CHAPTER 8 – LIABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
To hold otherwise for gross negligence, the assailed act
Contents of Chapter 8:
1. Kinds of Duties
2. Liabilities:
a. President
b. Legislators
c. Judges
d. Quasi-judicial officers
e. Local Officials
f. Ministerial Officers
g. Acts of Subordinates
h. Personal liability
3. Remedies against the public officer
Quick summary of liabilities (Own notes):
PUBLIC
GENERAL RULE
OFFICER
The President shall be immune from
suit to guarantee independence of the
public official who otherwise might be
unwilling to make the right decisions
President
for fear that he might be called to
account therefor in a court of law by
disgruntled individuals adversely
affected by his act
Cabinet members cannot be held
liable for acts done by them in the
exercise of their discretion and within
the limits of their authority
Members of the legislature, both
national and local, act as a body and
discharge duties owing to the public in
Legislators general. Hence, they cannot be held
liable, individually or collectively, for
the performance or non-performance
of their duties
Judges shall not be liable for their acts
Judges
provided he acts in good faith and
without malice.
EXCEPTION
Rome Statute on the International
Criminal Court
= with respect to the crime of genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes,
and the crime of aggression
Attendance of malice, bad faith, or
gross negligence
à Mendoza v de Leon: Municipal
council exercising proprietary functions
which could be likened to the directors
of a private corporation who normally
should not be sued directly for their
official acts. These should be imputed
to the corporation itself. Nevertheless,
the members were held to have acted
in bad faith and so were made liable in
their personal capacities
à Roma v CA: Gov, Vice Gov,
members of Sang. Panlalawigan,
provincial auditor, treasurer and
engineer were ordered to pay jointly
and severally in their personal capacity
damages to 200 employees of province
of Cebu who were eased out of their
positions because of their political /
party affiliations
à Santiago v Sandiganbayan: SC
affirmed the authority of the
Sandiganbayan to issue orders of
preventive suspension even against
members of the Legislature,
independently of the power of
Congress to discipline its members
(For a charge of knowingly rendering
an unjust judgment) To hold him liable
would be to render judicial office must not only be contrary to existing
untenable, for no one called upon to law or jurisprudence, but must also be
try the facts or interpret the law in the motivated by bad faith, fraud,
process of administering justice can be dishonesty, or corruption on his part.
infallible in his judgment.
When they act without jurisdiction as
the law will not protect them for
exercising powers that do not belong to
them. This is usurpation.
These officers may not themselves be
held liable for such decisions.
Acting not within the scope of their
Otherwise, they would hesitate to
Quasi-judicial authority and with bad faith, malice or
exercise their duties for fear of being
officers corruption.
called upon to respond in damages to
disgruntled parties prejudiced by their
acts
Rules governing the liability of officials
in the national government are
Specific provisions of the Local
Local officials applicable to local officials in the
Government Code
discharge of their discretionary and
ministerial functions
Such duties and responsibilities
require commensurate protection, and
the ministerial officer who performs in
It follows that where the ministerial
the prescribed manner and with due
officer acts without authority, or in
care and diligence an at imposed upon
disregard of the occasion, time and
him by law incurs no liability to no
manner prescribed by law for the
Ministerial individual however much the latter
performance of the duty, he must
officers may be injured. Even though the
respond in damages to any person
power which set him in motion may
injured as a result. This ministerial
have erred, yet if the command comes
officer is thus liable for nonfeasance,
from the proper source and on its face
misfeasance or malfeasance.
fairly requires that he should act, he
may act without fear of personal
consequences to himself.
1. Where, being charged with the duty
of employing or retaining his
subordinates, he negligently or willfully
employs or retains unfit or improper
persons
Superior officers cannot be held liable
2. Where, being charged with the duty
for the acts of their subordinates as
to see that they are appointed and
otherwise competent persons may not
qualified in a proper manner, he
be willing to join the public service for
Acts of negligently or willfully fails to require of
fear of imputation to them of the
subordinates them the due conformity to the
shortcomings of others. The faults of
prescribed regulations
subordinates should be considered
3. Where he so carelessly or
their own responsibility alone and not
negligently oversees, conducts or
be visited upon the innocent superior.
carries on the business of his office as
to furnish the opportunity for the default
4. A fortiorari where he has directed,
authorized, or cooperated in the wrong
Evidence to prove partiality, malice and
Public officers generally have in their bad faith is usually required to hold
Personal
favor the presumption of regularity in them liable
liability
their performance of official duties Also, the law itself may hold the PO
personally liable (See provisions)
CARLOS | LAW OF PO 1
Constitution, Art XI, Section 1 Liability in General
SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act Book I, Chapter 9 of the Admin Code of 1987
with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
- Improper discharge of powers and duties à liability may attach SECTION 38. Liability of Superior Officers.—
- “Public office is public trust” à underlying principle for the relaxation of requirements of due of (1) A public officer shall not be civilly liable for acts done in the performance of his official
process of law in administrative proceedings duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence.
(2) Any public officer who, without just cause, neglects to perform a duty within a period
Administrative offenses: fixed by law or regulation, or within a reasonable period if none is fixed, shall be liable for
• They do not prescribe damages to the private party concerned without prejudice to such other liability as may be
• By their very nature pertain to the character of public officers and employees prescribed by law.
• Object sought is not punishment but the improvement of public service and preservation of (3) A head of a department or a superior officer shall not be civilly liable for the wrongful
the public’s faith and confidence in our government acts, omissions of duty, negligence, or misfeasance of his subordinates, unless he has
• Every public official is entitled to the presumption of good faith in the discharge of his actually authorized by written order the specific act or misconduct complained of.
official duties
SECTION 39. Liability of Subordinate Officers. —No subordinate officer or employee shall be civilly
Kinds of Duties: liable for acts done by him in good faith in the performance of his duties. However, he shall be liable
for willful or negligent acts done by him which are contrary to law, morals, public policy and good
1. Duty owing to the public in general customs even if he acted under orders or instructions of his superiors.
2. Duty owing to particular individuals
à Accountable officers CANNOT profess ignorance of laws / administrative circulars for it is required
Duty owing to the public in general that they must update their knowledge with whatever laws or any administrative issuances that may
- cannot give rise to liability in favor of particular individuals be issued by competent authorities
- damnum absque injuria – a case of damage without injury that may not be vindicated in a - HOWEVER, in Reyes v Rural Bank of San Miguel: Public officials of independent
court of justice corporate bodies such as the BSP, which have been bestowed under their charters with
- duty not performed not owed to any particular person but to the public as a fiscal and administrative autonomy, should be granted a certain degree of flexibility in the
whole performance of their duties and provided insulation from interference and vexatious suits,
- Individual himself has NO cause of action especially when moves of the kind are resorted to as a counterfoil to the exercise of their
à Remedy: Political, not judicial = exercised by the people themselves through their regular mandate.
suffrages

Examples:
Ø Duty of President to maintain peace and order
Ø Duty of Legislature to regulate smuggling
Ø Duty of Judiciary to try an accused

Duty owing to particular individuals

- Improper performance or non-performance will give rise to a cause of action in his favor
for any injury sustained by him

Examples:
Ø Duty of a sheriff to enforce a writ of execution
Ø Duty of a register of deeds to issue a certificate of title
Ø Duty of a clerk of court to serve copies of a decision upon the parties

CARLOS | LAW OF PO 2
The President
à Doctrine of presidential immunity
General Rule: The President shall be immune from suit to guarantee independence of the
public official who otherwise might be unwilling to make the right decisions for fear that he
might be called to account therefor in a court of law by disgruntled individuals adversely
affected by his act
- A suit against the President would not only “engender disrespect and disregard for the
authority that he represents” but would also result in “delay or inaction on important matters
of government” because of the time and effort that the President would have to devote to
his defense
à The President may generally not be held liable for his acts because they are mainly discretionary
and owing to the public in general
- Example: Convict cannot implead President for not granting him pardon for he has no
constitutional right to be pardoned
à Doctrine of separation of powers
- Prevents the courts from interfering with the President when he decides what are known
as political questions, except when his decision is tainted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
à Estrada v Desierto: petitioner contended that the cases filed against him before the Ombudsman
should be prohibited because impeachment proceedings against him remained pending
SC: NO. Impeachment court is Functus Officio (of no further official authority or legal effect
—used especially of an officer who is no longer in office or of an instrument that has
fulfilled its purpose). If petitioner’s plea is granted, it would a perpertual bar against his
prosecution. It will place him in a better position than a non-sitting President who has not
been subjected to impeachment proceedings and yet can be the object of a criminal
prosecution.
à “Incumbent presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of
their incumbency and tenure but not beyond”
à Has NO application where the petition for prohibition is directed not against the
President himself, but against his subordinates
Legislators
- Members of the legislature, both national and local, act as a body and discharge duties owing to the
public in general.
- Hence, as a rule, they cannot be held liable, individually or collectively, for the
performance or non-performance of their duties
- Exceptional cases:
à Mendoza v de Leon: Municipal council cancelled without valid cause a franchise to
operate a ferry. Plaintiff awarded damages because the municipal council was exercising
proprietary functions in this case, which could be likened to the directors of a private
corporation who normally should not be sued directly for their official acts. These should be
imputed to the corporation itself. Nevertheless, the members were held to have acted in
bad faith and so were made liable in their personal capacities
à Roma v CA: Gov, Vice Gov, members of Sang. Panlalawigan, provincial auditor,
treasurer and engineer were ordered to pay jointly and severally in their personal capacity
damages to 200 employees of province of Cebu who were eased out of their positions
because of their political / party affiliations
à Santiago v Sandiganbayan: SC affirmed the authority of the Sandiganbayan to issue
orders of preventive suspension even against members of the Legislature, independently
of the power of Congress to discipline its members
- It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of
suspension upon determination of the validity of the information filed before it. Once the
information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to issue an
order of suspension as a matter of course, and there seems to be "no ifs and buts about it."
- Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must
be suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which
he has been charged. Thus, it has been held that the use of the word "office" would
indicate that it applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only
the particular office under which he stands accused. The order of suspension prescribed
by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks
under the Constitution.

à Cabinet members cannot be held liable for acts done by them in the exercise of their discretion
and within the limits of their authority without the attendance of malice, bad faith, or gross negligence
- Like the President, of whom each of them is an alter ego, they are entitled to proper
respect for their discretionary acts which even the court of justice are not usually
empowered to review

à Where they are charged by law to perform ministerial duties for the benefit of particular individuals,
mandamus will lie to compel such performance.
- According to Mechem, there is no reason why they cannot held liable in damages for their
failure to discharge such duties (Ex: President can be made a respondent in an election
contest filed with SC and an impeachment proceeding)

à Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court

= with respect to the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the
crime of aggression
à the Statute “shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on official
capacity. In particular, it provides that official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a
member of a Government or parliament, an elected representative or a government official
shall in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Statue, nor shall it,
in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence”
à “immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a
person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising
its jurisdiction over such a person.”
à Accordingly, he can be investigated, prosecuted, arrested, tried, convicted and punished
by the International Criminal Court

CARLOS | LAW OF PO 3
Judges
General Rule: Judges shall not be liable for their acts
- In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial
capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous,
provided he acts in good faith and without malice
- To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to
try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in
his judgment
à For a charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment to prosper, it must be shown that the
judgment was unjust, and not that the judge merely committed an error of judgment or took the
unpopular side of a controversial point of law. He must have known that his judgment was indeed
unjust to render him administratively liable. To hold him liable for gross negligence, the assailed act
must not only be contrary to existing law or jurisprudence, but must also be motivated by bad faith,
fraud, dishonesty, or corruption on his part.
- HOWEVER: A judge enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance of
his functions no less than any public officer
- May be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a
duty.
- In case of doubt as to an officer’s act being lawful or unlawful, construction
should be made in favor of its lawfulness
à Liable if they act without jurisdiction as the law will not protect them for exercising powers that do
not belong to them. This is usurpation.
à The proper recourse of a party aggrieved by the decision of a judge is to file a motion for
reconsideration or to appeal to or file a petition for certiorari with the proper court, not to file an
administrative complaint
- Disciplinary proceedings against judges do not complement, supplement, or substitute
judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary
- An inquiry into their administrative liability arising from judicial acts may be made only
after other available remedies have been settled
- For until there is a final declaration by the appellate court that the challenged order or
judgment is manifestly erroneous, there will be no basis to conclude whether respondent
judge is administratively liable
à Where there is pending before the SC a Petition for Review of a decision of the CA
affirming orders of a judge which are the same orders subject of an administrative
complaint for gross ignorance of law, the disposition of the administrative case should be
held in abeyance
- but this does NOT in any way imply that an administrative case cannot proceed
independently of the main one
à Canon 3, Rule 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct: “A judge is required to be faithful to the law
and maintain professional competence.”
à Canon 3, Rule 3.09: He should be “meticulous and zealous as he should have been in organizing
and supervising the work of his subordinates.”
à Article 32, Civil Code: Damages are “not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission
constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.”
- Act complained of must itself constitute a crime (Ex: Art 204, RPC – judge rendering
grossly unjust decision)
- Immunity of judges has been expanded
à Absence of any damage to a complainant does not totally absolve a judge from any administrative
liability for wrongfully issuing a writ of execution amounting to grave abuse of authority if not
ignorance of the rule on execution in ejectment cases
à Failing to comply with the mandate to decide cases within the period prescribed by the
Constitution, the laws, the Rules of Court and the administrative circulars and guidelines constitutes
gross inefficiency and incompetence, for which the judge may be held to account
à Retirement from the Bench does not exempt the judge from liability for disobeying or ignoring the
mandate
à The Supreme Court is given by the Constitution the exclusive power over the discipline of lower
court judges and court personnel
Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution:
SECTION 11. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold
office during good behavior until they reached the age of seventy years or become
incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en banc shall
have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a
majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the
case and voted thereon.
à Jurisprudence has characterized administrative supervision as exclusive = no other
branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of
separation of powers
Section 5 (6), Article VIII of the Constitution:
SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil
Service Law.
à Empowers the Court to oversee all matters relating to the effective supervision and
management of all courts and personnel under it
à Administrative jurisdiction over a court employee belongs to the Supreme Court,
regardless of whether the offense was committed before or after employment in the
judiciary (Ampong v CSC)
à Administrative complaints (courts, judges, judicial staff) are outside the Ombudsman’s
investigatory powers. It only has the authority to conduct a preliminary investigation of a
complaint with violation of RA 3019 and upon finding a prima facie case, proceed to file the
information before the Sandiganbayan (Orap v Sandiganbayan)
à Ombudsman cannot determine for itself whether a criminal complaint against a judge or
court employee involves an administrative matter. Its duty it to have all cases filed before it
to be referred to the Supreme Court for determination as to whether an administrative
aspect is involved therein (Re: Request for Copy of 2008 SALN)
à RULE: By virtue of its constitutional power of administrative supervision over all courts
and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the CA down to the lowest municipal
court clerk, it is only the SC that can oversee their compliance with laws, and take the
proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other
branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of
separation of powers.
à HOWEVER: In Mamiscal v Clerk of Court à SC does not have jurisdiction to impose
proper disciplinary action against the Clerk of Court of the Shari’a Circuit Court in his
performance of duties as a civil (or circuit) registrar.
- “A review of the subject complaint reveals that Mamiscal seeks to hold
Abdullah liable for registering the divorce and issuing the CRD pursuant to his
duties as Circuit Registrar of Muslim divorces. It has been said that the test of
jurisdiction is the nature of the offense and not the personality of the offender.
The fact that the complaint charges Abdullah for "conduct unbecoming of a court
employee" is of no moment. Well-settled is the rule that what controls is not the
designation of the offense but the actual facts recited in the complaint. Verily,
unless jurisdiction has been conferred by some legislative act, no court or
tribunal can act on a matter submitted to it.”
CARLOS | LAW OF PO 4
 à In case of violation of the Civil Service Law by a court personnel, the standard
procedure is for the CSC to bring its complaint against a judicial employee before the OCA
of the SC
à Personnel of the judiciary may be guilty of misconduct, regardless of whether or not
their actions are work-related, because they must always beyond reproach so as to
preserve at all times the good name and standing of courts in the community.
à As criminal prosecution is available against the judge, there is not much justification for
holding him liable in an independent civil action for damages.
- Threat of such liability is likely to impair his independence, not to say his
prestige, and would occupy his time in his own defense when it should be
devoted to his work
- Moreover, where a judge is sued for his decision, the decision of the judge
trying the case may also be questioned before another judge, whose decision
may also be challenged, and so on ad infinitum
- This would lead to a multiplicity of litigation and require an increase in the
judicial machinery and the cost of maintaining it. There will be the strong
possibility that competent men will hesitate to join the Judiciary for fear that they
too will be held civilly liable in damages for their decisions
à The SC declared that it is not the proper forum for an administrative suit for disciplinary
action against a judge for unjustified refusal to pay his debts = Complainant’s course of
action is civil, not administrative (Litigio v Dicon)
à To grant a complaint for disbarment of a Member of the Court during the Member's
incumbency, would in effect be to circumvent and hence to ran afoul of the constitutional
mandate that Members of the Court may be removed from office only by impeachment for
and conviction of certain offenses listed in Article XI (2) of the Constitution. Precisely the
same situation exists in respect of the Ombudsman and his deputies (Article XI [8] in
relation to Article XI [2]), a majority of the members of the COMELEC (Article IX [C] [1] [1]
in relation to Article XI [2]), and the members of the COA who are not CPAs (Article XI [D]
[1] [1]), all of whom are constitutionally required to be members of the Philippine Bar.
- The Court is NOT saying that its members or other constitutional officers are
immune from liability à what the court is saying is that there is a fundamental
procedural requirement that must be observed before such liability may be
determined and enforced. Should the tenure of the SC Justice be thus
terminated by impeachment, he may then be held to answer either criminally or
administratively (by disbarment proceedings).
- The above rule rests on the fundamental principles of judicial independence
and separation of powers
à It follows then that a fiscal or other prosecuting officer should forthwith and
motu proprio dismiss any charges brought against a member of this the SC. The
remedy of a person with a legitimate grievance is to file impeachment
proceedings

à In instances involving dismissal of judges, the administrative cases must be deliberated

upon and decided by the SC en banc. It is only when the penalty imposed does not exceed
suspension of more than one year or a fine of P10,000.00, or both, that the administrative
matter may be decided in division. [Per SC Resolution, Re: Bar Matter 209]

à The quantum of evidence to hold a judge administratively liable is only a preponderance

of evidence
- A preponderance of evidence is defined as “evidence which is of greater weight or more
convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it; that is, evidence which as
a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.”

à At the very least, administrative charges against members of the judiciary must be
supported by substantial evidence, or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

à A complaint against a magistrate, when instituted by any person, must be verified and
duly supported by affidavits of persons who have personal knowledge of the facts alleged
therein, or by documents substantiating such allegations

à A resolution of the SC requiring comment on an administrative complaint against

officials and employees of the judiciary should not be construed as a mere request from
the Court, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately or selectively. A
respondent’s deliberate refusal to comply with the resolutions of the Court evinces gross
misconduct and insubordination

Insofar as Justices of the SC (and other impeachable officers) take note of this ruling in In Re: Raul
Gonzalez:
- A public officer who under the Constitution is required to be a Member of the Philippine
Bar as a qualification for the office held by him and who may be removed from office only
by impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during the incumbency of such public
officer. Further, such public officer, during his incumbency, cannot be charged criminally
before the Sandiganbayan or any other court with any offence which carries with it the
penalty of removal from office, or any penalty service of which would amount to removal
from office.

CARLOS | LAW OF PO 5
Quasi-Judicial Officers
- Decisions rendered by them may be reversed by courts of justice upon showing of a grave abuse of
discretion.
- HOWEVER – these officers may not themselves be held liable for such decisions as long
as it is shown that they were acting within the scope of their authority and without bad faith,
malice or corruption. Otherwise, they would hesitate to exercise their duties for fear of
being called upon to respond in damages to disgruntled parties prejudiced by their acts
à Example: Philippine Racing Club v Bonifacio à The Commission on Races, after
conducting an “on-the-spot” investigation, cancelled the race on the ground of faulty start.
The SC held that the Commission did not have the power to cancel races, BUT considering
that they acted in their official capacity in the honest belief that they had such power and
acted only after an on-the-spot investigation, they cannot be held liable for damages
Acts in Line of Duty or under Color of Authority. — As a rule, a public officer,
whether judicial, quasi-judicial, or executive, is not personally liable to one
injured as a consequence of an act performed within the scope of his official
authority, and in the line of his official duty. In order that acts may be done within
the scope of official authority, it is not necessary that they be prescribed by
statute, or even that they be specifically directed or requested by a superior
officer, but it is sufficient if they are done by an officer in relation to matters
committed by law to his control or supervision, or that they have more or less
connection with such matters, or that they have more or less connection with
such matters, or that they are governed by a lawful requirement of the
department under whose authority the officer is acting. Under this principle, state
building commissioners who, in obedience to a statute, discharge one who has
been employed to construct a state building, take possession of the work, and
place it in the hands of another contractor, are not liable to the former contractor
in damages, since in so doing they are merely acting in the line of their duty. An
officer is not personally responsible for the necessary and unavoidable
destruction of goods stored in buildings, when such buildings were destroyed by
him in the lawful performance of a public duty imposed on him by a valid and
constitutional statute.
Error or Mistake in Exercise of Authority. — Where an officer is invested with
discretion and is empowered to exercise his judgment in matters brought before
him, he is sometimes called a quasi-judicial officer, and when so acting he is
actually given immunity from liability to persons who may be injured as the result
of an erroneous or mistaken decision, however erroneous judgment may be,
provided the acts complained of are done within the scope of the officer's
authority, and without wilfulness, malice, or corruption.
à In Tadlip v Borres – The SC likened a lawyer practicing his profession, who was also a
provincial adjudicator, to a public officer who has been given the duty of deciding
conflicting claims of the parties. He is part of the quasi-judicial system. Thus, the dispute
may be likened to administrative cases of judges whose manner of deciding cases was
similarly subject of respective administrative cases
Local Officials
- Rules governing the liability of officials in the national government are applicable to local officials in
the discharge of their discretionary and ministerial functions
(Ex: Municipal mayor allowed to determine WON to license a liquor establishment and may
not be held civilly liable for his refusal absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion. If
denied without a valid reason a permit to use a public plaza for a lawful public assembly,
the mayor may be called to respond in damages as this would be a violation of a
fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution)
à Under the LGC of 1991:
Section 340. Persons Accountable for Local Government Funds. - Any officer of the local government
unit whose duty permits or requires the possession or custody of local government funds shall be
accountable and responsible for the safekeeping thereof in conformity with the provisions of this Title.
Other local officers who, though not accountable by the nature of their duties, may likewise be
similarly held accountable and responsible for local government funds through their participation in
the use or application thereof.
Section 341. Prohibitions Against Pecuniary Interest. - Without prejudice to criminal prosecution
under applicable laws, any local treasurer, accountant, budget officer, or other accountable local
officer having any pecuniary interest, direct or indirect, in any contract, work or other business of the
local government unit of which he is an accountable officer shall be administratively liable therefor.
Section 342. Liability for Acts Done Upon Direction of Superior Officer, or Upon Participation of Other
Department Heads or Officers of Equivalent Rank. - Unless he registers his objection in writing, the
local treasurer, accountant, budget officer, or other accountable officer shall not be relieved of liability
for illegal or improper use or application or deposit of government funds or property by reason of his
having acted upon the direction of a superior officer, elective or appointive, or upon participation of
other department heads or officers of equivalent rank. The superior officer directing, or the
department head participating in such illegal or improper use or application or deposit of government
funds or property, shall be jointly and severally liable with the local treasurer, accountant, budget
officer, or other accountable officer for the sum or property so illegally or improperly used, applied or
deposited.
Section 377. Measure of Liability of Persons Accountable for Government Property. -
(a) The person immediately accountable for government property shall be liable for its
money value in case of the illegal, improper or unauthorized use or misapplication thereof,
by himself or any other person for whose acts he may be responsible, and he shall be
liable for all loss, damage, or deterioration occasioned by negligence in the keeping or use
of property unless it is proved that he has exercised due diligence and care in the
utilization and safekeeping thereof.
(b) Unless he registers his objection in writing, an accountable person shall not be relieved
from liability by reason of his having acted under the direction of a superior officer in using
property with which he is chargeable; but the officer directing any illegal, unauthorized or
improper use of property shall first be required to answer therefor.
(c) In cases of loss, damage, or deterioration of government property arising from, or
attributable to, negligence in security, the head of the security agency shall be held liable
therefor.
à In Ricafort v Bansil: Where the complaint against a lawyer is in connection with the
discharge of his functions as a notary public, and not as an elected barangay chairman, the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees will not apply –
as a lawyer and notary public, he is covered by the Code of Professional Responsibility
and Code of Professional Ethics
CARLOS | LAW OF PO 6
Ministerial Officers
Ministerial Act – defined as “an act performed in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the law or
mandate of legal authority, without regard to, or exercise of, the judgment of the individual upon the
propriety of the act being done.”
à Where the act is performed by the officer under these conditions, and with due care and
diligence, he incurs no liability to any person prejudiced by it.
à As Mechem says: Such duties and responsibilities require commensurate protection,
and the ministerial officer who performs in the prescribed manner and with due care and
diligence an at imposed upon him by law incurs no liability to no individual however much
the latter may be injured. Even though the power which set him in motion may have erred,
yet if the command comes from the proper source and on its face fairly requires that he
should act, he may act without fear of personal consequences to himself.
à It follows that where the ministerial officer acts without authority, or in disregard of the
occasion, time and manner prescribed by law for the performance of the duty, he must
respond in damages to any person injured as a result. This ministerial officer is thus liable
for nonfeasance, misfeasance or malfeasance.
Nonfeasance is the neglect or refusal, without sufficient excuse, to perform an
act which it was the officer’s legal duty to the individual to perform.
Misfeasance or negligence is the failure to use, in the performance of a duty
owing to the individual, that degree of care, skill and diligence which the
circumstances of the case reasonably demand.
Malfeasance is the doing, either through ignorance, inattention or malice, of that
which the officer had no legal right to do at all, as where he acts without any
authority whatever, or exceeds, ignores or abuses his powers.
à In any of the above cases, the ministerial officer cannot interpose the defense
of good faith or honest mistake and must bear the consequences of his act or
omission.
à Misconduct, misfeasance, or malfeasance warranting removal from office of an officer
(or to constitute an administrative offense), must have a direct relation to and be connected
with the performance of official duties, amounting either to maladministration or willful,
intentional neglect and failure to discharge the duties of the office
Liability for Acts of Subordinates
- General Rule: Superior officers cannot be held liable for the acts of their subordinates as otherwise
competent persons may not be willing to join the public service for fear of imputation to them of the
shortcomings of others. The faults of subordinates should be considered their own responsibility
alone and not be visited upon the innocent superior.
à In Albert v Gangan:
- The mere fact that a public officer is the head of an agency does not necessarily mean that he is the
party ultimately liable in case of disallowance of expenses for questionable transactions of his
agency. Though not impossible, it would be improbable for him to check all the details and conduct
physical inspection and verification of the application considering the voluminous paperwork
attendant to his office. He has to rely mainly on the certifications, recommendations and memoranda
of his subordinates in approving the loan.
- Every person who signs or initials documents in the course of transit through standard
operating procedures does not automatically become a conspirator in a crime which
transpired at a stage where he had no participation. His knowledge of the conspiracy and
his active and knowing participation therein must be proved by positive evidence. The fact
that such officer signs or initials a voucher as it is going the rounds does not necessarily
follow that the said person becomes part of a conspiracy in an illegal scheme. The guilt
beyond reasonable doubt of each supposed conspirator must be established.
à In Arias v. Sandiganbayan:
- We would be setting a bad precedent if a head of office plagued by all too common
problems - dishonest or negligent subordinates, overwork, multiple assignments or
positions, or plain incompetence - is suddenly swept into a conspiracy conviction simply
because he did not personally examine every single detail, painstakingly trace every step
from inception and investigate the motives of every person involved in a transaction before
annexing his signature as the final approving authority. All heads of offices have to rely to a
reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good faith of those who prepare bids,
purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations. There should be other grounds than the mere
signature or approval appearing on a voucher to sustain a conspiracy charge and
conviction.
à Under Section 103 of PD 1455, an official or employee shall be personally liable for unauthorized
expenditures if the following requisites are present, to wit:
(a) there must be an expenditure of government funds or use of government property;
(b) the expenditure is in violation of law or regulation; and
(c) the official is found directly responsible therefor.
à In Typoco v People:
- To clarify, the Arias doctrine is not an absolute rule. It is not a magic cloak that can be
used as a cover by a public officer to conceal himself in the shadows of his subordinates
and necessarily escape liability. Thus, this ruling cannot be applied to exculpate petitioner
Typoco in view of the peculiar circumstances in this case which should have prompted him,
as head of office, to exercise a higher degree of circumspection and, necessarily, go
beyond what his subordinates had prepared.
à In Philippine Economic Zone Authority v COA:
- Good faith has always been a valid defense of public officials that has been considered
by this Court in several cases. Good faith is a state of mind denoting "honesty of intention,
and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry;
an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconcientious advantage of another, even
though technicalities of law, together with absence of all information, notice, or benefit or
belief of facts which render transaction unconscientious.
CARLOS | LAW OF PO 7
à Mechem notes a number of exceptions when the superior officer may be held liable:
1. Where, being charged with the duty of employing or retaining his subordinates, he
negligently or willfully employs or retains unfit or improper persons
2. Where, being charged with the duty to see that they are appointed and qualified in a
proper manner, he negligently or willfully fails to require of them the due conformity to the
prescribed regulations
3. Where he so carelessly or negligently oversees, conducts or carries on the business of
his office as to furnish the opportunity for the default
4. A fortiorari where he has directed, authorized, or cooperated in the wrong
à See RA 7160, Section 342 and 377 above
à See Book 1 Chapter 9, Admin Code, Section 38 and 39 – page 1
à The power of review is exercised to determine whether it is necessary to correct the acts of the
subordinate and to see to it that he performs his duties in accordance with law.
Personal Liability
- Where the wrong, whether contractual or tortious, is committed by the public officer without
authority or with malice or in bad faith, he may be held personally liable for his act or omission. In this
case, he is suable in his individual capacity and cannot invoke his official status to insulate himself
from liability.
à A public official is by law not immune from damages in his personal capacity for acts done in bad
faith which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of
immunity for official actions.
à Public officers generally have in their favor the presumption of regularity in their performance of
official duties and evidence to prove partiality, malice and bad faith is usually required to hold them
liable.
- This presumption does not apply to administrative proceedings resulting in deprivation of
a citizen or a taxpayer of his property
- A public officer shall not be liable by way of moral and exemplary damages for acts done
in the performance of official duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or
gross negligence
à In Cruz v Gangan:
- The SC ruled that a public school teacher cannot be held personally liable for losing a cell
phone issued to her by the government as she was riding an LRT train on her way to a
meeting, notwithstanding the fact that it was duly established that such was stolen from her
à In CSC v Gentallan:
- Without malice or bad faith in the illegal dismissal and refusal to reinstate the employee,
the superior officers cannot be held personally accountable for her back salaries, The
municipal government should disburse the funds to answer for her claims.
à Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or
some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive
or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively
operating with furtive design or some motive or self-interest or ill will for ulterior purposes. Evident
bad faith connotes a manifest deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong or cause
damage.
à Good faith is ordinarily used to describe that state of mind denoting “honesty of intention, and
freedom from knowledge of circumstance which ought to put the holder upon inquiry; an honest
intention to abstain from taking an unconscientious advantage of another, even through technicalities
of law, together with absence of all information, notice, or benefit or belief of facts which render
transactions unconscientious.
à As a general rule: Ignorance or mistake as to particular facts, honest and real, will exempt the
doer from felonious responsibility. (Ex: erroneous interpretation of the meaning of an ordinance by a
city mayor)
à The law itself may hold the PO personally liable.
- EO 292, Book V, Subtitle B, Chapter 8
SECTION 48. Void Contract and Liability of Officer.—Any contract entered into contrary
to the requirements of the two (2) immediately preceding sections (Sections 46 and 47)
shall be void, and the officer or officers entering into the contract shall be liable to the
Government or other contracting party for any consequent damage to the same extent as
if the transaction had been wholly between private parties.
- EO 292, Chapter 9
SECTION 52. General Liability for Unlawful Expenditures.—Expenditures of government
funds or uses of government property in violation of law or regulations shall be a personal
liability of the official or employee found to be directly responsible therefor.
Section 65. Liability of Appointing Authority. - No person employed in the Civil
Service in violation of the Civil Service Law and rules shall be entitled to receive pay from
CARLOS | LAW OF PO 8
 the government; but the appointing authority responsible for such unlawful employment
shall be personally liable for the pay that would have accrued had the employment been
lawful, and the disbursing officials shall make payment to the employee of such amount
from the salary of the officers so liable.
à Also see Section 377 of LGC above
à In Department of Health v CV Canchela & Associates, Architects:
- Certain officers of DOH entered into contracts without complying with the
prescribed legal requirements. The SC declared said contracts to be void, but
nonetheless exempted them from liability. The government was made to pay the
subject professional fees on the basis of quantum meruit.
- The formalities expressly required by the Auditing Code of the Philippines and
The Administrative Code of 1987 not having been complied with, the subject
three Agreements are null and void from the very beginning (need certification of
gov agency’s chief accountant or head of accounting unit as to the availability of
the funds first. Certification is condition sine qua non to entering any contract)
- The illegality of the subject Agreements proceeds, it bears emphasis, from an
express declaration or prohibition by law, not from any intrinsic illegality. As
such, the Agreements are not illegal per se and the party claiming thereunder
may recover what had been paid or delivered.
- The Court believes, however, that declaring the individual officers of petitioner
who entered into the Agreements personally liable for the unpaid professional
fees due to private respondents would be highly unjust, the government having
already received and accepted the benefits of the services rendered. En
passant, it is, however, non sequitur to let these officers go scot-free from their
negligence.
à If a public officer enters into a contract on behalf of the government but without the
proper authority, the contract is not enforceable against the latter and becomes the
personal liability of the officer.
à It may be ratified by the government and so become binding upon it, the officer himself
being absolved or released (But to be subject to ratification, the contract must be voidable
only and not null and void ab initio).
à In Orocio v COA:
- Expenditures of government funds or uses of governments property in violation
of law or regulations shall be a personal liability of the official or employee found
directly responsible therefor. In the instant case, while it may perhaps be true
that the petitioner had rendered the opinion which was relied upon for the
disbursement, it cannot be said that he was directly responsible therefor. His
was only a legal opinion which the governing board of the NPC or any of its
authorized officials could adopt or reject in the resolution of the request of
OPLGS for reimbursement.
- It does not necessarily follow, however, that in no case may the petitioner be
liable for his legal opinion. As the then officer-in-charge of the Office of the
General Counsel of NPC, he exercised quasi judicial functions. He was
empowered with discretion and authority to render an opinion as to whether the
claim for reimbursement by the OPLGS was proper and ultimately, to determine
if the NPC or any of its employees was responsible for the accident and,
therefore, liable for the injury suffered by Abodizo under the law on quasi-delict.
If he rendered the opinion in the just performance of his official duties and within
the scope of his assigned tasks, he would not be personally liable for any injury
that may result therefrom.
à Otherwise stated, a public official may be liable in his personal capacity for
whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad
faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.
à In matters of tort, the same will not be imputable to the public officer if it is shown that he acted
within the limits of his authority without the attendance of bad faith.
à In Saunders v Veridiano:
- It is stressed at the outset that the mere allegation that a government
functionary is being sued in his personal capacity will not automatically remove
him from the protection of the law of public officers and, if appropriate, the
doctrine of state immunity. By the same token, the mere invocation of official
character will not suffice to insulate him from suability and liability for an act
imputed to him as a personal tort committed without or in excess of his authority.
These well-settled principles are applicable not only to the officers of the local
state but also where the person sued in its courts pertains to the government of
a foreign state, as in the present case.
- Given the official character of the above-described letters, we have to conclude
that the petitioners were, legally speaking, being sued as officers of the United
States government. As they have acted on behalf of that government, and within
the scope of their authority, it is that government, and not the petitioners
personally, that is responsible for their acts.
- There should be no question by now that such complaint cannot prosper unless
the government sought to be held ultimately liable has given its consent to' be
sued.
- All this is not to say that in no case may a public officer be sued as such
without the previous consent of the state. To be sure, there are a number of well-
recognized exceptions. It is clear that a public officer may be sued as such to
compel him to do an act required by law, as where, say, a register of deeds
refuses to record a deed of sale; or to restrain a Cabinet member, for example,
from enforcing a law claimed to be unconstitutional; or to compel the national
treasurer to pay damages from an already appropriated assurance fund; or the
commissioner of internal revenue to refund tax over-payments from a fund
already available for the purpose; or, in general, to secure a judgment that the
officer impleaded may satisfy by himself without the government itself having to
do a positive act to assist him. We have also held that where the government
itself has violated its own laws, the aggrieved party may directly implead the
government even without first filing his claim with the Commission on Audit as
normally required, as the doctrine of state immunity "cannot be used as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice."
à In USA v Reyes:
- The doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where
the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an
ordinary citizen.
à The rule is well-settled that a public official is not liable for damages for performing a duty required
by law and absent bad faith. In such instances, it is the government who suffers.
à If the public officer’s act is ultra vires and tainted with bad faith, he may himself be held
answerable in his individual capacity
à In Salcedo v CA:
- The municipal mayor unlawfully dismissed the chief of police. When ordered by the CSC
to reinstate him, he refused to do so. The SC held the mayor personally liable for all of the
former’s back salaries. The mayor defied the order of the CSC and thus defied the directive
of a superior body with final authority on the matter.
à The errors of government officers should never be allowed to jeopardize the government’s
financial position. The government should never be made to suffer for the alleged negligence or
malfeasance of officers who have acted beyond the scope of their authority.
CARLOS | LAW OF PO 9
Remedies Against the Public Officer
à In Tecson v Sandiganbayan:
- A public official or employee is under a three-fold responsibility for violation of duty or for
a wrongful act or omission.
à This simply means that a public officer may be held civilly, criminally, and
administratively liable for a wrongful doing.
à The dismissal of an administrative case does not necessarily bar the filing of a criminal
prosecution for the same or similar acts, which were the subject of the administrative
complaint.
Three kinds of remedies:
1. Civil
2. Criminal
3. Administrative
à These remedies may be invoked separately, alternately, simultaneously, or
successively. Sometimes, the same same offense may be the subject of all three kinds of
remedies.
à The pendency of one suit will not constitute a prejudicial question which would serve to
suspend or bar the others, if based essentially on the same act or impropriety or the same
facts.
à Example: Peace officer who searches a private dwelling without a warrant and over the
owner’s objections
- Civil: Art 32 – moral, exemplary damages
- Criminal: Art 128, RPC – violation of domicile
- Administrative: Arbitrary and oppressive act
Civil liability
Civil Code:
Article 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses
or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other
relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.
Article 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and
liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages.
à Exception: Judge can be held civilly responsible only if his act or omission also
constitutes a crime
Criminal liability
Ø RPC, Title 2 (Crimes Against the Fundamental Laws of the State)
Ø RPC, Title 7 (Crimes Committed by the Public Officers)
Ø Other special penal statutes, such as RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)
à Where the public officer is brought to face criminal proceedings, the OSG is not authorized to
represent him.
à In Urbano v Chavez:
- This observation should apply as well to a public official who is haled to court on a civil
suit for damages arising from a felony allegedly committed by him. Any pecuniary liability
he may be held to account for on the occasion of such civil suit is for his own account. The
State is not liable for the same. A fortiori, the Office of the Solicitor General likewise has no
authority to represent him in such a civil suit for damages.
- The OSG is not authorized to represent a public official at any stage of a criminal case or
in a civil suit for damages arising from a felony. This pronouncement applies to all public
officials and employees in the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the
Government.
à Authority of Ombudsman:
à In Uy v Sandiganbayan:
- The Ombudsman is clothed with authority to conduct preliminary investigation and to
prosecute all criminal cases involving public officers and employees, not only those within
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, but those within the jurisdiction of the regular courts
as well.
- The authority of the Ombudsman to prosecute cases involving public officers and
employees before the regular courts does not conflict with the power of the regular
prosecutors under the DOJ to control and direct the prosecution of all criminal actions
under Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Court held in the case
of Sanchez vs. Demetriou that the power of the Ombudsman under Section 15 (1) of RA
6770 is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of
the offense charged.
à Jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan:
- With jurisdiction for violations of RA 3019, RA 1379, and RPC, where one or more of the
accused are officials occupying the specified positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense
- Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by
the public officials and employees
- Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Eos 1, 2, 14 and 14-A,
issued in 1986, provided, that:
- The RTC shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the information:
(a) does not allege any damage to the government or any bribery
(b) Alleges damage to the government or bribery arising from the
same or closely related transactions or acts in an amount not
exceeding one million pesos (P1,000,000.00)
- For the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive original jurisdiction under Sec 4(a) of PD 1606,
as amended by PD 1861, over crimes committed by public officers in relation to their office:
à It is essential that the facts showing the intimate relations between the office
and the offender and the discharge of official duties must be alleged in the
information – it is not enough to merely allege in the information that the crime
charged was committed by the offender in relation to his office because that
would be a conclusion of law.
- Under RA 7975, even if the offender committed the crime charged in relation to his office
but occupies a position corresponding to a salary grade below 27, the proper RTC or
Municipal Trial Court, as the case may be, shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the case
- Where a public officer is prosecuted criminally for offenses committed with private
individuals before the Sandiganbayan, a joint trial would be in order
Administrative liability
As for administrative action, the same may be taken against the public officer or employee for
practically any impropriety that can be regarded as a violation of the trust reposed upon him by the
public
- Among the usual administrative grounds against him are oppression,
dishonesty, insubordination, immorality, inefficiency, negligence, drunkenness,
partisan political activity, and the like
- These charges are to be proved before the proper administrative body, like the
CSC, or the SC in the case of the Judiciary or its personnel
à A lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar
for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. HOWEVER, if said
misconduct as a government official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer,
then he may be discipline by this Court as a member of the Bar
CARLOS | LAW OF PO 10
Quantum of Proof
à The defeat of any of the three remedies will not necessarily preclude resort to the other remedies
or affect decisions reached thereunder, as different degrees of evidence are required in these several
actions
à Criminal: Proof beyond reasonable doubt
à Civil and Administrative: Preponderance of evidence
à Administrative (malfeasance): Substantial evidence
- Where there is pending before the SC a petition for review of decision of the CA affirming
the orders of a judge which are the same orders subject of an administrative complaint for
ignorance of the law, the disposition of the administrative case should be held in abeyance,
but this does not in any way imply that an administrative case cannot proceed
independently of the main one
à However, in Cambaliza v Cristal-Tenorio:
- “When the criminal prosecution based on the same act charged is still pending
in court, any administrative disciplinary proceedings for the same act must await
the outcome of the criminal case to avoid contradictory findings.”
à The long-settled rule is that the dismissal of the criminal case on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence against an accused who is also a respondent in an administrative
case does not necessarily foreclose the administrative proceeding against him or carry with
it the relief from administrative liability
à Exception in the case of Palma v Fortich:
- In administrative actions against municipal officers, the SC classified the grounds for
suspension under two categories, namely:
(1) Those related to the discharge of the functions of the officer concerned
(neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other forms of maladministration of
office) and
(2) Those not so connected with said functions.
à Under the second category, when the crime involving moral
turpitude is not linked with the performance of official duties, conviction
by final judgment is required as a condition precedent to administrative
action.
- The ground for filing of the administrative action in the case at bar and the suspension of
petitioner Mayor is misconduct allegedly committed in the form of lascivious acts of the
latter.
- Misconduct has been defined as "such as affects his performance of his duties as an
officer and not only as affects his character as a private individual. In such cases, it has
been said at all times, it is necessary to separate the character of the man from the
character of the officer. "
- It is true that the charges of rape and concubinage may involve moral turpitude of which a
municipal official may be proceeded against, but before the provincial governor and board
may act and proceed against the municipal official, a conviction by final judgment must
precede the filing by the provincial governor of the charges and trial by the provincial
board.
- Under the circumstances, there being no showing that the acts of petitioner Mayor are
linked with the performance of official duties such as "neglect of duty, oppression,
corruption, or other form of maladministration of office", there appears to be no question
that the pending administrative case against him should be dismissed for lack of basis and
the restraining order issued by the court should be made permanent.
à Re-election of a local official will have the effect of automatically abating administrative charges
against him for offenses allegedly committed during his preceding term.
à In Pascual v Provincial Board:
- The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of
office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers.
When the people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with
knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or
misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or
misconduct to practically overrule the will of the people.
à In Lizares v Hechanova:
- The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms, and that the
reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the
extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor.
à This principle of “forgiveness” enunciated in the foregoing cases, which later came to be known as
the Condonation Doctrine
à Condonation Doctrine was abandoned in the case of Carpio Morales v CA:
- As earlier intimated, Pascual was a decision promulgated in 1959. Therefore, it was
decided within the context of the 1935 Constitution which was silent with respect to public
accountability, or of the nature of public office being a public trust.
- In consequence, it is high time for this Court to abandon the condonation doctrine that
originated from Pascual.
à To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary
requirement of accountability to the people at all times, as mandated under the 1987
Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea that an elective local official's
administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped off by
the fact that he was elected to a second term of office, or even another elective
post. Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense, and there is
simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an
official elected for a different term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising
from an offense done during a prior term.
- It should, however, be clarified that this Court's abandonment of the condonation doctrine
should be prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system
of the Philippines.
à In Dimapilis v COMELEC:
- Even though SC said Condonation doctrine should only apply prospectively, it
nevertheless did not apply the same:
- The OMB rulings dismissing petitioner for Grave Misconduct had already attained finality
on May 28, 2010, which date was even prior to his first election as Punong Barangay of
Brgy. Pulung Maragul in the October 2010 Barangay Elections. Although the principal
penalty of dismissal appears to have not been effectively implemented (since petitioner
was even able to run and win for two [2] consecutive elections), the corresponding
accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office had already
rendered him ineligible to run for any elective local position. It is undisputable that this
accessory penalty sprung from the same final OMB rulings, and therefore had already
attached and consequently, remained effective at the time petitioner filed his CoC on
October 11, 2013 and his later re-election in 2013. Therefore, petitioner could not have
been validly re-elected so as to avail of the condonation doctrine.
à At any rate, the condonation doctrine will NOT apply where the action is criminal, not merely
administrative. Reelection in this case will not constitute a parson, which may be extended not by the
electorate but only by the President.
à In Libanan v Sandiganbayan:
- The pendency of a criminal case under RA 3019 may be the basis for suspension from
office in a subsequent term in the event of a re-election
à The desistance of the complainant would not preclude the taking of disciplinary action against a
public officer (they are merely witnesses)
à Administrative proceedings against public employees are imbued with public interest,
public office being a public trust
CARLOS | LAW OF PO 11
 à Administrative proceedings are akin to criminal prosecution in the sense that no
compromise may be entered into between the parties with respect to the penal sanction.
Complainants are not vested with the power of removal or suspension. That prerogative
belongs to the proper government officials

à In Pimentel v de Leoz:
- The disciplinary power of this Court over its erring personnel, in general, cannot be
terminated just because one of the parties involved is now residing abroad. It is true,
however, that to allow an investigation to proceed against one who could no longer be in a
position to defend herself would be a denial of her right to be heard, our most basic
understanding of due process. But even in the absence of respondent De Leoz, if there
were sufficient records available, and other witnesses that could have been called to
testify, investigators could have utilized those records and those witnesses to come out
with a judicious recommendation based on the merits, rather than a recommendation to
dismiss based solely on the absence of De Leoz.

à Death of the complainant also does not warrant the non-pusuance of the charges (again, they’re
only just witnesses)

à The death or retirement, or resignation of any public officer from the service does not preclude the
filing of any adminsitrative liability to which he shall still be answerable.
à Exception in the case of CSC v Juen:
- The death of the respondent in an administrative case precludes the finding of
administrative liability when:
a) due process may be subverted;
b) on equitable and humanitarian reasons; and
c) the penalty imposed would render the proceedings useless.

à Where two penalties, arising from two separate causes of action, are imposed upon an erring
officer, said penalties shall be served successively

à In Concerned Taxpayer v Doblada:

- Respondent contends that Section 11 of RA 3019 provides that all offenses punishable
under the said law shall prescribe in ten (10) years. On this basis, respondent argues that
since the instant administrative complaint was filed on December 8, 1993, he can no longer
be charged for his failure to disclose some of his properties in his SALs for 1974 and 1976
on the ground of prescription.
- SC held this is untenable. Herein respondent is charged and found guilty administratively,
not criminally, for failure to submit true and detailed SALs.
à R.A. No. 3019 is a penal statute. The prescription provided for therein does not apply to
administrative cases. Settled is the rule that administrative offenses do not prescribe.

à Administraitive offenses do not prescribe. By their very nature, this pertains to the character of
public officers and employees.
à The object sought is not the punishment of the officer or employee but the improvement of the
public service and the preservatio of the public’s faith and confidence in our government

à Mere non-declaration of SALN does not automatically amount to such an offense. Dishonesty
requires malicious intent to conceal the truth or to make false statements. In addition, a public officer
or employee becomes susceptible to dishonestly only when such non-declaration results in
accumulated wealth becoming manifestly disproportionate to his/her income, and income from other
sources, and he/she fails to properly account or explain these sources of income and acquisitions.
- If not dishonesty, may be guilty of mere negligence for failure to accomplish SALN
properly and accurately

CARLOS | LAW OF PO 12