CHAPTER 4 DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY CASE DIGESTS

SANDERS VS. VERIDIANO II

Justice Cruz 1998
FACTS:
Petitioner:

Dale Sanders –Special Services Director of NAVSTA (Naval Station)

Moreau –Commanding Officer of the Subic Naval Base

Respondents:
Rossi (permanent residence of Phil) and Wyer (did two years ago)
–American Citizen employed as game room attendants in the special services department of NAVSTA
Events:
Private Respondents employment had been converted from permanent full-time to part-time
Respondents filed protest and a recommendation report was made by the hearing officer stipulating the
reinstatement of both respondents plus back wages. Report on hearing
contained the observation that “Special Services Management
practices an autocratic form of
supervision.”

Sanders disagreed with recommendation report with the later containing statements that:

Mr. Rossi tends to alienate most co-workers and supervisors

Mr. Rossi and Wyers have proven, according to their immediate supervisors, to be difficult employees to
supervise.

Grievants placed the records in public places where other not involved in the case could hear.

Moreau sent a letter to the Chief of Naval Personnel explaining the change of the private
respondent’s employment status and requesting concurrence therewith.
Filling of Case:
Respondents filed a case in Court of First Instance of Olongapo City a complaint for damages against
petitioners; plaintiffs claimed that letters contained libelous imputations.

Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on grounds that acts complained of were performed by them in their
discharge of official duties; consequently, court has no jurisdiction over them under the doctrine of state
immunity.

Petitioner’s motion was denied on ground that petitioners had not presented any evidence that
their acts were official in nature and not personal torts.

An order issued a writ of preliminary attachment, conditioned upon the filling of a P10,000 bond on
plaintiffs, against properties of Moreau, who allegedly was then about to leave the Philippines.

Moreau was declared in default.

Petitioner’s
Motion to lift the default order was dismissed on ground that Moreau’s failure to
appear at the pre-trial conference was the result of some understanding.

Motion for reconsideration of the denial motion was also dismissed.ISSUES:

Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Preliminary Injunction was thereafter filed before this court.

W/N petitioners were performing their official duties when they did acts for which they have been sued for
damages by the private respondent.RULING:

Petition was granted. Challenged Orders were set aside. Respondent Court is directed to dismiss the case.

Court held that he acts for which the petitioner are being called to account were performed by them in the
discharge of their official duties.

Sanders wrote the letter as a reply from Moreau for more information regarding the case of the private
respondents. Even without such request, he has the rights in reacting to the hearing
officer’s criticism.

Moreau’s letter
is clearly official in nature as the Commanding Chief of the Naval Base answerable to the naval personnel in
matters involving the special services department of NAVSTA.

Court concludes that petitioners acted behalf of the government, within the scope of their authority
making the action a suit against the government without its consent.

Sanders v. Veridiano
GR No. L-46930; June 10, 1988FACTS:
Petitioner Dale Sanders was the special services of the US Naval Station (NAVSTA) in Olongapo city. Private
respondents Anthony Rossi and Ralph Wyers are American citizens permanently residing in the Philippines
and who were employed as game room attendants in the special services department of NAVSTA. On
October 3, 1975, the respondents were advised that their employment had been converted from
permanent full-time to permanent part-time. In a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau, Sanders
disagreed with the hearing officer’s report of the reinstatement of private respondents to permanent full-
time status plus backwages. Respondents allege that the letters contained libelous imputations which
caused them to be ridiculed and thus filed for damages against petitioners.
ISSUE:
1) Were the petitioners acting officially or only in their private capacities when they did the acts for which
the private respondents sued them for damages?
2) Does the court have jurisdiction over the case?

HELD:
It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioner are being called to account
were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. Given the official character of the letters,
the petitioners were, legally speaking, being sued as officers of the United States government. As such, the
complaint cannot prosper unless the government sought to be held ultimately liable has given its consent
to be sued. The private respondents must pursue their claim against the petitioners in accordance with the
laws of the United States of which they are all citizens and under whose jurisdiction the alleged offenses
were committed for the Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over the case.
US vs. Guinto (Consti1)
En Banc
Cruz, February 26,1990
Topic: Sovereignty - Suits not against the state - Failure to raise immunity as defense
Facts:
 In the 4 consolidated suits, the USA moves to dismiss the cases on the ground that they are in
effect suits against it which it has not consented
On the first suit:
 On February 24, 1986, the Western Pacific Contracting Office, Okinawa Area Exchange, US Air
Force, solicited bids for barber services contracts through its contracting officer James F. Shaw
 Among those who submitted their bids were private respondents Roberto T. Valencia, Emerenciana
C. Tanglao, and Pablo C. del Pilar
 Bidding was won by Ramon Dizon over the objection of the private respondents who claimed that
he had made a bid for 4 facilities, including the Civil Engineering Area which was not included in the
invitation to bid
 The Philippine Area Exchange (PHAX), through its representatives petitioners Yvonne Reeves and
Frederic M. Smouse, upon the private respondents' complaint, explained that the Civil Engineering
concession had not been awarded to Dizon
 But Dizon was alreayd operating this concession, then known as the NCO club concession
 On June 30, 1986, the private respondents filed a complaint in the court below to compel PHAX and
the individual petitioners to cancel the award to Dizon, to conduct a rebidding for the barbershop
concessions and to allow the private respondents by a writ of preliminary injunction to continue
operating the concessions pending litigation
 Respondent court directed the individual petitioners to maintain the status quo
 On July 22, 1986, the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and opposition to the petition for
preliminary injunction on the ground that the action was in effect a suit against USA which had not
waived its non-suability
 On July 22, 1986, trial court denied the application for a writ of preliminary injunction
 On Oct. 10, 1988, trial court denied the petitioners' motion to dismiss
On the second suit:
 Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Anthony Lamachia, Wilfredo
Belsa, Rose Cartalla and Peter Orascion for his dismissal as cook in the US Air Force Recreation
Center at the John Hay Air Station in Baguio City
 It had been ascertained that Genove had poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the
vegetables served to the club customers
  His dismissal was effected on March 5, 1986 by Col. David C. Kimball, Commander of the 3rd
Combat Support Group, PACAF Clark Air Force Base
 Genove filed a complaint in the RTC of Baguio
 The defendants, joined by the United States of America, moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging
that Lamachia (the manager) as an officer of the US Air Force was immune from suit for the acts
done by him in his official capacity; they argued that the suit was in effect against USA, which had
not given its consent to be sued
 Motion was denied by respondent judge: although acting intially in their official capacities, the
defendants went beyond what their functions called for; this brought them out of the protective
mantle of whatever immunities they may have had in the beginning

On the third suit:

 Luis Bautisa, who was employed as a barracks boy in Camp O'Donnell, an extension of Clark Air
Base, was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by the individual petitioners Tomi J.
King, Darrel D. Dye and Stephen F. Bostick, officers of the US Air Force and special agents of the Air
Force of Special Investigators (AFOSI)
 Bautista was dismissed from his employment as a result of the filing of the charge
 He then filed a complaint for damages against the individual petitioners, claiming that it was
because of their acts that he was removed
 Defendants alleged that they had only done their duty in the enforcement of laws of the Philippines
inside the American bases, pursuant to the RP-US Military Bases Agreement
 The counsel for the defense invoked that the defendants were acting in their official capacity; that
the complaint was in effect a suit against the US without its consent
 Motion was denied by respondent judge: immunity under the Military Bases Agreement covered
only criminal and not civil cases; moreover, the defendants had come under the jurisdiction of the
court when they submitted their answer

On the fourth suit:

 Complaint for damages was filed by private respondents against the petitioners (except USA)
 According to the plaintiffs, the defendants beat them up, handcuffed the, and unleashed dogs on
them
 Defendants deny this and claim that the plaintiffs were arrested for theft and were bitten by dogs
because they were struggling and resisting arrest
 USA and the defendants argued that the suit was in effect a suit against the United States which
had not given its consent to be sued; that they were also immune from suit under the RP-US Bases
Treaty for acts done by them in the performance of their official functions
 Motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court: the acts cannot be considered Acts of State, if they
were ever admitted by the defendants
Issue:
  Whether or not the suits above are in effect suits against United States of America without its
consent
 In relation, whether or not the defendants are also immune from suit for acting within their official
functions.
Holding and Ratio:
 1st suit: No. The barbershops concessions are commercial enterprises operated by private persons.
They are not agencies of the US Armed forces. Petitioners cannot plead immunity. Case should be
remanded to the lower court.
 2nd suit: No. The petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of state immunity. The restaurants are
commercial enterprises. By entering into the employment contract with Genove, it impliedly
divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. (However, the petitioners are only suable, not
liable.)
 3rd suit: Yes. It is clear that the petitioners were acting in the exercise of their official functions. For
discharging their duties as agents of the US, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts attributable
to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued.
 4th suit: The contradictory factual allegations deserve a closer study. Inquiry must first be made by
the lower court. Only after can it be known in what capacity the petitioners were acting at the time
of the incident.

Republic of the Philippines, petitioner, vs. Hon. Edilberto G. Sandoval, RTC of Manila, Branch 9, Caylao
et.alG. R. No. 84607, March 19, 2003
FACTS:
The doctrines of immunity of the government from suit is expressly provided in the Constitution under
Article XVI, Section 3. It is provided that the State may not be sued without its consent. Some instances
when a suit against the State is proper are: (1) When the Republic is sued by name; (2) When the suit is
against an unincorporated government agency; (3) When the suit is, on its face, against a
government officer but the case is such that ultimate liablity will belong not to the officer but to the
government.W i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e i n c i d e n t t h a t h a p p e n e d i n M e n d i o l a o n J a n u a r y 2 2 ,
1 9 8 7 t h a t b e f e l l t w e l v e rallyists, the the case filed against the military officers was
dismissed by the lower court. The defendants were held liable but it would not result in financial
responsibility to the government. The petitioner (CaylaoGroup) filed a suit against the State that for
them the State has waived its immunity when the Mendiola Commission recommended the
government to indemnify the victims of the Mendiola incident and the acts and utterances of President
Aquino which is sympathetic to the cause is indicative of State's waiver of immunity and therefore, the
government should also be liable and should be compensated by the government . The case
has been dismissed that State has not waived its immunity. On the other hand, the Military Officer filed a
petition for certiorari to review the orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the State has waived its immunity from suit and therefore should the State be liable for the
incident?
HELD:
No. The recommendation made by the Mendiola Commission regarding the indemnification
of the heirs of the deceased and the victims of the incident does not in any way mean
liability authomatically a t t a c h e s t o t h e S t a t e . T h e p u r p o s e o f w h i c h i s t o i n v e s t i g a t e
o f t h e d i s o r d e r s t h a t t o o k p l a c e a n d t h e re commendation it makes cannot in any way bind the
State. The acts and utterances of President Aquino does not mean admission of the State of its liability.
Moreover, the case does not qualify as suit against the State.While the Republic in this case is sued
by name, the ultimate liability does not pertain to the government.The military officials are held
liable for the damages for their official functions ceased the moment they have exceeded to their
authority. They were deployed to ensure that the rally would be peaceful and orderly and should
guarantee the safety of the people. The court has made it quite clear that even a “high position in the
government does not confer a license to persecute or recklessly injure another.” The court rules that there
is n o r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r a n d n o g r a v e a b u s e o f d i c r e t i o n c o m m i t e d b y t h e
r e s p o n d e n t J u d g e i n i s s u i n g t h e questioned orders.

Bermoy v PNC

Facts: On July 6, 1954, (24) twenty four employees from its dormitory known as Normal Hall of the Philippine
Normal College, filled an action in the COF of Manila against the PNC for the recovery of salary differentials
and overtime pay. The Solicitor General on behalf of the defendant answers and denies the latter liability.
The court ordered it dismissed before the case was tried on the merits, on the ground that neither one of
the defendants was a corporation or a juridical entity with capacity to be sued. The plaintiffs took an appeal
to Supreme Court, alleging that it was an error to dismiss their case on the ground that, R.A. No. 416 took
effect July, 1949 converted PNS to PNC, thus created a Board of Trustees to administer the affairs as a
corporation under section 13 of the amended Act 1455 (Corporate Law), with the power “to sue and to be
sued in any court.”

Issue: Whether or not the PNC as a government corporation can be sued.

Held: The state has already given the consent by investing the college with express power to be sued in the
court. The act Authorizes the College to be sued is also made clear in Section 6, where it is provided that “all
process against the Board of Trustees shall be served on the President or Secretary thereof”. The order
appealed from is re revoked and the case remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings. No cost.

BUREAU OF PRINTING, SERAFIN SALVADOR and MARIANO LEDESMA,

petitioners, vs.
THE BUREAU OF PRINTING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (NLU), et al.
respondents.
G.R. No. L-15751 January 28, 1961
Facts:
The action in question was
—
upon complaint of the respondents Bureau of Printing Employees Association (NLU)Pacifico Advincula,
Roberto Mendoza, Ponciano Arganda and Teodulo Toleran
—
filed by an acting prosecutor of theIndustrial Court against herein petitioner Bureau of Printing, Serafin
Salvador, the Acting Secretary of the Department of General Services, and Mariano Ledesma the Director
of the Bureau of Printing. The complaint alleged that SerafinSalvador and Mariano Ledesma have been
engaging in unfair labor practices by interfering with, or coercing theemployees of the Bureau of Printing
particularly the members of the complaining association petition, in the exercise of their right to self-
organization an discriminating in regard to hire and tenure of their employment in order to
discouragethem from pursuing the union activities.The petitioners Bureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador and
Mariano Ledesma denied the charges of unfair labor practicesattributed to the and, by way of affirmative
defenses, alleged, among other things, that respondents Pacifico Advincula,Roberto Mendoza Ponciano
Arganda and Teodulo Toleran were suspended pending result of an administrativeinvestigation against
them for breach of Civil Service rules and regulations petitions; that the Bureau of Printing has no juridical
personality to sue and be sued; that said Bureau of Printing is not an industrial concern engaged for the
purposeof gain but is an agency of the Republic performing government functions. For relief, they prayed
that the case bedismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Thereafter, before the case could be heard, petitioners
filed an "Omnibus Motion"asking for a preliminary hearing on the question of jurisdiction raised by them in
their answer and for suspension of thetrial of the case on the merits pending the determination of such
jurisdictional question. The motion was granted, butafter hearing, the trial judge of the Industrial Court in
an order dated January 27, 1959 sustained the jurisdiction of thecourt on the theory that the functions of
the Bureau of Printing are "exclusively proprietary in nature," and,consequently, denied the prayer for
dismissal. Reconsideration of this order having been also denied by the court inbanc.
Note: The Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government created by the Administrative Code of 1916
(Act No. 2657). As suchinstrumentality of the Government, it operates under the direct supervision of the
Executive Secretary, Office of the President, and is"charged with the execution of all printing and binding,
including work incidental to those processes, required by the National Government and such other work of
the same character as said Bureau may, by law or by order of the (Secretary of Finance)Executive
Secretary, be authorized to undertake . . .." (See. 1644, Rev. Adm. Code). It has no corporate existence, and
itsappropriations are provided for in the General Appropriations Act. Designed to meet the printing needs
of the Government, it is primarily a service bureau and obviously, not engaged in business or occupation
for pecuniary profit.
Issue:
whether or not Bureau of Printing can be sued.
Ruling:
No. Indeed, as an office of the Government, without any corporate or juridical personality, the Bureau of
Printingcannot be sued. Any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it were to produce any effect, would
actually be a suit, actionor proceeding against the Government itself, and the rule is settled that the
Government cannot be sued without itsconsent, much less over its objection.It is true that the Bureau of
Printing receives outside jobs and that many of its employees are paid for overtime work onregular
working days and on holidays, but these facts do not justify the conclusion that its functions are
"exclusivelyproprietary in nature." Overtime work in the Bureau of Printing is done only when the interest
of the service so requires.As a matter of administrative policy, the overtime compensation may be paid,
but such payment is discretionary withthe head of the Bureau depending upon its current appropriations,
so that it cannot be the basis for holding that thefunctions of said Bureau are wholly proprietary in
character. Clearly, while the Bureau of Printing is allowed toundertake private printing jobs, it cannot be
pretended that it is thereby an industrial or business concern. The

additional work it executes for private parties is merely incidental to its function, and although such work
may be deemed proprietary in character, there is no showing that the employees performing said
proprietary function are separate and distinct from those employed in its general governmental functions

NATIONAL AIRPORTS CORP VS TEODORO

G.R. No. L-5122 91 Phil 203 April 30, 1952
NATIONAL AIRPORTS CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE TEODORO, SR., as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental and PHILIPPINE AIRLINES,
INC., respondents.
Facts:
The National Airports Corporation was organized under Republic Act No. 224, which expressly made the
provisions of the Corporation Law applicable to the said corporation. It was abolished by Executive Order
No. 365 and to take its place the Civil Aeronautics Administration was created.
Before the abolition, the Philippine Airlines, Inc. paid to the National Airports Corporation P65,245 as fees
for landing and parking for the period up to and including July 31, 1948. These fees are said to have been
due and payable to the Capitol Subdivision, Inc., who owned the land used by the National Airports
Corporation as airport. The owner commenced an action in the court against the Philippine Airlines, Inc
The Philippine Airlines, Inc. countered with a third-party complaint against the National Airports
Corporation, which by that time had been dissolved, and served summons on the Civil Aeronautics
Administration. The third party plaintiff alleged that it had paid to the National Airports Corporation the
fees claimed by the Capitol Subdivision, Inc. “on the belief and assumption that the third party defendant
was the lessee of the lands subject of the complaint and that the third party defendant and its
predecessors in interest were the operators and maintainers of said airport and, further, that the third
party defendant would pay to the landowners, particularly the Capitol Subdivision, Inc., the reasonable
rentals for the use of their lands.”
The Solicitor General, after answering the third party complaint, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the third- party complaint, first, because the National Airports
Corporation “has lost its juridical personality,” and, second, because agency of the Republic of the
Philippines, unincorporated and not possessing juridical personality under the law, is incapable of suing
and being sued
Issues:
Whether or not the Civil Aeronautics Administration should be regarded as engaged in private functions
and therefore subject to suit.
Discussions:
Not all government entities, whether corporate or non corporate, are immune from suits. The power to
sue and be sued is implied from the power to transact private business. And if it has the power to sue and
be sued on its behalf, the Civil Aeronautics Administration with greater reason should have the power to
prosecute and defend suits for and against the National Airports Corporation, having acquired all the
properties, funds and choses in action and assumed all the liabilities of the latter. The rule is thus stated in
Corpus Juris:
Suits against state agencies with relation to matters in which they have assumed to act in private or
nongovernment capacity, and various suits against certain corporations created by the state for public
purposes, but to engage in matters partaking more of the nature of ordinary business rather than functions
of a governmental or political character, are not regarded as suits against the state. The Latter is true,
although the state may own stock or property of such a corporation for by engaging in business operations
through a corporation the state divests itself so far of its sovereign character, and by implication consents
to suits against the corporation.
Republic vs. Feliciano (Consti1)
Republic of the Philippines, petitioner-appellee, vs. Pablo Feliciano and Intermediate Appellate Court,
respondents-appellants.
March 12, 1987Yap, J:
Facts:
 Respondent Pablo Feliciano filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance against the Republic of
the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, for the recovery of ownership and possession of
a parcel of land.
 The trial court rendered a decision declaring Lot No. 1 to be the private property of Feliciano and
the rest of the property reverted to the public domain.
 The trial court reopened the case due to the filing of a motion to intervene and to set aside the
decision of the trial court by 86 settlers, alleging that they had been in possession of the land for
more than 20 years under claim of ownership.
 The trial court ordered the settlers to present their evidence but they did not appear at the day of
presentation of evidence. Feliciano, on the other hand, presented additional evidence. Thereafter,
the case was submitted for decision and the trial court ruled in favor of Feliciano.
 The settlers immediately filed a motion for reconsideration and then the case was reopened to
allow them to present their evidence.
 Feliciano filed a petition for certiorari with the Appellate Court but it was denied.
 The settlers filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Republic of the Philippines cannot be
sued without its consent and hence the action cannot prosper. The motion was opposed by
Feliciano.
Issue: Whether or not the state can be sued for recovery and possession of a parcel of land.
Held: No
Ratio:
 A suit against the state is not permitted, except upon a showing that the state has consented to be
sued, either expressly or by implication through the use of statutory language too plain to be
misinterpreted.
 The complaint involves land not owned by the state but private land belonging to Feliciano, hence
the government is not being divested of any of its properties.

Meritt vs Government of the Philippine Islands

Facts:
Merrit, riding on a motorcycle at a speed of ten to twelve miles an hour, collided with an ambulance of the
General Hospital which turned suddenly and unexpectedly without having sounded any whistle or horn.
Merrit was severely injured. His condition had undergone depreciation and his efficiency as a contractor
was affected. The inquiry at once arises whether the Government is legally-liable for the damages resulting
therefrom even if the collision was due to the negligence committed by an agent or employee of the
government which is the chauffeur.
Issue:
Whether or not the Government may be held in this case.
Held:
No.That according to paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code and the principle laid down in a decision,
among others, of the 18th of May, 1904,in a damage case, the responsibility of the state is limited to that
which it contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a
definite order or commission to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise
to the claim
, and not where the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public official charged with some
administrative or technical office who can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by
the law of civil responsibility. Consequently, the trial court in not so deciding and in sentencing the said
entity to the payment of damages, caused by an official of the second class referred to, has by erroneous
interpretation infringed the provisions of articles 1902 and 1903of the Civil Code. (Supreme Court of Spain,
July 30, 1911; 122 Jur. Civ.,146.)It is, therefore, evidence that the State (the Government of the
PhilippineIslands) is only liable, according to the above quoted decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, for
the acts of its agents, officers and employees when they act as special agents within the meaning of
paragraph 5 of article 1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was
not such an agent.

Froilan, Compania Maratma, and theRepublic

FACTS
Defendant Pan Oriental took possession of the vessel in question after it had been repossessed by the
Shipping Administration and title thereto reacquired by the government, following the original purchaser,
Fernando Froilan’s, default in his payment of the unpaid balance and insurance premiums for the said
vessel. Pan Oriental chartered said vessel and operated the same after it had repaired the vessel and paid
the stipulated initial payment, thereby exercising its option to purchase, pursuant to a bareboat charter
contract entered between said company and the Shipping Corporation.The Cabinet resolved to restore
Froilan to his rights under the original contract of sale on condition that he shall pay a sum of money upon
delivery of the vessel to him, that he shall continue paying the remaining installments due, and that he
shall assume the expenses incurred for the repair and by docking of the vessel. Pan Oriental protested to
this restoration of Froilan’s rights under the contract of sale, for the reason that when the vessel was
delivered to it, the Shipping Administration had authority to dispose of said authority to the
property,Froilan having already relinquished whatever rights he may have thereon. Froilan paid the
required cash of P10,000.00 and as Pan Oriental refused to surrender possession of the vessel, he filed an
action for in the CFIof Manila to recover possession thereof and have him declared the rightful owner of
said property.The Republic of the Philippines was allowed to intervene in said civil case praying for the
possession of the in order that the chattel mortgage constituted thereon may be foreclosed.
ISSUE Whether or not the government’s motion to dismiss Pan Oriental counterclaims may prosper.
HELD:Under the circumstances already ad voted to, PanOriental cannot be considered a possessor in bad
faith until after the institution of the instant case. However,since it is not disputed that said appellant is
entitled to the refund of such expenses with the right to retain the vessel until he has been reimbursed
therefore. As it is by the corrected acts of defendant and intervenor Republic of the Philippines that the
appellant ha a lien far his expenses, appellees Froilan, Compania Maratma, and the Republic of the
Philippines are declared liable for the reimbursement to appellant of its legitimate expenses, as allowed by
law, with legal interest from the time of disbursement.
US v. Ruiz (Consti1)

US v. Ruiz
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES E. GALLOWAY, WILLIAM I. COLLINS and ROBERT GOHIER,
petitioners, vs. HON. V. M. RUIZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XV, Court of First Instance of Rizal and ELIGIO
DE GUZMAN & CO., INC., respondents.
En Banc
Doctrine: implied consent
Date: May 22, 1985
Ponente: Justice Abad-Santos

Facts:

 At times material to this case, the United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales.
The base was one of those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and
the United States.
 US invited the submission of bids for Repair offender system and Repair typhoon damages. Eligio de
Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation, submitted bids and complied with the requests
based on the letters received from the US.
 In June 1972, a letter was received by the Eligio De Guzman & Co indicating that the company did
not qualify to receive an award for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance
rating on a repair contract for the sea wall at the boat landings of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic
Bay.
 The company sued the United States of America and Messrs. James E. Galloway, William I. Collins
and Robert Gohier all members of the Engineering Command of the U.S. Navy. The complaint is to
order the defendants to allow the plaintiff to perform the work on the projects and, in the event
that specific performance was no longer possible, to order the defendants to pay damages. The
company also asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants
from entering into contracts with third parties for work on the projects.
 The defendants entered their special appearance for the purpose only of questioning the
jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter of the complaint and the persons of defendants,
the subject matter of the complaint being acts and omissions of the individual defendants as agents
of defendant United States of America, a foreign sovereign which has not given her consent to this
suit or any other suit for the causes of action asserted in the complaint." (Rollo, p. 50.)
 Subsequently the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint which included an opposition
to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. The company opposed the motion.
 The trial court denied the motion and issued the writ. The defendants moved twice to reconsider
but to no avail.
 Hence the instant petition which seeks to restrain perpetually the proceedings in Civil Case No. 779-
M for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.
Issue/s:
  WON the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions to be able to
invoke state immunity

Held:
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the questioned orders of the respondent judge are set aside and Civil
Case No. is dismissed. Costs against the private respondent.

Ratio:
 The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another
State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of
independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified;
they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it
has been necessary to distinguish them-between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii)
and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now
extends only to acts jure imperil (sovereign & governmental acts)
 The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of
commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs.
Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus
be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts.
It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case
the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the
United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order;
they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.
 correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by a State but
the legal nature of the act
Amigable v. Cuenca (Consti1)

Amigable v. Cuenca
VICTORIA AMIGABLE, plaintiff-appellant, vs.NICOLAS CUENCA, as Commissioner of Public Highways and
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, defendants-appellees.

En Banc
Doctrine: equity
Date: February 29, 1972
Ponente: Justice Makalintal

Facts:
  This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu in its Civil Case No. R-5977,
dismissing the plaintiff's complaint.
 Victoria Amigable, the appellant herein, is the registered owner of Lot No. 639 of the Banilad Estate
in Cebu City
 At the back of her Transfer Certificate of Title (1924), there was no annotation in favor of the
government of any right or interest in the property.
 Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of said lot, with an
area of 6,167 square meters, for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues.
 On March 27, 1958 Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting payment
of the portion of her lot which had been appropriated by the government. The claim was indorsed
to the Auditor General, who disallowed it in his 9th Indorsement dated December 9, 1958. A copy
of said indorsement was transmitted to Amigable's counsel by the Office of the President on
January 7, 1959.
 On February 6, 1959 Amigable filed in the court a quo a complaint, which was later amended on
April 17, 1959 upon motion of the defendants, against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas
Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of ownership and
possession of the 6,167 square meters of land traversed by the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. She
also sought the payment of compensatory damages in the sum of P50,000.00 for the illegal
occupation of her land, moral damages in the sum of P25,000.00, attorney's fees in the sum of
P5,000.00 and the costs of the suit.
 On July 29, 1959 said court rendered its decision holding that it had no jurisdiction over the
plaintiff's cause of action for the recovery of possession and ownership of the portion of her lot in
question on the ground that the government cannot be sued without its consent; that it had
neither original nor appellate jurisdiction to hear, try and decide plaintiff's claim for compensatory
damages in the sum of P50,000.00, the same being a money claim against the government; and
that the claim for moral damages had long prescribed, nor did it have jurisdiction over said claim
because the government had not given its consent to be sued. Accordingly, the complaint was
dismissed.
 Unable to secure a reconsideration, the Amigable appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
subsequently certified the case to Us, there being no question of fact involved.

Issue/s:
 WON the Amigable may properly sue the government under the facts of the case

Held: the government is NOT immune to the suit.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and the case remanded to the court a quo for
the determination of compensation, including attorney's fees, to which the appellant is entitled as above
indicated. No pronouncement as to costs.

Ratio:
  Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance of Cebu: where the government takes away property from a
private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or
negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without
thereby violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent
 Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of her certificate of
title and that she has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot to the
government, the appellant remains the owner of the whole lot.
 As registered owner, she could bring an action to recover possession of the portion of land in
question at any time because possession is one of the attributes of ownership.
 However, since restoration of possession of said portion by the government is neither convenient
nor feasible at this time because it is now and has been used for road purposes, the only relief
available is for the government to make due compensation which it could and should have done
years ago. To determine the due compensation for the land, the basis should be the price or value
thereof at the time of the taking
 the plaintiff is entitled thereto in the form of legal interest on the price of the land from the time it
was taken up to the time that payment is made by the government.
 the government should pay for attorney's fees, the amount of which should be fixed by the trial
court after hearing.
Santiago vs. Republic (Consti1)
Ildefonso Santiago, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, Alfredo T. Santiago, petitioner, vs. The
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, represented by Director, Bureau of Plant Industry, and the
Regional Director, Region IX, Zamboanga City, repondent.

December 19, 1978

Fernando, J:

Facts:
 Petitioner Ildefonso Santiago donated a parcel of land to the Bureau of Plant Industry on the terms
that the Bureau should construct a building and install lighting facilities on the said lot.
 When time passed and there were still no improvements on the lot, Santiago filed a case pleading
for the revocation of such contract of donation but the trial court dismissed the petition claiming
that it is a suit against the government and should not prosper without the consent of the
government.

Issue:
 Whether or not the respondent government has waived its immunity from suit.
Held:
  Yes.
Ratio:

 The government's waiver of immunity was implied by virtue of the terms provided in the deed of
donation. The government is a beneficiary of the terms of the donation but it did not comply with
such terms. Thus, the donor Santiago has the right to be heard in the court. Also, to not allow the
donor to be heard would be unethical and contrary to equity which the government so advances.
The Court of First Instance is hereby directed to proceed with the case.