IV.

LOCAL OFFICIALS
A. Provisions applicable to Elective and Appointive Local Officials
Cases:

1. Republic of the Philippines v. Rambuyong (G.R. No. 167810, 04 October 2010)

FACTS:
Alfredo
against Y.
theChu (Chu)Power
National filed aCorporation
case for collection of a sumasofCivil
(NPC) docketed money and/or
Case damages
No. I-197 which
was raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, Branch 24;
appearing as counsel for Chu is Atty. Richard B. Rambuyong (Atty. Rambuyong) who
was then the incumbent Vice-Mayor of Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

Thereafter, NPC filed a Motion for Inhibition of Atty. Rambuyong arguing that under
Section 90(b), (1) of Republic Act (RA) No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code, sanggunian members are prohibited “to appear as counsel before
any court wherein x x x any office, agency or instrumentality of the government is the
adverse party.” NPC contended that being a government -owned or controlled
corporation, it is embraced within the term, “instrumentality.”

ISSUE:
Whether NPC is an instrumentality of government such that Atty. Rambuyong, as a
Sanggunian member, should not appear as counsel against it

HELD:
Section 2 of the Administrative Code of 1987 is clear and unambiguous. It categorically
provides that the term “instrumentality” includes government -owned or -controlled
corporations. Hence there is no room for construction. All that has to be done is to apply
the law as called for by the circumstances of the case.
Wherefore, pursuant to Sec. 90(b) (1) of the Local Government Code, Atty.
Rambuyong, as Sanggunian member, cannot appear as counsel of a party adverse to
the NPC, which is an instrumentality of government.
2. Catu v. Rellosa (A.C. No. 5738, 19 February 2008)

FACTS:
Complainant Wilfredo Catu is a co-owner of a lot and building erected at Malate, Manila.
With his mother and brother, contested the possession of Elizabeth Catu and Antonio
Pastor of one of the units in the building. The latter ignored demands to vacate the
premises. Thus, a complaint was initiated against them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa in
their barangay.
Respondent Atty Vicente Rellosa, as Punong Barangay summoned the parties to
conciliation meetings. But the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, thus,
respondent issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court.
Thereafter, Catu's mother and brother filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth
and Pastor in the MTC. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the
defendants in that case. Because of this, complainant filed the instant administrative
complaint. The complaint was referred to the IBP for investigation. IBP found sufficient
ground to discipline respondent.

According to IBP, Respondent admitted that as punong barangay he presided over the
conciliation proceeding, however, he represented the defendants in the ejectment case
filed against them, and by doing so he violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Furthermore, as an elective official, he contravened the prohibition under
Section 7 (b)(2) of R.A. 6713 ( The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees).

"Sec. 7 Prohibited Acts and Transactions- In addition to acts and omissions of

public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the
following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public officials and
employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
XXX XXX XXX
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto.- Public officials and
employees during their incumbency shall not:
XXX XXX XXX
(2) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or
law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official
functions; XXX"

The IBP recommended the respondent's suspension from the practice of law for one
month with stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act will be dealt
with more severely. This was adopted by the IBP Board of Governors.

ISSUE: WON the respondent can represent the defendant in the ejectment case while
he is an incumbent public official.
HELD:

The SC ruled that respondent cannot be found liable for violation of rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. As worded, that Rule applies only to a lawyer who
has left government service and in connection "with any matter in which he intervened
while in said service". Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he
committed the act complained of. Therefore, he was not covered by that provision.

The SC also ruled that Section 7(b)(2) of R.A 6713 is a general law which applies to all
public officials and employees. Thus, it is not applicable to the case at bar. However,
Section 90 of R.A. 7160 (The Local Government Code of 1992) governs the practice of
profession of elective local government officials. This is a special law with definite
scope, it constitutes an exception to Section 7(b)(2) of R.A 6713. Accordingly, the
respondent as punong barangay was not forbidden to practice his profession. However,
he should have procured prior permission or authorization from the head of his
Department, as required by the civil service regulations as stated in Section 12, Rule
XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules.

In acting as counsel for a party without first securing a written permission, respondent
not only engaged in the unauthorized practice of law but also violated civil service rules
which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Atty. Vicente Rellosa is therefore suspended from the practice of law for a period of 6
months and sternly warned that any repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely.
3. Flores v. Drilon (G.R. No. 104732, 22June 1993)

FACTS:
The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227,otherwise known as the "Bases
Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under which respondent Mayor Richard J.
Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is challenged with prayer for prohibition,
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. Paragraph (d) reads
—
(d) Chairman administrator — The President shall appoint a professional manager as
administrator of the Subic Authority with a compensation to be determined by the Board
subject to the approval of the Secretary of Budget, who shall be theex oficio chairman
of the Board and who shall serve as the chief executive officer of the Subic Authority:
Provided, however, That for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act,
the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief
executive officer of the Subic Authority .

Petitioners maintain that such infringes to the constitutional provision of Sec. 7, first
par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states that "no elective official shall be eligible
for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public officer or position during his
tenure," The petitioners also contend that Congress encroaches upon the discretionary
power of the President to appoint.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the proviso in Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 is constitutional.

HELD:
The proviso violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation
of elective officials to other government posts.

In full, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution provides:

No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any
public office or position during his tenure.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no
appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

In the case at bar, the subjectproviso directs the President to appoint an elective official,
i.e., the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government posts (as Chairman of the Board
and Chief Executive Officer of SBMA). Since this is precisely what the constitutional
proscription seeks to prevent, there is no doubt to conclude that the proviso
contravenes Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution.
The appointment of Gordon as Chairman of the SBMA is null. However, despite his
appointment to the said office, Gordon did not automatically forfeit his seat as Mayor of
Olongapo City.

Thus, respondent Gordon remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA
official are not necessarily null and void; he may be considered ade facto officer who
may retain the benefits he may receive from the position he may have assumed.
B. Elective Local Officials
Cases:

4. Jalosjos v. Comelec (G.R. Nos. 193237/193536, 09 October 2012)

FACTS:
On November 16, 2001, the Court promulgated its Decision convicting petitioner by final
judgment.
perpetua Consequently,
and reclusion he was sentenced
temporal to suffer
for each count,therespectively,
principal penalties
whichofcarried
reclusion
the
accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification pursuant to Article 41 of the
Revised Penal Code. On April 30, 2007, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
issued an order commuting his prison term to sixteen (16) years, three (3) months and
three (3) days.

On April 26, 2012, petitioner applied to register as a voter in Zamboanga City. However,
because of his previous conviction, his application was denied by the Acting City
Election Officer of the Election Registration Board (ERB), prompting him to file a Petition
for Inclusion in the Permanent List of Voters before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of
Zamboanga City. Pending resolution of the same, he filed a CoC on October 5, 2012,
seeking to run as mayor for Zamboanga City in the upcoming local elections scheduled
on May 13, 2013. In his CoC, petitioner stated, inter alia, that he is eligible for the said
office and that he is a registered voter of Barangay Tetuan, Zamboanga City.

On October 18, 2012,the MTCC denied his Petition for Inclusion on account of his
perpetual absolute disqualification which in effect, deprived him of the right to vote in
any election. Such denial was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court in its Order which,
pursuant to Section 138 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881, as amended, otherwise known
as the "Omnibus Election Code" (OEC), was immediately final and executory.

The COMELEC En Banc issued motu proprio Resolution No. 9613 on January 15,
2013, resolving "to CANCEL and DENY due course the Certificate of Candidacy filed by
Romeo G. Jalosjos as Mayor of Zamboanga City in the May 13, 2013 National and
Local Elections" due to his perpetual absolute disqualification as well as his failure to
comply with the voter registration requirement.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner's perpetual absolute disqualification to run for elective office
had already been removed by Section 40 (a) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise
known as the "Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC).

HELD:
Decision of the appellate court is affirmed.

The petitioner was sentenced to suffer the principal penalties of reclusion perpetua and
reclusion temporal which, pursuant to Article 41 of the RPC, carried with it the
accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification and in turn, pursuant to Article
30 of the RPC, disqualified him to run for elective office.

Section 40 (a) of the LGC would not apply to cases wherein a penal provision such as
Article 41 in this case directly and specifically prohibits the convict from running for
elective office. Hence, despite the lapse of two (2) years from petitioner's service of his
commuted prison term, he remains bound to suffer the accessory penalty of perpetual
absolute
Zamboangadisqualification which consequently, disqualifies him to run as mayor
City.for
5. Jalosjos v. Comelec (G.R. No. 205033, 18 June 2013)
6. Aratea v. Comelec (G.R. No. 195229, 09 October 2012)

FACTS:
Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida) and Estela D. Antipolo (Antipolo) were candidates for
Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010 National and Local Elections. Dra.
Sigrid S. Rodolfo (Rodolfo) filed a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code to disqualify Lonzanida and to deny due course or to cancel Lonzanida’s
certificate
mayor of Sanof candidacy on the ground
Antonio, Zambales that(4)Lonzanida
for four wasterms
consecutive elected, and had prior
immediately served, as
to the
term for the May 2010 elections.
Rodolfo asserted that Lonzanida made a false material representation in his certificate
of candidacy when Lonzanida certified under oath that he was eligible for the office he
sought election. Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and Section 43(b) of the
Local Government Code both prohibit a local elective official from being elected and
serving for more than three consecutive terms for the same position.

The COMELEC Second Division rendered a Resolutionon 18 February 2010 cancelling

Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy.

Lonzanida’s motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc remained

pending during the May 2010 elections. Lonzanida and Efren Racel Aratea (Aratea)
garnered the highest number of votes and were respectively proclaimed Mayor and
Vice-Mayor.

Aratea took his oath of office as Acting Mayor before Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge
of Olongapo. On the same date, Aratea wrote the DILG and requested for an opinion on
whether, as Vice-Mayor, he was legally required to assume the Office of the Mayor in
view of Lonzanida’s disqualification.
DILG stated that Lonzanida was disqualified to hold office by reason of his criminal
conviction, and as a consequence, his office was deemed permanently vacant, and thus,
Aratea should assume the Office of the Mayor in an acting capacity without prejudice to
the COMELEC’s resolution of Lonzanida’s motion for reconsideration.

In another letter dated 6 August 2010, Aratea requested the DILG to allow him to take
the oath of office as Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. In his response, then Secretary
Jesse M. Robredo allowed Aratea to take an oath of office as "the permanent Municipal
Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales without prejudice however to the outcome of the cases
pending before the COMELEC.

On 11 August 2010, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution disqualifying

Lonzanida from running for Mayor in the May 2010 elections. The COMELEC En Banc’s
resolution was based on two grounds:first, Lonzanida had been elected and had served
as Mayor for more than three consecutive terms without interruption; andsecond,
Lonzanida had been convicted by final judgment of 10 counts of falsification under the
Revised Penal Code. Lonzanida was sentenced for each count of falsification to
imprisonment of 4 years and 1 day ofprisión correccional as minimum, to 8 years and 1
day of prisión mayor as maximum. The judgment of conviction became final on 23
October 2009 in the Decision of this Court inLonzanida v. People, before Lonzanida
filed his certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009.

The manner of filling up the permanent vacancy in the Office of the Mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales is dependent upon the determination of Lonzanida’s removal.
Whether Lonzanida was disqualified under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, or
made
in hisa certificate
false material
of representation
candidacy beingunder Section
void 78 of
ab initio same Codethat
thedeterminative
, is ofresulted
whether
Aratea or Antipolo is the rightful occupant to the Office of the Mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales.

HELD:
Antipolo, the alleged "second placer," should be proclaimed Mayor because
Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy was voidab initio. In short, Lonzanida was never a
candidate at all. All votes for Lonzanida were stray votes. Thus, Antipolo, the only
qualified candidate, actually garnered the highest number of votes for the position of
Mayor.

1
The grounds for disqualification for a petition under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code are specifically enumerated.
A petition for disqualification under Section 68 clearly refers to "the commission of
prohibited acts and possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country."All
the offenses mentioned in Section 68 refer to election offenses under the
Omnibus Election Code, not to violations of other penal laws . There is absolutely
nothing in the language of Section 68 that would justify including violation of the three-
term limit rule, or conviction by final judgment of the crime of falsification under the
Revised Penal Code, as one of the grounds or offenses covered under Section 68.

On the other hand, Section 782 of the Omnibus Election Code states that a certificate of
candidacy may be denied or cancelled when there isfalse material representation of
the contents of the certificate of candidacy:

1
Sec. 68. Disqualifications. ‒ Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final
decision by a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material
consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b)
committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; spent
(c) in his election campaign an amount in
excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under
Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and
cc, subparagraph ,6shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the
office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for
any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a
foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.

2
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. ‒ A verified petition seeking to deny due
course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false . The petition may be
filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be
decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code detailsthe contents of the certificate of
candidacy:
Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. ‒ The certificate of candidacy shall
state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein
and that he is eligible for said office x x x
The conviction of Lonzanida by final judgment, with the penalty ofprisión
mayor, disqualifies him perpetually from holding any public office, or from being
elected to the
finality of any judgment
public office This perpetual
of .conviction, disqualification
before tookhis
Lonzanida filed effect upon the
certificate of
candidacy.

The penalty of prisión mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law, the
accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification andperpetual special
disqualification. Under Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code, temporary absolute
disqualification produces the effect of "deprivation of the right to vote in any election for
any popular elective officeor to be elected to such office. ” The duration of temporary
absolute disqualification is the same as that of the principal penalty ofprisión mayor.

On the other hand, under Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code,perpetual special
disqualification means that "the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public
office during the period of his disqualification, ” which is perpetually. Both
temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification constitute
ineligibilities to hold elective public office.
A person suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective public
office, and commits a false material representation if he states in his certificate of
candidacy that he is eligible to so run.

Effect of a Void Certificate of Candidacy

A cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to a valid candidacy,
and much less to valid votes.

As the Comelec stated in their February 2011 Resolution: Since Lonzanida was never a
candidate for the position of Mayor [of] San Antonio, Zambales, the votes cast for him
should be considered stray votes. Consequently, Intervenor Antipolo, who remains as
the sole qualified candidate for the mayoralty post and obtained the highest number of
votes, should now be proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.
Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was ineligible or not
qualified to run for Mayor.1âwphi1Whether his certificate of candidacy is cancelled
before or after the elections is immaterial because the cancellation on such ground
means he was never a candidate from the very beginning, his certificate of candidacy
being void ab initio. There was only one qualified candidate for Mayor in the May 2010
elections - Antipolo, who therefore received the highest number of votes.
Petition dismissed.
7. Japzon v. Comelec (G.R. No. 180088. 19 January 2009)
8. Sobejana-Condon v. Comelec (G.R No. 198742, 10 August 2012)
9. Corodora v. Comelec (GR No. 176947, 19 February 2008)
10. Kida v. Senate of the Philippines (supra)

FACTS:
RA 6734 provided for the organic act mandated by the constitution for the formation of
ARMM. Unfortunately said organic act did not provide for the exact date for the regional
elections in ARMM. Because of this, several Laws were enacted to provide for the date
of the election ; RA 9054- Second Monday of September 2001, RA 9140 —November
26, 2001,
years RA 9333—2nd Monday of August 2005. And on the same date every three
thereafter.

Pursuant to RA 9333, COMELEC made preparations for August 8, 2001 Election but
sometime in June, Congress enacted RA 10153- An act providing for the
synchronization of the elections in ARMM with the national and local elections.

Several people, including herein plaintiff assailed the constitutionality of the said
enactment.

ISSUE/S:

1. WON ARMM is a distinct from an ordinary local government unit and therefore
should not be required to hold its election during the local elections mandated in the
constitution.

2. WON RA. 10153 is constitutional on the basis that it granted the president the
power to appoint OIC for several elective positions until such positions be filled during
the May 2013 elections.

HELD:
1. No ARMM is not a distinct government unit therefore not exempt from the
synchronization of election. SC held that the inclusion of autonomous regions in the
enumeration of political subdivisions of the State under the heading “Local Government”
indicates quite clearly the constitutional intent to consider autonomous regions as one of
the forms of local governments.

That the Constitution mentions only the “national government” and the “local
governments,” and does not make a distinction between the “local government” and the
“regional government,” is particularly revealing, betraying as it does the inten
tion of the
framers of the Constitution to consider the autonomous regions not as separate forms of
government, but as political units which, while having more powers and attributes than
other local government units, still remain under the category of local governments.
Since autonomous regions are classified as local governments, it follows that elections
held in autonomous regions are also considered as local elections.

2. Yes, The Supreme court upheld the constitutionality of RA 10153 stating that there
is no incompatibility between the President’s power of supervision over local
governments and autonomous regions, and the power granted to the President, within
the specific confines of RA No. 10153, to appoint OICs.

The power of supervision is defined as “the power of a superior officer to see to it that
lower officers perform their functions in accordance with law.” This is distinguished from
the power of control or “the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for the latter.”

The petitioners’ apprehension regarding the President’s alleged power of control over
the OICs is rooted in their belief that the President’s appointm
ent power includes the
power to remove these officials at will. In this way, the petitioners foresee that the
appointed OICs will be beholden to the President, and act as representatives of the
President and not of the people.

Section 3 of RA No. 10153 expressly contradicts the petitioners’ supposition. The

provision states:
Section 3. Appointment of Officers-in-Charge.— The President shall appoint officers-in-
charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members
of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the
said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified
and assumed office.
The wording of the law is clear. Once the President has appointed the OICs for the
offices of the Governor, Vice Governor and members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly, these same officials will remain in office until they are replaced by the duly
elected officials in the May 2013 elections. Nothing in this provision even hints that the
President has the power to recall the appointments he already made. Clearly, the
petitioners’ fears in this regard are more apparent than real.
11. Abundo v. Commission on Elections (GR No. 201716, 08 January 2013)

FACTS:
For four (4) successive regular elections, namely, the 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010
national and local elections, Petitioner Abelardo Abundo, Sr. (Abundo) vied for the
position of municipal mayor. In both the 2001 and 2007 runs, he emerged and was
proclaimed
corresponding asterms
the as
winning
mayor. mayoralty candidate
In the 2004 electoral and
derby,accordingly
however, the served the
municipal
board of canvassers initially proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres (Torres), who, in
due time, performed the functions of the office of mayor. Abundo protested Torres
election and proclamation. Abundo was eventually declared the winner of the 2004
mayoralty electoral contest, paving the way for his assumption of office starting May 9,
2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007, or for a period of a little
over one year and one month. Then came the May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo
and Torres again opposed each other. When Abundo filed his certificate of candidacy
for the mayoralty seat relative to this electoral contest, Torres sought the formers
disqualification to run.

The RTC declared Abundo as ineligible, under the three-term limit rule, to run in the
2010 elections for the position of, and necessarily to sit as, mayor. In its Resolution, the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second Division affirmed the decision of RTC,
which affirmed by COMELEC en banc.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Abundo has consecutively served for three terms.

HELD:
The petition is partly meritorious.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Involuntary Interruption of Service

The consecutiveness of what otherwise would have been Abundos three successive,
continuous mayorship was effectively broken during the 2004- 2007 term when he was
initially deprived of title to, and was veritably disallowed to serve and occupy, an office
to which he, after due proceedings, was eventually declared to have been the rightful
choice of the electorate.

The declaration of being the winner in an election protest grants the local elected official
the right to serve the unexpired portion of the term. Verily, while he was declared winner
in the protest for the mayoralty seat for the 2004-2007 term, Abundos full term has been
substantially reduced by the actual service rendered by his opponent (Torres). Hence,
there was actual involuntary interruption in the term of Abundo and he cannot be
considered to have served the full 2004-2007 term.

Prior to the finality of the election protest, Abundo did not serve in the mayors office
and, in fact, had no legal right to said position. During the pendency of the election
protest, Abundo ceased from exercising power or authority. Consequently, the period
during which Abundo was not serving as mayor should be considered as a rest period
or break in his service because prior to the judgment in the election protest, it was
Abundos opponent, Torres, who was exercising such powers by virtue of the still then
valid proclamation.
Petition is PARTLY GRANTED.
12. Borja v. Comelec (G.R. No. 133495, 03 September 1998)
13. Aldovino v. Comelec (G.R. No. 184836, 23 December 2009)
14. Adormeo v. Comelec (G.R. No. 147927, 04 February 2002)
15. Socrates v. Comelec (G.R. No. 154512, 12 November 2002)

FACTS:
COMELEC gave due course to the Recall Resolution against Mayor Socrates of the
City of Puerto Princesa, and scheduled the recall election on September 7, 2002.

On August 23, 2002, Hagedorn filed his COC for mayor in the recall election.
Different petitioners
disqualification filed their to
of Hagedorn respective petitions,
run for the recall which were
election andconsolidated seeking
the cancellation of the
his
COC on the ground that the latter is disqualified from running for a fourth consecutive
term, having been elected and having served as mayor of the city for three (3)
consecutive full terms in 1992, 1995 and 1998 immediately prior to the instant recall
election for the same post.
COMELEC’s First Division dismissed in a resolution the petitioner for lack of merit. And
COMELEC declared Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election.

ISSUE:
WON one who has been elected and served for 3 consecutive full terms is qualified to
run for mayor in the recall election.

HELD:
Yes. The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of
the Constitution, which states:

“Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangayofficials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length
of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the
full term for which he was elected.”

This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160, otherwise known
as the Local Government Code, which provides:

“Section 43. Term of Office. –(a) x x x

(b) No local elective official shall servefor more than three (3) consecutive terms in the
same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the
elective official was elected.”

The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three
consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in
determining the three-term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation
of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear
intent is that involuntary severance from office for any leng th of time interrupts
continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the interruption from
being joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms.
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate re-
election for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the nextregular election for
the same office following the end of the third consecutive term. Anys ubs equent
election , like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two
reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate re-
election after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an
involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.
Based from the deliberations of a Constitutional Commission, what the Constitution
prohibits is an immediate re-election for a fourth term following three consecutive
terms. The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent re-election for a
fourth term as long as the re-election is not immediately after the end of the third
consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the term following the third consecutive
term is a subsequent election but not an immediate re-election after the third term.

Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate re-election to
run in any other subsequent election involving the same term of office. What the
Constitution prohibits is aconsecutive fourth term.

In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September 24, 2002 is
not an immediate re-election after his third consecutive term which ended on June 30,
2001. The immediate re-election that the Constitution barred Hagedorn from seeking
referred to the regular elections in 2001.
16. Latasa v. Comelec (G.R. No. 154829, 10 December 2003)
17. Ong v. Alegre (G.R. No. 163295, 23 January 2006)
18. Mendoza v. Comelec (G.R. No. 149736, 17 December 2002)
19. Rivera III v. Comelec (G.R. No. 167591, 09 May 2007)

FACTS:
A petition for cancelation of the Certificate of Candidacy of Marino Morales as mayoralty
candidate in Mabalacat, Pampanga for the May 2004 mayoralty was filed on the ground
the he already served three consecutive terms in the office he seeks to run.

st
Morales
term) andargues that this
2004-2007 (3rd is not so
term), hebecause although
was merely he really
a caretaker or served
de factoinmayor
1995-1998 (1
in 1998-
nd
2001(2 term) because his election was declared void by the RTC due to an election
protest.

Comelec ruled that Morales already served his third term and after an MR was filed,
declared it final and executory on May 14, 2004.

ISSUE:
WON Morales had already served his 3 consecutive terms and if so, who should take
his position.

HELD:
For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or
requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three
(3) consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully
served three (3) consecutive terms.

Here, Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001. He assumed the
position. He served as mayor until June 30, 2001. He was mayor for the entire period
notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the electoral protest case filed by petitioner
Dee ousting him (respondent) as mayor. Such circumstance does not constitute an
interruption in serving the full term.

Whether as "caretaker" or "de facto" officer, he exercises the powers and enjoys the
prerequisites of the office which enables him "to stay on indefinitely".

With regard to the person who will replace Morales, it is a rule that the ineligibility of a
candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the
next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate
cannot be deemed elected to the office.

Since his disqualification became final and executory after the elections, the candidate
having the second highest number of votes cannot assume the position. Hence, it is the
petitioner, the elected Vice Mayor Anthony Dee who should be declared as the mayor.
20. Dizon v. Comelec (G.R. No. 182088, 30 January 2009)

FACTS:
Roberto L. Dizon, a resident and taxpayer of Mabalacat, Pampanga, filed a case with
the COMELEC to disqualify Marino P. Morales, the incumbent mayor of Mabalacat on
the ground that the latter was elected and had fully served three previous consecutive
terms in violation of Section 43 of the Local Government Code. Dizon alleged that
Morales wasallowed
have been municipal mayorfiled
to have in 1995, 1998, 2001
his Certificate ofand 2004. Thus,
Candidacy Morales
on March should
2007 not
for the
same position and same municipality.

Morales, on the other hand, contended that he is still eligible and qualified to run as
mayor of Mabalacat because he was not elected for the said position in the 1998
elections. He averred that the COMELEC en banc affirmed the decision of the RTC
declaring Anthony D. Dee as the duly elected Mayor of Mabalacat in the 1998 elections.
Thus, he was not elected for the said position in the 1998 elections. His term should be
reckoned from 2001. He added that his election in 2004 is only for his second term.

COMELEC Second Division ruled in favor of Morales and denied the petition. It took
judicial notice of SC’s ruling in the Rivera case promulgated on May 9, 2007 where it
was held that Morales was elected as mayor of Mabalacat in 1995, 1998 and 2001
(notwithstanding the RTC Decision in an electoral protest case that the then
proclamation of Morales was void). The SC ruled in that case that Morales violated the
three-term limit under Section 43 of the LGC. Hence, Morales was considered not a
candidate in the 2004 elections, and this failure to qualify for the 2004 elections is a gap
and allows him to run again for the same position in 2007 elections.

Dizon filed a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc. COMELEC En
Banc: affirmed. The three-term limit is not applicable here for: 1) Morales was not the
duly-elected mayor of Mabalacat for the July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007 term primordially
because he was not even considered a candidate thereat; and 2) Morales has failed to
serve the entire duration of the term of office because he has already relinquished the
disputed office on May 16, 2007 which is more than a month prior to the end of his
supposed term.

ISSUES:
1. WON the period served by Morales in the 2004-2007 term (although he was ousted
from his office as Mayor on May16, 2007) should be considered his fourth term

2. WON the 2007-2010 term of Morales is his 5th term

HELD:

1. NO. In our decision promulgated on 9 May 2007, this Court unseatedMorales during
his fourth term. We cancelled his Certificate of Candidacy dated 30 December 2003.
This cancellation disqualified Morales from being a candidate in the May 2004 elections.
The votes cast for Morales were considered stray votes.

Both
CodeArticle X, Section
state that 8 ofofthe
the term Constitution
office andlocal
of elective Section 43(b)except
officials, of the Local Government
barangay officials,
shall be three years, and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.

There should be a concurrence of two conditions for the application of the

disqualification: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive
terms in the same local government post and (2) that he has fully served three
consecutive terms.

In the Rivera case, we found that Morales was elected as mayor of Mabalacat for four
consecutive terms: 1 July 1995 to 30 June 1998, 1 July 1998 to 30 June 2001, 1 July
2001 to 30 June 2004, and 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2007. We disqualified Morales from
his candidacy in the May 2004 elections because of the three-term limit. Although the
trial court previously ruled that Morales’ proclamation for the 1998
-2001 term was void,
there was no interruption of the continuity of Morales’ service with respect to the 1998
-
2001 term because the trial court’s ruling was promulgated only on 4 July 2001, or after
the expiry of the 1998-2001 term.

Our ruling in the Rivera case served as Morales’ involuntary severance from office with
respect to the 2004-2007 term. Involuntary severance from office for any length of time
short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service.
Our decision in the Rivera case was promulgated on 9 May 2007 and was effective
immediately. The next day, Morales notified the vice mayor’s office of our decision. The
vice mayor assumed the office of the mayor from 17 May 2007 up to 30 June 2007. The
assumption by the vice mayor of the office of the mayor, no matter how short it may
seem to Dizon, interrupted Morales’ continuity o f service. Thus, Morales did not hold
th
office for the full term of 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2007. (4 term)

2. Dizon claims that the 2007-2010 term is Morales’ fifth term in office. NO. Morales
occupied the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the following periods:

1 July 1995 to 30 June 1998

1 July 1998 to 30 June 2001
1 July 2001 to 30 June 2004, and
1 July 2004 to 16 May 2007.
However, because of his disqualification, Morales was not the duly elected mayor for
the 2004-2007 term. Neither did Morales hold the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the
full term. Morales cannot be deemed to have served the full term of 2004-2007 because
he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. Morales’ occupancy
of the position of mayor of Mabalacat from 1 July 2004 to 16 May 2007 cannot be
counted as a term for purposes of computing the three-term limit. Indeed, the period
from
rule. 17 Maythe
Thus, 2007 to 30 1June
present July2007
2007served as a gap
to 30June 2010forterm
purposes of the three-term
is effectively limit
Morales’ first
term for purposes of the three-term limit rule.

● Dizon alleges that Morales "was able to serve his fourth term as mayor through
lengthy litigations. In other words, he was violating the rule on three-term limit with
impunity by the sheer length of litigation and profit from it even more by raising the
technicalities arising therefrom." To this, we quote our ruling in Lonzanida v. COMELEC:

“The respondents harp on the delay in resolving the election protest be

tween petitioner
and his then opponent Alvez which took roughly about three years and resultantly
extended the petitioner’s incumbency in an office to which he was not lawfully elected.
We note that such delay cannot be imputed to the petitioner. There is neither specific
allegation nor proof that the delay was due to any political maneuvering on his part to
prolong his stay in office. Moreover, protestant Alvez, was not without legal recourse to
move for the early resolution of the election protest while it was pending before the
regional trial court or to file a motion for the execution of the regional trial court’s
decision declaring the position of mayor vacant and ordering the vice-mayor to assume
office while the appeal was pending with the COMELEC. Such delay which is not here
shown to have been intentionally sought by the petitioner to prolong his stay in office
cannot serve as basis to bar his right to be elected and to serve his chosen local
government post in the succeeding mayoral election.”
21. Bolos, Jr. v. Comelec (G.R. No. 184082, 17 March 2009)

Facts:

Petitioner Bolos was elected as the Punong Barangay of Barangay Biking, Dauis, Bohol
for 3 consecutive terms (1994, 1997, 2002). In May 2004, during his incumbency, he
ran for Municipal Councilor of Dauis and won. He assumed office on July 1, 2004
leaving his for
candidacy post
theasposition
PunongofBarangay. After serving
Punong Barangay hisOctober
in the term as29,
a councilor he filedand
2007 Barangay his
Sangguniang Kabataan Elections.

Cinconiegue, then incumbent Punong Barangay and also a candidate for the same
office, filed a petition for disqualification on the ground that Bolos Jr. has already served
the maximum limit of three term hence no longer eligible to run and hold the position in
accordance with Sec. 8, Article X of the Constitution and Sec. 43 (b) of RA 7160 or the
Local Government Code of 1991.Cinconiegue contended that Bolos’ relinquishment of
the position of Punong Barangay in July 2004 was voluntary on his part, as it could be
presumed that it was his personal decision to run as municipal councilor in the May 14,
2004 National and Local Elections. He added that petitioner knew that if he won and
assumed the position, there would be a voluntary renunciation of his post as Punong
Barangay.
In his Answer, petitioner argued that when he assumed the position of Sangguniang
Bayan member, he left his post as Punong Barangay by operation of law; hence, it must
be considered as an involuntary interruption in the continuity of his last term of
service. Pending the resolution of the case before the Comelec, Bolos Jr. won in
the election.

The Comelec resolved the petition in favor of Cinconiegue ruling that Bolos Jr. has
already served the maximum three consecutive term for an office and thus disqualified
to run for the same office. It further ordered that the proclamation of Bolos Jr. be
annulled and that the office will be succeeded based on Sec. 44 of the Local
Government Code.

Issue:

Whether or not there was a voluntary renunciation of the office of Punong Barangay by
Bolos when he assumed the post of Municipal Councilor so that he is deemed to have
served for three consecutive terms.

Held:

The three-term limit for elective official is contained in Sec. 8, Article X of the
Constitution states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected.
The Local Government Code provides for the term of office of Barangay Officials:
Sec. 43. Term of Office. – x x x (b) No local elective official shall serve for more than
three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service
for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.
(c) The term of barangay officials and members of the sangguniang kabataan shall be
for five (5) years, which shall begin after the regular election of barangay officials on the
second Monday of May 1997: Provided, that the sangguniang kabataan members who
were elected in the May 1996 elections shall serve until the next regular election of
barangay officials.
Socrates vs. Comelec held that the rule on the three-term limit, embodied in the
Constitution and the Local Government Code, has two parts: x x x The first part
provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive
terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-
term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length
of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary
severance from office for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents
the service before and after the interruption from being joined together to form a
continuous service or consecutive terms.

After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection
for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same
office following the end of the third consecutive term.

In Lonzanida vs. Comelec, the Court stated that the second part of the rule on the three-
term limit shows the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution to bar any attempt to
circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same
time respect the people’s choice and grant their elected official full service of a term.
The Court held that two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur:
(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same
government post; and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

In this case, it is undisputed that petitioner was elected as Punong Barangay for three
consecutive terms, satisfying the first condition for disqualification. What is to be
determined is whether petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily renounced his position
as Punong Barangay during his third term when he ran for and won as Sangguniang
Bayan member and assumed said office.

The Court agrees with the Comelec that petitioner’s relinquishment of the office of
Punong Barangay of Biking, Dauis, Bohol, as a consequence of his assumption to office
as Sangguniang Bayan member of Dauis, Bohol, on July 1, 2004, is a voluntary
renunciation.
When petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the Office of Sangguniang Bayan,
he was not deemed resigned. Nonetheless, all the acts attending his pursuit of his
election as municipal councilor point out to an intent and readiness to give up his post
as Punong Barangay once elected to the higher elective office, for it was very unlikely
that respondent had filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Sangguniang Bayan post,
campaigned and exhorted the municipal electorate to vote for him as such and then
after being
election elected and
as municipal proclaimed,
councilor would return to his former of
entail abandonment position. He knew
the position that and
he held, his
he intended to forego of it. Abandonment, like resignation, is voluntary.

Petitioner erroneously argues that when he assumed the position of Sangguniang

Bayan member, he left his post as Punong Barangay by operation of law; hence, he did
not fully serve his third term as Punong Barangay.

The term "operation of law" is defined by the Philippine Legal Encyclopedia as "a term
describing the fact that rights may be acquired or lost by the effect of a legal rule without
any act of the person affected." Black's Law Dictionary also defines it as a term that
"expresses the manner in which rights, and sometimes liabilities, devolve upon a person
by the mere application to the particular transaction of the established rules of law,
without the act or cooperation of the party himself.
In this case, petitioner did not fill or succeed to a vacancy by operation of law. He
instead relinquished his office as Punong Barangay during his third term when he won
and assumed office as Sangguniang Bayan member of Dauis, Bohol, which is deemed
a voluntary renunciation of the Office of Punong Barangay.
22. Comelec v. Cruz (G.R. No. 186616, 20 November 2009)
23. Talaga v. Comelec (G.R. No. 196804, 09 October 2012)

FACTS:
Ramon Talaga, Jr. served as mayor of Lucena City during terms 1992-1995 and 1995-
1998. During the 1998 elections, Talaga lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. However, before
Tagarao’s 1998-2001 term ended, a recall election was conducted in May 2000 wherein
Talaga won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 2001. When Talaga
ran for mayor
served in 2001,
as mayor his candidacy
for three wasterms
consecutive challenged on theof
in violation ground that he
the three had already
term-limit rule.
Comelec found Talaga disqualified to run for mayor. Talaga filed a motion for
reconsideration which Comelec granted. Talaga was then elected Mayor.

ISSUE:
Whether Talaga was disqualified to run as mayor given that he had already served two
full terms and he won in the 2000 recall elections.

HELD:
The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected
as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough
that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must
also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the
disqualification can apply.

For nearly two years Talaga was a private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was
disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections. The time between his second term and the
recall election is sufficient interruption. Thus, there was no three consecutive terms as
contemplated in the disqualifications in the LGC.

Talaga only served two consecutive full terms. There was a disruption when he was
defeated in the 1998 elections. His election during the 2000 recall election is not a
continuation of his two previous terms which could constitute his third term thereby
barring him for running for a fourth term. Victory in the 2000 recall election is not the
“voluntary renunciation” contemplated by the law.
24. Gamboa v. Aguirre (G.R. No. 134213, 20 July 1999)

FACTS:
In the 1995 elections, Rafael Coscolluela, petitioner Romeo Gamboa and respondents
Marcelo Aguirre, Jr. and Juan Araneta were leveled Negros Occidental Governor, Vice-
Governor and SP members, respectively. Sometime in August 1995, the governor
designated as Acting Governor for the duration of the former's official trip abroad until
his return. When
questioned the Sangguniang
the authority Panlalawigan
of petitioner held its in
to preside therein regular session,
view of respondents
his designation as
acting governor and asked him to vacate the Chair. The latter, however, refused to do
so. In another session, seven members of the SP voted to allow petitioner to continue
presiding while four others voted against it. Respondents filed before the lower court a
petition for declaratory relief and prohibition. In the meantime, the governor re-assumed
his office. The trial court rendered a decision and declared petitioner as temporarily
legally incapacitated to preside over the sessions of the SP during the period that he is
the acting governor. Petitioner filed a petition for review.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Gamboa, while serving as acting governor, temporarily relinquished the
powers, fictions, duties and responsibilities of the Vice-Governor, including the power to
preside over the sessions of the SP
HELD:
Yes. The Local Government Code provides that the vice governor shall be the presiding
officer of the SP. In addition to such function, he becomes the governor and assumes
the higher office for the unexpired term of his predecessor, in case of permanent
vacancy. When the vacancy however is merely temporary, the vice governor shall
automatically exercise the powers (subject to certain limitations) and perform the duties
and functions of the governor.

When the vice governor exercises the powers and duties of governor, he does not
assume the latter's office. He only acts as the governor but does not become the
governor. His assumption of powers of the provincial chief executive does not create a
permanent vacancy in his position as vice governor. Thus, he does not relinquish not
abandon his position and title by merely becoming an acting governor.
A vice governor who is concurrently an acting governor is actually a quasi-governor.
This means, that for purposes of exercising his legislative prerogatives and powers, he
is deemed considered as a non member of the SP for the time being. The offices of
provincial governor and vice governor are essentially executive in nature, whereas plain
members of the provincial board perform functions partaking of a legislative character.
This is clear from the law when it provides that local legislative power shall be vested in
the SP, which is the legislative body of the province.
The governor is not included in the SP members and thus, local executive power is
vested alone in the governor.
Art. 49(b) of the Local Government Code provides that in the event of the inability of the
regular presiding officer to toe side at the sangguniang session, the members present
and constituting a quorum shall elect among themselves a temporary presiding officer.
Therefore, the vice governor who became an acting governor cannot continue to
simultaneously exercise the duties of the office, since the nature of it calls for a full-time
occupant to discharge them
25. Ganzon v. Court of Appeals (200 SCRA 271)

FACTS:
Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10 complaints were filed against him
on grounds of misconduct and misfeasance of office. The Secretary of Local
Government issued several suspension orders against Ganzon based on the merits of
the complaints filed against him hence Ganzon was facing about 600 days of
suspension.
order by the Ganzon appealed
Secretary. Ganzonthe issue tothat
asserted thethe
CA1987
and the CA affirmed
Constitution thenot
does suspension
authorize
the President nor any of his alter ego to suspend and remove local officials; this is
because the 1987 Constitution supports local autonomy and strengthens the same.
What was given by the present Constitution was mere supervisory power.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the President’s alter ego, can
suspend and or remove local officials.

HELD:
Yes. Ganzon is under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere
supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied
her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression
because legally, “supervision” is not incompatible with disciplinary authority.

The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision by
the President over local government officials in contrast to the power of control given to
him over executive officials of our government wherein it was emphasized that the two
terms, control and supervision, are two different things which differ one from the other in
meaning and extent. “In administration law supervision means overseeing or the power
or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter
fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by
law to make them perform their duties.

Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of
set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.” But from this pronouncement
it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the President over local
government officials does not include the power of investigation when in his opinion the
good of the public service so requires.

The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of the president, in suspending
Ganzon is exercising a valid power. He however overstepped by imposing a 600-day
suspension.
26. Joson v. Torres (290 SCRA 279)
27. Salalima v. Guingona (257 SCRA 55)
28. Berces v. Executive Secretary (241 SCRA 539)
29. Malinao v. Reyes ( 256 SCRA 616)
30. Sanggunian Baranggay of Don Mariano Marcos v. Martinez (G.R. No. 170626,
March 3, 2008)
31. Lingating v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 153478, November 13, 2002)
32. Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole (G.R. No. 108072, December 12, 1995)
33. Office of the Ombudsman v. Rodriguez (G.R. No. 172700, July 23, 2010)
34. Talaga, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 169888, November 11, 2008)
35. Aguinaldo v. Santos (G.R. No. 94115, 21 August 1992)

Pertinent provision of the Local Government Code: Section 60 – Grounds for

Disciplinary Actions
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary mandatory injunction and/or
restraining order, petitioner Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo assails the decision of respondent
Secretary of Local Government dated March 19,1990 in A dm. C ase No. P-10437-89

dis miss ing him as G overnor of Ca g ayan.

Facts: Petitioner was the duly elected Governor of the province of Cagayan, having
been elected to said position during the local elections held on January 17, 1988, to
serve a term of four (4) years therefrom. On December 7, 1989, a sworncomplaint for
disloyalty to the Republic and culpable violation of the Constitution was filed by
Veronico Agatep, Manuel Mamba and Orlino Agatep, respectively the mayors of the
municipalities of Gattaran, Tuao and Lasam, all in Cagayan, against petitioner for acts
the latter committed during thecoup. Petitioner was required to file a verified answer to
the complaint. In his letter, petitioner denied being privy to the planning of the coup
or actively participating in its execution, though he admitted thathe was sympathetic
to the cause of the rebel soldiers .

Respondent Secretary considered petitioner's reply letter as hisrespondent

answer to the complaint
Secretary
of Mayor Veronico Agatep and others. On the basis thereof,
suspended petitioner from office for sixty (60) days from notice, pending the outcome
of the formal investigation into the charges against him. During the hearing conducted
on the charges against petitioner, complainants presented testimonial and documentary
evidence to prove the charges. Petitioner neither presented evidence nor even cross-
examined the complainant's witnesses, choosing instead to move that respondent
Secretary inhibit himself from deciding the case, which motion was denied. Thereafter,
respondent Secretary rendered the questioned decision finding petitioner guilty
as charged and ordering his removal from office.

While this case was pending before this Court, petitioner filed his certificate of
candidacy for the position of Governor of Cagayan for the May 11, 1992 elections. As
petitioner won by a landslide margin in the elections , the resolution paved the way
for his eventual proclamation as Governor of Cagayan.
One of the three grounds petitioner relies on for this petition is that:the alleged act of
disloyalty committed by petitioner should be proved by proof beyond reasonable doubt,
and not be a mere preponderance of evidence, because it is an act punishable as
rebellion under the Revised Penal Code.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner should be removed from office on the ground of disloyalty to
the Republic.
Held:
NO. Petitioner's re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan hasrendered the
administration case pending before the Court moot and academic . It appears that
after the canvassing of votes, petitioner garnered the most number of votes among the
candidates for governor of Cagayan province. The rule is that a public official can not be
removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-
election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the
extent of cuttingtooffcriminal
no application the rightcases
to remove him therefor.
pending The foregoing
against petitioner rule, however,
for acts finds
he may have
committed during the failed coup.

Equally without merit is petitioner's claim that before he could be suspended or removed
from office, proof beyond reasonable doubt is required inasmuch as he is charged with
a penal offense of disloyalty to the Republic which is defined and penalized under
Article 137 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner is not being prosecuted criminally
under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, but administratively with the end in
view of removing petitioner as the duly elected Governor of Cagayan Province for acts
of disloyalty to the Republic where the quantum of proof required is only substantial
evidence.

WHEREFORE, petitioner is hereby GRANTED and the decision of public respondent

Secretary of Local Government dated March 19, 1990 in Adm. Case No. P-10437-89,
dismissing petitioner as Governor of Cagayan, is herebyREVERSED.
36. Salumbines, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman (G.R. No. 180917, 23 April 2010)

FACTS:
Salumbides and Glenda were appointed as Municipal Legal Officer/Administrator and
Municipal Budget Officer, respectively, of Tagkawayan, Quezon. On May 13, 2002,
herein respondentsRicardo Agon, Ramon Villasanta, Elmer Dizon, Salvador Adul and
Agnes Fabian,all members of theSangguniang Bayanof Tagkawayan, filed withthe
Office of thetheOmbudsman
petitioners), a complaintagainst
mayor, Coleta, Jason and Aquino.Salumbides and Glenda
The administrative (hereafter
aspect of the
case charged petitionerset al. with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Gross Neglect of
Duty, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and violation of the
Commission on Audit (COA) Rules and the Local Government Code. The Office of the
Ombudsman denied the prayer to place petitionerset al. under preventive suspension
pending investigation. By Order datedFebruary 1, 2005, approved onApril 11, 2005, it
denied the motion for reconsideration butdropped the mayor and Coleta, both elective
officials, as respondents in the administrative case, the 2004 elections having mooted
the case. The Office of the Ombudsman approved the September 9, 2005
Memorandumabsolving Jason and Aquino, and finding petitioners guilty of Simple
Neglect of Duty.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the doctrine of condonation is applicable in this case.

HELD:
Court of Appeals decision is affirmed.

POLITICAL LAW: doctrine of condonation

The reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct

to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The Court should never
remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise
would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When the people
elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life
and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had
been guilty of any.It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct, to
practically overrule the will of the people. Contrary to petitioner
’s asseveration, the non-
application of the condonation doctrine to appointive officials does not violate the right to
equal protection of the law. The electorate’s condonation of the previous administrative
infractions of the reelected official cannot be extended to that of the reappointed
coterminous employees, the underlying basis of the rule being to uphold the will of the
people expressed through the ballot. In other words, there is neither subversion of the
sovereign will nor disenfranchisement of the electorate to speak of, in the case of
reappointed coterminous employees. It is the will of the populace, not the whim of one
person who happens to be the appointing authority, that could extinguish an
administrative liability. Since petitioners hold appointive positions, they cannot claim the
mandate of the electorate. The people cannot be charged with the presumption of full
knowledge of the life and character of each and every probable appointee of the
elective official ahead of the latters actual reelection.

Moreover, as correctly observed by respondents, the lack of conspiracy cannot be

appreciated in favor of petitioners who were found guilty of simple neglect of duty, for if
they conspired to act negligently, their infraction becomes intentional. There can hardly
be conspiracy to commit negligence. Petitioners fell short of the reasonable diligence
required of them,
requirements and for failing
fiscal to exercise
soundness due
of the care and
projects prudence
before in ascertaining
stamping the legal
their imprimatur and
giving their advice to their superior.

The appellate court correctly ruled that as municipal legal officer, petitioner Salumbides
failed to uphold the law and provide a sound legal assistance and support to the mayor
in carrying out the delivery of basic services and provisions of adequate facilities when
he advised the mayor to proceed with the construction of the subject projects without
prior competitive bidding. As pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, to
absolve Salumbides is tantamount to allowing with impunity the giving of erroneous or
illegal advice, when by law he is precisely tasked to advise the mayor on matters related
to upholding the rule of law. Indeed, a legal officer who renders a legal opinion on a
course of action without any legal basis becomes no different from a lay person who
may approve the same because it appears justified.
As regards petitioner Glenda, the appellate court held that the improper use of
government funds upon the direction of the mayor and prior advice by the municipal
legal officer did not relieve her of liability for willingly cooperating rather than registering
her written objection as municipal budget officer. Aside from the lack of competitive
bidding, the appellate court, pointing to the improper itemization of the expense, held
that the funding for the projects should have been taken from the capital outlays that
refer to the appropriations for the purchase of goods and services, the benefits of which
extend beyond the fiscal year and which add to the assets of the local government unit.
It added that current operating expenditures like MOOE/RMF refer to appropriations for
the purchase of goods and services for the conduct of normal local government
operations within the fiscal year.

DENIED.
37. Ombudsman Carpio-Morales v. CA and Binay (G.R. Nos. 217126-27,
10 November 2015

FACTS:
On July 22, 2014, a complaint/affidavit was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal and Nicolas
"Ching" Enciso VI before the Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other
public officers and employees of the City Government of Makati (Binay, Jr.,et al),
accusing them of Plunder
as "The Anti-Graft and violation
and Corrupt of Act,"
Practices Republic Act No. (RA)
in connection with3019, otherwise
the five known
(5) phases of
the procurement and construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building (Makati
Parking Building).

On September 9, 2014, the Ombudsman constituted a Special Panel of Investigators to

conduct a fact-finding investigation, submit an investigation report, and file the
necessary complaint, if warranted (1st Special Panel). Pursuant to the Ombudsman's
directive, on March 5, 2015, the 1st Special Panel filed a complaint (OMB Complaint)
against Binay, Jr., et al, charging them with six (6) administrative cases for Grave
Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service, and six (6) criminal cases for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019,
Malversation of Public Funds, and Falsification of Public Documents (OMB Cases).

On March 6, 2015, the Ombudsman created another Special Panel of Investigators to

conduct a preliminary investigation and administrative adjudication on the OMB Cases
(2nd Special Panel).

Before Binay, Jr., et al.'s filing of their counter-affidavits, the Ombudsman, upon the
recommendation of the 2nd Special Panel, the subject preventive suspension order,
placing Binay, Jr., et al. under preventive suspension for not more than six (6) months
without pay, during the pendency of the OMB Cases. The Ombudsman ruled that the
requisites for the preventive suspension of a public officer are present, finding that:
(a) the evidence of Binay, Jr., et al.'s guilt was strong given that (1) the losing bidders and
members of the Bids and Awards Committee of Makati City had attested to the irregularities
attending the Makati Parking Building project; (2) the documents on record negated the
publication of bids; and (3) the disbursement vouchers, checks, and official receipts showed the
release of funds; and

(b) (1) Binay, Jr., et al. were administratively charged with Grave Misconduct, Serious
Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service; (2) said
charges, if proven to be true, warrant removal from public service under the Revised
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS), and (3) Binay, Jr.,et al.'s
respective positions give them access to public records and allow them to influence
possible witnesses; hence, their continued stay in office may prejudice the investigation
relative to the OMB Cases filed against them. Consequently, the Ombudsman directed
the DILG, through Secretary Roxas, to immediately implement the preventive
suspension order against Binay, Jr.,et al., upon receipt of the same.

On March 11, 2015, a copy of the preventive suspension order was sent to the Office of
the City Mayor, and received by Maricon Ausan, a member of Binay, Jr.'s staff.

The Proceedings Before the CA

On even date, Binay, Jr. filed a petition forcertiorari before the CA, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 139453, seeking the nullification of the preventive suspension order, and
praying for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin its implementation.Primarily,
Binay, Jr. argued that he could not be held administratively liable for any
anomalous activity attending any of the five (5) phases of the Makati Parking Building
project.

In any event, Binay, Jr. claimed that the Ombudsman's preventive suspension
order failed to show that the evidence of guilt presented against him is strong,
maintaining that he did not participate in any of the purported irregularities. In support of
his prayer for injunctive relief, Binay, Jr. argued that he has a clear and unmistakable
right to hold public office, having won by landslide vote in the 2010 and 2013 elections,
and that, in view of the condonation doctrine, as well as the lack of evidence to sustain
the charges against him, his suspension from office would undeservedly deprive the
electorate of the services of the person they have conscientiously chosen and voted into
office.

On March 16, 2015, Secretary Roxas caused the implementation of the preventive
suspension order through Director Brion, who posted a copy thereof on the wall of the
Makati City Hall after failing to personally serve the same on Binay, Jr. as the points of
entry to the Makati City Hall were closed. At around 9:47 a.m., Assistant City Prosecutor
of Makati Billy C. Evangelista administered the oath of office on Makati City Vice Mayor
Romulo V. Peña, Jr. (Peña, Jr.) who thereupon assumed office as Acting Mayor.

At noon of the same day, the CA issued a Resolution (dated March 16, 2015), granting
Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a TRO, notwithstanding Pena, Jr.'s assumption of duties as Acting
Mayor earlier that day. Citing the case ofGovernor Garcia, Jr. v. CA , the CA found that
it was more prudent on its part to issue a TRO in view of the extreme urgency of the
matter and seriousness of the issues raised, considering that if it were established that
the acts subject of the administrative cases against Binay, Jr. were all committed during
his prior term, then, applying the condonation doctrine, Binay, Jr.'s re-election meant
that he can no longer be administratively charged. The CA then directed the
Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition forcertiorari .

On March 17, 2015, the Ombudsman manifested that the TRO did not state what act
was being restrained and that since the preventive suspension order had already been
served and implemented, there was no longer any act to restrain.

On the same day, Binay, Jr. filed a petition for contempt, accusing Secretary Roxas,
Director Brion, the officials of the Philippine National Police, and Pena, Jr. of
deliberately refusing to obey the CA, thereby allegedly impeding, obstructing, or
degrading the administration of justice. The Ombudsman and Department of Justice
Secretary Leila M. De Lima were subsequently impleaded as additional respondents
upon Binay, Jr.'s filing of the amended and supplemental petition for contempt (petition
for contempt) on March 19, 2015.Among others, Binay, Jr. accused the Ombudsman
and other respondents therein for willfully and maliciously ignoring the TRO issued by
the CA against the preventive suspension order.

The Proceedings Before the Court

Prior
presentto petition
the hearing of this
before the Court,
oral arguments before
assailing the CA'sthe CA, 16,
March the2015
Ombudsman filed
Resolution, the
which
granted Binay, Jr.'s prayer for TRO and the March 20, 2015 Resolution directing her to
file a comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504. The
Ombudsman claims that:
(a) the CA had no jurisdiction to grant Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a TRO, citing Section 14 of
RA 6770, or "The Ombudsman Act of 1989," which states that no injunctive writ could
be issued to delay the Ombudsman's investigation unless there is prima facie evidence
that the subject matter thereof is outside the latter's jurisdiction; and
(b) the CA's directive for the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for
contempt is illegal and improper, considering that the Ombudsman is an impeachable
officer, and therefore, cannot be subjected to contempt proceedings.

In his comment filed on April 6, 2015, Binay, Jr. argues that Section 1, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution specifically grants the CA judicial power to review acts of any branch
or instrumentality of government, including the Office of the Ombudsman, in case of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, which he asserts
was committed in this case when said office issued the preventive suspension order
against him.

Binay, Jr. posits that it was incumbent upon the Ombudsman to have been apprised of
the condonation doctrine as this would have weighed heavily in determining whether
there was strong evidence to warrant the issuance of the preventive suspension order.
In this relation, Binay, Jr. maintains that the CA correctly enjoined the implementation of
the preventive suspension order given his clear and unmistakable right to public office,
and that it is clear that he could not be held administratively liable for any of the charges
against him since his subsequent re-election in 2013 operated as a condonation of any
administrative offenses he may have committed during his previous term. As regards
the CA's order for the Ombudsman to comment on his petition for contempt, Binay, Jr.
submits that while the Ombudsman is indeed an impeachable officer and, hence,
cannot be removed from office except by way of impeachment, an action for contempt
imposes the penalty of fine and imprisonment, without necessarily resulting in removal
from office. Thus, the fact that the Ombudsman is an impeachable officer should not
deprive the CA of its inherent power to punish contempt.

Meanwhile, the CA issued a Resolution granting Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a WPI, which
further enjoined the implementation of the preventive suspension order. In so ruling, the
CA found that Binay, Jr. has an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for, namely, the
nullification of the preventive suspension order, in view of the condonation doctrine,
citing A g uinaldo v. S antos . Particularly, it found that the Ombudsman can hardly
impose preventive suspension against Binay, Jr. given that his re-election in 2013 as
City Mayor of Makati condoned any administrative liability arising from anomalous
activities relative to the Makati Parking Building project from 2007 to 2013. In this
regard, the CA added that, although there were acts which were apparently committed
by Binay, Jr. beyond his first term— namely, the alleged payments on July 3, July 4,
and July 24, 2013,94 corresponding to the services of Hillmarc's and MANA - still, Binay,
Jr.uingona
G cannot , be
Jr . ,held
and administratively
Mayor G arcia v.liable therefor
Mojica whereinbased on the cases
the condonation ofS alalima
doctrine v.
was still
applied by the Court although the payments were made after the official's re-election,
reasoning that the payments were merely effected pursuant to contracts executed
before said re-election. To this, the CA added that there was no concrete evidence of
Binay, Jr.'s participation for the alleged payments made on July 3, 4, and 24, 2013.

In view of the CA's supervening issuance of a WPI pursuant to its April 6, 2015
Resolution, the Ombudsman filed a supplemental petitionbefore this Court, arguing that
the condonation doctrine is irrelevant to the determination of whether the evidence of
guilt is strong for purposes of issuing preventive suspension orders. The Ombudsman
also maintained that a reliance on the condonation doctrine is a matter of defense,
which should have been raised by Binay, Jr. before it during the administrative
proceedings, and that, at any rate, there is no condonation because Binay, Jr.
committed acts subject of the OMB Complaint after his re-election in 2013.

On July 15, 2015, both parties filed their respective comments to each other's
memoranda. Meanwhile, on July 16, 2015, the OSG filed its Manifestation In Lieu of
Comment, simply stating that it was mutually agreed upon that the Office of the
Ombudsman would file its Memorandum, consistent with its desire to state its
"institutional position." In her Memorandum and Comment to Binay, Jr.'s Memorandum,
the Ombudsman pleaded, among others, that this Court abandon the condonation
doctrine. In view of the foregoing, the case was deemed submitted for resolution.

ISSUES:
1) Whether the Petition filed before the SC, without resorting to the filing of a motion for
reconsideration, was theOmbudsman’s plain, speedy, and adequate remedy;
2) Whether the Court of Appeals (“CA”) has subject matter jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the petition;

3) Whether the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a Temporary Restraining

Order (“TRO”) and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction (“WPI”) enjoining the
implementation of the preventive suspension issued by Ombudsman against Binay, Jr.;

4) Whether the CA acted in grave abuse of its discretion in issuing said TRO and WPI;
and

5) Whether the CA’s directive for the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.’s petition
for contempt was improper or illegal.

HELD:
Firs t Iss ue , the SC ruled that the Ombudsman’s petition falls under the exceptions that
a prior motion for reconsideration must be filed, citing the case ofRepublic v. Bayao,
G.R. No. 179492, 5 June 2013, which held as follows: (a) where the order is a patent
nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in
the
are certiorari
the same proceedings have
as those raised been
and duly upon
passed raisedinand
the passed upon(c)
lower court; by the lower
where therecourt,
is anor
urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would
prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject
matter of the action is perishable ; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for
reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and
there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of
arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where
the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the
proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i)
where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved .
(Emphasis supplied on the grounds relied on by the SC in this case, in ruling that no
motion for reconsideration was needed.)
**IN FAVOR OF OMBUDSMAN
As to the S econd Is s ue, the discussion revolved around Sec. 14 of Republic Act No.
6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act (RA 6770), more particularly its 2nd
Paragraph states:

“Section 14. Restrictions. — No writ of injunction shall be issued by any

court to delay an investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under
this Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of
the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the
decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on
pure question of law.”
The SC ruled that the 2nd Paragraph of Sec. 14, RA 6770, is vague, unconstitutional
and invalid. The SC relied on its ruling in the landmark case ofFabian v. Desierto, 356
Phil. 787 (1998), which, in turn, held that the 4th Paragraph of Sec. 27, RA 6770, is
void, as it had the effect of increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the SC without its
advice and concurrence, in violation of Sec. 30, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution. (This
tells us that lawyers should always be wary of reading RA 6770 since case law has
affected it so much – maybe it’s time to update it.)

Interestingly, the SC mentioned the Senate deliberations cited by the Ombudsman, in

the crafting of RA 6770. It quoted the exchanges between Senators Jovito Salonga,
Edgardo Angara, Teofisto Guingona, Jr., and Neptali Gonzales, which merely led the
SC to be suspicious on whether said Senators were talking about Sec. 14, RA 6670, or
some other provision. In other words, while the throwback was appreciated by the SC,
the discussions were not really useful in this case.

Regardless, the SC still ruled that the remedy of Binay, Jr.– the filing of petition for
certiorari pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to assail the Ombudsman’s
preventive suspension order – was valid, citing the cases of Office of the Ombudsman
v. Capulong,
G.R. G.R.No.
No. 184083, 19201643,
November12 March
2013. 2014, and sad
It’s just Dagan
thatv.Office of theend
the sorry Ombudsman,
of Second
Paragraph of Sec. 14, RA 6770 came as collateral damage in this case. The SC
justified its taking up this issue on its own motion, or ex mero motu, which it can
rightfully do, since it is, after all, the SC.
** INFAVOR OF BINAY: SECTION 30, ART6 OF CONSTI

The Third Iss ue is where it starts to become more interesting.Here, the Ombudsman’s
history was discussed, citing heavily from the case ofGonzales III v. Office of the
President, G.R. No. 196231 and 19232, 28 January 2014(hereinafter referred to as
“Gonzales”). You can imagine the Ombudsman smiling from ear to ear while reading
this portion, but this form of flattery should lead one to be suspicious.

What can be picked up from the Gonzales case is that the Office of the Ombudsman’s
independence covers the following: (1) it is the creation of the Constitution; (2) it enjoys
fiscal autonomy; and (3) it is insulated from executive supervision and control. On this
basis, the SC held that the Ombudsman was meant to be protected from political
harassment and pressure, to free it from the “insidious tentacles of politics.” Since the
SC is apolitical, then Gonzales should not be interpreted to shield the Ombudsman from
the judicial review power of the courts.

After the Ombudsman, it is now the SC’s turn to give an exhaustive recap of its own
history. Starting from the definition of Judicial Power, the SC went on the discuss its
expanded scope of judicial review enunciated inOposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083,
30 July 1993, then the evolution of its rule-making authority inEchegaray v. Secretary of
Justice, 361 Phil. 73 (1999). The SC pointed out that Congress, in relation to RA 6770,
has no authority to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure, and rules allowing the issuance of an injunction form part of the court’s
inherent power, which (now, citing foreign case law) enable the judiciary to accomplish
its constitutionally mandated functions.

The SC ruled that Congress’ passing of the First Paragraph of Sec. 14, RA 6770, which
prohibits the issuance of an injunction, is an encroachment of theSC’s rule-making
authority. An injunction, after all, is merely a provisional and auxiliary relief to preserve
rights in esse. However, the SC noted that it has not consented to this as it has not
issued rules of procedure through an administrative circular. Thus, pending deliberation,
the SC declared the First Paragraph of Sec. 14, RA 6770, as ineffective, “until it is
adopted as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued
therefor.”

Sec. 14, RA 6770 is now beaten and badly bruised. To sum it up: The Second
Paragraph was declared unconstitutional, and the First Paragraph was now deemed
ineffective. As such, the CA was held to have correctly issued the injunctive relief in
enjoining the preventive suspension against Binay, Jr.
**IN FAVOR OF BINAY

The Fourth Issue is where the condonation doctrine was taken up. The SC abandoned
the condonation doctrine, but ruled that the CA did not act in excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the WPI, as it did so based on good case law, considering that the
abandonment is prospective in nature.

In abandoning the condonation doctrine, the SC emphasized that this was a

jurisprudential creation that srcinated in the 1959 Pascual case, which was decided
under the 1935 Constitution. It is notable that there was no legal precedent on the issue
at that time, and the SC resorted to American authorities. The SC stated what appears
the sole basis for the condonation doctrine in Pascual, to wit:

The weight of authorities x x x seems to incline toward the rule denying the right to
remove one from office because of misconduct during a prior term, to which we fully
subscribe.

As can be read above, it is clear that no real justification was given for the condonation
doctrine, except that “it seems to incline” towards American authorities. On this regard,
the SC made its own investigation, and found that there was really no established
weight of authorities in the United States (“US”). In fact, 17 States in the US have
already abandoned the condonation doctrine, as pointed out by the Ombudsman. The
SC went on to adopt the findings of the Ombudsman in US jurisprudence, with the
caveat that said cases are merely “guides of interpretation.”

Perhaps the greatest victory in this case for the Ombudsman is that it was able to
convince the SC not to adhere to stare decisis, thereby enriching Philippine
jurisprudence on this matter. This is important, as its effects are far-reaching, since we
now have additional basis to petition the abandonment of old ineffective case laws. For
this moment of glory, allow us to quote directly from the case,viz:

Therefore, the ultimate analysis is on whether or not the condonation

doctrine, as espoused in Pascual, and carried over in numerous cases
after, can be held up against prevailing legal norms. Note that the doctrine
of stare decisis does not preclude this Court from revisiting existing
doctrine. As adjudged in the case of Belgica, the stare decisis rule should
not operate when there are powerful countervailing considerations against
its application. In other words, stare decisis becomes an intractable rule
only when circumstances exist to preclude reversal of standing precedent.
 As the Ombudsman correctly points out, jurisprudence, after all, is not a
rigid, atemporal abstraction; it is an organic creature that develops and
devolves along with the society within which it thrives. In the words of a
recent US Supreme Court Decision, ‘[w]hat we can decide, we ca n
undecide.'

In this case, the Court agrees with the Ombudsman that since the time Pascual was
decided, the legal
decided under thelandscape has radically
1935 Constitution, shifted.
which datedAgain, Pascualdowas
provisions nota reflect
1959 case
the
experience of the Filipino People under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Therefore, the
plain difference in setting, including, of course, the sheer impact of the condonation
doctrine on public accountability, calls for Pascual’s judicious re
-examination.”

The SC then proceeded to dissect Pascual, and went on to enumerate the notable
cases that applied Pascual, which included cases issued under the 1987 Constitution.
Pascual was tested under existing laws, to see if there exists legislation to support
Pascual, e.g. 1987 Constitution, Revised Administrative Code, Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, Local Government Code of 1991,
and Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in Civil Service. The SC ruled:
"Reading the 1987 Constitution together with the above-cite legal provisions now leads
this Court to the conclusion that the doctrine of condonation is actually bereft of legal
bases.

To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement
of accountability to the people at all times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is
plainly inconsistent with the idea that an elective local official’s administrative liability for
a misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was
elected to a second term of office, or even another elective post. Election is not a mode
of condoning an administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory
basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a different term is
fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense done during a prior
term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising from administrative offenses may be condoned
by the President in light of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which was
interpreted in Llamas v. Orbos to apply to administrative offenses: xxx …"
The SC made it clear that Pascual has no statutory basis at all. By abandoning the
condonation doctrine, the SC would remove this defense oft-times used by elected
officials, of which the SC was aware of, as it made mention of the data brought forward
by the Ombudsman, to wit:

“To provide a sample size, the Ombudsman has informed the Court that
‘for the period of July 2013 to December 2014 alone, 85 cases from the
Luzon Office and 24 cases from the Central Office were dismissed on the
ground on condonation. Thus, in just one and a half years, over a hundred
cases of alleged misconduct – involving infractions such as dishonesty,
oppression, gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct– were placed
 beyond the reach of the Ombudsman’s investigatory and prosecutorial
powers.’ Evidently, this fortifies the finding that the case is capable of
repetition and must therefore, not evadereview.”

*IN FAVOR OF OMBUDSMAN (BECAUSE OF THE AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE

The Fifth and Final Issue on whether the order to comment directed to the
Ombudsman was illegal,
contempt proceedings yet.was
It is refused to of
the claim bethe
resolved on thethat
Ombudsman ground
sincethere are no
she was an
impeachable officer, she could be subjected to contempt. However, no due course has
been given to the contempt action, thus, the Ombudsman’s claim was premature.
C. Appointive Local Officials
Cases:

38.De Rama v. CA (G.R. No. 131136, February 28, 2001)

FACTS:
Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, petitioner Conrado
L. de Rama
CSC), seekingwrote
the a letterofdated
recall July 13, 1995
the appointments of to the Civil
fourteen Service
(14) Commission
municipal employees.(or
Justifying his recall request on the allegation that the appointments of the said
employees were “midnight” appointments of the former mayor, Ma. Evelyn S. Abeja,
done in violation of Article VII, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution. The CSC denied
petitioner’s request for the recall of the appointments of the fourteen employees, for lack
of merit. The CSC upheld the validity of the appointments on the ground that they had
already been approved by the Head of the CSC Field Office in Lucena City, and for
petitioner’s failure to present evidence that would warrant the revocation or recall of the
said appointments.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the recall made by petitioner is valid.

RULING:
No. It is the CSC that is authorized to recall an appointment initially approved, but only
when such appointment and approval are proven to be in disregard of applicable
provisions of the civil service law and regulations. Rule V, Section 9 of the Omnibus
Implementing Regulations of the Revised Administrative Code specifically provides that
“an appointment accepted by the appointee cannot be withdrawn or revoked by the
appointing authority and shall remain in force and in effect until disapproved by the
Commission.

Accordingly, the appointments of the private respondents may only be recalled on the
following grounds: (a) Non-compliance with the procedures/criteria provided in the
agency’s Merit Promotion Plan; (b)Failure to pass through the agency’s
Selection/Promotion Board; (c) Violation of the existing collective agreement between
management and employees relative to promotion; or (d) Violation of other existing civil
service law, rules and regulations.
39.Plaza v. CA (G.R. No. 138464, January 18, 2008)
40.Atienza v. Villarosa (G.R. No. 161081, 10 May 2005)

FACTS:

Governor issued a memoranda concerning:

1. “AUTHORITY TO SIGN PURCHASE ORDERS OF SUPPLIES, MATERIALS,
EQUIPMENT[S], INCLUDING FUEL, REPAIRS AND MAINTENANCE OF THE
SANGGUNIANG
2. “TERMINATION PANLALAWIGAN.”
OF CONTRACT OF SERVICES OF CASUAL/JOB ORDER
EMPLOYEES AND REAPPOINTMENT OF THE RESPECTIVE RECOMMENDEES” –
entered into by Vice-Governor Ramon M. Atienza are hereby terminated for being
unauthorized.
3. "ENFORCIBILITY (sic) OF PREVIOUS MEMORANDA ISSUED ON JUNE 20, 26
AND JULY 1, 2002.”

Vice-Governor invoked the principle of separation of powers as applied to the local

government units, (Governor)-head of the executive branch, and (Vice-Governor)- head
of the legislative branch, which is the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

Both public officials are no longer incumbent. The VG did not seek re-election while the
Gov. did not win his candidacy.
ISSUE:
WON the Governor in issuance of his memoranda is is authorized to approve purchase
orders of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan

HELD:
Be the presiding officerof the sangguniang panlalawigan and sign all warrants
drawn on the provincial treasury for all expenditures appropriated for the
operation of the sangguniang panlalawigan.
In case of temporary absence or incapacity of the department head or chief of
office, the officer next-in-rank shall automatically perform his function and he shall
be fully responsible therefor.
The Governor, with respect to the appointment of the officials and employees of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, has no such authority.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Memoranda dated June 25, 2002 and
July 1, 2002 issued by respondent Governor Jose T. Villarosa are NULL AND VOID.
41.People v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 164185, 23 July 2008)
42.Sales v. Carreon (G.R. No. 160791, 13 February 2007)
43.Quirog v. Aumentado (G.R. No. 163443, 11 November 2008)
 44.Montuerto v. Ty (G.R. No. 177736, 06 October 2008)

FACTS:
On March 17, 1992, petitioner was issued an appointment as Municipal Budget Officer
by the thenMayor Supremo T. Sabitsana of the Municipality of Almeria, Biliran. On
March 24, 1992, her appointment was approved as permanent by Gerardo Corder,
Acting
Bayan Civil ServiceBiliran
of Almeria, Commission
passedField Officer.On Bayan
Sangguniang January 14, 2002, the No.
(SB)Resolution Sangguniang
01-S-2002
entitled "A Resolution Requesting the Civil Service Commission Regional Office,to
Revoke the Appointment of Mrs. Melanie P. Montuerto, Municipal Budget Officer of the
Municipality ofAlmeria, Biliran for Failure to Secure the Required Concurrence from the
Sangguniang Bayan."

Consequently, the Municipality of Almeria, Biliran submitted the 201 file of petitioner to
Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. VIII (CSCRO No. VIII) which showed that
petitioner's appointment lacked the required concurrence of the local sanggunian. On
the other hand, petitioner submitted to the same office a Joint-Affidavit executed on
March 6, 2002, by the majority of the then members of the Sangguniang Bayan
ofAlmeria, Biliran, that only verbal concurrence on the appointment and also there is no
record to show that there is an appointment of Mrs Melanie P. Montuerto as Municipal
Bidget Officer of Almeria. On March 11, 2002, CSCRO No. VIII issued an Order of
recalled on the grounds that it lacks the required concurrence of the majority of all the
members of the Sanguninang Bayan and On July 11, 2005, theMunicipal Mayor issued
a Memorandum terminating the services of petitioner as Municipal Budget Officer
pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 050756.Petitioner filed a Petition for Review under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil Procedure before the CA, which denied it for lack of merit.

ISSUE:
Whether the appointment of petitioner as Municipal Budget Officer, without the written
concurrence of the Sanggunian, but duly approved by the CSC and after the appointee
had served as such for almost ten years without interruption, can still be revoked by the
Commission.

RULING:
We resolve to deny the Petition. The law is clear. Under Section 443(a) and (d) of
Republic ActNo. 7160 or the Local Government Code, the head of a department or
office in the municipal government,such as the Municipal Budget Officer, shall be
appointed by the mayor with the concurrence of the majority of all Sangguniang Bayan
members subject to civil service law, rules and regulations. Per records, the
appointment of petitioner was never submitted to the Sangguniang Bayan for its
concurrence or, even if so submitted, no such concurrence was obtained. Such factual
finding of quasi-judicial agencies, especially if adopted and affirmed by the CA, is
deemed final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal by this Court. This
Court is not a trier of facts and generally, does not weigh anew evidence already
passed upon by the CA. Absent a showing that this case falls under any of the
exceptions to this general rule, this Court will refrain from disturbing the findings of fact
of the tribunals below.Moreover, we agree with the ruling of the CA that the verbal
concurrence allegedly given by the Sanggunian,as postulated by the petitioner, is not
the concurrence required and envisioned under R.A. No. 7160. The Sanggunian, as a
body, acts through a resolution or an ordinance. Absent such resolution of
concurrence,the appointment of petitioner failed to comply with the mandatory
requirement of Section 443(a) and (d) ofR.A. No. 7160. Without a valid appointment,
petitioner
served asacquired
such fornoten
legal title to
years. the Office ofthe
Accordingly, MunicipalBudget
CSC has the Officer, even
authority if she had
to recall the
appointment of the petitioner.
 V. INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS

45.MMDA v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc. (G.R. No. 170656, 15 August 2007)

FACTS:
GMA declared Executive Order (E.O.) No. 179 operational, thereby creating the MMDA
in 2003. Due to traffic congestion, the MMDA recommended a plan to “decongest traffic
by
andeliminating the bus
providing more andterminals nowacc
convenient located
ess to along major
the mass Metro Manila
transport thoroughfares
system.” The MMC
gave a go signal for the project. Viron Transit, a bus company assailed the move. They
alleged that the MMDA didn’t have the power to direct operators to abandon their
terminals. In doing so they asked the court ot interpret the extent and scope of MMDA’s
power under RA 7924. They also asked if the MMDA law contravened the Public
Service Act.

Another bus operator, Mencorp, prayed for a TRO for the implementation in a trial court.
In the Pre-Trial Order17 issued by the trial court, the issues were narrowed down to
whether 1) the MMDA’s power to regulate traffic in Metro Manila included the power to
direct provincial bus operators to abandon and close their duly established and existing
bus terminals in order to conduct business in a common terminal; (2) the E.O. is
consistent with the Public Service Act and the Constitution; and (3) provincial bus
operators would be deprived of their real properties without due process of law should
they be required to use the common bus terminals. The trial court sustained the
constitutionality.

Both bus lines filed for a MFR in the trial court. It, on September 8, 2005, reversed its
Decision, this time holding that the E.O. was "an unreasonable exercise of police
power"; that the authority of the MMDA under Section (5)(e) of R.A. No. 7924 does not
include the power to order the closure of Viron’s and Mencorp’s existing bus terminals;
and that the E.O. is inconsistent with the provisions of the Public Service Act.

MMDA filed a petition in the Supreme Court. Petitioners contend that there is no
justiciable controversy in the cases for declaratory relief as nothing in the body of the
E.O. mentions or orders the closure and elimination of bus terminals along the major
thoroughfares of Metro Manila. To them, Viron and Mencorp failed to produce any letter
or communication from the Executive Department apprising them of an immediate plan
to close down their bus terminals.

And petitioners maintain that the E.O. is only an administrative directive to government
agencies to coordinate with the MMDA and to make available for use government
property along EDSA and South Expressway corridors. They add that the only relation
created by the E.O. is that between the Chief Executive and the implementing officials,
but not between third persons.

ISSUES:
1. Is there a justiciable controversy?
2. Is the elimination of bus terminals unconstitutional? Held: Yes to both. Petition
dismissed.

HELD:
1. Requisites: (a) there must be a justiciable controversy; (b) the controversy must be
between persons whose interests are adverse; (c) the party seeking declaratory relief
must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (d) the issue invoked must be ripe for
judicial determination
It cannot be gainsaid that the E.O. would have an adverse effect on respondents. The
closure of their bus terminals would mean, among other things, the loss of income from
the operation and/or rentals of stalls thereat. Precisely, respondents claim a deprivation
of their constitutional right to property without due process of law.

Respondents have thus amply demonstrated a "personal and substantial interest in the
case such that [they have] sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of [the
E.O.’s] enforcement." Consequently, the established rule that the constitutionality of a
law or administrative issuance can be challenged by one who will sustain a direct injury
as a result of its enforcement has been satisfied by respondents.

2. Under E.O. 125 A, the DOTC was given the objective of guiding government and
private investment in the development of the country’s intermodal transportation and
communications systems. It was also tasked to administer all laws, rules and
regulations in the field of transportation and communications.

It bears stressing that under the provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, it is the
DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is authorized to establish and implement a project
such as the one subject of the cases at bar. Thus, the President, although authorized to
establish or cause the implementation of the Project, must exercise the authority
through the instrumentality of the DOTC which, by law, is the primary implementing and
administrative entity in the promotion, development and regulation of networks of
transportation, and the one so authorized to establish and implement a project such as
the Project in question.

By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of the Project, the President
clearly overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. No. 179
ultra vires. There was no grant of authority to MMDA. It was delegated only to set the
policies concerning traffic in Metro Manila, and shall coordinate and regulate the
implementation of all programs and projects concerning traffic management, specifically
pertaining to enforcement, engineering and education.

In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of
authority to implement the Project as envisioned by the E.O; hence, it could not have
been validly designated by the President to undertake the Project.
MMDA’s move didn’t satisfy police power requirements such as that (1) the interest of
the public generally, as distinguished from that of a particular class, requires its
exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Stated
differently, the police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and
welfare and a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes and the means.

As early as Calalang v. Williams, this Court recognized that traffic congestion is a

public, not merely a private, concern. The Court therein held that public welfare
underlies the contested
rules and regulations statute authorizing
to regulate and control the Director
traffic of Public
on national Works to promulgate
roads.
Likewise, in Luque v. Villegas,46 this Court emphasized that public welfare lies at the
bottom of any regulatory measure designed "to relieve congestion of traffic, which is, to
say the least, a menace to public safety." As such, measures calculated to promote the
safety and convenience of the people using the thoroughfares by the regulation of
vehicular traffic present a proper subject for the exercise of police power.

Notably, the parties herein concede that traffic congestion is a public concern that
needs to be addressed immediately. Are the means employed appropriate and
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose. Are they not duly
oppressive?

De la Cruz v. Paras- Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede the
flow of traffic. How the outright proscription against the existence of all terminals, apart
from that franchised to petitioner, can be considered as reasonably necessary to solve
the traffic problem, this Court has not been enlightened

In the subject ordinances, however, the scope of the proscription against the
maintenance of terminals is so broad that even entities which might be able to provide
facilities better than the franchised terminal are barred from operating at all.

Finally, an order for the closure of respondents’ terminals is not in line with the
provisions of the Public Service Act.

Consonant with such grant of authority, the PSC (now the LTFRB)was empowered to
"impose such conditions as to construction, equipment, maintenance, service, or
operation as the public interests and convenience may reasonably require" in approving
any franchise or privilege. The law mandates the LTFRB to require any public service to
establish, construct, maintain, and operate any reasonable extension of its existing
facilities.
 46.MMDA v. Garin (G.R. No. 130230. April 15, 2005)

FACTS:
One day, Respondent, Dante O. Garin, a lawyer, was issued a traffic violation receipt
(TVR) and his driver’s license was confiscated for parking illegally alon g Gandara
Street, Binondo, Manila, on 05 August 1995. Shortly before the expiration of the TVR’s
validity (which is 48 hours from date of apprehension), the respondent addressed a
letter to and
license, thenexpressing
MMDA Chairman Prospero
his preference Oreta
for his caserequesting
to be filed the returnSince
in court. of his dri
ver’s
there was
no reply, Garin filed the srcinal complaint with application for preliminary injunction in
Branch 260 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque, on 12 September 1995,
contending that, in the absence of any implementing rules and regulations, Sec. 5(f) of
Rep. Act No. 7924 grants the MMDA unbridled discretion to deprive erring motorists of
their licenses, pre-empting a judicial determination of the validity of the deprivation,
thereby violating the due process clause of the Constitution. The respondent further
contended that the provision violates the constitutional prohibition against undue
delegation of legislative authority, allowing as it does the MMDA to fix and impose
unspecified – and therefore unlimited - fines and other penalties on erring motorists.

For its part, the MMDA, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, pointed out
that the powers granted to it bySec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 are limited to the fixing,
collection and imposition of fines and penalties for traffic violations, which powers are
legislative and executive in nature; the judiciary retains the right to determine the validity
of the penalty imposed. The MMDA also refuted Garin’s allegation that the Metro Manila
Council, the governing board and policy making body of the petitioner, has as yet to
formulate the implementing rules for Sec. 5(f) of Rep. ActNo. 7924 and directed the
court’s attention to MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT -95-001 dated 15 April
1995which authorizes confiscation of driver’s licenses upon issuance of aTVR.
Respondent Garin, however, questioned the validity of MMDA Memorandum Circular
No. TT-95-001, as he claims that it was passed by the Metro ManilaCouncil in the
absence of a quorum.On 23 October 1995, the RTC granted the preliminary mandatory
injunction which ordered the MMDA to return the respondent's driver’s license. On 14
August 1997, the RTC rendered the decision in favor of the respondent.Meanwhile, on
12 August 2004, the MMDA, through its Chairman Bayani Fernando, implemented
MemorandumCircular No. 04, Series of 2004, outlining the procedures for the use of the
Metropolitan Traffic Ticket (MTT) scheme. Under the circular, erring motorists are
issued an MTT, which can be paid at any Metrobank branch. Traffic enforcers may no
longer confiscate drivers’ licenses as a matter of course in cases of traffic violations. All
motorists within redeemed TVRs were given seven days from the date of
implementation of the new system to pay their fines and redeem their license or vehicle
platesAlthough this case was considered as moot and academic by the implementation
of Memorandum Circular No. 04,Series of 2004, the Supreme Court believed that it was
but proper to address the current issue for the proper implementation of the petitioner's
future programs.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 5(f) of Republic Act No. 7924, which created the Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority (MMDA), authorizes the MMDA to confiscate and
suspend or revoke driver’s licenses in the enforcement of traffic laws and regulations?

RULING:
By virtue of the doctrine promulgated in the case of Metro Manila Development
Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., Rep. Act No. 7924 does not grant the
MMDA with police
administrative power,Police
in nature. let alone legislative
power, having power, and that
been lodged all of its
primarily in functions are
the National
Legislature, cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing
legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the
president and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal
corporations or local government units (LGUs). Once delegated, the agents can
exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national
lawmaking body. Thus, as held in the aforementioned case, . . . “[T]he powers of the
MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation,
implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of
a system and administration. There is no syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the
MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not
been delegated any legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local
government units, there is no provision in R. A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or
its Council to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the
general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the
charter itself, a "development authority." It is an agency created for the purpose of
laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies,
people's organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the
efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its
functions are administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the charter
itself, viz:..”Although petitioner is not precluded – and in fact is duty-bound – to
confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers’ licenses in the exercise of its mandate of
transport and traffic management, as well as the administration and implementation of
all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education
programs, it still needs a valid law, or ordinance, or regulation arising from a legitimate
source. This is consistent with the ruling in Bel-Air that the MMDA is a development
authority created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the
various national government agencies, people’s organizations, non -governmental
organizations and the private sector, which may enforce, but not enact, ordinances.
Hence, the power of MMDA to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers’ licenses
without need of any other legislative enactment, is an unauthorized exercise of police
power.
 47.Province of Rizal v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 129546, 13 December 2005)

FACTS:
Through their concerted efforts of the officials and residents of Province of Rizal and
Municipality of San Mateo, the dump site was closed. However, during the term of
President Estrada in 2003, the dumpsite was re-opened. A temporary restraining order
was then filed.
consulted and Although
approvedpetitioners
by their did not raised Sanggunian,
appropriate the question that
the the project
court take was not
it into
consideration since a mere MOA does not guarantee the dump site’s permanent
closure.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the consultation and approval of the Province of Rizal and municipality
of San Mateo is needed before the implementation of the project..

RULING:
The court reiterated again that "the earth belongs in usufruct to the living."

Yes, as lucidly explained by the court: contrary to the averment of the respondents,
Proclamation No. 635, which was passed on 28 August 1995, is subject to the
provisions of the Local Government Code, which was approved four years earlier, on 10
October 1991.

Section 2(c) of the said law declares that it is the policy of the state- "to require all
national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultation with appropriate local
government units, non-governmental and people's organization, and other concerned
sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented in their
respective jurisdiction." Likewise Section 27 requires prior consultations before a
program shall be implemented by government authorities ans the prior approval of the
Sanggunian is obtained." Corollarily as held in Lina , Jr. v. Paño, Section 2 (c), requiring
consultations with the appropriate local government units, should apply to national
government projects affecting the environmental or ecological balance of the particular
community implementing the project.
Relative to the case, during the oral arguments at the hearing for the temporary
restraining order, Director Uranza of the MMDA Solid Waste Management Task Force
declared before the Court of Appeals that they had conducted the required
consultations. However, the ambivalence of his reply was brought to the fore when at
the height of the protest rally and barricade made by the residents of petitioners to stop
dump trucks from reaching the site, all the municipal mayors of the province of Rizal
openly declared their full support for the rally and notified the MMDA that they would
oppose any further attempt to dump garbage in their province.

Moreover, Section 447, which enumerates the powers, duties and functions of the
municipality, grants the sangguniang bayan the power to, among other things, “enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of th(e) Code.” These inclu
de:

(1) Approving ordinances and passing resolutions to protect the environment and
impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment, such as
dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing, illegal logging and smuggling of
logs, smuggling of natural resources products and of endangered species of flora and
fauna, slash ofand
acceleration burn farming,
eutrophication and such
of rivers other or
and lakes, activities which imbalance;
of ecological result in pollution,
[Section
447 (1)(vi)]

(2) Prescribing reasonable limits and restraints on the use of property within the
jurisdiction of the municipality, adopting a comprehensive land use plan for the
municipality, reclassifying land within the jurisdiction of the city, subject to the pertinent
provisions of this Code, enacting integrated zoning ordinances in consonance with the
approved comprehensive land use plan, subject to existing laws, rules and regulations;
establishing fire limits or zones, particularly in populous centers; and regulating the
construction, repair or modification of buildings within said fire limits or zones in
accordance with the provisions of this Code;[Section 447 (2)(vi-ix)]

(3) Approving ordinances which shall ensure the efficient and effective delivery of the
basic services and facilities as provided for under Section 17 of this Code, and in
addition to said services and facilities, ...providing for the establishment, maintenance,
protection, and conservation of communal forests and watersheds, tree parks,
greenbelts, mangroves, and other similar forest development projects ....and, subject to
existing laws, establishing and providing for the maintenance, repair and operation of an
efficient waterworks system to supply water for the inhabitants and purifying the source
of the water supply; regulating the construction, maintenance, repair and use of
hydrants, pumps, cisterns and reservoirs; protecting the purity and quantity of the water
supply of the municipality and, for this purpose, extending the coverage of appropriate
ordinances over all territory within the drainage area of said water supply and within one
hundred (100) meters of the reservoir, conduit, canal, aqueduct, pumping station, or
watershed used in connection with the water service; and regulating the consumption,
use or wastage of water.”[Section 447 (5)(i) & (vii)]
Briefly stated, under the Local Government Code, two requisites must be met before a
national project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local
communities can be implemented:

(1) prior consultation with the affected local communities, and

(2)prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian.
Absent either of these mandatory requirements, the project’s implementation is illegal.