DIGESTS:

1. Padilla vs. Court of Appeals 129 SCRA 55

Facts:
Petitioner Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdones, Pepito Bedena, Yolly Rico, David Bermundo, Villanaoc,
Roberto Rosales, Villania, Garrido, Ortega jr., Celestino, “Kamlon” and 14 Ricardo Does was charged
of Grave Coercion.
On Feb 1964 around 9 am at Camarines Norte, The petitioners willfully and feloniously prevented
Antonio Vergara and his family from closing their stall at the Public Market. Petitioners forcibly
opened the door of the stall and brutally demolished the stall using axes then carrying away the goods
and merchandise.
Such acts of the petitioners where said to be pursuant to an ordinance. The damage amounted to 30K
for actual damages and 20K for exemplary damages. Roy Padilla and company also took advantage of
their public position, being the Mayor of the said municipality and the others being policemen. The CFI
finds them guilty. The CA acquitted the accused but ordered them to pay jointly and severally 9,600 as
actual damages.
Issue: WON the order of payment for damages is valid notwithstanding the acquittal of the accused.
Held: Yes it is valid. Civil liability is not extinguished where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt
that the accused is guilty of the crime charged. No separate civil action is necessary considering that the
facts to be proved in the civil case have already been established in the criminal proceeding. To require
a separate civil action would only clod the court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation. A
separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be established.

2. SECURITY BANK CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. JUDGE MANUEL D. VICTORIO,

Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 141; THE TRADE AND INVESTMENT
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE MAR FISHING
COMPANY, INC., respondents.
FACTS:
On February 3, 1983, the MAR Fishing Company, Inc. (MFCI), obtained a US$2-million loan from the
PISO Development Bank (PISO Bank) to finance its importation of a fishing vessel to be used in its
fishing activities under the PISOs re-lending credit line from the Asian Development Bank. Under the
Loan Agreement executed by the MFCI, it was obliged to pay the loan in 10 years, from the date of
PISO Banks approval of the loan with a two-year grace period.

FCI failed to pay its loan account to the PISO Bank. On August 11, 1987, the PISO Bank filed a
Complaint against SBC with the RTC of Makati City, docketed as Civil Case No. 175634. The case
was raffled to Branch 147 of the court.
On September 1, 1999, TIDCORP filed a complaint for sum of money against the SBC, docketed as
Civil Case No. 99-1581 and raffled to Branch 141 of the court. TIDCORP alleged, inter alia, that on or
about August, 1981 MFCI obtained loans from Export Credit Corporation of Canada (EDC) in the
amount of US$6,333,564.00 which was covered by its irrevocable and unconditional guarantee; MFCI
defaulted in the payments of its said loan, and the plaintiff was compelled to pay and/or settle the
obligations of MFCI to EDC; on November 10, 1987, the plaintiff and MFCI executed a Restructuring
Agreement covering the latters obligations, but still failed to pay P855,766,785.00 as of September 11,
1998; on August 20, 1998 MFCI assigned the amount of P5 Million to TIDCORP, including all
deposits and interests that may have accrued thereto from MFCIs Sinking Fund under the custody of
SBC; by virtue of the Deed of Assignment executed by MFCI to the plaintiff (TIDCORP), the latter
demanded from SBC the delivery and/or payment of the said amount, including all deposits and
interests that may have accrued thereto, but SBC refused to do so.
SBC argued that, if the judgment of the RTC in Civil Case No. 17563 would be unfavorable to it, it
would be held liable to plaintiff PISO Bank, then third-party defendant MFCI would be liable to
defendant SBC, in which case the obligations of the third-party defendant MFCI would be outstanding,
and entitling SBC to enforce its lien over the Sinking Fund. It averred that it had a better right to the
fund because its lien antedated the assignment of the fund. If, on the other hand, the judgment of the
RTC in Civil Case No. 17563 would be in its favor in that it would not be held liable to the plaintiff
therein, then, the third-party defendant will not be liable to the defendant in which case, it would lose
its lien over the Sinking Fund.
SBC further averred that the transactions and issues in Civil Case No. 17563 and in the case before the
court were interrelated, and that the proceedings should be suspended to await the outcome of Civil
Case No. 99-1581. The defendant cited the rulings of the Court in Quiambao v. Osorio,[24] Vidad v.
RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch 42[25] and City of Pasig v. Commission on Elections,[26] that
prejudicial questions may be appreciated even if no criminal case is involved.

ISSUE:
WHETHER RESPONDENTS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION BY DISREGARDING SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE IN
DENYING THE SUSPENSION OF FURTHER HEARINGS IN THE TIDCORP CASE UNTIL
AFTER A FINAL JUDGMENT SHALL HAVE BEEN PROMULGATED IN THE PISO CASE [

RULING:
The petition has no merit.
For clarity, the Court will refer to Civil Case No. 17563 pending in Branch 141 of the RTC as the
FIRST CASE. The plaintiff therein is the PISO Bank, while the defendant and third-party plaintiff
therein is the petitioner. The MFCI is the third-party defendant. The Court will refer to Civil Case No.
99-1581 as the SECOND CASE, the plaintiff therein being the respondent TIDCORP, and the
defendant is petitioner SBC. The MFCI is also the third-party defendant therein.
The petitioner harps on the need for the suspension of the proceedings in the SECOND CASE based
on a prejudicial question still to be resolved in the FIRST CASE. But the doctrine of prejudicial
question comes into play generally only in a situation under Section 5, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure[30] where civil and criminal actions are pending and the issues involved in both
cases are similar or so closely related that an issue must be preemptively resolved in the civil cases
before the criminal action

3.PIMENTEL V. PIMENTEL
G.R. No. 172060, [September 13, 2010]

FACTS:
On 25 October 2004, Maria Pimentel y Lacap(private respondent) filed an action for frustrated
parricide against Joselito Pimentel (petitioner) before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo City for the pre-trial and trial of a civil case (Maria Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC
Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the
relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of the civil
case would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City.
The RTC Quezon City held that the pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial
question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order before the Court of Appeals. However, The Court of Appeals ruled that
even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent would be declared void, it would be immaterial
to the criminal case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the crime of
frustrated parricide had already been committed.
ISSUE:
Whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants
the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.
HELD:
No.
RATIO:
Annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is not a prejudicial question in a
criminal case for parricide.
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that elements of a prejudicial
question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to
the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
In the case at bar, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for
frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure was not met since the civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.
The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of parricide, which
punishes any person “who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or
any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse.” However, the issue in the annulment of marriage
is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the
relationship between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused.
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether
petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in
parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with
frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have killed
respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of petitioner’s will. At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and
respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage will have no effect on the
alleged crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the
marriage
between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at
the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.
We cannot accept petitioner’s reliance on Tenebro v. Court of Appeals that “the judicial declaration of
the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the
celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned x x x.” First, the
issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial declaration of nullity of a second or subsequent marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity on a criminal liability for bigamy. There was no issue of
prejudicial question in that case. Second, the Court ruled in Tenebro that “[t]here is x x x a recognition
written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal
consequences.” In fact, the Court declared in that case that “a declaration of the nullity of the second
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s
penal laws are concerned.”

ASSIGNMENT CASES TO BE DIGESTED (below)

THE CASE:
G.R. No. 86939 August 2, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SANTOS DUCAY and EDGARDO DUCAY, accused. SANTOS DUCAY,
accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Valmonte Law Office for accused-appellant.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

FACTS:
Santos Ducay and Edgardo Ducay, father and son, were charged with the complex crime of double murder
and multiple frustrated murder in an Information filed on 16 October 1986 with intent to kill Pacita Labos,
Manuel Labos, Lina Labos-Mojica, Edwin Labos and Ma. Cristina Labos, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and treachery, attack, assault and shoot with a .45 caliber
[pistol] and shotgun they were then provided the said Pacita Labos, Manuel Labos; Lina Labos-Mojica,
Edwin Labos and Maria Cristina Labos, hitting them on their body, thereby causing them serious physical
injuries which directly caused the death of Pacita Labos and Manuel Labos; thereby, also, with respect to
Lina Labos-Mojica, Edwin Labos and Maria Cristina Labos, performing all the acts of execution which
ordinarily would have produced the crime of murder but which nevertheless did not produce it by reason of
a cause independent of their will, that is, the timely and able medical attendance rendered to said Lina
Labos-Mojica, Edwin Labos and Maria Cristina Labos which prevented their death.
Upon arraignment, both accused entered a plea not guilty. In due course, the trial on the merits proceeded.
On 29 April 1988, the trial court promulgated its judgment finding Santos Ducay guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged but acquitting Edgardo Ducay on ground of reasonable doubt.
Santos Ducay, hereinafter referred to as the Appellant, then filed on 7 June 1988 a Notice of Appeal.

ISSUE:
whether the death of several victims from several shots constitute several offenses?

RULING:
The crimes committed by the appellant and his companion, which were proven beyond reasonable doubt
are: (1) two counts of murder with the qualifying circumstance of treachery since the attack on the victims
was so sudden and at a time when the victims were barely awake, thus giving them no chance whatsoever
to defend themselves; and (2) three counts of frustrated murder.
the challenged judgment of Branch 172 of the Regional Trial court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila in Criminal
Case No. 7792-V-6 is AFFIRMED subject to the modifications herein indicated. As modified, appellant
Santos Ducay is convicted of (a) two crimes of murder for the death of Pacita Labos and Manuel Labos and
is accordingly sentenced to reclusion perpetua for each death, with the indemnity in each crime increased
from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 in conformance with the current policy of this Court; and (b) three crimes of
frustrated murder committed on Lina Labos, Ma. Cristina Labos and Edwin Labos, and is hereby sentenced
in each crime to an indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium as
minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal medium as
maximum.
DOCTRINE LEARNED:
The information in this case, although denominated as one for a complex crime, clearly charges the
accused with five different criminal acts. It states: "the above-named accused, with intent to kill Pacita
Labos, Manuel Labos, Lina Labos-Mojica, Edwin Labos, and Ma. Cristina Labos, . . . did then and there . . .
attack, assault and shoot with a .45 caliber [pistol] and shotgun they were then provided the said Pacita
Labos, Manuel Labos, Lina Labos-Mojica, Edwin Labos and Ma. Cristina Labos, . . . ." The appellant and
his co-accused did not move to quash the information on the ground of multiplicity of charges. At no other
time thereafter did they object thereto. They therefore waived such defectnd the trial court thus validly
rendered judgment against them for as many crimes as were alleged and proven.
The trial court correctly ruled that there was no complex crime "considering that the trigger of the gun used
in committing the acts complained of was pressed in several instances and not in one single act." It is
settled that when various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct
crimes.

THE CASE:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FERNANDO "Ando" COSTALES and
FERNANDO RAMIREZ (at-large), accused.
FERNANDO "Ando" COSTALES, accused-appellant.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:

FACTS:
Accused Fernando "Ando" Costales and Fernando Ramirez, the latter being still at large, stood charged
with the murder of Miguel Marcelo and the frustrated murder of Crispina Marcelo. As the perpetrators were
found to be in unlawful possession of firearms they were also charged with violation of PD 1866, as
amended by RA 8294.
Since accused Fernando Ramirez remained at large, only accused Fernando "Ando" Costales was
arraigned and tried.
Accused Fernando Costales takes exception to the findings of the trial court and thus seeks reversal of his
convictions on the ground that it erred: (a) in according credence to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses although the same are perforated with material inconsistencies and bias; (b) in not giving weight
to the defense of alibi despite the weakness of the prosecution evidence; (c) in convicting him of violation of
Sec. 1, PD 1866, as amended, since the same was absorbed in the crime of murder; (d) in finding that the
crime was attended by conspiracy despite the fact that no aggravating circumstance was established
beyond reasonable doubt; and, (e) in not appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in
his favor.
Accused-appellant decries the Decision of the court a quo in qualifying the crimes of murder and attempted
murder with illegal possession of firearm and at the same time convicting him for violation of PD 1866, as
amended.

ISSUE:
Whether Illegal possession of firearms committed ahould be treated as a separte offense

RULING:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision finding accused-appellant Fernando "Ando" Costales guilty of murder
and attempted murder is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATION: In Crim. Case No. T-2057, the
crime of murder not being considered to have been attended by any generic mitigating or aggravating
circumstances, accused-appellant Fernando "Ando" Costales is sentenced to suffer only the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. In Crim. Case No. T-2056, the crime of attempted murder not likewise considered to
have been attended by any generic mitigating or aggravating circumstances, accused-appellant Fernando
"Ando" Costales is accordingly sentenced in addition to his penalty imposed in Crim. Case No. T-2057
herein before mentioned, to suffer an indeterminate prison term of two (2) years and four (4) months of
prision correccional medium as minimum, to eight (8) years and six (6) months of prision mayor minimum
as maximum;
Accused-appellant Fernando "Ando" Costales is further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim Miguel
Marcelo P50,000.00 as death indemnity and another P50,000.00 as moral damages.
Although the prosecution duly established that the crime of illegal possession of firearm under PD 1866
was committed, RA 8294, which took effect , amended the decree and now considers the use of unlicensed
firearm as a special aggravating circumstance in murder and homicide, and not as a separate offense.
As it should be, possession and use of firearm without license should aggravate the crimes of murder and
frustrated murder as herein charged but, fortunately for accused-appellant, Secs. 8 and 9 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure, which took effect 1 December 2000, now require the qualifying as well as
aggravating circumstances to be expressly and specifically alleged in the complaint or information,
otherwise the same will not be considered by the court even if proved during the trial. Withal, in the
absence of any allegation in the Information in Crim. Case No. T-2057 that accused-appellant committed
murder with the use of unlicensed firearm, the same cannot be appreciated in imposing the proper penalty.

DOCTRINED LEARNED:
Where there is nothing in the evidence to show that the wound would be fatal if not medically attended to,
the character of the wound is doubtful; hence, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused and the
crime committed by him may be declared as attempted, not frustrated murder.