Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
Enclosed please find Defendant’s RSA 173-B:5, VIII(b) Motion to Dismiss and
Terminate Stalking Order and accompanying memorandum of law for filing in
the above-referenced case.
Sincerely,
Paul J. Maravelias
1
THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
NOW COMES Paul Maravelias (“Defendant”) and respectfully requests this Court, pursuant
to constitutional law, to dismiss and terminate the Stalking Final Order of Protection in this case:
3. The continued existence of this protective order imposes severe restrictive burden
upon Defendant and harshly punishes him with unlawful deprivation of fundamental constitutional
rights. Defendant has never contacted Plaintiff during, nor ever violated, said order.
individual officers for prospective injunctive/declaratory relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to secure
his right to videotape his own public hearing if Plaintiff moves to extend in 2020. This Court has
previously disregarded Defendant’s constitutional and statutory right to videotape his own hearing.
6. Defendant respectfully submits this Court should dismiss the stalking order which
would obviate the pending November federal civil rights litigation and serve judicial economy.
7. Defendant attempted to obtain concurrence from counsel by email but has not heard
B. Grant this Motion, dismiss this case, and terminate the Stalking
Final Order of Protection extended to 2/4/20 in this Court’s Order
dated 3/8/19; and
in propria persona
____________________
Paul J. Maravelias
34 Mockingbird Hill Rd
Windham, NH 03087
paul@paulmarv.com
603-475-3305
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Paul Maravelias, certify that a timely provided copy of this document is being sent on
this date to Plaintiff’s counsel of record pursuant to the rules of this Court.
2
PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
NOW COMES Paul Maravelias (“Defendant”) and respectfully submits the within
Memorandum of Law in support of this Motion. Defendant notes that none of the arguments
presented herein have ever been decided, neither positively nor negatively, by any court in the
TABLE OF CONTENTS
A. First-Amendment Background.................................................................... 7
B. Analysis....................................................................................................... 8
III. THE COURT MUST TERMINATE THE STALKING ORDER BECAUSE, AS-
APPLIED TO MARAVELIAS, IT VIOLATES HIS 14TH AMENDMENT RIGHT
TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW ............................................................................. 21
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 24
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
STATE CASES
Doyle v. Comm’r, N.H. Dep’t. of Resources & Economic Dev., 163 N.H. 215,221 (2012) . 12, 14
Gray v. Kelly, 161 N.H. 160 (2010) ............................................................................................... 6
Kenison v. Dubois, 152 N.H. 448,451,879 A.2d 1161 (2005) ..................................................... 12
MacPherson v. Weiner, 158 N.H. 6,10 (2008) ............................................................................. 16
McCarthy v. Wheeler, 152 N.H. 643, 645 (2005) ........................................................................ 22
McKenna v. Collier, No. 2014-0283, 2015 N.H. LEXIS 242 (May 8, 2015) .............................. 22
Morancy v. Morancy, 134 N.H. 493 (1991) ................................................................................. 23
O’Brien v. Borowski, 461 Mass. 415, 429 (2012) ........................................................................ 11
Opinion of the Justices, 137 N.H. 260 (1993) .............................................................................. 21
Petition of Harvey, 108 N.H. 196 A.2d 757 (1967)...................................................................... 21
Pickering v. Frink, 123 N.H. 326, 329, 461 A.2d 117, 119 (1983) .............................................. 10
Rios v. Fergusan, 51 Conn. Supp. 212, 978 A.2d 592 LEXIS 3223 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2008) ..... 10
Rock v. Michaels, No. 2007-0012, 2007 WL 9619509 (N.H. Dec. 7, 2007) ............................... 11
South v. McCabe, 156 N.H. 797, 800, 943 A.2d 779, 781 (2008) ......................................... 22, 23
State v. Brobst, 151 N.H. 420, 422, 857 A.2d 1253 (2004)...................................................... 7, 18
State v. Craig, 167 N.H. 361, 377 (2015) ..................................................................................... 10
State v. Hollenbeck, 164 N.H. 154, 158, 53 A.3d 591 (2012) ...................................................... 18
State v. Lilley, 204 A.3d 198 (2019) ............................................................................................ 18
2
PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
State v. MacElman, 149 N.H. 795 (2003)............................................................................... 13, 14
State v. Porelle, 149 N.H. 420 (2003) ........................................................................................... 22
State v. Veale, 158 N.H. 632 (2009) ....................................................................................... 11, 22
Stewart v. Murdock, (2015-0448) ................................................................................................. 17
FEDERAL CASES
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 244, 122 S.Ct. 1389,
152 L.Ed.2d 403 (2002)............................................................................................................. 14
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58, 372 U. S. 70 (1963)............................................. 11
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973) ................................................................................ 7
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 882,883 (2010) .......................................... 8
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) ................................................................................ 11
Doe v. Harris, 772 F.3d 563 (2014) .......................................................................................... 9, 14
Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524,540 (1989) ........................................................................... 16
Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 188 (1972) ..................................................................................... 8
Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703,732 (2000)................................................................................... 19
Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1764 (2017) .................................................................................. 9
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 (1931) ..................................................................................... 11
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) ....................................................... 12
Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017) ....................................................... 7
Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, No. 17-CV-06064-LHK, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51000
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2018)............................................................................................................ 7
R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2542 (1992) .......................................... 9
Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62,74 (1990)....................................................................... 15
Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W.N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 117 S. Ct. 855 (1997) ..................... 10
Showtime Entertainment, LLC v. Town of Mendon, 769 F.3d 61,73 (1st Cir. 2014) ............ 16, 17
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991) ..... 14
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2664 (2011) ........................................................................ 8
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 658, 114 S.Ct. 2445,
129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994)............................................................................................................... 8
3
PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
United States v. Jeffries, No. 3:10-CR-100, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125665
(E.D. Tenn. Oct. 22, 2010) .......................................................................................................... 7
United States v. Playboy Ent’t Group, 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) ................................................ 11
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 791 (1989). .............................................................. 9, 14
STATUTES
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
RULES
4
PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
FACTS
1. In a 3/8/19 Order, this Court extended the instant stalking protective order
(Leonard, J.) on the sole grounds that Maravelias had made “offensive and hateful statements in
public postings on the internet” about Plaintiff in the context of this very court case:
“… In particular, the Court finds that Mr. Maravelias continued efforts at disparaging Ms.
DePamphilis and her family by making offensive and hateful statements in public postings on
the internet demonstrates [sic] that he continues to harbor hostility toward her and her family
such that legitimate concerns for Ms. DePamphilis’ safety and well-being continue to exist. …
The Court notes that as long as Mr. Maravelias continues to engage in this vile conduct that
the Court will be hard-pressed not to grant further requests for extensions, including a five year
extension as was requested by Ms. DePamphilis.”
Id.
public YouTube comment made on his video of the 2018 extension hearing in this case. In said
comment, Maravelias pointed-out that Christina DePamphilis at age 16 bragged on public social
media about having sexual intercourse with a 21-year-old man in the year 2017. This legal fact
was established at the 2018 extension hearing. Maravelias defended himself to a stranger, noting
that DePamphilis’s age-baiting and optical posturing in the “stalking” case lacked credibility.
3. Plaintiff Christina DePamphilis has never denied, neither in this case nor anywhere,
the true fact that 1) at age 16 she was having sexual intercourse with a 21-year-old man and 2) that
she made a public social media post bragging about such conduct.
under the First Amendment. In a 9/27/19 Final Order, the NHSC declined to adjudicate
Maravelias’s argument whatsoever, falsely claiming he did not preserve it in this Court.
5
PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
5. Considering this holding, Maravelias now demands an adjudication of the
arguments he now unequivocally preserves in this Court with this Motion: that the continued
stalking order must be instantly terminated as it repugnant to state and federal constitutional law.
LEGAL STANDARD
6. Defendant validly brings the instant Motion under three causes of action: 1) the
inherited common law of the State of New Hampshire which guarantees Defendant a remedy for
every wrong, 2) the state and federal constitutions, including N.H. CONST., Pt. I, Art. 14 1, and 3)
the statutory cause of action RSA 173-B:5, VIII.(b), which states, “If either party wishes the
defendant to be excused from any provisions of an order of protection, the remedy is to petition
the court for modification of such order.” Maravelias wishes to be excused from all such provisions
7. Not unlike family court divorce proceedings or child custody plans, the current
stalking order is subject to this Court’s original jurisdiction and may be modified and/or terminated
at any time for good cause shown. 2 See RSA 633:3-a, III-c. A “trial court … has the authority to
revisit an earlier ruling on a motion to dismiss if it becomes aware that the ruling may be incorrect”,
Gray v. Kelly, 161 N.H. 160 (2010). Defendant however is not even seeking reconsideration nor
reversal of this Court’s 3/8/19 extension Order. He merely contends that at the present juncture,
many months thereafter, given constitutional law and the circumstances of Plaintiff’s out-of-state
residence hundreds of miles away, this Court must now terminate the order.
1 “Every subject of this State is entitled to a certain remedy, by having recourse to the laws, for all injuries he may
receive in his person, property, or character; to obtain right and justice freely, without being obliged to purchase it;
completely, and without any denial; promptly, and without delay; conformably to the laws.”
2 See e.g. Judicial Branch Form NHJB-2062-F, “Petition to Change Court Order”.
6
PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
ARGUMENT
“statement[s]” fell into a category of speech validly recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court as
unprotected. As such, the extended stalking order violates his free speech rights under U.S. CONST.,
AMEND. I., and N.H. CONST., Pt. I., Art. 22, by applying RSA 633:3-a, III-c. to punish his protected
extends to such “statutes attempting to restrict or burden the exercise of First Amendment rights.”
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973); accord State v. Brobst, 151 N.H. 420, 422, 857 A.2d
1253 (2004).
A. First-Amendment Background
10. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that, in the 21st century, “the most important
place[] … for the exchange of views[] . . . is cyberspace.” Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S.
Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017). In particular, the YouTube comment section is the apotheosis of the 21st-
century public forum where individuals may exchange competing ideas and bitterly disagree. See,
e.g., Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, No. 17-CV-06064-LHK, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51000 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 26, 2018) , at *16 (“[YouTube is] a public forum dedicated to freedom of expression to
all.”); United States v. Jeffries, No. 3:10-CR-100, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125665 (E.D. Tenn.
Oct. 22, 2010) (YouTube communication proper basis for governmental deprivation of liberty only
7
PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
11. The First Amendment “requires heightened scrutiny whenever the government
creates ‘a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys.’”, Sorrell v.
IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2664 (2011), and “stands against attempts to disfavor certain subjects
content”, Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 882,883 (2010). “Speaker-based
laws demand strict scrutiny when they reflect the Government’s ... aversion to what the disfavored
speakers have to say.” Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 658, 114 S.Ct.
B. Analysis
12. This Court’s 3/8/19 Order openly favors the “viewpoint” of Plaintiff and strives to
“control content” of Defendant’s speech. This Court even commanded Maravelias to discontinue
his public self-expression and called his constitutionally protected behavior “vile”. In doing so,
the Court transgressed its duty to remain an impartial arbitrator of disputes and unilaterally adopted
one party’s interests to command the other side to stop expressing its own mere personal opinions
13. The stalking order therefore violates the constitution by punishing Maravelias for
his public speech. Although “offensive” is a point-of-view, even assuming this Court is correct the
speech was “offensive”, “the freedoms of speech, press, petition and assembly guaranteed by the
First Amendment must be accorded to the ideas we hate or sooner or later they will be denied to
the ideas we cherish.” Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 188 (1972). (Emphasis added)
14. This Court provided no basis for slandering Maravelias to call his speech “hateful”;
however, even if the Court is correct, “speech that demeans on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender,
8
PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
religion, age, disability, or any other similar ground is hateful; but the proudest boast of our free
speech jurisprudence is that we protect the freedom to express ‘the thought that we hate.’” Matal
15. This Court’s abuse of free speech cannot survive even intermediate scrutiny, where
the regulation must be “narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and ... leave
open ample alternative channels for communication of the information”. Doe v. Harris, 772 F.3d
563 (2014), citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 791 (1989). A statute fails intermediate
scrutiny if burdening “substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government’s
16. If Maravelias cannot even defend himself in a YouTube comment by making true
statements about this case, then the regulation (RSA 633:3-a, III-c. as-applied through the extended
stalking order) is neither narrowly tailored nor affords alternate channels for expression:
Maravelias had no other means of dialoguing with his YouTube interlocutor, an anonymous
stranger, but to respond to their comment. Nor does Maravelias’s solicited speech in public to
another about this case possibly contradict the government’s interest in protecting true victims of
stalking whatsoever, even minimally, where stalking conduct excludes legitimate constitutionally
protected activities. See RSA 633:3-a, II.(a). The extended stalking order is a palpably content-
based speech regulation, wherein this Court warned Maravelias to discontinue his expressive
conduct it finds “vile” and “disparaging”, in content, to one of the parties. “Content-based
regulations are presumptively invalid.” R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382, 112 S. Ct. 2538,
2542 (1992).
9
PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
17. The New Hampshire Supreme Court has already decided this matter favorably to
Maravelias in State v. Craig, 167 N.H. 361, 377 (2015) (social media communication was criminal
“indirect contact” only where defendant “directed the victim to his Facebook page” and personally
“addressed the victim”). In this case, Maravelias used the YouTube “Reply” feature to author a
individually to the sole user fooled by DePamphilis’s slander and libel against Maravelias. Cf. Rios
v. Fergusan, 51 Conn. Supp. 212, 978 A.2d 592 LEXIS 3223 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2008) (YouTube
communication proper grounds for civil restraining order only where defendant “specifically
targeted his message at Rios by threatening her life and safety”, Id. at *222).
legitimate public discussion, let alone offered adequate “breathing space” for his First-Amendment
freedoms. Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W.N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 117 S. Ct. 855 (1997). “[I]n
public debate[,] our own citizens must tolerate insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to
provide adequate breathing space to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment.” Id., 519
U.S. at *383.
19. Maravelias’s YouTube comment was political speech criticizing the government’s
determination in this very same court case she was a credible witness. As such, it was also
protected by absolute litigation privilege. Such statements “made in the course of judicial
proceedings are absolutely privileged from liability in civil actions”, such as Plaintiff’s civil claim
to a stalking order extension. Pickering v. Frink, 123 N.H. 326, 329, 461 A.2d 117, 119 (1983).
20. Further, the Court’s extension Order, by punishing Maravelias’s public self-
defensive speech and threatening him to “shut up” about his innocence or be further punished with
10
PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
an improperly utilized “stalking” order, violated Maravelias’s state constitutional liberty interest
in freedom from reputational stigma from governmental determinations which the New Hampshire
21. Should Plaintiff find “offensive” Maravelias’s internet-based political speech, the
U.S. Supreme Court commands she is “expected to protect [her] own sensibilities ‘simply by
averting [her] eyes.’” United States v. Playboy Ent’t Group, 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (quoting
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)). This Court’s Orwellian viewpoint-discrimination
directly specifically at him 3 – and impartially adulates the Plaintiff’s viewpoint of “offensiveness”.
It is “often true that one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric”. Cohen, supra.
22. This Court’s current extended stalking order is unconstitutional for the distinct and
additional reason that it constitutes an illegal prior restraint against Maravelias’s expressive
conduct. See 3/8/19 Order (this Court commanded Maravelias to discontinue his so-called “vile
conduct” of engaging in public discourse criticizing this legal case and exposing the falsity of
Christina DePamphilis’s legal attacks). The Court even threatened Maravelias with further stalking
order extensions should he continue his public speech. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court has held “[a]ny
system of prior restraints of expression comes [bears] a heavy presumption against its
constitutional validity”. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58, 372 U. S. 70 (1963); see
also Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 (1931). The instant stalking order therefore “amounts to a
3 It has been held Christina DePamphilis’s incitative/vulgar social-media-cyberbullying of Maravelias could form a
stalking course-of-conduct, Rock v. Michaels, No. 2007-0012, 2007 WL 9619509 (N.H. Dec. 7, 2007), and
potentially constitute a “true threat”, O’Brien v. Borowski, 461 Mass. 415, 429 (2012).
11
PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
flagrant, indefensible, and continuing violation of the First Amendment” and must be immediately
terminated. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
“Any order … may be extended by order of the court upon a motion by the plaintiff, showing
good cause, with notice to the defendant, for one year after the expiration of the first order and
thereafter each extension may be for up to 5 years, upon the request of the plaintiff and at the
discretion of the court. The court shall review the order, and each renewal thereof and shall
grant such relief as may be necessary to provide for the safety and well-being of the plaintiff.
…”
24. Here, the statute can be reasonably interpreted to permit extension upon a showing
the protective order, even if concern for “safety” is minimal. Any other reading is impossibly
legislature could have omitted the word “well-being”, but intentionally appended it after “safety”.
25. Neither RSA 633:3-a. nor RSA 173-B define the term “well-being”; thus,
dictionary reference is appropriate. See Doyle v. Comm’r, N.H. Dep’t. of Resources & Economic
Dev., 163 N.H. 215, 221 (2012). This Court ought to ascribe “the plain and ordinary meaning to
regulatory text”. Kenison v. Dubois, 152 N.H. 448,451,879 A.2d 1161 (2005). The Oxford English
4 https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/us/well-being
12
PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
26. The statute concerns the “fundamental right” of free speech, granting Maravelias
standing to propound a facial overbreadth challenge. State v. MacElman, 149 N.H. 795 (2003).
“The purpose of the overbreadth doctrine is to protect those persons who, although their speech or
conduct is constitutionally protected, may well refrain from exercising their rights for fear of
27. Insofar as New Hampshire trial courts are allowed to find a defendant’s specific
acts of protected speech have jeopardized the comfort, health, or happiness (“well-being”) or
“safety” of a plaintiff and therefore grant stalking order extensions, the statute is unconstitutionally
overbroad on its face in violation of the U.S. CONST., Amend. I., XIV., and N.H. CONST., Pt. I.,
Art. 22. By operation of the “safety and well-being” language of RSA 633:3-a, III-c., a trial court
may extend a stalking order on the basis of protected non-violent, non-threatening speech. Since
civil stalking orders criminalize possession of firearms and prohibit defendants from
communicating directly or indirectly to plaintiffs, the statute restricts constitutional rights. Since
is not narrowly tailored to serve the government’s interest in effecting the cessation of stalking. In
New Hampshire, “a statute is void for overbreadth if it attempts to control conduct by means which
13
PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
invade areas of protected freedom.” MacElman at 310. In the context of lawful-speech-related
stalking order extension, RSA 633:3-a, III-c. burdens the exercise of protected freedoms. 5
29. Even if RSA 633:3-a, III-c. were “content-neutral” and thus subject only to
interest, and ... leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information”. Doe
v. Harris, 772 F.3d 563 (2014), citing Ward. A statute fails intermediate scrutiny if burdening
“substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests”.
Ward at 799.
30. Where the statute’s standard for stalking order extension atrociously exceeds the
government’s interest in the “cessation of stalking” (See RSA 633:3-a, III-a.), it is overinclusively
speech, “the overbreadth doctrine prohibits the Government from banning unprotected speech if a
substantial amount of protected speech is prohibited or chilled in the process.” Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 244, 122 S.Ct. 1389, 152 L.Ed.2d 403 (2002) at 237. See also
Doyle at 221, invalidating laws as facially overbroad under N.H. CONST., Pt. I, Art. 22 where “a
substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the [law’s] plainly
legitimate sweep”.
31. RSA 633:3-a, III-c. permits trial courts to extend a stalking order wherever a
plaintiff merely testifies she’d feel “uncomfortable” or “unhappy” otherwise, since this alone
shows by “good-cause” that an extension would “provide for” her “state of being comfortable,
5 Cf. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991), invalidating a law
which imposed merely a “financial disincentive” to certain speech, let alone imposed restrictions on fundamental
rights as does the extended stalking order against Maravelias in this case.
14
PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
happy, or healthy”, the definition of “well-being”. The language renders the facts of the case – a
defendant’s history of stalking, the level of expected unlawful future behavior, etc. – completely
32. The draconian statute disowns any realistic model of human psychology or
distress an individual holding different views – even though the suppression of minor annoyance
alone triggers the dictionary definition of serving “well-being”. Negative social experiences
disfavor well-being. Rook, K.S. (1984) 6 Seeing the word “no” alone triggers unhealthy,
33. The statute burdens a woefully latitudinous fetch of protected speech far beyond
that necessary to promote “a cessation of stalking”. A potential rebuttal pits the controlling context
of “safety” and the generic context of the statute against “well-being” as altogether constituting a
legal standard for extension higher than prevention of minor annoyance. However, such an
interpretation is tautologically illogical, since the legislature added the word “well-being” and,
thus, intently did not stop at “safety”. Regardless, such a reading would separately demonstrate
34. Separately, reasonable alternatives to the “safety and well-being” language which
would equally advance the counter-stalking governmental-interest evince the statute’s lack of
narrow-tailoring. See Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 74 (1990). The statute could
alternatively permit stalking order extension upon a good-cause-showing such would provide for
6http://psycnet.apa.org/record/1984-25835-001
7Newberg and Waldman, 2012 (https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/words-can-change-your-
brain/201208/the-most-dangerous-word-in-the-world)
15
PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
a plaintiff’s “safety” only, or, better-yet, “as is necessary to bring about a cessation of” (or simply
currently allowing extension would fail this more-narrowly-tailored test wherein the
with speech and effectively criminalizing a defendant’s self-defensive speech. Such a narrowly-
tailored alternative would not amount to the necessity of re-proving new acts of stalking or
already requires that trial courts consider the underlying circumstantial provenance of the original
35. RSA 633:3-a, III-c. instead defectively supplants the original-stalking-order legal
standard (III-a.) with a patently absurd legal standard catering to “well-being” (III-c.), unrelated
therefore, the statute is also underinclusively not-narrowly-tailored. Statutes which fail to restrict
are not narrowly-tailored. See Showtime Entertainment, LLC v. Town of Mendon, 769 F.3d 61,73
(1st Cir. 2014); Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 540 (1989). Here, if “safety and well-being”
“safety and well-being” standard, rather than the higher-burden, more-stringent standard currently
within subsection III-a. positively requiring “stalking” and granting relief only as necessary “to
16
PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
36. The illogical “safety and well-being” conundrum at III-c. radically discriminates
between groups of potentially indifferentiable stalking order defendants. It assaults the liberty-
interests of extant defendants through a much-lower “well-being” legal standard, while III-a.
coddles the liberty-interests of new defendants, even though the liberty-restricting nature of the
one-year injunction-at-hand remains identical both at III-a. and III-c. Though civil in name, this
victims. There is no legitimate reason stalking victims newly-seeking protective injunction should
be expected to sustain a much higher burden than those already granted a stalking order, to obtain
the same one-year protection. If any difference in legal standard is appropriate between the two
groups, equity would require the reverse. This concern is exacerbated by New Hampshire trial
courts’ “extending” stalking orders by III-c. months after their expiration. See Stewart v. Murdock,
(2015-0448). The overbroad language at III-c. creates an inequitable advantage for prior-order-
“proffered interest is truly forwarded by the regulation, or is in fact substantial enough to warrant
such regulation.” Showtime Entertainment, LLC, supra. That is, if the “safety and well-being”
standard were narrowly-tailored to the interest, the interest would be compelling enough to warrant
usage of the same legal standard for original-stalking-order-issuance at subsection III-a. This
8 In fact, RSA 633:3-a, III-c. permits further extensions “for up to 5 years”, despite imposing a far lower legal
standard than RSA 633:3-a, III-a.
17
PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
39. Furthermore, wherever the “well-being” language could possibly remain narrowly-
tailored to the governmental-interest, such interest could never be “significant”, and the statute
40. Nor does the legal standard at III-c. appropriate any imaginable alternative manner
a defendant may dare disagree with a plaintiff’s stalking order within his public-or-third-party
communications without suffering greater likelihood of stalking order extension, where the
plaintiff’s “comfort” should be disturbed by knowing the defendant’s mere contrary opinion.
41. “To prevail on a facial challenge, the challenger must establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which the challenged statute or ordinance would be valid.” State v.
Lilley, 204 A.3d 198 (2019), cert. granted, S.Ct. No. 2019-64. Here, the “safety and well-being”
language controls every single stalking order extension proceeding. It is impossible for any such
proceeding to exist wherein a trial court does not consider the “well-being” of plaintiff as well as
the “safety”. See RSA 633:3-a, III-c. (using the word “shall” to command trial courts to grant relief
serving the “well-being” of plaintiffs). Accordingly, the statute’s overbreadth is substantial and
binding upon “all, or virtually all, of its applications”. State v. Hollenbeck, 164 N.H. 154, 158, 53
42. As a result of the statute’s substantial overbreadth, this Court must either
“invalidate” the statute or provide a “partial invalidation that narrows the scope of the statute to
constitutionally acceptable applications”. Brobst, 151 N.H. at *421. Either option in this case
18
PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
necessarily equates to dismissing and terminating the instant stalking order, because it has already
43. “A statute can be impermissibly vague for either of two independent reasons. First,
enforcement.” Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000). Here, the language of RSA 633:3-a,
III-c. is unintelligible and so loosely constrained that arbitrary, discriminatory enforcement thereof
is inevitable. Not only is the term “well-being” too vague, but also the extent to which the
stalking order extension case brought before a New Hampshire trial court, regardless of the
particular facts of such cases. The statute provides zero guidance on how trial court judges should
interpret “well-being”, or on what conduct beyond threatening speech or actual violence would
permit extension not necessarily to serve a plaintiff’s “safety”, but rather their “well-being”.
i. Semantic Vagueness
45. Civil stalking defendants such as Maravelias lack the intelligence to discern which
behaviors are reasonably expected to minimize chances of order extension. Whether they must
simply to obey the order, avoiding/ignoring the Plaintiff as Maravelias has in this case, or must
46. For trial courts, the facial language of the statute creates even worse problems. One
judge might think a “well-being” order ridiculous and far in-excess-of the legislative counter-
19
PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
stalking intent, calibrating his or her judgements to the statute’s broad “safety” context, even
applying ejusdem generis to constrain “well-being” thereby. However, another judge might reject
this interpretation, “safety and well-being” not being a list, and adopt the plain meaning of the
word “well-being”.
47. The statute is fraught with meaningful syntactic ambiguity between the co-possible
constructions “shall grant such relief as may be necessary to provide for the (safety and well-
being)” and “… relief as may be necessary to provide for the safety, and (relief as may be necessary
to provide for the) well-being”. The former interpretation begets tautology, the latter overbroad
applying subsection III-c. sponsors capricious, arbitrary extensions likened to this Court’s 3/8/19
48. The comparable restraining order laws of no other US state discard the initial-
issuance-standard for something pointlessly different for extension, as does New Hampshire’s
unconstitutionally defective statute. For example, the analogous Massachusettensian statute for
extension of Civil Harassment Orders (“stalking” orders do not exist), M.G.L. 258E §3(d), states
in relevant part that “the court [may extend] the [harassment] order … as it deems necessary to
protect the plaintiff from harassment.” Id. It does not switch the legal standard to something
different and overbroad when it concerns extension, requiring a “stalking course of conduct” for
an original order but only vague “interest in well-being” for subsequent extensions, as with the
defective New Hampshire statute. Cf. also 19-A M.R.S. 4007(2), the analogous Maine statute
controlling extension of DV protective orders following civil adjudications of “abuse”: “the court
20
PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
may extend an order, upon motion of the plaintiff, for such additional time as it determines
49. The inexplicable lowering of legal standard at subsection III-c. (for extensions)
compared to III-a. (new stalking orders) in RSA 633:3-a is constitutionally defective, affording
unequal rights to plaintiffs and defendants solely based upon their current status of involvement
with an extant order: a defect absent in comparable extrajurisdictional statutes. A civil finding of
‘stalking’ on the ‘preponderance of evidence’ standard cannot lawfully distinguish between past
and new defendants for purposes of the ‘similarly situated’ element of Equal Protection analysis.
In an analogous case, the New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed with this contention. See Opinion
of the Justices, 137 N.H. 260 (1993) (legislature proposed unconstitutional bill to constrain
alleged-sexual-assaulters’ right to file certain civil suits during pendency of criminal charges).
III. THE COURT MUST TERMINATE THE STALKING ORDER BECAUSE, AS-
APPLIED TO MARAVELIAS, IT VIOLATES HIS 14TH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO
DUE PROCESS OF LAW
50. The current extended stalking order violates Maravelias’s right to Due Process of
Law under U.S. CONST., AMEND. XIV and N.H. CONST., PT. I, ART. 2 and 15. “No subject shall
be deprived of his property, immunities, or privileges, … or deprived of his life, liberty, or estate,
but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land․” Id. “Law of the land in this article means
due process of law.” Petition of Harvey, 108 N.H. 196 A.2d 757 (1967). “The initial inquiry in
determining whether a particular state action violates due process is whether there is a deprivation
of liberty or property.” Opinion of the Justices, 137 N.H. at *268. “It hardly bears mentioning that
a restraining order restrains [a defendant’s] liberty ... from a number of legal activities”, McCarthy
21
PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
v. Wheeler, 152 N.H. 643, 645 (2005), including restricting Maravelias’s Second-Amendment
rights and even limiting his “fundamental right to freedom of movement”, State v. Porelle, 149
N.H. 420 (2003). The extended “stalking” restraining order is a “governmental determination”
51. Plaintiff’s 1/24/19 Motion to Extend never noticed any specific allegation of any
online comment by Maravelias which somehow constitutes good cause to extend the stalking
order. This Court’s words “offensive” and “hateful” were never used anywhere – not once – by
the Plaintiff to describe Maravelias’s comments. Maravelias objected at-trial on grounds of notice
when Plaintiff introduced the specific YouTube comment allegation, which was not previously
noticed. Plaintiff’s Paragraph 15 of the Motion to Extend contained a vague general passing
reference to “disparaging online comments”; however, without specific allegations noticed before
trial, the New Hampshire Supreme Court has held it to be constitutionally defective.
52. The New Hampshire Supreme Court has held such “general statement[s]” alleging
an “ongoing pattern of … behavior” do not “provide sufficient notice of the actual ‘facts alleged
against the defendant’”. South v. McCabe, 156 N.H. 797, 800, 943 A.2d 779, 781 (2008) (citing
RSA 173-B:3, I.). It reversed a protective order where a plaintiff’s “general reference in the petition
to the respondent’s prior ‘violence’ failed to notify him of the ‘actual facts alleged against [him].’”
McKenna v. Collier, No. 2014-0283, 2015 N.H. LEXIS 242 (May 8, 2015), at *5 (quoting South,
156 N.H. at *800). Here, Plaintiff’s general reference to “disparaging online comments” failed to
give Maravelias adequate notice of the specific “banging 21-year-old” YouTube comment. “It is
well settled that a defendant is entitled to be informed of the theory on which the plaintiffs are
22
PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
proceeding … as a result of the defendant’s actions.” Morancy v. Morancy, 134 N.H. 493 (1991)
(internal citation omitted). “The trial court should [have] limit[ed] its findings to the factual
allegations specifically recited in” Plaintiff’s Motion to Extend. South, supra, 156 N.H. at *800.
53. Accordingly, this Court is currently violating Maravelias’s Due Process rights until
it discontinues the stalking order extended on the sole basis of a specific allegation not previously
noticed to him before the hearing, depriving him a fair opportunity to rebut said allegation.
54. Defendant rebuts Plaintiff’s anticipated objection to the nature of this Motion.
Plaintiff’s counsel has a history of dastardly deception in this case regarding characterization of
Maravelias’s arguments, the nature of the past NHSC appeals, the legal effect and holdings of said
appeal dispositions, and the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and waiver of issues.
Counsel has committed twenty-three (23) counts of criminal conduct during this case against
55. Counsel’s dishonesty has gone so far that, in a pleading filed on 2/22/19 in this
Court, Plaintiff’s attorney Simon R. Brown, Esq. violated the N.H. Rules of Prof. Conduct Rule
3.1, Rule 3.3, and Rule 8.4 by falsely claiming the NHSC Final Order in Case No. 2018-0483 had
adjudicated and rejected Maravelias’s facial constitutional challenge to RSA 633:3-a, III-c. While
lying to this Court, counsel intimately knew the NHSC had, in fact, never adjudicated said
argument due to alleged insufficient issue preservation (and still has not to this day). In order to
deceive this Court and evade the task of responding to the merits of Maravelias’s hereunto-ignored
9See https://scribd.com/document/412386952/Motion-for-Contempt-Against-Simon-R-Brown-Esq-for-Criminal-
Fraud-Falsification-Extortion-and-Civil-Attorney-Misconduct
23
PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
facial attack against the statute, counsel quoted an enticing sentence from the NHSC’s rejection of
a completely different constitutional challenge, falsifying the context thereof in order to deceive.
56. This motion is properly before this Court for the distinct and tripartite reasons stated
supra, and respectfully signals counsel to confine his anticipated Objection to legal argument
CONCLUSION
57. For the foregoing reasons, this Court must immediately dismiss and terminate the
WHEREFORE, Defendant Paul Maravelias respectfully requests this Honorable Court grant the
in propria persona
24
PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Paul Maravelias, certify that a copy of the foregoing was forwarded on this day through
USPS Certified Mail to Simon R. Brown, Esq., counsel for the Petitioner, Christina
DePamphilis, P.O. Box 1318, Concord, NH, 03302-1318.
25
PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087