I.

ABSTRACT

Basic or Organic Law for the Autonomous Region of Bansangmoro of Mindanao. Whichever is

acceptable to the governing body of the Autonomous Region and imposed by national

government should be rendered constitutional.

II. HIGHLIGHTS

The adaptation of Law is the main concern of both the MNLF and MILF and other factions of

the region. Whether the governing body of the Autonomous Region prefers the law that is

conducive to the life style and religious belief of the people in the region is also the main concern

of the national government. However, the striking point of the implementation of the BBL or the

BOL is, whether there will be unification of the different factions in the region as the leaders of

each group wanted to grab the highest position of the governing body. Somehow, obtaining peace

in the region still remain lingering in the minds of the leaders of both the Autonomous Region

and the national government thus creating an obstacle to make the dreams of Autonomous

Region come true.

III. DISCUSSION

The colonial experience

When the Spanish colonizers arrived in the Philippines in the sixteenth century, Spain’s civil and

religious authorities created a hierarchical administrative structure based on indigenous

barangays (communities of around 30-100 families, headed by a datu), municipalities, and

provinces. In parts of the Philippine islands, particularly in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago,

the Spanish encountered well-organized Muslim communities within established sultanates.

Products of their European history, the Spaniards promptly termed these people ‘Moros’ and

launched a series of military campaigns against them. In Mindanao and Sulu, however, they met

strong resistance from the Moros, and were never able to integrate these islands into the Spanish

colonial regime. In other areas, also, indigenous people resisted Spanish rule, either militarily or

by withdrawing into the hinterland. Such groups were referred to by the Spanish as ‘infideles’ or

‘tribus independientes’, and later were identified as ‘tribal minorities’ or ‘cultural communities’.

When, in 1898, the United States took over the Philippines, following the Spanish-American

War, they essentially maintained the administrative structure (and the religiously-defined ethnic

hierarchy) established by Spain. In 1901 a Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes (subsequently

renamed Ethnological Survey of the Philippines) was created, to gather information on the non-

Christian people of the Philippines (including the Moros) with a view to ‘determining the most

practicable means for bringing about their advancement in civilization and material

prosperity’ (quoted in Gowing 1977:67). The following year a bill passed by the US Congress

‘recognized the distinction between the Moros, Pagans and Christian Filipinos and the

consequent necessity for providing different forms of government for the different people’
Under the Americans, a more intensive military campaign against the Moros put an end to hopes

of Moro sovereignty. Initially, administration of the Moro homelands in Mindanao and Sulu was

placed in the hands of the US Army, though in 1903 an assistant chief of the Bureau of Non-

Christian Tribes (a Syrian-born American) was appointed as Agent for Moro Affairs. The same

year, a special Moro Province was created, under the supervision of the civil governor of the

Philippine Islands and the Philippine Commission (the administrative arm of the colonial regime)

but until 1913 headed and predominantly staffed by army officers. The Moro Province comprised

five districts (Sulu, Cotabato, Davao, Lanao and Zamboanga). It had a legislative Council, with

limited powers, was subject to national laws except in civil or criminal actions involving only

Moros and Pagans, and was expected to be fiscally self-reliant. In 1913 the Moro Province was

replaced by a Department of Mindanao and Sulu, and control passed from the military to civilian

authorities headed by a governor. The districts were renamed provinces and the two non-Moro

Mindanao provinces of Bukidnon and Agusan were added. The Department was however seen as

a transitional arrangement, with the seven provinces to assume the same status as provinces

elsewhere in the country. It was abolished in 1920. Elsewhere, a number of ‘special provinces’

was created, under the secretary of the interior, for the governance of other non-Christian tribes.

In the Cordilleras of northern Luzon, where tribal groups, commonly referred to collectively as

‘the Igorots’, had most strongly resisted Spanish intrusions, the American administration in 1908

established a Mountain Province and the administration of the region was reorganized so that, in

the words of a contemporary observer, ‘the wild tribes were safely removed from the field of

insular [i.e. national] politics’ (Dean Bartlett, cited in Fry 1983). Around this time there was

some agitation for the administration of non-Christian tribes to be handed over to Filipino
provincial and municipal officials. The American secretary of the interior, Dean Worcester,

however argued that despite their ‘common racial origin’, the gap between the Filipino, the

Igorot and the Moro was very great, and that to hand over control of the non-Christian tribes to

Filipinos ‘would speedily result in disaster’ (Report of the Philippine Commission, 1909-1911,

cited in Lopez 1976:113). Nevertheless, from 1914 responsibility for non-Christian tribes,

though nominally in the hands of the secretary of the interior, was exercised increasingly by

provincial and municipal authorities. Dissatisfaction with these arrangements resulted three years

later in the reconstitution of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes. The Bureau was given

responsibility for both tribal areas and, until its demise in 1920, the Department of Mindanao and

Sulu (which as well as the Moros contained many tribal people, now known as, Lumad).

Between 1917 and 1935 the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes retained nominal control over the

non- Christian groups, though responsibility progressively shifted to the Philippine Legislature.

Following the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth in 1935, the Bureau of Non-

Christian Tribes was abolished. The administration of non-Christian tribes passed to the

Department of the Interior, though the special circumstances in the south were recognized in the

creation of a Commission for Mindanao and Sulu. [1935 datus’ petition] The historical

arrangements briefly outlined here reflected the perception of the colonial administration that

some degree of regionally-based autonomy was needed to safeguard the interests of the Muslim

and tribal people of the Philippines. After 1935 the special arrangements lapsed in the drive for

national integration. Four decades later, however, regional autonomy arrangements were revived.
Muslim Autonomy

In the late 1960s an Islamic resurgence in the south, coupled with growing tensions associated

with massive immigration to Mindanao from the northern, Christian, provinces and

encroachment on traditional Muslim and tribal lands, produced an outbreak of armed conflict, in

which the Philippine government, supported by various Christian militias and private armies,

confronted Muslim insurgents under the banner of the Moro National Liberation front (MNLF).

The principal demand of the MNLF was for an independent Bangsa Moro in the twenty-six [?]

provinces of Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan, though under pressure from the Organization of

Islamic Conference (OIC) the demand for independence was eventually scaled down to one of

autonomy in the thirteen provinces of traditional Muslim dominance. A major problem was that,

by the end of the 1960s, as a result of immigration, Muslims were a majority in only five of the

thirteen provinces. Following a negotiated ceasefire in 1976, the Philippine government of

President Marcos and the MNLF signed an agreement, in Tripoli, which provided for autonomy

in the thirteen provinces. Disagreements over implementation of the Tripoli Agreement

(particularly the Marcos government’s insistence that the proposed autonomy be subject to a

plebiscite in the provinces covered by the agreement), however, led to the MNLF’s withdrawal

from the peace negotiations. The plebiscite process nevertheless went ahead, without the

participation of the MNLF and its supporters, and two autonomous regional governments were

set up in administrative regions IX (Western Mindanao) and XII (Central Mindanao) – though

they lacked popular support and adequate resources. The Marcos presidency also saw the

growing politicization of tribal Filipinos/cultural communities, particularly in the Cordilleras

where an armed insurgency, led by the Cordillera Peoples Alliance and supported by the

Communist New People’s Army, emerged, primarily to resist encroachments on ancestral land.

Following the ‘People Power Revolution’ of 1986 a new constitution made special provision to

create areas of autonomy in Muslim Mindanao and Sulu (the Autonomous Region of Muslim

Mindanao, ARMM) and northern Luzon (the Cordillera Autonomous Region, CAR), and

assigned to them a range of legislative powers.[1] Self-exiled MNLF leader Nur Misuari returned

to the Philippines in 1986 to take part in talks with President Aquino, but the two failed to reach

an agreement on the content of the proposed Muslim autonomy. The 1987 constitution provided

that Congress legislate an organic act for each region, with the assistance of a regional

consultative commission created for this purpose. At least in the case of the ARMM, the

implementation of the constitutional provision was a deeply flawed process, but by 1989 an

organic act had been drafted and put to a plebiscite in the thirteen provinces and nine cities of

central and western Mindanao and Sulu listed in the Tripoli Agreement, on the basis that only

those provinces and cities voting to do so would become part of the ARMM. The MNLF (which

by then had split into three factions) boycotted the poll, and in the event only four provinces

(Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi) and no cities voted to join the autonomous

region. As with the regional governments established earlier under the Marcos government, the

ARMM thus lacked popular legitimacy and, with limited authority and funding, proved largely

ineffective. In 1992, following the election of President Fidel Ramos, negotiations with the

MNLF was reopened, with the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) playing a facilitative

role. These initiatives culminated in 1996 in the signing of a Peace Agreement between the

Philippine government and the MNLF. The agreement, which was subtitled ‘The Final
Agreement on the Implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement’, provided for the creation of a

Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD) covering the area defined in the Tripoli

Agreement, and a Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) with

authority to ‘control and/ or supervise…appropriate agencies of the government that are engaged

in peace and development activities in the area [of the SZOPAD]’. Provision was also made for a

Consultative Assembly, headed by the chair of the SPCPD and dominated by members of the

MNLF, for a Darul Iftah (religious advisory council) appointed by the SPCPD chair, and for the

integration of 7500 former MNLF (Bangsa Moro Army) fighters into the Armed Forces of the

Philippines and the Philippine National Police. Potential jurisdictional problems between the

ARMM and the SPCPD were avoided when Misuari, having returned from them Middle East,

was appointed chair of the SPCPD and subsequently elected governor of the ARMM. However, a

crucial provision of the 1996 Peace Agreement was that which required a referendum, to be held

within two years of the establishment of the SPCPD, seeking approval to extend the ARMM to

cover the area of the SZOPAD. The 1996 Agreement was greeted by many as a major step

towards a final settlement of the conflict. But those familiar with the history of the Moro struggle

could foresee a number of looming problems. For one, the agreement was specifically with the

MNLF. Although the MNLF was the faction of the Moro movement recognized by the OIC

(which therefore locked the Philippines government into negotiations with the MNLF), by the

mid-1990s the other major faction, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), was almost

certainly the more powerful group. The MILF was not a party to the 1996 agreement and had

vowed to continue the armed struggle. In December 1997, the chairman of the MILF, the late

Hashim Salamat, revived the demand for an independent Islamic state. Secondly, there was
considerable popular opposition to the 1996 Agreement among Christian communities within the

SZOPAD and among members of Congress. As a result of this, the executive order (EO 371)

intended to give effect to the Peace Agreement was a substantially watered down version of the

agreement signed with Misuari, which was a source of frustration to the Moro leadership.

Thirdly, there was no reason to believe that the mandated referendum – which was put off until

August 2001 – would yield a result any different from that of previous referenda on Muslim

autonomy. Added to this, the SPCPD/ARMM leadership complained that it did not receive

adequate funding to fulfill its goals, and expected foreign capital inflows did not materialize. In

March 1999 Misuari warned that if conditions did not improve former MNLF fighters would

return to the hills. Moreover, the MNLF leadership of the SPCPD was accused of inefficiency,

mismanagement and nepotism, and Misuari’s personal leadership came under attack. In 2001 the

required referendum was finally conducted, and predictably only five of the now fifteen

provinces and one of the nine cities voted for an expanded ARMM. Shortly after this Misuari

returned to armed insurgency, and is currently serving a prison sentence. The ARMM continues

to function, but with little popular support, while the MILF (with whom the Philippine

government is currently negotiating) operates as a virtual autonomous region within the

autonomous region.

Cordillera Autonomy

In the Cordilleras, an Interim Cordillera Regional Administration was established in 1986, but

there too the consultative process proved acrimonious. An organic law was eventually drafted

and submitted to plebiscite in 1990, but of the five provinces and one city in the region only one
province (Ifugao) voted for the autonomous region. On July 15, 1987, amidst the protest from

Cordillera People’s Alliance (CPA), Cordillera Broad Coalition (CBC) and private individuals,

President Aquino signed Executive Order No. 220 of 1987 establishing the Cordillera

Administrative. After which the Philippine Congress enacted Republic Act 6658 in June 10, 1998

creating the Cordillera Consultative Commission. The Commission was tasked to assist Congress

in their formulation of Organic Act for Cordillera autonomy. Sixteen months upon issuance of

RA6658, Congress passed RA6766 or the first Organic Act for the Creation of Cordillera

Autonomy which was duly approved on October 23, 1989. However, the Organic Act was

rejected during the plebiscite in January 30, 1990. Only the province of Ifugao voted for “Yes”.

All the other provinces of Abram, Benguet, Kalinga-Apayao, Mountain Province and the

chartered city of Baguio gave a resounding “No”. The second organic act, RA 8438 or an Act to

Establish the Cordillera Autonomous Region was passed in December 22, 1997 and submitted

for referendum in March 7, 1998. This time, only the province of Apayao (which was then

separated from Kalinga in 1995) gave the “Yes” vote. Ifugao, who voted affirmatively in the

1990 plebiscite reversed to “No”. There are lots of reasons cited why Cordilleras rejected the two

organic acts – disinformation/misinformation, misappropriation of campaign funds, very short

campaign period – to name a few. Whether those were true or not, it is very clear that the

Cordillerans were not yet ready for autonomy or maybe, they don’t want any autonomy after all.

It is very intriguing that such lengths be taken to create an Autonomous Cordillera. Autonomy

advocates believe achieving self-governance is the best option to help the people move out from

the shackles of poverty. However, most Cordillerans do not share the same sentiments or rather
could not correlate both. Even though, if proper approach to the matter be taken, Autonomy

could be realized as much more than a dream.

A new Cordillera Autonomous Region

In the widespread concern shown by our officials for the proposed Bangsamoro Autonomous

Region of Muslim Mindanao, we have tended to forget the other autonomous region provided in

our Constitution – the Cordilleras of Northern Luzon. This is the home of some 1.2 million

indigenous peoples generally known to lowlanders as Igorots although they actually belong to

several ethnolinguistic groups. Sen. Juan Miguel Zubiri in 2018 filed a bill to establish the

Autonomous Region of the Cordillera (ARC) to replace the present Cordillera Administrative

Region (CAR). The CAR had been set up, along with the Autonomous Region of Muslim

Mindanao (ARMM), pursuant to Section 15, Article X of the Constitution which provides:

“There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, consisting

of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive

historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics

within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty, as well as the territorial

integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.” In the 31 years of the 1987 Constitution, Zubiri said

the Cordillera region has yet to achieve real autonomy. It is today a progressive region

contributing 1.8 percent to the national Gross Domestic Product (GDP), principally through its

agricultural production of cabbage, rice, and corn. With greater autonomy as the ARC, the

Cordilleras under the Zubiri bill will continue to have an annual assistance of P10 billion for the
first five years and P5 billion for the next five years, while the local government units will

continue to receive their Internal Revenue Allotments (IRA) like the rest of the nation’s LGUs.

But as an autonomous region, it will have “the opportunity to decide on what policies and

programs will best fit the region and, at the same time, have the freedom to pursue their political,

economic, social, and cultural development within the framework of the national sovereignty and

in accordance with the local practices and cultural heritage and identity. The Cordilleras people

are well known to the rest of the country for their distinctive mountain culture. They now live in

the provinces of Abra, Apayao, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga, and Mountain Province, and the city of

Baguio. The provinces and city which vote in a plebiscite for the establishment of the

autonomous region would form the ARC. The organization of ARC in the far north of the

country could serve as model for other regions of the country should a federal system of

government be set up for the country under a new Constitution. There will be the other region in

the far south – the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region, for which a law has also been filed in

Congress. In between these two regions will be several other possible autonomous regions –

Northern Luzon’s Ilocano provinces, Central Luzon, Metro Manila, Southern Luzon, Bicol,

Western, Central, and Eastern Visayas, Northern and Southern Mindanao. These will have to

await the approval and ratification of a new Constitution.

Muslim Mindanao Divisions

The decades of negotiation between the government and the Moro National Liberation Front

(MNLF) which led to the creation of ARMM in 1989 and its enhancement in 2001 seriously

weakened the MNLF and its claims to represent the Moro community. The MILF split off from
the MNLF over opposition to the MNLF negotiations with the government and grew larger than

the MNLF. The local elites in Cotabato City, geographically in Maguindanao province, and

Isabela City, geographically in Basilan province, successfully campaigned against joining

ARMM in 2001. Ironically, Cotabato City, while outside of ARMM, is where the ARMM

administrative offices are located. A debilitating problem for the ARMM is that many in the

Moro community saw it as the creation of an agreement between the MNLF then led by Nur

Misuari and the government, and not as a regional autonomous government for all. Nur Misauri

becoming ARMM governor in the first elections after the peace agreement signed between the

Ramos government and the MNLF in 1996 further cemented this exclusivist view. BARMM will

face the very similar problem of being seen by its opponents in Muslim Mindanao as the creation

of an agreement between the MILF and the government. The Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom

Fighters at the heart of the January 2015 Mamasapano massacre that curtailed efforts by the

administration of Benigno Aquino to establish BARMM are a splinter group of the MILF

opposed to the negotiations between the MILF and the government. The Maute Group that led

the five-month siege of Marawi City in 2017 are also opposed to the MILF and its negotiations

with the government. Terrorist attacks by local groups in the ARMM continue despite the

invocation of martial law across all of Mindanao and the passage of the Bangsamoro Organic

Law. Such attacks are likely to persist for the foreseeable future and pose another ongoing

challenge for the Bangsamoro Organic Law and the BARMM if and when it is established.

Efforts by President Duterte to include Nur Misuari (who is facing charges for leading the 2013

siege of Zamboanga City) and his MNLF faction based in Sulu in the negotiations that led to the

Bangsamoro Organic Law have not prospered. Many interpret the 2013 siege as a reaction
against the negotiations between the MILF and the government. Sulu Governor Abdusakar Tan II

(the scion of the most powerful political dynasty in Sulu) has filed a case with the Supreme

Court against the Bangsamoro Organic Law claiming that it is unconstitutional. Tan is opposed

to the law’s clause that calls for a single vote in the ARMM on whether to join the BARMM or

not. Governor Tan wants a separate vote for Sulu. Sulu accounts for roughly one-fifth of the

ARMM population. Sulu, along with TawiTawi and Basilan, is part of island Muslim Mindanao

that is linguistically and culturally distinct from mainland Muslim Mindanao. The mainland

Muslim Mindanao provinces of Maguindanao and Lanao del Sur account for the majority of the

ARMM population. The MILF is closely associated with the ARMM’s largest province,

Maguindanao, and ethnic group, the Maguindanao. Tan’s case being heard by the court could

delay the plebiscites to ratify the Bangsamoro Organic Law. If his case is successful and the four

ARMM provinces vote separately, then the BARMM could end up being smaller than the

ARMM. If his case is not heard or is not successful, the BARMM plebiscite takes place, and a

majority of voters in Sulu vote against it but their province is incorporated in the BARMM due

to the aggregate ARMM vote, then trouble will likely ensue.

Sulu governor-elect Tan blinks, vows support for BARMM

Changing his stance, Sulu governor-elect Abdusakur Tan now pledged to support the new

Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM), noting the “people have

spoken.” Tan, who ran but lost in the 2016 gubernatorial race in the Autonomous Region in

Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), and over a hundred others graced the orientation and training

seminar for newly-elected local chief executives in the BARMM in Cotabato City on June 16
to17. The BARMM replaced the ARMM following the plebiscites early this year that resulted in

the overwhelming ratification of Republic Act 11054 or the Organic Law for the Bangsamoro

Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, popularly called the Bangsamoro Organic Law

(BOL). The BOL is anchored on the final peace agreement signed by the government and the

Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in 2014 after four decades of conflict that claimed over

120,000 lives, including civilians. Only Sulu rejected the ratification of the BOL. The other

ARMM provinces—Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Basilan (except Isabela City) and Tawi-tawi—

voted in favor of the BOL, as well as Cotabato City, the seat of the then ARMM and now the

BARMM regional government. But Sulu could not opt out of the new Bangsamoro region

because its votes were counted along with the other provinces that comprised the ARMM, which

overwhelmingly resulted in favor of BOL’s ratification. The Tans campaigned heavily for the

rejection of BOL in Sulu, one of the poorest provinces in the country. A few months before the

plebiscite, Gov. Abdusakur Tan II, Tan’s son and Sulu’s incoming vice governor, questioned

before the Supreme Court the legality of the BOL. The high tribunal has yet to decide on the

case. In an interview with a regional television network, the elder Tan assured they would abide

with the decision of the Supreme Court. Tan said that incoming Sulu public officials graced the

orientation for new local chief executives because they want to know the programs of the

Bangsamoro government. The winners in the May 13 elections assumed office on June 30.

BARMM interim Chief Minister Ahod Ebrahim welcomed Tan’s support to the new Bangsamoro

government. “I’m very happy that the (incoming Sulu) governor expressed his willingness to

cooperate and willingness to be a partner (of the Bangsamoro government,” said Ebrahim,

popularly known as MILF chair Al Haj Murad Ebrahim. Ebrahim stressed the need for unity and
collaboration among local officials to meet the Bangsamoro people’s high expectations in the

new BARMM government. Lawyer Naguib Sinarimbo, BARMM Minister for Local

Government, said they organized the orientation and training seminar for incoming local chief

executives in the BARMM to rally their support and for them to adopt “moral governance” as a

tool to improve the plight of the impoverished Bangsamoro region.

BARMM State Capacity

In socio-cultural and political terms, Muslim Mindanao presents a very good case for a truly

regional autonomous government. In socio-economic terms, it provides a fraught case for

effective self-government. The ARMM is the poorest by far of the sixteen regions in the

Philippines and Lanao del Sur that accounts for over a quarter of the ARMM population is the

poorest of the 81 provinces in the country. In 2015, Lanao del Sur was the only province where a

majority of families, 66.3 per cent, were under the national, regionally-adjusted poverty line.

The table below in Appendix 1 gives more details on the ARMM’s comparative lack of

economic development and poor educational outcomes. These weak socio-economic indicators

have entwined with the Philippines’ patrimonial, clan based political culture that is particularly

strong and violent in Muslim Mindanao to undermine the state capacity and service delivery of

the current ARMM government. The ARMM’s poor socio-economic situation and clan-based

patrimonial political culture are mutually reinforcing structural realities that have been resilient

to the multitude of capacity building and anti-corruption programs, mostly foreign-funded, that

have focused on the ARMM. Oddly, from 2012 to 2016, the ARMM and the Central Visayas

were the only two regions in the Philippines to suffer from a reduction in the number of
government employees. Over this same period, the number of government employees grew by

62.8 per cent nationally. The ambitious devolution of powers from the national government to

the BARMM one legislated for in the Bangsamoro Organic Law will likely aggravate these state

capacity problems for the foreseeable future. The early days of the BARMM could be rough

going. Appendix 2 below lists the 55 powers specifically delegated by the Bangsamoro Organic

Law to the yet-to-be-created BARMM government. These new powers range from health to

operating public utilities and from quarantine regulations and food security to the administration

of justice. The Bangsamoro Organic Law calls for the elections to the new parliamentary

BARMM government to be held in May 2022 where the MILF’s new and untested political

party, the United Bangsamoro Justice Party, could become the largest party and source of the

inaugural chief minister. Insurgents often do not make good democratic politicians or

government bureaucrats. The Bangsamoro Organic Law lists many new governmental

departments and agencies that this new BARMM government is legislated to create. These

include a number of intergovernmental boards and committees with national government

participation to manage shared and overlapping responsibilities and the inevitable disagreements

between levels of government. By itself, the BARMM government will need to quickly establish

a plethora of new regional state ministries and agencies. These include a general hospital system,

a housing and settlements agency, a ministry of indigenous peoples, a Bangsamoro revenue

office, and a ministry of energy. Creating the BARMM legislation and implementing rules for

these new bodies and finding qualified personnel and management to staff and run them will be a

herculean task. Notably, the ARMM government did not succeed in its much less daunting state

capacity challenge.
In a historic move, President Rodrigo Duterte signed the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL),

creating the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, home to minority Muslims

fighting for self-determination in the predominantly Roman Catholic Philippines. During a

speech in Zamboanga City on July 26, the President said he had signed the new law. Duterte, the

first Philippine President who hails from the South, promised to help the Moro people resolve

their grievances, many of which stem from disputes on ancestral land and decades of neglect.

But he is just the latest in a string of leaders to attempt to put an end to decades of conflict in the

troubled region. Numerous administrations have conducted peace negotiations with rebel groups

such as the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front

(MILF), resulting in multiple versions of the proposed law, which was earlier called Bangsamoro

Basic Law.

What is the Bangsamoro Organic Law and why do we need one?

The Bangsamoro Organic Law, now officially called the Organic Law for the Bangsamoro

Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (OLBARMM), is the result of decades-long peace

negotiations between the rebel groups in Mindanao, mainly the MILF, and the Philippine

Government. The OLBARMM abolishes the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao

(ARMM), established in 1989 through Republic Act No. 6734 and strengthened in 2001 through

Republic Act No. 9054. Officials have earlier called the ARMM a failure, marred by corruption

and mismanagement. The new law then creates the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim

Mindanao (BARMM), or simply the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region. University of the

Philippines Islamic law and politics professor Jamel Cayamodin said the Bangsamoro law is
designed to address the grievances, sentiments, and demands of Muslims in the region. "When

you talk about the BBL, it's the advocacy of every Muslim… For the past years, since martial

law, the Muslims have been asking for self-determination," Cayamodin said. He added the MILF

previously called for total independence when under the helm of its founder Salamat Hashim.

When Hashim died in 2003, the rebel group toned down its demands and instead lobbied for a

truly autonomous region. Cayamodin said provinces in the ARMM are consistently among the

poorest sectors of the country, mainly due to corrupt and inefficient government officials. Clan

wars or Rido were also prevalent in the region.

Road to peace in Mindanao: The Bangsamoro Organic Law

In 2011, Malacañang said former President Benigno Aquino III considers the ARMM a "failed

experiment." After multiple rounds of talks that spanned almost a decade, the government and

the MILF signed the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) in 2012. In 2014, the two

parties signed the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB), which incorporated the

FAB and annexes on transitional arrangements, wealth, power-sharing, and water territories. It

served as the basis of the draft BBL. Several versions of the BBL have been proposed by

lawmakers, including the first version submitted by Aquino to Congress in 2014. In 2015, a

House committee approved the draft and renamed it the Basic Law for the Bangsamoro

Autonomous Region. The Senate, meanwhile, passed its version of the bill and renamed it the

Bangsamoro Autonomous Region Law. While there were efforts to pass the BBL during the

Aquino administration, the length and complexity of the bill led the Senate to temporarily defer

its proceedings. The 16th Congress eventually failed to pass the measure before it adjourned. The
OLBARMM - the latest version of the BBL passed during the Duterte administration - reconciles

versions of the proposed measure acceptable to both the government and the rebel groups. MILF

Vice Chairman Ghazali Jaafar, who also chairs the Bangsamoro Transition Commission (BTC)

that created the first draft of the BBL, earlier said they will not accept an autonomy that is equal

to or less than the ARMM, which was the result of peace deals between the government and the

MNLF.

How will the OLBARMM quell the rebellion in Mindanao?

In the peace deal that led to the creation of CAB in 2014, the MILF promised to decommission

its troops and end the decades-long rebellion once the national government delivers its

commitment of a new Bangsamoro region. The MILF will then create its own political party to

be involved in the governance of the new entity. Jaafar said they are satisfied with the version

approved by the bicameral conference committee. "Satisfied kami, maganda po 'yung proceeding

ng both Senate and House of Representatives. Doon sa provisions ng Bangsamoro Organic Law,

more or less, ang gusto (naming) mapasama ay napasama sa provisions," Jaafar said.

[Translation: We are satisfied, as there were good proceedings in both Senate and House of

Representatives. The provisions we want were more or less included in the Bangsamoro Organic

Law.] He added the MILF will work with the MNLF to achieve a unified government in the

region. "Hanggang ngayon, nakakausap ko 'yung prominent leaders ng MNLF in Davao. At sa

pag-uusap naming ito, hindi nila nasabi sa akin na hindi sila pabor sa BBL. Pabor sila sa BBL,"

Jaafar said. "Natitiyak ko naman na tutulong sila, at hindi sila sasalungat. After all, itong
gobyerno na ito ay inclusive to everyone." The MILF is a breakaway group of the MNLF. The

establishment of the ARMM is the result of negotiations between the government and the MNLF.

"Hindi po ito gobyerno ng MILF o MNLF. Ito po ay gobyerno ng lahat ng tao na nandoon," he

added. [Translation: Until now, I still get to talk to prominent leaders of MNLF in Davao. In all

our conversations, they never told me they were against BBL. They are for BBL. I am sure they

will help and will not oppose. After all, this government is inclusive to everyone. This is not a

government of the MILF or MNLF. This is a government of all the people residing there.]

What are the differences between the ARMM and the BARMM?

Political Structure and Justice System

While the ARMM has a unitary form of government, the BARMM will have a parliamentary-

democratic one. This means that the legislative and executive bodies in the ARMM are

independent, while those in the BARMM are more closely related and empowered to enact its

own laws. In the ARMM, the residents elect their regional governor and vice governor. The

regional governor has his own Cabinet and advisory council. The legislative power lies with the

regional legislative assembly, whose 24 members are also elected by the people. In the BARMM,

the residents will elect an 80-member parliament representing different parties, districts, and

sectors, including indigenous peoples. The members of the parliament will then elect a chief

minister and two deputy chief ministers among themselves. The chief minister shall also appoint

members of his Cabinet. For the judiciary, both autonomous regions give Shari'ah courts

jurisdiction over cases exclusively involving Muslims in the region. The OLBARMM gives the

Supreme Court the authority to grant the incumbent Shari'ah District and Court judges who are
not regular members of the Philippine Bar a period to qualify. Tribal laws will still apply to

disputes of indigenous peoples within the region.

Fiscal autonomy and special development fund

Regional government officials under the ARMM must justify their funding before the Congress

like other agencies. This resulted in the dependency of the supposed autonomous region on the

national government for its annual budget. Meanwhile, the BARMM will have an automatic

allocation of the annual block grant, equivalent to five percent of the net national internal

revenue of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the

Bureau of Customs.

The region's share in government revenue taxes, fees, charges, and taxes imposed on natural

resources will increase to 75 percent from the current 70 percent. The national government will

also allocate the Bangsamoro P5 billion annually for a period of ten years, which will be used for

the rehabilitation of conflict-affected areas.

Territory

The ARMM covers the provinces of Basilan, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi.

The same provinces also comprise the BARMM. However, a plebiscite still has to determine if

39 barangays in North Cotabato, six municipalities in Lanao del Norte, and the cities of Cotabato

in Maguindanao and Isabela in Basilan will be included in the Bangsamoro territory. The

plebiscite will be held within three to five months after Duterte signs the law.
Lanao del Norte and North Cotabato will also have to vote as provinces if they are willing to let

go of their towns and barangays to join the Bangsamoro. Contiguous areas may also be included

in the BARMM if there is a local government resolution or a petition where at least 10 percent of

registered voters seek to join the plebiscite. For territorial waters, existing laws define only

municipal waters nationwide, including those in ARMM. These cover 15 kilometers from the

low-water mark of coasts that are part of the territory. The Organic Law, meanwhile, introduces

regional waters for the BARMM extending up to 19 kilometers from the low-water mark.

Inland waters

According to the administrative code of the ARMM, inland bodies of water in the region like

Lake Lanao remain an "integral part of the national territory" of the country.

For the BARMM, all inland waters will be preserved and managed by the Bangsamoro

government. However, those that are utilized for energy in areas outside the BARMM will be co-

managed by the Bangsamoro government and the Department of Energy.

All government revenues from the development and usage of natural resources within the

BARMM will go to the Bangsamoro government, but revenues from fossil fuels and uranium

will be equally shared with the national government.

Defense and security

Like the ARMM, the national government will be responsible for the defense and security of the

BARMM. The Philippine National Police will also organize, maintain, and supervise a Police

Regional Office to enforce the law. Members of the MNLF and MILF may be admitted to the
police force. The qualifications for age, height, and educational attainment may be waived if

availed within five years after the ratification of the OLBARMM. Recruits from the two rebel

groups must fulfill the requirement on educational attainment within 15 years.

Bangsamoro Identity

Republic Act 9054, which strengthened the ARMM, provided an all-encompassing definition of

the Bangsamoro people. Section 3(b), Article X of the law states that they are "citizens who are

believers in Islam and who have retained some or all of their own social, economic, cultural, and

political institutions." The OLBARMM, meanwhile, recognizes and retains the historical and

geographical identity of the Bangsamoro people. Section 1, Article II of the Organic Law states

that Bangsamoro People are "those who, at the advent of the Spanish colonization, were

considered natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago and its adjacent

islands, whether of mixed or of full blood," including their spouses and descendants.

The transition from ARMM to BARMM will take place after the Commission on Elections holds

a plebiscite, ratifying the latter. President Duterte will then appoint 80 members to the

Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA), which automatically includes the incumbent officials

of the Regional Government. There must also be representatives for non-Moro indigenous

communities, youth, women, settler communities, traditional leaders, and other sectors. Duterte

will also appoint an interim Chief Minister among the BTA members, who will then organize an

interim Cabinet. Government personnel in education, health, and social welfare agencies will be

retained.during this time. The BTA will hold legislative and executive powers and is considered
the Bangsamoro government during the transition. The first local elections will be held in 2022.

The BTA will be dissolved once elected officials assume office. "When you talk about the BBL,

it's the advocacy of every Muslim… For the past years, since martial law, the Muslims have been

asking for self-determination." — Professor Jamel Cayamodin

One of the major roadblocks faced by all versions of the BBL is constitutionality. In 2008, the

Supreme Court declared the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD)

unconstitutional due to the failure of the government and the MILF to engage and consult the

affected communities. The MOA-AD proposed the creation of an autonomous political region in

Mindanao with its own police, military, and judicial systems. However, lawmakers and the BTC

conducted several consultations with various communities for the OLBARMM. House Majority

Floor Leader Rodolfo Fariñas said they even changed the wording of the law from a "basic law"

to an "organic law" to adhere to the Constitution. He added the draft measure originally proposed

for the new entity to be referred as the Bangsamoro, but it was changed to Bangsamoro

Autonomous Region to make it "very clear" that it is an autonomous region of the Philippines.

However, Fariñas said lawmakers still welcome questions of constitutionality on the

OLBARMM, even if it is brought up to the Supreme Court. "Of course, that's their right. And we

want them to bring it [up so] it will pass the test of constitutionality," Fariñas said. The

Bangsamoro government will have an asymmetrical relationship with the national government,

as the BARMM will have more autonomy than other regions in the country. While the national

government will retain powers over constitutional and national matters such as foreign affairs

and defense, the Bangsamoro government will have exclusive powers over some areas including
budgeting, administration of justice, agriculture, customary laws, creation of sources of revenue,

disaster risk reduction and management, economic zones, ancestral domain, grants and

donations, human rights, local government units, public works, social services, tourism, and

trade and industry. Various intergovernmental bodies will also be created to improve relations

and resolve issues between the national and Bangsamoro governments. These bodies include the

Philippine Congress-Bangsamoro Parliament Forum, the Fiscal Policy Board, the Joint Body for

Zones of Joint Cooperation, the Infrastructure Development Board, the Energy Board, and the

Bangsamoro Sustainable Development Board.

National Government Supports

ARMM officials and Nur Misuari and his supporters place much of the blame for the ARMM’s

significant state capacity and governance shortcomings on a perceived lack of national

government support and incomplete implementation of the Organic Act for the Autonomous

Region of Muslim Mindanao, Republic Act 6734 (1989), and the enhanced autonomy promised

for the ARMM in the Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region

in Muslim Mindanao, Republic Act 9054 (2001). 9 The Estrada administration that succeeded

the Ramos administration in 1998 was criticized for treating the 1996 peace deal between the

MNLF and the national government more as a personal agreement between President Ramos and

Nur Misuari. For the Maranao community in Lanao del Sur in particular, the ongoing national

government efforts to rehabilitate Marawi City, the largest city in the ARMM and the home of

the Maranao, could act as a litmus test for national government support and responsiveness to

local concerns. If so, then so far, so bad. The rehabilitation project has been hit by serious delays,
a lack of personal support from President Duterte, and complaints from a growing number of

Maranao civil society groups that their concerns are being ignored. The ground-breaking

ceremony for the rehabilitation of Marawi City was first scheduled for mid-April 2018. It

occurred on 30 October 2018, after numerous delays. President Duterte did not attend, choosing

instead to front another unrelated ceremony the next day in Cotabato City. President Duterte did

attend on 11 January 2018 the ground-breaking ceremony for the new, second army base in

Marawi City that is opposed by many of the city’s resident and displaced population. The

Maranao historically have expressed very little trust in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or

the Philippine National Police. By the end of November 2018, thirteen months after the president

announced the liberation of Marawi City, a main contractor for the rehabilitation of the most

affected areas was still missing. The China-led consortium that was first selected to lead the

rehabilitation failed to live up to its commitments and has been dispensed with. Negotiations

with a second China led consortium have yet to prosper. The national government’s Task Force

Bangon Marawi, headed by former general Eduardo Del Rosario, has been criticized both for the

absence of local Maranao members and for a lack of effective local consultation. The MILF and

politicians in Lanao del Sur stressed during the Marawi City siege and its aftermath that passing

the Bangsamoro Organic Law was necessary to ensure no repeat of the siege. If the rehabilitation

of Marawi City from the destruction of the siege goes badly, support in Marawi City and among

the Maranao for the BARMM could erode. The passage of the Bangsamoro Organic Law on 26

July 2018 is the signature nation building achievement of the Duterte administration and likely

would not have happened without the personal intervention of President Duterte. The

Bangsamoro Organic Law offers the best chance at addressing Muslim Mindanao’s political
alienation and ending the Moro insurgency. How these three challenges are addressed will help

determine how good this chance will be.

Powers to be granted to BARMM under the Bangsamoro Organic Law, Republic Act 11054

1. Administration of justice

2. Administrative organization

3. Agriculture, livestock and food security

4. Ancestral domain and natural resources

5. Barter trade and counter trade

6. Budgeting

7. Business name registration

8. Cadastral land survey (property boundaries)

9. Civil service

10. Classification of public lands

11. Cooperatives and social enterprises

12. Creation, division, merger of boundaries of municipalities and barangays

13. Creation of government-owned or controlled corporations and pioneer firms

14. Creation of sources of revenue

15. Cultural exchanges and economic and technical cooperation

16. Culture and language

17. Customary laws

18. Development programs for women, labour, youth, the elderly, the differently-abled and
indigenous peoples

19. Disaster reduction and risk management

20. Ecological solid waste management and pollution control

21. Economic zones, industrial parks and free ports

22. Educations and skills training

23. Eminent domain

24. Environment, parks, forest management, wildlife, and nature reserves’ conservation

25. Fishery, marine, and aquatic resources

26. Grants and donations

27. Hajj and Umrah (Muslim pilgrimages to Mecca)

28. Health

29. Housing and human settlements

30. Humanitarian services and institutions

31. Human rights

32. Indigenous people’s rights

33. Inland waters

34. Inland waterways for navigation

35. Islamic banking and finance

36. Labour, employment and occupation

Libraries and museums and historical, cultural and archaeological sites

38. Loans, credits, and other forms of indebtedness

39. Mechanisms for consultations for women and marginalized sectors

40. People’s organizations

41. Public utilities operations

42. Power sector investments

43. Public works and infrastructure

44. Quarantine regulations

45. Regulations of births, marriages, and deaths

46. Regulations of the manufacture and distribution of food, drinks, drugs and tobacco

47. Science and technology, research councils, and scholarship programs

48. Social services, social welfare, and charities

49. Sports and recreation

50. Technical cooperation for human resource development

51. Tourism development

52. Trade and industry

53. Urban and rural planning development

54. Urban land reform and land use

55. Water supply and services, floor control, and irrigation systems

Note: Power already specifically delegated to ARMM under the Organic Act for the Autonomous

Region of Muslim Mindanao, Republic Act 6734 (1989)

IV. CONCLUSION

At the heart of the Mindanao peace process which gave birth to the BOL is the struggle of the

Bangsamoro people to assert their right to self-determination. This assertion, however, tends to

be limited by the language of lawmaking. And while their assertion is solid in the language of

history that predates the Philippines, the language used in legislation is the language of the

Philippine Constitution.The BOL is drafted to affirm the Bangsamoro’s right to self-

determination through legislation, as it seeks to address decades, if not centuries, of historical

injustices committed against the Bangsamoro people. Bangsamoro Organic Law. However, the

language of the new organic law seems to suggest dilution instead of affirmation. “Right to self-

determination” has been edited to the “right to chart their political future through a democratic

process that will secure their identity and posterity,” while the words “asymmetrical political

relationship” and “parity of esteem,” both of which were also in the 2014 draft of the said law,

have been deleted entirely. But beyond technicalities, the more striking change is seen in terms

of the language of ownership. While all final drafts by the Bangsamoro Transition Commission,

the House of Representatives, and the Senate clearly state whose voice is embodied by the then

proposed legislation — “We, the Bangsamoro People” — the ratified BOL takes on a different

tone: “In recognition of the aspirations of the Bangsamoro people and other inhabitants in the

autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao, the Filipino people, by the act of the Congress of the

Philippines, do hereby ordain and promulgate this Organic Law.” The law shifts from a language

of ownership that says “ours” to a language of distinction that says “theirs.” In the same way the

Bangsamoro is displaced from the lands of their ancestors, they are also displaced in the

language of the law. Peace and development in Muslim Mindanao in the shared hope for BOL
which involves massive redesigning of the regional autonomy framework. First, by vesting in the

regional government substantial political and fiscal authority. Second, and more importantly, by

instituting mechanisms to encourage the genuine engagement of the Bangsamoro community in

the governance of the region. Very clearly demanding more effort and resources be devoted to

the rebuilding of the regional bureaucracy. The BOL can provide the political space for new

politics in the Bangsamoro. Note though that this not mean replacing traditional political families

in the region for obviously this will be impossible to achieve. But the parliamentary structure of

the regional government can give currently marginalized peoples in the Bangsamoro, such as

sectoral organizations, former combatants and ethnic groups, a chance at having substantial

representation. Apparently, the new governance structure offered by the BOL presents a better

chance at addressing the long-standing socio-economic inequality affecting the region.

Accordingly, it must be emphasized that the BOL is intrinsically linked to the Comprehensive

Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB)’s prescriptions on Normalization and Transitional Justice.

Indeed, it is an integral component of a broader state effort to combat terrorism and violent

extremism. The importance of local politicians in the success of the BOL and in the

Normalization process must not be underestimated. They also share in this responsibility and can

be held accountable accordingly.As a conclusion, it is worth noting again that the BOL is merely

a partial fulfillment of the CAB. Therefore, the Bangsamoro struggle for right to self-

determination will continue. A Bangsamoro sub-state within a federal system is still the ultimate

goal. But a fully-functioning regional autonomy framework under the BOL could definitely be

the perfect motivation for the whole country to undertake charter change and allow the

Bangsamoro people to attain this prime objective.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

To implement whether the BBL or the BOL to be adapted by the Autonomous Region is up to the

Congress (Senate and House of Representatives). Total disarmament of the different rebel

factions should be the most and mandatory. This is the first step towards attaining peace in the

region. Constitutionality of the adapted law of the Autonomous Region should be considered as

the most vital aspect. The executive and the judicial branches of the government of Autonomous

Region should be patterned with the format of the national government. Which is the democratic

form.
REFERENCES:

1) A good map of the current ARMM and proposed BARMM can be viewed at http://
springtimeofnations.blogspot.com/2013/09/introducing-bangsamoro-republikbut-for.html

2) Cotabato City is administratively separate from Maguindanao province where it is located as

is Isabela City from Basilan province.

3)Ruth Cabal, “Exclusive: MILF ‘traitors’ and ‘criminals’ – Misuari”, CNN Philippines, 8
November 2016, http://cnnphilippines.com/news/2016/11/07/exclusive-misuari-milf-traitors-
criminals.html

4) Joseph Franco, “The Zamboanga standoff: role of the Nur Misuari group”, RSIS Commentary,
17 September 2013, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/cens/2056-the-zamboanga-standoff-
roleo/#.XBh3B2kRWUk

5) Lian Buan, “Governor Tan of Sulu runs to Supreme Court to block Bangsamoro law”,
Rappler, 30 October 2018, https://www.rappler.com/nation/215554-sulu-abdusakur-tan-ii-
supreme-court-petitionblock-bangsamoro-organic-law

6) “Run for governor of Sulu, Tausug urge Nur’s son”, Manila Standard, 11 October 2018, http://
manilastandard.net/lgu/mindanao/277699/run-for-governor-of-sulu-tausug-urge-nur-s-son.html
To complicate matters even more, a group of eminent constitutional lawyers have also filed a
case with the Supreme Court claiming that the Bangsamoro Organic Law is unconstitutional,
Dona Z. Pazzibugan, “Stop Bangsamoro law, group asks Supreme Court”, Philippine Daily
Inquirer, 19 December 2018, https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1064442/stop-bangsamoro-law-group-
asks-supremecourt
7) 2017 Philippine Statistical Yearbook. Quezon City: Philippine Statistics Authority, October
2017, p. 2-24, https://psa.gov.ph/sites/default/files/PSY_2017_Jan%2016%202018.pdf

8) 2017 Philippine Statistical Yearbook. Quezon City: Philippine Statistics Authority, October
2017, p. 11, https://psa.gov.ph/sites/default/files/PSY_2017_Jan%2016%202018.pdf

9) “ARMM should continue moving on – and moving up”, Manila Times, 7 March 2015,
www.manilatimes.net/armm-should-continue-moving-on-and-moving-up/167841/; and R.J. May
“Muslim Mindanao: Four years after the peace agreement”, Southeast Asian Affairs 2001, edited
by Daljit Singh and Anthony L. Smith, Singapore: ISEAS, 2001, pp. 263-75.

10) Carolyn O. Arguillas “Breaking deadlines, breaking ground in Marawi’s battleground”,

MindaNews, 3 November 2018, http://www.mindanews.com/top-stories/2018/11/breaking-
deadlinesbreaking-ground-in-marawis-battleground/

11) C. Dayag-Laylo, “Exploring Conflict Management in the Autonomous Region of Muslim

Mindanao”, paper presented at the 4th Asian Regional Conference of the World Association for
Public Opinion Research, Makati City, Philippines, 23-24 February 2004, p. 6, https://
asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/ExploringConflict.pdf