SANGBIGKIS NOTES

CASE PRINCIPLES IN CIVIL LAW

Property Law Pt. 1

All Rights Reserved 2019

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CLASSIFICATION OF PROPERTY
Lands of Public Dominion vs Patrimonial Lands
Government owned lands, as long they are
Land and Building; Real Estate Mortgage
patrimonial property, can be sold to private parties,
While it is true that a mortgage of land necessarily
whether Filipino citizens or qualified private
includes, in the absence of stipulation of the
corporations. Thus, the so-called Friar Lands
improvements thereon, buildings, still a building by
acquired by the government under Act No. 1120 are
itself may be mortgaged apart from the land on
patrimonial property which even private
which it has been built. Such mortgage would be still
corporations can acquire by purchase. Likewise,
a real estate mortgage for the building would still be
reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain if sold
considered immovable property even if dealt with
or transferred to a public or municipal corporation
separately and apart from the land. ( Soriano vs. Galit,
for a monetary consideration become patrimonial
411 SCRA 631, G.R. No. 156295 September 23, 2003)
property in the hands of the public or municipal
corporation. Once converted to patrimonial
Machines; Immovable by Destination
property, the land may be sold by the public or
In the present case, the machines that were the
municipal corporation to private parties, whether
subjects of the Writ of Seizure were placed by
Filipino citizens or qualified private corporations.
petitioners in the factory built on their own land.
(Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority, 403 SCRA 1,
Indisputably, they were essential and principal
G.R. No. 133250 May 6, 2003)
elements of their chocolate-making industry. Hence,
although each of them was movable or personal
LAUREL VS ABROGAR (2006)
property on its own, all of them have become
Gas and electrical energy should not be equated
immobilized by destination because they are
with business or services provided by business
essential and principal elements in the industry. In
entrepreneurs to the public. Business does not have
that sense, petitioners are correct in arguing that the
an exact definition. Business is referred as that which
said machines are real, not personal, property
occupies the time, attention and labor of men for the
pursuant to Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code. (Serg’s
purpose of livelihood or profit. It embraces
Products, Inc. vs. PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc., 338
everything that which a person can be employed.66
SCRA 499, G.R. No. 137705 August 22, 2000)
Business may also mean employment, occupation or
profession. Business is also defined as a commercial
Effect of Stipulation or Agreement;Immovable
activity for gain benefit or advantage. Business, like
It should be stressed, however, that our holding—that
services in business, although are properties, are not
the machines should be deemed personal property
proper subjects of theft under the Revised Penal
pursuant to the Lease Agreement—is good only
Code because the same cannot be “taken” or
insofar as the contracting parties are concerned.
“occupied.” If it were otherwise, as claimed by the
Hence, while the parties are bound by the
respondents, there would be no juridical difference
Agreement, third persons acting in good faith are
between the taking of the business of a person or
not affected by its stipulation characterizing the
the services provided by him for gain, vis-à-vis, the
subject machinery as personal. In any event, there is
taking of goods, wares or merchandise, or
no showing that any specific third party would be
equipment comprising his business. If it was its
adversely affected. (Serg’s Products, Inc. vs. PCI
intention to include “business” as personal property
Leasing and Finance, Inc., 338 SCRA 499, G.R. No.
under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, the
137705 August 22, 2000)
Philippine Legislature should have spoken in
language that is clear and definite: that business is
Immovable by Destination
personal property under Article 308 of the Revised
Article 415 (9) of the New Civil Code provides that
Penal Code. (Laurel vs. Abrogar, 483 SCRA 243, G.R.
“[d]ocks and structures which, though floating, are
No. 155076 February 27, 2006)
intended by their nature and object to remain at a
fixed place on a river, lake, or coast” are considered
LAUREL VS ABROGAR (2009)
immovable property. Thus, power barges are
Interest in business was not specifically enumerated
categorized as immovable property by destination,
as personal property in the Civil Code in force at the
being in the nature of machinery and other
time the above decision was rendered. Yet, interest
implements intended by the owner for an industry or
in business was declared to be personal property
work which may be carried on in a building or on a
since it is capable of appropriation and not included
piece of land and which tend directly to meet the
in the enumeration of real properties. Article 414 of
needs of said industry or work. (FELS Energy, Inc. vs.
the Civil Code provides that all things which are or
Province of Batangas, 516 SCRA 186, G.R. No. 168557,
may be the object of appropriation are considered
G.R. No. 170628 February 16, 2007)

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either real property or personal property. Business is
likewise not enumerated as personal property under
the Civil Code. Just like interest in business,
however, it may be appropriated. Following the
ruling in Strochecker v. Ramirez, 44 Phil. 933 (1922),
business should also be classified as personal
property. Since it is not included in the exclusive
enumeration of real properties under Article 415, it is
therefore personal property. (Laurel vs. Abrogar, 576
SCRA 41, G.R. No. 155076 January 13, 2009)
Telecommunication Services; Business is considered
Personal Property
The Court ruled that even prior to the passage of the
RPC, jurisprudence is settled that “any personal
property, tangible or intangible, corporeal or
incorporeal, capable of appropriation can be the
object of theft.”[40] This jurisprudence, in turn,
applied the prevailing legal meaning of the term
“personal property” under the old Civil Code as
“anything susceptible of appropriation and not
included in the foregoing chapter (not real
property).”[41] PLDT’s telephone service or its
business of providing this was appropriable personal
property and was, in fact, the subject of
appropriation in an ISR operation, facilitated by
means of the unlawful use of PLDT’s facilities.
(Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company vs.
Alvarez, 718 SCRA 54, G.R. No. 179408 March 5, 2014)
Civil Code vs Special Laws; To govern Property Law
MERALCO insists on harmonizing the
aforementioned provisions of the Civil Code and the
Local Government Code. The Court disagrees,
however, for this would necessarily mean imposing
additional requirements for classifying machinery as
real property for real property tax purposes not
provided for, or even in direct conflict with, the
provisions of the Local Government Code. As
between the Civil Code, a general law governing
property and property relations, and the Local
Government Code, a special law granting local
government units the power to impose real property
tax, then the latter shall prevail. (Manila Electric
Company vs. The City Assessor, 765 SCRA 52, G.R.
No. 166102 August 5, 2015)
Immovable Property; Properties of Public Dominion
In any case, granting that petitioner’s present theory
is allowed at this stage, we nevertheless find it
untenable. Concededly, “ports constructed by the
State” are properties of the public dominion, as
Article 420 of the Civil Code enumerates these as
properties “intended for public use.” It must be
stressed however that what is being taxed in the
present case is petitioner’s warehouse, which,
although located within the port, is distinct from the
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE PRINCIPLES IN BOOK 2 (PROPERTY)
port itself. (Philippine Ports Authority vs. City of
Iloilo, 406 SCRA 88, G.R. No. 109791 July 14, 2003)
Submerged Lands; Reclaimed Lands
Submerged lands, like the waters (sea or bay) above
them, are part of the State’s inalienable natural
resources. Submerged lands are property of public
dominion, absolutely inalienable and outside the
commerce of man. This is also true with respect to
foreshore lands. Any sale of submerged or foreshore
lands is void being contrary to the Constitution.
Reclaimed lands are no longer foreshore or
submerged lands, and thus may qualify as alienable
agricultural lands of the public domain provided the
requirements of public land laws are met. (Chavez
vs. Public Estates Authority, 415 SCRA 403, G.R. No.
133250 November 11, 2003)
Lands of Public Dominion; Public Use
Like in MIAA, the airport lands and buildings of
MCIAA are properties of public dominion because
they are intended for public use. As properties of
public dominion, they indisputably belong to the
State or the Republic of the Philippines, and are
outside the commerce of man. This, unless petitioner
leases its real property to a taxable person, the
specific property leased becomes subject to real
property tax; in which case, only those portions of
petitioner’s properties which are leased to taxable
persons like private parties are subject to real
property tax by the City of Lapu-Lapu. (Mactan-
Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) vs. City
of Lapu-Lapu, 757 SCRA 323, G.R. No. 181756 June 15,
2015)
Patrimonial Property
In the case at bar, a school, a public market, and a
cemetery were built upon the subject property.
Unlike a public square as that in Nicolas Case or a
playground as that in the Province of Zamboanga del
Norte Case, schools, public markets and cemeteries
are not for the free and indiscriminate use of
everyone. The determination of the persons allowed
to study in such schools, or put up stalls in the public
market, or bury their dead in public cemeteries are
regulated by the government. As such, the subject
property is, under the Civil Code classification,
patrimonial property, and the Municipality may have
the same registered in its name. ( In the Matter of
Reversion/Recall of Reconstituted OCT No. 0-116, et
al. vs. Registry of Deeds, Tarlac City, 535 SCRA 476,
G.R. No. 171304 October 10, 2007)
Land Registration; Lands of Public Domains
There must be an express declaration by the State
that the public dominion property is no longer
intended for public service or the development of
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the national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial. Without such express
declaration, the property, even if classified as
alienable or disposable, remains property of the
public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus
incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only
when such alienable and disposable lands are
expressly declared by the State to be no longer
intended for public service or for the development of
the national wealth that the period of acquisitive
prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall
be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a
Presidential Proclamation in cases where the
President is duly authorized by law. (Heirs of Mario
Malabanan vs. Republic, 587 SCRA 172, G.R. No.
179987 April 29, 2009)
MALABANAN CASE PRINCIPLES
It is clear under the Civil Code that where
lands of the public domain are patrimonial in
character, they are susceptible to acquisitive
prescription. On the other hand, among the public
domain lands that are not susceptible to acquisitive
prescription are timber lands and mineral lands. The
Constitution itself proscribes private ownership of
timber or mineral lands. (Heirs of Mario Malabanan
vs. Republic, 587 SCRA 172, G.R. No. 179987 April 29,
2009)
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura
Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into the
country from the West by Spain through the Laws of
the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, all lands of the
public domain belong to the State. This means that
the State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership of land, and is charged with the
conservation of such patrimony. All lands not
appearing to be clearly under private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Also, public lands
remain part of the inalienable land of the public
domain unless the State is shown to have reclassified
or alienated them to private persons. (Heirs of Mario
Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippines, 704 SCRA
561, G.R. No. 179987 September 3, 2013)
Alienable and disposable lands of the State
fall into two categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands
of the State, or those classified as lands of private
ownership under Article 425 of the Civil Code,
without limitation; and (b) lands of the public
domain, or the public lands as provided by the
Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands
must only be agricultural. Consequently, lands
classified as forest or timber, mineral, or national
parks are not susceptible of alienation or disposition
unless they are reclassified as agricultural. A positive
act of the Government is necessary to enable such
reclassification, and the exclusive prerogative to
classify public lands under existing laws is vested in
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE PRINCIPLES IN BOOK 2 (PROPERTY)
the Executive Department, not in the courts. If,
however, public land will be classified as neither
agricultural, forest or timber, mineral or national
park, or when public land is no longer intended for
public service or for the development of the national
wealth, thereby effectively removing the land from
the ambit of public dominion, a declaration of such
conversion must be made in the form of a law duly
enacted by Congress or by a Presidential
proclamation in cases where the President is duly
authorized by law to that effect. Thus, until the
Executive Department exercises its prerogative to
classify or reclassify lands, or until Congress or the
President declares that the State no longer intends
the land to be used for public service or for the
development of national wealth, the Regalian
Doctrine is applicable. (Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs.
Republic of the Philippines, 704 SCRA 561, G.R. No.
179987 September 3, 2013)
Properties of Public Dominion vs Patrimonial
Property
Article 1113 of the Civil Code provides that “property
of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial
in character shall not be the object of prescription.”
Articles 420 and 421 identify what is property of
public dominion and what is patrimonial property:
Art. 420. The following things are property of public
dominion: (1) Those intended for public use, such as
roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads,
and others of similar character; (2) Those which
belong to the State, without being for public use,
and are intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth. Art. 421. All
other property of the State, which is not of the
character stated in the preceding article, is
patrimonial property. (Dream Village Neighborhood
Association, Inc. vs. Dases Conversion Development
Authority, 702 SCRA 222, G.R. No. 192896 July 24,
2013)
Torrens Title; Land Registration Laws
It is a settled rule that lands under a Torrens title
cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession. Section 47 of P.D. No. 1529, the Property
Registration Decree, expressly provides that no title
to registered land in derogation of the title of the
registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession. And, although the registered
landowner may still lose his right to recover the
possession of his registered property by reason of
laches, nowhere has Dream Village alleged or proved
laches, which has been defined as such neglect or
omission to assert a right, taken in conjunction with
lapse of time and other circumstances causing
prejudice to an adverse party, as will operate as a bar
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in equity. Put any way, it is a delay in the assertion of
a right which works disadvantage to another
because of the inequity founded on some change in
the condition or relations of the property or parties.
It is based on public policy which, for the peace of
society, ordains that relief will be denied to a stale
demand which otherwise could be a valid claim.
(Dream Village Neighborhood Association, Inc. vs.
Dases Conversion Development Authority, 702 SCRA
222, G.R. No. 192896 July 24, 2013)
Public Lands; Adverse Possession
Since property of public dominion is outside the
commerce of man and not susceptible to private
appropriation and acquisitive prescription, the
adverse possession which may be the basis of a
grant of title in the confirmation of an imperfect title
refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the
public domain. It is only after the Government has
declared the land to be alienable and disposable
agricultural land that the year of entry, cultivation
and exclusive and adverse possession can be
counted for purposes of an imperfect title. ( Celestial
vs. Cachopero, 413 SCRA 469, G.R. No. 142595
October 15, 2003)
Public Lands
Properties of public dominion, being for public use,
are not subject to levy, encumbrance or disposition
through public or private sale. Any encumbrance,
levy on execution or auction sale of any property of
public dominion is void for being contrary to public
policy. Otherwise, essential public services would
stop if properties of public dominion would be
subject to encumbrances, foreclosures and auction
sale. Since it is GEMASCO which is liable for the
payment of the separation pay and backwages to its
illegally dismissed employees, any contemplated
sale must be confined only to those properties
absolutely owned by it and the subject water tanks
must corollarily be excluded from the same. ( General
Mariano Alvarez Services Cooperative, Inc.
(GEMASCO) vs. National Housing Authority (NHA),
750 SCRA 156, G.R. No. 175417, G.R. No. 198923
February 9, 2015)
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OWNERSHIP
Disputable Presumption of Ownership
The Court finds that under applicable laws and
jurisprudence, respondent cannot be ejected from
the property by means of an ex parte writ of
possession. Article 433 of the Civil Code states: Art.
433. Actual possession under claim of ownership
raises a disputable presumption of ownership. The
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE PRINCIPLES IN BOOK 2 (PROPERTY)
true owner must resort to judicial process for the
recovery of the property. Under the aforequoted
provision, one who claims to be the owner of a
property possessed by another must bring the
appropriate judicial action for its physical recovery.
The term “judicial process” could mean no less than
an ejectment suit or reivindicatory action, in which
the ownership claims of the contending parties may
be properly heard and adjudicated. In the present
case, petitioner had already complied with this
procedure by filing Civil Case No. 21957. The ex parte
petition for issuance of a possessory writ filed by
petitioner’s predecessor, TRB, in LRC CAD. REC. NOS.
1 and 9616, strictly speaking, is not the kind of
“judicial process” contemplated above. Even if the
same may be considered a judicial proceeding for
the enforcement of one’s right of possession as
purchaser in a foreclosure sale, it is not an ordinary
suit filed in court, by which one party “sues another
for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong.” ( Dayot vs. Shell
Chemical Company (Phils.), Inc., 525 SCRA 535, G.R.
No. 156542 June 26, 2007)
Accion Reinvindicatoria
Article 434 of the Civil Code provides that to
successfully maintain an action to recover the
ownership of a real property, the person who claims
a better right to it must prove two (2) things: first,
the identity of the land claimed, and; second, his title
thereto. In regard to the first requisite, in an accion
reinvindicatoria, the person who claims that he has a
better right to the property must first fix the identity
of the land he is claiming by describing the location,
area and boundaries thereof. VSD Realty &
Development Corporation vs. Uniwide Sales, Inc.,
684 SCRA 470, G.R. No. 170677 October 24, 2012
Accion Reinvindicatoria (MR of VS Realty Case)
The established legal principle in actions for
annulment or reconveyance of title is that a party
seeking it should establish not merely by a
preponderance of evidence but by clear and
convincing evidence that the land sought to be
reconveyed is his. Article 434 of the Civil Code
provides that to successfully maintain an action to
recover the ownership of a real property, the person
who claims a better right to it must prove two (2)
things: first, the identity of the land claimed, and;
second, his title thereto. In an action to recover, the
property must be identified, and the plaintiff must
rely on the strength of his title and not on the
weakness of the defendant’s claim.
SD Realty & Development Corporation vs. Uniwide
Sales, Inc,, 702 SCRA 597, G.R. No. 170677 July 31,
2013
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Defense of Ownership
The defense of ownership contemplated by the said
rule refers to a situation where the defendants either
claim ownership of the subject property or attributes
said ownership to another person other than the
plaintiff. It does not apply where the defendants
merely question the validity of the title of the
plaintiff. Thus, the petitioner spouses must anchor
the legality of their material possession of the
property on a claim of title in order for the court to
be able to touch, at least provisionally and only for
purposes of determining possession, on the legality
of the issue of ownership. (Lacap vs. Lee, 394 SCRA 1,
G.R. No. 142131 December 11, 2002)
Presumption of Good Faith; Both Parties acted in
Bad Faith
We note from the records, however, that the Church,
despite knowledge that its intended contract of sale
with the NHA had not been perfected, proceeded to
introduce improvements on the disputed land. On
the other hand, the NHA knowingly granted the
Church temporary use of the subject properties and
did not prevent the Church from making
improvements thereon. Thus, the Church and the
NHA, who both acted in bad faith, shall be treated as
if they were both in good faith. ( National Housing
Authority vs. Grace Baptist Church, 424 SCRA 147,
G.R. No. 156437 March 1, 2004)
Possession; Builder in Good Faith
A builder in good faith can, under the foregoing
provisions, compel the landowner to make a choice
between appropriating the building by paying the
proper indemnity or obliging the builder to pay the
price of the land. The choice belongs to the owner of
the land, a rule that accords with the principle of
accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the
principal and not the other way around. Even as the
option lies with the landowner, the grant to him,
nevertheless, is preclusive. He must choose one. He
cannot, for instance, compel the owner of the
building to instead remove it from the land. In order,
however, that the builder can invoke that accruing
benefit and enjoy his corresponding right to demand
that a choice be made by the landowner, he should
be able to prove good faith on his part. (Philippine
National Bank vs. De Jesus, 411 SCRA 557, G.R. No.
149295 September 23, 2003)
Builder in Good Faith
Where a party’s occupation of the subject property
was by mere tolerance, she has no right to retain its
possession under Article 448 of the Civil Code
Esmaquel vs. Coprada, 638 SCRA 428, G.R. No.
152423 December 15, 2010
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE PRINCIPLES IN BOOK 2 (PROPERTY)
Builders in Good Faith
The trial court ruled that the DepEd is a builder in
good faith. To be deemed a builder in good faith, it is
essential that a person asserts title to the land on
which he builds, i.e., that he be a possessor in the
concept of owner, and that he be unaware that there
exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw
which invalidates it. However, there are cases where
Article 448 of the Civil Code was applied beyond the
recognized and limited definition of good faith, e.g.,
cases wherein the builder has constructed
improvements on the land of another with the
consent of the owner. The Court ruled therein that
the structures were built in good faith in those cases
that the owners knew and approved of the
construction of improvements on the property. It is
provided under Article 448 of the Civil Code that the
builder cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value
is considerably more than that of the improvements
and buildings. (Department of Education vs.
Casibang, 782 SCRA 326, G.R. No. 192268 January 27,
2016)
Builders in Good Faith; Art. 448; When to Apply
Article 448 of the Civil Code applies when the builder
believes that he is the owner of the land or that by
some title he has the right to build thereon, or that,
at least, he has a claim of title thereto. Concededly,
this is not present in the instant case. The subject
property is covered by a Contract to Sell hence
ownership still remains with petitioner being the
seller. Nevertheless, there were already instances
where this Court applied Article 448 even if the
builders do not have a claim of title over the
property. (Communities Cagayan, Inc. vs. Nanol, 685
SCRA 453, G.R. No. 176791 November 14, 2012)
Builders in Bad Faith;
We hold that petitioners, as the owners of the land,
have the right to appropriate what has been built on
the property, without any obligation to pay
indemnity therefor; and that respondents have no
right to a refund of any improvement built therein,
pursuant to Articles 449 and 450 of the Civil Code
Aquino vs. Aguilar, 760 SCRA 444, G.R. No. 182754
June 29, 2015
Builders in Bad Faith; Right to be Reimbused
Pursuant to Article 452 of the Civil Code, a builder in
bad faith is entitled to recoup the necessary
expenses incurred for the preservation of the land.
The CA correctly ruled that respondents in this case
are similarly entitled to this reimbursement.
However, being builders in bad faith, they do not
have the right of retention over the premises.
Aquino vs. Aguilar, 760 SCRA 444, G.R. No. 182754
June 29, 2015
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Builder in Good Faith; Rights
Article 448 of the Civil Code, in relation to Article 546
of the same Code, which provides for full
reimbursement of useful improvements and
retention of the premises until reimbursement is
made only to a possessor in good faith who builds on
land with the belief that he is the owner thereof. It
does not apply where one’s only interest is that of a
lessee under a rental contract. VSD Realty &
Development Corporation vs. Uniwide Sales, Inc.,
684 SCRA 470, G.R. No. 170677 October 24, 2012
Obligation of a Landowner under Art. 448
Article 448 of the Civil Code provides that if the
landowner opts to “appropriate as his own the
works, sowing or planting,” he must pay indemnity to
the builder, planter, or sower in good faith in
accordance with the relevant provisions of the Code.
Automat Realty and Development Corporation vs.
Dela Cruz, Sr., 737 SCRA 395, G.R. No. 192026
October 1, 2014
Landowner Exercises Rights under Art. 448;
Reckoning Period
The reckoning period for valuing the property in case
the landowner exercised his rights in accordance
with Article 448 shall be at the time the landowner
elected his choice. Therefore, the basis for the
computation of the value of the subject property in
the instant case should be its present or current fair
market value. (Department of Education vs.
Casibang, 782 SCRA 326, G.R. No. 192268 January 27,
2016)
Occupation by Mere Tolerance; Builder in Bad Faith
As found by the trial court, petitioner’s possession of
the land was by mere tolerance of the respondents.
We have held in a number of cases that one whose
stay is merely tolerated becomes a deforciant
occupant the moment he is required to leave. He is
bound by his implied promise, in the absence of a
contract, that he will vacate upon demand.
Considering that he occupies the land by mere
tolerance, he is aware that his occupation of the
same may be terminated by respondents any time.
(Del Rosario vs. Manuel, 420 SCRA 128, G.R. No.
153652 January 16, 2004)
Accession
Article 461 provides for compensation for the loss of
the land occupied by the new bed since it is believed
more equitable to compensate the actual losers than
to add land to those who have lost nothing. Thus, the
abandoned river bed is given to the owner(s) of the
land(s) onto which the river changed its course
instead of the riparian owner(s). (Celestial vs.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE PRINCIPLES IN BOOK 2 (PROPERTY)
Cachopero, 413 SCRA 469, G.R. No. 142595 October
15, 2003)
Accession; Land Titles; Land Registration Laws
Rivers and their natural beds are undoubtedly
properties of public dominion (Art. 502 par. 1, Civil
Code of the Philippines). Whether navigable or not,
rivers belong to the public and cannot be acquired
by prescription (Com vs. Meneses, 38 O.G. 2839,
Paras, Civil Code, p. 328, Vol. II, 12th Edition). In fact,
a stream located within private land is still property
of public dominion, even if the Torrens Title of the
land does not show the existence of said stream
(Talion vs. Sec. of Public Works and Highways, L-
24281, May 16, 1967; Paras, supra). Correspondingly,
Art. 462 of the same Civil Code provides: Art. 462.
Whenever a river, changing its course by natural
causes, opens a new bed through a private estate,
this bed shall become of public dominion. The rule is
the same that even if the new bed is on private
property. The bed becomes property of public
dominion. Just as the old bed had been of public
dominion before the abandonment, the new
riverbed shall likewise be of public dominion (Hilario
vs. City of Manila, L-19570, April 27, 1967).
(Morandarte vs. Court of Appeals, 436 SCRA 213, G.R.
No. 123586 August 12, 2004)
Acquisitive Prescription; Ordinary and Extraordinary
Acquisitive prescription of real rights may be
ordinary or extraordinary.19 Ordinary acquisitive
prescription requires possession in good faith and
with just title for ten years.20 In extraordinary
prescription, ownership and other real rights over
immovable property are acquired through
uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years
without need of title or of good faith. The good faith
of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief
that the person from whom he received the thing
was the owner thereof, and could transmit his
ownership.22 For purposes of prescription, there is
just title when the adverse claimant came into
possession of the property through one of the
modes recognized by law for the acquisition of
ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was
not the owner or could not transmit any right.
(Imuan vs. Cereno, 599 SCRA 423, G.R. No. 167995
September 11, 2009)
Land Registration; Land Titles
Registering land under the Torrens System does not
create or vest title because registration is not a
mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is
merely an evidence of ownership or title over the
particular property described therein. ( Heirs of
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Susana De Guzman Tuazon vs. Court of Appeals, 420
SCRA 219, G.R. No. 125758 January 20, 2004)
Quieting of Title
Article 476 of the Civil Code provides that an action
to quiet title may be brought when there exists a
cloud on the title to real property or any interest
therein. In the early case of Bautista v. Exconde, we
held that a property owner whose property rights
were being disturbed may ask a competent court for
a proper determination of the respective rights of
the party-claimants, not only to place things in their
proper place, that is, to require the one who has no
right to refrain from acts injurious to the peaceful
enjoyment of the property not only of the rightful
owner but also for the benefit of both with the view
of dissipating any cloud of doubt over the property.
(Gapacan vs. Omipet, 387 SCRA 383, G.R. No. 148943
August 15, 2002)
Quieting of Title
As a general rule, a cloud which may be removed by
suit to quiet title is not created by mere verbal or
parol assertion of ownership of or an interest in
property. This rule is subject to qualification, where
there is a written or factual basis for the asserted
right. Thus, a claim of right based on acquisitive
prescription or adverse possession has been held to
constitute a removable cloud on title. ( Tandog vs.
Macapagal, 532 SCRA 550, G.R. No. 144208
September 11, 2007)
Quieting of Title; Requisites
Under Articles 476 and 477 of the New Civil Code,
there are two indispensable requisites in order that
an action to quiet title could prosper: (1) that the
plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable
title to or interest in the real property subject of the
action; and (2) that the deed, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title
must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative
despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal
efficacy. (Clado-Reyes vs. Limpe, 557 SCRA 400 ,
G.R. No. 163876 July 9, 2008)
Quieting of Title; Concept
An action for quieting of title is a remedy which may
be availed of only when by reason of any instrument,
record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding, which
appears valid but is, in fact, invalid, ineffective,
voidable or unenforceable, a cloud is thereby cast on
the complainant’s title to real property or any
interest therein. Article 476 of the Civil Code
provides: Article 476. Whenever there is a cloud on
title to real property or any interest therein, by
reason of any instrument, record, claim,
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE PRINCIPLES IN BOOK 2 (PROPERTY)
encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently
valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid,
ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be
prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to
remove such cloud or to quiet the title. An action
may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being
cast upon title to real property or any interest
therein. (Heirs of Enrique Diaz vs. Virata, 498 SCRA
141, G.R. No. 162037 August 7, 2006)
Land Titles; Land Registration Laws; Certificate of
Title
It is well-settled that even if the procurement of a
certificate of title was tainted with fraud and
misrepresentation, such defective title may be the
source of a completely legal and valid title in the
hands of an innocent purchaser for value. Where
innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of
the certificate of title thus issued, acquire rights over
the property, the court cannot disregard such rights
and order the total cancellation of the certificate.
The effect of such an outright cancellation would be
to impair public confidence in the certificate of title,
for everyone dealing with property registered under
the Torrens system would have to inquire in every
instance whether the title has been regularly or
irregularly issued. This is contrary to the evident
purpose of the law. ( Heirs of Victorino Sarili, The vs.
Lagrosa, 713 SCRA 726, G.R. No. 193517 January 15,
2014)
Mirror Doctrine; Land Titles
The general rule is that every person dealing with
registered land may safely rely on the correctness of
the certificate of title issued therefor and the law will
in no way oblige him to go beyond the certificate to
determine the condition of the property. ( Heirs of
Victorino Sarili, The vs. Lagrosa, 713 SCRA 726, G.R.
No. 193517 January 15, 2014)
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CO-OWNERSHIP
Co-ownership; Concept
The juridical concept of co-ownership is unity of the
object or property and plurality of subjects; Each co-
owner, jointly with the other co-owners, is the owner
of the whole property, but at the same time of the
undivided aliquot part. (Gapacan vs. Omipet, 387
SCRA 383, G.R. No. 148943 August 15, 2002)
Co-ownership; Concept and Requisites
It is a fundamental principle that a co-owner cannot
acquire by prescription the share of the other co-
owners, absent any clear repudiation of the co-
ownership. In order that the title may prescribe in
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favor of a co-owner, the following requisites must Possession acquired in good faith does not lose this
concur: (1) the co-owner has performed unequivocal character except in the case and from the moment
acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the facts exist which show that the possessor is not
other co-owners; (2) such positive acts of unaware that he possesses the thing improperly or
repudiation have been made known to the other co- wrongfully. The good faith ceases or is legally
owners; and (3) the evidence thereof is clear and interrupted from the moment defects in the title are
convincing. (Robles vs. Court of Appeals, 328 SCRA made known to the possessor, by extraneous
97, G.R. No. 123509 March 14, 2000) evidence or by suit for recovery of the property by
-------------------------------------------------------- the true owner. Rosales vs. Castelltort, 472 SCRA 144,
G.R. No. 157044 October 5, 2005
POSSESSION
Possessors in Good Faith
Dionisio was then well aware that this temporary
arrangement may be terminated at any time.
Respondents cannot now refuse to vacate the
property or eventually demand reimbursement of
necessary and useful expenses under Articles 448
and 546 of the New Civil Code, because the
provisions apply only to a possessor in good faith,
i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is
the owner thereof. Persons who occupy land by
virtue of tolerance of the owners are not possessors
in good faith. Thus, the directive of the RTC for
respondents to demolish their residential house on
Lot No. 5053-H was also proper. ( Heirs of Cipriano
Trazona vs. Heirs of Dionisio Cañada, 712 SCRA 300,
G.R. No. 175874 December 11, 2013)

Unlawful Detainer; Ejectment; Possession

In unlawful detainer cases, the possession of the
defendant was originally legal, as his possession was
permitted by the plaintiff on account of an express
or implied contract between them. However,
defendant’s possession became illegal when the
plaintiff demanded that defendant vacate the
subject property due to the expiration or termination
of the right to possess under their contract, and
defendant refused to heed such demand. The sole
issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is
physical or material possession of the property
involved, independent of any claim of ownership by
any of the parties. Where the issue of ownership is
raised by any of the parties, the courts may pass
upon the same in order to determine who has the
right to possess the property. The adjudication is,
however, merely provisional and would not bar or
prejudice an action between the same parties
involving title to the property. Since the issue of
ownership was raised in the unlawful detainer case,
its resolution boils down to which of the parties’
respective evidence deserves more weight.
(Esmaquel vs. Coprada, 638 SCRA 428, G.R. No.
152423 December 15, 2010)

Possession acquired in Good Faith

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