Doctrina - 2019-10-08T090127.625

Los principios generales del derecho: naturaleza y aplicación por la Corte
Permanente de Justicia Internacional y la Corte Internacional de Justicia
Por Hernando V. Cañardo(*)
In Memoriam Gabriel R, Diluise.1959-2019
I.Introducción
El término Principios Generales del Derecho presenta para su definición ciertas

dificultades, ya que puede referirse a expresiones que se encuentran en los sistemas
legales nacionales, u otras fuentes de Derecho Internacional que aún no están
perfectamente cristalizadas.
Cuando una costumbre no está evidenciada por unaconducta consistente o cuando los
Estados expresan la opinio juris sin una práctica correlativa, estas manifestaciones en
forma singular o conjunta pueden, posiblemente, ser consideradas la expresión de un
Principio.
Estos también pueden manifestarse a través del consenso expresado en Resoluciones de
la Asamblea General u otros órganos, sean los mismos de Organizaciones Internacionales
o Regionales.
Es claro que, en la medida que se afirme una interdependencia global cada vez, se
buscará másfrecuentemente en el Derecho Internacional la solución o guía a ciertas
cuestiones que antes eran consideradas teóricas, o de competencia interna de los Estados,
tales como el medio ambiente, los derechos humanos, el desarrollo, o la criminalidad
transnacional.
Los Principios, frente a determinadosconflictos y realidades, pueden otorgar una base

legal sustentable para la interpretación del derecho aplicable y la resolución; de allí que la
definición, identificación y utilización de los mismos requieraun estudio minucioso.
Sir Hersch Lauterpacht define a los Principios Generales del Derecho como: “Aquellos
principios del derecho público y privado, que contemplando la experiencia legal de las
naciones civilizadas llevan a ser considerados como máximas de carácter general y
fundamental enla comparación, generalización y síntesis de las reglas jurídicas dentro
de sus ramas privada, publica, constitucional y administrativa, que son comunes a
diferentes sistemas de derecho.” [1]
Si un Principio existe en la mayoría de las legislaciones nacionales, es inherente a la
estructura del Derecho Internacional, el cual puede regular eficazmente la conducta entre
Estados al aplicarlos, yaque han sidoreconocidos por los mismos.
De allí que si un Tribunal Internacional toma un principio del Derecho Privado, debe
estar seguro de que el mismo es reconocido en los principales sistemasjurídicosy que al
aplicarlo no los está violando.[2]
Ahora bien, es evidente que los Principios Generales que se encuentran en los sistemas
nacionales de Derecho son más claros y fáciles de determinar, por haber soportado las
pruebas del tiempo y de la experiencia jurídica.
En consecuencia son más privilegiados que aquellos que se encuentran dentro del sistema
de Derecho Internacional, en algunos supuestos indeterminados y difíciles de establecer.
En referencia a su origen algunos entendían que los mismos procedían del Derecho
positivo y otrosdel Derecho Natural clásico.
Desde que se introdujeron entre las fuentes de derecho formales en el Estatuto de la Corte
Permanente de Justicia Internacional, se observó su carácter problemático en cuanto a su
contenido y esas discusiones se plasmaron, como se verá, en el seno del Comité que
redactóel texto del Estatuto.[3]
II.Naturalezay Evolución de los Principios Generales del Derecho
Los principios generales se conocían y habían sido objeto de atención en Tratados y

Laudos Arbítrales, mucho antes del Estatuto de la Corte Permanente, que solo los recepta
y reconoce como fuente.
Los mismos estaban presentes en el Tratado de Washington del 8 de mayo de 1871
relativo al Arbitraje del Alabama, [4] yen el Compromiso Arbitral de 1908 sobre la
frontera marítima entre Suecia y Noruega.[5] En ambos instrumentosse declaran aplicables
los Principios generales del Derecho de Gentes o los Principios Generales reconocidos
por el Derecho Internacional.
Asimismo el Artículo 7º del Convenio XII de La Haya de 1907 relativo a la creación del
Tribunal de Presas, establecía que: “si no existieran normas generalmente reconocidas,
el Tribunal fallará según los Principios Generales del Derecho y la Equidad”.[6]
También se aplicaron en 1912 en la Sentencia de la Corte Permanente de Arbitraje por el
Caso de las Indemnizaciones de la Guerra de Turquía, donde sereconocían los principios
de la “indemnización por actos ilícitos” y el “enriquecimiento injusto”.[7]
El mismo principio del enriquecimiento injusto se observa también en el Caso Lena
Goldfields de 1930, con respecto a confiscaciones de la Unión Soviética.[8] En Petroleum
Development (Trucial Coast) Ltd. vs Sheikh of Abu Dhabi,el Árbitro Lord Asquith buscó
el derecho aplicable a un caso de delimitación de plataforma continental “en los
principios enraizados en el buen sentido y en la práctica común de la generalidadde las
naciones civilizadas, principios de justicia, equidad y buena conciencia”.[9]
El Comité de los Dieztuvo en cuenta los precedentes anteriores y acogió una fórmula que
representaba un compromiso entre las dos grandes tendencias que se presentaron dentro
del mismo, representadas respectivamente por el Barón Descamps, su Presidente de
origen belga y Lord Phillimore de Gran Bretaña.
Descamps presentó un proyecto donde preveía que el Tribunal debía aplicar, después de
los Tratados y la costumbre, “las reglas del derecho internacional tal y como eran
reconocidaspor la conciencia jurídica de los pueblos civilizados”. A la objeción de que
esta conciencia no era plenamente uniforme, responde “que la ley fundamental de lo
justo y de lo injusto que está profundamente grabada en el corazón del ser humano y
recibe la expresión más elevada y más autorizada en la conciencia jurídica de los
pueblos civilizados”.[10]
La otra postura estaba representada por Lord Phillimore, Elihu Root y otros miembros del
Comité, que entendían que los mismos eran principios del derecho común, como el de la
cosa juzgada, que podían ser a las relaciones internacionales. Finalmente fueel
estadounidenseRoot quien propuso una fórmulaestableciendo que el Tribunal aplicaría los
principios generales del Derecho reconocidos por las naciones civilizadas.[11] Tal fórmula
fue aceptada por el Comité y posteriormente por la Asamblea de la Liga de las
Nacionespasandoal Estatuto.
En consecuencia, el Articulo 38 (1) 3 del Estatuto de la Corte Permanente y el 38 1 (c) de
la Corte Internacional es en definitiva un compromiso entre el positivismo y el
iusnaturalismo, en la medida de lo posible, y una mezcla del pragmatismo del Common
Law con la posición conceptualdel sistema del Derecho Romano Continental.
Esto no debe sorprender pues el Derecho Internacional si se lo examina en profundidad,
es un proceso de acomodamiento de conceptos para que los mismos se engarcen en el
orden jurídico de la Comunidad de Estados.
Sin embargo, normalmentelos Principios Generales del Derecho han sido utilizados en
forma primaria para clarificar e interpretar normas convencionales y consuetudinarias, y
no para suplantarlas, es decir, determinar los derechos y obligaciones de los Estados en
un contexto de Tratadocostumbre, como sería el caso de la buena fe o el cumplimiento de
las obligaciones contractuales.
Es evidente que a medida que los ordenamientos jurídicos de los Estados se desarrollan
se inyectan elementos dinámicos, los que a su vez tendrán un impacto en la evolución del
Derecho Internacional frente a exigencias nuevas, intereses que cambian y objetivos o
metas que se transforman.
También y quizás esta fuera la intención original de los redactores del Estatuto, los
Principios Generales proveen una norma o standard, cuando el Tratado o la costumbre no
pueden ser claramente aplicados o no existen directamente, evitando un non liquet.
La función más controvertida de los Principios generales del Derecho es la de ser
correctivos, dejando de lado o modificando determinadas disposiciones de los Tratados o
normas consuetudinarias en aras de un bien común. Esta función se relaciona con la
noción de jus cogens que invalida otras normas, representando intereses considerados
fundamentales para la Comunidad en un determinado momento en aras de resolución que
se estimajusta, siendo un ejemplo la derogación del Nullum Crimen Nulla Poena Sine
Lege en los Procesos deNúremberg. La misma posición es adoptada por la Convención
Europea de los Derechos Humanos que limitael principio del Nullum Crimen,
precisamente basado en los Principios Generales del Derecho. [12]
La preocupación ante una aplicación arbitraria o subjetiva no ha sido fundada, ya que
detrás de los principios generales existeun consenso común similar al de la costumbre,
pero en este caso basado en la coincidencia de sistemas jurídicos de derecho interno.
Como en la Corte Internacionallos jueces representan los principales sistemas jurídicos
vigentes,es suficiente la coincidencia entre ellos, de acuerdo al Artículo 9 del Estatuto. [13]
Los términos “reconocidos por las naciones civilizadas” que eran percibidos comouna
imposición de los postulados del derecho occidental, sobre aquellos de países socialistas
o del Tercer Mundo, hoy son vistos como una garantía de la universalidad de fuentes del
Derecho Internacional.[14]
En definitiva estos Principios incluyen las normas comunes a las diferentes legislaciones
del mundo, unidas por la identidad del razonamiento legal, de la ratio legis, y traspuestas
o reenviadas de los derechos internos al Derecho Internacional.
Los principios generales del derecho más numerosos son los recogidos por los
ordenamientos internos o considerados como tales “in foro doméstico.”
Así por ejemplo la prohibición del abuso del derecho, la responsabilidad internacional, el
principio del enriquecimiento sin causa, o el que establece que la obligación de reparar
los daños no solo debe abarcar el daño sufrido efectivamente damnum emergens sino
también la ganancia dejada de obtener, el lucrum cessans.
A pesar del carácter de fuente, ambas Cortes han sido extremadamente cautas en aplicar
per se los principios y en consecuencia su ámbito preciso permanece en un marco de
incertidumbre.
Además de los fallos arbitrales mencionados y otros, tanto la Corte Permanentecomo la
actual Corte Internacionalde Justicia en ocasiones se han referido a los principios, si bien
no con frecuencia ni como el único basamento de sus decisiones.
Independientemente de su análisis posterior, la vertiente positivista obtuvo
acogidoreconocimiento en la Corte Permanente de Justicia en el Caso de la Alta Silesia
Polaca[15] y en elde la Fábrica de Chorzow, donde el Tribunal observa que es “un
principio de derecho que toda violación a un compromiso genera o implica una
obligación de reparación:[16]
“...the essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act -a principle
which seems to be established by international practice and in particular by the
decisions of arbitral tribunals-is that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out al the
consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all
probability, have existed if that act had not been committed...” [17]
La Corte Internacional también ha receptado la opinión del Baron Decamps, y se ha
referido a los principios en el Casodel Canal de Corfú en 1949 donde habla de “principios
elementales de humanidad.”[18]
“The obligations incumbent upon the Albanian authorities consisted in notifying, for the
benefit of shipping in general, the existence of a minefield in Albanian territorial waters
and in warning the approaching British warships of the imminent danger to which the
minefield exposed them. Such obligations are based, not on the Hague Convention of
1907, No. VTII, which is applicable in time of war, but on certain general and well-
recognized principles, namely: elementary considerations of humanity...”[19]
También lo hizo en la Opinión Consultiva sobre las Reservas a la Convención del

Genocidio de 1951,[20] al referirse a los principios reconocidos por las naciones
civilizadas obligatorios para todos los Estados, incluso fuera del vínculo convencional:
” ... the principles underlying the Convention are principles which are recognized by
civilized nations as binding on States, even without any conventional obligation.”[21]
En la Opinión de 1971 sobre Namibia[22]el Tribunal también se refiere al principio general
que establece que la violación grave de un Tratado es causal de extinción del mismo:
“South Africa, being responsible for having created and maintained a situation which the
Court has found to have been validly declared illegal, has the obligation to put an end to
it. It is therefore under obligation to withdraw its administration from the Territory of
Namibia. By maintaining the present illegal situation, and occupying the Territory
without title, South Africa incurs international responsibilities arising from a continuing
violation of an international obligation...”[23]
Para que una regla sea reconocida como Principio General de acuerdo al Artículo 38 (1)
(3) la regla debe existir en un número determinado de Estados, pero no requiere ser
universal ni haber pasado un test cuantitativo o numérico al respecto.
En el Caso Lotus se menciona el principio de territorialidad de la jurisdicción penal como
tal[24]. En el Caso del Derecho de Paso, la opinión disidente del Juez Fernandes en el
Párrafo 45 expresa una disquisición de extrema importancia:
“The general principles of law are at the basis of custom and of conventional law. The
latter are usually no more than the crystallization of those principles. The concrete rules
cannot be construed conflict with the principles of which they constitute the application."
(Verdross, Derecho Internacional Público, pp. 20 5-206.) "The priority given by Article
38 of the Statute of the Court to conventions and to custom in relation to the general
principles of law in no way excludes a simultaneity application of those principles and of
the first two sources of law. It frequently happens that a decision given on the basis of a
particular or general convention or of a custom requires recourse to the general
principles of law ... A court will have recourse to those principles to fill gaps in the
conventional rules, or to interpret them."”[25]
La Corte rechazóel requisito o test de verificación de aceptación universal en el Caso de

Sudoeste Africano [26]según la Opinión Disidente del Juez Tanaka:
“First the recognition of a principle by civilized nations, as indicated above, does not
mean recognition by all civilized nations, nor does it mean recognition by an official act
such as a legislative act; therefore the recognition is of a very elastic nature...”[27]
Dicho test también se rechazó en el Caso de la Plataforma Continental del Mar del Norte
con la Opinión Disidente de ManfredLachs:
“All this leads to the conclusion that the principles and rules enshrined in the Convention,
and in particular the equidistance rule, have been accepted not only by those States which
are parties to the Convention on the Continental Shelf, but also by those which have
subsequently followed it in agreements, or in their legislation, or have acquiesced in it
when faced with legislative acts of other States affecting them. This can be viewed as
evidence of a practice widespread enough to satisfy the criteria for a general rule of law.
For to become binding, a rule or principle of international law need not pass the test of
universal acceptance...”[28]
Debe quedar claro que el análisis del Derecho Comparado juega un rol preponderante en
la búsqueda y definición de los principios generales del Derecho. La forma en que esos
principios son reconocidos no es a través de una importación directa en bloque, sino
mediante la observación de las reglas como una indicación de políticas y principios que
pueden ser traslados al ámbito internacional.
Para identificar un Principio General que surge de varios sistemas legales internos se
utiliza el método inductivo observándose la presencia en los principales sistemas legales,
y será más fácil cuanto más general sea el carácter del principio.
Ambos Tribunales utilizaron este sistema empírico en los casosLotus yNottebohm con
respecto a las leyes de la nacionalidad:
En Nottebohmse afirma: “Similarly, the courts of third States, when they have before
them an individual whom two other States hold to be their national, seek to resolve the
conflict by having recourse to international criteria and their prevailing tendency is to
prefer the real and effective nationality.,. This requirement that such a concordance must
exist is to be found in the studies carried on in the course of the last thirty years upon the
initiative and under the (auspices of the League of Nations and the United Nations. It
explains the provision which the Conference for the Codification of International Law,
held at The Hague in 1930, inserted in Article I of the Convention relating to the Conflict
of Nationality Laws, laying down that the law enacted by a State for the purpose of
determining who are its nationals "shall be recognized by other States in so far as it is
consistent with .... international custom and the principles of law generally recognized
with regard to nationality". According to the practice of States, to arbitral and judicial
decisions and to the opinions of writers, nationality is a legal bond having as its basis a
social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments,
together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties. It may be said to constitute the
juridical expression of the fact that the individual upon whom it is conferred, either
directly by the law or as the result of an act of the authorities, is in fact more closely
connected with the population of the State conferring nationality than with that of any
other State. Conferred by a State, it only entitles that State to exercise protection vis-à-vis
another State, if it constitutes a translation into juridical terms of the individual’s
connection with the State which has made him its national.”[29]
Sin perjuicio de las Sentenciasy Opiniones mencionadas, se procederá a continuacióna
realizar un análisis cronológico y temáticodesu utilización por las Cortes Internacionales.
III.Los Principios Generales del Derecho en la Jurisprudencia de la Corte Permanente

de Justicia Internacional
La antigua Corte Permanente mencionó los principios generales, pero sin articular
claramente la base de sustentación, de allí que sea interesante analizar los casos donde los
mismosson mencionados.
En la Opinión Consultiva sobre el Intercambio de Poblaciones Greco Turcas [30] se refiere
al principio de que la legislación interna debe estar en armonía con las disposiciones de
un Tratado, inequívocamente planteando la supremacía de los Tratados sobre las leyes
internas:
“The Turkish Delegation however maintains that the Convention contains a reference to
national legislation and in support of this contention invokes amongst other things
Article 18, according to which: "The High Contracting Parties undertake to introduce in
their respective laws such modifications as may be necessary with a view to ensuring the
execution of the present Convention." This clause, however, merely lays stress on a
principle which is self-evident, according to which a State which has contracted valid
international obligations is bound to make in its legislation such modifications as may be
necessary to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations undertaken...”[31]
En el Caso de las Concesiones de Mavromatis, el Juez Hudson en su voto disidente dejó

enclaro que existe un principio general por el cual un tribunal no puede entender una
cuestión si carece de jurisdicción: “There are certain elementary conceptions common to
all systems of jurisprudence, and one of these is the principle that a court of justice is
never justified in hearing and adjudging the merits of a cause of which it has no
jurisdiction...”.[32]
Del mismo modo, en el Caso de los Intereses Alemanes en la Alta Silesia la Corte indicó
que las leyes de procedimiento no solo consisten en las Reglas del Estatuto de la Corte,
sino también los Principios Generales del Derecho:“Whether this submission should be
classified as an objection" or as fins de non-recevoir, it is certain that nothing, either in
the Statute or Rules which govern the Court's activities, or in the general principles of
law, prevents the Court from dealing with it at once, and before entering upon the merits
of the case; for there can be no proceedings on the merits unless this submission is over-
ruled.”[33]
Sin especificar la basepara la afirmación del principio, la Corte en su Opinión Consultiva

sobre la Frontera entre Irak y Turquía se refirió a que nadie puede ser juez en su propia
causa:[34]
“It follows from the foregoing that, according to the Covenant itself, in certain cases and
more particularly in the case of the settlement of a dispute, the rule of unanimity is
applicable, subject to the limitation that the votes cast by representatives of the interested
Parties do not affect the required unanimity...The principle laid down by the Covenant in
paragraphs 6 and 7 of Article 15 seems to meet the requirements of a case such as that
now before the Council, just as well as the circumstances contemplated in that article.
The well known rule that no one can be judge in his own suit holds good.” [35]
En suOpinión Consultiva sobre el Acuerdo Greco Turco afirmó, como regla general, que
cualquier cuerpo que posea jurisdicción tiene el derecho de determinar su extensión:“... It
is clear having regard amongst other things to the principle that, as a general rule,
anybody possessing jurisdictional powers has the right in the first place itself to
determine the extent of its jurisdiction...” [36]
En el Caso de la Fábrica de Chorzow [37] también mencionóprincipios generales como el

de ex injuria jus non oritur :
“It is, moreover, a principle generally accepted in the jurisprudence of international
arbitration, as well as by municipal courts, that one Party cannot avail himself of the fact
that the other has not full filled some obligation or has not had recourse to some means
of redress, if the former Party has, by some illegal act, prevented the latter from fulfilling
the obligation in question, or from having recourse to the tribunal which would have
been open, to him...” [38]
El caso del SS Lotus[39] es quizás el más citado, ya que trató como determinar si existe un
principio general. La Corte dirimió al respecto la siguientecuestión: ¿si de acuerdo al
Derecho Internacional existía o no un principio que le prohibiera a Turquía en las
circunstancias del caso procesar al Teniente Demons? [40]
El tema se relacionaba con la acción de Turquía y si la misma estaba en conflicto con los
principios del Derecho Internacional cuando asumió jurisdicción sobre el oficial a cargo
de un buque francés que había abordado a uno turco en alta mar: “It must therefore be
held that there is no principle of international law... which precludes the institution of the
criminal proceedings under consideration. Consequently, Turkey, by instituting, in virtue
of the discretion which international law leaves to every sovereign State, the criminal
proceedings in question, has not, in the absence of such principles, acted in a manner
contrary to the principles of international law within the meaning of the special
agreement.”[41]
Por su parte, en el Caso de la Fábrica de Chorzow,[42] en referencia a reclamos por

indemnización del Gobierno Alemán pordaños producidos a dos empresas por Polonia, la
Corte fundamenta y articula la base del principio general aplicado a la extensión de la
indemnización por daños, afirmando:
“It follows that the compensation due to the German Government is not necessarily
limited to the value of the undertaking at the moment of dispossession, plus interest to the
day of payment... The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act-a
principle which seems to be established by international practice and in particular by the
decisions of arbitral tribunals is that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the
consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in all
probability, have existed if that act had not been committed...”[43]
En el Caso de los Faros [44]se mencionó el origen del principio general referido a que las
partes contratantes deben actuar de buena fe en relación con un contrato celebrado entre
una empresa privada y el Gobierno Otomano sobre un territorio que había sido con
posterioridad cedido a Grecia:“The Court is asked to give its decision upon the question
whether the contract concluded on April /14th, 1913, between the French firm Collas &
Michel, known as the 'Administration générale des Phares de l'Empire ottoman', and the
Ottoman Government, extending from September 4th, 1924, to September 4th, 1949
concession contracts granted to the said firm, was duly entered into and is accordingly
operative as regardsthe Greek Government in so far as concerns lighthouses situated in
the territories assigned to it after the Balkan wars or subsequently.”
“There are therefore three questions of substance with which the Court must deal: it must
determine the intention of the Parties as regards the scope of the contract; it must
consider whether this contract was "duly entered into" according to Ottoman law, and
whether it is enforceable against Greece.”[45]
En su Opinión disidente el Juez Séfériadès también reafirmó el principio de la buena fe:

“Contracting parties are always assumed to be acting honestly and in good faith. That is
a legal principle, which is recognized in private law and cannot be ignored in
international law.”[46]
En el Caso de los Prestamos Serbios se rechazó la aplicación del principio del Estoppel:
“... The fact that gold francs were not paid cannot be admitted to show that gold francs
were not promised. If the subsequent conduct of the Parties is to be considered, it must be
not to ascertain the terms of the loans, but whether the Parties by their conduct have
altered or impaired their rights. In the latter view, the principle known in Anglo-saxon
law as estoppel is sought to be applied.” [47]
También se trató allí, la fuerza mayor o imposibilidad de cumplimiento:

“Force majeure. It cannot be maintained that the war itself, despite its grave economic
consequences, affected the legal obligations of the contracts between the Serbian
Government and the French bondholders. The economic dislocations caused by the war
did not release the debtor State, although they may present equities which doubtless will
receive appropriate consideration in the negotiations and-if resorted to- the arbitral
determination for which Article II of the Special Agreement provides. Versailles as it is to
obtain gold francs of the sort deemed to be required by the Serbian loan contracts”.[48]
En el Caso que lo acompañaba, referido a los Préstamos Brasileros, la Corte aceptó el

principio de interpretación contra proferentem:“When the Brazilian Government
promised to pay "gold francs", the reference to a well-known standard of value cannot be
considered as inserted merely for literary effect, or as a routine expression without
significance. The Court is called upon to construe the promise, not to ignore it. Moreover,
there is a familiar rule for the construction of instruments that, where they are found to be
ambiguous, they should be taken contra proferentem.In this case, as the Brazilian
Government by its representative assumed responsibility for the prospectus, which this
representative, who had signed the bonds, had "seen and approved", it would seem to be
proper to construe them in case of doubt contra proferentem and to ascribe to them the
meaning which they would naturally carry to those taking the bonds under the prospectus.
It can hardly be doubted that those taking the bonds on the faith of the prospectus would
understand that they were receiving gold bonds, which would mean bonds payable in
gold value both as to principal and interest. For these reasons, it is concluded that the
bonds of the issue of 1909 are to be construed as providing for the payment of principal
and interest in gold.[49]
En su Opinión Consultiva sobre las Comunidades Greco - búlgaras vuelve a presentarse

la cuestión de qué norma debía primar: si una establecida por una Convención o una
interna,y se estableceque prevalece la norma internacional convencional sobre la
municipal o interna: “…In the first place, it is a generally accepted principle of
international law that in the relations between Powers who are contracting Parties to a
treaty, the provisions of municipal law cannot prevail over those of the treaty. In the
second place, according to Article 2, paragraph 1, and Article 15 of the Greco-Bulgarian
Convention, the two Governments have undertaken not to place any restriction on the
right of emigration, notwithstanding any municipal laws or regulations to the contrary,
and to modify their legislation in so far as may be necessary to secure the execution of
the Convention. In these circumstances, if a proper application of the Convention were in
conflict with some local law the latter would not prevail over the Convention.” [50]
En otraOpinión Consultiva, sobre el Trato de los Nacionales Polacos en Danzig[51]también
fueron invocados los Principios Generales: “It should however be observed that, while on
the one hand, according to generally accepted principles, a State cannot rely, as against
another State, on the provisions of the latter's Constitution, but only on international law
and international obligations duly accepted, on the other hand and conversely, a State
cannot adduce as against another State its own Constitution with a view to evading
obligations incumbent upon it under international law or treaties in force.” [52]
Fueron aludidos[J1], sinhacer una referencia específica,en el Caso de Groenlandia
Oriental.[53] En el mismo se le aplica la regla del estoppel a Noruega en relación a la
ocupación de ciertos territorios en Groenlandia Oriental, pues la Corte concluyo que, al
aceptar el Tratado de 1826 y los Acuerdos entre Dinamarca y Noruega como obligatorios
y vinculantes, Noruega ha reconocido que la totalidad de Groenlandia corresponde a
Dinamarca, y se excluye de discutir la soberanía: “In accepting these bilateral and
multilateral agreements as binding upon herself, Norway reaffirmed that she recognized
the whole of Greenland as Danish; and thereby she has debarred herself from contesting
Danish sovereignty over the whole of Greenland, and, in consequence, from proceeding
to occupy any part of it.”[54]
En el caso de la Compañía de Electricidad de Sofía y Bulgaria (Medidas Cautelares)[55] se

consideró como principio universalmente aceptado por los Tribunales internacionales que
las partes en un caso deben abstenerse de medidas capaces de producir un efecto
perjudicial con respecto a la ejecución de las decisiones a ser otorgadas, y en general no
permitirningún acto que pueda agravar o extender la controversia:
“Whereas the above quoted provision of the Statute applies the principle universally
accepted by international tribunals and likewise laid down in many conventions to which
Bulgaria has been a party-to the effect that the parties to a case must abstain from any
measure capable of exercising a prejudicial effect in regard to the execution of the
decision to be given and, in general, not allow any step of any kind to be taken which
might aggravate or extend the dispute...”[56]
IV.Los Principios Generales del Derecho en la Jurisprudencia de la Corte Internacional

de Justicia
La Corte Internacional de Justicia continuó la tradición de la Corte Permanente,
perotampoco ha sido clara en articular los métodos o procesos por los cuales determina e
identifica la existencia de un Principio General de acuerdo al Artículo 38 (1) (c).
Entre los casos, en el del Templo de Preah Vihear se observa la renuencia de articular los
principios. La Corte no se refiere directamente al principio de preclusión por su nombre y
declara "qui tacet consentire videtur si loqui debuisset ac potuisset”:- el que guarda
silencio consiente si pudiera y debiera expresarse-. [57]
“It has been contended on behalf of Thailand that this communication of the maps by the
French authorities was, so to speak, ex parte, and that no formal acknowledgment of it
was either requested of, or given by, Thailand. In fact, as will be seen presently, an
acknowledgment by conduct was undoubtedly made in a very definite way; but even if it
were otherwise, it is clear that the circumstances were such as called for some reaction,
within a reasonable period, on the part of the Siamese authorities, if they wished to
disagree with the map or had any serious question to raise in regard to it. They did not
do so, either then or for many years, and thereby must be held to have acquiesced. Qui
tacet consentire videtur si loqui debuisset ac potuisset.[58]
En su Opinión Disidente el Juez Sir Percy Spender discurre sobre el principio,

vinculándolo con la aquiescencia y el reconocimiento: “A State may of course recognize
or acquiesce in any fact or situation either of law or fact and its intention to do so may
be evidenced expressly or by implication. The recognition may become the source of a
legal right or obligation to the extent to which it provides an essential element in the
establishment of a legal right or obligation, as for example in preclusion or prescription.
Preclusion-or, to use its Anglo-Saxon equivalent, estoppels-, may however only occur
where all the elements which constitute the principle of preclusion can be shown to exist.
There is a close affinity between prescription, preclusion, recognition, acquiescence and
absence of protest. The principle of preclusion is however, in my view, quite distinct from
the concept of recognition (or acquiescence), though the latter may, as any conduct may,
go to establish either prescription or preclusion. To accord to the concept of recognition
by a State of a fact or situation, without more, the legal consequence of a preclusion not
only finds, in my opinion, despite the views of certain writers, no authority as a principle
of international law under Article 38 of the Statute of the Court..” [59]
Asimismo dijo, sobre la relación entre estos principios y el de la buena fe: “The principle
of preclusion is a beneficent and powerful instrument of substantive international law.
Based as it is upon the necessity for good faith between States in their relations one with
another, it is not to be hedged in by artificial rules. It should not however be permitted to
become so indefinite as to acquire the somewhat formless content of a maxim. And since
the principle, when it is applicable to any given set of facts, substitutes relative truth for
the judicial search for the truth, it should be applied with caution.”[60]
En el Caso de los Ensayos Nucleares, donde se presenta una controversia entre Australia
y Francia en relación a las pruebas nucleares atmosféricas en el Océano Pacifico, la Corte
reconoció que el principio de la buena fe regula la creación y el cumplimiento de una
obligación internacional, sea la misma basada en un Tratado o en una declaración
unilateral:[61]"Just as the very rule of pacta sunt servanda in the law of treaties is based
on good faith, so also is the binding character of an international obligation assumed by
unilateral declaration...” [62]
En la Opinión Consultiva sobre el Sahara Occidental se examina la existencia del

principio de autodeterminación como principio fundamental que se origina en el Derecho
Internacional. La Corte determinó la base del mismo en la Carta de las Naciones Unidas,
Resoluciones de la Asamblea General y otras decisiones previas:[63]
“54. The Charter of the United Nations, in Article 1, paragraph 2, indicates, as one of the
purposes of the United Nations: "To develop friendly relations among nations based on
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples. This purpose
is further developed in Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter. Those provisions have direct
and particular relevance for non-self-governing territories, which are dealt with in
Chapter XI of the Charter. As the Court stated in its Advisory Opinion of 21 June 1971 on
The Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970):
“ … the subsequent development of international law in regard to non-self-governing
territories, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, made the principle of self-
determination applicable to all of them" (I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 31)
55. The principle of self-determination as a right of peoples, and its application for the
purpose of bringing all colonial situations to a speedy end, were enunciated in the
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, General
Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV). In this resolution the General Assembly proclaims "the
necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and
manifestations.” [64]
Sin embargo, en el Caso del Derecho de PasoIndia y Portugal frente a la afirmación de la

segunda, que invocaba un principio relacionado con la costumbre regional la Corte
decidió no examinar la cuestión.[65]
“Portugal also invokes general international custom, as well as the general principles of
law recognized by civilized nations, in support of its claim of a right of passage as
formulated by it. Having arrived at the conclusion that the course of dealings between
the British and Indian authorities on the one hand and the Portuguese on the other
established a practice, well understood between the Parties, by virtue of which Portugal
had acquired a right of passage in respect of private persons, civil officials and goods in
general, the Court does not consider it necessary to examine whether general
international custom or the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations may
lead to the same result.”[66]
Los Principios Generales también fueron utilizados para proveer una solución legal en
aquellos casos donde el derecho convencional o consuetudinario no la ofrece, sirviendo
como repositorio. En el Caso del Sudoeste Africano,[67] la Opinión Disidente del Juez Mc
Nair analiza los principios del trust, latutelay lacuratelay los encuentra aplicables al
régimen de los Mandatos:
“Nearly every legal system possesses some institution whereby the property (and
sometimes the persons) of those who are not sui juris, such as a minor or a lunatic, can
be entrusted to some responsible person as a trustee or tuteur or curateur. The Anglo-
American trust serves this purpose, and another purpose even more closely akin to the
Mandates System, namely, the vesting of property in trustees, and its management by
them in order that the public or some class of the public may derive benefit or that some
public purpose may be served. ..These are some of the general principles of private law
which throw light upon this new institution, and I am convinced that in its future
development the law governing the trust is a source from which much can be
derived…”[68]
A su vezen el Caso del Suroeste Africano de 1962[69], el Juez Jessupinvocó los principios
en referencia a los intereses que una Parte o los Estados tienen o pueden tener en el
resultado de una controversia independientemente de su relación con la misma ,es decir el
efecto erga omnes y la noción de interés común: “International law has long recognized
that States may have legal interests in matters which do not affect their financial,
economic, or other "material", or, Say, "physical" or "tangible" interests. One type of
illustration of this principle of international law is to be found in the right of a State to
concern itself, on general humanitarian grounds, with atrocities affecting human beings
in another country… For over a century treaties have specifically recognized the legal
interests of States in general humanitarian causes and have frequently provided
procedural means by which States could secure respect for these interests. ..As this Court
said of the Genocide Convention: "In such a convention the contracting States do not
have any interests of their own; they merely have, one and all, a common interest, namely
the accomplishment of those high purposes which are the raison d'être of the
convention...”[70]
El Juez Caicedo Castilla en su Opinión Disidente en el Caso del Asilomenciona los

principios del derecho internacional en orden a determinar si la doctrina del asilo, como
evidenciada en diversas Convenciones, permitía a Colombia calificar unilateralmente el
delito con el fin de otorgar el asilo a un ciudadano peruano acusado de organizar una
revolución: [71]
“17. Apart from the Havana Convention of 1923, there exists another agreement binding
on both Colombia and Peru, namely, the Bolivarian Agreement on Extradition of 1911,
Article 18 of which recognizes the institution of asylum in conformity with the principles
of international law.” [72]
Existen también principios generales que surgen del derecho internacional en relación a
la interpretación de los tratados y de las leyes internas con respecto a los contratos.
Así, la Corte los ha utilizado frecuentemente frente a problemas surgidos con Tratados y
contratos internacionales. En el Caso del Sudoeste Africano en 1962, el Juez Jessup
empleó el principio de separación o divisibilidadde las cláusulas de los Tratados que
pueden aplicarse subsidiariamentesi una disposición ya no resulta operativa:[73]
“The principle of separability is now accepted in the law of treaties, especially with
reference to multipartite treaties, although the older classical writers tended to reject it.
It is a doctrine which exists in municipal contract law (sometimes under the label of
"divisibility") and in the law governing the construction of statutes...The question which
can be answered is whether some provision or part of a provision became inoperable and
if so whether that: inoperable portion was so essential to the operation of the provision
in question that the whole provision falls. The provision which is particularly in question
is the reference in Article 7 of the Mandate to "another Member of the League of
Nations".[74]
Debe destacarsequetambiénse ha afirmadoque los Principios Generalesse derivan del
Derecho Natural. En el Caso del Sudoeste Africano de 1966, el Juez Tanaka entendió que
el Artículo 38(I) incorporaba el Derecho Natural al Derecho Internacional. En su Opinión
Disidente afirma que el Derecho Natural reconoce el principio de protección de los
derechos humanos y esos derechos son reconocidos en todas partes, pues pertenecen a los
individuos:[75]
“In short, human rights which require protections are the same; they are not the product
of a particular juridical system in the hierarchy of the legal order, but the same human
rights must be recognized, respected and protected everywhere man goes. The uniformity
of national laws on the protection of human rights is not derived, as in the cases of the
law of contracts and commercial arid maritime transactions, from considerations of
expediency by the legislative organs or from the creative power of the custom of a
community, but it already exists in spite of its more-or- less vague form. This is of nature
jus naturale in roman law.”[76]
Más recientemente, en la Opinión Consultiva sobre la Amenaza o Uso de las Armas

Nucleares, la Corte sostuvo la existencia de un principio de prohibición[J2]:
“The Court notes by way of introduction that international customary and treaty law does
not contain any specific prescription authorizing the threat or use of nuclear weapons or
any other weapon in general or in certain circumstances, in particular those of the
exercise of legitimate self- defence. Nor, however, is there any principle or rule of
international law which would make the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons
or of any other weapons dependent on a specific authorization. State practice shows that
the illegality of the use of certain weapons as such does not result from an absence of
authorization but, on the contrary, is formulated in terms of prohibition”.[77]
Culminando esta revisión, uno de los más recientes casos de la Corte relacionado a las
Consecuencias Legales de la Separación de Chagos del Archipiélago de Mauricio en
1965, afirmó la posición de la Corte frente a las resoluciones de la Asamblea y su valor
normativo como principio:[78]“As the Court has noted: “General Assembly resolutions,
even if they are not binding, may sometimes have normative value. They can, in certain
circumstances, provide evidence important for establishing the existence of a rule or the
emergence of an opinio juris.To establish whether this is true of a given General
Assembly resolution, it is necessary to look at its content and the conditions of its
adoption; it is also necessary to see whether an opinio juris exists as to its normative
character.” (Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J.
Reports 1996 (I), pp. 254-255, para. 70.) 152. The Court considers that, although
resolution 1514 (XV) is formally a recommendation, it has a declaratory character with
regard to the right to self-determination as a customary norm, in view of its content and
the conditions of its adoption. The resolution was adopted by 89 votes with 9 abstentions.
None of the States participating in the vote contested the existence of the right of peoples
to self-determination. Certain States justified their abstention on the basis of the time
required for the implementation of such a right.153. The wording used in resolution 1514
(XV) has a normative character, in so far as it affirms that “[a]ll peoples have the right to
self-determination.” Its preamble proclaims “the necessity of bringing to a speedy and
unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and manifestations” and its first paragraph
states that “[t]he subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation
constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights [and] is contrary to the Charter of the
United Nations.”[79]
V.Colofón
Como se ha observado tanto la Corte Permanente como la Corte Internacional han hecho
uso de los principios generales como una fuente subsidiaria. Si bien han sido cautelosos y
restrictivos, pero en todos los casos analizados se encuentran referencias a su valor.
Cuanto más se repita un principio, más respeto merece; siendo el proceso de análisis e
identificación similar al de la formación de una norma de costumbre, y así la costumbre
se puede derivar de principios y viceversa.
Un principio general amplio no requiere en su formulación un proceso similar al de una
costumbre, y así puede darse el ejemplo del derecho a la vida. Pero un principio
especifico o puntual para un rango acotado de situaciones si ha desuperar la mera opinión
jurídica, a través de una proceso de práctica difundido y repetido para ser reconocido
como tal. Un ejemplo de eso sería el denominado principio de precaución que muchos
estados no reconocen.
Es de destacar con respecto al análisis comparativo quelos Tribunales Internacionalesno
han dado una guía clara en su aplicación. Quizás porque las Cortes no han querido
establecer precedentes para casos futuros. A diferencia de las cortes de Common Law, que
se basan en ellosy se adhieren al stare decisis, tanto la Corte Permanente como la Corte
Internacional han evitado que sus decisiones lleven a ese desarrollo jurisprudencial,
interpretando en general el derecho positivo y no modificándolo. Si bien los positivistas
reconocen hoy que la rigidez textual es insostenible y bien pueden sustentarse decisiones
legítimas respecto de los hechos de un caso a partir de los valores subyacentes
finalísticamente discernidos desde la intertextualidad.
(*) Profesor Titular de Derecho Internacional Público. Universidad Católica Argentina
“Santa María de los Buenos Aires”. Profesor Titular Doctorado en Ciencias Jurídicas
Universidad Católica Argentina “Santa María de los Buenos Aires”.
[1]International Law Collected Papers of Sir Hersch Lauterpacht Pages. 69, 74. 568
Pages CambridgeUniversity Press. 1970.
Oppenheim Lassa, Lauterpacht Hersch.International Law, A Treatise Eighth Edition
Longmans Green & Co.London New York, Toronto Page 29 1955.
[2] Harold, C. Gutteridge Comparative Law Pages. 64- 65 2d Edition Pages 226-
Cambridge University Press 1949.[3]Statute of the Permanent Court of International
Justice.
https://www.icj-cij.org/en/statute
Consultado 29.3.2019.
[4] Treaty between the United States and Great Britain, 1871, Article VI In deciding the
matters submitted to the Arbitrators, they shall be governed by the following three rules,
which are agreed upon by the High Contracting Parties as rules to be taken as applicable
to the case, and by such principles of International Law not inconsistent therewith as the
Arbitrators shall determine to have been applicable to the case.
https://www.trans-lex.org/502000/_/treaty-between-the-united-states-and-great-britain-
1871-/
Consultado29.3.2019.
[5] Permanent Court of Arbitration, the Grisbadarna case Norway – Sweden, Unofficial
English Translation Arbitrators J.A. Loeff F.V.N. Beichmann K. Hj. L. Hammarskjöld
The Hague, 23 October 1900, II. as regards the principal question: 1. May it please the
Tribunal to be guided by the Treaty and map of 1661, to take into account the
circumstances of fact and the principles of the law of nations, and to determine that the
line of the disputed maritime boundary between Norway and Sweden starts frompoint
XVIII as already fixed, in such a manner that first, the boundary line shall be drawn in a
straight line to a point which constitutes the middle point of a straight line, connecting the
northernmost reef of Röskären, belonging to the Koster Islands, that is to say, the reef
indicated on table 5 of the Report of 1906 as showing depths of 9, 10 and 10, and the
southernmost reef of the Svartskjär, belonging to the Tisler Islands, and which is
equipped with a beacon, which point is indicated on the same table 5 as point XIX; 2.
May it please the Tribunal further to take account of the circumstances of fact and the
principles of the law of nations and to establish the remainder of the disputed boundary
in such a manner that...”
http://www.worldcourts.com/pca/eng/decisions/1909.10.23_Norway_v_Sweden.pdf
[6]The Hague Convention, Hague Convention XII (18 October 1907) Convention
Relative to the Creation of an International Prize Court Articles 1 – 57, Art. 7. If a
question of law to be decided is covered by a treaty in force between the belligerent
captor and a Power which is itself or whose subject or citizen is a party to the
proceedings, the Court is governed by the provisions in the said treaty. In the absence of
such provisions, the Court shall apply the rules of international law. If no generally
recognized rule exists, the Court shall give judgment in accordance with the general
principles of justice and equity. The above provisions apply equally to questions relating
to the order and mode of proof. If, in accordance with Article 3, No. 2(c), the ground of
appeal is the violation of an enactment issued by the belligerent captor, the Court will
enforce the enactment. The Court may disregard failure to comply with the procedure laid
down in the enactments of the belligerent captor, when it is of opinion that the of
complying therewith are unjust and inequitable”
https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/70c1fd/pdf/
[7]Permanent Court of Arbitration Russia claim for interest on indemnities (Damages
claimed by Russia for delay in payment of compensation owed to Russian injured during
the war of 1877-1878 )
http://www.worldcourts.com/pca/eng/decisions/1912.11.11_Russia_v_Turkey.pdf
Consultado 29.3.2019
[8] Cornell Law Review Volume 36 Issue 1Fall 1950.Article Arbitration Between the
Lena Goldfields
https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1582&context=clr
[9]Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Ltd. v. Sheikh of Abu Dhabi (1951) 18 I.L.R.
144
https://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/vdc_100033359270.0x000014
[10]“Let us therefore no longer hesitate, I would put in this appeal all the ardour and all
the foresight that my mind as a jurisconsult gives me - to insert, amongst the principles to
be followed by the judge in the solution of the dispute submitted to him, the law of
objective justice, at any rate in so far as it has twofold confirmation of the concurrent
teachings of jurisconsults of authority and of the public conscience of civilised nations.
On the threshold of the Palace of Peace where we meet daily there is a mosaic bearing the
inscription Sol Iustitiae Ilustra Nos. Let us draw inspiration and encouragement from this,
and let us recognise that the conception of justice and injustice as indelibly written on the
hearts of civilised peoples, and with the two additional guarantees that I would give it, is
not only the element par excellence making for progress in international law, but an
indispensable. Complement to the application of law, and as such essential to the judge in
the performance of the great task entrusted to him.” Annex No. I., Speech by Baron
Descamps on the Rules of Law to be applied, Proces-Verbaux Proceedings of the
Committee June 16 July 21, 1920, with annexes La Have Van Langen huysen Freres-
Pages. 324 -325. 796 Pages , 1920
[11]Lord Phillimore considered the President’s speech. The latter had quoted the case of
the California Pious Funds, in which sentence had been rendered in accordance with a
principle of common law: res judicata. This was a principle which had the same character
of laws any written law. Generally speaking, all the principles of common law are
applicable to international affairs. They are in fact part of international law. En: 14h
meeting (Private), held at the Peace Palace, the Hague, on July 2nd, Proces-Verbaux
Proceedings of the Committee June 16 July 21, 1920, with annexes La Have Van Langen
huysen Freres. 796 Pages.Page 316. 1920.
[12] European Convention on Human Rights. Article 7 No punishment without law1. No
one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which
did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time when
it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was
applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed.2. This Article shall not
prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the
time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law
recognised by civilised nations
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf
Sobre la reducción del ámbito del Principio Nullum Crimen
Tomuschat Chrsitian ,The Legacy of Nuremberg ..Journalof InternationalVolume 4Pages
830-8442006
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/73dc/c55d3a1ccadf9f8bb2202e5739c9cfd982b8.pdf
[13]Artículo 9 En toda elección, los electores tendrán en cuenta no sólo que las personas
que hayan de elegirse reúnan individualmente las condiciones re-queridas, sino también
que en el conjunto estén representadas. las grandes civilizaciones y los principales
sistemas jurídicos del mundo
https://www.icj-cij.org/files/statute-of-the-court/statute-of-the-court-es.pdf
[14] Artículo38 l. La Corte, cuya función es decidir conforme al derecho internacional las
controversias que le sean sometidas, deberá aplicar: a. las convenciones internacionales,
sean generales o particulares, que establecen reglas expresamente reconocidas por los
Estados litigantes; h. la costumbre internacional como. prueba de una práctica
generalmente aceptada como derecho; c. los principios generales de derecho reconocidos
por las naciones civilizadas;
https://www.icj-cij.org/files/statute-of-the-court/statute-of-the-court-es.pdf
[15]Publications of the Permanent court of International Justice Series A - No. 6 August
25th, 1925 Collection of Judgments
Case concerning certain German interests in Polish Upper Silesia,
https://www.icj-cij.org/files/permanent-court-of-international-
justice/serie_A/A_06/16_Interets_allemands_en_Haute_Silesie_polonaise_Competence_
Arret.pdf
[16] Publications of the Permanent court of International Justice Series A – N. I7 Le 13
September 1928 Recueil Des Arrets No 13 Affaire Relative a l’Usine de Chorzow
(Demande en Indemite’) (Fond),
justice/serie_A/A_17/54_Usine_de_Chorzow_Fond_Arret.pdf
[17]Publications of the Permanent court of International Justice Séries A - N. I7 Le 13
September 1928 Recueil Des Arrêts No 13 Affaire Relative a l’Usine de Chorzów
(Demande en Indemnité) (Fond) Page 47,
[18]Cour Internationale de Justice recueil des Arrêts avis consultatifs et ordonnances
affaire du Detroit de Corfou (Fond) Arrêt du 9 Avril 1949, en :
https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/1/001-19490409-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf
affaire du Detroit de Corfou (Fond) Arrêt du 9 Avril 1949, Page 22
réserves a la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide avis
consultatif du 28 mai 1951, en :
https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/12/012-19510528-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf
réserves a la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide avis
consultatif du 28 mai 1951, Page. 12,
[22]International Court of Justice reports of judgments, advisor, opinions and orders legal
consequences for States of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia (South
West Africa) notwithstanding security council Resolution 276 (1970) advisory opinion of
21 June 1971,
[23]International Court of Justice reports of judgments, advisor, opinions and orders legal
consequences for States of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia (South
West Africa) notwithstanding security council Resolution 276 (1970) advisory opinion of
21 June 1971, Page 42,
[24]Cour Permanentede Justice InternationaleSérie A - N" 10Le 7 septembre 1927
Recueil des Arrets Affaire du Lotus
justice/serie_A/A_10/30_Lotus_Arret.pdf
[25]Case ConcerningRight of Passage Over Indian TerrritoryPortugal vs IndiaMerits
Judgment 12 April1960. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Fernandes Pag 140.
[26]International Courtof Justice Reports of Judgments Advisory Opinionsand
OrdersSouth West Africa CasesEthiopia v South Africa .Liberiav South Africa Second
PhaseJudgment of 18 July1966. DissentingOpinionof Judge Tanaka
[27]International Courtof Justice Reports of Judgments Advissory Opinionsand
OrdersSouth West Africa CasesEthiopia v South Africa .Liberiav South Africa Second
PhaseJudgment of 18 July1966DissentingOpinionof Judge Tanaka, page. 299 – 300,
Consultado . 23.3.2019.
[28]International Court of Justice Reports of Judgments Advisory Opinions and Orders
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases Federal Republic of Germany//Denmark, Federal
Republic of Germany /Netherlands Judgment of 20 February 1969 Dissident Opinion
Lachs, Pages. 228 -229.
https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/51/051-19690220-JUD-01-10-BI.pdf
[29] Cour Internationale de Justice Recueil des arrêts, avis consultatifs et ordonnances
affaire Nottebohm (Liechtenstein vs Guatemala) Deuxième phase arrêt du 6 avril 1955,
Page. 24.
Consultado 24.3.2019
[30]Publications of the Permanent Court of International Justice, February 21st, 1925
Collection of advisory opinions exchange of Greek and Turkish populations (Lausanne
Convention VI January, 1923, article 2),
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if.pdf
[31]Publications of the Permanent Court of International Justice, February 21st, 1925
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if.pdf
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[32]Publications of the Permanent Court of International Justice. Series A 2 August 30th,
1924, Collection of Judgments the Mavrommatis Palestine Concession, Dissenting
opinion by Mr. Moore, Pages 27-28.
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[33]Affaire relative à certains intérêts allemands en Haute Silésie polonaise. Publications
of the Permanent Court of International JusticeSeries A - No. 6 August 25th, 6925
Collections of judgments case concerning certain German interests in polish Upper
Silesia, pag.19,
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Arret.pdf
Consultado25.3.2019,
[34]Publications of the Permanent Court of International Justice. November 21st, 1925,
Collections of advisory opinions article 3, paragraph 2 of the Treaty of Lausanne
(Frontier between Turkey and Iraq.
justice/serie_B/B_12/01_Article_3_du_traite_de_Lausanne_Avis_consultatif.pdf
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[35]Publications of the Permanent Court of International Justice. November 21st, 1925
Collections of advisory opinions article 3, paragraph 2 of the Treaty of Lausanne
(Frontier between Turkey y Iraq), nº 12 Pages. 31 and 32,
justice/serie_B/B_12/01_Article_3_du_traite_de_Lausanne_Avis_consultatif.pd
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[36]Publications of the Permanent Court of International Justice, Series B.-No. 76 August
28th, '1928 Collections of advisory opinions Interpretation of the Greco - Turkish
agreement of December lst, 1926, Final protocol, article T IV, pag 20,
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[37]Affaire relative a (Demande en indemnité) (Compétence), Publications of the
Permanent Court of International Justice Series A, No. 9 July 26th, 1927
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Consultado 233. 2019.
[38]Publications of the Permanent Court of International Justice. Series A. - No. 9 July
26th, 1927 Collection of judgements case concerning the Factory at Chorzow (Claim for
indemnity) (Jurisdiction), Pages. 30-31
[39] Publications of the Permanent Court of International Justice. Series A.-No. 70
September 7th, 1927 Collection of judgements the case of the S.S. "Lotus"
September 7th, 1927 Collection of judgements the case of the S.S. "Lotus",
September 7th, 1927 Collection of judgements the case of the S.S. "Lotus", Page. 31.
indemnity) (Jurisdiction).
https://www.icj-cij.org/files/permanent-court-of-international
Publications of the Permanent Court of International Justice. Series A. - No. 9 July 26th,
1927 Collection of judgements case concerning the Factory at Chorzow (Claim for
indemnity) (Jurisdiction), Page 47.
Publications of the Permanent Court of International Justice. Series A. - No. 9 July 26th,
1927 Collection of judgements case concerning the Factory at Chorzow (Claim for
indemnity) (Jurisdiction), Page. 29.
indemnity) (Jurisdiction)
[44] Permanent Court of International Justice Series A. 1 B. Judgements, orders and
advisory opinions Fascicule No. 62 Lighthouses case between France and Greece 17
March 1934
justice/serie_AB/AB_62/01_Affaire_des_phares_Arret.pdf
[45]Permanent Court of International Justice Series A. 1 B. Judgements, orders and
advisory opinions Fascicule No. 62 Lichthouses case between France and Greece,
Page18,
justice/serie_AB/AB_62/01_Affaire_des_phares_Arret.pdf
[46]Opinion individuelle de M. Seferiades,
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[47]Publications de la cour permanente de justice internationale recueil des arrêts affaire
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paiement en or, des emprunts fédéraux brésiliens émis en France. Publications of the
Permanent Court of International Justice. Collection of judgements, case concerning the
payment of various Serbian loans issued in France, case concerning the payment in gold
of the Brazilian federal loans issued in France (July 12). 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) Nos. 20,
21, pag. 5.
justice/serie_A/A_20/62_Emprunts_Serbes_Arret.pdf
[48]Publications de la cour permanente de justice internationale recueil des arrêts affaire
paiement en or des emprunts fédéraux brésiliens émis en France. Publications of the
21, Pages 38-40.
[49] Publications de la cour permanente de justice internationale recueil des arrêts affaire
paiement en or, des emprunts fédéraux brésiliens émis en France. Publications of the
21, Pages. 114,115,
Consultado 24.3.2019 .
[50]Publications of the Permanent Court of International Justice. Series B - NO 77 July
31st, 1930 Collections of advisory opinions the Greco – Bulgarian communities, Pages.
32 – 33,
justice/serie_B/B_17/01_Communautes_greco-bulgares_Avis_consultatif.pdf
[51]Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale série A/B arrêta, ordonnances et avis
consultatifs fascicule No 44, Traitement des nationaux polonais et des autres personnes
d’origine ou de Langue polonaise dans le territoire de Dantzig avis consultatif du 4
février 1932 XXIIl Session, Pages. 24,
justice/serie_AB/AB_44/01_Traitement_nationaux_polonais_Avis_consultatif.pdf
[52]Collections of Advisory opinions Fascicule No. 44 Treatment of Polish Nationals and
other persons of Polish origin or speech in the Danzig Territory, page 24,
justice/serie_AB/AB_44/01_Traitement_nationaux_polonais_Avis_consultatif.pdf
[53] XXVI th Sessions judgement of April 5th, 1933 Permanent Court of Justice Series,
A/B, Judgements orders and advisory opinions, fascicule No. 53 Legal Status of Eastern
Greenland.
justice/serie_AB/AB_53/01_Groenland_Oriental_Arret.pdf
[54] XXVI th Sessions judgement of April 5th, 1933 Permanent Court of Justice Series,
A/B, Judgements orders and advisory opinions, fascicule No. 53 Legal Status of Eastern
Greenland, pag. 68-69 en:
justice/serie_AB/AB_53/01_Groenland_Oriental_Arret.pdf
[55] Order of December 5th, 1939 Permanent Court of international Justice Series A/B
Judgements, orders and advisory opinions fascicule, No. 79, the electricity Company of
Sofia and Bulgaria (Interim Measures of protection Belgium Vs Bulgaria),
justice/serie_AB/AB_79/Compagnie_d_electricite_de_Sofia_ordonnance_19391205.pdf
[56]Order of December 5th, 1939 Permanent Court of international Justice Series A/B
Judgements, orders and advisory opinions fascicule, No. 79, the electricity Company of
Sofia and Bulgaria (Interim Measures of protection Belgium Vs Bulgaria), Page 199,
justice/serie_AB/AB_79/Compagnie_d_electricite_de_Sofia_ordonnance_19391205.pdf
[57]International Court of Justice reports of Judgements, advisory opinions and orders
case concerning the temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) Merits Judgements
of 15 June 1962, page 6-23,
[58] International Court of Justice reports of Judgements, advisory opinions and orders
case concerning the temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) Merits. Judgements
of 15 June 1962, Page. 23,
[59]Dissenting opinion of Sir Percy Spender, Page. 130
[60]Dissenting opinion of Sir Percy Spender, Page. 141
[61] International Court of Justice reports of Judgements, advisory opinions and orders,
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Los principios generales del derecho: naturaleza y aplicación por la Corte

Permanente de Justicia Internacional y la Corte Internacional de Justicia

Por Hernando V. Cañardo(*)

In Memoriam Gabriel R, Diluise.1959-2019

El término Principios Generales del Derecho presenta para su definición ciertas

Los Principios, frente a determinadosconflictos y realidades, pueden otorgar una base

II.Naturalezay Evolución de los Principios Generales del Derecho

Los principios generales se conocían y habían sido objeto de atención en Tratados y

También lo hizo en la Opinión Consultiva sobre las Reservas a la Convención del

La Corte rechazóel requisito o test de verificación de aceptación universal en el Caso de

III.Los Principios Generales del Derecho en la Jurisprudencia de la Corte Permanente

En el Caso de las Concesiones de Mavromatis, el Juez Hudson en su voto disidente dejó

Sin especificar la basepara la afirmación del principio, la Corte en su Opinión Consultiva

En el Caso de la Fábrica de Chorzow [37] también mencionóprincipios generales como el

Por su parte, en el Caso de la Fábrica de Chorzow,[42] en referencia a reclamos por

En su Opinión disidente el Juez Séfériadès también reafirmó el principio de la buena fe:

También se trató allí, la fuerza mayor o imposibilidad de cumplimiento:

En el Caso que lo acompañaba, referido a los Préstamos Brasileros, la Corte aceptó el

En su Opinión Consultiva sobre las Comunidades Greco - búlgaras vuelve a presentarse

En el caso de la Compañía de Electricidad de Sofía y Bulgaria (Medidas Cautelares)[55] se

IV.Los Principios Generales del Derecho en la Jurisprudencia de la Corte Internacional

En su Opinión Disidente el Juez Sir Percy Spender discurre sobre el principio,

En la Opinión Consultiva sobre el Sahara Occidental se examina la existencia del

Sin embargo, en el Caso del Derecho de PasoIndia y Portugal frente a la afirmación de la

El Juez Caicedo Castilla en su Opinión Disidente en el Caso del Asilomenciona los

Más recientemente, en la Opinión Consultiva sobre la Amenaza o Uso de las Armas

[64]Cour internationale de justice recueil des arrêts, avis consultatif et ordonnances

Citar: elDial DC28C7

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