Trope Theory

A Single Primitive Trope Relation
Author(s): John Bacon

Source: Journal of Philosophical Logic, Vol. 18, No. 2 (May, 1989), pp. 141-154
Published by: Springer
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JOHN BACON
A SINGLE PRIMITIVE TROPE RELATION
0. INTRODUCTION
00. Monadic tropes. G. F. Stout and D. C. Williams showed how th

world of individuals and their classes or properties could be fruitfully
reconstrued in terms of abstract particulars, or "tropes", as William
called them. Intuitively, a trope is a "thin" property, e.g. Mao's
redness in contrast to redness as such. The latter is then taken to be
the class of all the particular rednesses, and similarly for other generic
properties. The particular rednesses are precisely similar to each other
in being rednesses, cases of the same quality. Precise similarity, like
similarity relations generally, is reflexive and symmetric. Such a
relation gives rise to similarity classes, whose elements are all similar
to each other and not all similar to anything else. Properties are
similarity classes of tropes under the relation of precise similarity, or
resemblance, as it is sometimes called. There is another way tropes
can agree, as Mao's redness and Mao's Sinicity. These two tropes
concur in being concomitant aspects. Individuals are then equivalence
classes of tropes under the equivalence relation of concurrence.' An
individual exemplifies a property if and only if they intersect, i.e.
share a trope. Thus tropes bridge the dichotomy between individuals
and properties or classes. This seems an ontological gain. The price is
the primitive relations of precise similarity and concurrence. A set of
tropes together with these similarity or equivalence relations is called
a monadic trope structure.
01. Relation tropes. Williams does not explicitly develop a theory of

polyadic tropes or "thin" relations, such as John's love of Mary. Such
an extension of trope theory is given by Bacon (xz40f). The basic idea
is that concurrence be relativized to argument-places. Thus John's
love of Mary concurs with John's fear of Bertha in the first argument-
place; it concurs with Bertha's jealousy of Mary in the second argument
Journal of Philosophical Logic 18 (1989) 141-154.

xz 1989 by Kluwer Academic Publishers.
142 JOHN BACON
place. We may call these relations for sh

secondary concurrence, or I, and I2, and
degrees. In this extended relational fram
longer just a concurrence equivalence c
i-ary concurrence classes, one for each
concurrence class Mary,, her secondary
similarly for John. Precise-similarity clas
as well as properties. (Relations in this
protorelations to distinguish them from
Then our exemplification condition is o
John loves Mary iff John,, Mary2

(share a trope).
We can now characterize a trope structu

together with a set of similarity or equ
tropes. If the relations are all transitive, t
trope structure.
02. Modality aside. Tropes can be used

simple system of quantified modal logi
model-theoretic applications, the exemp
becomes the truth condition for simple
all modal ramifications aside: only trop
world are considered.
03. Proliferation of trope relations. Relations of individuals, e.g. love

or giving, dissolve into tropes at the expense of more and more con-
currence relations, one for each argument-place distinguished. For indi-
vidual relations of arbitrary finite degree, we shall need infinitely many
such concurrence relations. As a reduction of relations, this is not
impressive. Far from replacing individuals and their relations by tropes,
we have merely replaced them by tropes and their many relations.
Hochberg suggests a comparison between exemplification and precise
similarity as basic relations or "ties" in realism (about universals) and
trope theory respectively (pp. 188f, 191). We see, however, that relational
trope theory involves many such "ties", perhaps infinitely many.
PRIMITIVE TROPE RELATION 143
04. Higher-level tropes. Without developing them, Willia

second-level tropes, as attested by this slightly cryptic allus
... the total of the relations [concurrence and precise similarity] is not s
and above the total of the terms [tropes], for a relation R between trop
constitutive trope of the complex r '(a, b)2 (e.g., the concurrence-sum of
redness of lollipop No. 1] and Hamis [its roundness]) . . . (p. 80)
and this clearer project:
... an assimilation of the very categories of our theory - concurrence, similarity,

abstraction, and so forth - to the theory itself, as tropes like the rest, instead of
relegating them to the anomalous immunities of "transcendentals" ... (p. 84)
Let us call the tropes discussed above, such as Mao's redness and
John's love of Mary, first-level tropes, or "l-tropes" for short. (Indi-
viduals may be thought of as a limiting case of "tropes", viz. 0-tropes.)
Similarly, relations of 1-tropes are first-level relations, or 1-relations,
whilst ordinary relations are 0-relations. Now, a second-level trope, a
2-trope, is a "thin" 1-relation; e.g.,
John's love of Mary concurring secondarily with

Bertha's jealousy of Mary.
As all 1-relations are dyadic, so all 2-tropes are dyadic. Like 1-tropes,
2-tropes can stand in relations of precise similarity and concurrence.
Indeed, since all 1-relations are symmetric, only one second-level con-
currence relation is needed, 2-concurrence or I2. The ascent from
first-level to second-level tropes is now iterated once more to reach
third-level tropes. It will not be necessary to ascend any higher.
05. Reduction to one relation. We have seen that trope theory con-
ceived from the bottom up, based on what I have called trope struc-
tures, seems to involve a commitment to indefinitely many primitive
similarity or equivalence relations among 1-tropes. But now that we
have ascended to 3-tropes, an alternative top-down approach becomes
possible. If we start with 3-tropes, then the dyadic similarity relation
13 of concurrence of 3-tropes is the sole primitive trope relation we
need. In addition, the 3-tropes must be split into two groups, the
2-concurrence tropes and the 2-precise-similarity tropes. I call such a
top-down approach to trope theory a trope cascade.
144 JOHN BACON
06. Preview. I will show that every trop

up) to a trope cascade. Conversely, ever
(top-down) a trope structure. Finally, t
a trope cascade arising out of another t
this structure, and transitive if it is. T
trope structures. One primitive trope r
work of indefinitely many.
I. TROPE STRUCTURES AND CASCADES
10. Notation and terminology. Besides standard set-theoretic notatio

some special terms and abbreviations will come in handy here. The
variables r', . . . , z' will range over ith-level tropes (i-tropes). f', h',
will range over ith-level relations or protorelations, according to
context. The superscripts will often be omitted when no confusion i
likely. A protorelation is a relation construed top-down as a
precise-similarity class of tropes. For i > 0, a relation is construed
bottom-up as a set of unordered pairs (or singletons). Both relations
and protorelations are automatically symmetric for i > 0.
xfy says, as usual, that x bears the relation f to y. fxy is an
abbreviation for (f, {x, y}). When we work bottom-up, fxy is the
higher-level trope corresponding to the possibility that xfy. When in
fact xfy, the trope fxy is said to exist. Two such tropes are precisely
similar if their left members are the same relation.3 They are
concurrent if their right members overlap, i.e. share an element. A
trope of the form (f, {x}), abbreviated fx, is called a reflexive trop
Sis {fxy: xfy}, the protorelation corresponding to f. Xo Y (X
overlaps Y) iff X nY # A. x lf'ly' iff x'n y'o f' or x' = yi. Thus
f'l is the reflexive relation corresponding to the protorelation f'. I
and - thus mediate between relations and protorelations.
For a dyadic relation fi, X is an f'-class iff any two members of X
bear fi to each other.4 X is a maximal f'-class of tis if X contains
every ti that bears f' to all its members. Where f' is a similarity
relation, x will be a similarity class. Where fi is an equivalence
relation, X will be a similarity class. Where fi is an equivalence
f'-kernel iff any two i-tropes that bear f' to t' also bear fi' to each
other. In other words, t' will be an f'-kernel just in case f' 't' is an
f'-class. (Notice that f''t' is always maximal.) A similari

nucleate if it contains a kernel. Nucleate similarity class
between similarity classes in general and equivalence cla
beget a kind of local transitivity. A similarity relation f' o
f'-kernels is an equivalence relation.
11. The trope structure is a pair S = (T', R' ), where T'

and R' is a set of similarity relations on T' that is empty
Intuitively, we may think of T' as the set of first-level tro
as comprising precise first-level similarity H' or Id, first-l
concurrence I,', first-level secondary concurrence I2, a

ordering Id, I,', I, . . . , is not part of S.) It is admissible that Ixz' -
I/, where i # j; in particular, H' may be the same as I,'. Thus there
can be degenerate monadic trope structures with just one similarity
relation. Indeed, there is an even more degenerate trope structure
(A, A) with no trope at all, but it is of little interest.
12. The trope cascade is a triple C = (H2, 12, 3), where H2 and 12
are disjoint sets if they have more than one element between them,
and I3 is a similarity relation on T3 = U2 u 12. T3 is intended as the
set of third-level tropes. Notice that (T3, {13 }) is a degenerative
monadic trope structure. H2 is the nonreflexive core of the proto-
relation of precise second-level similarity, construed as a class of
3-tropes. I2 is the same for second-level concurrence. H2 and I2 may
be trivially taken as equivalence classes of 3-tropes under the equiv-
alence relation H3 = (H2 x H2) u (12 x 12) Of precise third-level
similarity. (H3 could equally well have been made just a similarity
relation.) We shall have no particular use for H3, however. Trope cas-
cades with fewer than two 3-tropes are naturally viewed as degenerate.
13. Cascades out of structures.5 Where S = (T, R) is a trope struc-

ture, a 2-trope on S is a couple fst, i.e. (f, {s, t}), such that sft,
f e R, and s, t e T. Precise similarity of 2-tropes is precise 2-similarity
or H2. Concurrence of 2-tropes is 2-concurrence or I2. Let T2 be
the set of 2-tropes and R2 = (H2, 2 } the set of 2-relations on S.
S2 = (T', R2) is now a trope structure with fewer relations than S
had.
146 JOHN BACON
We
have at this point an obvious one-to
between R and the equivalence classes int
2-tropes: each f e R corresponds to the e
{ fxy: xfy). Similarly, there is a one-to-o
and the nucleate similarity classes into w
corresponds to the similarity class { fst:
kernel H' t (as well as I? t, etc.).6
Next we iterate the above construction,
to S2. Thus 3-tropes on S (i.e., "2-tropes
members of H2 u 12 Or T3. 3-concurrenc
3-tropes.
Now C = (H2, 2, a3) is demonstrably
there are fewer than two 1-tropes, then
1-relation (identity), at most one 2-trope
at most one 3-trope. On the other hand,
1-tropes s and t, then there will be a 1-r
tH't. Thus we have H'sH2H't but not
makes H2 disjoint from 12. Finally, 13 is
overlapping is.
Again we get a (trivial) one-to-one corre
R2 = ({H2, 3 } and the precise 3-similarit
trivially, every 2-trope t2 E T2 corresponds
class {fst2:fe R2, S E T2} = FP'H2ft2 Of
and vice versa.7
The construction of 2-tropes as ordered
variant of van Fraassen's treatment of "f
McKinsey. Their rendering would have b
f R are symmetric, the order of x, y is
dispensable. For the same reason, we can
level concurrence relation i2, avoiding at
of xz03. Exactly analogous remarks apply
3-tropes.
14. Structures out of cascades. Where C = (H2, 2, 13) is a trope

cascade, a 2-trope on C is a nucleate I3-similarity class of 3-tropes.
Let T2* be the set of such 2-tropes, and let R2* = {1H21, 1121} be the
set of 2-relations on C.
If we equate C here with the C constructed in xz13, then S2 w

isomorphic to (T2*, R2 *) in the sense that there are structu
preserving one-to-one correspondences between T2 and T2.
R2 and R2 .
Now we iterate the above construction. A 1-trope on C is a
nucleate 1I21-similarity class of 2-tropes. A 1-protorelation on C is a
class IH21't2 Of 2-tropes for t2 e T2*. Finally, wheref is a 1-proto-
relation, Ifl is a 1-relation provided it is nonempty. Let T* be the set
of 1-tropes and R* the set of 1-relations on C.8
S* = (T*, R*) is demonstrably a trope structure. For by the defi-
nition of I I, the 1-relations Ifl are reflexive and symmetric on T*. It
remains to show that T* is empty iff R* is. If R* is nonempty, then it
contains a nonempty 1-relation among some 1-tropes, so T* is
nonempty. If, on the other hand, R* is empty, there are no proto-
relations 1H21't2 for any t2 e T2*, and T2* is empty. But then T* must
also be empty.
15. Structural isomorphism. Let S and C be as in xz13, and let the

derivative trope structure S* be constructed out of C as in xz14. S may
be considered isomorphic to S* iff there is a one-to-one mapping 4 of
T onto T* and of R onto R* such that sft iff 4(s)4(f)4(t) for all
f e R and s, t E T. Such a mapping, likewise called *, may be defined
as follows for t e T, fe R:
t* = {PI'H2hst:heR,seT}
f' = {PI3'HZfrs:r,s e T}
f*= If'l
For the degenerate case where T = R = T* = R* = A, the iso-
morphism is trivial and need not concern us further.
This definition arises naturally out of the one-to-one correspondences
pointed out in xzxz13-14. The 1-trope t corresponds to the I2-similarity
class 12 'H' t of all 2-tropes on S concurrent with H' t, i.e. having a t
on the right. Each of these 2-tropes t2 on S in turn corresponds to an
I3-similarity class 13 'H32, which is a 2-trope on C. The set of all these
2-tropes is t*, a 1-trope on C. Similarly, the 1-relationf corresponds to
148 JOHN BACON
the H2-equivalence class H2'ft of all 2

of these 2-tropes t2 in turn correspond
I3 'H2 t2. The set of these is f', a 1-pro
These correspondences strongly sugge
isomorphism. The proof is not trivial,
S and S* unpacks into the following fi
xz20. t*" E T
xz20. Vx e T* 3!t e T: x = t*
xz22. f* e R*
xz23. VhER* !f~e R: h =f*

xz24. V fexzR Vs, t e T: sft iff s*f*t*
These lemmas will now be proved, substantiating the claims of xz06.
II. PROOF OF ISOMORPHISM
20. t* e T*. t* will be a 1-trope on C, i.e. a nucleate ri|-similarity

class of 20-tropes, if it is an Ii-class I 12 't2 for some t2 T., t2 in
turn being an I3-class 13 ,/3 for somet' E T3. Let t3 be the doubly
reflexive 3-trope 12ft. Clearly t2 = P't3 is an I3-class.
Next we establish that I12 t2 is an i12 -class, i.e. that t2 is an
1i21-kernel. Assume, then, that t2112x and t21I2y. We need to prove
that xil21 y. According to the two premisses, t2 and x share an exist-
ent I2rs (or t2 = x, in which case they share t3), and t2 and y share
an existent I2uy (Or 2 = y). Since t2 contains t3, we know by
3-concurrence that one of r, s is ft, so by 2-concurrence both are of
the form hwt e T2. Similarly, u and v are of the form kzt e T2. Sinc
x and y are nucleate, they have reflexive kernels H2hwt and H2kzt
respectively. Then since hwtl2kzt, 12hwtkzt E x, y. Thus x and y sha
an existent I2-trope, so xl2i y.
Finally, we must prove that t* = 1I2 I'2. If x e t*, then
x = 3 'H2hst for hst e T2. Since hstl2ft, I2hstft will be in both x an
t2, so xit2. Conversely, if x and t2 share an existing I2uv (or
x = t2), one of u, v will beft and both will be of the form frt, with t on
the right. As x is nucleate, either H2U or H2v is its kernel. In e

case, x = 13 'H2frt for some r e T,so x e t*.
21. Vx e T* 3!t e T: x = t*. If x e T* then x = 12 I't2 for so

kernel t2 = P3'H2fst for some I3-kernel H2fst with fst e T2
y = 13 'H2fs and z = 13 'H2ft. Then I2fsfst e t?, y and I2ftf
both exist, so ? t21121 y and t2? I2 z. Since t2 is a kernel, it follow
ylI21z, i.e. y = z or y and z share an I2fsft such that {s} o {t)
case s = t, so H2ft is in t2 (and y) as its I3-kernel (and ? =
As t2 e t* by the definition of t*, and t* e T* by xz20, t2 must
I12 -kernel of t* as well as x, making x = t*.
For uniqueness, suppose that s* = t*. As z e t*, so z e s*,
is an H2hrs such that hrs e T2. Thus ft is an hrs, so {t} = {r
s =t.
22. f* e R*. i.e. If'I is nonempty andf' is a 1-protorelation o

That If'l is nonempty follows from the fact that it is by definit
reflexive on T*, which is nonempty (cf. xz15). f' will be a 1-prot
relation if it is a class IH2't2 for some t2 e T2*, where t2 = 13 't3
some I3-kernel t' e T'. As in xz20, let t3 be I2ft. Clearly t3 is an

kernel, making t2.a 2-trope and f' a 1-protorelation on C.
To show thatf' = IH21't2, first let x e f'. Then by the defin
f', x = 3 'H2frs for some r, s e T. Since frsH2ft, H2frsft wil
both x and t2, so xIH21t2. Conversely, if x and t2 share an existe
H2uv (or x = f2), one of u, v will beft (by 3-concurrence wit
and the other will have f on the left (by 2-concurrence with ft)
will be for the form fyz. As x E T2* is nucleate, either H2U Or H
its kernel. In either case, x = IP'H2fyz for some y, z e T, o
23. VjhI e R* 3!fe R: Ihl = f*. If Ihl e R*, then h = IH21't fo

t E T2., t2 being 13 'H2fst for some I'-kernel H2fst with fst
want to prove first that h = f'. If x e h then x shares a 3-tro
H2fstfuv with t2 (by 3-concurrence with H2 fst). As x e T2 * is
nucleate, its kernel is reflexive - either H2fst or H2fuv (or th
with i2). In either case, x e f'. Conversely, if x e f' then it c
an H2fuv. Since fstH2fuv, it follows that H2fstfuv e x, t?, so xlI
and x e h. That establishes that h = f' and jhl = f*. For uniq
cf. the end of xz21.
150 JOHN BACON
24. sft if s*f*t*, i.e. s* n t* of' or s* =

trope such that 3'H2fst e s*, t*, f'. Th
mon element. Conversely if s* = t* then
reflexivity of 1-relations. If, on the oth
common element, it must be of the for
that sft.
This lemma concludes the proof that S is isomorphic to S*.
25. Transitivity. For the sake of generality, I have required of precise

1-similarity and 1-concurrence only that they be similarity relations,
i.e. reflexive and symmetric. But they may also be equivalence rela-
tions and hence transitive too. In that case, we can prove that f* is
transitive iff R is. It follows easily enough from the lemma
Vx, y, z e T: x n y of', yn zof' -+ x n zof'.
For by xz21 we have an r e T such that x = r* = {-F'H2hur: h E R,

u e T}, and similarly for y = s* and z = t*. Now, if x, y, and f'
share an I3-class, it will have to be of the form -F'H2frs (f from f',
r from r*, and s from s*), where frs exists, i.e. rfs. In the same way,
y n z of' yields sft. Provided that f is transitive, rft follows. Now
I-f 'H2frt e x, zf, f', so x nz of'.

As a corollary, S* will be a transitive trope structure if S is.
III. LOOSE METAPHYSICAL ENDS
30. Nontransitivity of precise similarity. It is thus left open here

whether first-level concurrence and precise similarity are transitive or
not. Williams' terms 'precisely', 'wholly', 'perfectly similar' suggest
more than mere similarity. Yet there is some plausibility in the
thought that precise similarity might not be transitive. For example,
the color of a particular tomato might belong both to redness and
orangeness. This seems more natural than supposing redness and
orangeness to be mutually exclusive equivalence classes of tropes.
Analogous examples abound. They all suggest that precise similarity
does not form partitions. If not, then it is inappropriate to assume
that it is transitive.
31. Transitivity of concurrence? The sprightly charm of Schubert's
little overture to Die Zauberharfe is equaled by that of his R

overture, for they are the very same charm and the very same
ture. In virtue of this charm, both works get off to a sprightly
This trope, then, seems- equally constitutive of both. If so, and
Zauberharfe and Rosamunde can both count as particulars (th
a rather fragmentary one), then concurrence is not transitive. I
the fact that the overture is a type with many tokens seems to
the example, it may be put more schematically as follows. L
be two spatially overlapping G rectangles:
a b
(Ga)( (Gb)
(Fc)
Their G-ness consists in the F-ness of their common part c. It appears

that c's F-ness belongs to both a and b. Whilst such examples may
not be conclusive, they are again suggestive. My own tentative
inclination would be to make i-ary concurrence relations transitive, so
that they form partitions. But only detailed applications of trope
theory can decide.
32. States of affairs? Bacon has equated "tropes" with states of affairs
(xzxz02, 53). Several workers in the philosophy of tropes reject that
equation, including Williams himself (p. 91).9 It is important therefore
to point out that trope structures as developed here are neutral on
this question. Whether Mao's redness is the same thing or different
from the fact (obtaining state of affairs) that Mao is or was red, both
kinds of entity (if they are two) can realize the set T' of a trope struc-
ture. Both kinds can meaningfully support relations of precise similar-
ity and concurrence. Thus both give rise to "trope structures" in the
152 JOHN BACON
abstract sense treated here. Whilst ther

metaphysical reasons why a theory of t
relations is more fruitful than a theory o
(though I doubt it), the issue is not join
33. Ontological economy. The main poin

tures can be replaced by trope cascades,
of the simplest sort of trope structure,
structure. The latter, in turn, is nothing
relational structure. This result forces a
assessment of Bacon (xz28). He found m
structures to be more baroque than oth
attractive on other grounds. Now that
infinity of trope relations in trope struct
in a trope cascade, the corresponding m
lined. Both from a metaphysical and a s
theory now survives Ockham's razor ha
plicatae sunt praeter necessitatem.
34. Ontological options. To be sure, the

to trope cascades conflicts with what I
attractions of trope theory: the vision o
basic. As Williams puts it,
... entities like our fine parts or abstract compon

this or any possible world, the very alphabet of
the only actualities . . . (1953, p. 78)
This raises the question whether our logical red

cades and 3-tropes should be taken as an ontol
any case, it would sorely try the tonsorial skill
shave off the tangle of 1-relations while leaving
(It mightn't trouble a nominalist, I suppose; bu
inherently nomanilistic.) Whether being is aptly
and abbreviated in 3-tropes or vice versa, trope
alphabetic options.
NOTES
An equivalence relation is a similarity relation that is also transitive. Although

Wiliams nowhere stipulated the transitivity of concurrnce, he implied it: "Speaking
roughly, now, the set of or sum of tropes concurrent with a trope... is the concrete
particular or thing which it may be said to characterize" (p. 80). s can be similar to t
yet outside t's similarity class; but if s is equivalent to t in some sense, then s must be
in t's equivalence class. We must accordingly construe Williams' concrete particulars as
(sums of) equivalence classes. In fact, Williams treats abstract universals and precise
similarity in the same way. For the sake of generality, however, I shall presuppose
transitivity neither for concurrence nor for precise similarity. Williams was inclined to
take the concrete particular as the mereological fusion of its equivalence class (p. 81). I
shall leave mereology aside and stick with classes.
2 I think he means the set of all r-nesses of (a, b) such that arb.
3 Thus higher-level precise similarity, taken bottom-up, is always an equivalence rela-
tion, but it is left open whether precise first-level similarity is. Cf. xz30.
4 This formulation is due to the referee.
5 This section has benefited extensively from the referee's suggestions, particularly the
comments on one-to-one correspondence anticipating the isomorphism proved in
Part II.
6 It is the presence of reflexive tropes as I2-kernels in the nucleate similarity classes that
avoids Goodman's problem of imperfect community (p. 125). Without such kernels, a
maximal I2-class of 2-tropes might have only rs, st, or rt on their right, with no com-
mon element. I am indebted to the referee for calling my attention to this problem,
which pointed up the need for kernels.
7 Cf. Note 6, reading 'I' for '12

8 Protorelations as thus defined are not necessarily IH2 -classes or similarity classes, but
they become equivalence classes in our main use of them in xz22f below.
9 Also D. M. Armstrong, Keith Campbell, and Philip Pettit.
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pp. 221-230.
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Philosophy 66 (1988) pp. 188-207.
McKinsey, J. C. C., 'A new definition of truth', Synthese 7 (1949), pp. 428-433.
Stout, G. F., 'The nature of universals and propositions', Proceedings of the British
Academy 10 (1921), pp. 157-172; reprinted in the The Problem of Universals, ed.
Charles Landesman, Basic Books, New York, 1971, pp. 153-166.
154 JOHN BACON
Williams, D. C., 'The elements of being', in his Pr

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of being', Review of Metaphysics 7 (1953), pp. 3
Department of Traditional and Modern P

University of Sydney,
Sydney, NSW 2006,
Australia.

Trope Theory

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A Single Primitive Trope Relation

Author(s): John Bacon

A SINGLE PRIMITIVE TROPE RELATION

00. Monadic tropes. G. F. Stout and D. C. Williams showed how th

01. Relation tropes. Williams does not explicitly develop a theory of

Journal of Philosophical Logic 18 (1989) 141-154.

place. We may call these relations for sh

John loves Mary iff John,, Mary2

We can now characterize a trope structu

02. Modality aside. Tropes can be used

03. Proliferation of trope relations. Relations of individuals, e.g. love

04. Higher-level tropes. Without developing them, Willia

and this clearer project:

... an assimilation of the very categories of our theory - concurrence, similarity,

John's love of Mary concurring secondarily with

06. Preview. I will show that every trop

I. TROPE STRUCTURES AND CASCADES

10. Notation and terminology. Besides standard set-theoretic notatio

f'-class. (Notice that f''t' is always maximal.) A similari

11. The trope structure is a pair S = (T', R' ), where T'

concurrence I,', first-level secondary concurrence I2, a

13. Cascades out of structures.5 Where S = (T, R) is a trope struc-

14. Structures out of cascades. Where C = (H2, 2, 13) is a trope

If we equate C here with the C constructed in xz13, then S2 w

15. Structural isomorphism. Let S and C be as in xz13, and let the

the H2-equivalence class H2'ft of all 2

xz23. VhER* !f~e R: h =f*

These lemmas will now be proved, substantiating the claims of xz06.

II. PROOF OF ISOMORPHISM

20. t* e T*. t* will be a 1-trope on C, i.e. a nucleate ri|-similarity

the right. As x is nucleate, either H2U or H2v is its kernel. In e

21. Vx e T* 3!t e T: x = t*. If x e T* then x = 12 I't2 for so

22. f* e R*. i.e. If'I is nonempty andf' is a 1-protorelation o

some I3-kernel t' e T'. As in xz20, let t3 be I2ft. Clearly t3 is an

23. VjhI e R* 3!fe R: Ihl = f*. If Ihl e R*, then h = IH21't fo

24. sft if s*f*t*, i.e. s* n t* of' or s* =

25. Transitivity. For the sake of generality, I have required of precise

Vx, y, z e T: x n y of', yn zof' -+ x n zof'.

For by xz21 we have an r e T such that x = r* = {-F'H2hur: h E R,

I-f 'H2frt e x, zf, f', so x nz of'.

III. LOOSE METAPHYSICAL ENDS

30. Nontransitivity of precise similarity. It is thus left open here

31. Transitivity of concurrence? The sprightly charm of Schubert's

little overture to Die Zauberharfe is equaled by that of his R

Their G-ness consists in the F-ness of their common part c. It appears

abstract sense treated here. Whilst ther

33. Ontological economy. The main poin

34. Ontological options. To be sure, the

... entities like our fine parts or abstract compon

This raises the question whether our logical red

An equivalence relation is a similarity relation that is also transitive. Although

7 Cf. Note 6, reading 'I' for '12

Bacon, John, 'Four modal modelings', Journal of Philosophical Logic 17 (1988),

Hochberg, Herbert, 'A refutation of moderate nominalism', Australasian Journal of

Williams, D. C., 'The elements of being', in his Pr

Department of Traditional and Modern P

S-ar putea să vă placă și

20. t* e T. t will be a 1-trope on C, i.e. a nucleate ri|-similarity

21. Vx e T* 3!t e T: x = t. If x e T then x = 12 I't2 for so

23. VjhI e R* 3!fe R: Ihl = f. If Ihl e R, then h = IH21't fo

24. sft if sft, i.e. s n t* of' or s* =