable.
The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised
the proper diligence required under the particular circumstances.
All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on
quasi-delicts. (n)

AQUINO
‣ Article 218 of the Family Code provides that the school, its administrators, and teachers or the individual, entity or
institution engaged in child care shall have special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child under their
supervision, instruction or custody. As a consequence of the substitute parental authority exercised by the school and
other persons identified under Article 218, the Family Code provides that they are principally and solidarily liable for
damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. (Article 219, Family Code). They can only escape
liability by proving that they exercised the proper diligence required under the particular circumstances.
‣ Whenever the school or teacher is being made liable, the parents and those exercising substitute parental authority are not
free from liability because Article 219 of the Family Code expressly provides that they are subsidiarily liable. The parents
are only subsidiarily liable because persons exercising special parental authority replaces the primary authority of the
parents when the minor is under their custody. Athough parental authority remains, the parent is not supposed to interfere
with the discipline of the school nor with the authority and supervision of the teacher while the child is under instruction.
(Amadora vs. Court of Appeals, citing the dissenting opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Exconde vs. Capuno).
‣ The persons liable under the Family Code are the:
1. School,
2. Administrators
3. Teachers or
4. The individual, entity or institution engaged in child care.
‣ The Code makes the school liable without distinguishing if it is a non-academic or academic school. Hence, a school,
whether academic or non-academic is civilly liable for the acts of minors in their custody, instruction or supervision.
Administrators and teachers include the principal and other persons who are involved in the supervision of the child.
Examples of institutions engaged in child care are day-care centers and establishments found in shopping malls that
charge on a per hour basis for taking care of children. If the school is being sued together with administrators and
teachers, the liability is joint and solidary. (Article 219, Family Code). The rule is in keeping with the rule under Article 2194
of the Civil Code that joint tortfeasors are solidarily liable.
‣ In this case, the parents are merely subsidiarily liable, the person exercising special PA is the one vicariously liable.
‣ Article 218 of the Family Code expressly provides that the responsibility and authority of the school and other persons
exercising special parental authority shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of the
school, entity or institution. The present rule is broad enough to cover all the situations contemplated under Article 2180
(responsibility of the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades over the students)
‣ Unlike Article 2180 where the child should be within the school premises, custody under Article 218 of the Family Code
extends to acts committed inside or outside the school provided that the activity was an authorized activity.
‣ Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, provides that the subsidiary liability of the employer under Article 102 shall also
apply to teachers for felonies committed by their pupils. It should be noted that Article 103 does not also distinguish if the
teacher is a teacher in an academic or non-academic school. No distinction is also present with respect to the age of the
pupil. Hence, a teacher is liable whether he is employed in an academic or non-academic institution and whether the pupil
is a minor or not
ELEMENTS OF PARAGRAPH 7, ART. 2180
1. Kinds of School 1. Academic

2. Non-Academic (Arts and Trade)
2. Tortfeasor Students, pupils and apprentices
3. School Officials 1. Academic: Teacher in charge

Liable 2. Non-Academic (Arts and Trade): School Head
4. Meaning of ‣ Protective and supervisory custody

“Custody” ‣ Requires attendance in school, including recess, but doesn’t time after dismissal
‣ Must be within school premises
‣ Student must be within the disciplinary authority, control, and influence of the school,
regardless whether the semester had began or had ended already
5. Defense of School Proof that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
Officials

TORTFEASOR PERSONS VICARIOUSLY LIABLE
Paragraph 7, Art. Pupils, students, and 1. Academic School: Teacher in charge

2180 apprentices 2. Non-Academic School (arts and trade): Head
Paragraph 4 and 5, Employees Employer

Art. 2180
*Such as the school. Note that under Art. 2180, the school is not liable for
negligence of student, only for its employees (except if the (except if the
student is a working scholar). But the Family Code has changed this.
Schools can be held liable for torts committed by minor- students under
Art. 218 and 219 of the FC.
1. MERCADO V. COURT OF APPEALS, 108 PHIL. 414 (1960)

‣ Vicarious Liability of Heads and Teachers of Schools; “Custody Requirement”
‣ The clause "so long as they remain in their custody," contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards
with the teacher, such that the control, direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents.
‣ In these circumstances the control or influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the
father and mother to the teacher; and so would the responsibility for the torts of the pupil.
2. PALISOC V. BRILLANTES, 41 SCRA 557 (1971)

‣ Vicarious Liability of Heads and Teachers of Schools
‣ The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and students, so
long as they remain in their custody, is that they stand, to a certain extent, as to their pupils and students, in loco
parentis and are called upon to "exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child." This is expressly
provided for in Articles 349, 350 and 352 of the Civil Code.
‣ In the law of torts, the governing principle is that the protective custody of the school heads and teachers is
mandatorily substituted for that of the parents, and hence, it becomes their obligation as well as that of the school
itself to provide proper supervision of the students' activities during the whole time that they are at attendance in
the school, including recess time, as well as to take the necessary precautions to protect the students in their
custody from dangers and hazards that would reasonably be anticipated, including injuries that some student
themselves may inflict willfully or through negligence on their fellow students.
‣ As tersely summarized by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in his dissenting opinion in Exconde, "the basis of the
presumption of negligence of Art. 1903 [now 2180] is some culpa in vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc. are
supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their authority”and "where the parent places the child under the
effective authority of the teacher, the latter, and not the parent, should be the one answerable for the torts
committed while under his custody, for the very reason that the parent is not supposed to interfere with the
discipline of the school nor with the authority and supervision of the teacher while the child is under
instruction." The school itself, likewise, has to respond for the fault or negligence of its school head and teachers
under the same cited article
‣ “Custody Requirement”
‣ "So long as (the students) remain in their custody" means the protective and supervisory custody that the
school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in
the school, including recess time.
‣ There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach the pupil or student who commits
the tortious act must live and board in the school, as erroneously held by the lower court, and the dicta in
Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on which it relied, must now be deemed to have been set aside by the present
decision.
3. AMADORA V. COURT OF APPEALS, 160 SCRA 315 (1988)
‣ Vicarious Liability of Heads and Teachers of Schools; All Kinds of School (Academic or Non-Academic)
Covered under Article 2180
‣ The last paragraph of 2180 should apply to all schools, academic as well as non-academic.
‣ Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by
the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student, following the first part of the provision. This is the
general rule. In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held
liable as an exception to the general rule.

‣ In other words, teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students except where the school is
technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable.
‣ Following the canon of reddendo singula singulis "teachers" should apply to the words "pupils and students" and
"heads of establishments of arts and trades" to the word “apprentices."
‣ Justice JBL Reyes in Exconde Case: “I can see no sound reason for limiting Art. 1903 of the Old Civil Code to
teachers of arts and trades and not to academic ones. What substantial difference is there between them insofar
as concerns the proper supervision and vice over their pupils? It cannot be seriously contended that an academic
teacher is exempt from the duty of watching that his pupils do not commit a tort to the detriment of third Persons,
so long as they are in a position to exercise authority and Supervision over the pupil. In my opinion, in the phrase
"teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades" used in Art. 1903 of the old Civil Code, the words "arts
and trades" does not qualify "teachers" but only "heads of establishments. If, as conceded by all commentators,
the basis of the presumption of negligence of Art. 1903 in some culpa in vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc.
are supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their authority, it would seem clear that where the parent places
the child under the effective authority of the teacher, the latter, and not the parent, should be the one answerable
for the torts committed while under his custody, for the very reason/that the parent is not supposed to interfere
with the discipline of the school nor with the authority and supervision of the teacher while the child is under
instruction. And if there is no authority, there can be no responsibility.”
‣ There is really no substantial distinction between the academic and the non-academic schools insofar as torts
committed by their students are concerned. The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the students
under his control and supervision, whatever the nature of the school where he is teaching
‣ The Court cannot see why different degrees of vigilance should be exercised by the school authorities on the basis
only of the nature of their respective schools. There does not seem to be any plausible reason for relaxing that
vigilance simply because the school is academic in nature and for increasing such vigilance where the school is
non-academic. Notably, the injury subject of liability is caused by the student and not by the school itself nor is it a
result of the operations of the school or its equipment.
‣ The injury contemplated may be caused by any student regardless of the school where he is registered. The
teacher certainly should not be able to excuse himself by simply showing that he is teaching in an academic
school where, on the other hand, the head would be held liable if the school were non-academic.
‣ These questions, though, may be asked: If the teacher of the academic school is to be held answerable for
the torts committed by his students, why is it the head of the school only who is held liable where the injury
is caused in a school of arts and trades? And in the case of the academic or nontechnical school, why not
apply the rule also to the head thereof instead of imposing the liability only on the teacher?
‣ The reason for the disparity can be traced to the fact that historically the head of the school of arts and trades
exercised a closer tutelage over his pupils than the head of the academic school. The old schools of arts and
trades were engaged in the training of artisans apprenticed to their master who personally and directly
instructed them on the technique and secrets of their craft.
‣ The head of the school of arts and trades was such a master and so was personally involved in the task of
teaching his students, who usually even boarded with him and so came under his constant control, supervision
and influence.
‣ By contrast, the head of the academic school was not as involved with his students and exercised only
administrative duties over the teachers who were the persons directly dealing with the students. The head of
the academic school had then (as now) only a vicarious relationship with the students. Consequently, while he
could not be directly faulted for the acts of the students, the head of the school of arts and trades, because of
his closer ties with them, could be so blamed.
‣ It is conceded that the distinction no longer obtains at present in view of the expansion of the schools of arts
and trades, the consequent increase in their enrollment, and the corresponding diminution of the direct and
personal contract of their heads with the students.
‣ Article 2180, however, remains unchanged. In its present state, the provision must be interpreted by the
Court according to its clear and original mandate until the legislature, taking into account the charges in
the situation subject to be regulated, sees fit to enact the necessary amendment.
‣ “Custody Requirement”
‣ The custody requirement does not mean that the student must be boarding with the school authorities, it does
signify that the student should be within the control and under the influence of the school authorities at the time of
the occurrence of the injury.
‣ This does not necessarily mean that such, custody be co-terminous with the semester, beginning with the start of
classes and ending upon the close thereof, and excluding the time before or after such period, such as the period
of registration, and in the case of graduating students, the period before the commencement exercises.

‣ In the view of the Court, the student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the control
and influence of the school and within its premises, whether the semester has not yet begun or has already ended.
‣ It is too tenuous to argue that the student comes under the discipline of the school only upon the start of classes
notwithstanding that before that day he has already registered and thus placed himself under its rules. Neither
should such discipline be deemed ended upon the last day of classes notwithstanding that there may still be
certain requisites to be satisfied for completion of the course, such as submission of reports, term papers,
clearances and the like. During such periods, the student is still subject to the disciplinary authority of the school
and cannot consider himself released altogether from observance of its rules.
‣ As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate student
objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student
right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the responsibility of the school authorities
over the student continues.
‣ Indeed, even if the student should be doing nothing more than relaxing in the campus in the company of his
classmates and friends and enjoying the ambience and atmosphere of the school, he is still within the
custody and subject to the discipline of the school authorities under the provisions of Article 2180.
‣ During all these occasions, it is obviously the teacher-in-charge who must answer for his students' torts, in
practically the same way that the parents are responsible for the child when he is in their custody. The
teacher-in-charge is the one designated by the dean, principal, or other administrative superior to exercise
supervision over the pupils in the specific classes or sections to which they are assigned.
‣ It is not necessary that at the time of the injury, the teacher be physically present and in a position to prevent it.
Custody does not connote immediate and actual physical control but refers more to the influence exerted on the
child and the discipline instilled in him as a result of such influence. Thus, for the injuries caused by the student,
the teacher and not the parent shall be held responsible if the tort was committed within the premises of the
school at any time when its authority could be validly exercised over him.
‣ School is NOT covered under the last paragraph of Art. 2180; Defense of Good Father of Family to Prevent
Damage
‣ In any event, it should be noted that the liability imposed by this article is supposed to fall directly on the teacher
or the head of the school of arts and trades and not on the school itself. If at all, the school, whatever its nature,
may be held to answer for the acts of its teachers or even of the head thereof under the general principle of
respondeat superior, but then it may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it had exercised the diligence of a
bonus paterfamilias.
‣ Such defense is, of course, also available to the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades directly held
to answer for the tort committed by the student. As long as the defendant can show that he had taken the
necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained of, he can exonerate himself from the liability imposed by
Article 2180.
‣ The teacher himself may invoke this defense as it would otherwise be unfair to hold him directly answerable for the
damage caused by his students as long as they are in the school premises and presumably under his influence. In
this respect, the Court is disposed not to expect from the teacher the same measure of responsibility imposed on
the parent for their influence over the child is not equal in degree.
‣ Obviously, the parent can expect more obedience from the child because the latter's dependence on him is
greater than on the teacher. It need not be stressed that such dependence includes the child's support and
sustenance whereas submission to the teacher's influence, besides being coterminous with the period of
custody is usually enforced only because of the students' desire to pass the course. The parent can instill more
las discipline on the child than the teacher and so should be held to a greater accountability than the teacher
for the tort committed by the child.
‣ And if it is also considered that under the article in question, the teacher or the head of the school of arts and
trades is responsible for the damage caused by the student or apprentice even if he is already of age — and
therefore less tractable than the minor — then there should all the more be justification to require from the
school authorities less accountability as long as they can prove reasonable diligence in preventing the injury.
After all, if the parent himself is no longer liable for the student's acts because he has reached majority age and
so is no longer under the former's control, there is then all the more reason for leniency in assessing the
teacher's responsibility for the acts of the student.
‣ Student, Pupil or Apprentice is NOT required to be a minor under the last paragraph of Art. 2180
‣ In this connection, it should be observed that the teacher will be held liable not only when he is acting in loco
parentis for the law does not require that the offending student be of minority age. Unlike the parent, who wig be
liable only if his child is still a minor, the teacher is held answerable by the law for the act of the student under him
regardless of the student's age. Thus, in the Palisoc Case, liability attached to the teacher and the head of the

technical school although the wrongdoer was already of age. In this sense, Article 2180 treats the parent more
favorably than the teacher.
4. YLARDE V. AQUINO, G.R. NO. L-33722, JULY 29, 1988

‣ A principal, as a head, cannot be held liable for the torts of his students if the school he heads is an academic
school and not a school of arts and trades.
‣ Art. 2180 should apply to ALL schools, academic as well as non-academic.

‣ Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed
by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student, following the first part of the provision. This is
the general rule.
‣ In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as
an exception to the general rule.
‣ In other words, teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students except where the school is
technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable. Following the canon of
reddendo singula sinquilis 'teachers' should apply to the words "pupils and students' and 'heads of
establishments of arts and trades to the word "apprentices."
‣ Note that in this case, vicarious liability was not involved, the court merely used the elements of vicarious liability to
disprove the liability of schools and teachers under Art. 2176
5. SALVOSA V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, G.R. NO. 70458, OCTOBER 5, 1988
‣ Under the penultimate paragraph of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and
trades are hable for "damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their
custody." The rationale of such liability is that so long as the student remains in the custody of a teacher, the latter
"stands, to a certain extent, in loco parentis as to the student and is called upon to exercise reasonable
supervision over the conduct of the student.
‣ Custody Requirement
‣ Likewise, "the phrase used in [Art. 2180 — 'so long as (the students) remain in their custody means the protective
and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as
long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time
‣ A "recess," as the concept is embraced in the phrase "at attendance in the school," contemplates a situation of
temporary adjournment of school activities where the student still remains within call of his mentor and is not
permitted to leave the school premises, or the area within which the school activity is conducted. Recess by its
nature does not include dismissal
‣ The mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a school without more does not constitute "attending
school" or being in the "protective and supervisory custody' of the school, as contemplated in the law.
‣ Doesn’t the ruling of the court in this case conflict with the interpretation of “custody” in Amadora? Yes, the ratio in this
case is erroneous. The head of the school in this case should be absolved but not for the reasons provided by the
court, because there was custody in this case (according to Amadora). The head should be absolved in this case, since
he cannot be held liable under Art. 2180 (7) because the school is academic, not one of arts and trade. Note that this
ruling was pre-family code.
6. AQUINAS SCHOOL V. INTON, G.R. NO. 184202, JANUARY 26, 2011

‣ Vicarious Liability of School as Employer for Negligence of Teacher; Existence of Employer-Employee
Relationship
‣ The Court has consistently applied the "four-fold test" to determine the existence of an employer-employee
relationship: the employer
‣ Of the elements, the most crucial is the element of control. Control refers to the right of the employer, whether
actually exercised or reserved, to control the work of the employee as well as the means and methods by which he
accomplishes the same
‣ Schools are covered under par. 5 of Art. 2180 as employers

‣ How does vicarious liability apply in Ylarde and Aquinas considering no student was negligent or at fault here, rather it
was the student who was injured by the act/omissions of the teacher?
7. ST. JOSEPH'S COLLEGE V. MIRANDA, G.R. NO. 182353, JUNE 29, 2010

‣ Vicarious Liability of School as Employer for Negligence of Teacher

‣ In this case, the subject-teacher as well as the adviser were both deemed the “teacher-in-charge” and were held
to be liable for negligence as they both exercised control and supervision over the students
‣ The principal was also held to be likewise culpable under the doctrine of command responsibility because the
teachers were under her direct control and supervision. The negligent acts of the teachers were done within the
scope of their assigned tasks.
‣ The school was also held liable and the defense of due diligence of a good father of a family raised by it did
exculpate it from liability because it has been shown that it was guilty of inexcusable laxity in the supervision of its
teachers (despite an apparent rigid screening process for hiring) and in the maintenance of what should have been
a safe and secured environment for conducting dangerous experiments.
‣ The school is still liable for the wrongful acts of the teachers and employees because it had full information on the
nature of dangerous science experiments but did not take affirmative steps to avert damage and injury to
students. The fact that there has never been any accident in the past during the conduct of science experiments is
not a justification to be complacent in just preserving the status quo and do away with creative foresight to install
safety measures to protect the students. Schools should not simply install safety reminders and distribute safety
instructional manuals. More importantly, schools should provide protective gears and devices to shield students
from expected risks and anticipated dangers.
‣ Ordinarily, the liability of teachers does not extend to the school or university itself, although an educational
institution may be held liable under the principle of RESPONDENT SUPERIOR. It has also been held that the
liability of the employer for the [tortuous] acts or negligence of its employees is primary and solidary, direct
and immediate and not conditioned upon the insolvency of or prior recourse against the negligent
employee
E. RIGHT TO REIMBURSEMENT
Article 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for quasi-delict is solidary. (n)
REMEDY OF PLAINTIFF REMEDY OF PERSON WHO PAYS
1. Solidary Debtors
(Under Rules in Oblicon)
Can recover the proportionate share of the others
2. Two or more persons as Joint- Plaintiff can demand FULL payment
Tortfeasors under Art. 2194 from any party
3. Two tortfeasors solidarily 1. Person liable under 2176 pays: no recovery
liable, one under Art. 2176, the 2. Person liable under Art. 2180 pays: Can recover
other under Art. 2180 full amount paid from the person liable under Art.
2176
1. MENDOZA V. SPOUSES GOMEZ, G.R. NO. 160110, JUNE 18, 2014

‣ Vicarious Liability of Employers in relation to the Registered Owner Rule; Reimbursement as Remedy of the
Registered Owner
‣ The registered owner is deemed the employer of the negligent driver, and is thus vicariously liable under Article
2176, in relation to Article 2180, of the Civil Code. So far as third persons are concerned, the registered owner of
the motor vehicle is the employer of the negligent driver, and the actual employer is considered merely as an agent
of such owner.
‣ Thus, whether there is an employer-employee relationship between the registered owner and the driver is
irrelevant in determining the liability of the registered owner who the law holds primarily and directly responsible for
any accident, injury or death caused by the operation of the vehicle in the streets and highways

‣ Generally, when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee, there instantly arises a
presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the
servant or employee (culpa in eligiendo) or in the supervision over him after the selection (culpa vigilando), or both.
The presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure; consequently, it may be rebutted.
‣ Accordingly, the general rule is that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in the selection and
supervision of his employee he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption
is overcome and he is relieved of liability. However, with the enactment of the motor vehicle registration law, the
defenses available under Article 2180 of the Civil Code - that the employee acts beyond the scope of his assigned
task or that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage – are no longer available
to the registered owner of the motor vehicle, because the motor vehicle registration law, to a certain extent,
modified Article 2180
‣ This does NOT mean that the registered owner is left without any recourse. Under the civil law principle of
unjust enrichment, the registered owner of the motor vehicle has a right to be indemnified by the actual
employer of the driver; and under Article 2181 of the Civil Code, whoever pays for the damage caused by
his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of
the claim.
2. PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, G.R. NO. 66102-04, AUGUST 30, 1990
‣ Driver cannot be held jointly and severally liable with the carrier in case of breach of the contract of carriage.
‣ Firstly, the contract of carriage is between the carrier and the passenger, and in the event of contractual liability,
the carrier is exclusively responsible therefore to the passenger, even if such breach be due to the negligence of
his driver. In other words, the carrier can neither shift his liability on the contract to his driver nor share it with him,
for his driver's negligence is his.
‣ Secondly, if We make the driver jointly and severally liable with the carrier, that would make the carrier's liability
personal instead of merely vicarious and consequently, entitled to recover only the share which corresponds to the
driver, contradictory to the explicit provision of Article 2181 of the New Civil Code
SEE ALSO: CEREZO V. TUAZON, G.R. NO. 141538, MARCH 23, 2004
‣ Jurisdiction over the employee is NOT necessarily before the action can proceed against the employer under an action
based on quasi-delict. Under the rules on OBLICON, the creditor can recover from either solidary debtor, the one who
pays can recover from the other solidary debtor.
‣ But note that under Art. 2181, the employer who pays can recover the full amount from the employee liable
F. DISTINGUISHED FROM SUBSIDIARY LIABILITY UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE
Article 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of establishments. - In default of the
persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other persons or corporations shall be civilly liable for
crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or
special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their employees.Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for
the restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within their houses from guests lodging therein, or for the payment of
the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person
representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the directions which
such innkeeper or his representative may have given them with respect to the care and vigilance over such goods. No
liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons unless committed by the
innkeeper's employees.
Article 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. - The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article
shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed
by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.
1. CARPIO V. DOROJA, 180 SCRA 1 (1989)

‣ Subsidiary Liability of the Employer for Acts/Omissions of Employees based on Delict
‣ The issue raised in this case is; whether or not the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator may be enforced in the
same criminal proceeding against the driver where the award was given, or in a separate civil action.

‣ The law involved in the instant case is Article 103 in relation to Article 100, both of the Revised Penal Code, which
reads thus: “Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability established in the next
preceding article shall apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for
felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.”
‣ In order that an employer may be held subsidiarily liable for the employee's civil liability in the criminal action, it
should be shown:
1. That the employer, etc. is engaged in any kind of industry

2. That the employee committed the offense in the discharge of his duties and
3. That the employee is insolvent
‣ The subsidiary liability of the employer, however, arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal
action. All these requisites present, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon the employee's
conviction and upon proof of the latter's insolvency.
‣ Employer’s Subsidiary Liability can be Enforced in the Execution Stage of the Criminal Action with Proper
Notice and Hearing; Employer need NOT be impleaded in the Criminal Case; Separate Civil Action is also NOT
necessary.
‣ The filing of a separate complaint against the operator for recovery of subsidiary liability is not necessary since his
liability is clear from the decision against the accused. Such being the case, it is not indispensable for the question
of subsidiary liability to be passed upon by the appellate court. Such subsidiary liability is already implied from the
appellate court's decision.
‣ The employer has been NOT deprived of his day in court, because the case is not one wherein the employer is
sued for a primary liability under the Civil Code but one in which the subsidiary civil liability incident to and
dependent upon his employee's criminal negligence is sought to be enforced.
‣ Considering the subsidiary liability imposed upon the employer by law, he is in substance and in effect a party to
the criminal case. Ergo, the employer's subsidiary liability may be determined and enforced in the criminal case as
part of the execution proceedings against the employee
‣ The proceeding for the enforcement of the subsidiary civil liability may be considered as part of the
proceeding for the execution of the judgment. A case in which an execution has been issued is regarded as still
pending so that all proceedings on the execution are proceedings in the suit. There is no question that the court
which rendered the judgment has a general supervisory control over its process of execution, and this power
carries with it the right to determine every question of fact and law which may be involved in the execution.
‣ Once all the requisites as earlier discussed are met, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable,
without need of a separate action. Such being the case, the subsidiary liability can be enforced in the same
case where the award was given, and this does not constitute an act of amending the decision.
‣ It becomes incumbent upon the court to grant a motion for subsidiary writ of execution (but only after
the employer has been heard), upon conviction of the employee and after execution is returned unsatisfied
due to the employee's insolvency.
‣ Remember that the employer is primarily and directly liable under quasi-delict for tort of employee, but is merely
subsidiarily liable for civil liability for delicts committed by employee
‣ No need to amend the decision to include the subsidiary liability of the employer.
‣ The decision on subsidiary civil liability ex delicto of the employee is NOT conclusive as to the liability of the
employer, the employer can still raise several defenses
2. BANTOTO V. BOBIS, 18 SCRA 690 (1966)
‣ Insolvency of the Employee Need NOT be Stated in the Criminal Complaint for Satisfaction/Liability of
Employer to Arise
‣ Issue that was raised by the employer was that the insolvency of the employee was not stated in the criminal
complaint
‣ Court said that the master's liability, under the Revised Penal Code, for the crimes committed by his
servants and employees in the discharge of their duties, is NOT predicated upon the insolvency of the
latter.
‣ The insolvency of the servant or employee is nowhere mentioned in said article as a condition precedent. In
truth, such insolvency is required only when the liability of the master is being made effective by execution
levy, but not for the rendition of judgment against the master.
‣ The subsidiary character of the employer's responsibility merely imports that the latter's property is not be
seized without first exhausting that of the servant. And by analogy to a regular guarantor (who is the prototype

of persons subsidiarily responsible), the master may not demand prior exhaustion of the servant's (principal
obligor's) properties if he can not "point out to the creditor available property of the debtor within Philippine
territory, sufficient to cover the amount of the debt” This rule is logical, for as between the offended party (as
creditor) and the culprit's master or employer, it is the latter who is in a better position to determine the resources
and solvency of the servant or employee.
‣ Insolvency of the employee is NOT relevant for the liability of the employer to attach, it’s only relevant at the execution
stage.
‣ Subsidiary liability means that the employer has the “right of excussion”, parang guarantor soya
3. YONAHA V. COURT OF APPEALS, 255 SCRA 397 (1996)
‣ Requirement of Proper Notice and Hearing before a Writ of Subsidiary Execution may be issued against the
Employer
‣ This Court has sanctioned the enforcement of this subsidiary liability in the same criminal proceedings in which the
employee is adjudged guilty, on the thesis that it really is a part of, and merely an incident in, the execution
process of the judgment.
‣ But, execution against the employer must not issue as just a matter of course, and it behooves the court,
as a measure of due process to the employer, to determine and resolve a priori, in a hearing set for the
purpose, the legal applicability and propriety of the employer's liability.
‣ The requirement is mandatory even when it appears prima facie that execution against the convicted
employee cannot be satisfied.
‣ The court must convince itself that the convicted employee is in truth in the employ of the employer; that the latter
is engaged in an industry of some kind; that the employee has committed the crime to which civil liability attaches
while in the performance of his duties as such; and that execution against the employee is unsuccessful by reason
of insolvency.
‣ The assumption that, since petitioner in this case did not aver any exculpatory facts in her "motion to stay and
recall," as well as in her motion for reconsideration, which could save her from liability; a hearing would be a futile
and a sheer rigmarole is unacceptable. The employer must be given his full day in court.
‣ Subsidiary Liability of the Employer for Acts/Omissions of Employees based on Delict
‣ To repeat, the subsidiary liability of an employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code requires:
1. The existence of an employer-employee relationship;
2. That the employer is engaged in some kind of industry
3. That the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in the
discharge of his duties (not necessarily any offense he commits "while" in the discharge of such duties); and
4. That said employee is insolvent.
‣ The judgment of conviction of the employee, of course, concludes the employer
‣ A motion to enforce the subsidiary liability of the employer is a litigated motion, thus it must be set for hearing and
notice is required. Notice and hearing is a right of the employer to give him the opportunity to be heard and defend
himself. This is not for purposes of challenging the judgment on liability of the employee, but rather, for purposes of
due process of the employer so that he can set up the following defenses:
1. No employment relationship
2. Employee was not engaged in the discharge of his duties
3. Employee is not insolvent (right of excussion)

VI. PRIMARY LIABILITY
Article 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it
may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from
force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered damage. (1905)
Article 2186. Every owner of a motor vehicle shall file with the proper government office a bond executed by a
government- controlled corporation or office, to answer for damages to third persons. The amount of the bond and other
terms shall be fixed by the competent public official. (n)
Article 2187. Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods shall be liable for death
or injuries caused by any noxious or harmful substances used, although no contractual relation exists between them and
the consumers. (n)
Article 2188. There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant if the death or injury results
from his possession of dangerous weapons or substances, such as firearms and poison, except when the possession or
use thereof is indispensable in his occupation or business. (n)
Article 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any
person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under
their control or supervision. (n)
Article 2190. The proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damages resulting from its total or partial
collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs. (1907)
Article 2191. Proprietors shall also be responsible for damages caused:

(1) By the explosion of machinery which has not been taken care of with due diligence, and the inflammation of explosive
substances which have not been kept in a safe and adequate place;
(2) By excessive smoke, which may be harmful to persons or property;
(3) By the falling of trees situated at or near highways or lanes, if not caused by force majeure;
(4) By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or deposits of infectious matter, constructed without precautions suitable
to the place. (1908)
Article 2192. If damage referred to in the two preceding articles should be the result of any defect in the construction
mentioned in article 1723, the third person suffering damages may proceed only against the engineer or architect or
contractor in accordance with said article, within the period therein fixed. (1909)
Article 2193. The head of a family that lives in a building or a part thereof, is responsible for damages caused by things
thrown or falling from the same. (1910)

Article 1723. The engineer or architect who drew up the plans and specifications for a building is liable for damages if
within fifteen years from the completion of the structure, the same should collapse by reason of a defect in those plans
and specifications, or due to the defects in the ground. The contractor is likewise responsible for the damages if the
edifice falls, within the same period, on account of defects in the construction or the use of materials of inferior quality
furnished by him, or due to any violation of the terms of the contract. If the engineer or architect supervises the
construction, he shall be solidarily liable with the contractor.
Acceptance of the building, after completion, does not imply waiver of any of the cause of action by reason of any defect
mentioned in the preceding paragraph.
The action must be brought within ten years following the collapse of the building. (n)
MEMORIZE: ARTICLES 2183 TO 2193, AND 1723
A. POSSESSORS/USERS OF ANIMALS
Article 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it
may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from
force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered damage. (1905)
AQUINO: The language of the Art. 2183 reveals an evident intent to make the possessor or whoever makes use of the animal,
liable independent of fault. The only exception is when the damage was caused by force majeure or by the person who
suffered the damage. Additionally, there is an opinion to the effect that the owner or posssesor of the animal is still liable even
if damage was caused by the animal through the fault of third persons. If the acts of a third person cannot be foreseen or
prevented, then the situation is similar to that of force majeure and the possessor is not liable.
1. VESTIL V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, 179 SCRA 47 (1989)

‣ According to Manresa the obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on
the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. It is based on natural
equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must
answer for the damage which such animal may cause.
‣ The defendant's contention that they could not be expected to exercise remote control of the dog is not acceptable.
In fact, Article 2183 of the Civil Code holds the possessor liable even if the animal should "escape or be lost"
and so be removed from his control. And it does not matter either that, as the petitioners also contend, the dog was
tame and was merely provoked by the child into biting her. The law does not speak only of vicious animals but
covers even tame ones as long as they cause injury.
‣ Note that due diligence of a good father of a family is NOT a defense of the animal possessor or user under Art. 2183,
however, defense of fortuitous event/force majeure or that the cause of the injury was the plaintiff’s own fault are valid
defenses.
‣ This is one of the strict liability torts, no actual fault or negligence is required to impose liability. The defendant cannot
raise the defense of due diligence to escape liability
‣ Know the “first bite rule” which is used in common-law to determine whether the animal is vicious or tame. It is only
upon the animal’s first bite that the owner will know whether the animal is vicious, as before this he had no idea. The
first bite is not actionable, the owner gets a free pass on the first bite. But note that this rule is NOT applicable in the
Philippines because 2183 does not make a distinction between tame and vicious animals.
‣ Remember the Afialda Case, 2183 does not apply if the injured person is the owner/care taker of the animal
B. OWNERS OF MOTOR VEHICLES

those of persons for whom one is responsible. XXXXXX
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. XXXXXX
C. MANUFACTURERS AND PROCESSORS
Article 2187. Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods shall be liable for death
or injuries caused by any noxious or harmful substances used, although no contractual relation exists between them and
the consumers. (n)
Art. 2187 is also a strict liability tort, public policy makes the manufacturers and processors liable for placing harmful
substances in the market.
There is no SC decision yet on Art. 2187, but these are the elements:
1. Tortfeasor is a manufacturer and processor (NOT sellers)
2. Goods involved are foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods
3. Use of noxious or harmful substances
4. Death or injury results
5. Plaintiff is either the:
a. Consumer
b. User
c. Purchaser
How do you hold the manufacturers/sellers of defective products liable?

1. Art. 2176, for Tort
2. Art. 365 of the RPC, for Delict/Criminal Negligence
3. Breach of Warranty
‣ Remedies? See law on sales
a. Accion redhibitoria (action to withdraw)
b. Accion quanti-minoris (action of proportionate reduction of price)
4. Art. 33 for Fraud or Deceit
5. Consumer Act (but only for consumer goods such as personal, family, household and agricultural purposes)

1. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 110295, OCTOBER 18, 1993.
‣ The vendee's remedies against a vendor with respect to the warranties against hidden defects of or encumbrances
upon the thing sold are not limited to those prescribed in Article 1567 of the Civil Code, “Art. 1567. In the case of
Articles 1561, 1562, 1564, 1565 and 1566, the vendee may elect between withdrawing from the contract and
demanding a proportionate reduction of the price, with damages either case.
‣ The vendee may also ask for the annulment of the contract upon proof of error or fraud, in which case the ordinary
rule on obligations shall be applicable
‣ Under the law on obligations, responsibility arising from fraud is demandable in all obligations and any waiver of an
action for future fraud is void. Responsibility arising from negligence is also demandable in any obligation, but
such liability may be regulated by the courts, according to the circumstances. Those guilty of fraud, negligence, or
delay in the performance of their obligations and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof are liable
for damages
‣ The vendor could likewise be liable for quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, and an action based
thereon may be brought by the vendee.
‣ While it may be true that the pre-existing contract between the parties may, as a general rule, bar the applicability
of the law on quasi-delict, the liability may itself be deemed to arise from quasi-delict, i.e., the acts which breaks
the contract may also be a quasi-delict. In other words, liability for quasi-delict may still exist despite the presence
of contractual relations
‣ Under American law, the liabilities of a manufacturer or seller of injury-causing products may be based on:
1. Negligence
2. Breach of warranty
3. Tort, or
4. Other grounds such as fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.
‣ Quasi-delict, as defined in Article 2176 of the Civil Code, (which is known in Spanish legal treaties as culpa
aquiliana, culpa extra-contractual or cuasi-delitos) is homologous but not identical to tort under the common law,
which includes not only negligence, but also intentional criminal acts, such as assault and battery, false
imprisonment and deceit.
‣ Note that the four sources of liabilities of manufacturers or sellers under american law are also available under
Philippine Law
D. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
Republic Act No. 7160: “Local Government Code of 1991",
Section 24. Liability for Damages. - Local government units and their officials are not exempt from liability for death or
injury to persons or damage to property.
Article 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any
person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under
their control or supervision. (n)
1. CITY OF MANILA V. TEOTICO, 22 SCRA 267 (1968)

‣ Application of Art. 2189 contrasted with conflicting law
‣ Section 4 of Republic Act No. 409 (Charter of the City of Manila): “The city shall not be liable or held for damages
or injuries to persons or property arising from the failure of the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other city officer,
to enforce the provisions of this chapter, or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence of said Mayor, Municipal
Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions.”

‣ Art. 2189: “Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by,
any person by reason of defective conditions of road, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works
under their control or supervision.”
‣ Insofar as its territorial application is concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a special law and the Civil Code a general
legislation; but, as regards the subject-matter of the provisions above quoted, Section 4 of Republic Act 409
establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the City of Manila for: "damages or injury to persons or
property arising from the failure of" city officers "to enforce the provisions of" said Act "or any other law or
ordinance, or from negligence" of the city "Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting
to enforce said provisions." Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a particular
prescription making "provinces, cities and municipalities . . . liable for damages for the death of, or injury suffered
by any person by reason" — specifically — "of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings,
and other-public works under their control or supervision."
‣ In other words, said section 4 refers to liability arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the object
thereof, whereas Article 2189 governs liability due to "defective streets," in particular. Since the present
action is based upon the alleged defective condition of a road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.
‣ Mere “Control and Supervision” is sufficient for liability under Art. 2189
‣ Under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach that the
defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What
said article requires is that the province, city or municipality have either "control or supervision" over said street or
road.
2. JIMENEZ V. CITY OF MANILA, 150 SCRA 510 (1987)

‣ Reiterates and cited the ruling in City of Manila vs Teotico
‣ Reiterates and cited the ruling in City of Manila vs Teotico
3. GUILATCO V. CITY OF DAGUPAN, 171 SCRA 382 (1989)

‣ The express provision in the charter holding the city not liable for damages or injuries sustained by persons or
property due to the failure of any city officer to enforce the provisions of the charter, cannot be used to exempt the
city, as in the case at bar.
‣ The charter only lays down general rules regulating the liability of the city. On the other hand article 2189 applies in
particular to the liability arising from "defective streets, public buildings and other public works.
‣ It is not even necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the province, city or municipality for liability to
attach. The article only requires that either control or supervision is exercised over the defective road or street
E. BUILDING PROPRIETORS
Article 2190. The proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damages resulting from its total or partial
collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs. (1907)
Article 2191. Proprietors shall also be responsible for damages caused:

(1) By the explosion of machinery which has not been taken care of with due diligence, and the inflammation of explosive
substances which have not been kept in a safe and adequate place;
(2) By excessive smoke, which may be harmful to persons or property;
(3) By the falling of trees situated at or near highways or lanes, if not caused by force majeure;
(4) By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or deposits of infectious matter, constructed without precautions suitable
to the place. (1908)

Article 2192. If damage referred to in the two preceding articles should be the result of any defect in the construction
mentioned in article 1723, the third person suffering damages may proceed only against the engineer or architect or
contractor in accordance with said article, within the period therein fixed. (1909)
Article 2193. The head of a family that lives in a building or a part thereof, is responsible for damages caused by things
thrown or falling from the same. (1910)
1. DE ROY V. COURT OF APPEALS, 157 SCRA 757 (1988)

‣ Doctrine of Last Clear Chance is not a defense against liability under Art. 2190
‣ Nor was there error in rejecting defendant’s argument that the plaintiffs had the "last clear chance" to avoid the
accident if only they heeded the warning to vacate the tailoring shop and , therefore, the defendant’s prior
negligence should be disregarded, since the doctrine of "last clear chance," which has been applied to
vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this case.
F. ENGINEERS/ARCHITECTS/CONTRACTORS
Article 1723. The engineer or architect who drew up the plans and specifications for a building is liable for damages if
within fifteen years from the completion of the structure, the same should collapse by reason of a defect in those plans
and specifications, or due to the defects in the ground. The contractor is likewise responsible for the damages if the
edifice falls, within the same period, on account of defects in the construction or the use of materials of inferior quality
furnished by him, or due to any violation of the terms of the contract. If the engineer or architect supervises the
construction, he shall be solidarily liable with the contractor.
Acceptance of the building, after completion, does not imply waiver of any of the cause of action by reason of any defect
mentioned in the preceding paragraph.
The action must be brought within ten years following the collapse of the building. (n)
Elements of Art. 1723
1. Persons 1. Engineer or architect:

Covered a. Who drew up the plans and specifications
b. Who supervises the construction
2. Contractor
2. Instances 1. Engineer or architect

of Liability a. The building should collapse:
i. By reason of a defect in those plans and specifications, or
ii. Due to the defects in the ground.
b. If they supervise the construction, they are solidarily liable with the contractor
2. Contractor
a. If the edifice falls, on account of defects in the construction or the use of materials of inferior
quality furnished by him
b. Due to any violation of the terms of the contract.
3. Important 1. When the persons covered under Art. 1723 may be liable
Periods
‣ Within fifteen years from the completion of the structure
2. When the action based on Art. 1723 must be brought:

‣ Within ten years following the collapse of the building
1. NAKPIL & SONS V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-47851, OCTOBER 3, 1986

‣ Application of the Doctrine of “Fortuitous Events” in relation to Art. 1723

‣ The issue was whether or not an act of God-an unusually strong earthquake-which caused the failure of the
building, exempts from liability, parties who are otherwise liable because of their negligence.
‣ The general rule is that no person shall be responsible for events which could not be foreseen or which though
foreseen, were inevitable (Article 1174, New Civil Code).
‣ An act of God has been defined as an accident, due directly and exclusively to natural causes without human
intervention, which by no amount of foresight, pains or care, reasonably to have been expected, could have been
prevented.
‣ To exempt the obligor from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, for a breach of an obligation due to an "act
of God," the following must concur:
a. The cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the will of the debtor;
b. The event must be either unforseeable or unavoidable;
c. The event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner;
and
d. The debtor must be free from any participation in, or aggravation of the injury to the creditor
‣ Thus, if upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of God, there concurs a corresponding fraud, negligence,
delay or violation or contravention in any manner of the tenor of the obligation as provided for in Article 1170 of the
Civil Code, which results in loss or damage, the obligor cannot escape liability.
‣ The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must be one occasioned exclusively by
the violence of nature and all human agencies are to be excluded from creating or entering into the cause of the
mischief. When the effect, the cause of which is to be considered, is found to be in part the result of the participation
of man, whether it be from active intervention or neglect, or failure to act, the whole occurrence is thereby humanized,
as it were, and removed from the rules applicable to the acts of God.
‣ Thus it has been held that when the negligence of a person concurs with an act of God in producing a loss,
such person is not exempt from liability by showing that the immediate cause of the damage was the act of
God. To be exempt from liability for loss because of an act of God, he must be free from any previous
negligence or misconduct by which that loss or damage may have been occasioned.
‣ In this case, the destruction was not purely an act of God. Truth to tell hundreds of ancient buildings in the vicinity
were hardly affected by the earthquake. Only one thing spells out the fatal difference; gross negligence and evident
bad faith, without which the damage would not have occurred.
2. NAKPIL & SONS V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-47851, APRIL 15, 1988
‣ Application of the Doctrine of “Fortuitous Events” in relation to Art. 1723
‣ One who negligently creates a dangerous condition cannot escape hability for the natural and probable
consequences thereof, although the act of a third person, or an act of God for which he is not responsible,
intervenes to precipitate the loss.
‣ Meaning of “Collapse” in Art. 1723

‣ The defendant stresses that subject building did not disintegrate completely as the term “collapse" in Art. 1723 is
supposed to connote.
‣ After earthquake the building in question was not totally lost, the collapse was only partial and the building could
still be restored. But after the subsequent earthquakes there was no question that further damage was caused to
the property resulting in an eventual and unavoidable collapse or demolition (compete collapse). In fact, the
building was authorized by the trial court to be demolished at the expense of the plaintiff. Note that a needed
demolition is in fact a form of “collapse”.
G. STRICT LIABILITY TORTS
AQUINO: There is strict liability if one is made liable independent of fault, negligence or intent after establishing certain facts
specified by law. Strict liability tort can be committed even if reasonable care was exercised and regardless of the state of
mind of the actor at that time. Liability is imposed even without fault or negligence
Instances of Strict Liability (According to Aquino)

1. Possessors and Users of Animals (Art. 2183)

2. Falling Objects (Art. 2193)
‣ It is evident from the text of Article 2193 that the liability is absolute. It does not indicate a presumption or admit proof
of care.
‣ The term head of the family is not limited to the owner of the building and it may even include the lessee thereof.
(Dingcong vs Kanaan, but note that in this case, the SC seems to suggest that negligence is required)
3. Liability of Employers in case of Death or Injuries of Employees (Art. 1711)
‣ Article 1711 imposes an obligation on owners of enterprises and other employers to pay for the death or injuries to
their employees. The language of the provision indicates that the same is strict liability because liability exists even if
the cause is purely accidental.
4. Nuisances (Art. 695)
Instances of Strict Liability (According to Atty. Lopez)

1. Possessors and Users of Animals (Art. 2183)
2. Use of Noxious and Harmful Substances by Manufacturers or Processors of Foodstuffs, Drinks, Toilet Articles, Etc. (Art.
2187)
3. Falling Objects (Art. 2193) 

VII. SPECIAL TORTS (HUMAN RELATIONS)
A. ABUSE OF RIGHTS AND ACTS CONTRA BONUS MORES
Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter
for the same.
Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Article 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
MEMORIZE: ARTICLES 19, 20, AND 21
Elements of Abuse of Rights (Art. 19):

1. The existence of a legal right or duty;
2. Which is exercised in bad faith; and
3. For the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
 
Elements of Acts Contra Bonus Mores (Art. 21):
1. There is an act which is legal;
2. But which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; and
3. It is done with intent to injure.
What is Malicious Prosecution?

‣ A tort action for malicious prosecution has been defined as “an action for damages brought by one against another whom
a criminal prosecution, civil suit, or other legal proceedings has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause,
after the termination of such prosecution, suit or proceeding in favor of the defendant therein. The gist of the action is the
putting of legal process in force, regularly, for the mere purpose of vexation or injury.” The action which is terminated
should be one begun in malice without probable cause to believe the charges can be sustained and is instituted with the
intention of injuring another and which terminates in favor of the person prosecuted The statutory bases of the action are
not only Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the New Civil Code but also Articles 26, 32, 33, 35, 2217 and 2219(8). (AQUINO citing a
lot of juris)
 
Elements of Malicious Prosecution (As a special tort provided for by jurisprudence)
1. The fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor, and that the action was
finally terminated with an acquittal;
2. That in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause;
3. The prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice
Legal Malice?

‣ The prosecutor in the case is actuated by malice if he acted with “inexcusable intent to injure, oppress, vex, annoy or
humiliate.”
Does Malicious Prosecution only involve Criminal Cases?

‣ NO, it applies to civil cases as well. While generally associated with unfounded criminal actions, the term has been
expanded to include unfounded civil suits instituted just to vex and humiliate the defendant despite the absence of a
cause of action or probable cause (Martires vs Cokieng 2005)
Is the “Mere” Breach of a Promise to Marry actionable?

‣ NO. As a general rule, a breach of promise to marry by itself is NOT actionable. However, it becomes actionable if there
are additional circumstances which make it fall within the purview of Articles 19, 20, 21 or 2176 of the New Civil Code. In
such cases, there is another act independent of the breach of promise to marry which gives rise to liability. These include
cases where:
1. There was financial damage (Wassmer vs Velez 1964)
2. Social humiliation was caused to one of the parties, and
3. Where there was moral seduction (Baksh vs CA 1993)
1. FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY V. PACILAN, G.R. NO. 157314, JULY 29, 2005
‣ Elements of Abuse of Rights under Art. 19
‣ The elements of abuse of rights are the following:
1. The existence of a legal right or duty;

2. Which is exercised in bad faith; and
‣ Malice or bad faith is at the core of the said provision. The law always presumes good faith and any person who
seeks to be awarded damages due to acts of another has the burden of proving that the latter acted in bad faith or
with ill-motive
‣ Good faith refers to the state of the mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of
the intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another.
‣ Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence, dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity
and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty due to some motives or interest or ill-will that partakes of
the nature of fraud.
‣ Malice connotes ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and
unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad motive
‣ Application of Principle of Damnum Absque Injuria in relation to Abuse of Rights Doctrine

‣ In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such
injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff – a concurrence of injury to the
plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it.
‣ The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that the individual was injured in contemplation
of law. Thus, there must first be a breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before
damages may be awarded; and the breach of such duty should be the proximate cause of the injury
‣ There can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of
a legal duty. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone, the law affords no
remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations are
often called damnum absque injuria.
‣ The defense of good faith (which is presumed) is the defense available to the defendant in for alleged liability due to
abuse of rights. This is really the same as the defense of damnum absque injuria which is premised on the exercise of
rights in good faith
2. RELLOSA V. PELLOSIS, G.R. NO. 138964, AUGUST 9, 2001
‣ Abuse of Rights Doctrine as a Source of Rights and Obligations
‣ "Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith."

‣ This provision in our law is not just a declaration of principle for it can in itself constitute, when unduly ignored or
violated, a valid source of a cause of action or defense.
‣ A right is a power, privilege, or immunity guaranteed under a constitution, statute or decisional law, or recognized
as a result of long usage, constitutive of a legally enforceable claim of one person against another.
‣ The exercise of rights is not without limitations. The abuse of rights rule established in Article 19 of the Civil Code
requires every person to act with justice, to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith.
‣ When a right is exercised in a manner which discards these norms resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong is
committed for which the actor can be held accountable.
‣ In this instance, the issue is not so much about the existence of the right or validity of the order of demolition as
the question of whether or not petitioners have acted in conformity with, and not in disregard of, the standard set
by Article 19 of the Civil Code.
3. CEBU COUNTRY CLUB, INC., V. ELIZAGAQUE, G.R. NO. 160273, JANUARY 18, 2008
‣ Art. 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards
which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties.
‣ These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good
faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human
conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed.
‣ A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the
source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be held responsible.
‣ The exercise of a right, though legal by itself, must nonetheless be in accordance with the proper norm. When the
right is exercised arbitrarily, unjustly or excessively and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed
for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.
‣ Remedy for Violation of Abuse of Rights Doctrine; Role of Art. 20 and 21

‣ But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of
social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either
Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.
‣ Defense of Damnum Absque Injuria inapplicable if there is an abuse of rights
‣ As to defendant’s’ reliance on the principle of damnum absque injuria or damage without injury, suffice it to state
that the same is misplaced. In Amonoy v. Gutierrez, we held that this principle does not apply when there is an
abuse of a person’s right, as in this case.
‣ Mere denial of membership is not abuse of rights, unless there is bad faith. In this case, there was bad faith and fraud
which amounted to an act contra bonus mores.
4. NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN V. REYES, G.R. NO. 154259, FEBRUARY 28, 2005
‣ Abuse of Rights Doctrine as a Source of Rights and Obligations; Elements
‣ Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, is not a panacea for
all human hurts and social grievances
‣ When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in
damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible.
‣ The object of this article, therefore, is to set certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of
one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties.
‣ These standards are the following: act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith. Its
antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or intent to injure.
‣ Its elements are the following:
1. There is a legal right or duty;
2. Which is exercised in bad faith;

‣ When Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code.

‣ Article 20 pertains to damages arising from a violation of law
‣ Article 21 refers to acts contra bonus mores (contrary to morals)
‣ Elements of Liability under Art. 21

2. But which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; and
‣ A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act complained of must be intentional
‣ Bad judgment, coupled with good intentions does NOT amount to bad faith. In this case, at most, the defendant
merely exercised bad judgment. Remember that there must be an intention to injure another (3rd element of abuse of
rights)
5. CALATAGAN GOLF CLUB, INC., V. CLEMENTE, G.R. NO. 165443, APRIL 16, 2009
‣ Nature of Rights and Obligations under Art. 19, 20, and 21
‣ These provisions enunciate a general obligation under law for every person to act fairly and in good faith towards
one another.
6. UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST V. JADER, G.R. NO. 132344, FEBRUARY 17, 2000
‣ Nature and Purpose of the Abuse of Rights Doctrine
‣ Art. 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of
moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide specifically in statutory law.
‣ In civilized society, men must be able to assume that others will do them no intended injury — that others will
commit no internal aggressions upon them; that their fellowmen, when they act affirmatively will do so with due
care which the ordinary understanding and moral sense of the community exacts and that those with whom they
deal in the general course of society will act in good faith.
‣ The ultimate thing in the theory of liability is justifiable reliance under conditions of civilized society
‣ Good Faith must be absent for one to be liable for Abuse of Rights
‣ Absence of good faith must be sufficiently established for a successful prosecution by the aggrieved party in a suit
for abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code.
‣ Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of another, even though the
forms and technicalities of the law, together with the absence of all information or belief of facts, would render the
transaction unconscientious
‣ In this case, what was involved was a breach of contract of education, but the doctrine of abuse of rights was taken
into consideration as basis of awarding moral damages (See Art. 2219[10])
7. ALBENSON ENTERPRISES CORP. V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 88694, JANUARY 11, 1993
‣ Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain
standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's
duties.
faith.
‣ The law, therefore, recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights: that in their exercise, the norms of human
‣ A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source
of some illegality.
‣ When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results
in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.
‣ Nature of Rights and Obligations under Art. 19, 20, and 21

‣ Although the requirements of each provision is different, these three (3) articles are all related to each other.
‣ As the eminent Civilist Senator Arturo Tolentino puts it: "With this article (Article 21), combined with articles 19 and
20, the scope of our law on civil wrongs has been very greatly broadened; it has become much more supple and
adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. It is now difficult to conceive of any malevolent exercise of a right
which could not be checked by the application of these articles”

‣ Thus, under any of these three (3) provisions of law, an act which causes injury to another may be made the basis
for an award of damages.
‣ There is a common element under Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act must be intentional. However, Article 20
does not distinguish: the act may be done either "willfully", or "negligently"
‣ Application of Art. 19, 20 and 21

‣ There is however, no hard and fast rule which can be applied to determine whether or not the principle of abuse of
rights may be invoked.
‣ The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated, resulting in damages under
Articles 20 and 21 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case.
‣ Elements of Abuse of Rights Doctrine
‣ The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the following:
1. There is a legal right or duty;
2. Which is exercised in bad faith;
‣ Nature of Liability under Art. 20

‣ Article 20 speaks of the general sanction for all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for their
own sanction.
‣ Thus, anyone who, whether willfully or negligently, in the exercise of his legal right or duty, causes damage to
another, shall indemnify his victim for injuries suffered thereby.

‣ Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, and has the following elements:
2. But which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy;and
‣ Art. 19, 20 and 21 in relation to Malicious Prosecution

‣ To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design
to vex and humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his
charges were false and groundless.
‣ Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for
malicious prosecution.
‣ A civil action for damages for malicious prosecution is allowed under the New Civil Code, more specifically Articles
19, 20, 26, 29, 32, 33, 35, and 2219 (8) thereof.
‣ Thus, a party injured by the filing of a court case against him, even if he is later on absolved, may file a case
for damages grounded either on the principle of abuse of rights, or on malicious prosecution.
‣ Elements of Malicious Prosecution
‣ In order that such a case can prosper, however, the following three (3) elements must be present, to wit:
1. The fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor, and that
the action was finally terminated with an acquittal;
2. That in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause;
3. The prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice
‣ Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for
malicious prosecution. Proof and motive that the institution of the action was prompted by a sinister design to vex
and humiliate a person must be clearly and preponderantly established to entitle the victims to damage
‣ Defense of Existence of Probable Cause against Malicious Prosecution
‣ A complaint for damages based on malicious prosecution will prosper only if the three (3) elements aforecited are
shown to exist.
‣ It is well-settled that one cannot be held liable for maliciously instituting a prosecution where one has acted
with probable cause. “

‣ Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind,
acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for
which he was prosecuted.
‣ In other words, a suit will lie only in cases where a legal prosecution has been carried on without probable
cause. The reason for this rule is that it would be a very great discouragement to public justice, if prosecutors,
who had tolerable ground of suspicion, were liable to be sued at law when their indictment miscarried
‣ The presence of probable cause signifies, as a legal consequence, the absence of malice. In the instant case, it is
evident that petitioners were not motivated by malicious intent or by sinister design to unduly harass private
respondent, but only by a well-founded anxiety to protect their rights when they filed the criminal complaint
against private respondent.
‣ Can hold a person liable for malicious prosecution in the absence of malice or bad faith? No, malice is an essential
element. In fact, it should be legal malice, meaning the proof and motive of the institution of the action was prompted
by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person.
‣ Note that malicious prosecution is a special tort established by jurisprudence which may be based on Art. 19, 20, 26,
29, 32, 33, 35, and/or 2219 (8)
‣ The existence of probable cause, in the prosecution of criminal cases alleged to be malicious, NEGATES the existence
of malice. The existence of probable cause equals the absence of malice, BUT the reverse is not true. The mere fact
that there is no probable cause does NOT mean that there is malice.
8. MARTIRES V. COKIENG, G.R. NO. 150192, FEBRUARY 17, 2005
‣ Elements of Malicious Prosecution
‣ There is malicious prosecution when a person directly insinuates or imputes to an innocent person the commission
of a crime and the accused is compelled to defend himself in court. While generally associated with unfounded
criminal actions, the term has been expanded to include unfounded civil suits instituted just to vex and humiliate
the defendant despite the absence of a cause of action or probable cause
‣ To merit the award of damages in a case of malicious prosecution, the aggrieved party must prove:
1. That he has been denounced or charged falsely of an offense by the defendant,
2. That the latter knows that the charge was false or lacks probable case,
3. That the said defendant acted with malice, and, of course
4. The damages he has suffered.
‣ The elements of want of probable cause and malice must simultaneously exist; otherwise, the presence of
probable cause signifies, as a legal consequence, the absence of malice.
‣ On these, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a
person, and that it was initiated deliberately knowing that the charge was false and baseless to entitle the
victim to damages.
‣ Further Discussion on Malicious Prosecution

‣ While it is settled that the mere fact that the fiscal took full control of litigation does not grant immunity to persons
who misuse their rights to instigate criminal actions
‣ It is a doctrine well-entrenched in jurisprudence that the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for
prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution, for the law could not have meant to impose a
penalty on the right to litigate.
‣ It is a sound principle of justice and public policy that persons shall have free resort to the courts for redress of
wrong and vindication of their rights.This is not to undermine our previous ruling that the right to institute
criminal prosecutions has its metes and bounds and can not be exercised maliciously and in bad faith to the
detriment and harassment of a person who, without cause, is pestered, inconvenienced, and rendered cash-
strapped inasmuch as such suits where liberty is at stake, compel an accused to hire a lawyer and incur other
expenses for his defense.
‣ We are likewise constantly mindful that over and above these monetary costs is the psychological burden that an
accused and his family would have to hurdle in the interregnum. Indeed, being tagged as an "accused" is by itself
traumatic. nevertheless, the award of damages arising from malicious prosecution is justified if and only if it
is proved that there was a misuse or abuse of judicial processes or the institution and pursuit of legal
proceedings for the purpose of harassing, annoying, vexing or injuring an innocent person
‣ The mere fact of the following does NOT amount to malicious prosecution:
1. Acquittal
2. Availment by the plaintiff of the wrong remedy

3. Ill-advised counsel
4. No probable cause in criminal cases
5. Mere mistake in judgment
‣ It is NOT necessary that the case filed alleged to be malicious was criminal. It can also be a civil case. Although the
elements uses the words “acquittal” and “probable cause”, this case can be used to change the elements. This is
because malicious prosecution is based on abuse of judicial processes.
9. GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP. V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 81262, AUGUST 25, 1989
‣ History of the Incorporation of the Abuse of Rights Doctrine under the Civil Code
‣ One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the codification of "some basic principles that are to
be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the social order."
‣ The framers of the Code, seeking to remedy the defect of the old Code which merely stated the effects of the law,
but failed to draw out its spirit, incorporated certain fundamental precepts which were "designed to indicate
certain norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience" and which were also meant to serve as "guides
for human conduct that should run as golden threads through society, to the end that law may approach its
supreme ideal, which is the sway and dominance of justice" Foremost among these principles is that pronounced
in Article 19

‣ Art. 19 known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards
which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties.
faith.
‣ The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human
‣ A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source
of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in
Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be
held responsible.

‣ But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of
social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20
or Article 21 would be proper.
‣ Application of Art. 19, 20 and 21

‣ The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages under Article
20 or Article 21 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case.

‣ Art. 21 was adopted to remedy the "countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs
helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury" should "vouchsafe adequate legal
remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for
specifically in the statutes
‣ Discussion on Malicious Prosecution
‣ To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a design to
vex and humiliate a person and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that the charges
were false and groundless
‣ Concededly, the filing of a suit by itself, does not render a person liable for malicious prosecution
‣ The mere dismissal by the fiscal of the criminal complaint is not a ground for an award of damages for malicious
prosecution if there is no competent evidence to show that the complainant had acted in bad faith
10.FORD V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 51171-72, JUNE 4, 1990

‣ “Slapping” as an act contrary to morals and good customs
‣ The act of petitioner Ford in slapping private respondent on the face in public is contrary to morals and good
customs and under the circumstances, could not but have caused the latter mental anguish, moral shock,
wounded feelings and social humiliation
‣ Art. 21 in relation to Moral Damages under Art. 2219 (10)

‣ The award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the
Civil Code. Under Article 21 of said Code, in relation to Paragraph (10), Article 2219 thereof, any person who
willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for moral damages. By way of example or correction for the public good, exemplary
damages may also be awarded.
11.HERMOSISIMA V. COURT OF APPEALS, 109 PHIL. 628 (1960)

‣ Mere Breach of Promise of Marriage is NOT actionable
‣ The action for breach of promises to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money
or property advanced, upon the faith of such promise
‣ History on the Issue of Breach of Promise of Marriage

‣ The Code Commission charged with the drafting of the Proposed New Civil Code of the Philippines initially draft a
Chapter on Breach of Promise of Marriage, the articles were, however, eliminated in Congress.
‣ This is because the history of breach of promise suit in the United States and in England has shown that no other
action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men.
‣ The clear and manifest intent of our law making body is not to sanction actions for breach of promise to marry.
12.WASSMER V. VELEZ, 12 SCRA 648 (1964)
‣ Breach of Promise of Marriage may be actionable under Art. 21 in certain circumstances
‣ It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with
impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.”
‣ Mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. To formally set a wedding and go through all
the numerous preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be
solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which
defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.
‣ Court in this case held that it was not a mere breach of promise to marry. Because numerous preparations and
expenses were already undertaken in consideration of the supposed marriage. The plaintiff and defendant applied
for a license to contract marriage, which was subsequently issued. Their wedding was set. Invitations were printed
and distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances. The bride-to-be's trousseau, party dresses and other
apparel for the important occasion were purchased. Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl were
prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were given and gifts received
13.BAKSH V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 97336, FEBRUARY 19, 1993

‣ Mere Breach of Promise of Marriage is NOT actionable
‣ The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. Congress deliberately
eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so.
‣ The reason therefor is set forth in the report of the Senate Committees on the Proposed Civil Code, ”The
history of breach of promise suits in the United States and in England has shown that no other action lends
itself more readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has
led to the abolition of rights of action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in many of the American states”
‣ Breach of Promise of Marriage may be actionable under Art. 21 in certain circumstances

‣ The Civil Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in
this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for
human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books.
‣ The Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or determined by positive law. Fully
sensible that there are countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even
though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, the Commission has deemed it necessary, in the
interest of justice, to incorporate what is now Art. 21 of the New Civil Code
‣ “An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the nineteen-year old daughter of
"X". A promise of marriage either has not been made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under
the present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above nineteen years of age. Neither can any civil action for
breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the grievous moral wrong has been committed, and
though the girl and family have suffered incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring action
for damages. But under the proposed article, she and her parents would have such a right of action”

‣ Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved, would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for
that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the
statutes.
‣ In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a
man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his
representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto
him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was
only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent
to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to
marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which
followed thereafter.
‣ It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy.
‣ Function and Role of Art. 21 in Philippine Jurisdiction
‣ Art. 2176 is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict,
known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-American or
common law concept. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but
international criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the general
scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code,
intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while
negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
‣ In between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the absence of Article 21, would have
been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated that together with Articles 19 and
20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much
more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts.
‣ Moral Seduction involving promise of marriage as a ground for recovery under Art. 21
‣ Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in a breach of promise to marry where
the woman is a victim of moral seduction
‣ PARAS: Breach of promise to marry where there had been carnal knowledge, moral damages may be
recovered if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the intercourse was due to mutual lust.
‣ In other words, if the CAUSE be the promise to marry, and the EFFECT be the carnal knowledge, there is
a chance that there was criminal or moral seduction, hence recovery of moral damages will prosper. If it
be the other way around, there can be no recovery of moral damages, because here mutual lust has
intervened)
‣ TOLENTINO: Damages are recoverable if there was seduction, not necessarily in the legal sense, but in the vulgar
sense of deception. But when the sexual act is accomplished without any deceit or qualifying circumstance of
abuse of authority or influence, but the woman, already of age, has knowingly given herself to a man, it cannot be
said that there is an injury which can be the basis for indemnity.
‣ But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by willfulness , the action lies. The court, however,
must weigh the degree of fraud, if it is sufficient to deceive the woman under the circumstances,
because an act which would deceive a girl sixteen years of age may not constitute deceit as to an
experienced woman thirty years of age. But so long as there is a wrongful act and a resulting injury, there
should be civil liability, even if the act is not punishable under the criminal law and there should have been an
acquittal or dismissal of the criminal case for that reason.
‣ The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of
marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part
of the seducer to which the woman has yielded
‣ To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement and the woman must
yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is
from mutual desire, there is no seduction. She must be induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of
some species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to have and do have that effect, and which
result in her person to ultimately submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her seducer
‣ In an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or deception is the essence of the injury; and a mere proof
of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recovery. Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out
of sexual desire of curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely affords her the needed opportunity for the
commission of the act. It has been emphasized that to allow a recovery in all such cases would tend to the
demoralization of the female sex, and would be a reward for unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would
be swift to profit.

14.GARCIANO V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 96126, AUGUST 10, 1992

‣ Nature of liability under Art. 19, 20, and 21
‣ Liability for damages under Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code arises only from unlawful, willful or negligent
acts that are contrary to law, or morals, good customs or public policy.
‣ When cause of the injury is plaintiff’s own fault, he cannot recover under Art. 19, 20, or 21
‣ With respect to plaintiff's claim for moral damages, the right to recover them under Article 21 is based on equity,
and he who comes to court to demand equity, must come with clean hands. Article 21 should be construed as
granting the right to recover damages to injured persons who are not themselves at fault
‣ Consequently, whatever loss she may have incurred in the form of lost earnings was self-inflicted. Volenti non fit
injuria.
B. UNJUST ENRICHMENT
Article 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into
possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.
Article 23. Even when an act or event causing damage to another's property was not due to the fault or negligence of the
defendant, the latter shall be liable for indemnity if through the act or event he was benefited.
MEMORIZE: ARTICLES 22 AND 23
Elements for Liability under Unjust Enrichment (Art. 22) otherwise known as ACCION IN REM VERSO:
1. The defendant has been enriched
2. The plaintiff has suffered a loss
3. The enrichment of the defendant is without just or legal ground
4. The plaintiff has NO other action based on a contract, quasi-contract, crime, quasi-delict, or any other provision of law
(Grandteq vs Margallo 2009)
Must the injury be the direct cause of the enrichment?

‣ NO. The injury to the plaintiff, however, need NOT be the cause of the enrichment of the defendant. It is enough that there
be some relation between them, that the enrichment of the defendant would not have been produced had it not been for
the fact from which the injury to the plaintiff is derived. (Almario vs Philippine Airlines 2007)
 
AQUINO: An acción in rem verso is considered merely as an auxiliary action, available only when there is no other remedy on
contract, quasi-contract, delict, and quasi-delict. If there is an obtainable action under any other institution of positive law, that
action must be resorted to, and an action based on unjust enrichment will not lie. Unjust enrichment claims do NOT lie simply
because one party benefits from the efforts or obligations of others, but instead it must be shown that a party was unjustly
enriched in the sense that the term unjustly could mean illegally or unlawfully.
1. SECURITY BANK & TRUST COMPANY V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 117009, OCTOBER 11, 1995
‣ Discussion on Art. 22; Principle of Unjust Enrichment
‣ Article 22 of the Civil Code embodies the maxim, Nemo ex alterius incommodo debet lecupletari (no man ought to
be made rich out of another's injury). The article is part of the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations, the
provisions of which were formulated as "basic principles to be observed for the rightful relationship between
human beings and for the stability of the social order, . . . designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the
fountain of good conscience, guides for human conduct that should run as golden threads through society to the
end that law may approach its supreme ideal which is the sway and dominance of justice
‣ Application of Unjust Enrichment in this Case

‣ It cannot be denied that defendant bank derived benefits when plaintiff completed the construction even at an
increased cost. Hence, to allow defendant bank to acquire the constructed building at a price far below its actual
construction cost would undoubtedly constitute unjust enrichment for the bank to the prejudice of plaintiff. Such
unjust enrichment, as previously discussed, is not allowed by law.
2. UY V. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY, G.R. NOS. 147925-26 JUNE 8, 200

‣ Unjust Enrichment does NOT apply if the plaintiff assumed the risk and was not diligent in obtaining the
consent or giving notice
‣ The principle of unjust enrichment cannot be validly invoked by a party who, through his own act or omission, took
the risk of being denied payment for additional costs by not giving the other party prior notice of such costs and/or
by not securing their written consent thereto, as required by law and their contract.
‣ Different between Security Bank Case and this case? In the former, the plaintiff notified the defendant of certain
circumstances warranting the additional expenses to be incurred, in fact the defendant had made some steps which
the plaintiff relied on to think that it was amendable to the additional expenses. In the latter case, the plaintiff did not
even notify and tried to get the consent of the defendant, thus it ran the risk of not getting reimbursed for additional
expenses
3. CAR COOL PHILIPPINES, INC., V. USHIO REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 138088, JANUARY 23,
2006
‣ Elements of Unjust Enrichment under Art. 22
‣ There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains
money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience.
‣ The principle of unjust enrichment under Article 22 requires two conditions:
1. That a person is benefited without a valid basis or justification, and
2. That such benefit is derived at another’s expense or damage.
‣ Principle of Unjust Enrichment does NOT apply if the Enrichment is based on a Legal Right
‣ There is no unjust enrichment when the person who will benefit has a valid claim to such benefit
4. ALMARIO V. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., G.R. NO. 170928, SEPTEMBER 11, 2007
‣ Discussion on the Principle of Unjust Enrichment
‣ Enrichment of the defendant consists in every patrimonial, physical, or moral advantage, so long as it is
appreciable in money.
‣ It may consist of some positive pecuniary value incorporated into the patrimony of the defendant, such as:
1. The enjoyment of a thing belonging to the plaintiff;
2. The benefits from service rendered by the plaintiff to the defendant;
3. The acquisition of a right, whether real or personal; 

The increase of value of property of the defendant;
4. The improvement of a right of the defendant, such as the acquisition of a right of preference;
5. The recognition of the existence of a right in the defendant; and
6. The improvement of the conditions of life of the defendant.
‣ The enrichment of the defendant must have a correlative prejudice, disadvantage, or injury to the plaintiff. 1âwphi1
‣ This prejudice may consist, not only of the loss of property or the deprivation of its enjoyment, but also of non-
payment of compensation for a prestation or service rendered to the defendant without intent to donate on the
part of the plaintiff, or the failure to acquire something which the latter would have obtained.
‣ The injury to the plaintiff, however, need NOT be the cause of the enrichment of the defendant. It is enough
that there be some relation between them, that the enrichment of the defendant would not have been
produced had it not been for the fact from which the injury to the plaintiff is derived.
5. GRANDTEQ INDUSTRIAL STEEL PRODUCTS, INC., V. MARGALLO, G.R. NO. 181393, JULY 28, 2009
‣ Discussion on Art. 22; Principle of Unjust Enrichment
‣ Art. 22 is part of the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations, the provisions of which were formulated as
"basic principles to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the
social order; designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience; are guides for
human conduct that should run as golden threads through society to the end that law may approach its supreme
ideal, which is the sway and dominance of justice."

‣ There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit at the loss of another, or when a person retains
the money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience.
‣ This is not a case of equity overruling or supplanting a positive provision of law or judicial rule. Rather, equity is
exercised in this case "as the complement of legal jurisdiction that seeks to reach and to complete justice where
courts of law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the special
circumstances of cases, are incompetent to do so
‣ Elements of Unjust Enrichment under Art. 22

‣ There is unjust enrichment when:
1. A person is unjustly benefited, and
2. Such benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to another.
‣ Principle of Unjust Enrichment under Art. 22 as a Remedy of Last Resort

‣ The main objective of the principle of unjust enrichment is to prevent one from enriching oneself at the expense of
another. It is commonly accepted that this doctrine simply means that a person shall not be allowed to profit or
enrich himself inequitably at another’s expense.
‣ One condition for invoking this principle is that the aggrieved party has NO other action based on a
contract, quasi-contract, crime, quasi-delict, or any other provision of law.
‣ Note that this case gives an additional requirement to recover under unjust enrichment, there must be no other
adequate remedy under another source of obligation.
C. JUDICIAL VIGILANCE
Article 24. In all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his
moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for
his protection.
MEMORIZE: ARTICLE 24
1. EVERETT STEAMSHIP CORPORATION V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 122494, OCTOBER 8, 1998
‣ Judicial Vigilance in Contracts of Adhesion
‣ Greater vigilance, however, is required of the courts when dealing with contracts of adhesion in that the said
contracts must be carefully scrutinized "in order to shield the unwary from deceptive schemes contained in ready-
made covenants
D. THOUGHTLESS EXTRAVAGANCE
Article 25. Thoughtless extravagance in expenses for pleasure or display during a period of acute public want or
emergency may be stopped by order of the courts at the instance of any government or private charitable institution.
E. DISRESPECT OF PERSONS
Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other
persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of
action for damages, prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence;

(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or
other personal condition.
(10)Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
1. GREGORIO V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 179799, SEPTEMBER 11, 2009

‣ Rights protected under Art. 26
‣ Article 26 of the Civil Code grants a cause of action for damages, prevention, and other relief in cases of breach,
though not necessarily constituting a criminal offense, of the following rights:
1. Right to personal dignity;
2. Right to personal security;
3. Right to family relations;
4. Right to social intercourse;
5. Right to privacy; and
6. Right to peace of mind
2. MANALOTO V. VELOSO, G.R. NO. 171365, OCTOBER 6, 2010

‣ Rationale Behind of Art. 26
‣ The philosophy behind Art. 26 underscores the necessity for its inclusion in our civil law.
‣ The Code Commission stressed in no uncertain terms that the human personality must be exalted. The
sacredness of human personality is a concomitant consideration of every plan for human amelioration. The
touchstone of every system of law, of the culture and civilization of every country, is how far it dignifies man.
‣ If the statutes insufficiently protect a person from being unjustly humiliated, in short, if human personality is not
exalted - then the laws are indeed defective.
‣ Thus, under this article, the rights of persons are amply protected, and damages are provided for violations of a
person's dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind.
‣ Enumeration in Art. 26 NOT exclusive

‣ The violations mentioned in the codal provisions are not exclusive but are merely examples and do not preclude
other similar or analogous acts.
‣ Damages therefore are allowable for actions against a person's dignity, such as profane, insulting, humiliating,
scandalous or abusive language
3. RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., V. VERCHEZ, G.R. NO. 164349, JANUARY 31, 2006
‣ Moral Damages Recoverable under Art. 26 in relation to Art. 2219(10)
‣ Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: “(10) Acts and actions referred to in
Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.”
‣ In this case, the defendant’s negligence in not promptly performing its obligation undoubtedly disturbed the peace
of mind of the plaintiffs. As observed by the appellate court, it disrupted the "filial tranquillity" among them as they
blamed each other "for failing to respond swiftly to an emergency." The tortious acts and/or omissions complained
of in this case are, therefore, analogous to acts mentioned under Article 26 of the Civil Code, which are among the
instances of quasi-delict when courts may award moral damages under Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
‣ Note that in this case, the Court awarded moral damages where the action involved was a breach of contract. This is
allowed under Art. 2220. In this case, there was gross negligence amounting to bad faith
4. ST. LOUIS REALTY CORP. V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-46061, NOVEMBER 14, 1984

‣ Article 2219 allows moral damages for acts and actions mentioned in Article 26
5. SPOUSES HING V. CHOACHUY, SR., G.R. NO. 179736, JUNE 26, 2013
‣ Right to Privacy in General
‣ The right to privacy is enshrined in our Constitution and in our laws. It is defined as "the right to be free from
unwarranted exploitation of one’s person or from intrusion into one’s private activities in such a way as to cause
humiliation to a person’s ordinary sensibilities." It is the right of an individual "to be free from unwarranted publicity,
or to live without unwarranted interference by the public in matters in which the public is not necessarily
concerned." Simply put, the right to privacy is "the right to be let alone.
‣ The Bill of Rights guarantees the people’s right to privacy and protects them against the State’s abuse of power. In
this regard, the State recognizes the right of the people to be secure in their houses. No one, not even the State,
except "in case of overriding social need and then only under the stringent procedural safeguards," can disturb
them in the privacy of their homes
‣ Right to Privacy in “Residences” under Art. 26(1) includes “business offices”

‣ aAn individual’s right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be confined to his house or
residence as it may extend to places where he has the right to exclude the public or deny them access. The
phrase "prying into the privacy of another’s residence," therefore, covers places, locations, or even
situations which an individual considers as private. And as long as his right is recognized by society, other
individuals may not infringe on his right to privacy. The CA, therefore, erred in limiting the application of Article
26(1) of the Civil Code only to residences.
‣ Right to Privacy in “business offices” may also fall under “similar acts” in Art. 26
‣ The right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code covers business offices where the public are excluded
therefrom and only certain individuals are allowed to enter.
‣ This provision recognizes that a man’s house is his castle, where his right to privacy cannot be denied or even
restricted by others. It includes "any act of intrusion into, peeping or peering inquisitively into the residence of
another without the consent of the latter." The phrase "prying into the privacy of another’s residence," however,
does not mean that only the residence is entitled to privacy
‣ Our Code specifically mentions "prying into the privacy of another’s residence." This does not mean, however,
that only the residence is entitled to privacy, because the law covers also "similar acts." A business office is
entitled to the same privacy when the public is excluded therefrom and only such individuals as are allowed
to enter may come in.
‣ The "reasonable expectation of privacy" test is used to determine whether there is a violation of the right to
privacy.
‣ In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy, courts use the "reasonable expectation of
privacy" test. This test determines whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and whether the
expectation has been violated.
‣ The reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test:
1. Whether, by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and
2. This expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable.
‣ Customs, community norms, and practices may, therefore, limit or extend an individual’s "reasonable expectation
of privacy." Hence, the reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy must be determined on a case-to-
case basis since it depends on the factual circumstances surrounding the case
F. DERELICTION OF DUTY
Article 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without
just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice
to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.

Elements of Dereliction of Duty by Public Officers and Employees (Art. 27)

1. Public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty
2. Malice or inexcusable negligence on the part of the defendant
3. Plaintiff suffers material or moral loss
Art. 27 covers a case of nonfeasance or non-performance by a public officer of his official duty; it does NOT apply to a case of
negligence or misfeasance in carrying out an official duty. (Torio vs Fontanilla 1978)
1. Malfeasance – performance of some act which ought not to be done
2. Misfeasance – improper performance of some act which might lawfully be done
3. Nonfeasance – omission of some act which ought to be performed
1. PHILIPPINE MATCH CO., LTD., V. CITY OF CEBU, G.R. NO. L-30745, JANUARY 18, 1978
‣ Malice or Inexcusable Negligence as essential elements of Art. 27
‣ Article 27 presupposes that the refuse or omission of a public official is attributable to malice or inexcusable
negligence.
‣ In this case, it cannot be said that the city treasurer acted wilfully or was grossly in not refunding to the plaintiff the
taxes which it paid under protest on out-of-town sales of matches. The record clearly reveals that the city treasurer
honestly believed that he was justified under section 9 of the tax ordinance in collecting the sales tax on out-of-
town deliveries, considering that the company's branch office was located in Cebu City and that all out-of-town
purchase order for matches were filled up by the branch office and the sales were duly reported to it. The city
treasurer acted within the scope of his authority and in consonance with his bona fide interpretation of the tax
ordinance. The fact that his action was not completely sustained by the courts would not him liable for We have
upheld his act of taxing sales of matches booked and paid for in the city.”
‣ Public Officer NOT liable if act is performed within the scope of his official authority, and in line of his official
duty.
‣ As a rule, a public officer, whether judicial, quasi-judicial or executive, is not liable to one injured in consequence of
an act performed within the scope of his official authority, and in the line of his official duty." "Where an officer is
invested with discretion and is empowered to exercise his judgment in matters brought before him. he is
sometimes called a quasi-judicial officer, and when so acting he is usually given immunity from liability to persons
who may be injured as the result or an erroneous or mistaken decision, however erroneous his judgment may be.
provided the acts complained of are done within the scope of the officer's authority and without malice, or
corruptionMere Erroneous Interpretation does NOT amount to Bad Faith
‣ It has been held that an erroneous interpretation of an ordinance does not constitute nor does it amount to bad
faith that would entitle an aggrieved party to an award for damages
2. TUZON V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 90107, AUGUST 21, 1992
‣ Rationale Behind Art. 27
‣ It has been remarked that one purpose of this article is to end the "bribery system, where the public official, for
some flimsy excuse, delays or refuses the performance of his duty until he gets some kind of pabagsak.”
‣ Official inaction may also be due to plain indolence or a cynical indifference to the responsibilities of public service.
‣ Malice or Inexcusable Negligence as essential elements of Art. 27

‣ Reiterated doctrine in Philippine Match Case
‣ In the present case, it has not even been alleged that the Mayor Tuzon’s refusal to act on the private respondent’s
application was an attempt to compel him to resort to bribery to obtain approval of his application. It cannot be
said either that the mayor and the municipal treasurer were motivated by personal spite or were grossly negligent
in refusing to issue the permit and license to Jurado.It is no less significant that no evidence has been offered to
show that the petitioners singled out the private respondent for persecution. Neither does it appear that the
petitioners stood to gain personally from refusing to issue to Jurado the mayor’s permit and license he needed.
The petitioners were not Jurado’s business competitors nor has it been established that they intended to favor his
competitors. On the contrary, the record discloses that the resolution was uniformly applied to all the threshers in
the municipality without discrimination or preference

‣ Public Officer NOT liable if act is performed within the scope of his official authority, and in line of his official
duty.
‣ As a rule, a public officer, whether judicial, quasi-judicial or executive, is not personally liable to one injured in
consequence of an act performed within the scope of his official authority, and in line of his official duty.
‣ In this case, the defendants having acted in good faith in the discharge of their functions, should be absolved from
liability.
3. VITAL-GOZON V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 129132, JULY 8, 1998

‣ The instances when moral damages may be recovered are, inter alia, "acts and actions referred to in Articles 21,
26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35 of the Civil Code," which, in turn, are found in the Chapter on Human Relations
‣ It is thus evident that under Article 27, in relation to Articles 2219 and 2217 of the Civil Code, a public officer, like
petitioner herein, may be liable for moral damages for as long as the moral damages suffered by private
respondent were the proximate result of petitioner's wrongful act or omission, i.e., refusal to perform an
official duty or neglect in the performance thereof. In fact, if only to underscore the vulnerability of public officials
and employees to suits for damages to answer for any form or degree of misfeasance, malfeasance or
nonfeasance, this Court has had occasion to rule that under Articles 19 and 27 of the Civil Code, a public official
may be made to pay damages for performing a perfectly legal act, albeit with bad faith or in violation of the "abuse
of right" doctrine embodied in the preliminary articles of the Civil Code concerning Human Relations
‣ Exemplary damages may be imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the
moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.

‣ Art. 27 must then be read in conjunction with Section I of Article XI (Accountability of Public Officers) of the
Constitution: “Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable
to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice,
and lead modest lives.”
4. TORIO V. FONTANILLA, G.R. NO. L-29993, OCTOBER 23, 1978

‣ Art. 27 only covers Nonfeasance or Non-Performance by a Public Officer, NOT Negligence or Misfeasance
‣ Art. 27 covers a case of nonfeasance or non-performance by a public officer of his official duty; it does not apply
to a case of negligence or misfeasance in carrying out an official duty.
G. UNFAIR COMPETITION
Article 28. Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of force,
intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or highhanded method shall give rise to a right of action
by the person who thereby suffers damage.
Elements of liability for Unfair Competition (Art. 28):

1. It must involve an injury to a competitor or trade rival, and
2. It must involve acts which are characterized as "contrary to good conscience," or "shocking to judicial sensibilities," or
otherwise unlawful (these include force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed
method)

AQUINO: The Code Commission explained that Art. 28 is necessary in a system of free enterprise. “Democracy becomes a
veritable mockery if any person or group of persons by any unjust or highhanded method may deprive others of a fair chance
to engage in business or earn a living.”
1. WILLAWARE PRODUCTS CORP. V. JESICHRIS MANUFACTURING CORP., G.R. NO. 195549, SEPTEMBER 3, 2014
‣ Meaning of “Unfair” Competition under Art. 28
‣ What is being sought to be prevented is not competition per se but the use of unjust, oppressive or high-handed
methods which may deprive others of a fair chance to engage in business or to earn a living. Plainly, what the law
prohibits is unfair competition and not competition where the means used are fair and legitimate.
‣ In order to qualify the competition as "unfair," it must have two characteristics:
1. It must involve an injury to a competitor or trade rival, and
2. It must involve acts which are characterized as "contrary to good conscience," or "shocking to judicial
sensibilities," or otherwise unlawful; in the language of our law, these include force, intimidation, deceit,
machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method.
‣ The public injury or interest is a minor factor; the essence of the matter appears to be a private wrong perpetrated
by unconscionable means.
‣ Moreover, when a person starts an opposing place of business, not for the sake of profit to himself, but
regardless of loss and for the sole purpose of driving his competitor out of business so that later on he can
take advantage of the effects of his malevolent purpose, he is guilty of wanton wrong
2. CALAMBA MEDICAL CENTER, INC., V. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, G.R. NO. 176484, NOVEMBER 25,
2008
‣ “Unfair” Labor Practices giving right to action for damages under Art. 28
‣ The circulation of a "watchlist" or "watch out list containing names of alleged union members intended to prevent
employment of workers for union activities similarly constitutes unfair labor practice, thereby giving a right of
action for damages by the employees prejudiced (Art. 28 was footnoted in the case intended as the basis for
damages)
‣ Note that this is a case where the court ruled that there was an employer-employee relationship between a physician
and the hospital
H. VIOLATION OF CIVIL/POLITICAL RIGHTS
Article 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates
or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter
for damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;
(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
(7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;
(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures;
(10)The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(11)The privacy of communication and correspondence;
(12)The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law;
(13)The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the Government for redress of grievances;
(14)The right to be a free from involuntary servitude in any form;

(15)The right of the accused against excessive bail;

(16)The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witness in his behalf;
(17)Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or from being
induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such confession, except when the person confessing becomes a
State witness;
(18)Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is imposed or inflicted in
accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional; and
(19)Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or omission constitutes a criminal
offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for
other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may
be proved by a preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the
Penal Code or other penal statute.
AQUINO:
‣ Although Article 32 normally involves intentional acts, the tort of violation of civil and political rights can also be committed
through negligence. In addition, the rule is that good faith on the part of the defendant does not excuse such violation
‣ The tort of violation of constitutional rights in common law was directed against public officers or employees. In this
jurisdiction, the coverage of this tort was expanded to cover even private individuals. The law expressly imposes liability on
private individuals who obstruct, defeat, violate or in any manner impede or impair the rights and liberties of another. In
addition, the law provides that a person may be held liable whether his participation is direct or indirect.
‣ A public officer who is the defendant in a case for damages under Article 32 cannot escape liability under the doctrine of
state immunity. The doctrine of state immunity applies only if the acts involved are acts done by officers in the
performance of official duties within the ambit of their powers. Obviously, officers do not act within the ambit of their
powers if they would violate the constitutional rights of other persons.
1. LIM V. DE LEON, 66 SCRA 299 (1975)

‣ Under Art. 32, a person whose constitutional rights have been violated or impaired is entitled to actual and moral
damages from the public officer or employee responsible therefor. In addition, exemplary damages may also be
awarded
‣ Malice is NOT an element under Art. 27, Good Faith is NOT a defense; Rationale Behind Art. 32
‣ To be liable under Article 32 of the New Civil Code it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights
of the plaintiffs and it is not required that defendants should have acted with malice or bad faith.
‣ The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It is not necessary therefore that there
should be malice or bad faith. To make such a requisite would defeat the main purpose of Article 32 which is the
effective protection of individual rights. Public officials in the past have abused their powers on the pretext of
justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of their duties. Precisely, the object of the Article is to put an
end to official abuse by the plea of good faith. In the United States this remedy is in he nature of a tort.
‣ There is no real democracy if a public official is abusing, and we made the article so strong and so comprehensive
that it concludes an abuse of individual rights even if done in good faith, that official is liable. As a matter of fact,
we know that there are very few public officials who openly and definitely abuse the individual rights of the
citizens. In most cases, the abuse is justified on a plea of desire to enforce the law to comply with one's duty. And

so, if we should limit the scope of this article, that would practically nullify the object of the article. Precisely, the
opening object of the article is to put an end to abuses which are justified by a plea of good faith, which is in most
cases the plea of officials abusing individual rights.
2. MHP GARMENTS, INC., V. COURT OF APPEALS, 236 SCRA 227 (1994)

‣ Art. 32 Covers those Directly and Indirectly Involved as Joint Tortfeasors
‣ The law speaks of an officer or employee or person "directly or indirectly" responsible for the violation of the
constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e., the one directly responsible) who
must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages
or injury caused to the aggrieved party.
‣ While it would certainly be too naive to expect that violators of human rights would easily be deterred by the
prospect of facing damages suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no uncertain terms that Article 32 of the
Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint
tortfeasors.
‣ Neither can it be said that only those shown to have participated "directly" should be held liable. Article 32 of the
Civil Code encompasses within the ambit of its provisions those directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for its
violations.
‣ In this case, the defendants were indirectly involved in transgressing the right of private respondents against
unreasonable search and seizure.They instigated the raid. The raid was conducted with the active participation of
their employee. They did not lift a finger to stop the seizure of the goods. By standing by and apparently assenting
thereto, he was liable to the same extent as the officers themselves
3. NEWSWEEK V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, 142 SCRA 141 (1986)

‣ Victims in a Libel Case must be Identifiable; Libel against Groups or Classes
‣ In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable, although it is not necessary that he be
named.
‣ Defamatory matter which does not reveal the Identity of the person upon whom the imputation is cast, affords no
ground of action unless it be shown that the readers of the libel could have Identified the personality of the
individual defamed.
‣ This principle has been recognized to be of vital importance, especially where a group or class of persons, as in
the case at bar, claim to have been defamed, for it is evident that the larger the collectivity, the more difficult it is
for the individual member to prove that the defamatory remarks apply to him.
‣ Defamatory remarks directed at a class or group of persons in general language only, are not actionable by
individuals composing the class or group unless the statements are sweeping; and it is very probable that even
then no action would lie where the body is composed of so large a number of persons that common sense would
tell those to whom the publication was made that there was room for persons connected with the body to pursue
an upright and law abiding course and that it would be unreasonable and absurd to condemn all because of the
actions of a part
‣ Where the defamation is alleged to have been directed at a group or class, it is essential that the statement
must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to every individual in that group or class, or sufficiently
specific so that each individual in the class or group can prove that the defamatory statement specifically
pointed to him, so that he can bring the action separately, if need be.
‣ Note the elements of liability for group defamation or libel:
1. The statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to every individual in that group or class; or
2. Sufficiently specific so that each individual in the class or group can prove that the defamatory statement
specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring the action separately, if need be.
4. MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC., V. ISLAMIC DA’WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 135306, JANUARY 28, 2003
‣ What Constitutes Defamation
‣ It must be stressed that words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se, and mere
words of general abuse however opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatious, whether written or spoken, do not
constitute a basis for an action for defamation in the absence of an allegation for special damages. The fact that
the language is offensive to the plaintiff does not make it actionable by itself.
‣ Defamation is made up of the twin torts of libel and slander — the one being, in general, written, while the other in
general is oral. In either form, defamation is an invasion of the interest in reputation and good name. This is a
"relational interest" since it involves the opinion others in the community may have, or tend to have of the plaintiff.
‣ The law of defamation protects the interest in reputation — the interest in acquiring, retaining and enjoying one's
reputation as good as one's character and conduct warrant. The mere fact that the plaintiff's feelings and

sensibilities have been offended is not enough to create a cause of action for defamation. Defamation requires that
something be communicated to a third person that may affect the opinion others may have of the plaintiff. The
unprivileged communication must be shown of a statement that would tend to hurt plaintiff's reputation, to impair
plaintiff's standing in the community.
‣ Although the gist of an action for defamation is an injury to reputation, the focus of a defamation action is upon the
allegedly defamatory statement itself and its predictable effect upon third persons. A statement is ordinarily
considered defamatory if it "tends to expose one to public hatred, shame, obloquy, contumely, odium, contempt,
ridicule, aversion, ostracism, degradation or disgrace”The Restatement of Torts defines a defamatory statement as
one that "tends to so harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter
third persons from associating or dealing with him.”
‣ Consequently as a prerequisite to recovery, it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove as part of his prima facie case
that the defendant (1) published a statement that was (2) defamatory (3) of and concerning the plaintiff.
‣ The rule in libel is that the action must be brought by the person against whom the defamatory charge has been
made. In the American jurisdiction, no action lies by a third person for damages suffered by reason of defamation
of another person, even though the plaintiff suffers some injury therefrom. For recovery in defamation cases, it is
necessary that the publication be "of and concerning the plaintiff." Even when a publication may be clearly
defamatory as to somebody, if the words have no personal application to the plaintiff, they are not actionable by
him. If no one is identified, there can be no libel because no one's reputation has been injured
‣ Victims in a Libel Case must be Identifiable; Libel against Groups or Classes
‣ Reiterated the doctrine in Newsweek Case (regarding elements of group libel suit)
‣ Declarations made about a large class of people cannot be interpreted to advert to an identified or identifiable
individual. Absent circumstances specifically pointing or alluding to a particular member of a class, no member of
such class has a right of action without at all impairing the equally demanding right of free speech and expression,
as well as of the press, under the Bill of Rights.
‣ Defamation of a large group does not give rise to a cause of action on the part of an individual unless it can be
shown that he is the target of the defamatory matter.
‣ If the group is a very large one, then the alleged libelous statement is considered to have no application to
anyone in particular, since one might as well defame all mankind. Not only does the group as such have no
action; the plaintiff does not establish any personal reference to himself. At present, modern societal
groups are both numerous and complex. The same principle follows with these groups: as the size of these
groups increases, the chances for members of such groups to recover damages on tortious libel become
elusive. This principle is said to embrace two (2) important public policies: first, where the group referred to
is large, the courts presume that no reasonable reader would take the statements as so literally applying to
each individual member; and second, the limitation on liability would satisfactorily safeguard freedom of
speech and expression, as well as of the press, effecting a sound compromise between the conflicting
fundamental interests involved in libel cases.
‣ In this case, there was no fairly identifiable person who was allegedly injured by the Bulgar article. Since the
persons allegedly defamed could not be identifiable, private respondents have no individual causes of action;
hence, they cannot sue for a class allegedly disparaged. Private respondents must have a cause of action in
common with the class to which they belong to in order for the case to prosper. An individual Muslim has a
reputation that is personal, separate and distinct in the community. Each Muslim, as part of the larger Muslim
community in the Philippines of over five (5) million people, belongs to a different trade and profession; each has a
varying interest and a divergent political and religious view — some may be conservative, others liberal. A Muslim
may find the article dishonorable, even blasphemous; others may find it as an opportunity to strengthen their faith
and educate the non-believers and the "infidels." There is no injury to the reputation of the individual Muslims who
constitute this community that can give rise to an action for group libel. Each reputation is personal in character to
every person. Together, the Muslims do not have a single common reputation that will give them a common or
general interest in the subject matter of the controversy. In the instant case, the Muslim community is too vast as
to readily ascertain who among the Muslims were particularly defamed. The size of the group renders the
reference as indeterminate and generic as a similar attack on Catholics, Protestants, Buddhists or Mormons would
do. The word "Muslim" is descriptive of those who are believers of Islam, a religion divided into varying sects, such
as the Sunnites, the Shiites, the Kharijites, the Sufis and others based upon political and theological distinctions.
"Muslim" is a name which describes only a general segment of the Philippine population, comprising a
heterogeneous body whose construction is not so well defined as to render it impossible for any representative
identification.
‣ In order for one to maintain an action for an alleged defamatory statement, it must appear that the plaintiff is the
person with reference to whom the statement was made. This principle is of vital importance in cases where a
group or class is defamed since, usually, the larger the collective, the more difficult it is for an individual member to
show that he was the person at whom the defamation was directed.

‣ If the defamatory statements were directed at a small, restricted group of persons, they applied to any member of
the group, and an individual member could maintain an action for defamation. When the defamatory language was
used toward a small group or class, including every member, it has been held that the defamatory language
referred to each member so that each could maintain an action. This small group or class may be a jury, persons
engaged in certain businesses, professions or employments, a restricted subdivision of a particular class, a
society, a football team, a family, small groups of union officials, a board of public officers, or engineers of a
particular company.
‣ In contrast, if defamatory words are used broadly in respect to a large class or group of persons, and there is
nothing that points, or by proper colloquium or innuendo can be made to apply, to a particular member of the
class or group, no member has a right of action for libel or slander. Where the defamatory matter had no special,
personal application and was so general that no individual damages could be presumed, and where the class
referred to was so numerous that great vexation and oppression might grow out of the multiplicity of suits, no
private action could be maintained. This rule has been applied to defamatory publications concerning groups or
classes of persons engaged in a particular business, profession or employment, directed at associations or groups
of association officials, and to those directed at miscellaneous groups or classes of persons.
‣ Intentional Tortious Act causing Mental Distress; “Emotional Distress” Tort

‣ Words heaping extreme profanity, intended merely to incite hostility, hatred or violence, have no social value and
do not enjoy constitutional protection;
‣ Primarily, an "emotional distress" tort action is personal in nature, i.e., it is a civil action filed by an individual to
assuage the injuries to his emotional tranquility due to personal attacks on his character
‣ Moreover, under the Second Restatement of the Law, to recover for the intentional infliction of emotional distress
the plaintiff must show that: (a) The conduct of the defendant was intentional or in reckless disregard of the
plaintiff; (b) The conduct was extreme and outrageous; (c) There was a causal connection between the defendant's
conduct and the plaintiff's mental distress; and, (d) The plaintiff's mental distress was extreme and severe
‣ "Extreme and outrageous conduct" means conduct that is so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree,
as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in
civilized society. The defendant's actions must have been so terrifying as naturally to humiliate, embarrass or
frighten the plaintiff. Generally, conduct will be found to be actionable where the recitation of the facts to an
average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him or her to exclaim,
"Outrageous!" as his or her reaction
‣ Emotional distress" means any highly unpleasant mental reaction such as extreme grief, shame, humiliation,
embarrassment, anger, disappointment, worry, nausea, mental suffering and anguish, shock, fright, horror, and
chagrin. "Severe emotional distress," in some jurisdictions, refers to any type of severe and disabling emotional or
mental condition which may be generally recognized and diagnosed by professionals trained to do so, including
posttraumatic stress disorder, neurosis, psychosis, chronic depression, or phobia. The plaintiff is required to show,
among other things, that he or she has suffered emotional distress so severe that no reasonable person could be
expected to endure it; severity of the distress is an element of the cause of action, not simply a matter of damages
‣ Any party seeking recovery for mental anguish must prove more than mere worry, anxiety, vexation,
embarrassment, or anger. Liability does not arise from mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty
expressions, or other trivialities. In determining whether the tort of outrage had been committed, a plaintiff is
necessarily expected and required to be hardened to a certain amount of criticism, rough language, and to
occasional acts and words that are definitely inconsiderate and unkind; the mere fact that the actor knows that the
other will regard the conduct as insulting, or will have his feelings hurt, is not enough.
‣ Relational vs Reactive Harm

‣ Also, the purported damage caused by the article, assuming there was any, falls under the principle of relational
harm — which includes harm to social relationships in the community in the form of defamation; as distinguished
from the principle of reactive harm — which includes injuries to individual emotional tranquility in the form of an
infliction of emotional distress.
‣ This is a very long case full of obiters, in summary:

a. The group defamation/libel suit did not prosper because according to the court, Muslims in general may consist of
diverse classes of and the articles did not pertain to any particular person or any particular kind; no Muslim is
identifiable with the publication; since no one was identifiable, no one had a cause of action; since no one had a
cause of action no group of people can come together to file a class suit because all of them must have a
common interest; the sum cannot be greater than its parts
b. Relational interest involves the good reputation a person has to the perspective of the community
c. Relational harm (which is present in the case) involves harm to one’s reputation through social relationships;
Reactive harm involves damage to one’s emotional state

d. Elements of Emotional Distress Tort (otherwise known as the Tort of “Outrage”)

i. The conduct was of intentional disregard of the other’s welfare,
ii. The conduct was severe/outrageous,
iii. There was proximate causation between the conduct and the damage, and
iv. That the distress suffered by the person was extreme/severe/serious
5. SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL V. SOLUTA, G.R. NO. 163087, FEBRUARY 20, 2006
‣ Direct and open violations of the Penal Code trampling upon the freedoms named are not so frequent as those
subtle, clever and indirect ways which do not come within the pale of the penal law. It is in these cunning devices
of suppressing or curtailing freedom, which are not criminally punishable, where the greatest danger to democracy
lies. The injured citizen will always have, under the new Civil Code, adequate civil remedies before the courts
because of the independent civil action, even in those instances where the act or omission complained of does not
constitute a criminal offense.
‣ The Code Commission thus deemed it necessary to hold not only public officers but also private individuals civilly
liable for violation of rights enumerated in Article 32 of the Civil Code. That is why it is not even necessary that the
defendant under this Article should have acted with malice or bad faith, otherwise, it would defeat its main
purpose, which is the effective protection of individual rights. It suffices that there is a violation of the constitutional
right of the plaintiff.
‣ Malice NOT an element under Art. 32; Art. 32 covers BOTH public and private individuals
‣ The Code Commission thus deemed it necessary to hold not only public officers but also private individuals
civilly liable for violation of rights enumerated in Article 32 of the Civil Code.
‣ That is why it is not even necessary that the defendant under this Article should have acted with malice or bad
faith, otherwise, it would defeat its main purpose, which is the effective protection of individual rights. It suffices
that there is a violation of the constitutional right of the plaintiff.
‣ Art. 32 Covers those Directly and Indirectly Involved as Joint Tortfeasors

‣ Article 32 speaks of an officer or employee or person "directly or indirectly" responsible for the violation of the
constitutional rights and liberties of another. Hence, it is not the actor alone who must answer for damages under
Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved
party
‣ Note that the lawful occupants of a property entitle them to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
even against the owners of the property

VIII. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
VIII. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS
Article 1314. Any third person who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other
contracting party. (n)
Elements of Tortious Interference:

1. The existence of a valid contract;
2. Knowledge by the third person of the existence of the contract; and
3. Interference by the third person in the contractual relation without legal justification. (Tayag vs Lacson 2004)
Is malice an element of tortious interference?

‣ It depends on the remedy sought. If the remedy sought is merely an injunction, whether mandatory (to compel) or
prohibitory (to prohibit), malice is NOT an element. BUT, if damages is sought, then malice is an element in tort
interference. (So Ping Bun vs CA, 1999)
Is actual knowledge of the existence of the contract or the identity of the injured person required?
‣ No, it is not necessary to prove actual knowledge on the part of the defendant, but he must nonetheless be aware of the
facts which, if followed by a reasonable inquiry, will lead to a complete disclosure of the contractual relations and rights of
the parties in the contract (Lagon vs CA 2005)
‣ Knowledge of the identity of the injured person is NOT required. Nothing in Art. 1902 (provision on quasi-delict) requires
as a condition precedent to the liability of a tort-feasor that he must know the identity of a person to whom he causes
damages. In fact, the chapter wherein this article is found clearly shows that no such knowledge is required in order that
the injured party may recover for the damage suffered. (Gilchrist vs Cuddy 1915)
What is the liability of the person liable for tortious interference?

‣ He is solidarily liable with the party obligated under the contract as joint-tortfeasors. The rule is that the defendant found
guilty of interference with contractual relations cannot be held liable for more than the amount for which the party who
was inducted to break the contract can be held liable (Go vs Cordero 2010)
‣ The stranger cannot become more extensively liable in damages for the nonperformance of the contract than the party in
whose behalf he intermeddles. To hold the stranger liable for damages in excess of those that could be recovered against
the immediate party to the contract would lead to results at once grotesque and unjust (Daywalt v. Corporacion de PP
Agustinos Recoletos 1919)
1. GILCHRIST V. CUDDY, 29 PHIL. 542 (1915)

‣ Is Malice an element of Wrongful Interference?; Desire for Profit is NOT Malice
‣ Everyone has a right to enjoy the fruits and advantages of his own enterprise, industry, skill and credit. He has no
right to be free from malicious and wanton interference, disturbance or annoyance. If disturbance or loss come as
a result of competition, or the exercise of like rights by others, it is damnum absque injuria, unless some superior
right by contract or otherwise is interfered with.
‣ The plaintiff has a cause of action against the defendants, unless the court is satisfied that, when they interfered
with the contractual rights of plaintiff, the defendants had a sufficient justification for their interference; for it is not
a justification that `they acted bona fide in the best interests of the society of masons,' i. e., in their own interests.
Nor is it enough that `they were not actuated by improper motives.' I think their sufficient justification for
interference with plaintiff's right must be an equal or superior right in themselves, and that no one can legally
excuse himself to a man, of whose contract he has procured the breach, on the ground that he acted on a wrong
understanding of his own rights, or without malice, or bona fide, or in the best interests of himself, or even that he
acted as an altruist, seeking only good of another and careless of his own advantage.
‣ It is said that the ground on which the liability of a third party for interfering with a contract between others rests, is
that the interference was malicious. The contrary view, however, is taken by the Supreme Court of the United

States in the case of Angle vs. Railway Co. The only motive for interference by the third party in that case was the
desire to make a profit to the injury of one of the parties of the contract. There was no malice in the case beyond
the desire to make an unlawful gain to the detriment of one of the contracting parties.
‣ In this case, the only motive for the interference with the Gilchrist — Cuddy contract on the part of the appellants
was a desire to make a profit by exhibiting the film in their theater. There was no malice beyond this desire; but this
fact does not relieve them of the legal liability for interfering with that contract and causing its breach. It is,
therefore, clear, under the above authorities, that they were liable to Gilchrist for the damages caused by their acts,
unless they are relieved from such liability by reason of the fact that they did not know at the time the identity of
the original lessee (Gilchrist) of the film.
‣ Liability for Tort Interference as a Quasi-Delict; Identity of Injured Person NOT required to be known to the
Tort-Feasor
‣ The liability of the appellants arises from unlawful acts and not from contractual obligations, as they were under no
such obligations to induce Cuddy to violate his contract with Gilchrist
‣ Nothing in Art. 1902 (provision on quasi-delict) requires as a condition precedent to the liability of a tort-feasor that
he must know the identity of a person to whom he causes damages. In fact, the chapter wherein this article is
found clearly shows that no such knowledge is required in order that the injured party may recover for the damage
suffered.
‣ Injunction as a Remedy in Wrongful Interference

‣ An injunction is a "special remedy" adopted in that code from American practice, and originally borrowed from
English legal procedure, which was there issued by the authority and under the seal of a court of equity, and
limited, as in order cases where equitable relief is sought, to cases where there is no "plain, adequate, and
complete remedy at law," which "will not be granted while the rights between the parties are undetermined, except
in extraordinary cases where material and irreparable injury will be done," which cannot be compensated in
damages, and where there will be no adequate remedy, and which will not, as a rule, be granted, to take property
out of the possession of one party and put it into that of another whose title has not been established by law.
‣ Courts in the United States have usually granted such relief where the profits of the injured person are derived
from his contractual relations with a large and indefinite number of individuals, thus reducing him to the necessity
of proving in an action against the tort-feasor that the latter was responsible in each case for the broken contract,
or else obliging him to institute individual suits against each contracting party and so exposing him to a multiplicity
of suits
‣ One who wrongfully interferes in a contract between others, and, for the purpose of gain to himself induces one of
the parties to break it, is liable to the party injured thereby; and his continued interference may be ground for an
injunction where the injuries resulting will be irreparable.
‣ In this case, the issue on “malice” as an element of tort interference was merely obiter since the issue was really the
injunction by the plaintiff and the counterclaim by the defendants, the plaintiff had already filed a motion to dismiss his
own complaint. Though the court ruled that there was no malice as the defendants were merely motivated by
legitimate business reasons for profit. The issue on malice has been settled in So Ping Bun where the court said that
malice as an element of tort interference depends on the remedy sought. If the remedy sought is merely an injunction,
then malice is NOT an element. BUT, if damages is sought, then malice is an element. Note also that the tortfeasor is
not required to know the identity of the injured party, all the is required is knowledge of the existence of the contract he
interferes with.
2. DAYWALT V. CORPORACION DE PP AGUSTINOS RECOLETOS, 39 PHIL. 587 (1919)
‣ Is Malice an element of Wrongful Interference?
‣ Malice in some form is generally supposed to be an essential ingredient in cases of interference with contract
relations. But upon the authorities it is enough if the wrong-doer, having knowledge of the existence of the contract
relations, in bad faith sets about to break it up. Whether his motive is to benefit himself or gratify his spite by
working mischief to the employer is immaterial. Malice in the sense of ill-will or spite is not essential.
‣ Upon the question as to what constitutes legal justification, a good illustration was put in the leading case. If a
party enters into contract to go for another upon a journey to a remote and unhealthful climate, and a third person,
with a bona fide purpose of benefiting the one who is under contract to go, dissuades him from the step, no action
will lie. But if the advice is not disinterested and the persuasion is used for "the indirect purpose of benefiting the
defendant at the expense of the plaintiff," the intermedler is liable if his advice is taken and the contract broken.
‣ According to the English and American authorities, no question can be made as to the liability to one who
interferes with a contract existing between others by means which, under known legal cannons, can be
denominated an unlawful means. Thus, if performance is prevented by force, intimidation, coercion, or threats, or
by false or defamatory statements, or by nuisance or riot, the person using such unlawful means is, under all the
authorities, liable for the damage which ensues. No liability can arise from a meddlesome and malicious
interference with a contract relation unless some such unlawful means as those just indicated are used

‣ Wrongful Intermeddler can only be held liable to the same extent as the person violating the contract
‣ The stranger cannot become more extensively liable in damages for the nonperformance of the contract than the
party in whose behalf he intermeddles. To hold the stranger liable for damages in excess of those that could be
recovered against the immediate party to the contract would lead to results at once grotesque and unjust.
‣ Once a contract has been perfected between two parties, third persons must respect it, otherwise they run the risk of
being held liable for tort interference.
3. TAYAG V. LACSON, 426 SCRA 282 (2004)
‣ Elements of Tortious Interference under Art. 1314
‣ For Art. 1314, the pleader is burdened to prove the following:
1. The existence of a valid contract;

2. Knowledge by the third person of the existence of the contract; and
3. Interference by the third person in the contractual relation without legal justification.
‣ Is Malice an element of Wrongful Interference?
‣ Where there was no malice in the interference of a contract, and the impulse behind one’s conduct lies in a proper
business interest rather than in wrongful motives, a party cannot be a malicious interferer.
‣ Where the alleged interferer is financially interested, and such interest motivates his conduct, it cannot be said that
he is an officious or malicious intermeddler.
‣ One who is not a party to a contract and who interferes thereon is not necessarily an officious or malicious
intermeddler.
‣ In this case, the plaintiff did not allege therein that the respondents induced them to breach their contracts with the
petitioner.
‣ Generally if the interference is motivated by legitimate business motives there is NO malice, unless there is bad faith.
4. YU V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 86683, JANUARY 21, 1993
‣ Injunction as a Remedy for Wrongful Interference
‣ Injunction is the appropriate remedy to prevent a wrongful interference with contracts by strangers to such
contracts where the legal remedy is insufficient and the resulting injury is irreparable
‣ The manufacturer was duped into believing that the goods ordered through the distributor were to be shipped to
Nigeria only, but the goods were actually sent to and sold in the Philippines. A ploy of this character is akin to the
scenario of a third person who induces a party to renege on or violate his undertaking under a contract, thereby
entitling the other contracting party to relief therefrom (Article 1314, New Civil Code). The breach caused by private
respondent was even aggravated by the consequent diversion of trade from the business of petitioner to that of
private respondent caused by the latter's species of unfair competition as demonstrated no less by the sales
effected inspite of this Court's restraining order. This brings Us to the irreparable mischief which respondent court
misappreciated when it refused to grant the relief simply because of the observation that petitioner can be fully
compensated for the damage. A contrario, the injury is irreparable where it is continuous and repeated since from
its constant and frequent recurrence, no fair and reasonable redress can be had therefor by petitioner insofar as
his goodwill and business reputation as sole distributor are concerned. Withal, to expect petitioner to file a
complaint for every sale effected by private respondent will certainly court multiplicity of suits
‣ Contract of Sole Distributorship as a Property Right

‣ The right to perform an exclusive distributorship agreement and to reap the profits resulting from such
performance are proprietary rights which a party may protect which may otherwise not be diminished, nay,
rendered illusory by the expedient act of utilizing or interposing a person or firm to obtain goods from the supplier
to defeat the very purpose for which the exclusive distributorship was conceptualized, at the expense of the sole
authorized distributor
5. SO PING BUN V. COURT OF APPEALS, 314 SCRA 751 (1999)

‣ Is Malice an element of Wrongful Interference?; “No legal justification” element
‣ One view is that, as a general rule, justification for interfering with the business relations of another exists where
the actor's motive is to benefit himself. Such justification does not exist where his sole motive is to cause harm to
the other. Added to this, some authorities believe that it is not necessary that the interferer's interest outweigh that
of the party whose rights are invaded, and that an individual acts under an economic interest that is substantial,
not merely de minimis, such that wrongful and malicious motives are negatived, for he acts in self-protection.
Moreover justification for protecting one's financial position should not be made to depend on a comparison of his
economic interest in the subject matter with that of others. It is sufficient if the impetus of his conduct lies in a
proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives.

‣ Gilchrist vs Cuddy: We held that where there was no malice in the interference of a contract, and the impulse
behind one's conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives, a party cannot be a
malicious interferer. Where the alleged interferer is financially interested, and such interest motivates his conduct, it
cannot be said that he is an officious or malicious intermeddler
‣ While we do not encourage tort interferers seeking their economic interest to intrude into existing
contracts at the expense of others, however, we find that the conduct herein complained of did not
transcend the limits forbidding an obligatory award for damages in the absence of any malice. The
business desire is there to make some gain to the detriment of the contracting parties. Lack of malice,
however, precludes damages. But it does not relieve petitioner of the legal liability for entering into
contracts and causing breach of existing ones
6. LAGON V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 119107, MARCH 18, 2005
‣ Tort Interference under Art. 1314 based on violation of Property Rights
‣ Article 1314 of the Civil Code provides that any third person who induces another to violate his contract shall be
liable for damages to the other contracting party. The tort recognized in that provision is known as interference
with contractual relations. The interference is penalized because it violates the property rights of a party in a
contract to reap the benefits that should result therefrom.
‣ Knowledge as an essential element for Tort Interference

‣ Knowledge of the subsistence of the contract is an essential element to state a cause of action for tortuous
interference A defendant in such a case cannot be made liable for interfering with a contract he is unaware of.
While it is not necessary to prove actual knowledge, he must nonetheless be aware of the facts which, if followed
by a reasonable inquiry, will lead to a complete disclosure of the contractual relations and rights of the parties in
the contract
‣ “No legal justification” element

‣ Knowledge alone is not sufficient to make a person liable for tortuous interference. Which brings us to the third
element. A person may be held liable only when there was no legal justification or excuse for his action or when his
conduct was stirred by a wrongful motive.
‣ To sustain a case for tortuous interference, the defendant must have acted with malice or must have been driven
by purely impious reasons to injure the plaintiff. In other words, his act of interference cannot be justified
‣ Lack of malice in the conduct complained of precludes recovery of damages
‣ "Induce" refers to situations where a person causes another to choose one course of conduct by persuasion or
intimidation.
‣ Existence of Proper Business Interest is NOT Malice

‣ Advancement of financial or economic interests, absent any proof that he was enthused by improper motive
‣ Gilchrist vs Cuddy: A person is not a malicious interferer if his conduct is impelled by a proper business interest. In
other words, a financial or profit motivation will not necessarily make a person an officious interferer liable for
damages as long as there is no malice or bad faith involved.
‣ Note that actual knowledge of the contract is not necessary, all that is required is knowledge of facts which would have
alerted a reasonably prudent man to the existence of facts such that he will be put on guard.
7. GO V. CORDERO, G.R. NO. 164703, MAY 4, 2010
‣ Tort Interference under Art. 1314
‣ While it is true that a third person cannot possibly be sued for breach of contract because only parties can breach
contractual provisions, a contracting party may sue a third person not for breach but for inducing another to
commit such breach.
‣ Tort Interferer and Person Induced to Violate the Contract liable as Joint-Tortfeasors
‣ Court held here they they are solidarity liable as joint-tortfeasors as persons who command, instigate, promote,
encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is
done, if done for their benefit. They are each liable as principals, to the same extent and in the same manner as if
they had performed the wrongful act themselves
‣ The rule is that the defendant found guilty of interference with contractual relations cannot be held liable for more
than the amount for which the party who was inducted to break the contract can be held liable

IX. CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM CRIMES
RULES OF COURT
RULE 111: PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.—
(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged
shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to
institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts presenting
its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate, or
exemplary damages without specifying the amount thereof in the complaint or information, the filing fees therefor shall
constitute a first lien on the judgment awarding such damages.
Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or information, the corresponding filing
fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court.
Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual damages.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any cause
of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. (1a)
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action.
No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based on
the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or
information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party
shall pay additional filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of
these damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute
a first lien on the judgment.Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it
may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is
granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of
the civil and criminal actions. (cir. 57-97)
SEC. 2. When separate civil action is suspended.—After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil
action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment has been entered in the criminal action.
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted, the latter shall be suspended in
whatever stage it may be found before judgment on the merits. The suspension shall last until final judgment is rendered
in the criminal action. Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil action, the same may, upon
motion of the offended party, be consolidated with the criminal action in the court trying the criminal action. In case of
consolidation, the evidence already adduced in the civil action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal
action without prejudice to the right of the prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses presented by the offended party
in the criminal case and of the parties to present additional evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil actions shall be
tried and decided jointly.
During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period of prescription of the civil action which cannot be
instituted separately or whose proceeding has been suspended shall be tolled. (n)

The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action. However, the civil action based on
delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission
from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. (2a)
SEC. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. —In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed
independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the
offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action. (3a)
SEC. 4. Effect of death on civil actions. —The death of the accused after arraignment and during the pendency of the
criminal action shall extinguish the civil liability arising from the delict. However, the independent civil action instituted
under section 3 of this Rule or which thereafter is instituted to enforce liability arising from other sources of obligation
may be continued against the estate or legal representative of the accused after proper substitution or against said
estate, as the case may be. The heirs of the accused may be substituted for the deceased without requiring the
appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of
thirty (30) days from notice.
A final judgment entered in favor of the offended party shall be enforced in the manner especially provided in these rules
for prosecuting claims against the estate of the deceased.
If the accused dies before arraignment, the case shall be dismissed without prejudice to any civil action the offended
party may file against the estate of the deceased. (n)
SEC. 5. Judgment in civil action not a bar.—A final judgment rendered in a civil action absolving the defendant from civil
liability is not a bar to a criminal action against the defendant for the same act or omission subject of the civil action. (4a)
SEC. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. — A petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the
pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the
preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in
the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests. (6a)
SEC. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. — The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil
action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. (5a)
CIVIL CODE
Article 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires
only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to
answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence
of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that
ground.
Article 30. When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal
proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient
to prove the act complained of.

Article 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony,
such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Article 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render aid or protection to any person in
case of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages, and the city or municipality
shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action herein recognized shall be independent of any criminal
proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such action.
Article 35. When a person, claiming to be injured by a criminal offense, charges another with the same, for which no
independent civil action is granted in this Code or any special law, but the justice of the peace finds no reasonable
grounds to believe that a crime has been committed, or the prosecuting attorney refuses or fails to institute criminal
proceedings, the complaint may bring a civil action for damages against the alleged offender. Such civil action may be
supported by a preponderance of evidence. Upon the defendant's motion, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond
to indemnify the defendant in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
If during the pendency of the civil action, an information should be presented by the prosecuting attorney, the civil action
shall be suspended until the termination of the criminal proceedings.
Article 36. Pre-judicial questions, which must be decided before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may
proceed, shall be governed by rules of court which the Supreme Court shall promulgate and which shall not be in conflict
with the provisions of this Code.
MEMORIZE: ARTICLES 29 TO 31, AND 33 TO 36
A single act or omission can produce two or more causes of action. This is because it may violate several sources of
obligation. Remember that there the five sources of obligation in Art. 1157. Thus, a single act or omission that causes damage
to an offended party may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender:
1. Civil liability ex delicto
‣ The civil liability arising from the criminal offense itself under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code
2. Independent civil liability
‣ The civil liability that may be pursued independently of the criminal proceedings.
‣ The independent civil liability may be based on:
a. An obligation NOT arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony (Article 31 of the Civil Code)
‣ This is based on other sources of obligations such as breach of contract (Art. 1170) or tort (Art. 2176),
Intentional torts (Articles 32 and 34)
b. An act or omission that may constitute felony but, nevertheless, treated independently from the criminal
action by specific provision of Article 33 of the Civil Code
‣ This is in cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries
AQUINO:
‣ Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Chapter on Human Relations of the New Civil Code commonly provide for the authority to file
independent civil actions. “Independent civil actions’’ include actions for damages for violation of civil and political rights,
defamation, fraud, physical injuries and neglect of public officers. It should be noted in this connection that independent
civil actions are not peculiar to Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the New Civil Code because there are special laws that likewise
recognize the right to initiate independent civil actions. For example, Article 135 of the Labor Code recognizes an
independent civil action for discrimination. Likewise, Section 5 of the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995 provides that
nothing in the provisions of the said Act “shall preclude the victim of work, education or training-related sexual harassment
from institution a separate and independent action for damages and other affirmative relief.”

‣ The liability sought to be enforced by independent civil actions granted under Articles 32, 33, and 34 is not the civil liability
arising from crime. The basis is said to be tortious actions more of the nature of culpa aquiliana and, therefore, separate
and distinct from the civil liability arising from crime
SUMMARY ON THE RULES OF CIVIL LIABILITIES ARISING EX DELICTO OR ARISING INDEPENDENTLY
CIVIL LIABILITY EX DELICTO INDEPENDENT CIVIL LIABILITY
Source Arising from the criminal offense itself (delict) under Article 100 of 1. Law (Art. 31)
the Revised Penal Code (Cancio vs Isip 2002) 2. Contract (Art. 31, 1170)
3. Quasi-Contract (Art. 31)
4. Delict (Art. 32 and 34)
5. Quasi-Delict (Art. 31, 2176, 2180, etc)
(Cancio vs Isip 2002)
Enforcement Either: The independent civil actions may be filed

1. As part of the criminal action involving the same act/omission, separately and prosecuted independently
or even without any reservation in the
2. In a separate civil action criminal action. The failure to make a
reservation in the criminal action is not a
Generally, it is deemed instituted with the criminal action unless waiver of the right to file a separate and
the offended party: independent civil action. (Cancio vs Isip
1. Waives the civil action 2002)
2. Reserves the right to institute it separately, or
3. Institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action The independent civil liabilities are separate
‣ The reservation must be made before the prosecution starts from the criminal action and may be
presenting evidence the offended party must have a reasonable pursued independently, as provided in
opportunity to make such reservation Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil Code.
Because of the distinct and independent
Qualifications: nature of the two kinds of civil liabilities,
‣ The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 jurisprudence holds that the offended party
shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No may pursue the two types of civil liabilities
reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed. simultaneously or cumulatively, without
‣ Counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint by the offending the rules on forum shopping, litis
accused should be in a separate civil action pendentia, or res judicata (Lim vs Ping,
(Rule 111, Sec. 1) 2012)
Suspension If a separate civil action is reserved: Proceeds independently of the criminal

‣ Once the criminal action has been commenced, the separate action. No suspension or consolidation in
civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been this case. But this is subject to the rule on
entered in the criminal action double recovery (Rule 111, Sec. 3,
If a separate civil action is filed prior to the criminal acton: Casupanan v. Laroya 2002)
‣ If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has
already been instituted, the latter shall be suspended in
whatever stage it may be found before judgment on the merits.
The suspension shall last until final judgment is rendered in the
criminal action
(Rule 111, Sec. 1)
Consolidation Before judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil action, the
same may, upon motion of the offended party, be consolidated with
the criminal action in the court trying the criminal action (Rule 111,
Sec. 1)

Effect of General Rule: The extinction of the penal action does NOT carry The acquittal of the accused in the criminal
Acquittal of the with it extinction of the civil action. (Rule 111, Sec. 2) action does NOT extinguish the
Accused in the independent civil liabilities, regardless
Criminal The civil liability is NOT extinguished by acquittal where: (Padilla vs of whether the acquittal is based on
Action CA 1984) reasonable doubt or even by a
1. The acquittal is based on reasonable doubt
declaration in the criminal case that the
criminal act charged has not happened
2. Where the court expressly declares that the liability of or has not been committed by the
the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature
accused.
3. Where the civil liability does not arise from or is not
The extinction of civil liability referred to in
based upon the criminal act of which the accused was
Section 2 of Rule 111, refers exclusively to
acquitted
civil liability founded on Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil
liability for the same act considered as a
In fact the Court can acquit an accused on reasonable quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not
doubt but still order payment of civil damages in the same extinguished even by a declaration in the
case (Romero vs People 2009)
criminal case that the criminal act charged
has not happened or has not been
committed by the accused.
EXCEPTION: The civil action based on delict shall be deemed (Manliclic v. Calaunan 2007)
extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal
action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may
arise did not exist. (Rule 111, Sec. 2)
In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the

evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the
accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or
omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. (Rule
120, Sec. 2, Romero v. People 2009)
Remedy of the Private Offended Party in case of Acquittal of

the Accused (Padilla vs CA 1984)
‣ He has the option of either:
1. Filing a motion before the court with jurisdiction over the

criminal action to rule on the civil liability, or
2. Filing a separate civil action on the ground that the

accused was acquitted based on reasonable doubt (Art.
29)
‣ But a separate civil action (under Art. 29) is required if:

1. Need to allege and establish more facts and present more
evidence
2. Where the criminal case has been fully terminated and a

separate complaint would be just as efficacious or even
more expedient than a timely remand to the trial court
where the criminal action was decided for further hearings
on the civil aspects of the case.

Effect of Death The death of the accused after arraignment and during the The independent civil action may be
of the Accused pendency of the criminal action shall extinguish the civil liability continued against the estate or legal
Pending arising from the delict (Rule 111, Sec. 4, Cabugao v. People 2014) representative of the accused after
Appeal of the ‣ Same rule, even if accused dies before arraignment. But note proper substitution or against said
Criminal that in both cases, the independent civil liabilities survive estate, as the case may be. The heirs of
Action ‣ If accused dies after final conviction its enforced as an ordinary the accused may be substituted for the
money claim deceased without requiring the appointment
of an executor or administrator and the
EXCEPTION: If there is already final conviction but the civil liability court may appoint a guardian ad litem for
ex delicto is reserved and subsequently instituted only after such the minor heirs. (Rule 111, Sec. 4)
final conviction, then the accused dies during its pendency, the
action SURVIVES and it may be continued against the heirs of the Upon the extinction of the criminal liability
deceased under the rules of substitution (Rule 3, Sec. 16) due to the death of the accused pending
‣ The civil liability ex delicto survives in this case (even though it appeal and the offended party desires to
is pending), as the criminal liability has already been settled, recover damages from the same act or
there's no more issue on the criminal liability. omission complained of, the party may file
a separate civil action based on the
other sources of obligation in accordance
with Section 4, Rule 111.
Source is Quasi-Delict
‣ A separate civil action must be filed
against the executor or administrator of
the estate of the accused, under
Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of
Court.
Source is Breach of Contract

‣ A separate civil action must be filed
against the estate, pursuant to Section
5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court
(Cabugao v. People 2014)
Existence of The existence of a prejudicial question in the civil action suspends An independent civil action based on
Prejudicial the criminal action (Art. 36, Rule 111, Sec. 6 and 7) defamation, fraud and physical injuries does
Questions not raise a prejudicial question to stop the
The elements of a prejudicial question are: proceedings in a pending criminal
1. The previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar prosecution of the defendant for estafa
or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent through falsification. This is because the
criminal action, and result of the independent civil action is
2. The resolution of such issue determines whether or not the irrelevant to the issue of guilt or innocence
criminal action may proceed. of the accused. (Consing vs People, 2012)
1. BANAL V. TADEO, G.R. NO. L-78911-25, DECEMBER 11, 1987

‣ Every person criminally liable is civilly liable; Civil liabilities arising from Delict (ex delicto)
‣ Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law that "Every man
criminally liable is also civilly liable" (Art. 100, The Revised Penal Code).
‣ Underlying this legal principle is the traditional theory that when a person commits a crime he offends two entities
namely:
1. The society in which he lives in or the political entity called the State whose law he had violated; and
2. The individual member of that society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property was actually or directly
injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission.
‣ However, this rather broad and general provision is among the most complex and controversial topics in criminal
procedure. It can be misleading in its implications especially where the same act or omission may be treated as a
crime in one instance and as a tort in another or where the law allows a separate civil action to proceed
independently of the course of the criminal prosecution with which it is intimately intertwined. Many legal scholars
treat as a misconception or fallacy the generally accepted notion that, the civil liability actually arises from the
crime when, in the ultimate analysis, it does not.
‣ While an act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much
because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another. Viewing things pragmatically, we can readily see
that what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and the moral duty of everyone to repair or make

whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently,
whether or not the same be punishable by law.
‣ In other words, criminal liability will give rise to civil liability only if the same felonious act or omission
results in damage or injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof. Damage or injury to
another is evidently the foundation of the civil action.
‣ Such is not the case in criminal actions for, to be criminally liable, it is enough that the act or omission
complained of is punishable, regardless of whether or not it also causes material damage to another.
‣ Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a special law so provides, indemnification of the offended party may be
had on account of the damage, loss or injury directly suffered as a consequence of the wrongful act of another.
The indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the penalty imposed by law for the
commission of a crime
‣ Every crime gives rise to a penal or criminal action for the punishment of the guilty party, and also to civil action for
the restitution of the thing, repair of the damage, and indemnification for the losses
‣ Private offended party may intervene in the criminal action to pursue the civil action arising from the delict and
protect her interests; Avoidance of Multiplicity of Suits
‣ In this case, indeed one cannot disregard the private party in the case at bar who suffered the offenses committed
against her. Not only the State but the petitioner too is entitled to relief as a member of the public which the law
seeks to protect. She was assured that the checks were good when she parted with money, property or services.
She suffered with the State when the checks bounced.
‣ Civil liability to the offended private party cannot thus be denied, The payee of the check is entitled to receive the
payment of money for which the worthless check was issued. Having been caused the damage, she is entitled to
recompense.
‣ The petitioner's intervention in the prosecution of Criminal Cases is justified not only for the protection of her
interests but also in the interest of the speedy and inexpensive administration of justice mandated by the
Constitution (Section 16, Article III, Bill of Rights, Constitution of 1987). A separate civil action for the purpose
would only prove to be costly, burdensome, and time-consuming for both parties and further delay the final
disposition of the case. This multiplicity of suits must be avoided. Where petitioner's rights may be fulIy
adjudicated in the proceedings before the trial court, resort to a separate action to recover civil liability is
clearly unwarranted.
‣ Lower court said that there is no counterpart provision on civil liability in BP 22 like the that of Art. 100 of the RPC
(regarding civil liability ex delicto), thus there is no civil liability ex delicto in BP 22 cases. But the SC held that the
general rule is that in BOTH felonies (under RPC) and offenses (under special penal laws), all persons who are
criminally liable are civilly liable. Thus, the offended party is given the right to intervene in the criminal case to protect
and pursue such civil liability arising from the delict. But, this is only when there is a private offended party in criminal
acts. If no one is injured by a criminal act, there’s no civil liability ex delicto, thus private parties cannot intervene.
2. SIMON V. CHAN, G.R. NO. 157547, FEBRUARY 23, 2011
‣ In BP 22 cases, the filing of an independent civil action (based on fraud in Art. 33) and the reservation to
institute separately the civil action ex delicto are BOTH NOT ALLOWED
‣ There is no independent civil action to recover the civil liability arising from the issuance of an unfunded check
prohibited and punished under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22).
‣ This is clear from Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, effective December 1, 2000, which relevantly provides: "(b) The
criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action.
No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed”
‣ Supreme Court Circular 57-97:
‣ The following rules and guidelines shall henceforth be observed in the filing and prosecution of all criminal
cases under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 which penalizes the making or drawing and issuance of a check without
funds or credit: “The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to necessarily
include the corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed or
recognized.”
‣ Under Circular 57-97, the criminal action for violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil
action. It also requires the complainant to pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved.
Generally, no filing fees are required for criminal cases, but because of the inclusion of the civil action in
complaints for violation of B.P. 22, the Rules require the payment of docket fees upon the filing of the complaint.
This rule was enacted to help declog court dockets which are filled with B.P. 22 cases as creditors actually
use the courts as collectors. Because ordinarily no filing fee is charged in criminal cases for actual damages, the
payee uses the intimidating effect of a criminal charge to collect his credit gratis and sometimes, upon being paid,
the trial court is not even informed thereof. The inclusion of the civil action in the criminal case is expected to

significantly lower the number of cases filed before the courts for collection based on dishonored checks. It
is also expected to expedite the disposition of these cases.
‣ Instead of instituting two separate cases, one for criminal and another for civil, only a single suit shall be filed
and tried. It should be stressed that the policy laid down by the Rules is to discourage the separate filing of
the civil action.
‣ The Rules even prohibit the reservation of a separate civil action, which means that one can no longer file a
separate civil case after the criminal complaint is filed in court.
‣ The only instance when separate proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead of the
criminal case. Even then, the Rules encourage the consolidation of the civil and criminal cases.
‣ We have previously observed that a separate civil action for the purpose of recovering the amount of the
dishonored checks would only prove to be costly, burdensome and time-consuming for both parties and would
further delay the final disposition of the case. This multiplicity of suits must be avoided.
‣ Rule in Estafa different from BP 22 Cases

‣ Although the Court has ruled that the issuance of a bouncing check may result in two separate and distinct crimes
of estafa and violation of BP 22, the procedures for the recovery of the civil liabilities arising from these two distinct
crimes are different and non-interchangeable.
‣ In prosecutions of estafa, the offended party may opt to reserve his right to file a separate civil action, or may
institute an independent action based on fraud pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code. In prosecutions of
violations of BP 22, however, the Court has adopted a policy to prohibit the reservation or institution of a separate
civil action to claim the civil liability arising from the issuance of the bouncing check.
‣ Note that the rule in BP 22 cases is different (based on Rule 111 and SC Circular 57-97), but the rule in estafa is still
the same (as other crimes and as “fraud” under Art. 33), in such case, the offended party can reserve and file a
separate civil action ex delicto (under Rule 111) and an independent civil action based on “fraud” (under Art. 33)
3. CANCIO V. ISIP, G.R. NO. 133978, NOVEMBER 12, 2002

‣ Every person criminally liable is civilly liable; Civil liabilities involved in delicts
‣ An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the
offender:
1. Civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and
2. Independent civil liabilities, such as those:
a. Not arising from an act or omission complained of as felony [e.g. culpa contractual or obligations arising
from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code]; or
b. Where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action
[Article 33, Civil Code].
‣ Either of these two possible liabilities may be enforced against the offender subject, however, to the caveat
under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party "cannot recover damages twice for the same
act or omission" or under both causes
‣ How to enforce the Civil Liability ex delicto
‣ Section 1, Rule 111, of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: “(a) When a criminal action is instituted,
the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the
criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil
action shall be made before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the
offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation. Where the civil action has been filed separately
and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the
court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with
section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.”
‣ Thus, the civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted with the criminal action, but the offended party is
given the option to file a separate civil action before the prosecution starts to present evidence.
‣ How to enforce the Independent Civil Liabilities
‣ Anent the independent civil actions under Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the old rules
considered them impliedly instituted with the civil liability ex-delicto in the criminal action, unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior
to the criminal action.

‣ Under the present Rules, however, the independent civil actions may be filed separately and prosecuted
independently even without any reservation in the criminal action. The failure to make a reservation in the
criminal action is not a waiver of the right to file a separate and independent civil action based on these
articles of the Civil Code.
‣ To reiterate, an independent civil action arising from contracts, as in the instant case, may be filed separately and
prosecuted independently even without any reservation in the criminal action. Under Article 31 of the Civil Code
"[w]hen the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony,
[e.g. culpa contractual] such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of
the result of the latter.”
‣ Pursuing the two civil actions involved in the criminal offense does NOT violate the rule on Forum-Shopping or
Res Judicata, since there are multiple causes of action involved because multiple sources of obligations are
also involved
‣ One of the elements of res judicata is identity of causes of action. In the instant case, it must be stressed that the
action filed by petitioner is an independent civil action, which remains separate and distinct from any criminal
prosecution based on the same act. Not being deemed instituted in the criminal action based on culpa criminal, a
ruling on the culpability of the offender will have no bearing on said independent civil action based on an entirely
different cause of action, i.e., culpa contractual.
‣ The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of
action, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment.
‣ Although the cases filed by petitioner arose from the same act or omission of respondent, they are, however,
based on different causes of action. The criminal cases for estafa are based on culpa criminal while the civil action
for collection is anchored on culpa contractual.
‣ Moreover, there can be no forum-shopping in the instant case because the law expressly allows the filing of a
separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal action.
‣ To summarize, there are two civil actions which may be involved in criminal cases, it can either be a civil action arising
from the delict itself (civil actions ex delicto) or an independent civil action (which is sourced from obligations other
than delict, such as contract or quasi-delict). In civil actions ex delicto, the private offended party has the option to
either reserve the civil action (arising from delict), institute it separately or institute it prior to the criminal action, if he
does not avail of these remedies, then the civil action is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action. BUT, in
independent civil actions, there is no need to make a reservation, the private offended party can enforce this regardless
of any reservations in the criminal action
4. CASUPANAN V. LAROYA, G.R. NO. 145391, AUGUST 26, 2002
‣ Issue in this case, is whether an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly file,
simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal
case. (Does it violate the rule on Forum Shopping?)
‣ There is no forum-shopping when the law and the rules expressly allow the filing of a separate civil action
which can proceed independently of the criminal action and also because they are based on different causes
of action.
‣ The offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or omission. The first a criminal case where the civil
action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a civil case for quasi-delict - without
violating the rule on non-forum shopping.
‣ The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of
action, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment.
‣ Forum-shopping is present when in the two or more cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights of action and
reliefs sought
‣ In this case, the complainant filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property based
on the Revised Penal Code while the plaintiffs filed the civil action for damages based on Article 2176 of the Civil
Code. Although these two actions arose from the same act or omission, they have different causes of action. The
criminal case is based on culpa criminal punishable under the Revised Penal Code while the civil case is based on
culpa aquiliana actionable under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code
‣ Also, the Rules also require the accused in a criminal action to file his counterclaim in a separate civil
action, there can be no forum-shopping if the accused files such separate civil action. (paragraph 6, Section
1, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure)
‣ OLD RULE to enforce the independent civil action

‣ Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure , as amended in 1988, allowed the filing of a separate
civil action independently of the criminal action provided the offended party reserved the right to file such civil
action.
‣ Unless the offended party reserved the civil action before the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution, ALL
civil actions arising from the same act or omission were deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal case (this
includes the independent civil action arising from other sources of obligation). These civil actions referred to the
recovery of civil liability ex-delicto, the recovery of damages for quasi-delict, and the recovery of damages for
violation of Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code on Human Relations.
‣ Thus, to file a separate and independent civil action for quasi-delict under the 1985 Rules, the offended
party had to reserve in the criminal action the right to bring such action. Otherwise, such civil action was
deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal action.
‣ NEW RULE to enforce the independent civil action
‣ Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, what is deemed instituted with the criminal action is only the action to
recover civil liability arising from the crime or ex-delicto. All the other civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code are no longer deemed instituted, and may be filed separately and prosecuted
independently even without any reservation in the criminal action.
‣ The failure to make a reservation in the criminal action is not a waiver of the right to file a separate and
independent civil action based on these articles of the Civil Code.
‣ The prescriptive period on the civil actions based on these articles of the Civil Code continues to run even
with the filing of the criminal action.
‣ Under the present Rule 111, the offended party is still given the option to file a separate civil action to recover civil
liability ex-delicto by reserving such right in the criminal action before the prosecution presents its evidence. Also,
the offended party is deemed to make such reservation if he files a separate civil action before filing the criminal
action. If the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is filed separately but its trial has not yet commenced,
the civil action may be consolidated with the criminal action.
‣ The consolidation under this Rule does not apply to separate civil actions arising from the same act or
omission filed under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code
‣ Institution of the criminal action suspends the Separate Civil Action ex delicto
‣ Section 2, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules continues this procedure, to wit: “When separate civil action is suspended.
After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until
final judgment has been entered in the criminal action. If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has
already been instituted, the latter shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found before judgment on the
merits. The suspension shall last until final judgment is rendered in the criminal action.”
‣ Thus, Section 2, Rule 111 of the present Rules did not change the rule that the separate civil action, filed to
recover damages ex-delicto, is suspended upon the filing of the criminal action. Section 2 of the present Rule 111
also prohibits the filing, after commencement of the criminal action, of a separate civil action to recover damages
ex-delicto.
‣ NOTE: The court discussed the old and new rules, and concluded that the rule was the same in both. The separate
civil action arising from the delict is suspended if the criminal action is instituted.
‣ Institution of the criminal action does NOT suspend the independent civil action
‣ The commencement of the criminal action does not suspend the prosecution of the independent civil action under
these articles of the Civil Code. The suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action
arising from the crime, if such civil action is reserved or filed before the commencement of the criminal action.
‣ The two cases can proceed simultaneously and independently of each other. The commencement or prosecution
of the criminal action will not suspend the civil action for quasi-delict.
‣ The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant. In most cases, the offended party will have no reason to file a second civil action since he cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused. In some instances, the accused may be
insolvent, necessitating the filing of another case against his employer or guardians.
‣ The accused in the criminal case can also file a separate civil action (based on quasi-delict) to enforce the
counter-claims involved in the criminal case
‣ Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he is accused of in the
criminal case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which states that the
counterclaim of the accused may be litigated in a separate civil action.
‣ This is only fair for two reasons.

‣ First, the accused is prohibited from setting up any counterclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed instituted in
the criminal case. The accused is therefore forced to litigate separately his counterclaim against the offended
party. If the accused does not file a separate civil action for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period may set in
since the period continues to run until the civil action for quasi-delict is filed.
‣ Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in the
same way that the offended party can avail of this remedy which is independent of the criminal action. To
disallow the accused from filing a separate civil action for quasi-delict, while refusing to recognize his
counterclaim in the criminal case, is to deny him due process of law, access to the courts, and equal protection
of the law.
‣ What if the decisions of the civil actions which proceed independently of the criminal actions results in
different conflicting judgments? Doesn’t matter, law provides for it.
‣ We make this ruling aware of the possibility that the decision of the trial court in the criminal case may vary with
the decision of the trial court in the independent civil action. This possibility has always been recognized ever
since the Civil Code introduced in 1950 the concept of an independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Code. But the law itself, in Article 31 of the Code, expressly provides that the independent civil action
may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
‣ More than half a century has passed since the Civil Code introduced the concept of a civil action separate and
independent from the criminal action although arising from the same act or omission. The Court, however, has yet
to encounter a case of conflicting and irreconcilable decisions of trial courts, one hearing the criminal case and the
other the civil action for quasi-delict. The fear of conflicting and irreconcilable decisions may be more apparent
than real. In any event, there are sufficient remedies under the Rules of Court to deal with such remote
possibilities.
5. RODRIGUEZ V. PONFERRADA, G.R. NOS. 155531-34, JULY 29, 2005

‣ Issue in this case, is whether or not the private offended party can be allowed to intervene and participate in the
proceedings of the above-entitled estafa cases for the purpose of prosecuting the attached civil liability arising from the
issuance of the checks involved which is also subject mater of the pending B.P. 22 cases.
‣ Court held that hte possible single civil liability arising from the act of issuing a bouncing check can be the subject of
both civil actions deemed instituted with the estafa case and the BP 22 violation prosecution. In the crimes of both
estafa and violation of BP 22, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court expressly allows, even automatically in the present case,
the institution of a civil action without need of election by the offended party. As both remedies are simultaneously
available to this party, there can be no forum shopping
‣ Doctrine of Election of Remedies

‣ In its broad sense, election of remedies refers to the choice by a party to an action of one of two or more
coexisting remedial rights, where several such rights arise out of the same facts, but the term has been
generally limited to a choice by a party between inconsistent remedial rights, the assertion of one being
necessarily repugnant to, or a repudiation of, the other.
‣ In its more restricted and technical sense, the election of remedies is the adoption of one of two or more coexisting
ones, with the effect of precluding a resort to the others
‣ As a technical rule of procedure, the purpose of the doctrine of election of remedies is not to prevent recourse to
any remedy, but to prevent double redress for a single wrong. It is regarded as an application of the law of
estoppel, upon the theory that a party cannot, in the assertion of his right occupy inconsistent positions which
form the basis of his respective remedies. However, when a certain state of facts under the law entitles a party
to alternative remedies, both founded upon the identical state of facts, these remedies are not considered
inconsistent remedies. In such case, the invocation of one remedy is not an election which will bar the other,
unless the suit upon the remedy first invoked shall reach the stage of final adjudication or unless by the
invocation of the remedy first sought to be enforced, the plaintiff shall have gained an advantage thereby or
caused detriment or change of situation to the other. It must be pointed out that ordinarily, election of
remedies is not made until the judicial proceedings has gone to judgment on the merits.
‣ Consonant with these rulings, this Court, through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, opined that while some American
authorities hold that the mere initiation of proceedings constitutes a binding choice of remedies that precludes
pursuit of alternative courses, the better rule is that no binding election occurs before a decision on the merits is
had or a detriment to the other party supervenes.
‣ This is because the principle of election of remedies is discordant with the modern procedural concepts embodied
in the Code of Civil Procedure which permits a party to seek inconsistent remedies in his claim for relief without
being required to elect between them at the pleading stage of the litigation.
‣ In this case, the institution of the civil actions with the estafa cases and the inclusion of another set of civil actions
with the BP 22 cases are not exactly repugnant or inconsistent with each other. Nothing in the Rules signifies that the
necessary inclusion of a civil action in a criminal case for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law precludes the

institution in an estafa case of the corresponding civil action, even if both offenses relate to the issuance of the same
check.
‣ Can party pursue inconsistent remedies? Generally, NO, unless the law specifically allows it. Note when the election of
remedy is deemed made (when the preclusive effect of the doctrine of election of remedies attaches), it either attaches:
1. Judgment on the merits
2. A detriment to the other party supervenes
‣ An act or omission gives rise to two actions: (1) criminal action, civil liability impliedly instituted (2) independent civil action
under Articles 31, 32, 33, 34, 2176. The offended party can pursue both at the same time. These can proceed
independently. Isn’t this prohibited in the doctrine of election of remedies? The Court said that the doctrine sets in when 2
conditions are present:
1. When the remedies are inconsistent: In this case are there any inconsistencies between the 2 remedies? No
inconsistency. They are based on different causes of action. And precisely because they are allowed by the law. The
law allows this things to happen. That is why you can’t say that these 2 are inconsistent remedies.
2. Remedies granted after final judgment: when is the choice has deemed to been made by the party? At the end or
at the start? At the end. What is the end? At what point has the party deemed to has elected the particular remedy?
According to Mellon Bank v. Magsino “no binding election occurs before a decision on the merits is had or a
detriment to the other party supervenes. This is because the principle of election of remedies is discordant with the
modern procedural concepts embodied in the Code of Civil Procedure which permits a party to seek inconsistent
remedies in his claim for relief without being required to elect between them at the pleading stage of the litigation.”
6. PADILLA V. COURT OF APPEALS, 129 SCRA 558 (1984)
‣ Effect of the Extinction (due to acquittal) of the Criminal Action on the Civil Liability: Civil Liability ex delicto is
generally NOT extinguished, UNLESS there is a declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did
not exist.
‣ The extinction of the civil action by reason of acquittal in the criminal case refers exclusively to civil liability ex
delicto founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. In other words, the civil liability which is also
extinguished upon acquittal of the accused is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime.
‣ Section 3 (c) of Rule 111 specifically provides that: ”(c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it
extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which
the civil might arise did not exist. In other cases, the person entitled to the civil action may institute it in the
Jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the person who may be liable for restitution of the thing and
reparation or indemnity for the damage suffered.”
‣ The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a
declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist.
‣ Thus, the civil liability is NOT extinguished by acquittal where:
a. The acquittal is based on reasonable doubt (as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases)
b. Where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature (as,
for instance, in the felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief committed by certain relatives who thereby
incur only civil liability, see Art. 332, Revised Penal Code)
c. Where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was
acquitted (cause of action is based on a source of obligation other than the delict)
‣ The acquittal of the defendant in the criminal case is NOT an obstacle to the filing of separate civil action
based on the same acts which led to the criminal prosecution (under Art. 29)
‣ Article 29 of the Civil Code also provides that: “When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the
ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or
omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant,
the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be
malicious. If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare.
In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the
acquittal is due to that ground.”
‣ In case of acquittal of the accused, a separate civil action is NOT required to enforce the civil liability ex delicto
(merely permitted by Art. 29), the court rendering the judgment in the criminal case can already rule on the civil
aspect
‣ The question is, if the Court finds the evidence sufficient to sustain the civil action but inadequate to justify a
conviction in the criminal action, may it render judgment acquitting the accused on reasonable doubt, but hold him
civilly liable nonetheless, or is a separate civil action based on Art. 29 required?

‣ There appear to be no sound reasons to require a separate civil action to still be filed considering that the facts to
be proved in the civil case have already been established in the criminal proceedings where the accused was
acquitted. Due process has been accorded the accused. He was, in fact, exonerated of the criminal charged. The
constitutional presumption of innocence called for more vigilant efforts on the part of prosecuting attorneys and
defense counsel, a keener awareness by all witnesses of the serious implications of perjury, and a more studied
consideration by the judge of the entire records and of applicable statutes and precedents.
‣ To require a separate civil action simply because the accused was acquitted would mean needless
clogging of court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its attendant loss of time, effort,
and money on the part of all concerned.
‣ What Article 29 clearly and expressly provides is a remedy for the plaintiff in case the defendant has been
acquitted in a criminal prosecution on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. It
merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act or
omission. The Civil Code provision does not state that the remedy can be availed of only in a separate civil action.
A separate civil case (under Art. 29) may be filed but there is no statement that such separate filing is the
only and exclusive permissible mode of recovering damages.
‣ There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code provision in the rendition of a judgment of acquittal and a
judgment awarding damages in the same criminal action. The two can stand side by side. A judgment of
acquittal operates to extinguish the criminal liability.
‣ It does not, however, extinguish the civil liability unless there is clear showing that the act from which civil
liability might arise did not exist
‣ Instances when a separate civil action is required (under Art. 29) when the accused is acquitted and his civil
liability is not extinguished
‣ A separate civil action may be warranted where:
1. Additional facts have to be established or more evidence must be adduced or
2. Where the criminal case has been fully terminated and a separate complaint would be just as efficacious or
even more expedient than a timely remand to the trial court where the criminal action was decided for further
hearings on the civil aspects of the case.
‣ The offended party may, of course, choose to file a separate action.
7. ROMERO V. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 167546, JULY 17, 2009

‣ Extinction of the criminal liability (due to acquittal) generally does NOT include the extinction of the civil
liability, the civil liability may still be enforced in the same action OR in a separate action
‣ The rule is that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable. Criminal liability will give rise to civil liability only if the felonious
act or omission results in damage or injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof. Every crime gives rise to (1) a
criminal action for the punishment of the guilty party and (2) a civil action for the restitution of the thing, repair of the damage, and
indemnification for the losses
‣ However, the reverse is not always true. In this connection, the relevant portions of Section 2, Rule 111 and
Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court provide respectively:
‣ The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action. However, the civil action
based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that
the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.
‣ In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to
prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the
judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.
‣ The rule is that the acquittal of an accused of the crime charged will not necessarily extinguish his civil
liability, unless the court declares in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise
did not exist. Courts can acquit an accused on reasonable doubt but still order payment of civil damages in
the same case. It is not even necessary that a separate civil action be instituted
8. PEOPLE V. BAYOTAS, G.R. NO. 102007, SEPTEMBER 2, 1994
‣ Issue was, does death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability?
‣ Extinction of the criminal liability (due to death of the accused, PENDING APPEAL) extinguishes his civil liability
ex delicto
‣ Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability
based solely thereon.

‣ As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his
criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil
liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
‣ Extinction of the criminal liability (due to death of the accused, PENDING APPEAL) does NOT extinguish his
civil liability arising from other causes of action based on other sources of obligation
‣ The claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a
source of obligation other than delict
‣ Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued
but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure as amended.
‣ This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the
accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
‣ The private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where
during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the
civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the
criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a
possible privation of right by prescription
9. CABUGAO V. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 163879, G.R. NO. 165805, JULY 30, 2014
‣ Extinction of the criminal liability (due to death of the accused, PENDING APPEAL) does NOT extinguish his
Independent Civil Liabilities; Remedies of the Private Offended Party to Enforce such Civil Liabilities
‣ In this case, the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability. However, the recovery of
civil liability subsists as the same is not based on delict but by contract and the reckless imprudence he was guilty of under
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.1For this reason, a separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/
administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based, and in
accordance with Section 4, Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
‣ In sum, upon the extinction of the criminal liability and the offended party desires to recover damages from
the same act or omission complained of, the party may file a separate civil action based on the other
sources of obligation in accordance with Section 4, Rule 111. If the same act or omission complained of
arises from quasi-delict,as in this case, a separate civil action must be filed against the executor or
administrator of the estate of the accused, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court. Conversely,
if the offended party desires to recover damages from the same act or omission complained of arising from
contract, the filing of a separate civil action must be filed against the estate, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 86
of the Rules of Court
‣ Sec. 4, Rule 111: “Effect of death on civil actions. – The death of the accused after arraignment and during the
pendency of the criminal action shall extinguish the civil liability arising from the delict. However, the
independent civil action instituted under section 3 of this Rule or which thereafter is instituted to enforce liability
arising from other sources of obligation may be continued against the estate or legal representative of the
accused after proper substitution or against said estate, as the case may be. The heirs of the accused may be
substituted for the deceased without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court
may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs."
‣ Section 1, Rule 87: “Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or administrator. —
No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debtor interest thereon shall be commenced against the
executor or administrator; but to recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to
enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may
be commenced against him.”
‣ Section 5, Rule 86: “Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed, barred; exceptions. — All claims
for money against the decent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or
contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expense for the last sickness of the decedent, and judgment for
money against the decent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever,
except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the executor or administrator may bring
against the claimants. Where an executor or administrator commencesan action, or prosecutes an action
already commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer the claims he has
against the decedent, instead of presenting them independently to the court as herein provided, and mutual
claims may be set off against each other in such action; and if final judgment is rendered in favor of the
defendant, the amount so determined shall be considered the true balance against the estate, as though the
claim had been presented directly before the court in the administration proceedings. Claims not yet due, or
contingent, may be approved at their present value.”

‣ As a final note, we reiterate that the policy against double recovery requires that only one action be maintained for the
same act or omission whether the action is brought against the executor or administrator, or the estate.The heirs of the
offended party must choose which of the available causes of action for damages they will bring.
10. SANCHEZ V. FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, G.R. NO. 155309, NOVEMBER 15, 2005
‣ Civil liability ex delicto generally deemed instituted with the Criminal Action; Right of the Private Offended
Party to Intervene in the Criminal Action
‣ Article 100 of the RPC states that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. This rule holds true, except in
instances when no actual damage results from an offense, such as espionage, violation of neutrality, flight to an enemy
country, and crime against popular representation.
‣ Clearly, the extinction of the penal liability does not always carry with it the extinction of the civil. According to Article 29 of the
Civil Code, if the acquittal is made on the ground that the guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, the accused may
be held civilly liable for damages arising from the same act or omission constituting the offense. As in any ordinary civil case, the
liability may be established by a mere preponderance of evidence.
‣ An action for the recovery of civil liability arising from an offense charged is necessarily included in the criminal proceedings,
unless:
1. There is an express waiver of the civil action,
2. There is a reservation to institute a separate one, or
3. The civil action was filed prior to the criminal complaint.
‣ For this purpose, the offended parties are allowed to intervene in the criminal proceedings, but solely to enforce
their right to claim indemnification for damages arising from the criminal act.
‣ Appeal of the Civil Aspect of the Decision Acquitting the Accused

‣ Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused.
a. Acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or omission complained of.
‣ This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of
any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or omission.
‣ There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be
instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of.
‣ The civil action based on the delict is extinguished if there is a finding in the final judgment in the criminal
action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did
not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.
‣ This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.
b. Acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused.

‣ In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from
civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.
‣ This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code, where the civil action for damages is ‘for
the same act or omission.
‣ If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders judgment on the civil aspect of the
criminal case, the prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment of acquittal as it would place the accused
in double jeopardy. However, the aggrieved party, the offended party or the accused or both may appeal
from the judgment on the civil aspect of the case within the period therefor.
‣ Court trying the criminal case can acquit the accused of the delict, BUT award damages based on the civil
aspect
‣ The acquittal of the accused does NOT prevent a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case
where:
a. The acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required
b. Where the court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil
c. Where the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the
accused was acquitted.
11. MANLICLIC V. CALAUNAN, G.R. NO. 150157, JANUARY 25, 2007

‣ Acquittal in the Criminal Action does NOT extinguish Independent Civil Liability
‣ Section 2(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure reads: “Extinction of the penal action does not carry
with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from
which the civil might arise did not exist.”

‣ The extinction of civil liability referred to in Section 2 (b) of Rule 111], refers exclusively to civil liability founded on
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only
and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has
not happened or has not been committed by the accused.
‣ Sec. 2B of Rule 111 pplies only to a civil action arising from crime or ex delicto and not to a civil action arising
from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.
‣ A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all
its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime – a distinction exists
between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-
contractual.
‣ The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or
create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. It is now settled that acquittal
of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the extinction of the
civil liability based on quasi delict
‣ In other words, if an accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his civil liability arising from the
crime may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. However, if an accused is acquitted on the basis that he
was not the author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the
fact from which the civil might arise did not exist), said acquittal closes the door to civil liability based on the crime
or ex delicto. In this second instance, there being no crime or delict to speak of, civil liability based thereon or ex
delicto is not possible. In this case, a civil action, if any, may be instituted on grounds other than the delict
complained of.
‣ BUT, as regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same will not be extinguished by
an acquittal, whether it be on ground of reasonable doubt or that accused was NOT the author of the act or
omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist).
‣ The responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code
‣ An acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case based on quasi-delict
or culpa aquiliana
‣ In Sanchez, SC said that when the court declares that an act from which the civil liability might arise did not exist, this
extinguishes the civil liability. Note that the lower courts need not expressly state this, it can be inferred from the
decision, such as if there was a ruling that the defendant was not negligent or he’s not the author of the crime. BUT,
Manliclic tells us that this only extinguishes the civil liability ex delicto, NOT the independent civil liabilities
12. CRUZ V. COURT OF APPEALS, 282 SCRA 188 (1997)
‣ In this case, the Court acquitted the defendant-physician for recklesss imprudence resulting in homicide but found
that he was civilly liable and accordingly awarded damages
‣ The accused is a doctor in whose hands a patient puts his life and limb. For insufficiency of evidence this Court was
not able to render a sentence of conviction but it is not blind to the reckless and imprudent manner in which the
petitioner carried out her duties. A precious life has been lost and the circumstances leading thereto exacerbated the
grief of those left behind. The heirs of the deceased continue to feel the loss of their mother up to the present time
and this Court is aware that no amount of compassion and commiseration nor words of bereavement can suffice to
assuage the sorrow felt for the loss of a loved one. Certainly, the award of moral and exemplary damages in favor of
the heirs of Lydia Umali are proper in the instant case.
13. LIM V. PING, G.R. NO. 175256, AUGUST 23, 2012
‣ The question in this case, is it forum shopping for a private complainant to pursue a civil complaint for specific
performance (based on contract) and damages (based on quasi-delict), while appealing the judgment on the civil
aspect of a criminal case for estafa?
‣ Court said that the civil cases involves only the obligations arising from contract and from tort, whereas the appeal
in the estafa case involves only the civil obligations of defendent/accused arising from the offense charged. They
present different causes of action, which under the law, are considered "separate, distinct, and independent" from
each other. Both cases can proceed to their final adjudication, subject to the prohibition on double recovery under
Article 2177 of the Civil Code
‣ Every person criminally liable is civilly liable; Civil liabilities involved in delicts
‣ A single act or omission that causes damage to an offended party may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on
the part of the offender:

a. Civil liability ex delicto, that is, civil liability arising from the criminal offense under Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, and
b. Independent civil liability, that is, civil liability that may be pursued independently of the criminal proceedings.
‣ The independent civil liability may be based on "an obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony," as provided in Article 31 of the Civil Code (such as for breach of contract or for
tort). It may also be based on an act or omission that may constitute felony but, nevertheless, treated
independently from the criminal action by specific provision of Article 33 of the Civil Code ("in cases of
defamation, fraud and physical injuries").
‣ How to enforce the civil liability ex delicto; Extinguishment

‣ The civil liability arising from the offense or ex delicto is based on the acts or omissions that constitute the criminal
offense; hence, its trial is inherently intertwined with the criminal action. For this reason, the civil liability ex delicto
is impliedly instituted with the criminal offense.
‣ If the action for the civil liability ex delicto is instituted prior to or subsequent to the filing of the criminal action, its
proceedings are suspended until the final outcome of the criminal action.
‣ The civil liability based on delict is extinguished when the court hearing the criminal action declares that "the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.
‣ How to enforce the Independent Civil Liability

‣ On the other hand, the independent civil liabilities are separate from the criminal action and may be pursued
independently, as provided in Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil Code
‣ Because of the distinct and independent nature of the two kinds of civil liabilities, jurisprudence holds that the
offended party may pursue the two types of civil liabilities simultaneously or cumulatively, without offending the
rules on forum shopping, litis pendentia, or res judicata
‣ Since civil liabilities arising from felonies and those arising from other sources of obligations are authorized by law
to proceed independently of each other, the resolution of the present issue hinges on whether the two cases herein
involve different kinds of civil obligations such that they can proceed independently of each other.
14. CONSING V. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 161075, JULY 15, 2013
‣ Independent Civil Action cannot NEVER raise a Prejudicial Question to suspend the Criminal Action
‣ An independent civil action based on fraud initiated by the defrauded party does not raise a prejudicial question to
stop the proceedings in a pending criminal prosecution of the defendant for estafa through falsification. This is
because the result of the independent civil action is irrelevant to the issue of guilt or innocence of the accused.
‣ It is well settled that a civil action based on defamation, fraud and physical injuries may be independently instituted
pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, and does not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the
suspension of a criminal case
‣ Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed
independently of each other.
‣ For prejudicial questions, it always a test of logic and common sense, whether the issue in the first case should be
determined first, before the second case must proceed, in which case, the second case should be suspended until the
first case is decided. the two cases must be “intimately related”. Generally, there must be a previously instituted civil
action and a subsequent criminal action for the doctrine of prejudicial question to apply, but the SC has relaxed this
and applied the doctrine in a previously instituted administrative case and a subsequent civil case (Quiambao vs
Osorio) and also a previously instituted administrative case, and a subsequent criminal case. But these cases should
be construed as mere exceptions, and the general rule should be followed

X. DAMAGES
X. DAMAGES
Remember:
‣ Injury is the legal invasion of a legal right
‣ Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury
‣ Damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered
A. IN GENERAL
Article 2195. The provisions of this Title shall be respectively applicable to all obligations mentioned in article 1157.
Article 2196. The rules under this Title are without prejudice to special provisions on damages formulated elsewhere in
this Code. Compensation for workmen and other employees in case of death, injury or illness is regulated by special
laws. Rules governing damages laid down in other laws shall be observed insofar as they are not in conflict with this
Code.
Article 2197. Damages may be:

(1) Actual or compensatory;
(2) Moral;
(3) Nominal;
(4) Temperate or moderate;
(5) Liquidated; or
(6) Exemplary or corrective.
Article 2198. The principles of the general law on damages are hereby adopted insofar as they are not inconsistent with
this Code.
Is proof of pecuniary loss required to recover damages?

‣ Proof of pecuniary loss is necessary to successfully recover actual damages from the defendant. No proof of pecuniary
loss is necessary in order that moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated or exemplary damages, may be adjudicated. The
assessment of such damages, except liquidated ones, is left to the discretion of the court, according to the circumstances
of each case
1. ONG V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 117103, JANUARY 21, 1999

‣ Requirements to Recover Damages: Damages should be Pleaded and Proven
‣ Actual damages are such compensation or damages for an injury that will put the injured party in the position in
which he had been before he was injured. They pertain to such injuries or losses that are actually sustained and
susceptible of measurement. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, a party is entitled to adequate
compensation only for such pecuniary loss as he has duly proven.
‣ To be recoverable, actual damages must be pleaded and proven in Court. In no instance may the trial judge
award more than those so pleaded and proven. Damages cannot be presumed. The award thereof must be
based on the evidence presented, not on the personal knowledge of the court; and certainly not on flimsy,
remote, speculative and nonsubstantial proof. Article 2199 of the Civil Code expressly mandates that
except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such
pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved.

X. DAMAGES
‣ A person is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her body, and if that integrity is violated, damages are due
and assessable. However, physical injury, like loss or diminution of use of an arm or a limb, is not a pecuniary loss.
Indeed, it is not susceptible of exact monetary estimation.Thus, the usual practice is to award moral damages for
physical injuries sustained for mental anguish, wounded feelings and shock.
‣ Although actual damages include indemnification for profits which the injured party failed to obtain (lucro cesante
or lucrum cesans),the rule requires that said person produce the best evidence of which his case is susceptible.
‣ In this case, The bare and unsubstantiated assertion of Francia that she usually earned P200 a day from her
market stall is not the best evidence to prove her claim of unrealized income for the eight-month period that
her arm was in plaster cast. Her testimony that it was their lessor who filed their income tax returns and
obtained business licenses for them does not justify her failure to present more credible evidence of her
income. Furthermore, after her ten-day confinement at the San Pablo Hospital,she could have returned to her
work at the public market despite the plaster cast on her right arm, since she claimed to have two nieces as
helpers. Clearly, the appellate court was correct in deleting the award for unrealized income, because of
petitioners utter failure to substantiate her claim.
‣ Generally, claims for actual/compensatory damages cannot be presumed, they must be pleaded and proven by the
plaintiff. The plaintiff must plead and prove:
a. Fact of loss or injury and incidental expenses due to such loss
b. Amount of such injury and expenses
‣ In this case, note that the cost of restorative treatment was taken into consideration as the basis for awarding
actual damages.
B. ACTUAL DAMAGES
Actual or compensatory damages under the prevailing law may be classified into two. One is the loss of what a person already
possesses (Damnum Emergens), and the other is the failure to receive as a benefit that would have pertained to him (Lucrum
Cessans)
What are the 7 specific kinds of actual damages? (I-LAV-IIT)

1. Indemnity for death
2. Loss of benefits which would have otherwise pertained to the injured party (Lucrum Cessans)
3. Attorney’s fees
4. Value of loss actually sustained (Damnum Emergens)
5. Interest
6. Injury to business standing or commercial credit
7. Temporary or permanent loss of earning capacity
Article 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such
pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory
damages.
Article 2200. Indemnification for damages shall comprehend not only the value of the loss suffered, but also that of the
profits which the obligee failed to obtain. (1106)
Article 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall
be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation, and which the parties have
foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted.
In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be
reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation. (1107a)

X. DAMAGES
Article 2202. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the natural and probable
consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could
have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant.
Article 2204. In crimes, the damages to be adjudicated may be respectively increased or lessened according to the
aggravating or mitigating circumstances.
Article 2205. Damages may be recovered:

(1) For loss or impairment of earning capacity in cases of temporary or permanent personal injury;
(2) For injury to the plaintiff's business standing or commercial credit.
Article 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pesos,
even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to
the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased
on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his
death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of article 291, the recipient who is not an heir
called to the decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or intestate succession, may demand support from the
person causing the death, for a period not exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages
for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.
Article 1764. Damages in cases comprised in this Section shall be awarded in accordance with Title XVIII of this Book,
concerning Damages. Article 2206 shall also apply to the death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract by a
common carrier.
Article 195 of the Family Code. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding articles, the following are obliged to support
each other to the whole extent set forth in the preceding article:
(1) The spouses;
(2) Legitimate ascendants and descendants;
(3) Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter;
(4) Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter; and
(5) Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of full or half-blood (291a)
Article 196 of the Family Code. Brothers and sisters not legitimately related, whether of the full or half-blood, are likewise
bound to support each other to the full extent set forth in Article 194, except only when the need for support of the
brother or sister, being of age, is due to a cause imputable to the claimant's fault or negligence. (291a)
Article 2207. If the plaintiff's property has been insured, and he has received indemnity from the insurance company for
the injury or loss arising out of the wrong or breach of contract complained of, the insurance company shall be
subrogated to the rights of the insured against the wrongdoer or the person who has violated the contract. If the amount
paid by the insurance company does not fully cover the injury or loss, the aggrieved party shall be entitled to recover the
deficiency from the person causing the loss or injury.
Article 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be
recovered, except:
(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;

X. DAMAGES
(2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to
protect his interest;
(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;
(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;
(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly valid, just and
demandable claim;
(6) In actions for legal support;
(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers;
(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability laws;
(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;
(10)When at least double judicial costs are awarded;
(11)In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be
recovered.
In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.
Article 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity for
damages, there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of the interest agreed upon, and in the absence
of stipulation, the legal interest, which is six per cent per annum. (1108)
Article 2210. Interest may, in the discretion of the court, be allowed upon damages awarded for breach of contract.
Article 2211. In crimes and quasi-delicts, interest as a part of the damages may, in a proper case, be adjudicated in the
discretion of the court.
Article 2212. Interest due shall earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded, although the obligation may be
silent upon this point. (1109a)
Article 2213. Interest cannot be recovered upon unliquidated claims or damages, except when the demand can be
established with reasonable certainty.
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Circular No. 799, Series of 2013

Subject: Payment of Interest in the Absence of Stipulation
Section 1. The rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or credits, and the rate allowed in
judgments, in the absence of an express contract as to such rate of interest, shall be six percent (6%) per annum
MEMORIZE: ARTICLES 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2204, 2205, AND 2208
COMPARISON OF DELICTS AND QUASI-DELICTS AGAINST BREACH OF CONTRACT IN ACTUAL DAMAGES
DELICT/QUASI-DELICT BREACH OF CONTRACT
Extent and Defendant is liable for all Breach in Good Faith

Scope of damages which are the ‣ Defendant is liable shall be those that are the natural and probable
Actual natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation, and which the parties
Damage consequences of the act or have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the
omission complained of. obligation was constituted.
It is NOT necessary that such Breach in Bad Faith

damages have been foreseen
or could have reasonably been ‣ Defendant is liable for all damages which may be reasonably
foreseen by the defendant. attributed to the non-performance of the obligation.
*Breach in bad faith includes malice, fraud or wanton attitude

X. DAMAGES
DELICT/QUASI-DELICT BREACH OF CONTRACT
Basis of the Time of the loss/injury Time the obligation was constituted (perfection of the contract)
Value of the
Loss/Injury
*Note that the rule in crimes and quasi-delicts is the same as the rule in breach of contracts and quasi-contracts where the
breach was accompanied by fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude on the part of the obligor.
*To make things easier, for reference:

1. “Kinds and Extent of Actual Damage”
‣ What are actual damages? what is deemed included therein? what are the kinds? what losses are allowed by law to be
recovered as actual damages?
‣ Covers the different kinds of actual/compensatory damages such as loss of earning capacity, compensatory interests,
etc
2. “Rationale for Recovery of Actual Damages”
‣ Why does the law allow recovery for actual damages? Purpose or rationale?
3. “Requirements to Recover Actual Damages”
‣ What must the plaintiff do or prove in order to recover? how does the plaintiff prove the loss? what should the plaintiff
allege in his complaint?
4. “Computation/Determination of the Amount of Actual Damages”
‣ "How do you determine the specific amount of the loss? What are the factors to consider? What is the formula?
1. PNOC SHIPPING AND TRANSPORT CORPORATION V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 107518, OCTOBER 8, 1998
‣ Rationale for Recovery of Actual Damages
‣ They proceed from a sense of natural justice and are designed to repair the wrong that has been done, to
compensate for the injury inflicted and not to impose a penalty
‣ Kinds and Extent of Actual Damage
‣ In actions based on torts or quasi-delicts, actual damages include all the natural and probable consequences of
the act or omission complained of
‣ There are two kinds of actual or compensatory damages:
1. Loss of what a person already possesses (daño emergente)
2. Failure to receive as a benefit that which would have pertained to him (lucro cesante)
‣ Requirements to Recover Actual Damages: Proof of Amount of Loss

‣ A party is entitled to adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss actually suffered and duly proved.
‣ Indeed, basic is the rule that to recover actual damages, the amount of loss must not only be capable of proof but
must actually be proven with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof or best
evidence obtainable of the actual amount thereof.
‣ The claimant is duty-bound to point out specific facts that afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory
damages are borne.
‣ A court cannot merely rely on speculations, conjectures, or guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages as
well as hearsay or uncorroborated testimony whose truth is suspect.
‣ The burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence would be presented on either side. He
must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence which means that the evidence, as a whole, adduced by
one side is superior to that of the other.
‣ In other words, damages cannot be presumed and courts, in making an award must point out specific facts that
could afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne
2. ALGARRA V. SANDEJAS, 27 PHIL. 284 (1914)

‣ Common Law vs Civil Law Concept of Damages (Under the Old Civil Code)

X. DAMAGES
‣ The rules for the measure of damages, once that liability is determined, are, however, somewhat different. The Civil
Code requires that the defendant repair the damage caused by his fault or negligence. No distinction is made
therein between damage caused maliciously and intentionally and damages caused through mere negligence in so
far as the civil liability of the wrongdoer in concerned. Nor is the defendant required to do more than repair the
damage done, or, in other words, to put the plaintiff in the same position, so far as pecuniary compensation can do
so, that he would have been in had the damage not been inflicted. In this respect there is a notable difference
between the two systems.
‣ Under the Anglo-Saxon law, when malicious or willful intention to cause the damage is an element of the
defendant's act, it is quite generally regarded as an aggravating circumstance for which the plaintiff is entitled to
more than mere compensation for the injury inflicted. These are called exemplary or punitive damages, and no
provision is made for them in article 1902 of the Civil Code.
‣ Again it is quite common under the English system to award what is called nominal damages where there is only a
technical violation of the plaintiff's rights resulting in no substantial injury to him. This branch of damages is also
unknown under the Civil Code. If no damages have actually occurred there can be none to repair and the
doctrine of nominal damages is not applicable.
‣ Thus it has been often held by the supreme court of Spain that a mere noncompliance with the obligations
of a contract is not sufficient to sustain a judgment for damages. It must be shown that damages actually
existed.
‣ Actual damages, under the American system, include pecuniary recompense for pain and suffering, injured
feelings, and the like. Article 1902, does not extend to such incidents. Aside from this exception, actual damages,
in this jurisdiction, in the sense that they mean just compensation for the loss suffered, are practically synonymous
with actual damages under the American system.
‣ The purpose of the law in awarding actual damages is to repair the wrong that has been done, to compensate for
the injury inflicted, and not to impose a penalty.
‣ Actual damages are not dependent on nor graded by the intent with which the wrongful act is done.”
‣ The words "actual damages" shall be construed to include all damages that the plaintiff may he has suffered in
respect to his property, business, trade, profession, or occupation, and no other damages whatever.
‣ Actual damages are compensatory only.
‣ Compensatory damages' as indicated by the word employed to characterize them, simply make good or replace
the loss caused by the wrong.
‣ They proceed from a sense of natural justice, and are designed to repair that of which one has been deprived by
the wrong of another.
‣ "Compensatory damages' are such as awarded to compensate the injured party for caused by the wrong, and
must be only such as make just and fair compensation, and are due when the wrong is established, whether it was
committed maliciously — that is, with evil intention — or not.

‣ Except in those cases where the law authorizes the imposition of punitive or exemplary damages, the party
claiming damages must establish by competent evidence the amount of such damages, and courts can not give
judgment for a greater amount than those actually proven.”
‣ Kinds and Extent of Actual Damage (under the Old Civil Code)
‣ Under Article 1902, that the defendant repair the damage done can only mean what is set forth in the above
definitions, Anything short of that would not repair the damages and anything beyond that would be excessive.
Actual compensatory damages are those allowed for tortious wrongs under the Civil Code; nothing more,
nothing less.
‣ Actual damages include not only loss already suffered, but loss of profits which may not have been realized.
The allowance of loss of prospective profits could hardly be more explicitly provided for.
‣ The indemnity comprises, not only the value of loss suffered, but also that of the prospective profit that was not
realized, and the obligation of the debtor in good faith is limited to such losses and damages as were foreseen or
might have been foreseen at the time the obligation was incurred and which are a necessary consequence of his
failure of fulfillment. Losses and damages under such limitations and frustrated profits must, therefore, be proved
directly by means of the evidence the law authorizes.
‣ Computation/Determination of the Amount of Actual Damages; Factors to Consider (arising from interruption
to the business of the plaintiff)

X. DAMAGES
‣ It is proper to consider the business the plaintiff is engaged in, the nature and extent of such business, the
importance of his personal oversight and superintendence in conducting it, and the consequent loss arising from
his inability to prosecure it.
‣ When it is shown that a plaintiff's business is a going concern with a fairly steady average profit on the investment,
it may be assumed that had the interruption to the business through defendant's wrongful act not occurred, it
would have continued producing this average income "so long as is usual with things of that nature." When in
addition to the previous average income of the business it is further shown what the reduced receipts of the
business are immediately after the cause of the interruption has been removed, there can be no manner of doubt
that a loss of profits has resulted from the wrongful act of the defendant
‣ Where the plaintiff has just made his arrangements to begin business, and he is prevented from beginning either
by tort or a breach of contract, or where the injury is to a particular subject matter, profits of which are uncertain,
evidence as to expected profits must be excluded from the jury because of the uncertainty. There is as much
reason to believe that there will be no profits as to believe that there will be no profits, but no such argument can
be made against proving a usual profit of an established business
‣ The profits of an established business may be considered in calculating the measure of damages for an
interruption
‣ Note that for loss already sustained, the receipts for treatment and medical expenses can be basis to determine the
amount of the loss, for loss of opportunity (loss of benefits), obviously, there are no receipts for this. See the factors the
court in this case used to consider in determining the amount for such loss.
3. CERRANO V. TAN CHUCO, G.R. NO. 12907, AUGUST 1, 1918

‣ When the existence of a loss is established, absolute certainty as to its amount is not required. The benefit to be
derived from a contract which one of the parties has absolutely failed to perform is of necessity to some extent, a
matter of speculation, but the injured party is not to be denied all remedy for that reason alone.
‣ He must produce the best evidence of which his case is susceptible and if that evidence warrants the inference
that he has been damaged by the loss of profits which he might with reasonable certainty have anticipated but for
the defendant's wrongful act, he is entitled to recover.
‣ The general rule is, then, that a plaintiff may recover compensation for any gain which he can make it appear with
reasonable certainty the defendant's wrongful act prevented him from acquiring, . . . .
‣ It is equally well-settled, however, that the burden of proof rests upon the defendant to show that the plaintiff might
have reduced the damages.
‣ For loss of profits/benefits, the proof as to the exact amount and absolute certainty is not required, only reasonable
certainty is required.
4. HICKS V. MANILA HOTEL COMPANY, G.R. NO. 9973, NOVEMBER 6, 1914

‣ Article 1106 and 1107 of the Civil Code reads as follows: Indemnity for losses and damages includes not only the
amount of the loss which may have suffered, but also that of the profits which the creditor many have failed to
realize, reserving the provisions contained in the following articles. The losses and damages for which a debtor in
good faith is liable, are those foreseen or which may have been foreseen, at the time of constituting the obligation,
and which may be necessary consequence of its non-fulfillment. In case of fraud, the debtor shall be liable for all
those which clearly may originate from the no-fulfillment of the obligation.
‣ Under these provisions we are required to determine the amount of profits which plaintiff failed to realize by reason
of the refusal of defendant to permit him to continue under the contract for the second year and which were
foreseen or which might have been foreseen at the time the contract was made and which were a necessary
consequence of the breach.
‣ Where a loss of profits is not too remote or conjectural to be suspectible of computation with reasonable
accuracy, they are proper elements of damage.
‣ As to whether or not the plaintiff in an action of this character may recover only that portion of the profits
which had accrued up to the time of bringing the action, or whether he may sue for all the damages
resulting from the breach in a single action, even though that action is begun long before the period during
which the profits will accrue has expired, we may say that, in our judgment, the weight of authority is to the
effect that the plaintiff need bring but one action and that he may recover the damages sustained for the
whole period even though it be by anticipation.

X. DAMAGES
‣ The recent tendency of judicial decisions in this country, in actions of contract, as well as in actions of tort, has
been towards allowing entire damages to be recovered, once for all, in a single action, and thus avoiding the
embarrassment and annoyance of repeated litigation.
‣ From the amount of damages proved in the case at bar there would have been deducted, if there had been
any proof to that effect, whatever profits plaintiff had gained up to the time of the action or might
reasonably be expected to gain during the period sued for
‣ For cases of anticipatory breach of contract, the plaintiff can sue for damages for loss porifts, based on the entire
period of such contract, even if they are not yet due and demandble. In this sense, damages not yet incurred is
allowed to be recovered, to avoid multiplicity of suits and splitting of causes of action. Thus, the plaintiff may
already claim all the damages arising from the breach, even though the obligations involved are not yet
demandable.
‣ In order to justify a recovery in any case, assuming that a breach has been committed, there are two necessary
elements to be considered:
1. That a damage has been done;

2. Such damage is the result of the breach.
‣ The amount of the one should be computed with reasonable accuracy. The fact of the other must be determined
with reasonable certainty.
‣ A less degree of accuracy is required in the former than of certainty in the latter, but neither is required to be
absolute or beyond conjectural possibilities.
‣ Where it reasonably appears that a party has been damaged, and that such damage is the direct result of the
breach, then a recovery is justified.
‣ Computation/Determination of the Amount of Actual Damages

‣ The next step is to ascertain how much will reasonably compensate the injured party. This should be computed by
the plainest, easiest, and most accurate measure which will do justice in the premises, and if from the conditions in
the contract, and the nature of the breach, it reasonably appears that the extent or amount of damages may be
more readily, easily, correctly, and justly ascertained by applying the loss of profits as a measure, if it is evident that
profits were lost and the amount thereof can be calculated with reasonable accuracy, then such profits are the true
measure to be applied. In such cases, however, it should appear evident that profits were lost.
‣ The amount may be estimated with only reasonable accuracy; but the fact that profits were lost should require
stricter proof.
5. JUSTIVA V. GUSTILO, 7 SCRA 72 (1963)

‣ Requirements to Recover Actual Damages: Proof of Amount of Loss, Pleading for Actual Damages
‣ Is the award of actual damages proper? While the prayer by the respondents in their "Answer" mentions only
exemplary damages, moral damages and attorney's fees, therein also is a plea for "such further relief ... as this
Honorable Court may deem just and equitable." This prayer may include "actual damages", if and when
they are proved.
‣ It is to be observed that in the course of the trial, defendants introduced evidence of actual damages; yet
petitioners failed to object to such presentation. Consequently, the unalleged but proved matter of actual damages
may be considered by the court. The trial judge mentioned such damages. And the Court of Appeals, without
going into specifics, approved the award, and declared explicitly that the evidence sustained it. In this Court
appellees quoted without contradiction portions of the oral evidence in support of the judge's findings. So, the
matter being factual, we must, in the circumstances, affirm the appellate court's assessment of actual damages.
‣ Note that the rule that damages must be specifically pleaded (in the complaint) is only the general rule, in certain
instances, the court awards even it was only pleaded in general terms
6. DE GUIA V. THE MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD & LIGHT COMPANY, G.R. NO. 14335, JANUARY 28, 1920
‣ If the damages incurred are too speculative to be the basis of recovery in a civil action, it must be eliminated. It
goes without saying that damage of this character could not, at the time of the accident, have been foreseen by
the delinquent party as a probable consequence of the injury inflicted.
‣ Requirement to Recover Actual Damages: Damages being pleaded for

X. DAMAGES
‣ The failure of a party to amend a pleading to conform to the evidence adduced during trial does not preclude an
adjudication by the court on the basis of such evidence which may embody new issues not raised in the
pleadings, or serve as a basis for higher award of damages.
‣ The court may treat the pleading as if it had been amended to conform to the evidence, although it had not been
actually so amended.
‣ Requirement to Recover Actual Damages: Expenses must be reasonably necessary and actually incurred
‣ In order to constitute a proper element of recovery in an action of this character, the medical service for which
reimbursement is claimed should not only be such as to have created a legal obligation upon the plaintiff but such
as was reasonably necessary in view of his actual condition.
‣ It can not be permitted that a litigant should retain an unusual and unnecessary number of professional experts
with a view to the successful promotion of a lawsuit and expect to recover against his adversary the entire
expense thus incurred. His claim for medical services must be limited to such expenditures as were reasonably
suited to the case.
‣ In this case, it does not appear that said physicians have in fact made charges for those services with the intention
of imposing obligations on the plaintiff to pay for them.
‣ On the contrary it would seem that said services were gratuitously rendered out of courtesy to the plaintiff as
a member of the medical profession. The suggestions made on the stand by these physicians to the effect that
their services were worth the amounts stated by them are not sufficient to proved that the plaintiff had incurred the
obligation to pay those amounts.
‣ In the second place, we are convinced that in employing so many physicians the plaintiff must have had in view of
the successful promotion of the issue of this lawsuit rather than the bona fide purpose of effecting the cure of his
injuries
‣ No actual damages may be awarded for expenses which were not really incurred because they were gratuitously
received
7. TALISAY-SILAY MILLING CO., INC., V. GONZALES, G.R. NO. 91852, AUGUST 15, 1995
‣ Requirement to Recover Actual Damages: Proof of Amount of Loss of Profits
‣ The familiar rule is that damages consisting of unrealized profits, frequently referred as "ganancias frustradas" or
"lucrum cessans," are not to be granted on the basis of mere speculation, conjecture or surmise but rather by
reference to some reasonably definite standard such as market value, established experience or direct
inference from known circumstances.
‣ Uncertainty as to whether or not a claimant suffered unrealized profits at all, uncertainty as to the very fact
of injury, will, of course, preclude recovery of this species of damages.
‣ Where, however, it is reasonably certain that injury consisting of failure to realize otherwise reasonably expected
profits had been incurred, uncertainty as to the precise amount of such unrealized profits will not prevent
recovery or the award of damages. The problem then would be the ascertainment of the amount of such
unrealized profits.
‣ This is similar to the Cerrano case, but distinguish the kinds of “uncertainty”. Uncertainty precludes damages only if it
pertains to the uncertainty of the fact of the injury, but uncertainty as to the amount of such injury (such as to the
amount of loss of profits) will NOT prevent recovery. In the latter, all that is required is “reasonable certainty” based on
the “best evidence obtainable”.
8. LIM V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 125817, JANUARY 16, 2002

‣ In awarding damages for tortuous injury, it becomes the sole design of the courts to provide for adequate
compensation by putting the plaintiff in the same financial position he was in prior to the tort.
‣ It is a fundamental principle in the law on damages that a defendant cannot be held liable in damages for more
than the actual loss which he has inflicted and that a plaintiff is entitled to no more than the just and adequate
compensation for the injury suffered. His recovery is, in the absence of circumstances giving rise to an allowance
of punitive damages, limited to a fair compensation for the harm done.
‣ The law will not put him in a position better than where he should be in had not the wrong happened
9. ADRIAN WILSON INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATES, INC., V. TMX PHILIPPINES, INC., G.R. NO. 162608, JULY 26, 2010

X. DAMAGES
‣ Actual damages puts the claimant in the position in which he had been before he was injured.

‣ A claimant is entitled to be compensated reasonably and commensurately for what he or she has lost as a result of
another’s act or omission, and the amount of damages to be awarded shall be equivalent to what have been
pleaded and adequately proven.
‣ The award thereof must be based on the evidence presented, not on the personal knowledge of the court; and
certainly not on flimsy, remote, speculative and nonsubstantial proof. Under the Civil Code, one is entitled to an
adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved.
‣ Remedy in case Failure to Prove Extent of the Loss

‣ Should the claimant fail to prove with exactitude the extent of injury he or she sustained, the court will still allow
redress if it finds that the claimant has suffered due to another’s fault.
‣ As a matter of equity, therefore, a relief in the form of temperate damages is warranted.
‣ There are 2 things which must be proven in cases of actual loss (where expenses are incurred).
a. Proof of actual payment
b. Proof of actual receipt
‣ Note that a voucher is merely a record, but an official receipt is proof of actual payment and receipt. Between the two,
the latter is the “best evidence obtainable”
10. PEOPLE V. MAMARUNCAS, G.R. NO. 179497, JANUARY 25, 2012

‣ To be entitled to an award of actual damages, "it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable
degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable

‣ A list of expenses cannot replace receipts when the latter should have been issued as a matter of course in
business transactions
‣ Remedy in case Failure to Prove Extent of the Loss

‣ Since entitlement of the same is shown under the facts of the case, temperate damages should be awarded in lieu
of actual damages to the heirs of the victim pursuant to Article 2224 of the Civil Code which provides that
temperate damages "may be recovered when the court finds that pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount
cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty
‣ Note the “best evidence obtainable” rule for recovery of damages based on actual loss. If the best evidence according
to the circumstances of the case cannot be presented, the plaintiff is not precluded from recovery, he can recover
temperate damages instead (which are less the actual damages but more than nominal damages)
‣ In this case, for funeral expenses, the best evidence obtainable for proof for actual payment are the receipts. If the
plaintiff cannot present the receipts, actual damages based on this cannot be awarded since the amount of the
expenses cannot be proven, BUT temperate damages can still be awarded (P25,000 is the trend now). But note that
other actual damages can still be awarded.
11. PEOPLE V. ARELLANO, G.R. NO. 122477, JUNE 30, 2000

‣ Requirement to Recover Actual Damages: Civil Indemnity, no need for proof or to be pleaded for
‣ While the heirs of the victim did not expressly claim an amount representing the deceased’s loss of earning
capacity nor present evidence thereon, such failure does not necessarily prevent recovery of damages
considering that there is sufficient basis on record upon which the court may determine a reasonable and
fair estimate of such damages.
‣ Civil indemnity is automatically granted to the heirs of the victim without need of any evidence other than the
fact of the commission of the crime.
‣ Computation/Determination of the Amount of Actual Damages: Compensation for Loss of Earning Capacity
‣ The amount of loss of earning capacity is based mainly on two factors.
c. The number of years of which the damages shall be computed; and

‣ This is computed by using the formula based on the American Expectancy Table of Mortality or 2/3 x [80 –
age of the victim at the time of death] = life expectancy in terms of years

X. DAMAGES
d. The rate at which the losses sustained by the respondent should be fixed.
‣ This is arrived at by multiplying the life expectancy by the earning of the deceased. The computation of the
rate of loss of earnings should be based on the net earnings.
‣ When there is death due to delict or quasi-delict (or breach of contract of carriage in relation to Art. 1764 but more on
this later), civil indemnity (a form of actual damages), may automatically be awarded without proof or pleading (See Art.
2206). The P3,000 in Art. 2206 has been increased by the courts to P75,000 in case death results in criminal cases.
12. PEOPLE V. ANTICAMARA, G.R. NO. 178771, JUNE 8, 2011

‣ Requirement to Recover Actual Damages: Civil Indemnity, no need for proof or to be pleaded for
‣ The award of civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than
the commission of the crime
‣ Even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed because of the prohibition in R.A. 9346, the civil indemnity of is
proper, because it is not dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying
circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the commission of the offense
‣ While R.A. No. 9346 prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the fact remains that the penalty provided for by
law for a heinous offense is still death, and the offense is still heinous.
‣ Civil indemnity covers not only death arising from delict, but for other heinous crimes as well, such as rape and
kidnapping, even if death does not occur
13. CARIAGA V. LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS COMPANY, G.R. NO. L-11037, DECEMBER 29, 1960
‣ Kinds and Extent of Actual Damage: Loss of Earning Capacity
‣ Under Art. 2201 of the Civil Code the damages for which the obligor, guilty of a breach of contract but who acted
in good faith, is liable shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach and which
the parties had forseen or could have reasonably forseen at the time the obligation was constituted,
provided such damages, according to Art. 2199 of the same Code, have been duly proved.
‣ In this case, the income which the plaintiff could earn if he should finish the medical course and pass the
corresponding board examinations must be deemed to be within the same category because they could
have reasonably been foreseen by the parties at the time he boarded the bus of the defendant. At that time
he was already a fourth-year student in medicine in a reputable university. While his scholastic may not be first
rate, it is, nevertheless, sufficient to justify the assumption that he could have passed the board test in due time.
As regards the income that he could possibly earn as a medical practitioner, it appears that, according to a
witness, the amount of P300.00 could easily be expected as the minimum monthly income of Edgardo had he
finished his studies.
‣ This case involved death and breach of contract (of carriage).

‣ Note when the natural and probable consequences of the breach should have been foreseen, which is the time of the
perfection of the contract, and in the case of contracts of carriage, it is perfected upon boarding
‣ Note also that the court here did not yet use the well-known american formula for computing the amount of loss of
earning capacity, that formula was only incorporated in the next Villa Rey Transit Case, which is a landmark case.
14. VILLA REY TRANSIT V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-25499, FEBRUARY 18, 1970
‣ The determination of the indemnity to be awarded to the heirs of a deceased person has therefore no fixed basis.
Much is left to the discretion of the court considering the moral and material damages involved, and so it has been
said that there can be no exact or uniform rule for measuring the value of a human life and the measure of
damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculation, but the amount recoverable depends
on the particular facts and circumstances of each case.
‣ The life expectancy of the deceased or of the beneficiary, whichever is shorter, is an important factor.
‣ Other factors that are usually considered are:
a. Pecuniary loss to plaintiff or beneficiary
b. Loss of support
c. Loss of service
d. Loss of society

X. DAMAGES
e. Mental suffering of beneficiaries
f. Medical and funeral expenses
‣ Thus, life expectancy is, not only relevant, but, also, an important element in fixing the amount recoverable by
private respondents herein. Although it is not the sole element determinative of said amount, no cogent reason has
been given to warrant its disregard and the adoption, in the case at bar, of a purely arbitrary standard, such as a
four-year rule.
‣ Earning capacity, as an element of damages to one's estate for his death by wrongful act is necessarily his
net earning capacity or his capacity to acquire money, "less the necessary expense for his own living.
‣ Stated otherwise, the amount recoverable is not loss of the entire earning, but rather the loss of that portion of
the earnings which the beneficiary would have received.
‣ In other words, only net earnings, not gross earning, are to be considered that is, the total of the earnings less
expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or income and less living and other incidental expenses
‣ This is a landmark case incorporating this “formula” for computing the amount of loss of earning capacity. Note that
the formula provided for is the general rule, generally it is not modified. If asked in the bar, absent any special
circumstances, use this formula as provided for here. But just note that the SC has at times modified it because of
special circumstances, which we will see later.
15. CRUZ V. SUN HOLIDAYS, INC., G.R. NO. 186312, JUNE 29, 2010
‣ As for damages representing unearned income, the formula for its computation is: Net Earning Capacity = life
expectancy x (gross annual income - reasonable and necessary living expenses).
‣ Thus there are three factors involved
a. Life expectancy
‣ This is determined in accordance with the formula: 2 / 3 x [80 — age of deceased at the time of death].
This is the formula adopted in the American Expectancy Table of Mortality or the Actuarial of Combined
Experience Table of Mortality
b. Gross annual income

‣ This is computed by multiplying the life expectancy by the net earnings of the deceased, i.e., the total
earnings less expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or income and less living and other
incidental expenses.
‣ The loss is not equivalent to the entire earnings of the deceased, but only such portion as he would
have used to support his dependents or heirs. Hence, to be deducted from his gross earnings are the
necessary expenses supposed to be used by the deceased for his own needs
c. Reasonable and necessary living expenses

‣ When there is no showing that the living expenses constituted the smaller percentage of the gross
income, the living expenses are fixed at half of the gross income
‣ Kinds and Extent of Actual Damage: Compensatory Interest

‣ Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals teaches that when an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law,
contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts is breached, the contravener can be held liable for payment
of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages
‣ Damages for loss of earning capacity (and civil indemnity, support, etc) when death occurs may generally be awarded
only in cases of delict or quasi-delict (Art. 2206), but Art. 1764 (on common carriers) extends Art. 22206 to breach of
contract cases involving contracts of carriage.
‣ When the amount of gross expenses cannot be proven it is fixed at half of the gross income (so 50% of the gross
income, this acts like a ceiling). May cases na higher percent ang ginagamit ng court, but for all intents and purposes,
use this 50%.
16. DE CALISTON V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-63135, JUNE 24, 1983
‣ Under Article 2206 of the Civil Code — The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall
be at least three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition: (1) The

X. DAMAGES
defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the
heirs of the latter. . .
‣ The pension of the decedent being a sure income that was cut short by her death for which the defendant was
responsible, the surviving heir of the former is entitled to the award of P 10,000.00 which is just equivalent to the
pension the decedent would have received for one year if she did not die.
17. METRO MANILA TRANSIT CORPORATION V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 116617, NOVEMBER 16, 1998
‣ Kinds and Extent of Actual Damage: Indemnity for Death
‣ Indemnity for Death. Art. 2206 provides for the payment of indemnity for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict.
Initially fixed in said article of the Civil Code at P3,000.00, the amount of the indemnity has through the years been
gradually increased based on the value of the peso. At present, it is fixed at P50,000.00
‣ Actual Damages. Art. 2199 provides that "except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an
adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved.
‣ Hence, apart from the indemnity for death, the plaintiffs are entitled to recover actual damages
‣ Kinds and Extent of Actual Damage: Compensation for Loss of Earning Capacity of MINORS
‣ Art. 2206 of the Civil Code provides that in addition to the indemnity for death caused by a crime or quasi delict,
the "defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid
to the heirs of the latter; . . ."
‣ Compensation of this nature is awarded not for loss of earnings but for loss of capacity to earn money.
‣ Evidence must be presented that the victim, if not yet employed at the time of death, was reasonably
certain to complete training for a specific profession.
‣ In one case, no award of compensation for loss of earning capacity was granted to the heirs of a college freshman
because there was no sufficient evidence on record to show that the victim would eventually become a
professional pilot. But compensation should be allowed for loss of earning capacity resulting from the death of a
minor who has not yet commenced employment or training for a specific profession if sufficient evidence is
presented to establish the amount thereof. In the United States it has been observed:
‣ This raises the broader question of the proper measure of damages in death cases involving children, housewives,
the old, and others who do not have market income so that there is no pecuniary loss to survivors or to the estate
of the decedent.
‣ The traditional approach was to award no or merely nominal damages in such cases. . . . Increasingly, however,
courts allow expert testimony to be used to project those lost earnings
‣ In another case, the court allowed the heirs of a seven-year-old boy who was killed in a car accident to recover
compensation for loss of earning capacity
‣ The argument for allowing compensation for loss of earning capacity of a minor is even stronger if he or
she was a student, whether already training for a specific profession or still engaged in general studies
‣ There are numerous cases that have held admissible evidence of prospective earnings of a student or trainee. .
. . The appellants contend that such evidence is not admissible unless the course under study relates to a
given occupation or profession and it is shown that the student is reasonably certain to follow that occupation
or profession. It is true that the majority of these decisions deal with students who are studying for a specific
occupation or profession. However, not one of these cases indicate that evidence of one's education as a
guide to future earnings is not admissible where the student is engaged in general studies or whose education
does not relate to a specific occupation.
‣ In this case, considering her good academic record, extra-curricular activities, and varied interests, it is reasonable
to assume that Liza Rosalie would have enjoyed a successful professional career had it not been for her untimely
death. Hence, it is proper that compensation for loss of earning capacity should be awarded to her heirs in
accordance with the formula established in decided cases
‣ Formula for computing net earning capacity: Net Earning = Life [Gross Necessary Capacity Expectancy x [Annual
— Living Income Expenses]
‣ See footnote 52 for application of the formula for computing the gross annual income. Start with the current rate of
daily minimum wage then multiply it by 365 to get the annual minimum wage. Then divide it by 12 to get the monthly.
Then multiply it by 13 (you include 13th month pay because labor law provides for it) to get the gross annual income.
‣ In this case, there were no documents to show the gross income since the victim was only a student at the time of her
death, but court considered the academic records as the basis of awarding loss of earning capacity and concluded

X. DAMAGES
that she would have enjoyed a successful career had she not died, and used the minimum wage as basis for gross
income.
18. TAMAYO V. SEÑORA, G.R. NO. 176946, NOVEMBER 15, 2010

‣ Kinds and Extent of Actual Damage: Compensation for Loss of Earning Capacity
‣ The award of damages for loss of earning capacity is concerned with the determination of losses or damages
sustained by respondents, as dependents and intestate heirs of the deceased.
‣ This consists not of the full amount of his earnings, but of the support which they received or would have received
from him had he not died as a consequence of the negligent act.
‣ Thus, the amount recoverable is not the loss of the victim’s entire earnings, but rather the loss of that portion of
the earnings which the beneficiary would have received
‣ Indemnity for loss of earning capacity is determined by computing the net earning capacity of the victim
‣ Formula: Net Earning Capacity = life expectancy x (gross annual income - reasonable and necessary living
expenses).
‣ Gross annual income requires the presentation of documentary evidence for the purpose of proving the victim’s
annual income
‣ The trial court in this case used the age “55” instead of the normal “80” for computing the life expectancy of the
deceased because, as he was a policeman, the mandatory retirement age of such profession is 55. But the court ruled
that the lower courts erred in modifying the formula. Use the age 80 because even if there’s a lower retirement age, in
the profession in which the deceased was engaged in, between such retirement age and “80”, the person can still
work and still has earning capacity. By setting a standard of “80” years of age, this means that beyond this age, a
person has no more earning capacity, but he can still recover of course, not based on loss of earning capacity but
based on other kinds of actual damages, such as loss of profits, etc.
19. PHILIPPINE HAWK CORPORATION V. LEE, G.R. NO. 166869, FEBRUARY 16, 2010
‣ Kinds and Extent of Actual Damages: Compensation for Loss of Earning Capacity
‣ The indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased is provided for by Article 2206 of the Civil Code.
Compensation of this nature is awarded not for loss of earnings, but for loss of capacity to earn money.
‣ Requirements to Recover Actual Damages: Proof of Loss in case of Compensation for Loss of Earning
Capacity
‣ As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for damages for loss of earning
capacity
‣ By way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the absence of
documentary evidence when:
a. The deceased is self-employed and earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, in
which case, judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the deceased's line of work no documentary
evidence is available; or
b. The deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current
labor laws
‣ In this case, the deceased husband was leasing and operating a Caltex gasoline station in Gumaca, Quezon.
Respondent testified that her husband earned an annual income of one million pesos. Respondent presented in
evidence a Certificate of Creditable Income Tax Withheld at Source for the Year 1990, which showed that
respondent’s husband earned a gross income of P950,988.43 in 1990. It is reasonable to use the Certificate and
respondent’s testimony as bases for fixing the gross annual income of the deceased at one million pesos before
respondent’s husband died on March 17, 1999. However, no documentary evidence was presented regarding the
income derived from their copra business; hence, the testimony of respondent as regards such income cannot be
considered.
‣ In the computation of loss of earning capacity, only net earnings, not gross earnings, are to be considered;
that is, the total of the earnings less expenses necessary for the creation of such earnings or income, less
living and other incidental expenses.
‣ In the absence of documentary evidence, it is reasonable to peg necessary expenses for the lease and
operation of the gasoline station at 80 percent of the gross income, and peg living expenses at 50 percent of
the net income (gross income less necessary expenses).

X. DAMAGES
‣ Requirements to Recover Actual Damages: Proof of Loss

‣ Actual damages must be substantiated by documentary evidence, such as receipts, in order to prove expenses
incurred as a result of the death of the victim or the physical injuries sustained by the victim.
‣ Generally, documentary evidence is required to substantiate a claim for damages based on loss of earning capacity,
evidence must be presented to prove the gross income. Meaning if a person is a CEO or President of a company, then
proof must be presented as to how much his salary was (such as at the payroll documents of the company). But there
are exceptions to this rule, two of which are provided in this case, the other, in the other cases. These exceptions are
based on the fact that there can be no evidence which may be presented to really show how much the person could
have earned:
1. The deceased is self-employed and earning less than the minimum wage (under current labor laws)
‣ Judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the deceased's line of work no documentary evidence is
available; or
2. The deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws
3. The deceased is a minor or is still a student at the time of death, (but evidence must be presented pertaining to
their academic standing, fact of enrolment, etc)
‣ In these executions, I think the minimum wage is used as basis for computing the gross income
‣ What if the person is unemployed at the time of his death?
20. OMC CARRIERS, INC., V. NABUA, G.R. NO. 148974, JULY 2, 2010
‣ Requirements to Recover Actual Damages: Basis for Awarding Attorney’s Fees Required
‣ The rule on the award of attorney's fees is that there must be a justification for the same. In the absence of a
statement why attorney's fees were awarded, the same should be disallowed
‣ Requirements to Recover Actual Damages: Proof of Loss

‣ For one to be entitled to actual damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable
degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and the best evidence obtainable by the injured party.
‣ To justify an award of actual damages, there must be competent proof of the actual amount of loss. Credence can
be given only to claims which are duly supported by receipts
Capacity
‣ In the case at bar, respondents only testified to the fact that the victim, Reggie Nabua, was a freshman taking up
Industrial Engineering at the Technological Institute of the Philippines in Cubao. Unlike in Metro Transit where
evidence of good academic record, extra-curricular activities, and varied interests were presented in court, herein
respondents offered no such evidence. Hence, the CA was correct when it deleted the award of compensatory
damages amounting to P2,000,000.00
‣ Note the importance of documentary evidence!
21. SPOUSES PEREÑA V. SPOUSES ZARATE, G.R. NO. 157917, AUGUST 29, 2012
‣ The fact that Aaron (the deceased-minor-plaintiff) was then without a history of earnings should not be taken
against his parents and in favor of the defendants whose negligence not only cost Aaron his life and his right to
work and earn money, but also deprived his parents of their right to his presence and his services as well.
‣ Our law itself states that the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased shall be the liability of the guilty party in
favor of the heirs of the deceased, and shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court "unless the
deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at
the time of his death.”
‣ Accordingly, we emphatically hold in favor of the indemnification for Aaron’s loss of earning capacity despite
him having been unemployed, because compensation of this nature is awarded not for loss of time or
earnings but for loss of the deceased’s power or ability to earn money
‣ In this case, the SC ruled that the CA and the RTC were not speculating that Aaron would be some highly-paid
professional, like a pilot (or, for that matter, an engineer, a physician, or a lawyer). Instead, the computation of
Aaron’s earning capacity was premised on him being a lowly minimum wage earner despite his being then
enrolled at a prestigious high school like Don Bosco in Makati, a fact that would have likely ensured his
success in his later years in life and at work.

X. DAMAGES
‣ Court in this case modified the formula, particularly the life expectancy of the deceased, since he was still a minor, the
court used the age “21” instead of his age at the time of death, because it said that this was probably the time he
would have started earning and working. (unlike in other cases involving minors too, such as MMTC case). But this is
to be understood as an exceptional, and generally, you should still use the age at the time of death
22. VICTORY LINER, INC. V. GAMMAD, G.R. NO. 159636, NOVEMBER 25, 2004
‣ Damages involved in Breach of Contract of Carriage
‣ Article 1764 in relation to Article 2206 of the Civil Code, holds the common carrier in breach of its contract of
carriage that results in the death of a passenger liable to pay the following: (1) indemnity for death, (2) indemnity
for loss of earning capacity, and (3) moral damages.
Capacity;
‣ The award of compensatory damages for the loss of the deceased’s earning capacity should be deleted for
lack of basis. As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for damages for loss
of earning capacity.
‣ By way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the absence of documentary
evidence when
a. The deceased is self-employed earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, and judicial
notice may be taken of the fact that in the deceased’s line of work no documentary evidence is available; or
b. The deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor
laws
‣ In People v. Oco, the evidence presented by the prosecution to recover damages for loss of earning capacity was
the bare testimony of the deceased’s wife that her husband was earning P8,000.00 monthly as a legal researcher
of a private corporation. Finding that the deceased was neither self-employed nor employed as a daily-wage
worker earning less than the minimum wage under the labor laws existing at the time of his death, the Court held
that testimonial evidence alone is insufficient to justify an award for loss of earning capacity.
‣ Likewise, in People v. Caraig, damages for loss of earning capacity was not awarded because the circumstances
of the 3 deceased did not fall within the recognized exceptions, and except for the testimony of their wives, no
documentary proof about their income was presented by the prosecution
‣ In this case, the trial court and the Court of Appeals computed the award of compensatory damages for loss of
earning capacity only on the basis of the testimony of respondent Rosalito that the deceased was 39 years of age
and a Section Chief of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Tuguergarao District Office with a salary of P83,088.00 per
annum when she died. No other evidence was presented. The award is clearly erroneous because the
deceased’s earnings does not fall within the exceptions.
‣ Remedy in Case Amount of Lost Income Cannot be Proven: Temperate Damages
‣ However, the fact of loss having been established, temperate damages in the amount of P500,000.00 should be
awarded to respondents. Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate or moderate damages, which are more
than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary
loss has been suffered but its amount can not, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty.
‣ Temperate damages in lieu of actual damages may be awarded for loss of earning capacity because the income of
the victim was not sufficiently proven,
‣ Art. 2224, was applied in several cases to justify the award of temperate damages in lieu of damages for loss of
earning capacity which was not substantiated by the required documentary proof.
‣ Kinds and Extent of Actual Damage: Attorney’s Fees and Compensatory Interests
‣ Pursuant to Article 2208 of the Civil Code, attorney’s fees may also be recovered in the case at bar where
exemplary damages are awarded.
‣ In this case, the Court finds the award of attorney’s fees equivalent to 10% of the total amount adjudged
against petitioner reasonable.
‣ In Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, it was held that when an obligation, regardless of its source,
i.e., law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts is breached, the contravenor can be held liable for
payment of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damage
‣ Damages for loss of earning capacity weren’t awarded here because no documentary evidence was presented, but the
plaintiff still has a remedy, the court in which case, can award temperate damages

X. DAMAGES
What is the rule for recovery of actual damages based on loss of legal support in Art. 2206? (No case on this, but we
discussed this after at this point, before Daywalt)
Remember that in case of death due to quasi-delict, delict or breach of contract of carriage (Art. 2206 (2), 1764), if the
deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of article 291 (now Art. 195 and 196 of the Family Code on
Support), the recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or intestate succession,
may demand support from the person causing the death, for a period not exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed
by the court
Under Art. 195, 196 of the Family Code, the following are entitled to support each other:
(1) The spouses;
(2) Legitimate ascendants and descendants;
(3) Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter;
(4) Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter; and
(5) Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of full or half-blood
(6) Illegitimate brothers and sisters, whether of full or half-blood (Art. 196)
What is the correct interpretation of the phrase “the recipient (to legal support) who is not an heir called to the decedent's
inheritance by the law of testate or intestate succession”? In other words, who can demand damages based on this paragraph
in Art. 2206?
‣ 2 interpretations (as far as intestate succession is concerned) according to Atty. Lopez:
1. Only the illegitimate brothers and sisters, whether of full or half-blood
‣ This is because the first five groups of heirs above are “called to succeed” by intestate succession, although
whether they “actually succeed” depends on the rules of exclusion and concurrence
‣ While the spouse and children are the primary and concurring heirs, the others merely secondary heirs and may
be excluded
‣ Only the illegitimate siblings are not called because of the Iron Curtain Rule in Art. 992
2. The parents, ascendants, descendants, other collateral relatives
‣ The test is not whether they re called to succeed, but rather, whether they really “actually succeed” by intestate
succession
‣ This article does not take into consideration compulsory succession, or succession to the legitime. What if the testator
fully disposes of his free portion to third persons but the legitimate go accordingly to the compulsory heirs, in this case,
the persons entitled to support DO NOT inherit either by testate or intestate succession (which only pertains to the free
portion), is this a case when they can sue for damages due to loss of legal support? (This probably falls under the second
interpretation of Atty. Lopez, the test is whether they “actually succeed” by testate or intestate successon
23. DAYWALT V. CORPORACION DE PP AGUSTINOS RECOLETOS, 39 PHIL. 587 (1919)

‣ Kinds and Extent of Actual Damage: In case of Breach of Contract; Ordinary and Special Damages
‣ We recognize the possibility that more extensive damages may be recovered where, at the time of the creation of
the contractual obligation, the vendor, or lessor, is aware of the use to which the purchaser or lessee desires to put
the property which is the subject of the contract, and the contract is made with the eyes of the vendor or lessor
open to the possibility of the damage which may result to the other party from his own failure to give possession.
‣ The extent of the liability for the breach of a contract must be determined in the light of the situation in
existence at the time the contract is made; and the damages ordinarily recoverable are in all events limited
to such as might be reasonable are in all events limited to such as might be reasonably foreseen in the light
of the facts then known to the contracting parties.
‣ Where the purchaser desires to protect himself, in the contingency of the failure of the vendor promptly to give
possession, from the possibility of incurring other damages than such as the incident to the normal value of the
use and occupation, he should cause to be inserted in the contract a clause providing for stipulated
amount to the paid upon failure of the vendor to give possession; and not case has been called to our
attention where, in the absence of such a stipulation, damages have been held to be recoverable by the
purchaser in excess of the normal value of use and occupation. On the contrary, the most fundamental
conceptions of the law relative to the assessment of damages are inconsistent with such idea.

X. DAMAGES
‣ The discussion contained in the opinion of the court in Hadley vs. Baxendale leads to the conclusion that the
damages recoverable in case of the breach of a contract are two sorts, namely:
1. The ordinary, natural, and in a sense necessary damage; and

‣ Ordinary damages is found in all breaches of contract where the are no special circumstances to
distinguish the case specially from other contracts.
‣ The consideration paid for an unperformed promise is an instance of this sort of damage. In all such cases
the damages recoverable are such as naturally and generally would result from such a breach, "according
to the usual course of things."
‣ In case involving only ordinary damage no discussion is ever indulged as to whether that damage was
contemplated or not.
‣ This is conclusively presumed from the immediateness and inevitableness of the damage, and the recovery
of such damage follows as a necessary legal consequence of the breach.
‣ Ordinary damage is assumed as a matter of law to be within the contemplation of the parties.
2. Special damages
‣ Special damage, on the other hand, is such as follows less directly from the breach than ordinary damage.
It is only found in case where some external condition, apart from the actual terms to the contract exists or
intervenes, as it were, to give a turn to affairs and to increase damage in a way that the promisor, without
actual notice of that external condition, could not reasonably be expected to foresee.
‣ Concerning this sort of damage, Hadley vs. Baxendale (1854) [supra] lays down the definite and just rule
that before such damage can be recovered the plaintiff must show that the particular condition which made
the damage a possible and likely consequence of the breach was known to the defendant at the time the
contract was made.
‣ To bring damages which would ordinarily be treated as remote within the category of recoverable
special damages, it is necessary that the condition should be made the subject of contract in such
sense as to become an express or implied term of the engagement
‣ It must so far have been within the contemplation of the parties as to form at least an implied term of the
contract
‣ Know the Hadley vs Baxendale Case! This is a very important case, for actual damages involving breach of contract.
This is the leading English Case on the matter and it is incorporated in our jurisdiction by Daywalt.
‣ Before going to the difficult concept of Ordinary and Special Damages, note first the rules on damages in breach of
contract cases, whether the breach is based on good faith or bad faith. These concepts are NOT mutually exclusive. A
good faith breach may be ordinary or special damages, depending on the facts, conversely, a bad faith breach can also
be ordinary or special damages.
Rules on Breach in Good Faith:

Breach of ‣ Defendant is liable shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach
Contract (Art. of the obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the
2201) time the obligation was constituted.
‣ Test is based on two elements:

1. Natural and probable consequences
2. Foreseeability
Breach in Bad Faith

‣ Defendant is liable for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance
of the obligation.
‣ Test is “reasonable attribution”
* Note that both good faith or bad faith breach both require some sort of reference to the contract
itself

X. DAMAGES
Ordinary ‣ Found in all breaches of contract where the are no special circumstances to distinguish the case
Damages specially from other contracts.
(Daywalt and
Hadley) ‣ The damages recoverable are such as naturally and generally would result from such a breach,
"according to the usual course of things."
‣ Whether the damage was contemplated or not is immaterial as this is conclusively presumed from
the immediateness and inevitableness of the damage, and the recovery of such damage follows
as a necessary legal consequence of the breach.
‣ Ordinary damage is assumed as a matter of law to be within the contemplation of the parties.
Special ‣ This follows less directly from the breach than ordinary damage and is more remote than ordinary
Damages damages
(Daywalt and
Hadley) ‣ There must be a particular condition which made the damage a possible and likely consequence
of the breach was known to the defendant at the time the contract was made.
‣ It is necessary that the condition should be made the subject of contract in such sense as to
become an express or implied term of the engagement
‣ It must have been within the contemplation of the parties as to form at least an implied term of the
contract
Consequentia ‣ Damages were reasonably foreseen or have been brought within the contemplation of the parties as the
l Damages probable result of a breach at the time of or prior to contracting
(Continental
Cement) *Parang same lang sa ordinary damages
24. CONSOLIDATED DAIRY PRODUCTS CO. V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 100401, AUGUST 24, 1992
‣ The trial court received evidence to support private respondent's claim for damages. It should be emphasized here
that the damages claimed by private respondents do not refer to claims which were already due from the can
supply contract. The claims here are for damages caused by the fraudulent termination by petitioners of the can
supply contract four (4) years before the end of its term and for such a short notice.
‣ Indemnification for damages shall comprehend not only the value of the loss suffered, but also that of the profits
which the obligee failed to obtain (Art. 2200 NCC). The presumption that Standard would earn exactly the same
profit as it did five (5) years before its closure is speculative. A more reasonable amount would be the average of
the yearly profit for the five years preceding the closure (1971-1975) multiplied by the number of years remaining
as provided for in the contract. The average yearly profit for 1971 to 1975 is P1,041,095.76. This amount multiplied
by five (years) amounts to P5,205,478.80.
25. CONTINENTAL CEMENT CORPORATION V. ASEA BROWN BOVERI, INC., G.R. NO. 171660, OCTOBER 17, 2011
‣ Kinds and Extent of Actual Damage: In case of Breach of Contract; Consequential Damages
‣ Art. 2199: Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such
pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory
damages
‣ Consequential damages, such as loss of profits on account of delay or failure of delivery, may be recovered only if
such damages were reasonably foreseen or have been brought within the contemplation of the parties as the
probable result of a breach at the time of or prior to contracting
26. MENDOZA V. PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, 90 PHIL. 836 (1952)

‣ Kinds and Extent of Actual Damage: In case of Breach of Contract; Ordinary Damages
‣ Ordinary damages or damages in general providing for the payment of damages caused by the negligence or
delay in the fulfillment of one's obligation. Under Art. 1107 of the Civil Code, a debtor in good faith like the
defendant herein, may be held liable only for damages that were foreseen or might have been foreseen at the
time the contract of the transportation was entered into.
‣ Even applying the provisions of the Code of Commerce, as already stated, the pertinent provisions regarding
damages only treats of ordinary damages or damages in general, not special damages

X. DAMAGES
‣ Kinds and Extent of Actual Damage: In case of Breach of Contract; Special Damages
‣ In order to impose on the defaulting party further liability than for damages naturally and directly, i.e., in the
ordinary course of things, arising from a breach of contract, such unusual or extraordinary damages must have
been brought within the contemplation of the parties as the probable result of a breach at the time of or
prior to contracting.
‣ Generally, notice then of any special circumstances which will show that the damages to be anticipated from a
breach would be enhanced has been held sufficient for this effect.
27. ARANETA V. BANK OF AMERICA, G.R. NO. L-25414, JULY 30, 1971
‣ Kinds and Extent of Actual Damage: Attorney’s Fees
‣ Attorney’s fees may be awarded done motu propio by this Court under Article 2208 of the Civil Code, which
provides that attorney's fees may be recovered in the instances therein enumerated and "in any other case where
the Court deems, it first and equitable that attorney's fees ... should be recovered," provided the amount thereof
be reasonable in all cases.
‣ Remedy in Case Amount of Injury to Business Standing cannot be Reason: Temperate Damages
‣ This case involved aa claim for actual damages based on injury to the business standing of the plaintiff. It’s hard to
put a value on that, it's value cannot be determined with reasonable certainty, thus the court awarded temperate
damages
28. SIMEX INTERNATIONAL (MANILA), INCORPORATED V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 88013, MARCH 19, 1990
‣ Kinds and Extent of Actual Damage: Injury to the plaintiff’s business standing or commercial credit
‣ In this case, the plaintiff's credit line was canceled and its orders were not acted upon pending receipt of actual
payment by the suppliers. Its business declined. Its reputation was tarnished. Its standing was reduced in the
business community. All this was due to the fault of the defendant bank which was undeniably remiss in its duty to
the plaintiff.
‣ Article 2205 of the Civil Code provides that actual or compensatory damages may be received "(2) for injury to the
plaintiff’ s business standing or commercial credit." There is no question that the petitioner did sustain actual
injury as a result of the dishonored checks and that the existence of the loss having been established
"absolute certainty as to its amount is not required.
‣ In this moral damages were awarded for injury tot he reputation of a juridical person. This is analogous to injury to
business standing. In case of injury to business standing or reputation where the amount of the loss cannot be
reasonably ascertained, a claim for moral damages is also a remedy. Relate this with the FNBI case (taken up later in
moral damages) the basis for claim of moral damages for injury to reputation is Art. 2219(7) for acts of defamation.
29. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-43814, APRIL 16, 1982
‣ Requirements to Recover Actual Damages: Proof required for recovery of damages for injury to the plaintiff's
business standing or commercial credit
‣ Damages must be shown by actual proof with a reasonable degree of certainty and cannot be based on
speculation and conjecture.
‣ The provisions allowing recovery of damages for injury to the plaintiff's business standing or commercial credit" fall
under the chapter on actual or compensatory damages of Title XVIII /n damages of the new Civil Code. And such
actual or compensatory damages must be established by clear evidence.
‣ In this case, in justifying its award of damages in the amount of P 500,000.00 for alleged injury to plaintiff’s
business standing or commercial credit, the appellate court merely took as good plaintiff’s bare assertion that its
"credit standing in the community were completely shattered, its entire business destroyed and its mortgages lost"
but cites no evidence whatsoever to support the same. More importantly, these damages have no legal basis in
view of our finding that the plaintiff has no cause of action against the defendant. As defendant submits in its brief,
WILMAG has no business reputation or commercial credit standing in the community (in its decision, the
Court of Appeals did not even mention or discuss the business reputation or standing of the plaintiff)
Summary of the rules for claim for actual damages based on injury to business standing or commercial credit
‣ Requisites:
1. The fact of loss must be established (that the business standing of the person was really injured)

X. DAMAGES
‣ This was satisfied in Araneta and Simex, but not in NTC, in the latter, the plaintiff had no more good business
standing to begin with
2. The amount of the loss must be duly established with reasonable certainty based on documentary evidence
‣ The question of “how much” must be answered by the plaintiff. This points to the quantum of loss
‣ What if this element cannot be satisfied? Plaintiff cannot recover actual damages, BUT he may recover:
a. Temperate Damages (in Araneta)
b. Moral Damages (in Simex, based on FNBI case also, and Art. 2219[7])
30. PADILLA MACHINE SHOP V. JAVILGAS, G.R. NO. 175960, FEBRUARY 19, 2008
‣ Requirements to Recover Actual Damages: Attorney’s Fees
‣ There is no merit in petitioners claim that attorneys fees may not be awarded to the respondent since his case
was being handled pro bono by the U.P. Office of Legal Aid, which provides free legal assistance to indigent
litigants.
‣ In this jurisdiction, there are two concepts of attorneys fees.
1. In the ordinary sense, attorneys fees represent the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client
for the legal services he has rendered to the latter.
2. In its extraordinary concept, attorneys fees may be awarded by the court as indemnity for damages to be
paid by the losing party to the prevailing party, and not counsel. In its extraordinary sense, attorneys fees as
part of damages is awarded only in the instances specified in Article 2208 of the Civil Code
‣ Note the two concepts of Attorney’s fees, the fact that the lawyer of the plaintiff is pro-bono is immaterial in recovering
attorney’s fees
31. DAVID V. MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., G.R. NO. 194785, JULY 11, 2012
‣ Indeed, the plaintiff was compelled to file an action against defendant but this reason alone will not warrant an
award of attorney’s fees. It is settled that the award of attorney's fees is the exception rather than the rule.
‣ Counsel's fees are not awarded every time a party prevails in a suit because of the policy that no premium should
be placed on the right to litigate.
‣ Attorney's fees, as part of damages, are not necessarily equated to the amount paid by a litigant to a lawyer. In the
ordinary sense, attorney's fees represent the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal
services he has rendered to the latter; while in its extraordinary concept, they may be awarded by the court as
indemnity for damages to be paid by the losing party to the prevailing party.
‣ Attorney's fees as part of damages are awarded only in the instances specified in Article 2208 of the Civil
Code which demands factual, legal, and equitable justification. Its basis cannot be left to speculation or
conjecture
‣ In the absence of stipulation, a winning party may be awarded attorney's fees only in case plaintiffs action or
defendant's stand is so untenable as to amount to gross and evident bad faith
‣ Recovery of Attorney’s Fees is NOT a matter of right or course, it can only be awarded as a form of actual damages in
the following exceptional circumstances:
1. When there is a stipulation (See first phrase of Art. 2208)
2. Circumstances enumerated in Art. 2208
‣ Rationale behind this rule? The law does not want to place a premium or payment on the right to litigate.
‣ In this case, the under a claim for Attorney’s Fees under Art. 2208(5), the mere fact of being compelled to file a case is
NOT enough, there must be gross or evident bad faith (but of course, other grounds in Art. 2208 may be claimed if
applicable)
32. LACSON V. REYES, 182 SCRA 729 (1990)

‣ An attorney who is concurrently an executor of a will is barred from recovering attorney's fees from the estate
‣ Rule 87, Sec 7: “When the executor or administrator is an attorney, he shall not charge against the estate any
professional fees for legal services rendered by him.”

X. DAMAGES
‣ The rule is therefore clear that an administrator or executor may be allowed fees for the necessary expenses he
has incurred as such, but he may not recover attorney's fees from the estate. His compensation is fixed by the rule
but such a compensation is in the nature of executor's or administrator's commissions, and never as attorney's
fees. In one case, we held that "a greater sum other than that established by the rule may be allowed 'in any
special case, where the estate is large, and the settlement has been attended with great difficulty, and has required
a high degree of capacity on the part of the executor or administrator.'" It is also left to the sound discretion of the
court. With respect to attorney's fees, the rule, as we have seen, disallows them
‣ The next question is quite obvious: Who shoulders attorney's fees? We have held that a lawyer of an
administrator or executor may not charge the estate for his fees, but rather, his client. Mutatis mutandis,
where the administrator is himself the counsel for the heirs, it is the latter who must pay therefor.
‣ In that connection, attorney's fees are in the nature of actual damages, which must be duly proved.
‣ They are also subject to certain standards, to wit:
1. They must be reasonable, that is to say, they must have a bearing on the importance of the subject
matter in controversy
2. The extent of the services rendered; and
3. The professional standing of the lawyer.
‣ In all cases, they must be addressed in a full-blown trial and not on the bare word of the parties.And always, they
are subject to the moderating hand of the courts.
‣ Remember that attorney’s fees is a form of actual damages, thus the claim for it must be duly proven. See the
standards the court gives us in this case
33. PETRON CORPORATION V. NATIONAL COLLEGE OF BUSINESS AND ARTS, 516 SCRA 168 (2007)
‣ Article 2208(5), where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiffs plainly
valid, just and demandable claim, contemplates a situation where one refuses unjustifiably and in evident bad
faith to satisfy anothers plainly valid, just and demandable claim, compelling the latter needlessly to seek
redress from the courts.
‣ In such a case, the law allows recovery of money the plaintiff had to spend for a lawyers assistance in suing the
defendant expenses the plaintiff would not have incurred if not for the defendants refusal to comply with the most
basic rules of fair dealing.
‣ It does not mean, however, that the losing party should be made to pay attorneys fees merely because the court
finds his legal position to be erroneous and upholds that of the other party, for that would be an intolerable
transgression of the policy that no one should be penalized for exercising the right to have contending claims
settled by a court of law.
‣ In fact, even a clearly untenable defense does not justify an award of attorneys fees unless it amounts to gross
and evident bad faith
34. BUAN V. CAMAGANACAN, 16 SCRA 321 (1966)

‣ The text of the decision should state the reason why attorneys' fees are being awarded, otherwise, the
award is disallowed
‣ The very opening paragraph of Article 2208 reveals that the award of attorneys' fees remains exceptional in our
law, and it is up to the court to make an express finding of the facts that bring the case within the execution and
justify the grant of counsel fees
‣ The general rule being still that it is not sound public policy to place a penalty on the right to litigate nor should
counsel fees be awarded every time a party wins a lawsuit
‣ It is true that, in No. 11 of Article 2208, recovery of counsel fees is allowed "where the court deems it just and
equitable that attorneys' fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered", but even in such cases the
conclusion must be borne out by findings of facts and law.
‣ What is just and equitable in a given case is not a mere matter of feeling but of demonstration. This is specially
true since the last part of Article 2208 expressly adds that the "attorneys' fees and expenses of litigation must be
reasonable".

X. DAMAGES
‣ The exercise of judicial discretion in the award of attorneys' fees under Article 2208 (11) of the Civil Code
demands a factual, legal, or equitable justification upon the basis of which the court exercises its
discretion.
‣ Without such justification, the award is a conclusion without a premise, as basis being improperly left to
speculation and conjecture.
35. VILLANUEVA V. SALVADOR, 480 SCRA 39 (2006)

‣ As a matter of sound practice, an award of attorneys fee has always been regarded as the exception rather than
the rule. Counsels fees are, to be sure, not awarded every time a party prevails in a suit because of the policy that
no premium should be placed on the right to litigate.
‣ Attorneys fees, as part of damages, are assessed only in the instances specified in Article 2208 of the Civil
Code.And it is necessary for the trial court to make express findings of fact and law that would bring the case
within the exception. In short, the factual, legal or equitable justification for the award must be set forth in the
text of the decision.
‣ The matter of attorneys fees cannot be touched only in the fallo of the decision, else the award should be
thrown out for being speculative and conjectural.
36. EASTERN SHIPPING V. COURT OF APPEALS, 234 SCRA 78 (1994)

‣ Kinds and Extent of Actual Damage: Compensatory Interest; Guidelines to Compute Legal Interest
‣ With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages, the rate of
interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or
forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing.
‣ Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded.
‣ In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default, i.e.,
from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the
amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum.
‣ No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages except when or until the
demand can be established with reasonable certainty.
‣ Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from
the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty cannot
be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the
date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to
have been reasonably ascertained).
‣ The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal
interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum from
such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a
forbearance of credit.
37. NACAR V. GALLERY FRAMES, G.R. NO. 189871, AUGUST 13, 2013
‣ Reiterated the rules in Eastern Shipping Case regarding computing legal interest, but changed the rate form 12%
to 6%
‣ In the absence of an express stipulation as to the rate of interest that would govern the parties, the rate of legal
interest for loans or forbearance of any money, goods or credits and the rate allowed in judgments shall no longer
be twelve percent (12%) per annum - as reflected in the case of Eastern Shipping Lines and Subsection X305.1
of the Manual of Regulations for Banks and Sections 4305Q.1, 4305S.3 and 4303P.1 of the Manual of Regulations
for Non-Bank Financial Institutions, before its amendment by BSP-MB Circular No. 799 - but will now be six
percent (6%) per annum effective July 1, 2013.

X. DAMAGES
‣ It should be noted, nonetheless, that the new rate could only be applied prospectively and not retroactively.
Consequently, the twelve percent (12%) per annum legal interest shall apply only until June 30, 2013. Come
July 1, 2013 the new rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be the prevailing rate of interest when
applicable.
38. RIVERA V. SPOUSES CHUA, G.R. NO. 184458, JANUARY 14, 2015
‣ Also reiterated the rules in Eastern Shipping and Nacar Cases
‣ The liability for damages of those who default, including those who are guilty of delay, in the performance of their
obligations is laid down on Article 1170 of the Civil Code.
‣ Corollary thereto, Article 2209 solidifies the consequence of payment of interest as an indemnity for damages
when the obligor incurs in delay:
‣ Art. 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity
for damages, there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of the interest agreed upon, and in the
absence of stipulation, the legal interest, which is six percent per annum.
‣ Article 2209 is specifically applicable in this instance where:
1. The obligation is for a sum of money;
2. The debtor, Rivera, incurred in delay when he failed to pay on or before 31 December 1995; and
3. The Promissory Note provides for an indemnity for damages upon default of Rivera which is the payment of
a 5% monthly interest from the date of default.
‣ In this case, the court said that the stipulation in the Promissory Note is designated as payment of interest, not as
a penal clause, and is simply an indemnity for damages incurred by the Spouses Chua because Rivera defaulted in
the payment of the amount of P120,000.00. The measure of damages for the Rivera’s delay is limited to the
interest stipulated in the Promissory Note. In apt instances, in default of stipulation, the interest is that
provided by law. BUT, the stipulated interest of 5% per month or 60% per annum in addition to legal interests and
attorney’s fees is, indeed, highly iniquitous and unreasonable. Stipulated interest rates are illegal if they are
unconscionable and the Court is allowed to temper interest rates when necessary. Since the interest rate
agreed upon is void, the parties are considered to have no stipulation regarding the interest rate, thus, the rate of
interest should be 12% per annum computed from the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand
RULES ON COMPENSATORY INTEREST

Remember that there are two kinds of interest:
1. MONETARY
‣ See Art. 1956, this was what was taken up in security transactions
‣ Remember that this must be expressly stipulated in writing
2. COMPENSATORY
‣ This is interest in the form of actual damages.
‣ It’s governed by Art. 2209-2213
BASIC RULES ON COMPUTATION OF INTEREST FOR LOANS OR FORBEARANCE OF MONEY (BASED ON EASTERN SHIPPING AND
NACAR)
1. Generally, no interest (monetary) is due unless it is expressly stipulated in writing (Art. 1956)
2. If interest is stipulated but the amount is not, legal interest will apply
3. Upon default or delay, compensatory interests will start to accrue on the principal, this is either based on the
stipulated rate or the legal rate (if none stipulated)
‣ This is upon extra-judicial demand
‣ Remember basic rules in OBLICON
‣ Article 1169. Those obliged to deliver or to do something incur in delay from the time the obligee judicially or
extrajudicially demands from them the fulfillment of their obligation. However, the demand by the creditor shall not
be necessary in order that delay may exist:
(1) When the obligation or the law expressly so declare; or

X. DAMAGES
(2) When from the nature and the circumstances of the obligation it appears that the designation of the time when
the thing is to be delivered or the service is to be rendered was a controlling motive for the establishment of
the contract
(3) When demand would be useless, as when the obligor has rendered it beyond his power to perform.
‣ If the basis of default is that extra-judicial demand may be dispensed with because the obligations expressly declares
it is not necessary, the obligation must not merely state the maturity date, but must state the the debtor “will be in
default” at a particular date (Rivera Case)
4. Upon Judicial Demand, compensatory interests will still run (still based on the stipulated rate, or if none, the legal
rate), furthermore, interest upon interest will now accrue (compounding interest). The rate of interest on interest is
the legal rate
‣ Basis is Article 2212: “Interest due shall earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded, although the
obligation may be silent upon this point.”
‣ Note the wording of Art. 2212, “interest due”, it is only the interest due at the time of the judicial demand (filing of the
complaint) that will earn interest.
5. Upon finality of judgment (final and executory), the judgment award is treated as a forbearance of credit, thus, it
will earn interest at the legal rate until satisfaction
6. The legal rate of interest is 12% (per annum) if prior to July 1, 2013, after such date, the rate is 6% (per annum)
a. BEFORE JULY 1, 2013: Rate is 12% per annum (BSP Circular 416)
b. ON OR AFTER JULY 1, 2013: Rate is 6% per annum (BSP Circular 779)
‣ What if judgment has already become final before July 1, 2013 (thus the court imposed 12% interest at this point), but
it is satisfied only after July 1, 2013, does the interval of time between finality and satisfaction subject the running of
the interest to “biforcation”, do you “biforcate” the period? (meaning from finality until 7/1/13 you subject it to 12%,
but after only 6% nalang?)
‣ NO, remember the doctrine of immutability of judgments, once the court renders judgment providing for 12%
interest, this cannot be modified by law or BSP circulars
‣ When then does “biforcation” apply?
‣ When there is no final decision yet, such as when the July 1, 2013 hits the interval in between judicial demand and
finality, in such case, you need to “biforcate” the period, 12% is the rate prior to 7/1/13, only 6% on and after.
EXAMPLE:
Contract of Loan, principal amount in P1,000. Interest stipulated is 10% per annum
‣ Relevant dates:
‣ January 1, 2011— Extra-judicial demand, the debtor thus becomes in default
‣ January 1, 2012— Judicial demand, the creditor files a suit to collect
‣ January 1, 2013— Decision in favour of creditor becomes final and executory
‣ January 1, 2014— Judgment is finally satisfied
How does the rule on compensatory interests apply?

1. Interval between the beginning of default (extra-judicial demand) and judicial demand (1/1/11 to 1/1/12)
‣ Debtor liable for interest of 10% on the principal
‣ Assuming there’s no stipulated rate, or no stipulated payment of interest at all, the rate is 12% legal rate, since this is
before July 1, 2013, BSP Circular 416 still applies
2. Interval between Judicial Demand and Final Decision (1/1/12 to 1/1/13)

‣ Debtor liable for interest of 10% on the principal (this still continues to run, notwithstanding the judicial demand)
‣ Debtor liable for interest of legal rate (12%) on interest due (the interest due is the amount at the time of judicial
demand, based on the facts, this is P100 pesos, the it is based on this amount that the legal rate will apply.
3. Interval between Final Decision and Satisfaction of Judgment (1/1/13 to 1/1/14)

‣ Debtor liable for legal interest (12%) on the judgment award
‣ Why not 6% from July 1, 2013 until January 1, 2014? Because of doctrine of immutability of judgments

X. DAMAGES
C. MORAL DAMAGES
Article 2216. No proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated or exemplary
damages, may be adjudicated. The assessment of such damages, except liquidated ones, is left to the discretion of the
court, according to the circumstances of each case.
Article 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral
damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act for omission.
Article 2218. In the adjudication of moral damages, the sentimental value of property, real or personal, may be
considered.
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover
moral damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in
the order named.
Article 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that,
under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the
defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith
Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have
acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755.
Article 1764. Damages in cases comprised in this Section shall be awarded in accordance with Title XVIII of this Book,
concerning Damages. Article 2206 shall also apply to the death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract by a
common carrier.
Article 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pesos,
even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for
mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.

X. DAMAGES
MEMORIZE: ARTICLES 2216 TO 2220
SUMMARY OF THE RULES ON MORAL DAMAGES
Requirements 1. There must be an injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the
to Recover claimant
2. There must be a culpable act or omission factually established
3. The wrongful act or omission of the defendant must be the proximate cause of the injury
sustained by the claimant; and
4. The award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 or in case of
Breach of Contract (Art. 2220, 2206 in relation to 1764)
(Villanueva v. Salvador, Sulpicio Lines, Inc., v. Curso, other cases)
Other Rules 1. No proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded
on the
2. There must be pleading and proof of moral suffering, mental anguish, fright and the like.
Requirements
to Recover 3. Mere allegations do not suffice; they must be substantiated by clear and convincing proof.
4. The claimant should satisfactorily show the existence of the factual basis of damages and its
causal connection to defendants acts.
5. Article 2219 is not an exhaustive list of the instances where moral damages may be recovered
since it only specifies, among others, Article 21. When a party reneges on his or her obligations
arising from contracts in bad faith, the act is not only contrary to morals, good customs, and
public policy; it is also a violation of Article 1159. Breaches of contract become the basis of
moral damages, not only under Article 2220, but also under Articles 19 and 20 in relation to
Article 1159.
Rules in 1. Not punitive in nature and were never intended to enrich the claimant at the expense of the
Determining defendant.
the Amount
2. No hard-and-fast rule in determining what would be a fair and reasonable amount of moral
to be
damages, since each case must be governed by its own peculiar facts.
Awarded
(Summary in 3. Although incapable of pecuniary computation, they must be proportionate to the suffering
the Cases) inflicted.
4. The amount of the award bears no relation whatsoever with the wealth or means of the
offender.
5. Moral damages are awarded to achieve a spiritual status quo.
6. Moral damages are awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions or
amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he/she has undergone, by reason of
the defendants culpable action
7. Its award is aimed at restoration, as much as possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; thus, it
must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted
8. The social and financial standing of a claimant of moral damages may be considered in
awarding moral damages only if he or she was subjected to contemptuous conduct despite the
offender's knowledge of his or her social and financial standing.
9. The yardstick should be that the amount awarded should not be so palpably and scandalously
excessive as to indicate that it was the result of passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of
the trial judge. Neither should it be so little or so paltry that it rubs salt to the injury already
inflicted on plaintiffs.
Automatic Moral damages are automatically granted in rape and murder cases without need of further proof
Recovery in other than the fact of its commission. For it is assumed that a victim has actually suffered moral
Criminal injuries entitling her to such an award
Cases
(People vs Iroy, People vs Pareja, People vs Rarugal)

X. DAMAGES
SUMMARY OF THE RULES ON MORAL DAMAGES
Rules of Generally, moral damages are not recoverable in an action predicated on a breach of contract. This
Recovery in is because such action is not included in Article 2219 of the Civil Code as one of the actions in which
Breach of moral damages may be recovered.
Contract
‣ EXCEPTION: Moral damages are recoverable in an action predicated on a breach of contract:
Cases
1. Where the mishap results in the death of a passenger (Article 1764, in relation to Article
2206 [3])
‣ But only the spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the
deceased
2. Where the common carrier has been guilty of fraud or bad faith (Article 2220)
(Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. v. Paras)
When a party reneges on his or her obligations arising from contracts in bad faith, the act is not only
contrary to morals, good customs, and public policy; it is also a violation of Article 1159. Breaches of
contract become the basis of moral damages, not only under Article 2220, but also under Articles 19
and 20 in relation to Article 1159.
(Arco Pulp and Paper Co., Inc. v. Lim)
Recovery by A juridical person is generally NOT entitled to moral damages because, unlike a natural person, it
Juridical cannot experience physical suffering or such sentiments as wounded feelings, serious anxiety,
Persons mental anguish or moral shock
‣ EXCEPTION: A juridical person such as a corporation can validly complain for libel or any other
form of defamation and claim for moral damages.
‣ If the claim for moral damages falls under item 7 of Article 2219 of the Civil Code. This
provision expressly authorizes the recovery of moral damages in cases of libel, slander or
any other form of defamation. Article 2219(7) does not qualify whether the plaintiff is a natural
or juridical person.
(Filipinas Broadcasting Network, Inc., v. AGO Medical and Educational Center)
1. MAYO V. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 91201, DECEMBER 5, 1991

‣ Kinds and Extent of Moral Damage
‣ There is no question that moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury.
‣ Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate
result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission.
‣ In this case, we agree that complainant is entitled to moral damages. She suffered injuries as a result of the
criminal offense of the petitioner. Moreover, her injuries resulting in a permanent scar at her forehead and the loss
of her right eye undoubtedly gave her mental anguish, wounded feelings and shock. The psychological effect on
her as regards the scar on her forehead and her false eye must have devastated her considering that women in
general are fastidious on how they look. More important, however, was the loss of vision of her right eye which
was severely injured as a result of the accident. Since the accident, the plaintiff had to contend with the loss of her
eyesight on her right eye which necessarily hampers her not only physically but also professionally for the rest of
her life. Before the accident, the plaintiff who is a home economist by profession was doing well in her career. A
graduate of the University of the Philippines with the degree of Home Economics, she is the Assistant-Vice
President as well as Resident Manager of Club Solviento receiving a gross income of P10,000.00 a month.
Simultaneously with her work at Club Solviento, she served as Food Consultant of Food City where she received a
monthly salary of P7,000.00. She, however, had to give up her consultancy job after the accident not only because
of her prolonged absences but because of the physical handicap she suffered.
‣ Nevertheless, we find no justification to award moral damages in favor of the plaintiff for the loss of her
boyfriend. No doubt, the loss of her boyfriend after the accident added to her mental and emotional sufferings
and psychologically affected and disturbed her. However, there is no clear evidence on record to show that her
boyfriend left her after the accident due to her physical injuries. He may have left her even if she did not suffer
the slightest injury. The reasons for the break-up of a courtship are too many and too complicated such that
they should not form the basis of damages arising from a vehicular accident. Moreover, granting that her

X. DAMAGES
boyfriend left her due to her physical injuries, we still find no legal basis for the award of moral damages in
favor of complainant because of the loss of a boyfriend. Article 2719 of the New Civil Code quoted earlier
enumerates cases wherein moral damages may be granted. Loss of a boyfriend as a result of physical injuries
suffered after an accident is not one of them. Neither can it be categorized as an analogous case.
‣ Determination of the Amount of Moral Damages

‣ The well-entrenched principle is that moral damages depend upon the discretion of the trial courts based on
the facts and circumstances of each case.
‣ This discretion is, however, conditioned in that the "amount awarded should not be palpably and scandalously
excessive" so as to indicate that it was the result of prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial court.
‣ In determining the amount of moral damages, the actual losses sustained by the aggrieved party and the
gravity of the injuries must be considered.
‣ Moral damages are emphatically not intended to enrich a complainant at the expense of the defendant. They
are awarded only to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion or amusements that will serve to
alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone, by reason of the defendant's culpable action
‣ In this case, applying these principles in the instant case, we rule that the award of P700,000.00 as moral damages
in favor of complainant is unconscionable and excessive. We rejected complainant's claim for the amount of
P1,000,000.00 as moral damages for the loss of her boyfriend. We note that she asked for the amount of
P500,000.00 as moral damages due to her personal injuries. Therefore, the award for moral damages should not
exceed the amount of P500,000.00. We rule that under the circumstances of the instant case, the amount of
P200,000.00 as moral damages in favor of complainant is reasonable, just and fair.
‣ Proximate Causation is important in claim for moral damages, the basis of moral damages in this case was delict
causing physical injuries Art. 2219(3)
2. SAMSON V. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, G.R. NO. 150487, JULY 10, 2003
‣ Moral damages are meant to compensate the claimant for any physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injuries unjustly
caused.
‣ Although incapable of pecuniary estimation, the amount must somehow be proportional to and in approximation of
the suffering inflicted.
‣ Moral damages are not punitive in nature and were never intended to enrich the claimant at the expense of the
defendant.
‣ There is no hard-and-fast rule in determining what would be a fair and reasonable amount of moral damages,
since each case must be governed by its own peculiar facts.
‣ Trial courts are given discretion in determining the amount, with the limitation that it should not be palpably and
scandalously excessive. Indeed, it must be commensurate to the loss or injury suffered
‣ Moral damages are awarded to achieve a spiritual status quo. Moral damages are awarded to enable the injured
party to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he/she has
undergone, by reason of the defendants culpable action. Its award is aimed at restoration, as much as possible, of
the spiritual status quo ante; thus, it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. Since each case must be
governed by its own peculiar circumstances, there is no hard and fast rule in determining the proper amount
‣ The social standing of the aggrieved party is essential to the determination of the proper amount of the
award. Otherwise, the goal of enabling him to obtain means, diversions, or amusements to restore him to
the status quo ante would not be achieved.
3. VILLANUEVA V. SALVADOR, G.R. NO. 139436, JANUARY 25, 2006

‣ Requirements to Recover Moral Damages
‣ While proof of pecuniary loss is unnecessary to justify an award of moral damages, the amount of indemnity being
left to the sound discretion of the court, it is, nevertheless, essential that the claimant satisfactorily proves the
existence of the factual basis of the damages and its causal connection to defendants wrongful act or omission.
‣ This is so because moral damages, albeit incapable of pecuniary estimation, are designed to compensate the
claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. There is thus merit on petitioners
assertion that proof of moral suffering must precede a moral damage award.
‣ The conditions required in awarding moral damages are:

X. DAMAGES
1. There must be an injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant;
2. There must be a culpable act or omission factually established;
3. The wrongful act or omission of the defendant must be the proximate cause of the injury sustained by
the claimant; and
4. The award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code
‣ While there need not be a showing that the defendant acted in a wanton or malevolent manner, as this is a
requirement for an award of exemplary damages,there must still be proof of fraudulent action or bad faith for a
claim for moral damages to succeed. Then, too, moral damages are generally not recoverable in culpa contractual
except when bad faith supervenes and is proven
‣ Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imports a dishonest purpose or some moral
obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty through some motive or interest or ill-will that
partakes of the nature of the fraud. And to the person claiming moral damages rests the onus of proving by
convincing evidence the existence of bad faith, for good faith is presumed
‣ Clear it is from the above that before moral damages may be assessed thereunder, the defendants act must be
vitiated by bad faith or that there is willful intent to injure. Simply put, moral damages cannot arise from simple
negligence
‣ Breach of Contract in this case, note that generally, moral damages cannot be awarded in breach of contract cases
unless there is:
1. Bad faith (Art. 2220)
2. Death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract by a common carrier (Art. 1764 in relation to Art. 2206)
‣ In this case, Art. 2206 authorises the spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the
deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.
4. MAHINAY V. VELASQUEZ, G.R. NO. 152753, JANUARY 13, 2004

‣ In order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be pleading and proof of moral suffering, mental
anguish, fright and the like.
‣ While respondent alleged in his complaint that he suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and
moral shock, he failed to prove them during the trial. Indeed, respondent should have taken the witness stand and
should have testified on the mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and other emotional and mental
suffering he purportedly suffered to sustain his claim for moral damages.
‣ Mere allegations do not suffice; they must be substantiated by clear and convincing proof.
‣ No other person could have proven such damages except the respondent himself as they were extremely
personal to him.
‣ While no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the amount of
indemnity being left to the discretion of the court, it is nevertheless essential that the claimant should
satisfactorily show the existence of the factual basis of damages and its causal connection to defendants
acts.
‣ This is so because moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an award
designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer.
‣ In Francisco vs. GSIS, the Court held that there must be clear testimony on the anguish and other forms of
mental suffering. Thus, if the plaintiff fails to take the witness stand and testify as to his/her social humiliation,
wounded feelings and anxiety, moral damages cannot be awarded.
‣ In this case, the testimony of Machete was not enough evidence of the moral damages that the respondent
supposedly suffered. Machete may have clearly testified on the specific words uttered by petitioner against
respondent but he could not have testified on the wounded feelings respondent allegedly went through by reason
of petitioners slanderous remark. The award of moral damages must be anchored to a clear showing that
respondent actually experienced mental anguish, besmirched reputation, sleepless nights, wounded feelings or
similar injury. There was no better witness to this experience than respondent himself. Since respondent failed to
testify on the witness stand, the trial court did not have any factual basis to award moral damages to him.
5. MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION V. HUANG, G.R. NO. 172122, JUNE 22, 2007
‣ Rationale of Moral Damages; Determination of the Amount of Moral Damages

X. DAMAGES
‣ The award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the limits of the possible, of the spiritual status quo
ante.
‣ Moral damages are designed to compensate and alleviate in some way the physical suffering, mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury
unjustly caused a person.
‣ Although incapable of pecuniary computation, they must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted.
‣ The amount of the award bears no relation whatsoever with the wealth or means of the offender.
‣ In Mahinay, the employee of the plaintiff was the one who testified as to the injury to the plaintiff (which was the basis
of the claim for moral damages), the court didn’t award because it said that it was hearsay evidence and the plaintiff
should have testified himself. In Huang,the court awarded moral damages even if it was the family of the plaintiff who
testified.
6. KIERULF V. COURT OF APPEALS, 269 SCRA 433 (1997)

‣ The claim for moral damages is factual in origin and must find basis not only in the evidence presented but also in
the findings of the Respondent Court. For lack of factual basis, such claim cannot be ruled upon by this Court at
this time.
‣ This Court cannot remind the bench and the bar often enough that in order that moral damages may be awarded,
there must be pleading and proof of moral suffering, mental anguish, fright and the like.
‣ While no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the amount of
indemnity being left to the discretion of the court,it is nevertheless essential that the claimant should satisfactorily
show the existence of the factual basis of damages and its causal connection to defendant's acts.
‣ This is so because moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an award
designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer.
‣ In Francisco vs. GSIS, the Court held that there must be clear testimony on the anguish and other forms of mental
suffering. Thus, if the plaintiff fails to take the witness stand and testify as to his/her social humiliation, wounded
feelings and anxiety, moral damages cannot be awarded.
‣ In Cocoland Development Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission, the Court held that "additional
facts must be pleaded and proven to warrant the grant of moral damages under the Civil Code, these being, x x x
social humiliation, wounded feelings, grave anxiety, etc., that resulted therefrom."

‣ The social and financial standing of Lucila cannot be considered in awarding moral damages. The factual
circumstances prior to the accident show that no "rude and rough" reception, no "menacing attitude," no
"supercilious manner," no "abusive language and highly scornful reference" was given her.
‣ The social and financial standing of a claimant of moral damages may be considered in awarding moral
damages only if he or she was subjected to contemptuous conduct despite the offender's knowledge of his
or her social and financial standing.
‣ Moral damages are awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve
to alleviate the moral suffering he/she has undergone, by reason of the defendant's culpable action.
‣ Its award is aimed at restoration, as much as possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; thus, it must be
proportionate to the suffering inflicted.
‣ Since each case must be governed by its own peculiar circumstances, there is no hard and fast rule in
determining the proper amount. The yardstick should be that the amount awarded should not be so
palpably and scandalously excessive as to indicate that it was the result of passion, prejudice or corruption
on the part of the trial judge. Neither should it be so little or so paltry that it rubs salt to the injury already
inflicted on plaintiffs.
‣ Are award of moral damages for loss of marital consortium not allowed? NO, it can still be the basis of moral damages
if it can be proven that the act of the defendant was the proximate cause of the mental anguish, etc. However, in this
case, it was not allowed because the plaintiff himself did not testify.
7. PEOPLE V. IROY, G.R. NO. 187743, MARCH 3, 2010

‣ Requirements to Recover Moral Damages: Rape Cases

X. DAMAGES
‣ Moral damages are automatically granted in a rape case without need of further proof other than the fact of its
commission. For it is assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling her to such an award
8. PEOPLE V. PAREJA, G.R. NO. 188979, SEPTEMBER 5, 2012

‣ Requirements to Recover Moral Damages: Attempted Rape Cases
‣ Automatic P 25,000.00 as moral damages in attempted rape case
9. PEOPLE V. RARUGAL, G.R. NO. 188603, JANUARY 16, 2013

‣ Requirements to Recover Moral Damages: Murder Cases
‣ We sustain the RTC’s award for moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 even in the absence of proof of
mental and emotional suffering of the victim’s heirs.
‣ As borne out by human nature and experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional
pain and anguish on the part of the victim’s family
10. FORES V. MIRANDA, G.R. NO. L-12163, MARCH 4, 1959

‣ Requirements to Recover Moral Damages: Breach of Contract of Carriage
‣ Moral damages are NOT recoverable in damage actions predicted on a breach of the contract of transportation, in
view of Articles 2219 and 2220 of the new Civil Code
‣ Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (1) A criminal offense
resulting in physical injuries; (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
‣ Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court
should find that, under circumstances, such damages are justify due. The same rule applies to breaches
of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
‣ By contrasting the provisions of these two articles it immediately becomes apparent that:
a. In case of breach of contract (including one of transportation) proof of bad faith or fraud (dolus), i.e., wanton or
deliberately injurious conduct, is essential to justify an award of moral damages; and
b. That a breach of contract can not be considered included in the descriptive term "analogous cases" used in
Art. 2219; not only because Art. 2220 specifically provides for the damages that are caused by contractual
breach, but because the definition of quasi-delict in Art. 2176 of the Code expressly excludes the cases where
there is a "preexisting contractual relation between the parties.”
‣ The exception to the basic rule of damages now under consideration is a mishap resulting in the death of a
passenger, in which case Article 1764 makes the common carrier expressly subject to the rule of Art. 2206,
that entitles the deceased passenger to "demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the
death of the deceased”
‣ But the exceptional rule of Art. 1764 makes it all the more evident that where the injured passenger does not die,
moral damages are not recoverable unless it is proved that the carrier was guilty of malice or bad faith.
‣ We think it is clear that the mere carelessness of the carrier's driver does not per se constitute of justify an
inference of malice or bad faith on the part of the carrier; and in the case at bar there is no other evidence of such
malice to support the award of moral damages by the Court of Appeals.
‣ To award moral damages for breach of contract, therefore, without proof of bad faith or malice on the part
of the defendant, as required by Art. 220, would be to violate the clear provisions of the law, and constitute
unwarranted judicial legislation.
‣ It is also suggested that a carrier's violation of its engagement to safety transport the passenger involves a breach
of the passenger's confidence, and therefore should be regarded as a breach of contract in bad faith, justifying
recovery of moral damages under Art. 2220. This theory is untenable, for under it the carrier would always be
deemed in bad faith, in every case its obligation to the passenger is infringed, and it would be never accountable
for simple negligence; while under the law (Art. 1756). the presumption is that common carriers acted negligently
(and not maliciously), and Art. 1762 speaks of negligence of the common carrier
‣ The distinction between fraud, bad faith or malice in the sense of deliberate or wanton wrong doing and
negligence (as mere carelessness) is too fundamental in our law to be ignored (Arts. 1170-1172); their
consequences being clearly differentiated by the Code.
‣ It is to be presumed, in the absence of statutory provision to the contrary, that this difference was in the
mind of the lawmakers when in Art. 2220 they limited recovery of moral damages to breaches of contract in

X. DAMAGES
bad faith. It is true that negligence may be occasionally so gross as to amount to malice; but that fact must
be shown in evidence, and a carrier's bad faith is not to be lightly inferred from a mere finding that the
contract was breached through negligence of the carrier's employees.
‣ AGAIN, generally, moral damages cannot be awarded in breach of contract cases unless there is:
1. Bad faith (Art. 2220)
‣ Why is it so difficult to claim moral damages in breach of contract cases? The rationale is in Fores, the reason
being that it is already easier for the plaintiff to recover damages in breach of contract cases (involving contract
of carryage as well) as there is already as presumption of negligence against the defendant upon proof of the
contract and its breach. The scales of justice are already tilted against the common carrier.
2. Death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract by a common carrier (Art. 1764 in relation to Art. 2206)
‣ In this case, Art. 2206 authorises the spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the
‣ Thus, for death of passenger, moral damages are NOT automatic, the person claiming must be the spouse,
descendants or ascendants (legitimate or illegitimate) of the deceased. This was seen in the next case of
Sulpicio Lines (where the persons claiming were the siblings and the court disallowed moral damages)
‣ Note that this modified that 4 requirements you usually see when the court enumerates the requirement to recover
moral damages, it not only based in instances under Art. 2219, it can also be based on breach of contract cases
(under Art. 2220 and 1159 in relation to Art. 19 and 20, as we will see later in Acro Pulp Case)
11. SULPICIO LINES, INC., V. CURSO, G.R. NO. 157009, MARCH 17, 2010
‣ Essentially, the purpose of moral damages is indemnity or reparation, that is, to enable the injured party to obtain
the means, diversions, or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone by reason
of the tragic event.
‣ The conditions for awarding moral damages are:
a. There must be an injury, whether physical, mental, or psychological, clearly substantiated by the claimant;
b. There must be a culpable act or omission factually established;
c. The wrongful act or omission of the defendant must be the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the
claimant; and
d. The award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
‣ Article 2219 circumscribes the instances in which moral damages may be awarded. The provision does not include
succession in the collateral line as a source of the right to recover moral damages. The usage of the phrase
analogous cases in the provision means simply that the situation must be held similar to those expressly
enumerated in the law in question following the ejusdem generis rule
‣ Requirements to Recover Moral Damages: Breach of Contract of Carriage

‣ As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a breach of contract,
unless there is fraud or bad faith.
‣ As an exception, moral damages may be awarded in case of breach of contract of carriage that results in
the death of a passenger, in accordance with Article 1764, in relation to Article 2206 (3), of the Civil Code,
which provide:
‣ Article 1764. Damages in cases comprised in this Section shall be awarded in accordance with Title XVIII of this
Book, concerning Damages. Article 2206 shall also apply to the death of a passenger caused by the breach of
contract by a common carrier.
‣ Article 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three
thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition: (1) The defendant
shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs
of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on
account of permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of
his death; (2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of article 291, the
recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or intestate succession,
may demand support from the person causing the death, for a period not exceeding five years, the exact
duration to be fixed by the court; (3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the

X. DAMAGES
‣ The foregoing legal provisions set forth the persons entitled to moral damages. The omission from Article
2206 (3) of the brothers and sisters of the deceased passenger reveals the legislative intent to exclude them
from the recovery of moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased. Inclusio
unius est exclusio alterius.
‣ In fine, moral damages may be recovered in an action upon breach of contract of carriage only when:
a. Where death of a passenger results, or
b. It is proved that the carrier was guilty of fraud and bad faith, even if death does not result.
‣ Article 2206 of the Civil Code entitles the descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, and surviving spouse
of the deceased passenger to demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the
deceased
12. BAGUMBAYAN V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, 132 SCRA 441 (1984)

‣ Kinds and Extent of Moral Damage
‣ What we call moral damages are treated in American jurisprudence as compensatory damages awarded for mental
pain and suffering or mental anguish resulting from a wrong
‣ Mental suffering means distress or serious pain as distinguished from annoyance, regret or vexation. Mental
anguish is intense mental suffering
‣ Generally, damages for mental anguish are limited to cases in which there has been a personal physical injury or
where the defendant wilfully, wantonly, recklessly, or intentionally caused the mental anguish. Nor will damages
generally be awarded for mental anguish which is not accompanied by a physical injury, at least where
maliciousness, wantonness, or intentional conduct is not involved
‣ Damages for mental anguish and suffering have been held recoverable where the act complained of was done with
such gross carelessness or recklessness as to show an utter indifference to the consequences
‣ Under Ohio law, damages for emotional distress consisting of embarrassment and mental suffering and dire
threats, are not recoverable unless intentionally caused
‣ Where the act is wanton or willful there may be a recovery for humiliation and mental suffering without any physical
injury. It was further held that in negligence cases, where there is no willful or wanton wrong, there can be no
recovery for mental suffering unless there is also physical injury.

‣ In this case, the grant of moral and exemplary damages is devoid of legal justification because it was not
predicated upon any of the cases enumerated in the Civil Code in Art. 2219
‣ It is not specifically mentioned in article 2219 which refers to quasi-delicts causing physical injuries. The Appellate
Court erred in considering it as analogous to the cases mentioned therein without indicating what specific case the
instant case resembles or is analogous to. For example, an unfounded complaint with a baseless imputation of
forgery is analogous to defamation mentioned in article 2219 (7).
13. UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK V. RAMOS, 415 SCRA 596 (2003)
‣ For the award of moral damages to be granted, the following must exist:
1. There must be an injury clearly sustained by the claimant, whether physical, mental or psychological;
2. There must be a culpable act or omission factually established;
3. The wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant;
and
4. The award for damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code
14. FILIPINAS BROADCASTING NETWORK, INC., V. AGO MEDICAL AND EDUCATIONAL CENTER, G.R. NO. 141994, JANUARY
17, 2005
‣ Kinds and Extent of Moral Damage: Moral Damage to Juridical Persons
‣ A juridical person is generally not entitled to moral damages because, unlike a natural person, it cannot experience
physical suffering or such sentiments as wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish or moral shock

X. DAMAGES
‣ In this case, however, the plaintiff-corporation’s claim for moral damages falls under item 7 of Article 2219 of the
Civil Code. This provision expressly authorizes the recovery of moral damages in cases of libel, slander or any
other form of defamation. Article 2219(7) does not qualify whether the plaintiff is a natural or juridical person.
‣ Therefore, a juridical person such as a corporation can validly complain for libel or any other form of
defamation and claim for moral damages.
‣ Principle of Respondeat Superior was erroneosly applied here, it should have been vicarious liability as we learned
before.
‣ In this case, moral damages were awarded against the LGU (municipal corp), pwde ba yon? state immunity dba?
‣ Yup, the general rule for vicarious liability of municipal corporations is in the LGC, that they are vicariously liable for
the fault or negligence of their employees. See Sec. 24 of LGC: “Local government units and their officials are not
exempt from liability for death or injury to persons or damage to property.”
15. CITY GOVERNMENT OF TAGAYTAY V. GUERRERO, G.R. NOS. 140743 & 140745, SEPTEMBER 17, 2009
‣ Kinds and Extent of Moral Damage: Moral Damage by Municipal Corporations
‣ In this case, the gross negligence of the City of Tagaytay in levying taxes and auctioning properties to answer for
real property tax deficiencies outside its territorial jurisdiction amounts to bad faith that calls for the award of moral
damages.
‣ Moral damages are meant to compensate the claimant for any physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injuries unjustly
caused. Although incapable of pecuniary estimation, the amount must somehow be proportional to and in
approximation of the suffering inflicted.
‣ Moral damages are awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve
to alleviate the moral suffering the person has undergone, by reason of defendant's culpable action. The award is
aimed at restoration, as much as possible, of the spiritual status quo ante. Thus, it must be proportionate to the
suffering inflicted.
‣ Since each case must be governed by its own peculiar circumstances, there is no hard and fast rule in determining
the proper amount.
‣ The social standing of the aggrieved party is essential to the determination of the proper amount of the award.
Otherwise, the goal of enabling him to obtain means, diversions, or amusements to restore him to the status quo
ante would not be achieved
16. PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES, INC. V. PARAS, G.R. NO. 161909, APRIL 25, 2012
‣ As a general rule, indeed, moral damages are not recoverable in an action predicated on a breach of contract. This
is because such action is not included in Article 2219 of the Civil Code as one of the actions in which moral
damages may be recovered.
‣ By way of exception, moral damages are recoverable in an action predicated on a breach of contract:
a. Where the mishap results in the death of a passenger, as provided in Article 1764, in relation to Article
2206, (3), of the Civil Code; and
b. Where the common carrier has been guilty of fraud or bad faith, as provided in Article 2220 of the Civil
Code.
17. ARCO PULP AND PAPER CO., INC. V. LIM, G.R. NO. 206806, JUNE 25, 2014
‣ Requirements to Recover Moral Damages: Breach of Contract
‣ Under Article 2220 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be awarded in case of breach of contract where the
breach is due to fraud or bad faith:
‣ Moral damages are not awarded as a matter of right but only after the party claiming it proved that the breach was
due to fraud or bad faith. As this court stated:
‣ Moral damages are not recoverable simply because a contract has been breached. They are recoverable
only if the party from whom it is claimed acted fraudulently or in bad faith or in wanton disregard of his
contractual obligations. The breach must be wanton, reckless, malicious or in bad faith, and oppressive or
abusive.

X. DAMAGES
‣ Breaches of contract done in bad faith, however, are not specified within the enumeration under Art. 2219. When a
party breaches a contract, he or she goes against Article 19 of the Civil Code
‣ Persons who have the right to enter into contractual relations must exercise that right with honesty and good faith.
Failure to do so results in an abuse of that right, which may become the basis of an action for damages. Article 19,
however, cannot be its sole basis: Article 19 is the general rule which governs the conduct of human relations. By
itself, it is not the basis of an actionable tort. Article 19 describes the degree of care required so that an actionable tort
may arise when it is alleged together with Article 20 or Article 21
‣ When parties act in bad faith and do not faithfully comply with their obligations under contract, they run the risk of
violating Article 1159 of the Civil Code: “Article 1159. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between
the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith.”
‣ Article 2219, therefore, is not an exhaustive list of the instances where moral damages may be recovered since
it only specifies, among others, Article 21. When a party reneges on his or her obligations arising from
contracts in bad faith, the act is not only contrary to morals, good customs, and public policy; it is also a
violation of Article 1159. Breaches of contract become the basis of moral damages, not only under Article
2220, but also under Articles 19 and 20 in relation to Article 1159.
‣ Moral damages, however, are not recoverable on the mere breach of the contract. Article 2220 requires that the
breach be done fraudulently or in bad faith
‣ To recover moral damages in an action for breach of contract, the breach must be palpably wanton,
reckless and malicious, in bad faith, oppressive, or abusive. Hence, the person claiming bad faith must
prove its existence by clear and convincing evidence for the law always presumes good faith.
‣ Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral
obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty through some motive or interest or ill will that
partakes of the nature of fraud. It is, therefore, a question of intention, which can be inferred from one’s conduct
and/or contemporaneous statements
‣ Since a finding of bad faith is generally premised on the intent of the doer, it requires an examination of the
circumstances in each case.
‣ The enumeration in Art. 2219 is NOT exclusive, because it includes “analogous circumstances”. But in breach of
contract cases does not fall under “analogous circumstances in Art. 2219, it falls under Art. 2220 or Art. 19 and 20 in
relation to Art. 1159
SEE ALSO: SIMEX INTERNATIONAL (MANILA), INCORPORATED V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 88013, MARCH 19, 1990.
‣ Kinds and Extent of Moral Damage: Moral Damage in favour of Juridical Persons
‣ Moral damages are not awarded to penalize the defendant but to compensate the plaintiff for the injuries he may
have suffered.
‣ In the case at bar, the petitioner is seeking such damages for the prejudice sustained by it as a result of the private
respondent's fault. The respondent court said that the claimed losses are purely speculative and are not supported
by substantial evidence, but if failed to consider that the amount of such losses need not be established with
exactitude precisely because of their nature.
‣ Moral damages are not susceptible of pecuniary estimation. Article 2216 of the Civil Code specifically
provides that "no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated or
exemplary damages may be adjudicated." That is why the determination of the amount to be awarded (except
liquidated damages) is left to the sound discretion of the court, according to "the circumstances of each case.”
‣ From every viewpoint except that of the petitioner's, its claim of moral damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00 is
nothing short of preposterous. Its business certainly is not that big, or its name that prestigious, to sustain such an
extravagant pretense. Moreover, a corporation is not as a rule entitled to moral damages because, not being
a natural person, it cannot experience physical suffering or such sentiments as wounded feelings, serious
anxiety, mental anguish and moral shock. The only exception to this rule is where the corporation has a
good reputation that is debased, resulting in its social humiliation
D. NOMINAL DAMAGES

X. DAMAGES
Article 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by
the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered
by him.
Article 2222. The court may award nominal damages in every obligation arising from any source enumerated in article
1157, or in every case where any property right has been invaded.
Article 2223. The adjudication of nominal damages shall preclude further contest upon the right involved and all
accessory questions, as between the parties to the suit, or their respective heirs and assigns.
1. VENTANILLA V. CENTENO, G.R. NO. L-14333, JANUARY 28, 1961

‣ Determination of the Amount of Nominal Damages
‣ The assessment of nominal damages is left to the discretion of the court, according to the circumstances
of the case
‣ Nominal damages are not for indemnification of loss suffered but for the vindication or recognition of a right
violated or invaded.
‣ Effect of Award of Nominal Damages
‣ If the plaintiff is not entitled to actual or compensatory damages but has been awarded nominal damages by the
trial court, such award precludes the recovery of temperate or moderate damages.
2. VDA. DE MEDINA V. CRESENCIA, G.R. NO. L-8194, JULY 11, 1956

‣ Requirements to Recover Nominal Damages
‣ Nominal damages cannot co-exist with compensatory damages.
‣ The purpose of nominal damages is to vindicate or recognize a right that has been violated, in order to preclude
further contest thereon; and not for the purpose of indemnifying the Plaintiff for any loss suffered by him” (Articles
2221, 2223)
‣ In this case, since the court below has already awarded compensatory and exemplary damages that are in
themselves a judicial recognition that Plaintiff’s right was violated, the award of nominal damages is unnecessary
and improper.
3. SEVEN BROTHERS SHIPPING CORP. V. DMC-CONSTRUCTION RESOURCES, INC., G.R. NO. 193914, NOVEMBER 26, 2014
‣ Requirements to Recover Nominal Damages
‣ Under Article 2221 of the Civil Code, nominal damages may be awarded in order that the plaintiff’s right, which has
been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered.
‣ Nominal damages are ‘recoverable where a legal right is technically violated and must be vindicated
against an invasion that has produced no actual present loss of any kind or where there has been a breach
of contract and no substantial injury or actual damages whatsoever have been or can be shown
‣ In one case, nominal damages were granted because while petitioner suffered no substantial injury, his right to be
treated with due courtesy was violated by the respondent.
‣ In another case, it was awarded where a right was violated, but produced no injury or loss to the aggrieved party
‣ In contrast, under Article 2224, temperate or moderate damages may be recovered when the court finds that
some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be provided with
certainty
SEE ALSO: SINGSON V. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, G.R. NO. L-24837; 23 SCRA 1117 (1968).
E. TEMPERATE DAMAGES

X. DAMAGES
Article 2224. Temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may
be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount can not, from the nature of
the case, be provided with certainty.
Article 2225. Temperate damages must be reasonable under the circumstances.
1. EQUITABLE PCI BANK V. TAN, G.R. NO. 165339, AUGUST 23, 2010
‣ Requirements to Recover Temperate Damages
‣ In the absence of competent proof on the actual damages suffered, respondent is entitled to temperate damages.
‣ The allowance of temperate damages when actual damages were not adequately proven is ultimately a rule
drawn from equity, the principle affording relief to those definitely injured who are unable to prove how definite
the injury.
‣ In this case, it is apparent that respondent suffered pecuniary loss. The negligence of petitioner triggered the
disconnection of his electrical supply, which temporarily halted his business operations and the consequent loss of
business opportunity. However, due to the insufficiency of evidence before Us, We cannot place its amount with
certainty. Article 2216 of the Civil Code instructs that assessment of damages is left to the discretion of the court
according to the circumstances of each case.
2. PEOPLE V. MURCIA, G.R. NO. 182460, MARCH 9, 2010

‣ Requirements to Recover Temperate Damages
‣ In this case, temperate damages were awarded in accordance with Art. 2224 of the Civil Code, providing that
temperate damages may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its
amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proven with certainty. It is thus reasonable to expect that the
value of the house burned down amounted to at least P200,000.00.
3. PEOPLE V. GUTIERREZ, G.R. NO. 188602, FEBRUARY 4, 2010

‣ Requirements to Recover Temperate Damages: In Criminal Cases
‣ When death occurs due to a crime, the following may be recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of
the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorney's fees
and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in proper cases
‣ Temperate and actual damages are mutually exclusive in that both may not be awarded at the same time.
Hence, no temperate damages may be awarded if actual damages have already been granted.
‣ Generally, the Court annot award temperate damages for death, when actual damages were awarded. Because
temperate damages may be awarded when there is loss but the exact amount cannot be provided. So when you award
actual damages, there is no need to award temperate damages and vice versa. The reason why you award temperate
damages precisely because there is no proof of the amount or there is difficulty in ascertainment of the amount.
4. RAMOS V. COURT OF APPEALS, 321 SCRA 584 (1999)

‣ Requirements to Recover Temperate Damages: Instances where the injury is chronic and continuing.
‣ Our rules on actual or compensatory damages generally assume that at the time of litigation, the injury suffered as
a consequence of an act of negligence has been completed and that the cost can be liquidated. However, these
provisions neglect to take into account those situations, as in this case, where the resulting injury might be
continuing and possible future complications directly arising from the injury, while certain to occur, are
difficult to predict.
‣ In these cases, the amount of damages which should be awarded, if they are to adequately and correctly respond
to the injury caused, should be one which compensates for pecuniary loss incurred and proved, up to the time of
trial; and one which would meet pecuniary loss certain to be suffered but which could not, from the nature
of the case, be made with certainty.

X. DAMAGES
‣ In other words, temperate damages can and should be awarded on top of actual or compensatory damages
in instances where the injury is chronic and continuing.
‣ And because of the unique nature of such cases, no incompatibility arises when both actual and temperate
damages are provided for. The reason is that these damages cover two distinct phases.
‣ As it would not be equitable - and certainly not in the best interests of the administration of justice - for the victim
in such cases to constantly come before the courts and invoke their aid in seeking adjustments to the
compensatory damages previously awarded - temperate damages are appropriate. The amount given as
temperate damages, though to a certain extent speculative, should take into account the cost of proper care.
‣ In this case, petitioners were able to provide only home-based nursing care for a comatose patient who has
remained in that condition for over a decade. Having premised our award for compensatory damages on the
amount provided by petitioners at the onset of litigation, it would be now much more in step with the interests of
justice if the value awarded for temperate damages would allow petitioners to provide optimal care for their loved
one in a facility which generally specializes in such care. They should not be compelled by dire circumstances to
provide substandard care at home without the aid of professionals, for anything less would be grossly inadequate
‣ Generally, the Court cannot award actual and temperate damages at the same time.
‣ EXCEPTION: They may be awarded at the same time when injury is chronic and continuing.
SEE ALSO: ARANETA V. BANK OF AMERICA, G.R. NO. L-25414, JULY 30, 1971, AND , G.R. NO. 140182, APRIL 12, 2005.
‣ In this case, the CA held that the plaintiff has not proven his claim that the two checks for $500 each were in partial
payment of two orders for jewels worth P50,000 each. He has likewise not proven the actual damage which he claims
he has suffered. And in view of the fact that he has not proven the existence of the supposed contract for himself to
buy jewels at a profit there is not even an occasion for an award of temperate damages on this score.
‣ Plaintiff argues that in an action by a depositor against a bank for damages resulting from the wrongful dishonor of the
depositor's checks, temperate damages for injury to business standing or commercial credit may be recovered even
in the absence of definite proof of direct pecuniary loss to the plaintiff, a finding — as it was found by the Court of
Appeals — that the wrongful acts of the respondent had adversely affected his credit being sufficient for the purpose
‣ Defendant argues that since the plaintiff invokes Article 2205 of the Civil Code, which speaks of actual or
compensatory damages for injury to business standing or commercial credit, he may not claim them as temperate
damages and thereby dispense with proof of pecuniary loss under Article 2216. The respondent cites Article 2224,
which provides that "temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than compensatory
damages may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot,
from the nature of the case, proved with certainty," and contends that the petitioner failed to show any such loss in
this case
‣ SC awarded nominal damages notwithstanding the absence of definite proof of direct pecuniary loss to the
plaintiff
‣ The Code Commission, in explaining the concept of temperate damages under Article 2224: In some States of the
American Union, temperate damages are allowed. There are cases where from the nature of the case, definite
proof of pecuniary loss cannot be offered, although the court is convinced that there has been such loss. For
instance, injury to one's commercial credit or to the goodwill of a business firm is often hard to show with certainty
in terms of money. Should damages be denied for that reason? The judge should be empowered to calculate
moderate damages in such cases, rather than that the plaintiff should suffer, without redress from the defendant's
wrongful act
‣ In this case, the plaintiff is a merchant of long standing and good reputation in the Philippines. Some of his record
is cited in the decision appealed from. We are of the opinion that his claim for temperate damages is legally
justified. Considering all the circumstances, including the rather small size of the petitioner's account with the
respondent, the amounts of the checks which were wrongfully dishonored, and the fact that the respondent tried
to rectify the error soon after it was discovered, although the rectification came after the damage had been
caused, we believe that an award of P5,000 by way of temperate damages is sufficient.
F. LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
Article 2226. Liquidated damages are those agreed upon by the parties to a contract, to be paid in case of breach
thereof.

X. DAMAGES
Article 2227. Liquidated damages, whether intended as an indemnity or a penalty, shall be equitably reduced if they are
iniquitous or unconscionable.
Article 2228. When the breach of the contract committed by the defendant is not the one contemplated by the parties in
agreeing upon the liquidated damages, the law shall determine the measure of damages, and not the stipulation.
1. AZCUNA V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 116665, MARCH 20, 1996

‣ Stipulation in a Lease Contract:
‣ “That after the termination of the lease, the LESSEE shall peaceably deliver to the LESSOR the leased premises
vacant and unencumbered and in good tenantable conditions minus the ordinary wear and tear. In case the
LESSEEs failure or inability to do so, LESSOR has the right to charge the LESSEE P1,000.00 per day as damages
without prejudice to other remedies which LESSOR is entitled in the premise.
‣ This is clearly an agreement for liquidated damages - entitling private respondent to claim a stipulated amount by way
of damages (correctly totalling P3,000.00 per day as there were three [3] units being leased by petitioner) over and
above other damages still legally due him, i.e., the fair rental value for the use and occupation of the property as
provided for in Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
‣ The freedom of the contracting parties to make stipulations in their contract provided they are not contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy is so settled, and the Court finds nothing immoral or illegal with
the indemnity/ penalty clause of the lease contract (paragraph 10) which does not appear to have been forced upon or
fraudulently foisted on petitioner.
‣ Petitioner cannot now evade further liability for liquidated damages, for after entering into such an agreement,
petitioner cannot thereafter turn his back on his word with a plea that on him was inflicted a penalty shocking to the
conscience and impressed with iniquity as to call for the relief sought on the part of a judicial tribunal
‣ The issue here was that there was a provision for liquidated damages in the lease contract. Rule 70 of RoC on Forcible
entry and unlawful detainer states that the only damages that may be recovered in an ejectment case are the damages
for the loss of the use or value of the property. If it is provided in the contract that liquidated damages are to be
awarded, then following article 1306 of the Civil Code, The contracting parties may establish such stipulations,
clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy. You link that in cases where 1 party is at a disadvantage as in Article 24.
‣ Whether you characterize the clause as liquidated damage or penalty, the court may mitigate or lessen the
award of damages.
‣ When the breach of the contract committed by the defendant is not the one contemplated by the provision
which provides the liquidated damages, then you don’t award liquidated damages for that breach.
2. FILINVEST LAND, INC. V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 138980, SEPTEMBER 20, 2005
‣ Distinction between a Penal Clause as Penalty for Breach and Penalty for Damages
‣ The distinction between a penalty clause imposed essentially as penalty in case of breach and a penalty
clause imposed as indemnity for damages should be made in cases where there has been neither partial
nor irregular compliance with the terms of the contract.
‣ In cases where there has been partial or irregular compliance, as in this case, there will be no substantial
difference between a penalty and liquidated damages insofar as legal results are concerned.
‣ The distinction is thus more apparent than real especially in the light of certain provisions of the Civil Code of the
Philippines which provides in Articles 2226 and Article 2227
‣ Art. 2226. Liquidated damages are those agreed upon by the parties to a contract to be paid in case of breach
thereof
‣ Art. 2227. Liquidated damages, whether intended as an indemnity or a penalty, shall be equitably reduced if
they are iniquitous or unconscionable.
‣ There is no justification for the Civil Code to make an apparent distinction between a penalty and liquidated
damages because the settled rule is that there is no difference between penalty and liquidated damages
insofar as legal results are concerned and that either may be recovered without the necessity of proving
actual damages and both may be reduced when proper.

X. DAMAGES
3. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. FAMILY FOODS MANUFACTURING CO., LTD., G.R. NO. 180458, JULY 30,
2009
‣ This Court has recognized a penalty clause as an accessory obligation which the parties attach to a principal
obligation for the purpose of insuring the performance thereof by imposing on the debtor a special prestation
(generally consisting in the payment of a sum of money) in case the obligation is not fulfilled or is irregularly or
inadequately fulfilled.
‣ The enforcement of the penalty can be demanded by the creditor only when the non-performance is due to the fault
or fraud of the debtor. The non-performance gives rise to the presumption of fault; in order to avoid the payment of
the penalty, the debtor has the burden of proving an excuse the failure of the performance was due to either force
majeure or the acts of the creditor himself
G. EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
Article 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good, in
addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
Article 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall be
paid to the offended party.
Article 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence.
Article 2232. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary damages if the defendant acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.
Article 2233. Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right; the court will decide whether or not they
should be adjudicated.
Article 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, the plaintiff must show that he is entitled
to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary
damages should be awarded. In case liquidated damages have been agreed upon, although no proof of loss is necessary
in order that such liquidated damages may be recovered, nevertheless, before the court may consider the question of
granting exemplary in addition to the liquidated damages, the plaintiff must show that he would be entitled to moral,
temperate or compensatory damages were it not for the stipulation for liquidated damages.
Article 2235. A stipulation whereby exemplary damages are renounced in advance shall be null and void.
1. MAKABALI V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-46877, JANUARY 22, 1988

‣ As to exemplary damages, Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that such damages may be imposed by way of
example or correction for the public good.
‣ While exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right, they need not be proved, although plaintiff
must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider
the question of whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded
‣ It will thus be noted that We have awarded moral and exemplary damages depending upon the facts attendant to
each case. It will also be noted that We gave separate awards for moral and exemplary damages.

X. DAMAGES
‣ This is as it should be because the nature and purposes of said damages are different. While moral damages have to
do with injury personal to the awardee, such as physical suffering and the like, exemplary damages are imposed by
way of example or correction for the public good.
‣ Only exemplary damages are meant to be punitive. All the others are meant to compensate. What about nominal? Not
intended to indemnify but to recognize a right which was violated.
2. PEOPLE V. CATUBIG, 363 SCRA 62 (2001)

‣ Exemplary Damages in Criminal Cases involving Rape
‣ The attendance of aggravating circumstances in the perpetration of the crime serves to increase the penalty
(the criminal liability aspect), as well as to justify an award of exemplary or corrective damages (the civil liability
aspect), moored on the greater perversity of the offender manifested in the commission of the felony such as may
be shown by:
1. The motivating power itself,
2. The place of commission,
3. The means and ways employed,
4. The time, or
5. The personal circumstances of the offender or the offended party or both.
‣ There are various types of aggravating circumstances, among them, the ordinary and the qualifying. Also, alternative
circumstances
‣ Doubts linger on whether relationship may then be considered to warrant an award for exemplary damages where it is
used to qualify rape as a heinous crime, thereby becoming an element thereof, as would subject the offender to the
penalty of death. Heretofore, the Court has not categorically laid down a specific rule, preferring instead to treat the
issue on a case to case basis.
‣ Also known as punitive or vindictive damages, exemplary or corrective damages are intended to serve as a deterrent
to serious wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a
punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. These terms are generally, but not always, used interchangeably.
‣ In common law, there is preference in the use of exemplary damages when the award is to account for injury to
feelings and for the sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by a person as a result of an injury that has been
maliciously and wantonly inflicted, the theory being that there should be compensation for the hurt caused by the
highly reprehensible conduct of the defendant - associated with such circumstances as willfulness, wantonness,
malice, gross negligence or recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud or gross fraud that intensifies the injury.
‣ The terms punitive or vindictive damages are often used to refer to those species of damages that may be awarded
against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct. In either case, these damages are intended in good
measure to deter the wrongdoer and others like him from similar conduct in the future
‣ The term aggravating circumstances used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified otherwise, is to be
understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the public
as it breaches the social order and the other upon the private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which is
addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of additional
damages to the victim.
‣ The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the attendance
of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its commission.
‣ Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of damages, however, is likewise, if
not primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award of
exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to
be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a
distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender.
In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying,
should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article
2230 of the Civil Code.
3. PEOPLE V. DALISAY, G.R. NO. 188106, NOVEMBER 25, 2009

‣ Exemplary Damages in Criminal Cases involving Rape
‣ Prior to the effectivity of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, courts generally awarded exemplary damages in
criminal cases when an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, had been proven to have

X. DAMAGES
attended the commission of the crime, even if the same was not alleged in the information. This is in accordance
with the aforesaid Article 2230.
‣ However, with the promulgation of the Revised Rules, courts no longer consider the aggravating
circumstances not alleged and proven in the determination of the penalty and in the award of damages.
Thus, even if an aggravating circumstance has been proven, but was not alleged, courts will not award
exemplary damages
‣ Sec. 8. Designation of the offense.The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given
by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection
of the statute punishing it.
‣ Sec. 9. Cause of accusation.The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying
and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the
language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what
offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to
pronounce judgment.
‣ Nevertheless, People v. Catubig laid down the principle that courts may still award exemplary damages based
on the aforementioned Article 2230, even if the aggravating circumstance has not been alleged, so long as
it has been proven, in criminal cases instituted before the effectivity of the Revised Rules which remained pending
thereafter. Catubig reasoned that the retroactive application of the Revised Rules should not adversely affect the
vested rights of the private offended party.
‣ In our body of jurisprudence, criminal cases, especially those involving rape, dichotomized:
‣ One awarding exemplary damages, even if an aggravating circumstance attending the commission of the crime
had not been sufficiently alleged but was consequently proven in the light of Catubig; and
‣ Another awarding exemplary damages only if an aggravating circumstance has both been alleged and proven
following the Revised Rules.
‣ Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be awarded, not only in the presence of an
aggravating circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or
outrageous conduct of the offender. In much the same way as Article 2230 prescribes an instance when
exemplary damages may be awarded, Article 2229, the main provision, lays down the very basis of the award
‣ The application of Article 2230 of the Civil Code strictissimi juris in such cases, as in the present one, defeats the
underlying public policy behind the award of exemplary damagesto set a public example or correction for the
public good.
‣ Pabago bago yung rule ng court dito sa exemplary damages in criminal cases where the aggravating circumstances
were not alleged. But the court used this case to finally establish the rule which is in favor of the offended party, the
aggravating circumstances need NOT be alleged, but it should be proven, to recover exemplary damages in criminal
cases
‣ People v. Dalisay MODIFIES People v. Catubig. It’s not only when you have aggravating or qualifying circumstances
attending crimes when you can award exemplary damages. It says that in criminal cases, you can award exemplary
damages even WITHOUT aggravating or qualifying circumstances. The provision which requires aggravating
circumstances is Art. 2230. Dalisay says that you can look at the nature of the crime and if it is a crime committed with
a graver degree of perversity than other crimes, then even if no aggravating circumstances, you can still award
exemplary damages under Article 2229. So when crimes are concerned you can look at and award exemplary
damages under either Art. 2230, which is you allege and you prove the existence of aggravating and/or qualifying
circumstances, or under Art. 2229

4. KAPALARAN BUS LINE V. CORONADO, G.R. NO. 85331, AUGUST 25, 1989
‣ Article 2231 of the Civil Code explicitly authorizes the imposition of exemplary damages in cases of quasi-delicts "if
the defendant acted with gross negligence." Thus we believe that the award of exemplary damages by the trial court
was quite proper, although granted for the wrong reason, and should not only be restored but augmented in the
present case. The Court is aware that respondent Shinyo did not file a separate petition for review to set aside that
portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision which deleted the grant by the trial court of exemplary damages. It is settled,
however, that issues which must be resolved if substantial justice is to be rendered to the parties, may and should be
considered and decided by this Court even if those issues had not been explicitly raised by the party affected.
‣ In the instant case, it is not only the demands of substantial justice but also the compelling considerations of
public policy noted above, which impel us to the conclusion that the trial court's award of exemplary damages
was erroneously deleted and must be restored and brought more nearly to the level which public policy and
substantial justice require.

X. DAMAGES
‣ When you have breaches of contract, then you have to follow or look in whether the breach is accompanied by:
(WFROM)
1. Wanton
2. Fraudulent
3. Reckless
4. Oppressive
5. Malevolent
‣ In this case, the common carrier’s obligation to observe extraordinary diligence does not only apply to passengers. It
also applies to third parties. Because here what was involved was for quasi-delict, the injured passenger of the jeep
filed against the bus company (no contract of carriage between them). So he cannot sue based on breach of contract
of carriage. This case falls under exemplary damages for quasi-delict. Thus the Court ruled that obligation to observe
extraordinary diligence does not only apply to passengers. It also applies in favor of third parties who were injured.
‣ This was a bar question before: To whom does the common carrier owe the duty to observe extraordinary diligence?
Answer: to the public. It owes to the public the duty to to observe extraordinary diligence. Primarily, to its passengers.
But if it observes extraordinary diligence in favor of the passenger, obviously the people at large will be benefitted.)
‣ Generally, exemplary damages, in breaches of contract, should only be awarded against the driver. It was only the
driver who acted with gross negligence or WFROM manner.
‣ EXCEPTION: When it is demonstrated or established that the common carrier tolerated or approved the driver’s
conduct.
‣ In breach of contract cases, exemplary damages are usually awarded against common carriers and banks. The logic
being these common carriers and banks are statutorily required to observe extraordinary diligence. And their failure to
exercise extraordinary diligence gives rise to the award of exemplary damages to serve as an example to other banks
or to other common carriers.
5. QUEZON CITY GOVERNMENT V. DACARA, G.R. NO. 150304, JUNE 15, 2005
‣ Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right.
‣ While granting them is subject to the discretion of the court, they can be awarded only after claimants have shown
their entitlement to moral, temperate or compensatory damages
‣ In this case, respondent sufficiently proved before the courts a quo that petitioners negligence was the proximate
cause of the incident, thereby establishing his right to actual or compensatory damages. He has adduced adequate
proof to justify his claim for the damages caused his car. The question that remains, therefore, is whether exemplary
damages may be awarded in addition to compensatory damages.
‣ Article 2231 of the Civil Code mandates that in cases of quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be recovered if the
defendant acted with gross negligence.
‣ Gross negligence means such utter want of care as to raise a presumption that the persons at fault must have been
conscious of the probable consequences of their carelessness, and that they must have nevertheless been indifferent
(or worse) to the danger of injury to the person or property of others.
‣ The negligence must amount to a reckless disregard for the safety of persons or property. Such a circumstance
obtains in the instant case.
‣ The facts of the case show a complete disregard by petitioners of any adverse consequence of their failure to install
even a single warning device at the area under renovation. Considering further that the street was dimly lit, the need
for adequate precautionary measures was even greater. By carrying on the road diggings without any warning or
barricade, petitioners demonstrated a wanton disregard for public safety. Indeed, the February 28, 1988 incident was
bound to happen due to their gross negligence. It is clear that under the circumstances, there is sufficient factual
basis for a finding of gross negligence on their part.
‣ Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be imposed by way of example or correction for
the public good. The award of these damages is meant to be a deterrent to socially deleterious actions. Public policy
requires such imposition to suppress wanton acts of an offender.
‣ It must be emphasized that local governments and their employees should be responsible not only for the
maintenance of roads and streets, but also for the safety of the public. Thus, they must secure construction
areas with adequate precautionary measures. Not only is the work of petitioners impressed with public
interest; their very existence is justified only by public service. Hence, local governments have the paramount
responsibility of keeping the interests of the public foremost in their agenda. For these reasons, it is most
disturbing to note that the present petitioners are the very parties responsible for endangering the public
through such a rash and reckless act.

X. DAMAGES
‣ Exemplary damages may be awarded against LGU.
SEE ALSO: CONSOLIDATED DAIRY PRODUCTS CO. V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 100401, AUGUST 24, 1992.
H. MITIGATION OF DAMAGES
Article 2203. The party suffering loss or injury must exercise the diligence of a good father of a family to minimize the
damages resulting from the act or omission in question.
Article 2204. In crimes, the damages to be adjudicated may be respectively increased or lessened according to the
aggravating or mitigating circumstances.
Article 2214. In quasi-delicts, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall reduce the damages that he may recover.
Article 2215. In contracts, quasi-contracts, and quasi-delicts, the court may equitably mitigate the damages under
circumstances
other than the case referred to in the preceding article, as in the following instances:
(1) That the plaintiff himself has contravened the terms of the contract;
(2) That the plaintiff has derived some benefit as a result of the contract;
(3) In cases where exemplary damages are to be awarded, that the defendant acted upon the advice of counsel;
(4) That the loss would have resulted in any event;
(5) That since the filing of the action, the defendant has done his best to lessen the plaintiff's loss or injury.
MEMORIZE: ARTICLES 2203 TO 2204, AND 2214 TO 2215
All these cases involve the doctrine of avoidable consequences. Distinguish the doctrine of avoidable consequences and
doctrine of contributory negligence. The following principles and rules can be observed:
1. The injured party has the duty to observe due diligence to mitigate or minimize his own injury under Art. 2203.
2. Burden of proof in proving whenever the injured party can mitigate his damages and by how much falls on the defendant
or the tortfeasor.
3. The duty is on the part of plaintiff the burden of proof is on the part of defendant. Plaintiff has duty to mitigate his
damages. Defendant has the burden of proving that:
a. Plaintiff could have mitigated his damages; and
b. That plaintiff could have mitigated his damages by this much.
‣ Why? Because Art. 2203 operates to lessen or mitigate the damages that are awarded against the defendant. So it is
the defendant’s burden of proof that the plaintiff has the opportunity to mitigate his damages and by how much.
Art. 2203 is also known as the doctrine of avoidable consequences. It has the same effect as the doctrine of contributory
negligence, which operates to mitigate or reduce the damages recoverable by the plaintiff. The difference is the time factor, in
CN, the negligence of the plaintiff is before the negligence of the defendant; in AC, the negligence of the plaintiff is after the
negligence of the defendant.
1. VELASCO V. MANILA ELECTRIC CO., G.R. NO. L-18390, AUGUST 6, 1971

‣ The law in this jurisdiction is clear. Article 2203 prescribes that "The party suffering loss or injury must exercise the
diligence of a good father of a family to minimize the damages resulting from the act or omission in question". This
codal rule, which embodies the previous jurisprudence on the point,clearly obligates the injured party to undertake
measures that will alleviate and not aggravate his condition after the infliction of the injury, and places upon
him the burden of explaining why he could not do so.

X. DAMAGES
2. LIM V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 125817, JANUARY 16, 2002

‣ The defendants failed to offer in evidence the estimated amount of the damage caused by plaintiff's unconcern
towards the damaged vehicle.
‣ It is the burden of the defendants to show satisfactorily not only that the injured party could have mitigated his
damages but also the amount thereof; failing in this regard, the amount of damages awarded cannot be
proportionately reduced.
‣ In this case, the plaintiff left his passenger jeepney by the roadside at the mercy of the elements. Article 2203 of the
Civil Code exhorts parties suffering from loss or injury to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family to minimize
the damages resulting from the act or omission in question.
‣ One who is injured then by the wrongful or negligent act of another should exercise reasonable care and
diligence to minimize the resulting damage. Anyway, he can recover from the wrongdoer money lost in
reasonable efforts to preserve the property injured and for injuries incurred in attempting to prevent damage to
it
3. SOTELO V. BEHN, MEYER & CO., G.R. NO. 35489, DECEMBER 29, 1932
‣ An employee who is improperly discharged is under an obligation to use reasonable diligence to obtain other suitable
employment and that in assessing the damages for the period which is still to run after the breach, the court may
properly take into account the probability that the discharged employee will be able to earn money in other
employment. As was said in that case, "The law of service is a law of life. The general rule is that sooner or later men
who are capable of service find employment, and enforced idleness is the exception. It should not be presumed in
advance that the exceptional will occur. To assume that the plaintiff must remain idle through the entire term of the
contract merely because he had not found employment up to the time of trial would put a premium on idleness and
incompetency.
‣ A person employed under contract for a definite term who is discharged by the employer without cause before the
termination of service has the right to recover damages for the breach of contract but the amount to be awarded does
not necessarily include full unearned salary for the entire period which the contract is yet to run.
4. LEMOINE V. ALKAN, G.R. NO. 10422, JANUARY 11, 1916

‣ Even if all the facts necessary to establish the defenses as alleged were proved, could not really be called defenses.
They would more properly go to a mitigation of damages
‣ The fact that the plaintiff in such an action could have obtained by the use of reasonable diligence like employment
under similar conditions in the same locality, or that the employer who wrongfully discharged him offered to permit him
to return to his employment under substantially the same conditions as formerly and at the same rate of wages, does
not constitute a defense to the action but are matters in mitigation.
‣ In order that the defendant in such an action may take advantage of the fact that the plaintiff could have obtained like
employment under similar conditions in the same locality, he must show the rate of wages which plaintiff would have
received if he had obtained such employment. Defendant cannot be allowed a sum to reduce plaintiff’s damages
unless he has proved what that sum is.


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TORTS AND

CODAL — CIVIL CODE PROVISIONS ON THE LAW ON TORTS AND DAMAGES

2. VIOLATION OF RULES AND STATUTES 41

3. DANGEROUS WEAPONS AND SUBSTANCES 49

CLARENCE TIU TORTS AND DAMAGES

VI. PRIMARY LIABILITY 104

VII. SPECIAL TORTS (HUMAN RELATIONS) 112

VIII. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS 134

IX. CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM CRIMES 138

CLARENCE TIU TORTS AND DAMAGES

A. SOURCES OF OBLIGATION UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW

Article 1156. An obligation is a juridical necessity to give, to do or not to do. (n)

Article 1157. Obligations arise from:

CLARENCE TIU TORTS AND DAMAGES

MEMORIZE: ART. 1157 AND 2176

REPORT OF THE CODE COMMISSION, PP. 161 TO 162

REVIEW: CAUSES OF ACTION (RULES OF COURT)

RULE 2: Cause of Action

B. QUASI-DELICT DISTINGUISHED FROM OTHER SOURCES OF OBLIGATION

QUASI-DELICT BREACH OF CONTRACT

Characterization Negligence is direct, substantive and Negligence is merely incidental to the

Presumption of Generally, there is no presumption of Negligence is presumed so long as it can be

CLARENCE TIU TORTS AND DAMAGES

QUASI-DELICT BREACH OF CONTRACT

Damages 1. Actual Damages (Art. 2202)

2. Moral Damages (Art. 2219[2])

performance of the obligation

‣ EXCEPTION: If the act is wanton or

wilful, moral damages can still be

1. CANGCO V. MANILA RAILROAD CO., 38 PHIL. 768 (1918)

CLARENCE TIU TORTS AND DAMAGES

CLARENCE TIU TORTS AND DAMAGES

CLARENCE TIU TORTS AND DAMAGES

CLARENCE TIU TORTS AND DAMAGES

6. LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY V. NAVIDAD, 397 SCRA 75 (2003)

Interests affected Private interest Public interest

Purpose Reparation of damage by means of Punishment of a criminal act

Quantum of Evidence Preponderance of Evidence Proof beyond reasonable doubt

1. BARREDO V. GARCIA, 73 PHIL. 607 (1942)

CLARENCE TIU TORTS AND DAMAGES

‣ Art. 1093 of the old civil code is now Art. 1162

‣ Distinctions between Quasi-Delicts and Delicts

CLARENCE TIU TORTS AND DAMAGES

CLARENCE TIU TORTS AND DAMAGES

CLARENCE TIU TORTS AND DAMAGES

1. ANDAMO V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, G.R. NO. 74761, NOVEMBER 6, 1990

‣ Quasi-Delicts and Delicts as independent sources of obligations

2. HUANG V. PHILIPPINE HOTELIERS INC., G.R. NO. 180440, DECEMBER 5, 2012

CLARENCE TIU TORTS AND DAMAGES

1. Damages suﬀered by the plaintiﬀ;

‣ The quantum of proof required is preponderance of evidence

3. LUCAS V. TUAÑO, G.R. NO. 178763, APRIL 21, 2009

CLARENCE TIU TORTS AND DAMAGES

2. Breach and Injury

‣ Indispensability of the Testimony of Expert Witnesses in Actions of Medical Negligence

4. CASUMPANG VS CORTEJO, G.R. NO. 171127, MARCH 11, 2015

CLARENCE TIU TORTS AND DAMAGES

‣ Criteria in Qualifying as an Expert Witness in Medical Malpractice Suits

CLARENCE TIU TORTS AND DAMAGES

B. NO DOUBLE RECOVERY RULE

MEMORIZE: ART. 2177

1. JOSEPH V. BAUTISTA, 170 SCRA 540 (1989)

2. PADUA V. ROBLES, G.R. NO. L-40486, AUGUST 29, 1975