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Robin E.

Pinelle, Circuit Clerk October 15th, 2019


NH Circuit Court
Paul Maravelias
10th Circuit – District Division – Derry
34 Mockingbird Hill Rd
10 Courthouse Lane
Derry, NH 03038 Windham, NH 03087

VIA HAND DELIVERY

RE: Christina DePamphilis v. Paul Maravelias (473-2016-CV-00124)

Dear Clerk Pinelle:

Enclosed please find Defendant’s RSA 173-B:5, VIII(b) Motion to Dismiss and
Terminate Stalking Order and accompanying memorandum of law for filing in
the above-referenced case.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

Paul J. Maravelias

CC: Simon R. Brown, Esq.

1
THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

ROCKINGHAM, SS 10TH CIRCUIT COURT – DISTRICT DIVISION – DERRY

Christina DePamphilis ) Case No.: 473-2016-CV-00124


)
v.
)
Paul Maravelias. )

MOTION TO DISMISS AND TERMINATE STALKING ORDER OF PROTECTION

NOW COMES Paul Maravelias (“Defendant”) and respectfully requests this Court, pursuant

to constitutional law, to dismiss and terminate the Stalking Final Order of Protection in this case:

1. In January 2019, this Court granted Plaintiff an extension to February 2020.

2. Plaintiff no longer lives in New England. She is now a resident of Florida.

3. The continued existence of this protective order imposes severe restrictive burden

upon Defendant and harshly punishes him with unlawful deprivation of fundamental constitutional

rights. Defendant has never contacted Plaintiff during, nor ever violated, said order.

4. Defendant is constrained to bring federal suit in November against this Court’s

individual officers for prospective injunctive/declaratory relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to secure

his right to videotape his own public hearing if Plaintiff moves to extend in 2020. This Court has

previously disregarded Defendant’s constitutional and statutory right to videotape his own hearing.

5. Defendant repeats and incorporates by reference his 10/15/2019 Memorandum of

Law in Support of this Motion, filed contemporaneously herewith.

6. Defendant respectfully submits this Court should dismiss the stalking order which

would obviate the pending November federal civil rights litigation and serve judicial economy.
7. Defendant attempted to obtain concurrence from counsel by email but has not heard

back as of the filing of this Motion.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Paul Maravelias respectfully requests this Honorable Court:

A. Rule upon this Motion by 11/1/2019, in the interest of judicial


economy, to prevent otherwise-necessary federal civil rights action;

B. Grant this Motion, dismiss this case, and terminate the Stalking
Final Order of Protection extended to 2/4/20 in this Court’s Order
dated 3/8/19; and

C. Grant any further relief as may be deemed just and proper.

Dated: October 15th, 2019 Respectfully submitted,


PAUL J. MARAVELIAS,

in propria persona

____________________
Paul J. Maravelias
34 Mockingbird Hill Rd
Windham, NH 03087
paul@paulmarv.com
603-475-3305

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Paul Maravelias, certify that a timely provided copy of this document is being sent on
this date to Plaintiff’s counsel of record pursuant to the rules of this Court.

/s/ Paul J. Maravelias Dated: October 15th, 2019


Paul J. Maravelias

2
PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

ROCKINGHAM, SS 10TH CIRCUIT COURT – DISTRICT DIVISION – DERRY

Christina DePamphilis ) Case No.: 473-2016-CV-00124


)
v.
)
Paul Maravelias. )

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S MOTION


TO DISMISS AND TERMINATE STALKING ORDER OF PROTECTION

NOW COMES Paul Maravelias (“Defendant”) and respectfully submits the within

Memorandum of Law in support of this Motion. Defendant notes that none of the arguments

presented herein have ever been decided, neither positively nor negatively, by any court in the

State of New Hampshire.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................................... 2


FACTS ............................................................................................................................................ 5
LEGAL STANDARD ..................................................................................................................... 6
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 7

I. AS-APPLIED TO MARAVELIAS, THE CURRENT STALKING ORDER


VIOLATES CONSTITUTIONAL FREE-SPEECH PROTECTIONS .................. 7

A. First-Amendment Background.................................................................... 7
B. Analysis....................................................................................................... 8

II. THE COURT MUST IMMEDIATELY TERMINATE THE STALKING ORDER


BECAUSE RSA 633:3-A, III-C. IS FACIALLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL ....... 12

A. The Statute Is Substantially Overbroad Because It Punishes Too Broad a


Sweep of Constitutionally Protected Conduct .......................................... 12
B. The Statute Is Void For Unconstitutional Vagueness ............................... 19
i. Semantic Vagueness ............................................................................ 19
ii. Syntactic Vagueness ........................................................................... 20
C. The Statute Violates Equal Protection Rights On Its Face, Unlawfully
Discriminating Between Similarly-Situated Individuals .......................... 21

III. THE COURT MUST TERMINATE THE STALKING ORDER BECAUSE, AS-
APPLIED TO MARAVELIAS, IT VIOLATES HIS 14TH AMENDMENT RIGHT
TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW ............................................................................. 21

IV. THIS MOTION IS PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT .................................. 23

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 24

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

STATE CASES

Doyle v. Comm’r, N.H. Dep’t. of Resources & Economic Dev., 163 N.H. 215,221 (2012) . 12, 14
Gray v. Kelly, 161 N.H. 160 (2010) ............................................................................................... 6
Kenison v. Dubois, 152 N.H. 448,451,879 A.2d 1161 (2005) ..................................................... 12
MacPherson v. Weiner, 158 N.H. 6,10 (2008) ............................................................................. 16
McCarthy v. Wheeler, 152 N.H. 643, 645 (2005) ........................................................................ 22
McKenna v. Collier, No. 2014-0283, 2015 N.H. LEXIS 242 (May 8, 2015) .............................. 22
Morancy v. Morancy, 134 N.H. 493 (1991) ................................................................................. 23
O’Brien v. Borowski, 461 Mass. 415, 429 (2012) ........................................................................ 11
Opinion of the Justices, 137 N.H. 260 (1993) .............................................................................. 21
Petition of Harvey, 108 N.H. 196 A.2d 757 (1967)...................................................................... 21
Pickering v. Frink, 123 N.H. 326, 329, 461 A.2d 117, 119 (1983) .............................................. 10
Rios v. Fergusan, 51 Conn. Supp. 212, 978 A.2d 592 LEXIS 3223 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2008) ..... 10
Rock v. Michaels, No. 2007-0012, 2007 WL 9619509 (N.H. Dec. 7, 2007) ............................... 11
South v. McCabe, 156 N.H. 797, 800, 943 A.2d 779, 781 (2008) ......................................... 22, 23
State v. Brobst, 151 N.H. 420, 422, 857 A.2d 1253 (2004)...................................................... 7, 18
State v. Craig, 167 N.H. 361, 377 (2015) ..................................................................................... 10
State v. Hollenbeck, 164 N.H. 154, 158, 53 A.3d 591 (2012) ...................................................... 18
State v. Lilley, 204 A.3d 198 (2019) ............................................................................................ 18

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
State v. MacElman, 149 N.H. 795 (2003)............................................................................... 13, 14
State v. Porelle, 149 N.H. 420 (2003) ........................................................................................... 22
State v. Veale, 158 N.H. 632 (2009) ....................................................................................... 11, 22
Stewart v. Murdock, (2015-0448) ................................................................................................. 17

FEDERAL CASES

Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 244, 122 S.Ct. 1389,
152 L.Ed.2d 403 (2002)............................................................................................................. 14
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58, 372 U. S. 70 (1963)............................................. 11
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973) ................................................................................ 7
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 882,883 (2010) .......................................... 8
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) ................................................................................ 11
Doe v. Harris, 772 F.3d 563 (2014) .......................................................................................... 9, 14
Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524,540 (1989) ........................................................................... 16
Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 188 (1972) ..................................................................................... 8
Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703,732 (2000)................................................................................... 19
Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1764 (2017) .................................................................................. 9
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 (1931) ..................................................................................... 11
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) ....................................................... 12
Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017) ....................................................... 7
Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, No. 17-CV-06064-LHK, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51000
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2018)............................................................................................................ 7
R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2542 (1992) .......................................... 9
Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62,74 (1990)....................................................................... 15
Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W.N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 117 S. Ct. 855 (1997) ..................... 10
Showtime Entertainment, LLC v. Town of Mendon, 769 F.3d 61,73 (1st Cir. 2014) ............ 16, 17
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991) ..... 14
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2664 (2011) ........................................................................ 8
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 658, 114 S.Ct. 2445,
129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994)............................................................................................................... 8

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
United States v. Jeffries, No. 3:10-CR-100, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125665
(E.D. Tenn. Oct. 22, 2010) .......................................................................................................... 7
United States v. Playboy Ent’t Group, 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) ................................................ 11
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 791 (1989). .............................................................. 9, 14

STATUTES

19-A M.R.S. 4007(2) .................................................................................................................... 20


M.G.L. 258E §3(d)........................................................................................................................ 20
RSA 173-B:5, VIII.(b) .................................................................................................................... 6
RSA 173-B:3, I. ............................................................................................................................ 22
RSA 633:3-a, II.(a) ......................................................................................................................... 9
RSA 633:3-a, III-a. ........................................................................................................... 14, 16, 17
RSA 633:3-a, III-c. ................................................................................................................ passim

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

N.H. CONST., Pt. I, Art. 14 .............................................................................................................. 6


N.H. CONST., PT. I, ART. 2 ............................................................................................................ 21
N.H. CONST., PT. I., ART. 15 ......................................................................................................... 21
N.H. CONST., Pt. I., Art. 22 ....................................................................................................... 7, 13
U.S. CONST., AMEND. I. ............................................................................................................ 7, 13
U.S. CONST., AMEND. XIV ..................................................................................................... 13, 21

RULES

N.H. Rules of Prof. Conduct, Rule 3.1 ......................................................................................... 23


N.H. Rules of Prof. Conduct, Rule 3.3 ......................................................................................... 23
N.H. Rules of Prof. Conduct, Rule 8.4 ......................................................................................... 23

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
FACTS

1. In a 3/8/19 Order, this Court extended the instant stalking protective order

(Leonard, J.) on the sole grounds that Maravelias had made “offensive and hateful statements in

public postings on the internet” about Plaintiff in the context of this very court case:

“… In particular, the Court finds that Mr. Maravelias continued efforts at disparaging Ms.
DePamphilis and her family by making offensive and hateful statements in public postings on
the internet demonstrates [sic] that he continues to harbor hostility toward her and her family
such that legitimate concerns for Ms. DePamphilis’ safety and well-being continue to exist. …
The Court notes that as long as Mr. Maravelias continues to engage in this vile conduct that
the Court will be hard-pressed not to grant further requests for extensions, including a five year
extension as was requested by Ms. DePamphilis.”
Id.

2. Sometime in 2018, Maravelias had defended himself by replying to a stranger’s

public YouTube comment made on his video of the 2018 extension hearing in this case. In said

comment, Maravelias pointed-out that Christina DePamphilis at age 16 bragged on public social

media about having sexual intercourse with a 21-year-old man in the year 2017. This legal fact

was established at the 2018 extension hearing. Maravelias defended himself to a stranger, noting

that DePamphilis’s age-baiting and optical posturing in the “stalking” case lacked credibility.

3. Plaintiff Christina DePamphilis has never denied, neither in this case nor anywhere,

the true fact that 1) at age 16 she was having sexual intercourse with a 21-year-old man and 2) that

she made a public social media post bragging about such conduct.

4. Maravelias appealed the extension, bringing a free-speech constitutional challenge

under the First Amendment. In a 9/27/19 Final Order, the NHSC declined to adjudicate

Maravelias’s argument whatsoever, falsely claiming he did not preserve it in this Court.

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
5. Considering this holding, Maravelias now demands an adjudication of the

arguments he now unequivocally preserves in this Court with this Motion: that the continued

stalking order must be instantly terminated as it repugnant to state and federal constitutional law.

LEGAL STANDARD

6. Defendant validly brings the instant Motion under three causes of action: 1) the

inherited common law of the State of New Hampshire which guarantees Defendant a remedy for

every wrong, 2) the state and federal constitutions, including N.H. CONST., Pt. I, Art. 14 1, and 3)

the statutory cause of action RSA 173-B:5, VIII.(b), which states, “If either party wishes the

defendant to be excused from any provisions of an order of protection, the remedy is to petition

the court for modification of such order.” Maravelias wishes to be excused from all such provisions

in seeking to dismiss the order.

7. Not unlike family court divorce proceedings or child custody plans, the current

stalking order is subject to this Court’s original jurisdiction and may be modified and/or terminated

at any time for good cause shown. 2 See RSA 633:3-a, III-c. A “trial court … has the authority to

revisit an earlier ruling on a motion to dismiss if it becomes aware that the ruling may be incorrect”,

Gray v. Kelly, 161 N.H. 160 (2010). Defendant however is not even seeking reconsideration nor

reversal of this Court’s 3/8/19 extension Order. He merely contends that at the present juncture,

many months thereafter, given constitutional law and the circumstances of Plaintiff’s out-of-state

residence hundreds of miles away, this Court must now terminate the order.

1 “Every subject of this State is entitled to a certain remedy, by having recourse to the laws, for all injuries he may
receive in his person, property, or character; to obtain right and justice freely, without being obliged to purchase it;
completely, and without any denial; promptly, and without delay; conformably to the laws.”
2 See e.g. Judicial Branch Form NHJB-2062-F, “Petition to Change Court Order”.

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
ARGUMENT

I. AS-APPLIED TO MARAVELIAS, THE CURRENT STALKING ORDER VIOLATES


CONSTITUTIONAL FREE-SPEECH PROTECTIONS

8. This Court never found Maravelias’s “offensive and hateful” “online”

“statement[s]” fell into a category of speech validly recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court as

unprotected. As such, the extended stalking order violates his free speech rights under U.S. CONST.,

AMEND. I., and N.H. CONST., Pt. I., Art. 22, by applying RSA 633:3-a, III-c. to punish his protected

speech with an extended restraining order limiting his fundamental rights.

9. First-Amendment protection surpasses the ambit of criminal prohibitions and

extends to such “statutes attempting to restrict or burden the exercise of First Amendment rights.”

Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973); accord State v. Brobst, 151 N.H. 420, 422, 857 A.2d

1253 (2004).

A. First-Amendment Background

10. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that, in the 21st century, “the most important

place[] … for the exchange of views[] . . . is cyberspace.” Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S.

Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017). In particular, the YouTube comment section is the apotheosis of the 21st-

century public forum where individuals may exchange competing ideas and bitterly disagree. See,

e.g., Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, No. 17-CV-06064-LHK, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51000 (N.D.

Cal. Mar. 26, 2018) , at *16 (“[YouTube is] a public forum dedicated to freedom of expression to

all.”); United States v. Jeffries, No. 3:10-CR-100, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125665 (E.D. Tenn.

Oct. 22, 2010) (YouTube communication proper basis for governmental deprivation of liberty only

where said communication was a “true threat” to “inflict bodily harm”).

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
11. The First Amendment “requires heightened scrutiny whenever the government

creates ‘a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys.’”, Sorrell v.

IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2664 (2011), and “stands against attempts to disfavor certain subjects

or viewpoints or to distinguish among different speakers, which may be a means to control

content”, Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 882,883 (2010). “Speaker-based

laws demand strict scrutiny when they reflect the Government’s ... aversion to what the disfavored

speakers have to say.” Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 658, 114 S.Ct.

2445, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994).

B. Analysis

12. This Court’s 3/8/19 Order openly favors the “viewpoint” of Plaintiff and strives to

“control content” of Defendant’s speech. This Court even commanded Maravelias to discontinue

his public self-expression and called his constitutionally protected behavior “vile”. In doing so,

the Court transgressed its duty to remain an impartial arbitrator of disputes and unilaterally adopted

one party’s interests to command the other side to stop expressing its own mere personal opinions

about this legal case in public discourse.

13. The stalking order therefore violates the constitution by punishing Maravelias for

his public speech. Although “offensive” is a point-of-view, even assuming this Court is correct the

speech was “offensive”, “the freedoms of speech, press, petition and assembly guaranteed by the

First Amendment must be accorded to the ideas we hate or sooner or later they will be denied to

the ideas we cherish.” Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 188 (1972). (Emphasis added)

14. This Court provided no basis for slandering Maravelias to call his speech “hateful”;

however, even if the Court is correct, “speech that demeans on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender,

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
religion, age, disability, or any other similar ground is hateful; but the proudest boast of our free

speech jurisprudence is that we protect the freedom to express ‘the thought that we hate.’” Matal

v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1764 (2017).

15. This Court’s abuse of free speech cannot survive even intermediate scrutiny, where

the regulation must be “narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and ... leave

open ample alternative channels for communication of the information”. Doe v. Harris, 772 F.3d

563 (2014), citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 791 (1989). A statute fails intermediate

scrutiny if burdening “substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government’s

legitimate interests”. Ward at 799.

16. If Maravelias cannot even defend himself in a YouTube comment by making true

statements about this case, then the regulation (RSA 633:3-a, III-c. as-applied through the extended

stalking order) is neither narrowly tailored nor affords alternate channels for expression:

Maravelias had no other means of dialoguing with his YouTube interlocutor, an anonymous

stranger, but to respond to their comment. Nor does Maravelias’s solicited speech in public to

another about this case possibly contradict the government’s interest in protecting true victims of

stalking whatsoever, even minimally, where stalking conduct excludes legitimate constitutionally

protected activities. See RSA 633:3-a, II.(a). The extended stalking order is a palpably content-

based speech regulation, wherein this Court warned Maravelias to discontinue his expressive

conduct it finds “vile” and “disparaging”, in content, to one of the parties. “Content-based

regulations are presumptively invalid.” R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382, 112 S. Ct. 2538,

2542 (1992).

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
17. The New Hampshire Supreme Court has already decided this matter favorably to

Maravelias in State v. Craig, 167 N.H. 361, 377 (2015) (social media communication was criminal

“indirect contact” only where defendant “directed the victim to his Facebook page” and personally

“addressed the victim”). In this case, Maravelias used the YouTube “Reply” feature to author a

solicited comment in a one-on-one debate with a third-party. He addressed the comment

individually to the sole user fooled by DePamphilis’s slander and libel against Maravelias. Cf. Rios

v. Fergusan, 51 Conn. Supp. 212, 978 A.2d 592 LEXIS 3223 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2008) (YouTube

communication proper grounds for civil restraining order only where defendant “specifically

targeted his message at Rios by threatening her life and safety”, Id. at *222).

18. Accordingly, this Court served no governmental interest by punishing Maravelias’s

legitimate public discussion, let alone offered adequate “breathing space” for his First-Amendment

freedoms. Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W.N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 117 S. Ct. 855 (1997). “[I]n

public debate[,] our own citizens must tolerate insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to

provide adequate breathing space to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment.” Id., 519

U.S. at *383.

19. Maravelias’s YouTube comment was political speech criticizing the government’s

determination in this very same court case she was a credible witness. As such, it was also

protected by absolute litigation privilege. Such statements “made in the course of judicial

proceedings are absolutely privileged from liability in civil actions”, such as Plaintiff’s civil claim

to a stalking order extension. Pickering v. Frink, 123 N.H. 326, 329, 461 A.2d 117, 119 (1983).

20. Further, the Court’s extension Order, by punishing Maravelias’s public self-

defensive speech and threatening him to “shut up” about his innocence or be further punished with

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
an improperly utilized “stalking” order, violated Maravelias’s state constitutional liberty interest

in freedom from reputational stigma from governmental determinations which the New Hampshire

Supreme Court recognized in State v. Veale, 158 N.H. 632 (2009).

21. Should Plaintiff find “offensive” Maravelias’s internet-based political speech, the

U.S. Supreme Court commands she is “expected to protect [her] own sensibilities ‘simply by

averting [her] eyes.’” United States v. Playboy Ent’t Group, 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (quoting

Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)). This Court’s Orwellian viewpoint-discrimination

ignores what Defendant deems “offensive” – such as Plaintiff’s vulgar social-media-harassment

directly specifically at him 3 – and impartially adulates the Plaintiff’s viewpoint of “offensiveness”.

It is “often true that one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric”. Cohen, supra.

22. This Court’s current extended stalking order is unconstitutional for the distinct and

additional reason that it constitutes an illegal prior restraint against Maravelias’s expressive

conduct. See 3/8/19 Order (this Court commanded Maravelias to discontinue his so-called “vile

conduct” of engaging in public discourse criticizing this legal case and exposing the falsity of

Christina DePamphilis’s legal attacks). The Court even threatened Maravelias with further stalking

order extensions should he continue his public speech. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court has held “[a]ny

system of prior restraints of expression comes [bears] a heavy presumption against its

constitutional validity”. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58, 372 U. S. 70 (1963); see

also Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 (1931). The instant stalking order therefore “amounts to a

3 It has been held Christina DePamphilis’s incitative/vulgar social-media-cyberbullying of Maravelias could form a
stalking course-of-conduct, Rock v. Michaels, No. 2007-0012, 2007 WL 9619509 (N.H. Dec. 7, 2007), and
potentially constitute a “true threat”, O’Brien v. Borowski, 461 Mass. 415, 429 (2012).

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
flagrant, indefensible, and continuing violation of the First Amendment” and must be immediately

terminated. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).

II. THE COURT MUST IMMEDIATELY TERMINATE THE STALKING ORDER


BECAUSE RSA 633:3-A, III-C. IS FACIALLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL

A. The Statute Is Substantially Overbroad Because It Punishes Too Broad a Sweep of


Constitutionally Protected Conduct

23. RSA 633:3-a provides at III-c.,

“Any order … may be extended by order of the court upon a motion by the plaintiff, showing
good cause, with notice to the defendant, for one year after the expiration of the first order and
thereafter each extension may be for up to 5 years, upon the request of the plaintiff and at the
discretion of the court. The court shall review the order, and each renewal thereof and shall
grant such relief as may be necessary to provide for the safety and well-being of the plaintiff.
…”

24. Here, the statute can be reasonably interpreted to permit extension upon a showing

of “good-cause” that a plaintiff’s “well-being” primarily would be jeopardized without extending

the protective order, even if concern for “safety” is minimal. Any other reading is impossibly

tautological, as a threat to an individual’s “safety” is also a threat to their “well-being”. The

legislature could have omitted the word “well-being”, but intentionally appended it after “safety”.

25. Neither RSA 633:3-a. nor RSA 173-B define the term “well-being”; thus,

dictionary reference is appropriate. See Doyle v. Comm’r, N.H. Dep’t. of Resources & Economic

Dev., 163 N.H. 215, 221 (2012). This Court ought to ascribe “the plain and ordinary meaning to

regulatory text”. Kenison v. Dubois, 152 N.H. 448,451,879 A.2d 1161 (2005). The Oxford English

Dictionary defines “well-being” as “the state of being comfortable, healthy or happy.” 4

4 https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/us/well-being

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
26. The statute concerns the “fundamental right” of free speech, granting Maravelias

standing to propound a facial overbreadth challenge. State v. MacElman, 149 N.H. 795 (2003).

“The purpose of the overbreadth doctrine is to protect those persons who, although their speech or

conduct is constitutionally protected, may well refrain from exercising their rights for fear of

criminal sanctions by a statute susceptible of application to protected expression.” State v.

Gubitosi, 157 N.H. 726-27, 958 A.2d 962 (quotation omitted).

27. Insofar as New Hampshire trial courts are allowed to find a defendant’s specific

acts of protected speech have jeopardized the comfort, health, or happiness (“well-being”) or

“safety” of a plaintiff and therefore grant stalking order extensions, the statute is unconstitutionally

overbroad on its face in violation of the U.S. CONST., Amend. I., XIV., and N.H. CONST., Pt. I.,

Art. 22. By operation of the “safety and well-being” language of RSA 633:3-a, III-c., a trial court

may extend a stalking order on the basis of protected non-violent, non-threatening speech. Since

civil stalking orders criminalize possession of firearms and prohibit defendants from

communicating directly or indirectly to plaintiffs, the statute restricts constitutional rights. Since

constitutionally protected, non-threatening speech to third-parties permits extension and thus

limitation of fundamental rights, the statute is overbroad.

28. Specifically, the language of the statute is unconstitutionally overbroad because it

is not narrowly tailored to serve the government’s interest in effecting the cessation of stalking. In

New Hampshire, “a statute is void for overbreadth if it attempts to control conduct by means which

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invade areas of protected freedom.” MacElman at 310. In the context of lawful-speech-related

stalking order extension, RSA 633:3-a, III-c. burdens the exercise of protected freedoms. 5

29. Even if RSA 633:3-a, III-c. were “content-neutral” and thus subject only to

intermediate scrutiny review, it must be “narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental

interest, and ... leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information”. Doe

v. Harris, 772 F.3d 563 (2014), citing Ward. A statute fails intermediate scrutiny if burdening

“substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests”.

Ward at 799.

30. Where the statute’s standard for stalking order extension atrociously exceeds the

government’s interest in the “cessation of stalking” (See RSA 633:3-a, III-a.), it is overinclusively

not-narrowly-tailored. Although arguably intending to regulate unprotected (e.g., threatening)

speech, “the overbreadth doctrine prohibits the Government from banning unprotected speech if a

substantial amount of protected speech is prohibited or chilled in the process.” Ashcroft v. Free

Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 244, 122 S.Ct. 1389, 152 L.Ed.2d 403 (2002) at 237. See also

Doyle at 221, invalidating laws as facially overbroad under N.H. CONST., Pt. I, Art. 22 where “a

substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the [law’s] plainly

legitimate sweep”.

31. RSA 633:3-a, III-c. permits trial courts to extend a stalking order wherever a

plaintiff merely testifies she’d feel “uncomfortable” or “unhappy” otherwise, since this alone

shows by “good-cause” that an extension would “provide for” her “state of being comfortable,

5 Cf. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991), invalidating a law
which imposed merely a “financial disincentive” to certain speech, let alone imposed restrictions on fundamental
rights as does the extended stalking order against Maravelias in this case.

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
happy, or healthy”, the definition of “well-being”. The language renders the facts of the case – a

defendant’s history of stalking, the level of expected unlawful future behavior, etc. – completely

irrelevant where granting extension serves a plaintiff’s mere “comfort” or “happiness”.

32. The draconian statute disowns any realistic model of human psychology or

sociology, in which one person’s lawful third-party-or-public expressions might incidentally

distress an individual holding different views – even though the suppression of minor annoyance

alone triggers the dictionary definition of serving “well-being”. Negative social experiences

disfavor well-being. Rook, K.S. (1984) 6 Seeing the word “no” alone triggers unhealthy,

uncomfortable, and unhappy neurotransmitters and hormones. 7

33. The statute burdens a woefully latitudinous fetch of protected speech far beyond

that necessary to promote “a cessation of stalking”. A potential rebuttal pits the controlling context

of “safety” and the generic context of the statute against “well-being” as altogether constituting a

legal standard for extension higher than prevention of minor annoyance. However, such an

interpretation is tautologically illogical, since the legislature added the word “well-being” and,

thus, intently did not stop at “safety”. Regardless, such a reading would separately demonstrate

the statute’s unacceptable vagueness, discussed infra.

34. Separately, reasonable alternatives to the “safety and well-being” language which

would equally advance the counter-stalking governmental-interest evince the statute’s lack of

narrow-tailoring. See Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 74 (1990). The statute could

alternatively permit stalking order extension upon a good-cause-showing such would provide for

6http://psycnet.apa.org/record/1984-25835-001
7Newberg and Waldman, 2012 (https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/words-can-change-your-
brain/201208/the-most-dangerous-word-in-the-world)

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a plaintiff’s “safety” only, or, better-yet, “as is necessary to bring about a cessation of” (or simply

“prevent”) “stalking”, to mirror the language in subsection III-a. No possible circumstance

currently allowing extension would fail this more-narrowly-tailored test wherein the

governmental-interest involved is truly one of counter-stalking, rather than of silencing disagreed-

with speech and effectively criminalizing a defendant’s self-defensive speech. Such a narrowly-

tailored alternative would not amount to the necessity of re-proving new acts of stalking or

showing protective-order non-compliance to obtain extension, since the “good-cause” standard

already requires that trial courts consider the underlying circumstantial provenance of the original

stalking-order. See MacPherson v. Weiner, 158 N.H. 6, 10 (2008).

35. RSA 633:3-a, III-c. instead defectively supplants the original-stalking-order legal

standard (III-a.) with a patently absurd legal standard catering to “well-being” (III-c.), unrelated

to the narrow counter-stalking governmental-interest, when extension is concerned. Naturally,

therefore, the statute is also underinclusively not-narrowly-tailored. Statutes which fail to restrict

an amount of harmful-to-the-governmental-interest speech comparable to the amount restricted

are not narrowly-tailored. See Showtime Entertainment, LLC v. Town of Mendon, 769 F.3d 61,73

(1st Cir. 2014); Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 540 (1989). Here, if “safety and well-being”

actually is otherwise narrowly-tailored to serve the governmental-interest, then so should the

initial-stalking-order-issuance legal standard of III-a. adopt the lower good-cause-provision-for-

“safety and well-being” standard, rather than the higher-burden, more-stringent standard currently

within subsection III-a. positively requiring “stalking” and granting relief only as necessary “to

bring about a cessation” thereof.

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36. The illogical “safety and well-being” conundrum at III-c. radically discriminates

between groups of potentially indifferentiable stalking order defendants. It assaults the liberty-

interests of extant defendants through a much-lower “well-being” legal standard, while III-a.

coddles the liberty-interests of new defendants, even though the liberty-restricting nature of the

one-year injunction-at-hand remains identical both at III-a. and III-c. Though civil in name, this

contravenes the precepts of constitutional double-jeopardy protections. 8

37. In failing to be narrowly-tailored, the statute also discriminates against stalking

victims. There is no legitimate reason stalking victims newly-seeking protective injunction should

be expected to sustain a much higher burden than those already granted a stalking order, to obtain

the same one-year protection. If any difference in legal standard is appropriate between the two

groups, equity would require the reverse. This concern is exacerbated by New Hampshire trial

courts’ “extending” stalking orders by III-c. months after their expiration. See Stewart v. Murdock,

(2015-0448). The overbroad language at III-c. creates an inequitable advantage for prior-order-

wielding plaintiffs and an indefensible disadvantage for prior-order-subject defendants.

38. The underinclusiveness aforementioned casts doubt on whether the statute’s

“proffered interest is truly forwarded by the regulation, or is in fact substantial enough to warrant

such regulation.” Showtime Entertainment, LLC, supra. That is, if the “safety and well-being”

standard were narrowly-tailored to the interest, the interest would be compelling enough to warrant

usage of the same legal standard for original-stalking-order-issuance at subsection III-a. This

suggests the governmental-interest served is neither “compelling” nor “significant”.

8 In fact, RSA 633:3-a, III-c. permits further extensions “for up to 5 years”, despite imposing a far lower legal
standard than RSA 633:3-a, III-a.

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39. Furthermore, wherever the “well-being” language could possibly remain narrowly-

tailored to the governmental-interest, such interest could never be “significant”, and the statute

would fail intermediate scrutiny regardless. The presumed counter-stalking governmental-interest

motivating RSA 633:3-a might be “significant”, but the obsequiously-catering-to-the-epicurean-

“comfort”-and-“happiness”-of-a-plaintiff interest (the only interest to which “well-being” is

narrowly-tailored) surely is not.

40. Nor does the legal standard at III-c. appropriate any imaginable alternative manner

a defendant may dare disagree with a plaintiff’s stalking order within his public-or-third-party

communications without suffering greater likelihood of stalking order extension, where the

plaintiff’s “comfort” should be disturbed by knowing the defendant’s mere contrary opinion.

41. “To prevail on a facial challenge, the challenger must establish that no set of

circumstances exists under which the challenged statute or ordinance would be valid.” State v.

Lilley, 204 A.3d 198 (2019), cert. granted, S.Ct. No. 2019-64. Here, the “safety and well-being”

language controls every single stalking order extension proceeding. It is impossible for any such

proceeding to exist wherein a trial court does not consider the “well-being” of plaintiff as well as

the “safety”. See RSA 633:3-a, III-c. (using the word “shall” to command trial courts to grant relief

serving the “well-being” of plaintiffs). Accordingly, the statute’s overbreadth is substantial and

binding upon “all, or virtually all, of its applications”. State v. Hollenbeck, 164 N.H. 154, 158, 53

A.3d 591 (2012).

42. As a result of the statute’s substantial overbreadth, this Court must either

“invalidate” the statute or provide a “partial invalidation that narrows the scope of the statute to

constitutionally acceptable applications”. Brobst, 151 N.H. at *421. Either option in this case

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
necessarily equates to dismissing and terminating the instant stalking order, because it has already

been extended by means of an unconstitutionally overbroad statute.

B. The Statute Is Void For Unconstitutional Vagueness

43. “A statute can be impermissibly vague for either of two independent reasons. First,

if it fails to provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what

conduct it prohibits. Second, if it authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory

enforcement.” Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000). Here, the language of RSA 633:3-a,

III-c. is unintelligible and so loosely constrained that arbitrary, discriminatory enforcement thereof

is inevitable. Not only is the term “well-being” too vague, but also the extent to which the

preceding term “safety” narrows or qualifies “well-being”.

44. This vagueness is substantially likely, if not guaranteed, to complicate every

stalking order extension case brought before a New Hampshire trial court, regardless of the

particular facts of such cases. The statute provides zero guidance on how trial court judges should

interpret “well-being”, or on what conduct beyond threatening speech or actual violence would

permit extension not necessarily to serve a plaintiff’s “safety”, but rather their “well-being”.

i. Semantic Vagueness

45. Civil stalking defendants such as Maravelias lack the intelligence to discern which

behaviors are reasonably expected to minimize chances of order extension. Whether they must

simply to obey the order, avoiding/ignoring the Plaintiff as Maravelias has in this case, or must

somehow appease Plaintiff’s psychological “well-being” is unclear.

46. For trial courts, the facial language of the statute creates even worse problems. One

judge might think a “well-being” order ridiculous and far in-excess-of the legislative counter-

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
stalking intent, calibrating his or her judgements to the statute’s broad “safety” context, even

applying ejusdem generis to constrain “well-being” thereby. However, another judge might reject

this interpretation, “safety and well-being” not being a list, and adopt the plain meaning of the

word “well-being”.

ii. Syntactic Vagueness

47. The statute is fraught with meaningful syntactic ambiguity between the co-possible

constructions “shall grant such relief as may be necessary to provide for the (safety and well-

being)” and “… relief as may be necessary to provide for the safety, and (relief as may be necessary

to provide for the) well-being”. The former interpretation begets tautology, the latter overbroad

plaintiff-sycophancy. This tremendous interpretation-dependent leeway afforded trial courts in

applying subsection III-c. sponsors capricious, arbitrary extensions likened to this Court’s 3/8/19

extension order currently affecting Maravelias’s constitutional interests.

48. The comparable restraining order laws of no other US state discard the initial-

issuance-standard for something pointlessly different for extension, as does New Hampshire’s

unconstitutionally defective statute. For example, the analogous Massachusettensian statute for

extension of Civil Harassment Orders (“stalking” orders do not exist), M.G.L. 258E §3(d), states

in relevant part that “the court [may extend] the [harassment] order … as it deems necessary to

protect the plaintiff from harassment.” Id. It does not switch the legal standard to something

different and overbroad when it concerns extension, requiring a “stalking course of conduct” for

an original order but only vague “interest in well-being” for subsequent extensions, as with the

defective New Hampshire statute. Cf. also 19-A M.R.S. 4007(2), the analogous Maine statute

controlling extension of DV protective orders following civil adjudications of “abuse”: “the court

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
may extend an order, upon motion of the plaintiff, for such additional time as it determines

necessary to protect the plaintiff … from abuse.”

C. The Statute Violates Equal Protection Rights On Its Face, Unlawfully


Discriminating Between Similarly-Situated Individuals

49. The inexplicable lowering of legal standard at subsection III-c. (for extensions)

compared to III-a. (new stalking orders) in RSA 633:3-a is constitutionally defective, affording

unequal rights to plaintiffs and defendants solely based upon their current status of involvement

with an extant order: a defect absent in comparable extrajurisdictional statutes. A civil finding of

‘stalking’ on the ‘preponderance of evidence’ standard cannot lawfully distinguish between past

and new defendants for purposes of the ‘similarly situated’ element of Equal Protection analysis.

In an analogous case, the New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed with this contention. See Opinion

of the Justices, 137 N.H. 260 (1993) (legislature proposed unconstitutional bill to constrain

alleged-sexual-assaulters’ right to file certain civil suits during pendency of criminal charges).

III. THE COURT MUST TERMINATE THE STALKING ORDER BECAUSE, AS-
APPLIED TO MARAVELIAS, IT VIOLATES HIS 14TH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO
DUE PROCESS OF LAW

50. The current extended stalking order violates Maravelias’s right to Due Process of

Law under U.S. CONST., AMEND. XIV and N.H. CONST., PT. I, ART. 2 and 15. “No subject shall

be deprived of his property, immunities, or privileges, … or deprived of his life, liberty, or estate,

but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land․” Id. “Law of the land in this article means

due process of law.” Petition of Harvey, 108 N.H. 196 A.2d 757 (1967). “The initial inquiry in

determining whether a particular state action violates due process is whether there is a deprivation

of liberty or property.” Opinion of the Justices, 137 N.H. at *268. “It hardly bears mentioning that

a restraining order restrains [a defendant’s] liberty ... from a number of legal activities”, McCarthy

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
v. Wheeler, 152 N.H. 643, 645 (2005), including restricting Maravelias’s Second-Amendment

rights and even limiting his “fundamental right to freedom of movement”, State v. Porelle, 149

N.H. 420 (2003). The extended “stalking” restraining order is a “governmental determination”

implicating Maravelias’s personal liberty interest to be free of reputational stigma, further

triggering due process requirements. Veale, 158 N.H. at 632.

51. Plaintiff’s 1/24/19 Motion to Extend never noticed any specific allegation of any

online comment by Maravelias which somehow constitutes good cause to extend the stalking

order. This Court’s words “offensive” and “hateful” were never used anywhere – not once – by

the Plaintiff to describe Maravelias’s comments. Maravelias objected at-trial on grounds of notice

when Plaintiff introduced the specific YouTube comment allegation, which was not previously

noticed. Plaintiff’s Paragraph 15 of the Motion to Extend contained a vague general passing

reference to “disparaging online comments”; however, without specific allegations noticed before

trial, the New Hampshire Supreme Court has held it to be constitutionally defective.

52. The New Hampshire Supreme Court has held such “general statement[s]” alleging

an “ongoing pattern of … behavior” do not “provide sufficient notice of the actual ‘facts alleged

against the defendant’”. South v. McCabe, 156 N.H. 797, 800, 943 A.2d 779, 781 (2008) (citing

RSA 173-B:3, I.). It reversed a protective order where a plaintiff’s “general reference in the petition

to the respondent’s prior ‘violence’ failed to notify him of the ‘actual facts alleged against [him].’”

McKenna v. Collier, No. 2014-0283, 2015 N.H. LEXIS 242 (May 8, 2015), at *5 (quoting South,

156 N.H. at *800). Here, Plaintiff’s general reference to “disparaging online comments” failed to

give Maravelias adequate notice of the specific “banging 21-year-old” YouTube comment. “It is

well settled that a defendant is entitled to be informed of the theory on which the plaintiffs are

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
proceeding … as a result of the defendant’s actions.” Morancy v. Morancy, 134 N.H. 493 (1991)

(internal citation omitted). “The trial court should [have] limit[ed] its findings to the factual

allegations specifically recited in” Plaintiff’s Motion to Extend. South, supra, 156 N.H. at *800.

53. Accordingly, this Court is currently violating Maravelias’s Due Process rights until

it discontinues the stalking order extended on the sole basis of a specific allegation not previously

noticed to him before the hearing, depriving him a fair opportunity to rebut said allegation.

IV. THIS MOTION IS PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT

54. Defendant rebuts Plaintiff’s anticipated objection to the nature of this Motion.

Plaintiff’s counsel has a history of dastardly deception in this case regarding characterization of

Maravelias’s arguments, the nature of the past NHSC appeals, the legal effect and holdings of said

appeal dispositions, and the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and waiver of issues.

Counsel has committed twenty-three (23) counts of criminal conduct during this case against

Maravelias, including fraudulent theft, falsification, and extortion. 9

55. Counsel’s dishonesty has gone so far that, in a pleading filed on 2/22/19 in this

Court, Plaintiff’s attorney Simon R. Brown, Esq. violated the N.H. Rules of Prof. Conduct Rule

3.1, Rule 3.3, and Rule 8.4 by falsely claiming the NHSC Final Order in Case No. 2018-0483 had

adjudicated and rejected Maravelias’s facial constitutional challenge to RSA 633:3-a, III-c. While

lying to this Court, counsel intimately knew the NHSC had, in fact, never adjudicated said

argument due to alleged insufficient issue preservation (and still has not to this day). In order to

deceive this Court and evade the task of responding to the merits of Maravelias’s hereunto-ignored

9See https://scribd.com/document/412386952/Motion-for-Contempt-Against-Simon-R-Brown-Esq-for-Criminal-
Fraud-Falsification-Extortion-and-Civil-Attorney-Misconduct

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
facial attack against the statute, counsel quoted an enticing sentence from the NHSC’s rejection of

a completely different constitutional challenge, falsifying the context thereof in order to deceive.

56. This motion is properly before this Court for the distinct and tripartite reasons stated

in Paragraph 6 hereinabove. Defendant repeats and incorporates by reference Paragraphs 6 and 7

supra, and respectfully signals counsel to confine his anticipated Objection to legal argument

rebutting the substantive merits of Maravelias’s constitutional analysis herein.

CONCLUSION

57. For the foregoing reasons, this Court must immediately dismiss and terminate the

Stalking Final Order of Protection and end this case.

WHEREFORE, Defendant Paul Maravelias respectfully requests this Honorable Court grant the

relief requested in the accompanying Motion.

Dated: October 15th, 2019 Respectfully submitted,


PAUL J. MARAVELIAS,

in propria persona

/s/ Paul J. Maravelias


Paul J. Maravelias
34 Mockingbird Hill Rd
Windham, NH 03087
paul@paulmarv.com
603-475-3305

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Paul Maravelias, certify that a copy of the foregoing was forwarded on this day through
USPS Certified Mail to Simon R. Brown, Esq., counsel for the Petitioner, Christina
DePamphilis, P.O. Box 1318, Concord, NH, 03302-1318.

_____________ Dated: October 15th, 2019


Paul J. Maravelias

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087

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