Leouel Santos vs. CA
This condition must exist at the
GR No. 112019, January 4, 1995
FACTS:
Leouel, a First Lieutenant in the Philippine
Army, met Julia in Iloilo. The two got
married in 1986 before a municipal trial
court followed shortly thereafter, by a
church wedding. The couple lived with
Julia’s parents at the J. Bedia
Compound. Julia gave birth to a baby boy
in 1987 and was named as Leouel Santos
Jr. Occasionally, the couple will quarrel
over a number of things aside from the
interference of Julia’s parents into their
family affairs.
Julia left in 1988 to work in US as a nurse
despite Leouel’s pleas to dissuade
her. Seven months after her departure, she
called her husband and promised to return
home upon the expiration of her contract in
July 1989 but she never did. Leouel got a
chance to visit US where he underwent a
training program under AFP, he desperately
tried to locate or somehow get in touch with
Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
Leouel filed a complaint to have their
marriage declared void under Article 36 of
the Family Code. He argued that failure of
Julia to return home or to communicate with
him for more than 5 years are
circumstances that show her being
psychologically incapacitated to enter into
married life.
ISSUE: Whether their marriage can be
considered void under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
HELD:
The intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of psychological
incapacity to the most serious cases of
personal disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the
marriage.
time the marriage is celebrated.
Undeniably and understandably, Leouel
stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his
present situation. Regrettably, neither law
nor society itself can always provide all the
specific answers to every individual
problem. Wherefore, his petition was
denied.
Santos Sr., vs CA March 16, 1996 NO
DIGEST
Republic vs. CA and Molina
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
FACTS:
The case at bar challenges the decision of
CA affirming the marriage of the respondent
Roridel Molina to Reynaldo Molina void in
the ground of psychological incapacity. The
couple got married in 1985, after a year,
Reynaldo manifested signs of immaturity
and irresponsibility both as husband and a
father preferring to spend more time with
friends whom he squandered his money,
depends on his parents for aid and
assistance and was never honest with his
wife in regard to their finances. In 1986, the
couple had an intense quarrel and as a
result their relationship was
estranged. Roridel quit her work and went
to live with her parents in Baguio City in
1987 and a few weeks later, Reynaldo left
her and their child. Since then he
abandoned them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is void
on the ground of psychological incapacity.
HELD:
The marriage between Roridel and
Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. What
constitutes psychological incapacity is not
mere showing of irreconcilable differences
and confliction personalities. It is
indispensable that the parties must exhibit
inclinations which would not meet the
essential marital responsibilites and duties
due to some psychological
illness. Reynaldo’s action at the time of the
marriage did not manifest such
characteristics that would comprise grounds
for psychological incapacity. The evidence
shown by Roridel merely showed that she
and her husband cannot get along with
each other and had not shown gravity of the
problem neither its juridical antecedence nor
its incurability. In addition, the expert
testimony by Dr Sison showed no incurable
psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility
which is not considered as psychological
incapacity.
The following are the guidelines as to the
grounds of psychological incapacity laid set
forth in this case:
• burden of proof to show nullity
belongs to the plaintiff
• root causes of the incapacity must
be medically and clinically inclined
• such incapacity should be in
existence at the time of the marriage
• such incapacity must be grave so as
to disable the person in complying with the
essentials of marital obligations of marriage
• such incapacity must be embraced
in Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220, 221 and
225 of the Family Code
• decision of the National Matrimonial
Appellate Court or the Catholic Church must
be respected
• court shall order the prosecuting
attorney and the fiscal assigned to it to act
on behalf of the state.
Marcos vs. Marcos October 19 2000
ARTICLE 36 OF FAMILY CODE
FACTS:
Wilson Marcos and Brenda Marcos first met
sometime in 1980 when both of them were
assigned at the Malacanang Palace, she as
an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a
Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand
Marcos. They got married twice, first was on
September 6, 1982 and on May 8, 1983 and
blessed with five children. After the downfall
of President Marcos, he left the military
service in 1987 and then engaged in different
business ventures that did not succeeded.
Due to his failure to engage in any gainful
employment, they would often quarrel and as
a consequence, he would hit and beat
her. He would also inflict physical harm on
their children. In 1992, they were already
living separately. On October 16, 1994, when
Brenda saw him in their house, she was so
angry that she lambasted him. Wilson then
turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her
and even on her mother who came to her
aid. On October 17, 1994, she and their
children left the house and sought refuge in
her sister’s house. On October 19, 1994, she
submitted herself to medical examination at
the Mandaluyong Medical Center. Thus,
petitioner filed for annulment of marriage in
the RTC assailing Article 36 of the Family
Code. The court ruled the respondent to be
psychologically incapacitated to perform his
marital obligations. But the Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the RTC because
psychological incapacity had not been
established by the totality of the evidence
presented. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES:
Whether or not there is a need for personal
medical examination of respondent to prove
psychological incapacity? Whether the
totality of evidence presented in this case
show psychological incapacity?
HELD:
The testimonies of petitioner, the common
children, petitioner’s sister and the social
worker were not enough to sustain a finding
that the respondent was psychologically
incapacitated. Personal medical or
psychological examination of respondent is
not a requirement for a declaration of
psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the
totality of the evidence she presented does
not show such incapacity. Although Supreme
Court is convinced that respondent failed to
provide material support to the family and
may have resorted to physical abuse and
abandonment, the totality of these acts does
not lead to a conclusion of psychological
incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no
showing that his “defects” were already
present at the inception of the marriage or
that they are incurable.
Chi Ming Tsoi vs CA
G.R. No. 119190, 266 SCRA 324, January
16, 1997
Facts:
Petitioner was married to private respondent
(Gina Lao-Tsoi). During their 10 months of
cohabitation (i.e., from May 22, 1998 to
March 15, 1989), they never have sexual
intercourse. The wife claimed that her
husband was impotent that even they sleep
in the same room and bed, nothing
happened. The wife initiated the nullity case
of their marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of
the Family Code. Though the husband does
not want to end their marriage, he claimed
that he was not impotent as evidenced by his
medical report and that it is his wife who
avoid to have sexual intercourse.
Issue:
WON Chi Ming Tsoi’s refusal to have sexual
intercourse with his wife constitute
psychological incapacity.
Held:
Yes, Chi Ming Tsoi’s refusal to have sexual
intercourse with his wife constitute
psychological incapacity. Supposed that wife
refused to have sexual intercourse, the
husband could have asked his wife or
discussed what was wrong or what is ailing
her that she avoids him everytime he wanted
to have sexual intercourse. But he never did.
Since he claimed that it was his wife who has
physical disorder, it is his burden to prove
such claim.
One of the essential marital obligation is to
procreate children through sexual
cooperation. A refusal of one party to
consummate the marriage is considered a
psychological incapacity. Senseless and
protracted refusal of one party to fulfill the
above marital obligation is equivalent to
psychological incapacity.
Maria Victoria G. Belo-Henares vs. Atty.
Roberto "Argee" C. Guevarra
A.C. No. 11394. December 1, 2016
Facts
This instant administative case arose from a
verified complaint for disbarment filed by
complainant complainant Maria Victoria G.
Belo-Henares (complainant) against
respondent Atty. Roberto "Argee" C.
Guevarra (respondent) for alleged violations
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Complainant is the Medical Director and
principal stockholder of the Belo Medical
Group, Inc. (BMGI), a corporation duly
organized and existing under Philippine
laws 2 and engaged in the specialized field
of cosmetic surgery.3 On the other hand,
respondent is the lawyer of a certain Ms.
Josefina "Josie" Norcio (Norcio ), who filed
criminal cases against complainant for an
allegedly botched surgical procedure on her
buttocks in 2002 and 2005, purportedly
causing infection and making her ill in
2009.
In 2009, respondent wrote a series of posts
on his Facebook account insulting and
verbally abusing complainant. The
complaint further alleged that respondent
posted remarks on his Facebook account
that were intended to destroy and ruin
BMGI's medical personnel, as well as the
entire medical practice of around 300
employees for no fair or justifiable cause.
His posts include the following excerpts:
Argee Guevarra Quack Doctor Becky Belo: I
am out to get Puwitic Justice here! Kiss My
Client’s Ass, Belo. Senator Adel Tamano,
don’t kiss Belo’s ass. Guys and girls,
nagiisip na akong tumakbo sa Hanghalan
2010 to Kick some ass!!! I will launch a
national campaign against Plastic Politicians
-No guns, No goons, No gold -IN GUTS I
TRUST!
Argee Guevarra Dr. Vicki Belo, watch out
for Josefina Norcio’s Big Bang on Friday -
You will go down in Medical History as a
QUACK DOCTOR!!!! QUACK QUACK
QUACK QUACK. CNN, FOX NEWS,
BLOOMBERG, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, L.A.
TIMES c/o my partner in the U.S., Atty.
Trixie Cruz-Angeles (September 22 at
11:18pm)
Argee Guevarra is amused by a libel case
filed by Vicki Belo against me through her
office receptionist in Taytay Rizal. Haaaaay,
style-bulok at style-duwag talaga. Lalakarin
ng Reyna ng Kaplastikan at Reyna ng
Payola ang kaso … si Imelda Marcos nga
sued me for P300 million pesos and ended
up apologizing to me, si Belo pa kaya?
(September 15 at 12:08pm
Argee Guevarra get vicki belo as your
client!!! may ‘extra-legal’ budget yon. Kaya
Lang, bistado ko na kung sino-sino ang
tumatanggap eh, pag nalaman mo, baka
bumagsak pa isang ahensya ng gobyerno
dito, hahaha (August 9 at 10:31pm)
Argee Guevarra ATTENTION MGA BA
TCHMATES SA DOJ: TIMBREHAN NJYO
AKO KUNG MAGKANONG PANGSUHOL
NJ BELO PARA MADIIN AKO HA???? I just
[want] to know how much she hates me,
ok? Ang payola budget daw niya runs into
tens of millions …. (September 15 at
3:57pm) xxx xxx xxx
Asserting that the said posts, written in
vulgar and obscene language, were
designed to inspire public hatred, destroy
her reputation, and to close BMGI and all its
clinics, as well as to extort the amount of
P200 Million from her as evident from his
demand letter dated August 26, 2009,
complainant lodged the instant complaint for
disbarment against respondent before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
docketed as CBD Case No. 09-2551.
In defense, respondent claimed that the
complaint was filed in violation of his
constitutionally-guaranteed right to privacy,
asserting that the posts quoted by
complainant were private remarks on his
private account on Facebook, meant to be
shared only with his circle of friends of
which complainant was not a part. He also
averred that he wrote the posts in the
exercise of his freedom of speech, and
contended that the complaint was filed to
derail the criminal cases that his client,
Norcio, had filed against complainant. He
denied that the remarks were vulgar and
obscene, and that he made them in order to
inspire public hatred against complainant.
He likewise denied that he attempted to
extort money from her, explaining that he
sent the demand letter as a requirement
prior to the filing of the criminal case for
estafa, as well as the civil case for damages
against her. Finally, respondent pointed out
that complainant was a public figure who is,
therefore, the subject of fair comment.
Issues:
1. Whether respondent can
validly invoke his right to privacy.
2. Whether respondent can
validlyn invoke freedom of speech.
SC Ruling
Respondent never denied that he posted
the purportedly vulgar and obscene remarks
about complainant and BMGI on his
Facebook account. In defense, however, he
invokes his right to privacy, claiming that
they were "private remarks" on his "private
account" that can only be viewed by his
circle of friends. Thus, when complainant
accessed the same, she violated his
constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy.
The defense is untenable. Before, can have
an expectation of privacy in his or her online
social networking activity -in this case,
Facebook -it is first necessary that said user
manifests the intention to keep certain posts
private, through the employment of
measures to prevent access thereto or to
limit its visibility. This intention can
materialize in cyberspace through the
utilization of Facebook's privacy tools. In
other words, utilization of these privacy tools
is the manifestation, in the cyber world, of
the user's invocation of his or her right to
informational privacy.
The bases of the instant complaint are the
Facebook posts maligning and insulting
complainant, which posts respondent insists
were set to private view. However, the latter
has failed to offer evidence that he utilized
any of the privacy tools or features of
Facebook available to him to protect his
posts, or that he restricted its privacy to a
select few. Therefore, without any positive
evidence to corroborate his statement that
the subject posts, as well as the comments
thereto, were visible only to him and his
circle of friends, respondent's statement is,
at best, self-serving, thus deserving scant
consideration.
Moreover, even if the Court were to accept
respondent's allegation that his posts were
limited to or viewable by his "Friends" only,
there is no assurance that the same -or
other digital content that he uploads or
publishes on his Facebook profile -will be
safeguarded as within the confines of
privacy, in light of the following:
1. Facebook "allows the world
to be more open and connected by
giving its users the tools to interact
and share in any conceivable way";
2. A good number of Facebook
users "befriend" other users who are
total strangers;
3. The sheer number of
"Friends" one user has, usually by
the hundreds; and
4. A user's Facebook friend can
"share" the former's post, or "tag"
others who are not Facebook friends
with the former, despite its being
visible only to his or her own
Facebook friends.
Thus, restricting the privacy of one's
Facebook posts to "Friends" does not
guarantee absolute protection from the
prying eyes of another user who does not
belong to one's circle of friends. The user's
own Facebook friend can share said content
or tag his or her own Facebook friend
thereto, regardless of whether the user
tagged by the latter is Face book friends or
not with the former. Also, when the post is
shared or when a person is tagged, the
respective Facebook friends of the person
who shared the post or who was tagged can
view the post, the privacy setting of which
was set at "Friends." Under the
circumstances, therefore, respondent's
claim of violation of right to privacy is
negated.
As to the second issue, it has been held that
the freedom of speech and of expression,
like all constitutional freedoms, is not
absolute. As such, the constitutional right of
freedom of expression may not be availed
of to broadcast lies or half-truths, insult
others, destroy their name or reputation or
bring them into disrepute.
A punctilious scrutiny of the Facebook
remarks complained of disclosed that they
were ostensibly made with malice tending to
insult and tarnish the reputation of
complainant and BMGI. Calling complainant
a "quack doctor," "Reyna ng Kaplastikan,"
"Reyna ng Payola," and "Reyna ng
Kapalpakan," and insinuating that she has
been bribing people to destroy respondent
smacks of bad faith and reveals an intention
to besmirch the name and reputation of
complainant, as well as BMGI. Respondent
also ascribed criminal negligence upon
complainant and BMGI by posting that
complainant disfigured ( "binaboy ") his
client Norcio, labeling BMGI a "Frankenstein
Factory," and calling out a boycott of
BMGI's services -all these despite the
pendency of the criminal cases that Norcio
had already filed against complainant. He
even threatened complainant with
conviction for criminal negligence and
estafa -which is contrary to one's obligation
"to act with justice."
In view of the foregoing, respondent's
inappropriate and obscene language, and
his act of publicly insulting and undermining
the reputation of complainant through the
subject Facebook posts are, therefore, in
complete and utter violation of the following
provisions in the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
Rule 7.03 -A lawyer shall not engage in
conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law, nor shall he, whether in
public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession.
Rule 8.01 -A lawyer shall not, in his
professional dealings, use language which
is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Rule 19.01 -A lawyer shall employ only fair
and honest means to attain the lawful
objectives of his client and shall not present,
participate in presenting or threaten to
present unfounded criminal charges to
obtain an improper advantage in any case
or proceeding.
By posting the subject remarks on
Facebook directed at complainant and
BMGI, respondent disregarded the fact that,
as a lawyer, he is bound to observe proper
decorum at all times, be it in his public or
private life. He overlooked the fact that he
must behave in a manner befitting of an
officer of the court, that is, respectful, firm,
and decent. Instead, he acted
inappropriately and rudely; he used words
unbecoming of an officer of the law, and
conducted himself in an aggressive way by
hurling insults and maligning complainant's
and BMGI' s reputation.
That complainant is a public figure and/or a
celebrity and therefore, a public personage
who is exposed to criticism does not justify
respondent's disrespectful language. It is
the cardinal condition of all criticism that it
shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over
the walls of decency and propriety. In this
case, respondent's remarks against
complainant breached the said walls, for
which reason the former must be
administratively sanctioned.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto
"Argee" C. Guevarra is found guilty of
violation of Rules 7.03, 8.01, and 19.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. He
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of one (1) year, effective
upon his receipt of this Decision, and
is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of
the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely.
RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS.
MARGARITA and DAVID SUZARA,
Petitioners, vs ST. THERESA’S
COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T.
ESCUDERO, and JOHN DOES,
Respondents
G.R. No. 202666
September 29, 2014
TOPIC: right to informational privacy, writ of
habeas data
PONENTE: Velasco, Jr.
PREFATORY:
The individual’s desire for privacy is never
absolute, since participation in society is an
equally powerful desire. Thus each individual
is continually engaged in a personal
adjustment process in which he balances the
desire for privacy with the desire for
disclosure and communication of himself to
others, in light of the environmental
conditions and social norms set by the
society in which he lives.
– Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967)
FACTS:
Julia and Julienne, both minors, were
graduating high school students at St.
Theresa’s College (STC), Cebu City.
Sometime in January 2012, while changing
into their swimsuits for a beach party they
were about to attend, Julia and Julienne,
along with several others, took digital
pictures of themselves clad only in their
undergarments. These pictures were then
uploaded by Angela on her Facebook profile.
At STC, Mylene Escudero, a
computer teacher at STC’s high school
 department, learned from her students that
some seniors at STC posted pictures online,
depicting themselves from the waist up,
dressed only in brassieres. Escudero then
asked her students if they knew who the girls
in the photos are. In turn, they readily
identified Julia and Julienne, among others.
Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s
students logged in to their respective
personal Facebook accounts and showed
her photos of the identified students, which
include: (a) Julia and Julienne drinking hard
liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a bar;
and (b) Julia and Julienne along the streets
of Cebu wearing articles of clothing that show
virtually the entirety of their black brassieres.
Also, Escudero’s students claimed that there
were times when access to or the availability
of the identified students’ photos was not
confined to the girls’ Facebook friends, but
were, in fact, viewable by
any Facebook user.
Investigation ensued. Then Julia, Julienne
and other students involved were barred
from joining the commencement exercises.
Petitioners, who are the respective parents of
the minors, filed a Petition for the Issuance of
a Writ of Habeas Data. RTC dismissed the
petition for habeas data on the following
grounds:
1. Petitioners failed to prove the existence of an
actual or threatened violation of the minors’
right to privacy, one of the preconditions for
the issuance of the writ of habeas data.
2. The photos, having been uploaded
on Facebook without restrictions as to who
may view them, lost their privacy in some
way.
3. STC gathered the photographs through legal
means and for a legal purpose, that is, the
implementation of the school’s policies and
rules on discipline.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was indeed an actual or
threatened violation of the right to privacy in
the life, liberty, or security of the minors
involved in this case. (Is there a right to
informational privacy in online social
network activities of its users?)
HELD: (Note that you can skip the
preliminary discussions and check the ruling
at the latter part)
Nature of Writ of Habeas Data
It is a remedy available to any person whose
right to privacy in life, liberty or security is
violated or threatened by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or
of a private individual or entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family,
home and correspondence of the aggrieved
party.
It is an independent and summary remedy
designed to protect the image, privacy,
honor, information, and freedom of
information of an individual, and to provide a
forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and
to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a
person’s right to control information
regarding oneself, particularly in instances in
which such information is being collected
through unlawful means in order
to achieve unlawful ends.
In developing the writ of habeas data, the
Court aimed to protect an individual’s right to
informational privacy, among others. A
comparative law scholar has, in fact, defined
habeas data as “a procedure designed to
safeguard individual freedom from abuse
in the information age.”
Issuance of writ of habeas data;
requirements
1. The existence of a person’s right to
informational privacy
2. An actual or threatened violation of the right
to privacy in life, liberty or security of the
victim (proven by at least substantial
evidence)
Note that the writ will not issue on the basis
merely of an alleged unauthorized access to
information about a person.
The writ of habeas data is not only
confined to cases of extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances
The writ of habeas data can be availed of as
an independent remedy to enforce one’s
right to privacy, more specifically the right to
informational privacy. The remedies against
the violation of such right can include the
updating, rectification, suppression or
destruction of the database or information or
files in possession or in control of
respondents. Clearly then, the privilege of
the Writ of Habeas Data may also be availed
of in cases outside of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances.
Meaning of “engaged” in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or
information
Habeas data is a protection against
unlawful acts or omissions of public officials
and of private individuals or entities engaged
in gathering, collecting, or storing data about
the aggrieved party and his or her
correspondences, or about his or her family.
Such individual or entity need not be in the
business of collecting or storing data.
To “engage” in something is different
from undertaking a business endeavour.
To “engage” means “to do or take part in
something.” It does not necessarily mean
that the activity must be done in pursuit
of a business. What matters is that the
person or entity must be gathering, collecting
or storing said data or information about the
aggrieved party or his or her family. Whether
such undertaking carries the element of
regularity, as when one pursues a business,
and is in the nature of a personal endeavour,
for any other reason or even for no reason at
all, is immaterial and such will not prevent the
writ from getting to said person or entity.
As such, the writ of habeas data may be
issued against a school like STC.
Right to informational privacy
Right to informational privacy is the right
of individuals to control information
about themselves. Several commentators
regarding privacy and social networking
sites, however, all agree that given the
millions of OSN users, “in this Social
Networking environment, privacy is no longer
grounded in reasonable expectations, but
rather in some theoretical protocol better
known as wishful thinking.” So the underlying
question now is: Up to what extent is the
right to privacy protected in OSNs?
Facebook Privacy Tools
To address concerns about privacy, but
without defeating its purpose, Facebook was
armed with different privacy tools designed to
regulate the accessibility of a user’s profile as
well as information uploaded by the user. In
H v. W, the South Gauteng High Court
recognized this ability of the users to
“customize their privacy settings,” but did so
with this caveat: “Facebook states in its
policies that, although it makes every effort to
protect a user’s information, these privacy
settings are not foolproof.”
For instance, a Facebook user can regulate
the visibility and accessibility of digital
images (photos), posted on his or her
personal bulletin or “wall,” except for the
user’s profile picture and ID, by selecting his
or her desired privacy setting:
1. Public – the default setting;
every Facebook user can view the photo;
2. Friends of Friends – only the
user’s Facebook friends and their friends
can view the photo;
3. Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends
can view the photo;
4. Custom – the photo is made visible only to
particular friends and/or networks of the
Facebook user; and
5. Only Me – the digital image can be viewed
only by the user.
The foregoing are privacy tools, available to
Facebook users, designed to set up barriers
to broaden or limit the visibility of his or her
specific profile content, statuses, and photos,
among others, from another user’s point of
view. In other words, Facebook extends its
users an avenue to make the availability
of their Facebook activities reflect their
choice as to “when and to what extent to
disclose facts about themselves – and to
put others in the position of receiving
such confidences.”
LONE ISSUE:
NONE. The Supreme Court held that STC
did not violate petitioners’ daughters’ right to
privacy as the subject digital photos were
viewable either by the minors’ Facebook
friends, or by the public at large.
Without any evidence to corroborate the
minors’ statement that the images were
visible only to the five of them, and without
their challenging Escudero’s claim that the
other students were able to view the photos,
their statements are, at best, self-serving,
thus deserving scant consideration.
It is well to note that not one of petitioners
disputed Escudero’s sworn account that her
students, who are the minors’ Facebook
“friends,” showed her the photos using their
own Facebook accounts. This only goes to
show that no special means to be able to
view the allegedly private posts were ever
resorted to by Escudero’s students, and that
it is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the
photos were, in reality, viewable either by (1)
their Facebook friends, or (2) by the public at
large.
Considering that the default setting for
Facebook posts is “Public,” it can be
surmised that the photographs in question
were viewable to everyone on Facebook,
absent any proof that petitioners’ children
positively limited the disclosure of the
photograph. If such were the case, they
cannot invoke the protection attached to the
right to informational privacy.
US v. Gines-Perez: A person who places a
photograph on the Internet precisely intends
to forsake and renounce all privacy rights to
such imagery, particularly under
circumstances such as here, where the
Defendant did not employ protective
measures or devices that would have
controlled access to the Web page or the
photograph itself.
United States v. Maxwell: The more open
the method of transmission is, the less
privacy one can reasonably expect.
Messages sent to the public at large in the
chat room or e-mail that is forwarded from
correspondent to correspondent loses any
semblance of privacy.
The Honorable Supreme Court continued
and held that setting a post’s or profile
detail’s privacy to “Friends” is no assurance
that it can no longer be viewed by another
user who is not Facebook friends with the
source of the content. The user’s own
Facebook friend can share said content or
tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto,
regardless of whether the user tagged by the
latter is Facebook friends or not with the
former. Also, when the post is shared or
when a person is tagged, the respective
Facebook friends of the person who shared
the post or who was tagged can view the
post, the privacy setting of which was set at
“Friends.” Thus, it is suggested, that a
profile, or even a post, with visibility set
at “Friends Only” cannot easily, more so
automatically, be said to be “very
private,” contrary to petitioners’
argument.
No privacy invasion by STC; fault lies with
the friends of minors
Respondent STC can hardly be taken to task
for the perceived privacy invasion since it
was the minors’ Facebook friends who
showed the pictures to Tigol. Respondents
were mere recipients of what were posted.
They did not resort to any unlawful means of
gathering the information as it was voluntarily
given to them by persons who had legitimate
access to the said posts. Clearly, the fault, if
any, lies with the friends of the minors.
Curiously enough, however, neither the
minors nor their parents imputed any
violation of privacy against the students who
showed the images to Escudero.

Different scenario of setting is set on “Me

Only” or “Custom”

Had it been proved that the access to the

pictures posted were limited to the original
uploader, through the “Me Only” privacy
setting, or that the user’s contact list has
been screened to limit access to a select few,
through the “Custom” setting, the result may
have been different, for in such instances,
the intention to limit access to the particular
post, instead of being broadcasted to the
public at large or all the user’s friends en
masse, becomes more manifest and
palpable.