The People of the Philippines vs. Que Po Lay, G.R. No.

L-6791, March 29, 1954

G.R. No. L-6791 March 29, 1954

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
QUE PO LAY, defendant-appellant.

Prudencio de Guzman for appellant.

First Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., and Solicitor Lauro G. Marquez for appellee.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

Que Po Lay is appealing from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, finding him guilty of violating
Central Bank Circular No. 20 in connection with section 34 of Republic Act No. 265, and sentencing him to
suffer six months imprisonment, to pay a fine of P1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and to pay the costs.

The charge was that the appellant who was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of U.S. dollars, U.S.
checks and U.S. money orders amounting to about $7,000 failed to sell the same to the Central Bank through
its agents within one day following the receipt of such foreign exchange as required by Circular No. 20. the
appeal is based on the claim that said circular No. 20 was not published in the Official Gazette prior to the act
or omission imputed to the appellant, and that consequently, said circular had no force and effect. It is
contended that Commonwealth Act. No., 638 and Act 2930 both require said circular to be published in the
Official Gazette, it being an order or notice of general applicability. The Solicitor General answering this
contention says that Commonwealth Act. No. 638 and 2930 do not require the publication in the Official
Gazette of said circular issued for the implementation of a law in order to have force and effect.

We agree with the Solicitor General that the laws in question do not require the publication of the circulars,
regulations and notices therein mentioned in order to become binding and effective. All that said two laws
provide is that laws, resolutions, decisions of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, notices and documents
required by law to be of no force and effect. In other words, said two Acts merely enumerate and make a list of
what should be published in the Official Gazette, presumably, for the guidance of the different branches of the
Government issuing same, and of the Bureau of Printing.

However, section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that statutes passed by Congress shall, in
the absence of special provision, take effect at the beginning of the fifteenth day after the completion of the
publication of the statute in the Official Gazette. Article 2 of the new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) equally
provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. It is true that Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank is not a statute or law
but being issued for the implementation of the law authorizing its issuance, it has the force and effect of law
according to settled jurisprudence. (See U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil., 119 and authorities cited therein.)
Moreover, as a rule, circulars and regulations especially like the Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank in question
which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective, this, on the general
principle and theory that before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law,
regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specifically informed of said contents
and its penalties.

Our Old Civil code, ( Spanish Civil Code of 1889) has a similar provision about the effectivity of laws, (Article 1
thereof), namely, that laws shall be binding twenty days after their promulgation, and that their promulgation
shall be understood as made on the day of the termination of the publication of the laws in the Gazette.
Manresa, commenting on this article is of the opinion that the word "laws" include regulations and circulars
issued in accordance with the same. He says:
 El Tribunal Supremo, ha interpretado el articulo 1. del codigo Civil en Sentencia de 22 de Junio de
1910, en el sentido de que bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien
los Reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordenes dictadas de
conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad. Tambien el poder ejecutivo lo ha
venido entendiendo asi, como lo prueba el hecho de que muchas de sus disposiciones contienen la
advertencia de que empiezan a regir el mismo dia de su publicacion en la Gaceta, advertencia que
seria perfectamente inutil si no fuera de aplicacion al caso el articulo 1.o del Codigo Civil. (Manresa,
Codigo Civil Español, Vol. I. p. 52).

In the present case, although circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was issued in the year 1949, it was not
published until November 1951, that is, about 3 months after appellant's conviction of its violation. It is clear
that said circular, particularly its penal provision, did not have any legal effect and bound no one until its
publication in the Official Gazzette or after November 1951. In other words, appellant could not be held liable
for its violation, for it was not binding at the time he was found to have failed to sell the foreign exchange in his
possession thereof.

But the Solicitor General also contends that this question of non-publication of the Circular is being raised for
the first time on appeal in this Court, which cannot be done by appellant. Ordinarily, one may raise on appeal
any question of law or fact that has been raised in the court below and which is within the issues made by the
parties in their pleadings. (Section 19, Rule 48 of the Rules of Court). But the question of non-publication is
fundamental and decisive. If as a matter of fact Circular No. 20 had not been published as required by law
before its violation, then in the eyes of the law there was no such circular to be violated and consequently
appellant committed no violation of the circular or committed any offense, and the trial court may be said to
have had no jurisdiction. This question may be raised at any stage of the proceeding whether or not raised in
the court below.

In view of the foregoing, we reverse the decision appealed from and acquit the appellant, with costs de oficio.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion and Diokno, JJ., concur.
Tanada vs. Tuvera, G.R. No. L-63915, Decision dated April 24, 1985 and Resolution dated December 29, 198

G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR

BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN
VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ,
in his capacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as
Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:

Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article
IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be
published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to
compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders.

Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:

a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265,
286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429,
445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718,
731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143,
1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-
1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.

b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161,
173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239,
241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303,
309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405,
438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609,
610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940,
964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.

c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.

d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532,
1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-
1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-
1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-
1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847,
1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952,
1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.

e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510,
522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593,
594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.
 f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95,
107, 120, 122, 123.

g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.

The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that
petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the
absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-
publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality
to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:

SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required
to be done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the
petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.

Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its
object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition
to be given due course.

The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor
General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private
individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some
particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the
public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen,
79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to
procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at
whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the
result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws [High,
Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].

Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to
the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for the position
of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T.
Trent said:

We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the
relator is a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to be
enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable
to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a
particular case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because, if under the particular
circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and reliance
upon the rule may well lead to error'

No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for the
respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different from those in the United
States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no other person
could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear
and represent the people in cases of this character.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned case
apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public
right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this
proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that
the Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his
appearance for respondents in this case.

Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the
effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that
since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect,
publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on
Article 2 of the Civil Code:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...

The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a long line of
decisions,4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the
legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for
determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself
provides for the date when it goes into effect.

Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the
fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is
easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even
if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as
follows:

Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and
resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and
administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; [3]
decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be
deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or
classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or
classes of documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to
have general applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ...

The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws
which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be
no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to
punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not
even a constructive one.

Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital
significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed
solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations
in the Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records—no such publicity
accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of
knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing
themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la
denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones,
Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad. 5

The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the Official
Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty
must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be
given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette.
Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or
excluded from such publication.

The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by
law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise
impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential
issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive
orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6

It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he
must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta
vs. COMELEC 7:

In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the law
of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official
Gazette as the official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such
decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know where to obtain their official and
specific contents.

The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been
published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible
unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees
which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether the Court's
declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The
answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course
set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:

The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to
be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no
duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118
U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however,
that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be
taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to
invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects-with respect to particular conduct,
private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior
determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light
of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These
questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts,
state and federal and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.

Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party under the
Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared unconstitutional by this
Court.

Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official
Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute
retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."

From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees sought
by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive,
1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of
these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may be,
it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the
government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is
necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on
the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials
considering the manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from
prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in
some other publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect immediately.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding
force and effect.

SO ORDERED.

Relova, J., concurs.

Aquino, J., took no part.

Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.

La Bugal B’laan Tribal Assn. vs. Ramos, G.R. No. 127882, Jan. 27, 200

The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAA is a exception to the rule that
participation in the nation’s natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Provision must be construed
strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos.
RA 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act) took effect on April 9, 1995. Before the effectivity of RA 7942, or on March
30, 1995, the President signed a Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with WMCP, a
corporation organized under Philippine laws, covering close to 100,000 hectares of land in South Cotabato,
Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato. On August 15, 1995, the Environment Secretary Victor
Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order 95-23, which was later repealed by DENR Administrative Order 96-
40, adopted on December 20, 1996.
Petitioners prayed that RA 7942, its implementing rules, and the FTAA between the government and WMCP
be declared unconstitutional on ground that they allow fully foreign owned corporations like WMCP to exploit,
explore and develop Philippine mineral resources in contravention of Article XII Section 2 paragraphs 2 and 4
of the Charter.
In January 2001, WMC – a publicly listed Australian mining and exploration company – sold its whole stake in
WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, 60% of which is owned by Filipinos while 40% of which is owned by Indophil
Resources, an Australian company. DENR approved the transfer and registration of the FTAA in Sagittarius‘
name but Lepanto Consolidated assailed the same. The latter case is still pending before the Court of Appeals.
EO 279, issued by former President Aquino on July 25, 1987, authorizes the DENR to accept, consider and
evaluate proposals from foreign owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving
wither technical or financial assistance for large scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals
which upon appropriate recommendation of the (DENR) Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign
proponent. WMCP likewise contended that the annulment of the FTAA would violate a treaty between the
Philippines and Australia which provides for the protection of Australian investments.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional for allowing fully foreign-owned corporations to
exploit the Philippine mineral resources. 2. Whether or not the FTAA between the government and WMCP is a
―service contract that permits fully foreign owned companies to exploit the Philippine mineral resources.

HELD:

First Issue: RA 7942 is Unconstitutional

RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is unconstitutional for permitting fully foreign owned corporations
to exploit the Philippine natural resources.
Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian Doctrine which states that ―All lands of the
public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils,
all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources
are owned by the State. The same section also states that, ―the exploration and development and utilization
of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.
Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the provision in the 1935 and 1973 Constitution authorizing the State to
grant licenses, concessions, or leases for the exploration, exploitation, development, or utilization of natural
resources. By such omission, the utilization of inalienable lands of the public domain through license,
concession or lease is no longer allowed under the 1987 Constitution.
Under the concession system, the concessionaire makes a direct equity investment for the purpose of
exploiting a particular natural resource within a given area. The concession amounts to complete control by the
concessionaire over the country‘s natural resource, for it is given exclusive and plenary rights to exploit a
particular resource at the point of extraction.
The 1987 Constitution, moreover, has deleted the phrase ―management or other forms of assistance in the
1973 Charter. The present Constitution now allows only ―technical and financial assistance. The management
and the operation of the mining activities by foreign contractors, the primary feature of the service contracts
was precisely the evil the drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to avoid.
The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs is an exception to the rule that
participation in the nation‘s natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly, such provision
must be construed strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos. Therefore, RA 7942 is invalid insofar as the
said act authorizes service contracts. Although the statute employs the phrase ―financial and
technical agreements in accordance with the 1987 Constitution, its pertinent provisions actually treat
these agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial ownership to foreign contractors contrary to the
fundamental law.
The underlying assumption in the provisions of the law is that the foreign contractor manages the mineral
resources just like the foreign contractor in a service contract. By allowing foreign contractors to manage or
operate all the aspects of the mining operation, RA 7942 has, in effect, conveyed beneficial ownership over the
nation‘s mineral resources to these contractors, leaving the State with nothing but bare title thereto.
The same provisions, whether by design or inadvertence, permit a circumvention of the constitutionally
ordained 60-40% capitalization requirement for corporations or associations engaged in the exploitation,
development and utilization of Philippine natural resources.
When parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions, considerations, inducements
or compensations for each other as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, then if
some parts are unconstitutional, all provisions that are thus dependent, conditional or connected, must fail with
them.
Under Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Charter, foreign owned corporations are limited only to merely technical
or financial assistance to the State for large scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals,
petroleum and other mineral oils.
Second Issue: RP Government-WMCP FTAA is a Service Contract
The FTAA between he WMCP and the Philippine government is likewise unconstitutional since the agreement
itself is a service contract.
Section 1.3 of the FTAA grants WMCP a fully foreign owned corporation, the exclusive right to explore, exploit,
utilize and dispose of all minerals and by-products that may be produced from the contract area. Section 1.2 of
the same agreement provides that EMCP shall provide all financing, technology, management, and personnel
necessary for the Mining Operations.
These contractual stipulations and related provisions in the FTAA taken together, grant WMCP beneficial
ownership over natural resources that properly belong to the State and are intended for the benefit of its
citizens. These stipulations are abhorrent to the 1987 Constitution. They are precisely the vices that the
fundamental law seeks to avoid, the evils that it aims to suppress. Consequently, the contract from which they
spring must be struck down.
Umali vs. Estanislao, G.R. No. 104037, May 29, 1999

PADILLA, J.:
These consolidated cases are petitions for mandamus and prohibition, premised upon the following undisputed
facts:
Congress enacted Rep. Act 7167, entitled "AN ACT ADJUSTING THE BASIC PERSONAL AND ADDITIONAL
EXEMPTIONS ALLOWABLE TO INDIVIDUALS FOR INCOME TAX PURPOSES TO THE POVERTY
THRESHOLD LEVEL, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTION 29, PARAGRAPH (L), ITEMS (1) AND (2)
(A) OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." It
provides as follows:
"SECTION (1). The first paragraph of item (1), paragraph (1) of Section 29 of the National Internal Revenue
Code, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
(1) Personal Exemptions allowable to individuals (1) Basic personal exemption as follows:
'For single individual or married individual judicially decreed as legally separated with no qualified dependents
P9,000
For head of a family …………………….. P12,000
For married individual........................... … P18,000
Provided, That husband and wife electing to compute their income tax separately shall be entitled to a personal
exemption of P9,000 each.'
SEC. 2. The first paragraph of item (2) (A), paragraph (1) of Section 29 of the same Code, as amended, is
hereby further amended to read as follows:
'(2) Additional exemption.
(A) Taxpayers with dependents. A married individual or a head of family shall be allowed an additional
exemption of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000) for each dependent: Provided, That the total number of
dependents for which additional exemptions may be claimed shall not exceed four dependents: Provided,
further, That an additional exemption of One Thousand Pesos (1,000) shall be allowed for each child who
otherwise qualified as dependent prior to January 1, 1980: Provided, finally, That the additional exemption for
dependents shall be claimed by only one of the spouses in case of married individuals electing to compute
their income tax liabilities separately.'
SEC. 3. This act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved."[1]
The said act was signed and approved by the President on 19 December 1991 and published on 14 January
1992 in "Malaya" a newspaper of general circulation.
On 26 December 1992, respondents promulgated Revenue Regulations No. 1-92, the pertinent portions of
which read as follows:
"SEC. 1. SCOPE Pursuant to Sections 245 and 72 of the National Internal Revenue Code in relation to
Republic Act No. 7167, these Regulations are hereby promulgated prescribing the collection at source of
income tax on compensation income paid on or after January 1, 1992 under the Revised Withholding Tax
Tables (ANNEX "A") which take into account the increase of personal and additional exemptions.
x x x x x
SEC. 3. Section 8 of Revenue Regulations No. 6-82 as amended by Revenue Regulations No. 1-86 is hereby
further amended to read as follows:
'Section 8. Right to claim the following exemptions.' x x x
Each employee shall be allowed to claim the following amount of exemption with respect to compensation paid
on or after January 1, 1992.
x x x x x
SEC. 5. EFFECTIVITY. These regulations shall take effect on compensation income from January 1, 1992."
On 27 February 1992, the petitioner in G.R. No. 104037, a taxpayer and a resident of Gitnang Bayan
Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro, filed a petition for mandamus for himself and in behalf of all individual Filipino
taxpayers, to COMPEL the respondents to implement Rep. Act 7167 with respect to taxable income of
individual taxpayers earned or received on or after 1 January 1991 or as of taxable year ending 31 December
1991.
On 28 February 1992, the petitioners in G.R. No. 104069 likewise filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition
on their behalf as well as for those other individual taxpayers who might be similarly situated, to compel the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue to implement the mandate of Rep. Act 7167 adjusting the personal and
additional exemptions allowable to individuals for income tax purposes in regard to income earned or received
in 1991, and to enjoin the respondents from implementing Revenue Regulations No.1-92.
In the Court's resolution of 10 March 1992, these two (2) cases were consolidated. Respondents were required
to comment on the petitions, which they did within the prescribed period.
The principal issues to be resolved in these cases are: (1) whether or not Rep. Act 7167 took effect upon its
approval by the President on 19 December 1991, or on 30 January 1992, i.e., after fifteen (15) days following
its publication on 14 January 1992 in the "Malaya" a newspaper of general circulation; and (2) assuming that
Rep. Act 7167 took effect on 30 January 1992, whether or not the said law nonetheless covers or applies to
compensation income earned or received during calendar year 1991.
In resolving the first issue, it will be recalled that the Court in its resolution in Caltex (Phils.), Inc. vs. The
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 97282, 26 June1991 -- which is on all fours with this case as to
the first issue -- held:
"The central issue presented in the instant petition is the effectivity of R.A 6965 entitled 'An Act Revising The
Form of Taxation on Petroleum Products from Ad Valorem to Specific, Amending For the Purpose Section 145
of the National Internal Revenue Code, As amended by Republic Act Numbered Sixty Seven Hundred Sixty
Seven.'
Section 3 of R.A. 6965 contains the effectivity clause which provides, 'This Act shall take effect upon its
approval'
R.A. 6965 was approved on September 19, 1990. It was published in the Philippine Journal, a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines, on September 20, 1990. Pursuant to the Act, an implementing regulation
was issued by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Revenue Memorandum Circular 85-90, stating that R.A.
6965 took effect on October 5, 1990. Petitioner took exception thereof and argued that the law took effect on
September 20, 1990 instead.
Pertinent is Article 2 of the Civil Code (as amended by Executive Order No. 200) which provides:
'Article. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the
official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided. x x x'
In the case of Tanada vs. Tuvera (L-63915, December 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 446, 452) we construed Article 2
of the Civil Code and laid down the rule:
'x x x: the) clause 'unless it is otherwise provided' refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislator may
make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date without its previous publication.'
'Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual
fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. x x x'
Inasmuch as R.A. 6965 has no specific date for its effectivity and neither can it become effective upon its
approval notwithstanding its express statement, following Article 2 of the Civil Code and the doctrine
enunciated in Tanada, supra, R.A. 6965 took effect fifteen days after September 20, 1990, or specifically, on
October 5,1990."
Accordingly, the Court rules that Rep. Act 7167 took effect on 30 January 1992, which is after fifteen (15) days
following its publication on 14 January 1992 in the "Malaya."
Coming now to the second issue, the Court is of the considered view that Rep. Act 7167 should cover or
extend to compensation income earned or received during calendar year 1991.
Sec. 29, par. (L), Item No. 4 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, provides:
"Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, the President shall automatically adjust not more often
than once every three years, the personal and additional exemptions taking into account, among others, the
movement in consumer price indices, levels of minimum wages, and bare subsistence levels."
As the personal and additional exemptions of individual taxpayers were last adjusted in 1986, the President,
upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, could have adjusted the personal and additional
exemptions in 1989 by increasing the same even without any legislation providing for such adjustment. But the
President did not.
However, House Bill 28970, which was subsequently enacted by Congress as Rep. Act 7167, was introduced
in the House of Representatives in 1989 although its passage was delayed and it did not become effective law
until 30 January 1992. A perusal, however, of the sponsorship remarks of Congressman Hernando B. Perez,
Chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means, on House Bill 28970, provides an indication of the
intent of Congress in enacting Rep. Act 7167. The pertinent legislative journal contains the following.
"At the outset, Mr. Perez explained that the Bill Provides for increased personal additional exemptions to
individuals in view of the higher standard of living.
"The Bill, he stated, limits the amount of income of individuals subject to income tax to enable them to spend
for basic necessities and have more disposable income.
xxx xxx xxx
"Mr. Perez added that inflation has raised the basic necessities and that it had been three years since the last
exemption adjustment in 1986.
xxx xxx xxx
"Subsequently, Mr. Perez stressed the necessity of passing the measure to mitigate the effects of the current
inflation and of the implementation of the salary standardization law. Stating that it is imperative for the
government to take measures to ease the burden of the individual income tax filers, Mr. Perez then cited
specific examples of how the measure can help assuage the burden to the taxpayers.
"He then reiterated that the increase in the prices of commodities has eroded the purchasing power of the peso
despite the recent salary increases and emphasized that the Bill will serve to compensate the adverse effects
of inflation on the taxpayers. x x x." (Journal of the House of Representatives, May 23, 1990, pp. 32-33).
It will also be observed that Rep. Act 7167 speaks of the adjustments that it provides for, as adjustments
"to the poverty threshold level". Certainly, "the poverty threshold level" is the poverty threshold level at the time
Rep. Act 7167 was enacted by Congress, not poverty threshold levels in futuro, at which time there may be
need of further adjustments in personal exemptions. Moreover, the Court can not lose sight of the fact that
these personal and additional exemptions are fixed amounts to which an individual taxpayer is entitled, as a
means to cushion the devastating effects of high prices and a depreciated purchasing power of the currency. In
the end, it is the lower-income and the middle-income groups of taxpayers (not the high-income taxpayers)
who stand to benefit most from the increase of personal and additional exemptions provided for by Rep. Act
7167. To that extent, the act is a social legislation intended to alleviate in part the present economic plight of
the lower income taxpayers. It is intended to remedy the inadequacy of the heretofore existing personal and
additional exemptions for individual taxpayers.
And then, Rep. Act 7167 says that the increased personal exemptions that it provides for shall be available
thenceforth, that is, after Rep. Act 7167 shall have become effective. In other words, these exemptions are
available upon the filing of personal income tax returns which is, under the National Internal Revenue Code,
done not later than the 15th day of April after the end of a calendar year. Thus, under Rep. Act 7167, which
became effective, as aforestated, on 30 January 1992, the increased exemptions are literally available on or
before 15 April 1992 (though not before 30 January 1992). But these increased exemptions can be available
on 15 April 1992 only in respect of compensation income earned or received during the calendar year 1991.
The personal exemptions as increased by Rep. Act 7167 cannot be regarded as available in respect of
compensation income received during the 1990 calendar year; the tax due in respect of said income had
already accrued, and been presumably paid, by 15 April 1991 and by 15 July 1991, at which time Rep. Act
7167 had not been enacted. To make Rep. Act 7167 refer back to income received during 1990 would require
language explicitly retroactive in purport and effect, language that would have to authorize the payment of
refunds of taxes paid on 15 April 1991 and 15 July 1991: such language is simply not found in Rep. Act 7167.
The personal exemptions as increased by Rep. Act 7167 cannot be regarded as available only in respect of
compensation income received during 1992, as the implementing Revenue Regulations No. 1-92 purport to
provide. Revenue Regulations No. 1-92 would in effect postpone the availability of the increased exemptions to
1 January-15 April 1993, and thus literally defer the effectivity of Rep. Act 7167 to 1 January 1993. Thus, the
implementing regulations collide frontally with Section 3 of Rep. Act 7167 which states that the statute "shall
take effect upon its approval." The objective of the Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue in postponing through Revenue Regulations No. 1-92 the legal effectivity of Rep. Act 7167 is, of
course, entirely understandable -- to defer to 1993 the reduction of governmental tax revenues which
irresistibly follows from the application of Rep. Act 7167. But the law-making authority has spoken and the
Court can not refuse to apply the law-maker's words. Whether or not the government can afford the drop in tax
revenues resulting from such increased exemptions was for Congress (not this Court) to decide.
WHEREFORE, Sections 1, 3 and 5 of Revenue Regulations No. 1-92 which provide that the regulations shall
take effect on compensation income earned or received from 1 January 1992 are hereby SET ASIDE. They
should take effect on compensation income earned or received from 1 January 1991.
Since this decision promulgated after 15 April 1992, the individual taxpayers entitled to the increased
exemptions on compensation income earned during calendar year 1991 who may have filed their income tax
returns on or before 15 April 1992 (later extended to 24 April 1992) without the benefit of such increased
exemptions, are entitled to the corresponding tax refunds and/or credits, and respondents are ordered to effect
such refunds and/or credits. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,
Nocon, and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., see concurrence.
Paras, J., see dissenting and concurring opinion.

[1]
Before the enactment of Rep. Act 7167, Executive Order No. 37 approved by the President on 31 July 1986,
provided for the following personal and additional exemptions for individual taxpapers:
(1) Personal exemptions allowable to individuals. - (1) Basic personal exemption. - For the purpose of
determining the tax provided in Section 21(a) of this Title, there shall be allowed a basic personal exemption as
follows:
For single individual or married individual judicially decreed as legally separated with no qualified
dependents P 6,000
For head of a family P 7,500
For married individual P12,000
Provided, That husband and wife electing to compute their income tax separately shall be entitled to a personal
exemption of P6,000 each.
For purposes of this paragraph, the term 'Head of Family' means an unmarried or legally separated man or
woman with one or both parents, or with one or more brothers or sisters, or with one or more legitimate,
recognized natural or legally adopted children living with and dependent upon him for their chief support, where
such brothers or sisters or children are not more than twenty-one (21) years of age, unmarried and not
gainfully employed or where such children, brothers or sisters, regardless of age are incapable of self-support
because of mental or physical defect.
(2) Additional exemption
(A) Taxpayers with dependents. - A married individual or a head of family shall be allowed an additional
exemption of Three thousand pesos (P3,000) for each dependent: Provided, That the total number of
dependents for which additional exemptions may be claimed shall not exceed four dependents: Provided,
further, That an additional exemption of One thousand pesos (P1,000) shall be allowed for each child who
otherwise qualified as dependent prior to January 1, 1980: and Provided, finally, That the additional exemption
for dependents shall be claimed by only one of the spouses in the case of married individuals electing to
compute their income tax liabilities separately.
In case of legally separated spouses, additional exemptions may be claimed only by the spouse who was
awarded custody of the child or children: Provided, That the total amount of additional exemptions that may be
claimed by both shall not exceed the maximum additional exemptions herein allowed:
For purposes of this paragraph, a dependent means a legitimate, recognized natural or legally adopted child
chiefly dependent upon and living with the taxpayer if such dependent is not more than twenty-one (21) years
of age, unmarried and not gainfully employed or if such dependent, regardless of age, is incapable of self-
support because of mental or physical defect.
Fortune Motors (Phils.), Inc. vs. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co., et al., G.R. No. 115068, November 28, 1996,
265 SCRA

Before us is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R CV No. 38340 entitled
"Fortune Motors (Phils.) Inc., v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company Et. Al." 1 The appellate court’s decision
reversed the decision in Civil Case No. 89-5637 of Branch 150 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.

It appears that Fortune Motors (Phils.) Inc. obtained the following loans from the Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company 220 Million, on March 31, 1982; (2) P8 Million, on April 30, 1983; (3) P2,500,000.00, on June 8, 1983
and; (4) P3 Million, on August 16, 1983.

On January 6, 1984, respondent bank consolidated the loans of P8 Million and P3 Million into one promissory
note, which amounted to P12,650,000.00. This included the interest that had accrued thereon in the amount of
P1,650,000.00.

To secure the obligation in the total amount of P34,150,000.00, petitioner mortgaged certain real estate in
favor of respondent bank.

Due to financial constraints, petitioner failed to pay the loan upon maturity. Consequently on May 25, 1984,
respondent bank initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings and in effect, foreclosed the real estate
mortgage.

The extrajudicial foreclosure was actually conducted by Senior Deputy Sheriff Pablo Y. Sy who had sent
copies of the Notice of Extrajudicial Sale to the opposing parties by registered mail. In accordance with law, he
posted copies of the Notice of Sheriff’s Sale at three conspicuous public places in Makati — the office of the
Sheriff, the Assessor’s Office and the Register of Deeds in Makati. He thereafter executed the Certificates of
Posting on May 20, 1984. The said notice was in fact published on June 2, 9 and 16, 1984 in three issues of
"The New Record." An affidavit of publication, dated June 19, 1984, 2 was executed by Teddy F. Borres,
publisher of the said newspaper.

Subsequently, the mortgaged property was sold at public auction for 47,899,264.91 to the mortgagee bank, the
highest bidder.

Petitioner failed to redeem the mortgaged property within the one-year redemption period and so, the titles
thereto were consolidated in the name of respondent bank by which token the latter was entitled to the
possession of the property mortgaged and, in fact possessed the same.

Petitioner then filed a complaint for the annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure, which covered TCT Nos.
461087, 432685, 457590, 432684, S-54185, S-54186, S-54187, and S-54188.

On December 27, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment annulling the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgage.

On May 14, 1992, an appeal was interposed by the respondent to the Court of Appeals. Acting thereon, the
Court of Appeals reversed the decision rendered by the lower court. Subsequently, the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied on April 26, 1994.

Aggrieved by the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals, petitioner appealed before this Court. On May 30,
1994, however, we issued a Resolution denying said petition. Hence, this motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner raises the following issues before us, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

"I
THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE PUBLICATION OF THE NOTICE OF
EXTRAJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE WAS VALID. 3

II

THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE NOTICES OF
EXTRAJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE, AND SALE WERE DULY RECEIVED BY THE PETITIONER. 4

III

THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO ADJUDGE THE IRREGULARITIES IN THE
BIDDING, POSTING, PUBLICATION, AND THE SALE OF FORTUNE BUILDING. 5

IV

THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RENDERING A JUDGMENT BASED ON

PRESUMPTION." 6

Petitioner contends that the newspaper "Daily Record" 7 where the notice of extrajudicial foreclosure was
published does not qualify as a newspaper of general circulation.

It further contends that the population that can be reached by the "Daily Record" is only .004% as its circulation
in Makati in 1984, was 1000 to 1500 per week. Hence, it concludes that only 1648 out of a population of
412,069 were probable readers of the "Daily Record," and that this is not the standard contemplated by law
when it refers to a newspaper of general circulation.

In the case of Bonnevie v. Court of Appeals, 8 we had already made a ruling on this
point:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The argument that the publication of the notice in the ‘Luzon Weekly Courier’ was not in accordance with law
as said newspaper is not of general circulation must likewise be disregarded. The affidavit of publication,
executed by the publisher, business/advertising manager of the Luzon Weekly Courier, states that it is ‘a
newspaper of general circulation in . . . Rizal; and that the Notice of Sheriff’s sale was published in said paper
on June 30, July 7 and July 14, 1968.’ This constitutes prima facie evidence of compliance with the requisite
publication. (Sadang v. GSIS, 18 SCRA 491).

To be a newspaper of general circulation, it is enough that ‘it is published for the dissemination of local news
and general information; that it has a bona fide subscription list of paying subscribers; that it is published at
regular intervals.’ (Basa v. Mercado, 61 Phil. 632). The newspaper need not have the largest circulation so
long as it is of general circulation. (Banta v. Pacheco, 74 Phil. 67)."cralaw virtua1aw library

In the case at bench, there was sufficient compliance with the requirements of the law regarding publication of
the notice in a newspaper of general circulation. This is evidenced by the affidavit of publication executed by
the New Record’s publisher, Teddy F. Borres, which stated that it is a newspaper edited in Manila and Quezon
City and of general circulation in the cities of Manila, Quezon City et. al., and in the Provinces of Rizal . . .,
published every Saturday by the Daily Record, Inc. This was affirmed by Pedro Deyto, who was the executive
editor of the said newspaper and who was a witness for petitioner. Deyto testified: a) that the New Record
contains news; b) that it has subscribers from Metro Manila and from all over the Philippines; c) that it is
published once a week or four times a month; and d) that he had been connected with the said paper since
1958, an indication that the said newspaper had been in existence even before that year. 9

Another contention posited by petitioner is that the New Record is published and edited in Quezon City and not
in Makati where the foreclosed property is situated, and that, when New Record’s publisher enumerated the
places where said newspaper is being circulated, Makati was not mentioned.
This contention of petitioner is untenable. In 1984, when the publisher’s affidavit relied upon by petitioner was
executed, Makati, Mandaluyong, San Juan, Parañaque et.al., were still part of the province of Rizal.
Apparently, this is the reason why in the New Record’s affidavit of publication executed by its publisher, the
enumeration of the places where it was being circulated, only the cities of Manila, Quezon, Caloocan, Pasay,
Tagaytay et. al., were named. Furthermore, as aptly ratiocinated by the Court of
Appeals:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The application given by the trial court to the provisions of P.D. No. 1079 is, to our mind, too narrow and
restricted and could not have been the intention of the said law. Were the interpretation of the trial court (sic) to
be followed, even the leading dailies in the country like the ‘Manila Bulletin,’ the ‘Philippine Daily Inquirer,’ or
‘The Philippine Star’ which all enjoy a wide circulation throughout the country, cannot publish legal notices that
would be honored outside the place of their publication. But this is not the interpretation given by the courts.
For what is important is that a paper should be in general circulation in the place where the properties to be
foreclosed are located in order that publication may serve the purpose for which it was intended." 10

Petitioner also claims that the New Record is not a daily newspaper because it is published only once a week.

A perusal of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1079 and Act 3135 shows that the said laws do not require that the
newspaper which publishes judicial notices should be a daily newspaper. Under P.D. 1079, for a newspaper to
qualify, it is enough that it be a "newspaper or periodical which is authorized by law to publish and which is
regularly published for at least one (1) year before the date of publication" which requirement was satisfied by
New Record. Nor is there a requirement, as stated in the said law, that the newspaper should have the largest
circulation in the place of publication.

Petitioner claims that, when its representative went to a newspaper stand to look for a copy of the new Record,
he could not find any. This allegation can not be made a basis to conclude that the newspaper "New Record" is
not of general circulation. By its own admission, petitioner’s representative was looking for a newspaper named
"Daily Record." Naturally, he could not find a newspaper by that name as the newspaper’s name is "New
Record" and not "Daily Record." Although it is the Daily Record Inc. which publishes the New Record, it does
not mean that the name of the newspaper is Daily Record.

Petitioner contends that, since it was the Executive Judge who caused the publication of the notice of the sale
and not the Sheriff, the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage should be deemed annulled.

Petitioner’s contention in this regard is bereft of merit, because Sec. 2 of P.D. No. 1079 clearly provides
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The executive judge of the court of first instance shall designate a regular working day and a definite time
each week during which the said judicial notices or advertisements shall be distributed personally by him 11 for
publication to qualified newspapers or periodicals . . ., which distribution shall be done by raffle."cralaw
virtua1aw library

The said provision of the law is clear as to who should personally distribute the judicial notices or
advertisements to qualified newspapers for publication. There was substantial compliance with the
requirements when it was the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati who caused the
publication of the said notice by the newspaper selected by means of raffle.

With regard to the second assigned error wherein petitioner claims that it did not personally receive the notices
of extrajudicial foreclosure and sale supposedly sent to it by Metrobank, we find the same unmeritorious.

Settled is the rule that personal notice to the mortgagor in extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings is not
necessary. Section 3 of Act No. 3135 governing extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgages, as amended
by Act No. 4118, requires only the posting of the notice of sale in three public places and the publication of that
notice in a newspaper of general circulation. It is pristine clear from the above provision that the lack of
personal notice to the mortgagor, herein petitioner, is not a ground to set aside the foreclosure sale. 12
Petitioner’s expostulation that it did not receive the mailed notice to it of the sale of the mortgaged property
should be brushed aside. The fact that respondent was able to receive the registry return card from the mail in
regular course shows that the postal item represented by the return card had been received by the addressee.
Otherwise, as correctly contended by respondent, the mailed item should have been stamped "Returned to
Sender," still sealed with all the postal markings, and the return card still attached to it.

As to the contention that the signature appearing on the registry return card receipt appears to be only a dot
and that the photostat copy does not contain a signature at all we find, after a close scrutiny of the registry
return card, that there are strokes before and after the dot. These strokes appear to be a signature which
signifies: a) that the registry claim card was received at the given address; b) that the addressee had
authorized a person to present the claim card at the post office and receive the registered mail matter; and c)
that the authorized person signed the return card to acknowledge his receipt of the mail matter. Even the trial
court in its decision ruled that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . the Court finds no cogent reason to overcome the presumption that Sheriff Pablo Sy performed his task
regularly and in accordance with the rules. A closer look at the assailed xerox copy of the registry receipt and
the original form which said xerox was admittedly copied would indeed show that the xerox is not a faithful
reproduction of the original since it does not bear the complete signature of the addressee as appearing on the
original. It does not, however, follow that the xerox is a forgery. The same bears slight traces of the signature
appearing on the original but, there is no indication that the one was altered to conform to the other. Rather,
there must have been only a misprint of the xerox but not amounting to any attempt to falsify the same.” 13

Petitioner also claims that it had transferred to a different location but the notice was sent to its old address.
Petitioner failed to notify respondent of its supposed change of address. Needless to say, it can be surmised
that respondent had sent the notice to petitioner’s official address.

Anent its third assigned error, petitioner assails the posting of the notices of sale by the Sheriff in the Office of
the Sheriff, Office of the Assessor and the Register of Deeds as these are not the conspicuous public places
required by law. Furthermore, it also questions the non-posting of the notice of sale on the property itself which
was to be sold.

Apparently, this assigned error of petitioner is tantamount to a last ditch effort to extricate itself from the
quagmire it is in. Act 3135 does not require posting of the notice of sale on the mortgaged property. Section 3
of the said law merely requires that the notice of the sale be posted for not less than twenty days in at least
three public places of the municipality or city where the property is situated. The aforementioned places, to wit:
the Sheriff’s Office, the Assessor’s Office and the Register of Deeds are certainly the public places
contemplated by law, as these are places where people interested in purchasing real estate congregate.

With regard to the fourth assigned error of petitioner, we do not subscribe to the latter’s view that the decision
of the Court of Appeals was mainly based on the presumption of the regularity of the performance of official
function of the officers involved. A perusal of the records indubitably shows that the requirement of Act No.
3135 on the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage had been duly complied with by Senior Deputy
Sheriff Sy.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision rendered in CA-G.R CV No. 38340 is hereby
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
ART. 4
∙ Albino Co vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100776, October 28, 1

NARVASA, C.J.:

In connection with an agreement to salvage and refloat asunken vessel - and in payment of his share of the
expenses of the salvage operations therein stipulated - petitioner Albino Co delivered to the salvaging firm on
September 1, 1983 a check drawn against the Associated Citizens' Bank, postdated November 30, 1983 in the
sum of P361,528.00. 1 The check was deposited on January 3, 1984. It was dishonored two days later, the
tersely-stated reason given by the bank being: "CLOSED ACCOUNT." chanrobles virtual law library

A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 2 was filed by the salvage company against
Albino Co with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. The case eventuated in Co's conviction of the crime
charged, and his being sentenced to suffer a term of imprisonment of sixty (60) days and to indemnify the
salvage company in the sum of P361,528.00.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Co appealed to the Court of Appeals. There he sought exoneration upon the theory that it was reversible error
for the Regional Trial Court to have relied, as basis for its verdict of conviction, on the ruling rendered on
September 21, 1987 by this Court in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) 3 - i.e., that a check issued merely
to guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22. This was because at
the time of the issuance of the check on September 1, 1983, some four (4) years prior to the promulgation of
the judgment in Que v. People on September 21, 1987, the delivery of a "rubber" or "bouncing" check as
guarantee for an obligation was not considered a punishable offense, an official pronouncement made in a
Circular of the Ministry of Justice. That Circular (No. 4), dated December 15, 1981, pertinently provided as
follows:

2.3.4. Where issuance of bouncing check is neither estafa nor violation of B.P. Blg.
22.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Where the check is issued as part of an arrangement to guarantee or secure the payment of an obligation,
whether pre-existing or not, the drawer is not criminally liable for either estafa or violation of B.P. Blg. 22 (Res.
No. 438, s. 1981, Virginia Montano vs. Josefino Galvez, June 19, 1981; Res. No. 707, s. 1989; Alice Quizon
vs. Lydia Calingo, October 23, 1981, Res. No. 769, s. 1981, Alfredo Guido vs. Miguel A. Mateo, et. al.,
November 17, 1981; Res. No. 589, s. 1981, Zenaida Lazaro vs. Maria Aquino, August 7, 1981).

This administrative circular was subsequently reversed by another issued on August 8, 1984 (Ministry Circular
No. 12) - almost one (1) year after Albino Co had delivered the "bouncing" check to the complainant on
September 1, 1983. Said Circular No. 12, after observing inter alia that Circular No. 4 of December 15, 1981
appeared to have been based on "a misapplication of the deliberation in the Batasang Pambansa, . . . (or) the
explanatory note on the original bill, i.e. that the intention was not to penalize the issuance of a check to secure
or guarantee the payment of an obligation," as follows: 4

Henceforth, conforming with the rule that an administrative agency having interpreting authority may reverse its
administration interpretation of a statute, but that its review interpretation applies only prospectively (Waterbury
Savings Bank vs. Danaher, 128 Conn., 476; 20 a2d 455 (1941), in all cases involving violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 where the check in question is issued after this date, the claim that the check is issued as a
guarantee or part of an arrangement to secure an obligation collection will no longer be considered a valid
defense.

Co's theory was rejected by the Court of Appeals which affirmed his conviction. Citing Senarillos
v. Hermosisima, 101 Phil. 561, the Appellate Court opined that the Que doctrine did not amount to the passage
of new law but was merely a construction or interpretation of a pre-existing one, i.e., BP 22, enacted on April 3,
1979.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
From this adverse judgment of the Court of Appeals, Albino Co appealed to this Court on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. By Resolution dated September 9, 1991, the Court dismissed his appeal. Co moved
for reconsideration under date of October 2, 1991. The Court required comment thereon by the Office of the
Solicitor General. The latter complied and, in its comment dated December 13, 1991, extensively argued
against the merits of Albino Co's theory on appeal, which was substantially that proffered by him in the Court of
Appeals. To this comment, Albino Co filed a reply dated February 14, 1992. After deliberating on the parties'
arguments and contentions, the Court resolved, in the interests of justice, to reinstate Albino Co's appeal and
adjudicate the same on its merits.

Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of
the Philippines," according to Article 8 of the Civil Code. "Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided," declares Article 4 of the same Code, a declaration that is echoed by Article 22 of the
Revised Penal Code: "Penal laws shall have, a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a
felony, who is not a habitual criminal . . . 5chanrobles virtual law library

The principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory, has been applied in many cases. These
include: Buyco v. PNB, 961 2 SCRA 682 (June 30, 1961), holding that Republic Act No. 1576 which divested
the Philippine National Bank of authority to accept back pay certificates in payment of loans, does not apply to
an offer of payment made before effectivity of the act; Largado v. Masaganda, et al., 5 SCRA 522 (June 30,
1962), ruling that RA 2613, s amended by RA 3090 on June, 1961, granting to inferior courts jurisdiction over
guardianship cases, could not be given retroactive effect, in the absence of a saving clause; Larga v. Ranada,
Jr., 64 SCRA 18, to the effect that Sections 9 and 10 of Executive Order No. 90, amending Section 4 of PD
1752, could have no retroactive application; People v. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640, holding that a person cannot
be convicted of violating Circular No. 20 of the Central, when the alleged violation occurred before publication
of the Circular in the Official Gazette; Baltazar v. C.A., 104 SCRA 619, denying retroactive application to P.D.
No. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil, and P.D. No. 316 prohibiting
ejectment of tenants from rice and corn farmholdings, pending the promulgation of rules and regulations
implementing P.D. No. 27; Nilo v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 519, adjudging that RA 6389 whichremoved
"personal cultivation" as a ground for the ejectment of a tenant cannot be given retroactive effect in the
absence of a statutory statement for retroactivity; Tac-An v. CA, 129 SCRA 319, ruling that the repeal of the
old Administrative Code by RA 4252 could not be accorded retroactive effect; Ballardo v. Borromeo, 161 SCRA
500, holding that RA 6389 should have only prospective application; (see also Bonifacio v. Dizon, 177 SCRA
294 and Balatbat v. CA, 205 SCRA 419).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The prospectivity principle has also been made to apply to administrative rulings and circulars, to wit: ABS-
CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. CTA, Oct. 12, 1981, 108 SCRA 142, holding that a circular or ruling of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue may not be given retroactive effect adversely to a taxpayer: Sanchez
v. COMELEC, 193 SCRA 317, ruling that Resolution No. 90-0590 of the Commission on Elections, which
directed the holding of recall proceedings, had no retroactive application; Romualdez v. CSC, 197 SCRA 168,
where it was ruled that CSC Memorandum Circular No. 29, s. 1989 cannot be given retrospective effect so as
to entitle to permanent appointment an employee whose temporary appointment had expired before the
Circular was issued.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The principle of prospectivity has also been applied to judicial decisions which, "although in themselves not
laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, . . . (this being) the reason whyunder Article 8 of the
New Civil Code, 'Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the
legal system . . .'"chanrobles virtual law library

So did this Court hold, for example, in Peo. v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607, 611:

It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the Provincial Government in 1962, and
Confidential Agent by the Provincial commander in 1964, the prevailing doctrine on the matter was that laid
down by Us in People v. Macarandang (1959) and People v. Lucero (1958). 6 Our decision in People
v. Mapa, 7reversing the aforesaid doctrine, came only in 1967. The sole question in this appeal is: should
appellant be acquitted on the basis of Our rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand
in view of the complete reverse of the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? . .
.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean,
and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system . . ."The interpretation upon a law by this Court
constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that law was originally passed, since this Court's
construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus construed intends to
effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of the legal maxim "legis
interpretation legis vim obtinet" - the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the
force of law. The doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the
law, of the land, at the time appellant was found in possession of the firearm in question and where he was
arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a
doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied
prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on, the old doctrine and acted on the faith
thereof. This is especially true in the construction and application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that
the punishment of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.

So, too, did the Court rule in Spouses Gauvain and Bernardita Benzonan v. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No.
97973) and Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et al (G.R. No 97998), Jan. 27, 1992,
205 SCRA 515, 527-528: 8

We sustain the petitioners' position, It is undisputed that the subject lot was mortgaged to DBP on February 24,
1970. It was acquired by DBP as the highest bidder at a foreclosure sale on June 18, 1977, and then sold to
the petitioners on September 29, 1979.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

At that time, the prevailing jurisprudence interpreting section 119 of R.A. 141 as amended was that enunciated
in Monge and Tupas cited above. The petitioners Benzonan and respondent Pe and the DBP are bound by
these decisions for pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or
the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines." But while our decisions form part of
the law of the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which provides that "laws shall have no
retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided." This is expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit,
non respicit, the law looks forward not backward. The rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive. The
retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested or impairs the
obligations of contract and hence, is unconstitutional (Francisco vs. Certeza, 3 SCRA 565
[1061]).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The same consideration underlies our rulings giving only prospective effect to decisions enunciating new
doctrines. Thus, we emphasized in People v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607 [1974]" . . . when a doctrine of this Court is
overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not
apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.

A compelling rationalization of the prospectivity principle of judicial decisions is well set forth in the oft-cited
case of Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter States Bank, 308 US 371, 374 [1940]. The Chicot doctrine
advocates the imperative necessity to take account of the actual existence of a statute prior to its nullification,
as an operative fact negating acceptance of "a principle of absolute retroactive
invalidity.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Thus, in this Court's decision in Tañada v. Tuvera, 9 promulgated on April 24, 1985 - which declared "that
presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published,shall have no force and effect,"
and as regards which declaration some members of the Court appeared "quite apprehensive about the
possible unsettling effect . . . (the) decision might have on acts done in reliance on the validity of these
presidential decrees . . ." - the Court said:
. . . . The answer is all too familiar. In similar situation is in the past this Court, had taken the pragmatic and
realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank (308 U.S. 371, 374) to
wit:chanrobles virtual law library

The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having found to be unconstitutional,
was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no
basis for the challenged decree. Norton vs. Shelby County, 118 US 425, 442; Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. v.
Hackett, 228 U. S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a
determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to
such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The
past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity
may have to be considered in various aspects - with respect to particular conduct, private and official.
Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality
and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous
application, demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those who have engaged
the attention of courts, state and federal, and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive
statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.

Much earlier, in De Agbayani v. PNB, 38 SCRA 429 - concerning the effects of the invalidation of "Republic Act
No. 342, the moratorium legislation, which continued Executive Order No. 32, issued by the then President
Osmeña, suspending the enforcement of payment of all debts and other monetary obligations payable by war
sufferers," and which had been "explicitly held in Rutter v. Esteban (93 Phil. 68 [1953] 10 . . . (to be) in 1953
'unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be prolonged a minute longer . . ." - the Court made
substantially the same observations, to wit: 11

. . . . The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, for that matter an
executive order or a municipal ordinance likewise suffering from that infirmity, cannot be the source of any
legal rights or duties. Nor can it justify any official act taken under it. Its repugnancy to the fundamental law
once judicially declared results in its being to all intents and purposes amere scrap of paper. . . . It is
understandable why it should be so, the Constitution being supreme and paramount. Any legislative or
executive act contrary to its terms cannot survive.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. lt may not however be sufficiently
realistic. It does not admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or
executive act must have been in force and had to be compiled with. This is so as until after the judiciary, in an
appropriate case, declares its invalidity,, it is entitled to obedience and respect. Parties may have acted under
it and may have changed theirpositions, what could be more fitting than that in a subsequent litigation regard
be had to what has been done while such legislative or executive act was in operation and presumed to be
valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its existence is a fact must
be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental
organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a, period of time
may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It
would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had
transpired prior to such adjudication.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: 'The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a
determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling
as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, - with respect to particular relations, individual
and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official (Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter States Bank,
308 US 371, 374 [1940]). This language has been quoted with approval in a resolution in Araneta v. Hill (93
Phil. 1002 [1953]) and the decision in Manila Motor Co. Inc. v. Flores (99 Phil. 738 [1956]). An even more
recent instance is the opinion of Justice Zaldivar speaking for the Court in Fernandez v. Cuerva and Co. (L-
21114, Nov. 28, 1967, 21 SCRA 1095).
Again, treating of the effect that should be given to its decision in Olaguer v. Military Commission No 34, 12 -
declaring invalid criminal proceedings conducted during the martial law regime against civilians, which had
resulted in the conviction and incarceration of numerous persons - this Court, in Tan vs. Barrios, 190 SCRA
686, at p. 700, ruled as follows:

In the interest of justice and consistently, we hold that Olaguer should, in principle, be applied prospectively
only to future cases and cases still ongoing or not yet final when that decision was promulgated. Hence, there
should be no retroactive nullification of final judgments, whether of conviction or acquittal, rendered by military
courts against civilians before the promulgation of the Olaguer decision. Such final sentences should not be
disturbed by the State. Only in particular cases where the convicted person or the State shows that there was
serious denial of constitutional rights of the accused, should the nullity of the sentence be declared and a retrial
be ordered based on the violation of the constitutional rights of the accused and not on the Olaguer doctrine. If
a retrial is no longer possible, the accused should be released since judgment against him is null on account of
the violation of his constitutional rights and denial of due process.

xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library

The trial of thousands of civilians for common crimes before the military tribunals and commissions during the
ten-year period of martial rule (1971-1981) which were created under general orders issued by President
Marcos in the exercise of his legislative powers is an operative fact that may not just be ignored. The belated
declaration in 1987 of the unconstitutionality and invalidity of those proceedings did not erase the reality of their
consequences which occurred long before our decision in Olaguer was promulgated and which now prevent us
from carrying Olaguer to the limit of its logic. Thus did this Court rule in Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, 27
SCRA 533, where the question arose as to whether the nullity of creation of a municipality by executive order
wiped out all the acts of the local government abolished. 13chanrobles virtual law library

It would seem then, that the weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the proposition that the Court's decision
of September 21, 1987 in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) 14 that a check issued merely to guarantee the
performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22 - should not be given retrospective effect
to the prejudice of the petitioner and other persons situated, who relied on the official opinion of the Minister of
Justice that such a check did not fall within the scope of B.P. Blg. 22.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library

Inveighing against this proposition, the Solicitor General invokes U.S. v. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128, applying the
familiar doctrine that in crimes mala prohibita, the intent or motive of the offender is inconsequential, the only
relevant inquiry being, "has the law been violated?" The facts in Go Chico are substantially different from those
in the case at bar. In the former, there was no official issuance by the Secretary of Justice or other government
officer construing the special law violated; 15 and it was there observed, among others, that "the defense . . .
(of) an honest misconstruction of the law under legal advice" 16 could not be appreciated as a valid defense. In
the present case on the other hand, the defense is that reliance was placed, not on the opinion of a private
lawyer but upon an official pronouncement of no less than the attorney of the Government, the Secretary of
Justice, whose opinions, though not law, are entitled to great weight and on which reliance may be placed by
private individuals is reflective of the correct interpretation of a constitutional or statutory provision; this,
particularly in the case of penal statutes, by the very nature and scope of the authority that resides in as
regards prosecutions for their violation. 17 Senarillos vs. Hermosisima, supra, relied upon by the respondent
Court of Appeals, is crucially different in that in said case, as in U.S. v. Go Chico, supra, no administrative
interpretation antedated the contrary construction placed by the Court on the law
invoked.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

This is after all a criminal action all doubts in which, pursuant to familiar, fundamental doctrine, must be
resolved in favor of the accused. Everything considered, the Court sees no compelling reason why the doctrine
of mala prohibita should override the principle of prospectivity, and its clear implications as herein above set
out and discussed, negating criminal liability.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals and of the Regional Trial Court are reversed and
set aside, and the criminal prosecution against the accused-petitioner is DISMISSED, with costs de
oficio.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

SO ORDERED.

∙ LRTA vs. Atty. Salvaña, G.R. No. 192074, June 10, 2014

LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY, represented by its Administrator MELQUIADES A.

ROBLES, Petitioner,
vs.
AURORA A. SALVAÑA, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

An administrative agency has standing to appeal the Civil Service Commission's repeal or modification of its
original decision. In such instances, it is included in the concept of a "party adversely affected" by a decision of
the Civil Service Commission granted the statutory right to appeal:

We are asked in this petition for review1 filed by the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA), a government-owned
and -controlled corporation, to modify the Civil Service Commission’s finding that respondent was guilty only of
simple dishonesty.

This case developed as follows:

On May 12, 2006, then Administrator of the Light Rail Transit Authority, Melquiades Robles, issued Office
Order No. 119, series of 2006.2 The order revoked Atty. Aurora A. Salvaña’s designation as Officer-in-Charge
(OIC) of the LRTA Administrative Department. It "direct[ed] her instead to handle special projects and perform
such other duties and functions as may be assigned to her"3 by the Administrator.

Atty. Salvaña was directed to comply with this office order through a memorandum issued on May 22, 2006 by
Atty. Elmo Stephen P. Triste, the newly designated OIC of the administrative department. Instead of
complying, Salvaña questioned the order with the Office of the President.4

In the interim, Salvaña applied for sick leave of absence on May 12, 2006 and from May 15 to May 31,
2006.5 In support of her application, she submitted a medical certificate6 issued by Dr. Grace Marie Blanco of
the Veterans Memorial Medical Center (VMMC).

LRTA discovered that Dr. Blanco did not issue this medical certificate. Dr. Blanco also denied having seen or
treated Salvaña on May 15, 2006, the date stated on her medical certificate.7 On June 23, 2006, Administrator
Robles issued a notice of preliminary investigation. The notice directed Salvaña to explain in writing within 72
hours from her receipt of the notice "why no disciplinary action should be taken against [her]"8 for not
complying with Office Order No. 119 and for submitting a falsified medical certificate.9

Salvaña filed her explanation on June 30, 2006.10 She alleged that as a member of the Bids and Awards
Committee, she "refused to sign a resolution"11 favoring a particular bidder. She alleged that Office Order No.
119 was issued by Administrator Robles to express his "ire and vindictiveness"12 over her refusal to sign.

The LRTA’s Fact-finding Committee found her explanation unsatisfactory. On July 26, 2006, it issued a formal
charge against her for Dishonesty, Falsification of Official Document, Grave Misconduct, Gross
Insubordination, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.13
On August 5, 2006, "Salvaña tendered her irrevocable resignation."14 None of the pleadings alleged that this
irrevocable resignation was accepted, although the resolution of the Fact-finding Committee alluded to
Administrator Robles’ acceptance of the resignation letter.

In the meantime, the investigation against Salvaña continued, and the prosecution presented its
witnesses.15 Salvaña "submitted a manifestation dated September 6, 2006, stating that the Committee was
biased and that [Administrator] Robles was both the accuser and the hearing officer."16

On October 31, 2006, the Fact-finding Committee issued a resolution "finding Salvaña guilty of all the charges
against her and imposed [on] her the penalty of dismissal from . . . service with all the accessory
penalties."17 The LRTA Board of Directors approved the findings of the Fact-finding Committee18

Salvaña appealed with the Civil Service Commission. "In her appeal, [she] claimed that she was denied due
process and that there [was] no substantial evidence to support the charges against her."19

On July 18, 2007, the Civil Service Commission modified the decision and issued Resolution No. 071364.The
Civil Service Commission found that Salvaña was guilty only of simple dishonesty. She was meted a penalty of
suspension for three months.20

LRTA moved for reconsideration21 of the resolution. This was denied in a resolution dated May 26,
2008.22 LRTA then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals.23

On November 11, 2009, the Court of Appeals24 dismissed the petition and affirmed the Civil Service
Commission’s finding that Salvaña was only guilty of simple dishonesty. The appellate court also ruled that
Administrator Robles had no standing to file a motion for reconsideration before the Civil Service Commission
because that right only belonged to respondent in an administrative case.25 LRTA moved for
reconsideration26 of this decision but was denied.27

Hence, LRTA filed this present petition.

Petitioner argues that it has the legal personality to appeal the decision of the Civil Service Commission before
the Court of Appeals.28 It cites Philippine National Bank v. Garcia29 as basis for its argument that it can be
considered a "person adversely affected" under the pertinent rules and regulations on the appeal of
administrative cases.30 It also argues that respondent’s falsification of the medical certificate accompanying her
application for sick leave was not merely simple but serious dishonesty.31

Respondent agrees with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that petitioner had no legal personality to file the
appeal since it was not the "person adversely affected" by the decision. She counters that Administrator
Robles had no authority to file the appeal since he was unable to present a resolution from the Board of
Directors authorizing him to do so.32 She also agrees with the Civil Service Commission’s finding that she was
merely guilty of simple dishonesty.33

In its reply,34 petitioner points out that it presented a secretary’s certificate35 dated July 17, 2008 and which it
attached to the petitions before the Civil Service Commission, Court of Appeals, and this court. It argues that
the certificate authorizes the LRTA and its Administrator to file the necessary motion for reconsideration or
appeal regarding this case, and this authorization has yet to be revoked.36

Both parties filed their respective memoranda before this court on May 23, 201237 and December 6, 2012.38

The legal issues that will determine the results of this case are:

1. Whether the LRTA, as represented by its Administrator, has the standing to appeal the modification
by the Civil Service Commission of its decision

2. Whether Salvaña was correctly found guilty of simple dishonesty only

We grant the petition.

The parties may appeal in administrative cases involving members of the civil service

It is settled that "[t]he right to appeal is not a natural right [or] a part of due process; it is merely a statutory
privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law."39 If it is
not granted by the Constitution, it can only be availed of when a statute provides for it.40 When made available
by law or regulation, however, a person cannot be deprived of that right to appeal. Otherwise, there will be a
violation of the constitutional requirement of due process of law.

Article IX (B), Section 3 of the Constitution mandates that the Civil Service Commission shall be "the central
personnel agency of the Government."41 In line with the constitutionally enshrined policy that a public office is a
public trust, the Commission was tasked with the duty "to set standards and to enforce the laws and rules
governing the selection, utilization, training, and discipline of civil servants."42

Civil servants enjoy security of tenure, and "[n]o officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or
dismissed except for cause as provided by law and after due process."43 Under Section 12, Chapter 3, Book V
of the Administrative Code, it is the Civil Service Commission that has the power to "[h]ear and decide
administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal."

The grant of the right to appeal in administrative cases is not new. In Republic Act No. 2260 or the Civil Service
Law of 1959, appeals "by the respondent"44 were allowed on "[t]he decision of the Commissioner of Civil
Service rendered in an administrative case involving discipline of subordinate officers and employees."45

Presidential Decree No. 807, while retaining the right to appeal in administrative cases, amended the phrasing
of the party allowed to appeal. Section 37, paragraph (a), and Section 39, paragraph (a),of Presidential Decree
No. 807 provide:

Sec. 37. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. - (a) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative cases
involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding
thirty days' salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office.

Sec. 39. Appeals. - (a) Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party adversely affected by the
decision within fifteen days from receipt of the decision unless a petition shall be decided within fifteen days.
(Emphasis supplied)

Additionally, Section 47, paragraph (1), and Section 49, paragraph (1), of the Administrative Code provide:

SECTION 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction.—(1) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative
disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an
amount exceeding thirty days’ salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office.

SECTION 49. Appeals.—(1) Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party adversely affected by the
decision within fifteen days from receipt of the decision unless a petition for reconsideration is seasonably filed,
which petition shall be decided within fifteen days….(Emphasis supplied)

The phrase, "person adversely affected," was not defined in either Presidential Decree No. 807 or the
Administrative Code. This prompted a series of cases46 providing the interpretation of this phrase.

The first of these cases, Paredes v. Civil Service Commission,47 declared:

Based on [Sections 37 (a) and 39 (a) of Presidential Decree No. 807], appeal to the Civil Service Commission
in an administrative case is extended to the party adversely affected by the decision, that is, the person or the
respondent employee who has been meted out the penalty of suspension for more than thirty days; or fine in
an amount exceeding thirty days salary demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office.
The decision of the disciplining authority is even final and not appealable to the Civil Service Commission in
cases where the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not
exceeding thirty days salary.48 (Emphasis supplied)

This ruling was repeated in Mendez v. Civil Service Commission49 where this court stated that:

A cursory reading of P.D. 807, otherwise known as "The Philippine Civil Service Law" shows that said law does
not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges.

....

By inference or implication, the remedy of appeal may be availed of only in a case where the respondent is
found guilty of the charges filed against him. But when the respondent is exonerated of said charges, as in this
case, there is no occasion for appeal.50 (Emphasis supplied)

The same ratio would be reiterated and become the prevailing doctrine on the matter in Magpale, Jr. v. Civil
Service Commission,51 Navarro v. Civil Service Commission and Export Processing Zone,52 University of the
Philippines v. Civil Service Commission,53 and Del Castillo v. Civil Service Commission.54

In these cases, this court explained that the right to appeal being merely a statutory privilege can only be
availed of by the party specified in the law. Since the law presumes that appeals will only be made in decisions
prescribing a penalty, this court concluded that the only parties that will be adversely affected are the
respondents that are charged with administrative offenses. Since the right to appeal is a remedial right that
may only be granted by statute, a government party cannot by implication assert that right as incidental to its
power, since the right to appeal does not form part of due process.55

In effect, this court equated exonerations in administrative cases to acquittals in criminal cases wherein the
State or the complainant would have no right to appeal.56 When the Civil Service Commission enacted the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, or the URACCS, on September 27, 1999, it applied
this court’s definition. Thus, Section 2, paragraph (l),Rule I, and Section 38,Rule III of the URACCS defined
"party adversely affected" as follows:

Section 2. Coverage and Definition of Terms.

....

(l) PARTY ADVERSELY AFFECTED refers to the respondent against whom a decision in a disciplinary case
has been rendered.

For some time, government parties were, thus, barred from appealing exonerations of civil servants they had
previously sanctioned. It was not until the promulgation by this court of Civil Service Commission v.
Dacoycoy57 on April 29, 1999 that the issue would be revisited.

Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoyand Philippine National Bank v. Garcia

In Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy,58 an administrative complaint for habitual drunkenness, misconduct,
and nepotism was filed against the Vocational School Administrator of Balicuatro College of Arts and Trade in
Allen, Northern Samar. The Civil Service Commission found Dacoycoy guilty, but the Court of Appeals
overturned this finding and exonerated Dacoycoy of all charges. The Civil Service Commission then appealed
the ruling of the appellate court. This court, in addressing the issue of the Commission’s standing, stated that:

Subsequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Civil Service Commission and held
respondent not guilty of nepotism. Who now may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme
Court? Certainly not the respondent, who was declared not guilty of the charge. Nor the complainant George
P. Suan, who was merely a witness for the government. Consequently, the Civil Service Commission has
become the party adversely affected by such ruling, which seriously prejudices the civil service system. Hence,
as an aggrieved party, it may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. By this ruling,
we now expressly abandon and overrule extant jurisprudence that "the phrase ‘party adversely affected by the
decision’ refers to the government employee against whom the administrative case is filed for the purpose of
disciplinary action which may take the form of suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or
dismissal from office" and not included are "cases where the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than
thirty (30) days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days salary" or "when the respondent is exonerated of
the charges, there is no occasion for appeal." In other words, we overrule prior decisions holding that the Civil
Service Law "does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or employees from
administrative charges" enunciated in Paredes v. Civil Service Commission; Mendez v. Civil Service
Commission; Magpale v. Civil Service Commission; Navarro v. Civil Service Commission and Export
Processing Zone Authority and more recently Del Castillo v. Civil Service Commission. 59 (Emphasis supplied;
citations omitted)

In his concurring opinion, then Chief Justice Puno summed up the rationale for allowing government parties to
appeal, thus:

In truth, the doctrine barring appeal is not categorically sanctioned by the Civil Service Law. For what the law
declares as "final" are decisions of heads of agencies involving suspension for not more than thirty (30) days or
fine in an amount not exceeding thirty (30) days salary.

But there is a clear policy reason for declaring these decisions final. These decisions involve minor offenses.
They are numerous for they are the usual offenses committed by government officials and employees. To
allow their multiple level appeal will doubtless overburden the quasi-judicial machinery of our administrative
system and defeat the expectation of fast and efficient action from these administrative agencies. Nepotism,
however, is not a petty offense. Its deleterious effect on government cannot be over-emphasized. And it is a
stubborn evil. The objective should be to eliminate nepotic acts, hence, erroneous decisions allowing nepotism
cannot be given immunity from review, especially judicial review. It is thus non sequitur to contend that since
some decisions exonerating public officials from minor offenses cannot be appealed, ergo, even a decision
acquitting a government official from a major offense like nepotism cannot also be appealed.60 (Emphasis
supplied)

The decision in Dacoycoy would be reiterated in 2002 when this court promulgated Philippine National Bank v.
Garcia.61 Philippine National Bank categorically allowed the disciplining authority to appeal the decision
exonerating the disciplined employee.

In that case, the bank charged Ricardo V. Garcia, Jr., one of its check processors and cash representatives,
with gross neglect of duty when he lost ₱7 million in connection with his duties. Both the Civil Service
Commission and the Court of Appeals reversed the bank and exonerated Garcia from all liability.

This court, however, upheld Philippine National Bank’s right to appeal the case. Citing Dacoycoy, this court
ruled:

Indeed, the battles against corruption, malfeasance and misfeasance will be seriously undermined if we bar
appeals of exoneration. After all, administrative cases do not partake of the nature of criminal actions, in which
acquittals are final and unappealable based on the constitutional proscription of double jeopardy.

Furthermore, our new Constitution expressly expanded the range and scope of judicial review. Thus, to
prevent appeals of administrative decisions except those initiated by employees will effectively and pervertedly
erode this constitutional grant.

Finally, the Court in Dacoycoy ruled that the CSC had acted well within its rights in appealing the CA’s
exoneration of the respondent public official therein, because it has been mandated by the Constitution to
preserve and safeguard the integrity of our civil service system. In the same light, herein Petitioner PNB has
the standing to appeal to the CA the exoneration of Respondent Garcia. After all, it is the aggrieved party
which has complained of his acts of dishonesty. Besides, this Court has not lost sight of the fact that PNB was
already privatized on May 27, 1996. Should respondent be finally exonerated indeed, it might then be
incumbent upon petitioner to take him back into its fold. It should therefore be allowed to appeal a decision that
in its view hampers its right to select honest and trustworthy employees, so that it can protect and preserve its
name as a premier banking institution in our country.62 (Emphasis supplied) Thus, the Civil Service
Commission issued Resolution No. 021600 published on December 29, 2002, which amended the URACCS,
to allow the disciplining authority to appeal the decision exonerating the employee:

Section 2. Coverage and Definition of Terms. –

....

(l) PARTY ADVERSELY AFFECTED refers to the respondent against whom a decision in a disciplinary case
has been rendered or to the disciplining authority in an appeal from a decision exonerating the said employee.

Subsequent decisions continued to reiterate the rulings in Dacoycoy and Philippine National Bank.

In Constantino-David v. Pangandaman-Gania,63 this court explained the rationale of allowing the Civil Service
Commission to appeal decisions of exonerations as follows:

That the CSC may appeal from an adverse decision of the Court of Appeals reversing or modifying its
resolutions which may seriously prejudice the civil service system is beyond doubt. In Civil Service
Commission v. Dacoycoy[,] this Court held that the CSC may become the party adversely affected by such
ruling and the aggrieved party who may appeal the decision to this Court.

The situation where the CSC’s participation is beneficial and indispensable often involves complaints for
administrative offenses, such as neglect of duty, being notoriously undesirable, inefficiency and incompetence
in the performance of official duties, and the like, where the complainant is more often than not acting merely
as a witness for the government which is the real party injured by the illicit act. In cases of this nature, a ruling
of the Court of Appeals favorable to the respondent employee is understandably adverse to the government,
and unavoidably the CSC as representative of the government may appeal the decision to this Court to protect
the integrity of the civil service system.

The CSC may also seek a review of the decisions of the Court of Appeals that are detrimental to its
constitutional mandate as the central personnel agency of the government tasked to establish a career service,
adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness and courtesy in the
civil service, strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human resources development programs
for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a management climate conducive to public accountability.
Nonetheless, the right of the CSC to appeal the adverse decision does not preclude the private complainant in
appropriate cases from similarly elevating the decision for review.64

Then in Civil Service Commission v. Gentallan,65 this court declared:

At the outset, it should be noted that the Civil Service Commission, under the Constitution, is the central
personnel agency of the government charged with the duty of determining questions of qualifications of merit
and fitness of those appointed to the civil service. Thus, the CSC, as an institution whose primary concern is
the effectiveness of the civil service system, has the standing to appeal a decision which adversely affects the
civil service. We hold, at this juncture, that CSC has the standing to appeal and/or to file its motion for
reconsideration.66

The right to appeal by government parties was not limited to the Civil Service Commission.

In Pastor v. City of Pasig,67 this court ruled that the City of Pasig had standing to appeal the decision of the
Civil Service Commission reinstating a city employee to her former position, despite the city government
having reassigned her to another unit.
In Geronga v. Varela,68 this court ruled that the Mayor of Cadiz City had the right to file a motion for
reconsideration of a decision by the Civil Service Commission exonerating a city employee on the ground that
"as the appointing and disciplining authority, [he] is a real party in interest."69

In Department of Education v. Cuanan,70 this court ruled that the Department of Education "qualifie[d] as a
party adversely affected by the judgment, who can file an appeal of a judgment of exoneration in an
administrative case."71

There are, however, cases, which sought to qualify this right to appeal.

In National Appellate Board v. Mamauag,72 an administrative complaint for grave misconduct was filed by
Quezon City Judge Adoracion G. Angeles against several members of the Philippine National Police (PNP).
The Central Police District Command (CPDC) of Quezon City, upon investigation, dismissed the complaint.
Dissatisfied, Judge Angeles moved for a reinvestigation by then PNP Chief Recaredo Sarmiento II.

PNP Chief Sarmiento issued a decision finding the accused police officers guilty of the offenses charged.
Some were meted the penalty of suspension while others were dismissed from service. Upon motion for
reconsideration by Judge Angeles, Chief Sarmiento modified his ruling and ordered the dismissal of the
suspended police officers.

One of the officers, Police Inspector John Mamauag, appealed the decision with the National Appellate Board
of the National Police Commission. The National Appellate Board, however, denied the appeal. Mamauag
appealed the denial with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the National
Appellate Board and ruled that it was the Philippine National Police, not Judge Angeles, which had the right to
appeal the decision of PNP Chief Sarmiento, as it was the party adversely affected. The National Appellate
Board then appealed this decision with this court.

This court, while citing Dacoycoy, declared that Judge Angeles, as complainant, had no right to appeal the
dismissal by CPDC of the complaint against Mamauag. It qualified the right of government agencies to appeal
by specifying the circumstances by which the right may be given, thus:

However, the government party that can appeal is not the disciplining authority or tribunal which previously
heard the case and imposed the penalty of demotion or dismissal from the service. The government party
appealing must be one that is prosecuting the administrative case against the respondent. Otherwise, an
anomalous situation will result where the disciplining authority or tribunal hearing the case, instead of being
impartial and detached, becomes an active participant in prosecuting the respondent. Thus, in Mathay, Jr. v.
Court of Appeals, decided after Dacoycoy, the Court declared:

To be sure, when the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission were brought before the Court of Appeals,
the Civil Service Commission was included only as a nominal party. As a quasi-judicial body, the Civil Service
Commission can be likened to a judge who should "detach himself from cases where his decision is appealed
to a higher court for review."

In instituting G.R. No. 126354, the Civil Service Commission dangerously departed from its role as adjudicator
and became an advocate. Its mandated function is to "hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or
brought before it directly or on appeal, including contested appointments and to review decisions and actions
of its offices and agencies," not to litigate.73 (Emphasis supplied)

The ruling in National Appellate Boardwas applied in Montoya v. Varilla,74 Pleyto v. PNP-CIDG,75 and
Ombudsman v. Liggayu.76

The present rule is that a government party is a "party adversely affected" for purposes of appeal provided that
the government party that has a right to appeal must be the office or agency prosecuting the case.
Despite the limitation on the government party’s right to appeal, this court has consistently upheld that right in
Dacoycoy. In Civil Service Commission v. Almojuela,77 we stated that:

More than ten years have passed since the Court first recognized in Dacoycoy the CSC’s standing to appeal
the CA’s decisions reversing or modifying its resolutions seriously prejudicial to the civil service system. Since
then, the ruling in Dacoycoy has been subjected to clarifications and qualifications but the doctrine has
remained the same: the CSC has standing as a real party in interest and can appeal the CA’s decisions
modifying or reversing the CSC’s rulings, when the CA action would have an adverse impact on the integrity of
the civil service. As the government’s central personnel agency, the CSC is tasked to establish a career
service and promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil
service; it has a stake in ensuring that the proper disciplinary action is imposed on an erring public employee,
and this stake would be adversely affected by a ruling absolving or lightening the CSC-imposed penalty.
Further, a decision that declares a public employee not guilty of the charge against him would have no other
appellant than the CSC. To be sure, it would not be appealed by the public employee who has been absolved
of the charge against him; neither would the complainant appeal the decision, as he acted merely as a witness
for the government. We thus find no reason to disturb the settled Dacoycoy doctrine.78 (Citations omitted)

Indeed, recent decisions showed that this court has allowed appeals by government parties. Notably, the
government parties’ right to appeal in these cases was not brought up as an issue by either of the parties.

In Civil Service Commission v. Yu,79 this court allowed the Civil Service Commission to appeal the Court of
Appeals’ decision granting the reinstatement of a government employee whose appointment had been revoked
by the Commission.

In National Power Corporation v. Civil Service Commission and Tanfelix,80 the National Power Corporation had
previously filed an administrative complaint against one of its employees, Rodrigo Tanfelix, resulting in his
dismissal from service. When the Civil Service Commission exonerated Tanfelix and the Court of Appeals
affirmed the exoneration, the National Power Corporation was allowed to appeal.

These cases, however, allowed the disciplining authority to appeal only from a decision exonerating the said
employee. In this case, respondent was not exonerated; she was found guilty, but the finding was modified.
This court previously stated that:

If the administrative offense found to have been actually committed is of lesser gravity than the offense
charged, the employee cannot be considered exonerated if the factual premise for the imposition of the lesser
penalty remains the same.81

Dacoycoy, Philippine National Bank, and the URACCS failed to contemplate a situation where the Civil Service
Commission modified the penalty from dismissal to suspension. The erring civil servant was not exonerated,
and the finding of guilt still stood. In these situations, the disciplinary authority should be allowed to appeal the
modification of the decision.

The LRTA had standing to appeal the modification by the Civil Service Commission of its decision

The employer has the right "to select honest and trustworthy employees."82 When the government office
disciplines an employee based on causes and procedures allowed by law, it exercises its discretion. This
discretion is inherent in the constitutional principle that "[p]ublic officers and employees must, at all times, be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with
patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives."83 This is a principle that can be invoked by the public as well as
the government office employing the public officer.

Here, petitioner already decided to dismiss respondent for dishonesty. Dishonesty is a serious offense that
challenges the integrity of the public servant charged. To bar a government office from appealing a decision
that lowers the penalty of the disciplined employee prevents it from ensuring its mandate that the civil service
employs only those with the utmost sense of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency.
Honesty and integrity are important traits required of those in public service. If all decisions by quasi-judicial
bodies modifying the penalty of dismissal were allowed to become final and unappealable, it would, in effect,
show tolerance to conduct unbecoming of a public servant. The quality of civil service would erode, and the
citizens would end up suffering for it.

During the pendency of this decision, or on November 18, 2011, the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in
the Civil Service or RACCS was promulgated. The Civil Service Commission modified the definition of a "party
adversely affected" for purposes of appeal.

Section 4. Definition of Terms. –

....

k. PARTY ADVERSELY AFFECTED refers to the respondent against whom a decision in an administrative
case has been rendered or to the disciplining authority in an appeal from a decision reversing or modifying the
original decision. (Emphasis supplied)

Procedural laws have retroactive application. In Zulueta v. Asia Brewery:84

As a general rule, laws have no retroactive effect. But there are certain recognized exceptions, such as when
they are remedial or procedural in nature. This Court explained this exception in the following language:

It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided. But there are settled exceptions to this general rule, such as when the statute is
CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.

....

On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws, i.e., those statutes relating to remedies or modes of
procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy
or confirmation of such rights, ordinarily do not come within the legal meaning of a retrospective law, nor within
the general rule against the retrospective operation of statutes.

Thus, procedural laws may operate retroactively as to pending proceedings even without express provision to
that effect. Accordingly, rules of procedure can apply to cases pending at the time of their enactment. In fact,
statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be applied on actions undetermined at the time of their
effectivity. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent. 85 (Emphasis supplied)

Remedial rights are those rights granted by remedial or procedural laws. These are rights that only operate to
further the rules of procedure or to confirm vested rights. As such, the retroactive application of remedial rights
will not adversely affect the vested rights of any person. Considering that the right to appeal is a right remedial
in nature, we find that Section 4, paragraph (k), Rule I of the RACCS applies in this case. Petitioner, therefore,
had the right to appeal the decision of the Civil Service Commission that modified its original decision of
dismissal.

Recent decisions implied the retroactive application of this rule. While the right of government parties to appeal
was not an issue, this court gave due course to the appeals filed by government agencies before the
promulgation of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.

In Civil Service Commission v. Clave,86 the Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) found one of its
employees, Aurora M. Clave, guilty of simple neglect of duty. The Civil Service Commission affirmed the
GSIS’s findings. The Court of Appeals, however, while affirming the Civil Service Commission, reduced the
penalty. Both the GSIS and the Civil Service Commission were given standing to appeal the decision of the
Court of Appeals.
In GSIS v. Chua,87 the GSIS dismissed Heidi R. Chua for grave misconduct, dishonesty, and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of service. The Civil Service Commission affirmed the GSIS, but the Court of
Appeals, while affirming the findings of the Commission, modified the penalty to simple misconduct. The GSIS
was then allowed to bring an appeal of the modification of the penalty with this court.

Thus, we now hold that the parties adversely affected by a decision in an administrative case who may appeal
shall include the disciplining authority whose decision dismissing the employee was either overturned or
modified by the Civil Service Commission.

The offense committed was less serious dishonesty, not simple dishonesty

Dishonesty has been defined "as the ‘disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness, lack of
integrity’ . . . ."88 Since the utmost integrity is expected of public servants, its absence is not only frowned upon
but punished severely.

Section 52, Rule IV of the URACCS provides:

Section 52. Classification of Offenses. – Administrative offenses with corresponding penalties are classified
into grave, less grave or light, depending on their gravity or depravity and effects on the government service.

A. The following are grave offenses with their corresponding penalties:

1. Dishonesty - 1st Offense – Dismissal

....

In Remolona v. Civil Service Commission,89 this court explained the rationale for the severity of the penalty:

It cannot be denied that dishonesty is considered a grave offense punishable by dismissal for the first offense
under Section 23, Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292. And the rule is that
dishonesty, in order to warrant dismissal, need not be committed in the course of the performance of duty by
the person charged. The rationale for the rule is that if a government officer or employee is dishonest or is
guilty of oppression or grave misconduct, even if said defects of character are not connected with his office,
they affect his right to continue in office. The Government cannot tolerate in its service a dishonest official,
even if he performs his duties correctly and well, because by reason of his government position, he is given
more and ample opportunity to commit acts of dishonesty against his fellow men, even against offices and
entities of the government other than the office where he is employed; and by reason of his office, he enjoys
and possesses a certain influence and power which renders the victims of his grave misconduct, oppression
and dishonesty less disposed and prepared to resist and to counteract his evil acts and actuations. The private
life of an employee cannot be segregated from his public life. Dishonesty inevitably reflects on the fitness of the
officer or employee to continue in office and the discipline and morale of the service.90 (Emphasis supplied)

However, on April 4, 2006, the Civil Service Commission issued Resolution No. 06-0538 or the Rules on the
Administrative Offense of Dishonesty.

Resolution No. 06-0538 recognizes that dishonesty is a grave offense punishable by dismissal from
service.91 It, however, also recognizes that "some acts of Dishonesty are not constitutive of an offense so
grave as to warrant the imposition of the penalty of dismissal from the service."92

Recognizing the attendant circumstances in the offense of dishonesty, the Civil Service Commission issued
parameters "in order to guide the disciplining authority in charging the proper offense"93 and to impose the
proper penalty.

The resolution classifies dishonesty in three gradations: (1) serious; (2) less serious; and (3) simple. Serious
dishonesty is punishable by dismissal.94 Less serious dishonesty is punishable by suspension for six months
and one day to one year for the first offense and dismissal for the second offense.95 Simple dishonesty is
punishable by suspension of one month and one day to six months for the first offense, six months and one
day to one year for the second offense, and dismissal for the third offense.96

The medical certificate respondent submitted to support her application for sick leave was falsified. The
question remains as to whether this act could be considered serious dishonesty, less serious dishonesty, or
simple dishonesty.

According to the Civil Service Commission’s finding in its resolution:

In the instant case, the prosecution was able to establish that the medical certificate submitted by Salvaña was
spurious or not genuine as the physician-signatory therein, Dr. Blanco[,] testified that she did not examine/treat
the appellant nor did she issue a medical certificate on May 15, 2006 since she was on sick leave of absence
on that particular day. Worthy [of] mention is that the appellant never bothered to submit any evidence,
documentary or otherwise, to rebut the testimony of Blanco.

Thus, the Commission rules and so holds that the appellant is liable for Dishonesty but applying the
aforementioned CSC Resolution No. 06-0538, her dishonest act would be classified only as Simple Dishonesty
as the same did not cause damage or prejudice to the government and had no direct relation to or did not
involve the duties and responsibilities of the appellant. The same is true with the falsification she committed,
where the information falsified was not related to her employment.97 (Emphasis supplied)

In Cuerdo v. Commission on Audit,98 this court previously ruled that "it is the general policy of this Court to
sustain the decisions of administrative authorities ‘not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers
but also for their presumed knowledge ability and even expertise in the laws they are entrusted to
enforce.’"99 The same case also stated that:

. . . . we reaffirmed the oft-repeated rule that findings of administrative agencies are generally accorded not
only respect but also finality when the decision and order . . . are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness
that would amount to abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction. The findings off acts must be respected, so long
as they are supported by substantial evidence even if not overwhelming or preponderant.100

Petitioner insists that respondent committed serious dishonesty when she submitted the falsified medical
certificate. Under Section 3 of Resolution No. 06-0538, serious dishonesty comprises the following acts:

Section 3. Serious Dishonesty. – The presence of any one of the following attendant circumstances in the
commission of the dishonest act would constitute the offense of Serious Dishonesty:

a. The dishonest act causes serious damage and grave prejudice to the government.

b. The respondent gravely abused his authority in order to commit the dishonest act.

c. Where the respondent is an accountable officer, the dishonest act directly involves property,
accountable forms or money for which he is directly accountable and the respondent shows an intent to
commit material gain, graft and corruption.

d. The dishonest act exhibits moral depravity on the part of the respondent.

e. The respondent employed fraud and/or falsification of official documents in the commission of the
dishonest act related to his/her employment.

f. The dishonest act was committed several times or in various occasions.

g. The dishonest act involves a Civil Service examination, irregularity or fake Civil Service eligibility
such as, but not limited to, impersonation, cheating and use of crib sheets.
 h. Other analogous circumstances. (Emphasis supplied)

Simple dishonesty, on the other hand, comprises the following offenses:

Section 5. The presence of any of the following attendant circumstances in the commission of the dishonest
act would constitute the offense of Simple Dishonesty:

a. The dishonest act did not cause damage or prejudice to the government.

b. The dishonest act had no direct relation to or does not involve the duties and responsibilities of the
respondent.

c. In falsification of any official document, where the information falsified is not related to his/her
employment.

d. That the dishonest act did not result in any gain or benefit to the offender.

e. Other analogous circumstances. (Emphasis supplied)

This court previously ruled that "[f]alsification of an official document, as an administrative offense, is knowingly
making false statements in official or public documents."101 Respondent, in her defense, states that she merely
relied on her Health Maintenance Organization’s (HMO) advice that it was going to issue her a medical
certificate after she had gone to the hospital complaining of hypertension.102 She maintains that she did not
know that her medical certificate was falsified. We do not find this defense credible.

Respondent knew that she was not examined by Dr. Blanco, the medical certificate’s signatory. She knew that
she would not be able to fully attest to the truthfulness of the information in the certificate. Despite this, she still
submitted the certificate in support of her application for leave.

The Civil Service Commission, however, found that the medical certificate was falsified. Dr. Blanco repudiated
the certificate. Respondent did not present any evidence to defend its validity. Her application for sick leave,
therefore, should not have been granted since it was unaccompanied by the proper documents. The
Commission correctly found respondent guilty of dishonesty.

However, it would be wrong to classify this offense as simple dishonesty.

By law, all employees in the civil service are entitled to leave of absence for a certain number of days, with or
without pay.103 Under Section 1, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative
Code, government employees are entitled to 15 days of sick leave annually with full pay.

The grant of sick leave with pay is an exception to the principle of "no work, no pay," i.e., entitlement to
compensation only upon actual service rendered. As such, applications for leave must be properly filled out
and filed accordingly. Section 16, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative
Code provides the rules for an application for sick leave:

SECTION 16. All applications for sick leaves of absence for one full day or more shall be on the prescribed
form and shall be filed immediately upon the employee's return from such leave. Notice of absence, however,
should be sent to the immediate supervisor and/or to the office head. Application for sick leave in excess of five
days shall be accompanied by a proper medical certificate.

Respondent’s application for sick leave, if approved, would allow her to be absent from work without any
deductions from her salary. Being a government employee, respondent would have received her salaries
coming from government funds.
Since her application for sick leave was supported by a false medical certificate, it would have been improperly
filed, which made all of her absences during this period unauthorized. The receipt, therefore, of her salaries
during this period would be tantamount to causing damage or prejudice to the government since she would
have received compensation she was not entitled to receive.

This act of causing damage or prejudice, however, cannot be classified as serious since the information
falsified had no direct relation to her employment. Whether or not she was suffering from hypertension is a
matter that has no relation to the functions of her office.

Given these circumstances, the offense committed can be properly identified as less serious dishonesty. Under
Section 4 of Resolution No. 06-0538, less serious dishonesty is classified by the following acts:

Section 4. The presence of any one of the following attendant circumstances in the commission of the
dishonest act would constitute the offense of Less Serious Dishonesty:

a. The dishonest act caused damage and prejudice to the government which is not so serious as to
qualify under the immediately preceding classification.

b. The respondent did not take advantage of his/her position in committing the dishonest act.

c. Other analogous circumstances. (Emphasis supplied)

We hold, therefore, that respondent Atty. Aurora A. Salvaña is guilty of less serious dishonesty.

A final note

The records showed that respondent tendered her irrevocable resignation on August 5, 2006. Petitioner’s
acceptance of respondent’s resignation was not mentioned in any of the pleadings. However, the resolution by
the Fact-finding Committee stated that "[o]n 16 August 2006, the Office of the Administrator received the
resignation."104 On the issue of whether respondent’s resignation mooted its proceedings, it concluded that:

[I]n the response of the Administrator to the letter of resignation filed by Respondent there was no
unconditional acceptance of the same. In fact it was specified therein that her resignation is "without prejudice
to any appropriate action on any malfeasance or misfeasance committed during her tenure[."]There can [sic]
be no other conclusion from the above that her resignation does not prevent the administration from
proceeding with any charge/s appropriate under the circumstances.105 (Emphasis in the original)

Resignation from public office, to be effective, requires the acceptance of the proper government authority. In
Republic v. Singun,106 this court stated:

Resignation implies an expression of the incumbent in some form, express or implied, of the intention to
surrender, renounce, and relinquish the office and the acceptance by competent and lawful authority. To
constitute a complete and operative resignation from public office, there must be: (a) an intention to relinquish
a part of the term; (b) an act of relinquishment; and (c) an acceptance by the proper authority.

....

In our jurisdiction, acceptance is necessary for resignation of a public officer to be operative and effective.
Without acceptance, resignation is nothing and the officer remains in office. Resignation to be effective must
be accepted by competent authority, either in terms or by something tantamount to an acceptance, such as the
appointment of the successor. A public officer cannot abandon his office before his resignation is accepted,
otherwise the officer is subject to the penal provisions of Article 238 of the Revised Penal Code. The final or
conclusive act of a resignation’s acceptance is the notice of acceptance. The incumbent official would not be in
a position to determine the acceptance of his resignation unless he had been duly notified
therefor.107 (Emphasis supplied)
If there was evidence to show that petitioner did not, in fact, accept respondent’s resignation, her resignation
would have been ineffective. Respondent’s continued absence from her post would have been deemed
abandonment from her office, of which she could be criminally charged.

Although the response of Administrator Robles was not attached to the record, it can be concluded from the
resolution of the Fact-finding Committee that he accepted the resignation, albeit with the qualification that it be
"without prejudice to any appropriate action on any malfeasance or misfeasance committed during her
tenure."108

The qualified acceptance of Administrator Robles, however, did not affect the validity of respondent’s
resignation.1âwphi1 Section 1, Rule XII of the Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 40, series
of 1998, as amended by Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 15, series of 1999, requires:

Sec. 1. Resignation. The following documents shall be submitted to the Commission for record purposes:

a. The voluntary written notice of the employee informing the appointing authority that he is
relinquishing his position and the efffectivity date of said resignation; and,

b. The acceptance of resignation in writing by the agency head or appointing authority which shall
indicate the date of effectivity of the resignation.

An officer or employee under investigation may be allowed to resign pending decision of his case without
prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings until finally terminated.

The qualification placed by Administrator Robles on his acceptance does not make respondent’s resignation
any less valid. The rules and regulations allow the acceptance of resignations while the administrative case is
pending provided that the proceedings will still continue.

We also note that the unauthorized absences were incurred after the issuance of Office Order No. 119.
Atrespondent’s refusal to comply, she was administratively charged, which prompted her resignation from
office. If there were irregularities in the issuance of Office Order No. 119, what respondent should have done
would be to occupy the new position and then file the proper remedies. She should not have defied the orders
of her superiors.

Because of her resignation on August 5, 2006, any modification as to the service of her suspension became
moot. Her permanent employment record, however, must reflect the modified penalty. Considering that she is
also a member of the Bar, this court furnishes the Office of the Bar Confidant with a copy of this decision to
initiate the proper disciplinary action against respondent.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated November 11, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP. No. 104225 and Resolution No. 071364 dated July 18, 2007 of the Civil Service Commission is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that respondent, Atty. Aurora A. Salvaña, is found guilty of Less Serious
Dishonesty. The Civil Service Commission is DIRECTED to attach a copy of this decision to respondent's
permanent employment record.

Let a copy of this decision be given to the Office of the Bar Confidant to initiate the proper disciplinary action
against respondent Atty. Aurora A. Salvaña.

SO ORDERED.

ART. 6
. ∙ Cui vs. Arellano University, L-15121, May 30, 1961
People of the Philippines v. Donato, G.R. No. 79269, June 5, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. PROCORO J. DONATO, in his official capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
XII, Manila; RODOLFO C. SALAS, alias Commander Bilog, respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

Jose Suarez, Romeo Capulong, Efren Mercado and Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity,
Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI) for Rodolfo Salas.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The People of the Philippines, through the Chief State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice, the City Fiscal
of Manila and the Judge Advocate General, filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer
for restraining order/preliminary injunction, to set aside the order of respondent Judge dated July 7, 1987
granting bail to the accused Rodolfo Salas alias "Commander Bilog" in Criminal Case No. 86-48926 for
Rebellion,1 and the subsequent Order dated July 30, 1987 granting the motion for reconsideration of 16 July
1987 by increasing the bail bond from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 but denying petitioner's supplemental motion
for reconsideration of July 17, 1987 which asked the court to allow petitioner to present evidence in support of
its prayer for a reconsideration of the order of 7 July 1987.

The pivotal issues presented before Us are whether the right to bail may, under certain circumstances, be
denied to a person who is charged with an otherwise bailable offense, and whether such right may be waived.

The following are the antecedents of this petition:

In the original Information2 filed on 2 October 1986 in Criminal Case No. 86-48926 of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, later amended in an Amended Information3 which was filed on 24 October 1986, private respondent
Rodolfo Salas, alias "Commander Bilog", and his co-accused were charged for the crime of rebellion under
Article 134, in relation to Article 135, of the Revised Penal Code allegedly committed as follows:

That in or about 1968 and for some time before said year and continuously thereafter until the present
time, in the City of Manila and elsewhere in the Philippines, the Communist Party of the Philippines, its
military arm, the New People's Army, its mass infiltration network, the National Democratic Front with its
other subordinate organizations and fronts, have, under the direction and control of said organizations'
leaders, among whom are the aforenamed accused, and with the aid, participation or support of
members and followers whose whereabouts and identities are still unknown, risen publicly and taken
arms throughout the country against the Government of the Republic of the Philippines for the purpose
of overthrowing the present Government, the seat of which is in the City of Manila, or of removing from
the allegiance to that government and its laws, the country's territory or part of it;

That from 1970 to the present, the above-named accused in their capacities as leaders of the
aforenamed organizations, in conspiracy with, and in support of the cause of, the organizations
aforementioned, engaged themselves in war against the forces of the government, destroying property
or committing serious violence, and other acts in the pursuit of their unlawful purpose, such as . . .

(then follows the enumeration of specific acts committed before and after February 1986).

At the time the Information was filed the private respondent and his co-accused were in military custody
following their arrest on 29 September 1986 at the Philippine General Hospital, Taft Ave., Manila; he had
earlier escaped from military detention and a cash reward of P250,000.00 was offered for his
capture.4

A day after the filing of the original information, or on 3 October 1986, a petition for habeas corpus for private
respondent and his co-accused was filed with this Court5 which, as shall hereafter be discussed in detail, was
dismissed in Our resolution of 16 October 1986 on the basis of the agreement of the parties under which
herein private respondent "will remain in legal custody and will face trial before the court having custody over
his person" and the warrants for the arrest of his co-accused are deemed recalled and they shall be
immediately released but shall submit themselves to the court having jurisdiction over their person.

On November 7, 1986 , private respondent filed with the court below a Motion to Quash the Information
alleging that: (a) the facts alleged do not constitute an offense; (b) the Court has no jurisdiction over the
offense charged; (c) the Court has no jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants; and (d) the criminal
action or liability has been extinguished,6 to which petitioner filed an Opposition7 citing, among other grounds,
the fact that in the Joint Manifestation and Motion dated October 14, 1986, in G.R. No. 76009, private
respondent categorically conceded that:

xxx xxx xxx

Par. 2 (B) — Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal custody and face trial before the court having
custody over his person.

In his Order of March 6, 1987,8 respondent Judge denied the motion to quash.

Instead of asking for a reconsideration of said Order, private respondent filed on 9 May 1987 a petition for
bail,9 which herein petitioner opposed in an Opposition filed on 27 May 198710 on the ground that since
rebellion became a capital offense under the provisions of P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and 1834, which amended
Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, by imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death on those who
promote, maintain, or head a rebellion the accused is no longer entitled to bail as evidence of his guilt is
strong.

On 5 June 1987 the President issued Executive Order No. 187 repealing, among others, P.D. Nos. 1996, 942
and 1834 and restoring to full force and effect Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code as it existed before the
amendatory decrees. Thus, the original penalty for rebellion, prision mayor and a fine not to exceed
P20,000.00, was restored.

Executive Order No. 187 was published in the Official Gazette in its June 15, 1987 issue (Vol. 83, No. 24)
which was officially released for circulation on June 26, 1987.

In his Order of 7 July 198711 respondent Judge, taking into consideration Executive Order No. 187, granted
private respondent's petition for bail, fixed the bail bond at P30,000.00 and imposed upon private respondent
the additional condition that he shall report to the court once every two (2) months within the first ten (10) days
of every period thereof. In granting the petition respondent Judge stated:

. . . There is no more debate that with the effectivity of Executive Order No. 187, the offense of
rebellion, for which accused Rodolfo Salas is herein charged, is now punishable with the penalty
of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding P20,000.00, which makes it now bailable pursuant to Section
13, Article III, 1986 Constitution and Section 3, Rule 114, 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. Unlike the
old rule, bail is now a matter of right in non-capital offenses before final judgment. This is very evident
upon a reading of Section 3, Rule 114, aforementioned, in relation to Section 21, same rule. In view,
therefore, of the present circumstances in this case, said accused-applicant is now entitled to bail as a
matter of right inasmuch as the crime of rebellion ceased to be a capital offense.

As to the contention of herein petitioner that it would be dangerous to grant bail to private respondent
considering his stature in the CPP-NPA hierarchy, whose ultimate and overriding goal is to wipe out all
vestiges of our democracy and to replace it with their ideology, and that his release would allow his return to
his organization to direct its armed struggle to topple the government before whose courts he invokes his
constitutional right to bail, respondent Judge replied:

True, there now appears a clash between the accused's constitutional right to bail in a non-capital
offense, which right is guaranteed in the Bill of Rights and, to quote again the prosecution, "the
existence of the government that bestows the right, the paramount interest of the state." Suffice to state
that the Bill of Rights, one of which is the right to bail, is a "declaration of the rights of the individual,
civil, political and social and economic, guaranteed by the Constitution against impairment or intrusion
by any form of governmental action. Emphasis is placed on the dignity of man and the worth of
individual. There is recognition of certain inherent and inalienable rights of the individual, which the
government is prohibited from violating" (Quisumbing-Fernando, Philippine Constitutional Law, 1984
Edition, p. 77). To this Court, in case of such conflict as now pictured by the prosecution, the same
should be resolved in favor of the individual who, in the eyes of the law, is alone in the assertion of his
rights under the Bill of Rights as against the State. Anyway, the government is that powerful and strong,
having the resources, manpower and the wherewithals to fight those "who oppose, threathen (sic) and
destroy a just and orderly society and its existing civil and political institutions." The prosecution's fear
may or may not be founded that the accused may later on jump bail and rejoin his comrades in the field
to sow further disorders and anarchy against the duly constituted authorities. But, then, such a fear can
not be a reason to deny him bail. For the law is very explicit that when it comes to bailable offenses an
accused is entitled as a matter of light to bail. Dura est lex sed lex.

In a motion to reconsider12 the above order filed on 16 July 1987, petitioner asked the court to increase the bail
from P30,000.00 to P100,000.00 alleging therein that per Department of Justice Circular No. 10 dated 3 July
1987, the bail for the, provisional release of an accused should be in an amount computed at P10,000.00 per
year of imprisonment based on the medium penalty imposable for the offense and explaining that it is
recommending P100,000.00 because the private respondent "had in the past escaped from the custody of the
military authorities and the offense for which he is charged is not an ordinary crime, like murder, homicide or
robbery, where after the commission, the perpetrator has achieved his end" and that "the rebellious acts are
not consummated until the well-organized plan to overthrow the government through armed struggle and
replace it with an alien system based on a foreign ideology is attained."

On 17 July 1987, petitioner filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration13 indirectly asking the court to deny
bail to the private respondent and to allow it to present evidence in support thereof considering the "inevitable
probability that the accused will not comply with this main condition of his bail –– to appear in court for trial," a
conclusion it claims to be buttressed "by the following facts which are widely known by the People of the
Philippines and which this Honorable Court may have judicial notice of:

1. The accused has evaded the authorities for thirteen years and was an escapee from detention when
arrested;

2. He was not arrested at his residence as he had no known address;

3. He was using the false name "Manuel Mercado Castro" at the time of his arrest and presented a
Driver's License to substantiate his false identity;

4. The address he gave "Panamitan, Kawit, Cavite," turned out to be also a false address;

5. He and his companions were on board a private vehicle with a declared owner whose identity and
address were also found to be false;

6. Pursuant to Ministry Order No. 1-A dated 11 January 1982 , a reward of P250,000.00 was offered
and paid for his arrest,
which "clearly indicate that the accused does not entertain the slightest intention to appear in court for trial, if
released." Petitioner further argues that the accused, who is the Chairman of the Communist Party of the
Philippines and head of its military arm, the NPA, together with his followers, are now engaged in an open
warfare and rebellion against this government and threatens the existence of this very Court from which he
now seeks provisional release," and that while he is entitled to bail as a matter of right in view of Executive
Order No. 187 which restored the original penalty for rebellion under Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code,
yet, when the interest of the State conflicts with that of an individual, that of the former prevails for "the right of
the State of self-preservation is paramount to any of the rights of an individual enshrined in the Bill of Rights of
the Constitution." Petitioner further invokes precedents in the United States of America holding "that there is no
absolute constitutional barrier to detention of potentially dangerous resident aliens pending deportation
proceedings,14 and that an arrestee may be incarcerated until trial as he presents a risk of flight; 15 and
sustaining a detention prior to trial of arrestee charged with serious felonies who are found after an adversary
hearing to pose threat to the safety of individuals and to the community which no condition of release can
dispel.16

On 30 July 1987 respondent Judge handed down the Order17 adverted to in the introductory portion of this
decision the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the "supplemental" motion
for reconsideration to be without merit and hereby denies it but finds the first motion for reconsideration
to be meritorious only insofar as the amount of bail is concerned and hereby reconsiders its Order of
July 7, 1987 only to increase the amount of bail from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00, subject to the approval
of this Court, and with the additional condition that accused Rodolfo Salas shall report to the court once
every two (2) months within the first ten (10) days of every period thereof (Almendras vs. Villaluz, et al.,
L-31665, August 6, 1975, 66 SCRA 58).

In denying the supplemental motion for reconsideration the respondent Judge took into account the "sudden
turn-about" on the part of the petitioner in that a day earlier it filed a motion for reconsideration wherein it
conceded the right of the private respondent to bail but merely asked to increase the amount of bail; observed
that it is only a reiteration of arguments in its opposition to the petition for bail of 25 May 1987; asserted that
the American precedents are not applicable since the cases involved deportation of aliens and, moreover, the
U.S. Federal Constitution does not contain a proviso on the right of an accused to bail in bailable offenses, but
only an injunction against excessive bail; and quoted the concurring opinion of the late Justice Pedro Tuason in
the cases of Nava, et al. vs. Gatmaitan, L-4853, Hernandez vs. Montesa, L-4964 and Angeles vs. Abaya, L-
5108, October 11, 1951, 90 Phil, 172.

Unable to agree with said Order, petitioner commenced this petition submitting therein the following issues:

THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE PROCORO J. DONATO ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AND IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION, AND IN TOTAL DISREGARD OF THE
PREVAILING REALITIES, WHEN HE DENIED PETITIONER'S SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION WITH PRAYER TO BE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO ADDUCE EVIDENCE
IN SUPPORT OF ITS OPPOSITION TO THE GRANT OF BAIL TO THE RESPONDENT RODOLFO
SALAS.

THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE PROCORO J. DONATO ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AND IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION WHEN HE GRANTED BAIL TO THE
RESPONDENT RODOLFO SALAS.

in support of which petitioner argues that private respondent is estopped from invoking his right to bail, having
expressly waived it in G.R. No. 76009 when he agreed to "remain in legal custody and face trial before the
court having custody of his person" in consideration of the recall of the warrant of arrest for his co-petitioners
Josefina Cruz and Jose Concepcion; and the right to bail, even in non-capital offenses, is not absolute when
there is prima facie evidence that the accused is a serious threat to the very existence of the State, in which
case the prosecution must be allowed to present evidence for the denial of bail. Consequently, respondent
Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he did not allow petitioner to present all the evidence it may
desire to support its prayer for the denial of bail and when he declared that the State has forfeited its right to do
so since during all the time that the petition for bail was pending, it never manifested, much less hinted, its
intention to adduce such evidence. And that even if release on bail may be allowed, respondent judge, in fixing
the amount of bail at P50,000.00 (originally P30,000.00 only), failed to take into account the lengthy record of
private respondents' criminal background, the gravity of the pending charge, and the likelihood of flight. 18

In Our resolution of 11 August 198719 We required the respondents to comment on the petition and issued a
Temporary Restraining Order ordering respondent Judge to cease and desist from implementing his order of
30 July 1987 granting bail to private respondent in the amount of P50,000.00.

In his Comment filed on 27 August 1987,20 private respondent asks for the outright dismissal of the petition and
immediate lifting of the temporary restraining order on the following grounds:

RESPONDENT SALAS NEVER WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO BAIL; NEITHER IS HE ESTOPPED FROM
ASSERTING SAID RIGHT. ON THE CONTRARY IT IS PETITIONER WHO IS ESTOPPED FROM
RAISING THE SAID ISSUE FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.

II

RESPONDENT SALAS ENJOYS NOT ONLY THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE PRESUMED

INNOCENT BUT ALSO THE RIGHT TO BAIL.

III

RESPONDENT SALAS IS NOT CHARGED WITH A CAPITAL OFFENSE (RECLUSION PERPETUA),

HENCE HE HAS THE RIGHT TO BAIL AS MANDATED BY THE CONSTITUTION.

IV

THE ORDER OF JULY 30, 1987 DENYING PETITIONER OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT EVIDENCE
IS CORRECT. PETITIONER'S ALLEGED RIGHT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE IS NON-EXISTENT
AND/OR HAD BEEN WAIVED.

THE ISSUANCE OF A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER IN THIS CASE VIOLATES NOT ONLY
RESPONDENT SALAS' RIGHT TO BAIL BUT ALSO HIS OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS.

We required the petitioner to reply to the comment of private respondent.21 The reply was filed on 18
September 1987.22

In Our resolution of 15 October 198723 We gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file
simultaneously their memoranda within twenty days from notice.

In their respective manifestations and motions dated 5 November24 and 23 November 198725 petitioner and
private respondents asked to be excused from filing their Memoranda and that the petition and reply be
considered as the Memorandum for petitioner and the Comment as the Memorandum for private respondent,
which We granted in Our resolution of 19 November 198726 and 1 December 1987,27 respectively.

In Our resolution of 14 September 1989 We required the Solicitor General to express his stand on the issues
raised in this petitions,28 which he complied with by filing his Manifestation on 30 May 199029 wherein he
manifests that he supports the petition and submits that the Order of respondent Judge of July 7, July 17 and
July 30, 1987 should be annulled and set aside asserting that private respondent had waived the light to bail in
view of the agreement in G.R. No. 76009; that granting bail to him is accepting wide-eyed his undertaking
which he is sure to break; in determining bail, the primary consideration is to insure the attendance of the
accused at the trial of the case against him which would be frustrated by the "almost certainty that respondent
Salas will lump bail of whatever amount"; and application of the guidelines provided for in Section 10 of Rule
114, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure on the amount of bail dictates denial of bail to private respondent. The
Solicitor General likewise maintains that the right of the petitioner to hearing on the application of private
respondent for bail cannot be denied by respondent Judge.

And now on the issues presented in this case.

I.

Unquestionably, at the time the original and the amended Informations for rebellion and the application for bail
were filed before the court below the penalty imposable for the offense for which the private respondent was
charged was reclusion perpetua to death. During the pendency of the application for bail Executive Order No.
187 was issued by the President, by virtue of which the penalty for rebellion as originally provided for in Article
135 of the Revised Penal Code was restored. The restored law was the governing law at the time the
respondent court resolved the petition for bail.

We agree with the respondent court that bail cannot be denied to the private respondent for he is charged with
the crime of rebellion as defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code to which is attached the penalty
of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding P20,000.00.30 It is, therefore, a bailable offense under Section 13 of
Article III of the 1987 Constitution which provides thus:

Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be prescribed by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

Section 3, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended, also provides:

Bail, a matter of right: exception. — All persons in custody shall, before final conviction, be entitled to
bail as a matter of right, except those charged with a capital offense or an offense which, under the law
at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail, is punishable by reclusion
perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong.

Therefore, before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the
offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua.31 To that extent the right is
absolute.32

And so, in a similar case for rebellion, People vs. Hernandez, et al., 99 Phil. 515, despite the fact that the
accused was already convicted, although erroneously, by the trial court for the complex crime of rebellion with
multiple murders, arsons and robberies, and sentenced to life imprisonment, We granted bail in the amount of
P30,000.00 during the pendency of his appeal from such conviction. To the vigorous stand of the People that
We must deny bail to the accused because the security of the State so requires, and because the judgment of
conviction appealed from indicates that the evidence of guilt of Hernandez is strong, We held:

. . . Furthermore, individual freedom is too basic, too transcendental and vital in a republican state, like
ours, to be derived upon mere general principles and abstract consideration of public safety. Indeed,
the preservation of liberty is such a major preoccupation of our political system that, not satisfied with
guaranteeing its enjoyment in the very first paragraph of section (1) of the Bill of Rights, the framers of
our Constitution devoted paragraphs (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18),
and (21) of said section (1) to the protection of several aspects of freedom.
The 1987 Constitution strengthens further the right to bail by explicitly providing that it shall not be impaired
even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. This overturns the Court's ruling in Garcia-
Padilla vs. Enrile, et al., supra., to wit:

The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must, indeed, carry with it the suspension
of the right to bail, if the government's campaign to suppress the rebellion is to be enhanced and
rendered effective. If the right to bail may be demanded during the continuance of the rebellion, and
those arrested, captured and detained in the course thereof will be released, they would, without the
least doubt, rejoin their comrades in the field thereby jeopardizing the success of government efforts to
bring to an end the invasion, rebellion or insurrection.

Upon the other hand, if the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a matter of
discretion. It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The court's discretion is limited to determining
whether or not evidence of guilt is strong.33 But once it is determined that the evidence of guilt is not strong,
bail also becomes a matter of right. In Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons, supra., We held:

The provision on bail in our Constitution is patterned after similar provisions contained in the
Constitution of the United States and that of many states of the Union. And it is said that:

The Constitution of the United States and the constitution of the many states provide that all
persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses, where the proof is
evident or the presumption of guilt is great, and, under such provisions, bail is a matter of right
which no court or judge can properly refuse, in all cases not embraced in the exceptions. Under
such provisions bail is a matter of right even in cases of capital offenses, unless the proof of
guilt is evident or the presumption thereof is great!34

Accordingly, the prosecution does not have the right to present evidence for the denial of bail in the
instances where bail is a matter of right. However, in the cases where the grant of bail is discretionary,
due process requires that the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable
time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion for
bail.35

We agree, however, with petitioner that it was error for the respondent court to fix the bond at
P30,000.00, then later at P50,000.00 without hearing the prosecution. The guidelines for the fixing of
the amount of bail provided for in Section 10 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court are not matters left
entirely to the discretion of the court. As We stated in People vs. Dacudao, et al., 170 SCRA, 489, 495:

Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the presentation of evidence and
reasonable opportunity for the prosecution to refute it. Among them are the nature and
circumstances of the crime, character and reputation of the accused, the weight of the evidence
against him, the probability of the accused appearing at the trial, whether or not the accused is a
fugitive from justice, and whether or not the accused is under bond in other case. . . .

In the instant case petitioner has sufficiently made out allegations which necessitate a grant of an
opportunity to be heard for the purpose of determining the amount of bail, but not for the denial thereof
because aforesaid Section 10 of Rule 114 does not authorize any court to deny bail.

II.

It must, however, be stressed that under the present state of the law, rebellion is no longer punishable
by prision mayor and fine not exceeding P20,000.00. Republic Act No. 6968 approved on 24 October
1990 and which took effect after publication in at least two newspapers of general circulation, amended,
among others, Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code by increasing the penalty for rebellion such that,
as amended, it now reads:
 Article 135. Penalty for rebellion, insurrection or coup d'etat. ––– Any person who promotes,
maintains, or heads a rebellion or insurrection shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Any person merely participating or executing the commands of others in a rebellion or

insurrection shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

xxx xxx xxx

This amendatory law cannot apply to the private respondent for acts allegedly committed prior to its
effectivity. It is not favorable to him. "Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the
person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of
this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced
and the convict is serving the same.36

III.

We agree with Petitioner that private respondent has, however, waived his right to bail in G.R. No.
76009.

On 3 October 1986, or the day following the filing of the original information in Criminal Case No. 86-
48926 with the trial court, a petition for habeas corpus for herein private respondent, and his co-
accused Josefina Cruz and Jose Concepcion, was filed with this Court by Lucia Cruz, Aida Concepcion
Paniza and Beatriz Salas against Juan Ponce Enrile, Gen. Fidel Ramos, Brig. Gen. Renato de Villa,
Brig. Gen. Ramon Montaño, and Col. Saldajeno praying, among others, that the petition be given due
course and a writ of habeas corpus be issued requiring respondents to produce the bodies of herein
private respondent and his co-accused before the Court and explain by what authority they arrested
and detained them. The following proceedings took place thereafter in said case:

1. In a resolution of 7 October 1986 We issued a writ of habeas corpus, required respondents to make
a return of the writ on or before the close of office hours on 13 October and set the petition for hearing
on 14 October 1986 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning.

2. On 13 October 1986 respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a Return To The
Writ of Habeas Corpus alleging therein that private respondent and Josefina Cruz alias "Mrs. Mercado",
and Jose Milo Concepcion alias "Eugene Zamora" were apprehended by the military on September 29,
1986 in the evening at the Philippine General Hospital Compound at Taft Ave., Mangga being leaders
or members of the Communist Party of the Philippines, New People's Army and National Democratic
Front, organizations dedicated to the overthrow of the Government through violent means, and having
actually committed acts of rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. After
their arrest they were forthwith charged with rebellion before Branch XII of the Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Region in Criminal Case No. 86-48926 and on 3 October warrants for their arrest were
issued and respondents continue to detain them because of the warrants of arrest and the pendency of
the criminal cases against them. Respondents further allege that, contrary to the allegation in the
petition, herein private respondent was not a member of the NDF panel involved in peace negotiations
with the Government; neither is he and his companions Cruz and Concepcion covered by any, safe
conduct pass issued by competent authorities.

3. At the hearing on 14 October 1986 the parties informed the Court of certain agreements reached
between them. We issued a resolution reading as follows:

When this case was called for hearing this morning, Attorneys Romeo Capulong, Arno V.
Sanidad, Efren H. Mercado, Edgardo Pamin-tuan, Casiano Sabile, Ramon Cura, and William
Chua appeared for the petitioners with Atty. Capulong arguing for the petitioners. Solicitor
General Sedfrey Ordonez, Assistant Solicitor General Romeo C. de la Cruz and Trial Attorney
 Josue E. Villanueva appeared for the respondents, with Solicitor General Ordoñez arguing for
the respondents.

Petitioners' counsel, Atty. Romeo Capulong, manifested in open Court that in conformity with
the agreement reached with the government, the petition for habeas corpus will be withdrawn
with detainee Rodolfo Salas to remain under custody, whereas his co-detainees Josefina Cruz
and Jose Milo Concepcion will be released immediately.

Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordoñez, also in open Court, confirmed the foregoing statement made
by petitioners' counsel regarding the withdrawal of the petition for habeas corpus, declaring that
no objection will be interposed to the immediate release of detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose
Milo Concepcion, and that no bond will be required of them, but they will continue to face trial
with their co-accused, Rodolfo Salas; further, that they will not be rearrested on the basis of the
warrants issued by the trial court provided that they manifest in open Court their willingness to
subject themselves to the jurisdiction of the Court and to appear in court when their presence is
required.

In addition, he stated that he is willing to confer with petitioners' counsel today relative to the
compromise agreement that they have previously undertaken to submit.

Upon manifestation of petitioners' counsel, Atty. Romeo Capulong, that on his oath as member
of the Bar, the detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion have agreed to subject
themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court, the Court ordered their immediate release.

Thereafter, the Court approved the foregoing manifestations and statements and required both
parties to SUBMIT to the Court their compromise agreement by 4:00 o'clock this afternoon.
Teehankee, C.J., is on official leave.

4. At 3:49 o'clock in the afternoon of 14 October 1986 the parties submitted a Joint Manifestation and
Motion duly signed by Atty. Romeo Capulong, counsel for petitioners, and Solicitor General Sedfrey
Ordoñez, Assistant Solicitor General Romeo C. de la Cruz and Trial Attorney Josue S. Villanueva,
counsel for respondents, which reads as follows:

COME NOW petitioners and the respondents, assisted by their respective counsel, and to this
Honorable Tribunal respectfully manifest:

1. That in the discussion between Romeo Capulong, petitioners' counsel, and Solicitor General
Sedfrey A. Ordoñez on October 13, 1986 exploratory talks were conducted to find out how the
majesty of the law may be preserved and human considerations may be called into play.

2. That in the conference both counsel agreed to the following terms of agreement:

a. The petition for habeas corpus will be withdrawn by petitioners and Josefina Cruz and
Jose Milo Concepcion will be immediately released but shall appear at the trial of the
criminal case for rebellion (People v. Rodolfo Salas, et al., Criminal Case No. 4886
[should be 86-48926], Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region) filed
against them under their personal recognizance.

b. Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal custody and face trial before the court
having custody over his person.

c. The warrant of arrest for the persons of Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion is
hereby deemed recalled in view of formal manifestation before the Supreme Court that
they will submit themselves to the court having jurisdiction over their person.
 3. That on October 14, the Solicitor General was able to obtain the conformity of the
Government to the foregoing terms which were likewise accepted by petitioner (sic) and their
counsel of record.

4. That the two counsel submitted their oral manifestation during the hearing on October 14 and
the present manifestation in compliance with the resolution announced in court this morning.

WHEREFORE, it is prayed that the petition for habeas corpus be dismissed.

5. On 16 October 1986 We issued the following resolution:

G.R. No. 76009 [In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Rodolfo Salas, Josefina Cruz
and Jose Milo Concepcion, et al. v. Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile, Gen. Fidel V. Ramos, Brig. Gen.
Renato de Villa, Brig. Gen. Ramon Montaño and Col. Virgilio Saldajeno] considering the Joint
Manifestation and Motion dated October 14, 1986 filed by Attorneys Romeo Capulong, Arno V.
Sanidad, Efren H. Mercado and Ricardo Fernandez, Jr. as counsel for petitioners and Solicitor
General Sedfrey A. Ordonez and Assistant Solicitor General Romeo C. de la Cruz and Trial
Attorney Josue S. Villanueva as counsel for respondents which states that they have entered
into an agreement whereby: [a] the petition for habeas corpus will be withdrawn by petitioners,
and Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion will be immediately released but shall appear at
the trial of the criminal case for rebellion [People vs. Rodolfo Salas, et al., Criminal Case No.
4886, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch XII, Manila], filed against
them, on their personal recognizance; [b] petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal custody
and face trial before the court having custody over his person; and [c] the warrant of arrest for
the person of Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion is hereby deemed recalled in view of the
formal manifestation before this Court that they will submit themselves to the court having
jurisdiction over their person and in view of the said agreement, the petition for habeas
corpus be dismissed, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petition for habeas corpus but subject
to the condition that petitioners' lead counsel, Atty. Capulong, upon his oath as member of the
Bar, shall abide by his commitment to ensure the appearance of Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo
Concepcion at the trial of the criminal case for rebellion filed against them. Teehankee, C.J., is
on official leave.

It is the stand of the petitioner that private respondent, "in agreeing to remain in legal custody even during the
pendency of the trial of his criminal case, [he] has expressly waived his right to bail."37 Upon the other hand,
private respondent asserts that this claim is totally devoid of factual and legal basis, for in their petition
for habeas corpus they precisely questioned the legality of the arrest and the continued detention of Rodolfo
Salas, Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion, which was not resolved by this Court or by the compromise
agreement of the parties but left open for further determination in another proceeding. Moreover, the matter of
the right to bail was neither raised by either party nor resolved by this Court, and the legal steps promptly taken
by private respondent after the agreement was reached, like the filing of the motion to quash on 7 November
1986 and the petition for bail on 14 May 1987, were clear and positive assertions of his statutory and
constitutional rights to be granted not only provisional but final and permanent liberty. Finally, private
respondent maintains that the term "legal custody" as used in the Joint Manifestation and Motion simply means
that private respondent agreed to continue to be in the custody of the law or in custodia legis and nothing else;
it is not to be interpreted as waiver.

Interestingly, private respondent admits that:

"Custody" has been held to mean nothing less than actual imprisonment. It is also defined as the
detainer of a person by virtue of a lawful authority, or the "care and possession of a thing or person."
(Bouviers Law Dictionary, Third Ed, Vol. I, pp. 741-742 citing Smith v. Com. 59 Pa. 320 and Rolland v.
Com. 82 Pa. 306)
He further admits that, in the light of Section 1 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court and settled jurisprudence, the
"constitutional right to bail is subject to the limitation that the person applying for admission to bail should be in
the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty."38

When the parties in G.R. No. 76009 stipulated that:

b. Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal custody and face trial before the court having custody
over his person.

they simply meant that Rodolfo Salas, herein respondent, will remain in actual physical custody of the court, or
in actual confinement or detention, as distinguished from the stipulation concerning his co-petitioners, who
were to be released in view of the recall of the warrants of arrest against them; they agreed, however, "to
submit themselves to the court having jurisdiction over their persons." Note should be made of the deliberate
care of the parties in making a fine distinction between legal custody and court having custody over the
person in respect to Rodolfo Salas and court having jurisdiction over the persons of his co-accused. Such a
fine distinction was precisely intended to emphasize the agreement that Rodolfo Salas will not be released, but
should remain in custody. Had the parties intended otherwise, or had this been unclear to private respondent
and his counsel, they should have insisted on the use of a clearer language. It must be remembered that at the
time the parties orally manifested before this Court on 14 October 1986 the terms and conditions of their
agreement and prepared and signed the Joint Manifestation and Motion, a warrant of arrest had already been
issued by the trial court against private respondent and his co-accused. The stipulation that only the warrants
of arrest for Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion shall be recalled and that only they shall be released,
further confirmed the agreement that herein petitioner shall remain in custody of the law, or detention or
confinement.

In defining bail as:

. . . the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, . . .

Section 1 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court admits no other meaning or interpretation for the term "in
custody of the law" than that as above indicated. The purpose of bail is to relieve an accused from
imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his appearance at the trial.39 It presupposes that the person
applying for it should be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of liberty.40

Consequently, having agreed in G.R. No. 76009 to remain in legal custody, private respondent had
unequivocably waived his right to bail.

But, is such waiver valid?

Article 6 of the Civil Code expressly provides:

Art. 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or
good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.

Waiver is defined as "a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known existing legal
right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege, which except for such waiver the party would have enjoyed; the
voluntary abandonment or surrender, by a capable person, of a right known by him to exist, with the intent that
such right shall be surrendered and such person forever deprived of its benefit; or such conduct as warrants an
inference of the relinquishment of such right; or the intentional doing of an act inconsistent with claiming it." 41

As to what rights and privileges may be waived, the authority is settled:

. . . the doctrine of waiver extends to rights and privileges of any character, and, since the word "waiver"
covers every conceivable right, it is the general rule that a person may waive any matter which affects
his property, and any alienable right or privilege of which he is the owner or which belongs to him or to
 which he is legally entitled, whether secured by contract, conferred with statute, or guaranteed by
constitution, provided such rights and privileges rest in the individual, are intended for his sole benefit,
do not infringe on the rights of others, and further provided the waiver of the right or privilege is not
forbidden by law, and does not contravene public policy; and the principle is recognized that everyone
has a right to waive, and agree to waive, the advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and
protection of the individual in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished without
infringing on any public right, and without detriment to the community at large. . . .

Although the general rule is that any right or privilege conferred by statute or guaranteed by
constitution may be waived, a waiver in derogation of a statutory right is not favored, and a waiver will
be inoperative and void if it infringes on the rights of others, or would be against public policy or morals
and the public interest may be waived.

While it has been stated generally that all personal rights conferred by statute and guaranteed by
constitution may be waived, it has also been said that constitutional provisions intended to protect
property may be waived, and even some of the constitutional rights created to secure personal liberty
are subjects of waiver.42

In Commonwealth vs. Petrillo,43 it was held:

Rights guaranteed to one accused of a crime fall naturally into two classes: (a) those in which the state,
as well as the accused, is interested; and (b) those which are personal to the accused, which are in the
nature of personal privileges. Those of the first class cannot be waived; those of the second may be.

It is "competent for a person to waive a right guaranteed by the Constitution, and to consent to action which
would be invalid if taken against his will."44

This Court has recognized waivers of constitutional rights such as, for example, the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures;45 the right to counsel and to remain silent;46 and the right to be heard.47

Even the 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes a waiver of rights guaranteed by its Bill of
Rights.1âwphi1 Section 12(l) of Article III thereof on the right to remain silent and to have a competent and
independent counsel, preferably of his own choice states:

. . . These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

This provision merely particularizes the form and manner of the waiver; it, nevertheless, clearly suggests that
the other rights may be waived in some other form or manner provided such waiver will not offend Article 6 of
the Civil Code.

We hereby rule that the right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right
which is personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public order, public policy,
morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.

The respondent Judge then clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting bail to the private
respondent.

WHEREFORE, the Orders of respondent Judge of July 7, 1987 and July 30, 1987 in Criminal Case No. 86-
48926 entitled People of the Philippines vs. Rodolfo C. Salas alias Commander Bilog/Henry, Josefina
Cruz alias Mrs. Mercado, and Jose Milo Concepcion alias Eugene Zamora, for Rebellion, are hereby
NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.
ART. 7
Case: Iloilo Palay Corn Planters Assn. Inc. vs. Feliciano, 13 SC

ILOILO PALAY AND CORN PLANTERS ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
HON. JOSE, Y. FELICIANO, ET AL., respondents.

Jose C. Zulueta and Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioners.

Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

On December 26, 1964, Jose Y. Feliciano, Chairman and General Manager of the Rice and Corn
Administration, wrote the President of the Philippines urging the immediate importation of 595,400 metric tons
of rice, thru a government agency which the President may designate, pursuant to the recommendation of the
National Economic Council as embodied in its Resolution No. 70, series of 1964.

On December 27, 1964, the President submitted said letter to his cabinet for consideration and on December
28, 1964, the cabinet approved the needed importation. On January 4, 1965, the President designated the
Rice and Corn Administration as the government agency authorized to undertake the importation pursuant to
which Chairman Jose Y. Feliciano announced an invitation to bid for said importation and set the bidding for
February 1, 1965.

Considering that said importation is contrary to Republic Act 3452 which prohibits the government from
importing rice and that there is no law appropriating funds to finance the same, the Iloilo Palay and Corn
Planters Association, Inc., together with Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as taxpayer, filed the instant
petition before this Court seeking to restrain Jose Y. Feliciano, in his capacity as Chairman and General
Manager of the Rice and Corn Administration, from conducting the bid scheduled on the date abovementioned,
and from doing any other act that may result in the contemplated importation until further orders of this Court.
For reasons that do not clearly appear, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Auditor General were made co-
respondents.

Pending decision on the merits, petitioners prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, which, in
due course, this Court granted upon petitioners' filing a bond in the amount of P50,000.00. This bond having
been filed, the writ was issued on February 10, 1965.

Respondents, in their answer do not dispute the essential allegations of the petition though they adduced
reasons which justify the importation sought to be made. They anchor the validity of the importation on the
provisions of Republic Act 2207 which, in their opinion, still stand.

It is petitioners' contention that the importation in question being undertaken by the government even if there is
a certification by the National Economic Council that there is a shortage in the local supply of rice of such
gravity as to constitute a national emergency, is illegal because the same is prohibited by Republic Act 3452
which, in its Section 10, provides that the importation of rice and corn is only left to private parties upon
payment of the corresponding taxes. They claim that the Rice and Corn Administration, or any other
government agency, is prohibited from doing so.

It is true that the section above adverted to leaves the importation of rice and corn exclusively to private parties
thereby prohibiting from doing so the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency, but from
this it does not follow that at present there is no law which permits the government to undertake the importation
of rice into the Philippines. And this we say because, in our opinion, the provision of Republic Act 2207 on the
matter still stands. We refer to Section 2 of said Act wherein, among other things, it provides that should there
be an existing or imminent shortage in the local supply of rice of such gravity as to constitute a national
emergency, and this is certified by the National Economic Council, the President of the Philippines may
authorize such importation thru any government agency that he may designate. Here there is no dispute that
the National Economic Council has certified that there is such shortage present which, because of its gravity,
constitutes a national emergency, and acting in pursuance thereof the President lost no time in authorizing,
after consulting his cabinet, the General Manager of the Rice and Corn Administration to immediately
undertake the needed importation in order to stave off the impending emergency. We find, therefore, no
plausible reason why the disputed importation should be prevented as petitioners now desire.

The contention that Republic Act 2207 has already been repealed by Republic Act 3452 is untenable in the
light of the divergent provisions obtaining in said two laws. Admittedly, Section 16 of Republic Act 3452
contains a repealing clause which provides: "All laws or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this
Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly." The question may now be asked: what is the nature of this
repealing clause ? It is certainly not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the Act
or Acts that are intended to be repealed [ Sutherland, Statutory Construction, (1943) Vol. 1, p. 467]. Rather, it
is a clause which predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in
existing and prior Acts. Such being the case, the presumption against implied repeals and the rule against
strict construction regarding implied repeals apply ex proprio vigore. Indeed, the legislature is presumed to
know the existing laws so that, if a repeal is intended, the proper step is to so express it [Continental Insurance
Co. v. Simpson, 8 F (2d) 439; Weber v. Bailey, 151 Ore. 2188, 51 P (2d) 832; State v. Jackson, 120 W. Va.
521, 199 S.E. 876]. The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any
existing law (Crawford, Construction of Statute, 1940 ed., p. 631), unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and
repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws. Here there is no such inconsistency.

To begin with, the two laws, although with a common objective, refer to different methods applicable to
different circumstances. Thus, the total banning of importation under normal conditions as provided for in
Republic Act 2207 is one step to achieve the rice and corn sufficiency program of the Administration. The
philosophy behind the banning is that any importation of rice during a period of sufficiency or even of a minor
shortage will unduly compete with the local producers and depress the local price which may discourage them
from raising said crop. On the other hand, a price support program and a partial ban of rice importation as
embodied in Republic Act 3452 is another step adopted to attend the sufficiency program. While the two laws
are geared towards the same ultimate objective, their methods of approach are different; one is by a total ban
of rice importation and the other by a partial ban, the same being applicable only to the government during
normal period.

There is another area where the two laws find a common point of reconciliation: the normalcy of the time
underlying both laws. Thus, with respect to the matter of importation Republic Act 2207 covers three different
situations: (1) when the local produce of rice is sufficient to supply local consumption; (2) when the local
produce falls short of the supply but the shortage is not enough to constitute a national emergency; and (3)
when the shortage, on the local supply of rice is of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency. Under
the first two situations, no importation is allowed whether by the government or by the private sector. However,
in the case of the third situation, the law authorizes importation, by the government.

Republic Act 3452, on the other hand, deals only with situations 1 and 2, but not with. Nowhere in said law can
we discern that it covers importation where the shortage in the local supply is of such gravity as to constitute a
national emergency. In short, Republic Act 3452 only authorizes importation during normal times, but when
there is a shortage in the local supply of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency, we have to turn to
Republic Act 2207. These two laws therefore, are not inconsistent and so implied repeal does not ensue.

Our view that Republic Act 3452 merely contemplates importation during normal times is bolstered by a
consideration of the discussion that took place in Congress of House Bill No. 11511 which was presented in
answer to the request of the Chief Executive that he be given a standby power to import rice in the Philippines.
On this matter, we quote the following views of Senators Padilla and Almendras:

SENATOR PADILLA: But under Republic Act No. 3452 them is a proviso in Sec. 10 thereof "that the
Rice and Corn Administration or any government agency is hereby prohibited from importing rice and
corn."

SENATOR ALMENDRAS: That is under normal conditions.

 SENATOR PADILLA: "Provided further", it says, "that the importation of rice, and corn is left to private
parties upon payment of the corresponding tax." So therefore, the position of the Committee as
expressed by the distinguished sponsor, is that Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 3452 is applicable under
normal conditions.

SENATOR ALMENDRAS: "Yes". (Senate Debate, June 16, 1964).

Much stress is laid on the content of Section 12 of Republic Act 3452 which gives to the President authority to
declare a rice and corn emergency any time he deems necessary in the public interest and, during the
emergency, to conduct raids, seizure and confiscation of rice and corn hoarded in any private warehouse or
bodega subject to constitutional limitations, to support the claim that said Act also bans importation on the part
of the government even in case of an emergency. The contention is predicated on a misinterpretation of the
import and meaning of said provision. Note that the section refers to an emergency where there is an artificial
shortage because of the apparent hoarding undertaken by certain unscrupulous dealers or businessmen, and
not to an actual serious shortage of the commodity because, if the latter exists, there is really nothing to raid,
seize or confiscate, because the situation creates a real national emergency. Congress by no means could
have intended under such a situation to deprive the government of its right to import to stave off hunger and
starvation. Congress knows that such remedy is worthless as there is no rice to be found in the Philippines.
Seizure of rice is only of value in fighting hoarding and profiteering, but such remedy cannot produce the rice
needed to solve the emergency. If there is really insufficient rice stocked in the private warehouses and
bodegas such confiscatory step cannot remedy an actual emergency, in which case we have to turn to
Republic Act 2207.

The two laws can therefore be construed as harmonious parts of the legislative expression of its policy to
promote a rice and corn program. And if this can be done, as we have shown, it is the duty of this Court to
adopt such interpretation that would give effect to both laws. Conversely, in order to effect a repeal by
implication, the litter statute must be irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant to the prior existing law [United
States v. Greathouse,. 166 U.S. 601, 41 L. Ed., 1130; In re Phoenix Hotel Co., 13 F. Supp. 229; Hammond v.
McDonald, 32 Cal. App. 187, 89 P (2d) 407; Sutherland, Statutory Construction, supra, p. 462]. The old and
the new laws must be absolutely incompatible (Compañia General de Tabacos v. Collector of Customs, 46
Phil. 8). A mere difference in the terms and provisions of the statutes is not sufficient to create a repugnancy
between them. There must be such a positive repugnancy between the provisions of the old and the new
statutes that they cannot be made to reconcile and stand together (Crawford, Construction of Statute, supra, p.
631). The clearest case possible must first be made before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn
[Nagano v. McGrath, 187 F (2d) 759]. Inconsistency is never presumed.

Republic Act 3848 entitled "An Act Providing for the Importation of Rice During the Calendar Year Nineteen
Hundred Sixty-Four in the Event of Shortage in Local Supply" cannot be given any nullifying value, as it is
pretended, simply because Section 6 thereof provides that "except as provided in this Act, no other agency or
instrumentality of the Government shall be allowed to purchase rice from abroad." The reason is that it is a
mere temporary law effective only for a specific year. As its title reads, it is merely an authority to import
rice during the year 1964. The same, therefore, is now functus officio at least on the matter of importation.

Neither can petitioners successfully pretend that as Section 4 thereof provides that pending prosecutions for
any violation of Republic Acts 2207 and 3452 shall in no way be affected by said Act 3848 the implication is
that the aforesaid Acts have already been repealed. That provision is merely a safeguard placed therein in
order that the prosecutions already undertaken may not be defeated with the enactment of Republic Act 3848
because the latter provides for penal provisions which call for lesser penalty. The intention is to except them
from the rule that penal statutes can be given retroactive effect if favorable to the accused.

To further bolster our view that Republic Act 2207 has not been impliedly repealed by Republic Act 3452, we
wish to briefly quote hereunder the views expressed by some senators during the discussion of House Bill
11511 already mentioned above. It should be here repeated that said bill was presented to accede to the
request of the President for a stand-by power to import in case of emergency in view of the uncertainty of the
law, but that during the discussion thereof it was strongly asserted and apparently upheld that such request for
authority was not necessary because Republic Act 2207 was still in force. It is probably for this reason that said
bill, after having been approved by the Senate, was killed in the conference committee that considered it.
These views, while not binding, are of persuasive authority and throw light on the issue relative to the effectivity
of Republic Act 2207.

SENATOR LIWAG: ... Now Mr. Chairman, is it the sense of the Committee that in the case of
emergency, in case of an impending shortage, we can import rice under the provisions of R.A. No.
2207?

SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes, that is what we mean, your Honor, in this paragraph (c), Section 2,
page 2, that when we say "under the provisions of existing law," we are referring to R.A. No. 2207.

xxx xxx xxx

SENATOR PADILLA: I notice, Mr. Senator, that Section 2 paragraph (c) of the amendment by
substitution reads:

Importation of rice and/or corn should be resorted to only in cases of extreme and under the provisions
of existing law.

I suppose that the existing laws referred to are Republic Act No. 2207 and Republic Act No. 3452. Does
this section in the proposed bill by substitution recognize the continued existence of the pertinent
provisions of Republic Act No. 2207 and Republic Act No. 3452 on rice importation ?

SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes, that is the reason, Your Honor, why we struck out the stand-by power
on the part of the President to import rice.

xxx xxx xxx

SENATOR ALMENDRAS: The position of your Committee, Your Honor, because of the existing law —
that is, Republic Act No. 3452 and Republic Act No. 2207 — that is the reason your Committee
eliminated that stand-by power of the President to import rice. Because you know, Your Honor, what is
the use of that stand-by power, inasmuch as under Republic Act No. 3452 and Republic Act No. 2207
the President can designate any government agency to import rice?

SENATOR PADILLA: Well, it is good to make that clear because in the decision of the Supreme Court,
as I said, there was no clear-cut holding as to the possible co-existence or implied repeal between
these two Acts.

SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes, Your Honor, but the gentleman from Nueva Ecija, Senator Liwag,
informed me that Republic Act No. 2207 has never been repealed.

SENATOR PADILLA: Well, I also concur with that view, but we want to make that clear ... .

SENATOR PADILLA: "Provided, further," it says, "That the importation of rice and corn is left to private
parties upon payment of the corresponding taxes." So, therefore, the position of the Committee, as
expressed by the distinguished sponsor is that Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 3452 is applicable under
normal conditions.

SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes.

SENATOR PADILLA: So, both provisions of law are in existence.

SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes.

SENATOR PADILLA: One is not repealed by the other.

 xxx xxx xxx

SENATOR TOLENTINO: Mr. President, there are two views already expressed on whether Republic
Act No. 2207 has been repealed by Republic Act No. 3452. One view sustains the theory that there has
been a repeal of Republic Act No. 2207 by Republic Act No. 3452 insofar as rice importation is
concerned. The other view is that there is no repeal. The Supreme Court does not state clearly which
side prevails. I take the view that the two laws can be reconciled ... .

Now, Mr. President, reading those two provisions together, I maintain that they are not totally repugnant
to each other, that it is possible for them to stand together except on certain points: First, is importation
in case of a national emergency certified by the National Economic Council permissible? By reading the
two provisos together I would say yes because there is nothing in the proviso contained in Republic Act
No. 3452 which would be inconsistent with importation during a shortage amounting to a national
emergency.

Another circumstance that strengthens our view is that when said House Bill No. 11511 was finally approved
by the Senate, it carried a clause which expressly repeals, among others, Republic Act No. 2207 (Section 14),
but which bill, as already said, was later killed in the conference committee. This attitude clearly reveals that
Congress preferred to fall back on Republic Act 2207 with regard to future importations.

Anent the point raised relative to the lack of necessary appropriation to finance the importation in question,
suffice it to state that under Republic Act 663 the National Rice and Corn Corporation is authorized to borrow,
raise and secure the money that may be necessary to carry out its objectives. We refer to Section 3 (e) of said
Act which empowers said corporation to secure money and to encumber any property it has as a guaranty, and
Republic Act No. 3452, which creates the Rice and Corn Administration, transferred its functions and powers to
the latter, including the power to borrow money under Section 3(e). This provision gives the RCA enough
power with which to finance the importation in question.

WHEREFORE, petition is dismissed. The writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court is hereby dissolved.
Costs against petitioners.
ART. 8
Ting vs. Velez-Ting, G.R. No. 166562, March 31, 2009

Petitioner Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and respondent Carmen Velez-Ting (Carmen) first met in 1972 while they
were classmates in medical school.5 They fell in love, and they were wed on July 26, 1975 in Cebu City when
respondent was already pregnant with their first child.

At first, they resided at Benjamin's family home in Maguikay, Mandaue City.6 When their second child was
born, the couple decided to move to Carmen's family home in Cebu City.7 In September 1975, Benjamin
passed the medical board examinations8 and thereafter proceeded to take a residency program to become a
surgeon but shifted to anesthesiology after two years. By 1979, Benjamin completed the preceptorship
program for the said field9 and, in 1980, he began working for Velez Hospital, owned by Carmen's family, as
member of its active staff,10 while Carmen worked as the hospital's Treasurer.11

The couple begot six (6) children, namely Dennis, born on December 9, 1975; James Louis, born on August
25, 1977; Agnes Irene, born on April 5, 1981; Charles Laurence, born on July 21, 1986; Myles Vincent, born on
July 19, 1988; and Marie Corinne, born on June 16, 1991.12

On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to petitioner and while their youngest child
was only two years old, Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City praying for the declaration
of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from
psychological incapacity even at the time of the celebration of their marriage, which, however, only became
manifest thereafter.13

In her complaint, Carmen stated that prior to their marriage, she was already aware that Benjamin used to
drink and gamble occasionally with his friends.14 But after they were married, petitioner continued to drink
regularly and would go home at about midnight or sometimes in the wee hours of the morning drunk and
violent. He would confront and insult respondent, physically assault her and force her to have sex with him.
There were also instances when Benjamin used his gun and shot the gate of their house.15 Because of his
drinking habit, Benjamin's job as anesthesiologist was affected to the point that he often had to refuse to
answer the call of his fellow doctors and to pass the task to other anesthesiologists. Some surgeons even
stopped calling him for his services because they perceived petitioner to be unreliable. Respondent tried to talk
to her husband about the latter's drinking problem, but Benjamin refused to acknowledge the same.16

Carmen also complained that petitioner deliberately refused to give financial support to their family and would
even get angry at her whenever she asked for money for their children. Instead of providing support, Benjamin
would spend his money on drinking and gambling and would even buy expensive equipment for his
hobby.17 He rarely stayed home18 and even neglected his obligation to his children.19

Aside from this, Benjamin also engaged in compulsive gambling.20 He would gamble two or three times a week
and would borrow from his friends, brothers, or from loan sharks whenever he had no money. Sometimes,
Benjamin would pawn his wife's own jewelry to finance his gambling.21 There was also an instance when the
spouses had to sell their family car and even a portion of the lot Benjamin inherited from his father just to be
able to pay off his gambling debts.22 Benjamin only stopped going to the casinos in 1986 after he was banned
therefrom for having caused trouble, an act which he said he purposely committed so that he would be banned
from the gambling establishments.23

In sum, Carmen's allegations of Benjamin's psychological incapacity consisted of the following manifestations:

1. Benjamin's alcoholism, which adversely affected his family relationship and his profession;

2. Benjamin's violent nature brought about by his excessive and regular drinking;
3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin found it necessary to sell the family car twice
and the property he inherited from his father in order to pay off his debts, because he no longer had money to
pay the same; andcralawlibrary

4. Benjamin's irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure and refusal to give regular financial
support to his family.24

In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He maintained that he is a respectable
person, as his peers would confirm. He said that he is an active member of social and athletic clubs and would
drink and gamble only for social reasons and for leisure. He also denied being a violent person, except when
provoked by circumstances.25 As for his alleged failure to support his family financially, Benjamin claimed that it
was Carmen herself who would collect his professional fees from Velez Hospital when he was still serving
there as practicing anesthesiologist.26 In his testimony, Benjamin also insisted that he gave his family financial
support within his means whenever he could and would only get angry at respondent for lavishly spending his
hard-earned money on unnecessary things.27 He also pointed out that it was he who often comforted and took
care of their children, while Carmen played mahjong with her friends twice a week.28

During the trial, Carmen's testimony regarding Benjamin's drinking and gambling habits and violent behavior
was corroborated by Susana Wasawas, who served as nanny to the spouses' children from 1987 to
1992.29 Wasawas stated that she personally witnessed instances when Benjamin maltreated Carmen even in
front of their children.30

Carmen also presented as witness Dr. Pureza Trinidad-Oñate, a psychiatrist.31 Instead of the usual personal
interview, however, Dr. Oñate's evaluation of Benjamin was limited to the transcript of stenographic notes
taken during Benjamin's deposition because the latter had already gone to work as an anesthesiologist in a
hospital in South Africa. After reading the transcript of stenographic notes, Dr. Oñate concluded that
Benjamin's compulsive drinking, compulsive gambling and physical abuse of respondent are clear indications
that petitioner suffers from a personality disorder.32

To refute Dr. Oñate's opinion, petitioner presented Dr. Renato D. Obra, a psychiatrist and a consultant at the
Department of Psychiatry in Don Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center, as his expert witness.33 Dr. Obra
evaluated Benjamin's psychological behavior based on the transcript of stenographic notes, as well as the
psychiatric evaluation report prepared by Dr. A.J.L. Pentz, a psychiatrist from the University of Pretoria in
South Africa, and his (Dr. Obra's) interview with Benjamin's brothers.34 Contrary to Dr. Oñate's findings, Dr.
Obra observed that there is nothing wrong with petitioner's personality, considering the latter's good
relationship with his fellow doctors and his good track record as anesthesiologist.35

On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its Decision36 declaring the marriage between petitioner and
respondent null and void. The RTC gave credence to Dr. Oñate's findings and the admissions made by
Benjamin in the course of his deposition, and found him to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage. Specifically, the trial court found Benjamin an excessive drinker, a
compulsive gambler, someone who prefers his extra-curricular activities to his family, and a person with violent
tendencies, which character traits find root in a personality defect existing even before his marriage to Carmen.
The decretal portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage between
plaintiff and defendant null and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. x x x

xxx

SO ORDERED.37

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA. On October 19, 2000, the CA rendered a Decision38 reversing the
trial court's ruling. It faulted the trial court's finding, stating that no proof was adduced to support the conclusion
that Benjamin was psychologically incapacitated at the time he married Carmen since Dr. Oñate's conclusion
was based only on theories and not on established fact,39 contrary to the guidelines set forth in Santos v. Court
of Appeals40 and in Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals and Molina.41

Because of this, Carmen filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the Molina guidelines should not be
applied to this case since the Molina decision was promulgated only on February 13, 1997, or more than five
years after she had filed her petition with the RTC.42 She claimed that the Molina ruling could not be made to
apply retroactively, as it would run counter to the principle of stare decisis. Initially, the CA denied the motion
for reconsideration for having been filed beyond the prescribed period. Respondent thereafter filed a
manifestation explaining compliance with the prescriptive period but the same was likewise denied for lack of
merit. Undaunted, respondent filed a petition for certiorari 43 with this Court. In a Resolution44 dated March 5,
2003, this Court granted the petition and directed the CA to resolve Carmen's motion for reconsideration.45 On
review, the CA decided to reconsider its previous ruling. Thus, on November 17, 2003, it issued an Amended
Decision46 reversing its first ruling and sustaining the trial court's decision.47

A motion for reconsideration was filed, this time by Benjamin, but the same was denied by the CA in its
December 13, 2004 Resolution.48

Hence, this petition.

For our resolution are the following issues:

I. Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to follow the guidelines set forth under the
Santos and Molina cases;

II. Whether the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of psychological incapacity for the declaration
of absolute nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code has been liberalized; andcralawlibrary

III. Whether the CA's decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void [is] in
accordance with law and jurisprudence.

We find merit in the petition.

I. On the issue of stare decisis.

The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by this Court in
its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it
should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.49 Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the
same issues,50 necessary for two simple reasons: economy and stability. In our jurisdiction, the principle is
entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code.51

This doctrine of adherence to precedents or stare decisis was applied by the English courts and was later
adopted by the United States. Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno's discussion on the
historical development of this legal principle in his dissenting opinion in Lambino v. Commission on
Elections52 is enlightening:

The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means "stand by the thing and do not disturb the calm."
The doctrine started with the English Courts. Blackstone observed that at the beginning of the 18th century, "it
is an established rule to abide by former precedents where the same points come again in litigation." As the
rule evolved, early limits to its application were recognized: (1) it would not be followed if it were "plainly
unreasonable"; (2) where courts of equal authority developed conflicting decisions; and, (3) the binding force of
the decision was the "actual principle or principles necessary for the decision; not the words or reasoning used
to reach the decision."

The doctrine migrated to the United States. It was recognized by the framers of the U.S. Constitution.
According to Hamilton, "strict rules and precedents" are necessary to prevent "arbitrary discretion in the
courts." Madison agreed but stressed that "x x x once the precedent ventures into the realm of altering or
repealing the law, it should be rejected." Prof. Consovoy well noted that Hamilton and Madison "disagree about
the countervailing policy considerations that would allow a judge to abandon a precedent." He added that their
ideas "reveal a deep internal conflict between the concreteness required by the rule of law and the flexibility
demanded in error correction. It is this internal conflict that the Supreme Court has attempted to deal with for
over two centuries."

Indeed, two centuries of American case law will confirm Prof. Consovoy's observation although stare decisis
developed its own life in the United States. Two strains of stare decisis have been isolated by legal scholars.
The first, known as vertical stare decisis deals with the duty of lower courts to apply the decisions of the higher
courts to cases involving the same facts. The second, known as horizontal stare decisis requires that high
courts must follow its own precedents. Prof. Consovoy correctly observes that vertical stare decisis has been
viewed as an obligation, while horizontal stare decisis, has been viewed as a policy, imposing choice but not a
command. Indeed, stare decisis is not one of the precepts set in stone in our Constitution.

It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare decisis - constitutional stare decisis and
statutory stare decisis. Constitutional stare decisis involves judicial interpretations of the Constitution while
statutory stare decisis involves interpretations of statutes. The distinction is important for courts enjoy more
flexibility in refusing to apply stare decisis in constitutional litigations. Justice Brandeis' view on the binding
effect of the doctrine in constitutional litigations still holds sway today. In soothing prose, Brandeis stated:
"Stare decisis is not . . . a universal and inexorable command. The rule of stare decisis is not inflexible.
Whether it shall be followed or departed from, is a question entirely within the discretion of the court, which is
again called upon to consider a question once decided." In the same vein, the venerable Justice Frankfurter
opined: "the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what we have said about
it." In contrast, the application of stare decisis on judicial interpretation of statutes is more inflexible. As Justice
Stevens explains: "after a statute has been construed, either by this Court or by a consistent course of decision
by other federal judges and agencies, it acquires a meaning that should be as clear as if the judicial gloss had
been drafted by the Congress itself." This stance reflects both respect for Congress' role and the need to
preserve the courts' limited resources.

In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of reasons, viz.: (1) it legitimizes judicial
institutions; (2) it promotes judicial economy; and, (3) it allows for predictability. Contrariwise, courts refuse to
be bound by the stare decisis rule where (1) its application perpetuates illegitimate and unconstitutional
holdings; (2) it cannot accommodate changing social and political understandings; (3) it leaves the power to
overturn bad constitutional law solely in the hands of Congress; and, (4) activist judges can dictate the policy
for future courts while judges that respect stare decisis are stuck agreeing with them.

In its 200-year history, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to follow the stare decisis rule and reversed its
decisions in 192 cases. The most famous of these reversals is Brown v. Board of Education which junked
Plessy v. Ferguson's "separate but equal doctrine." Plessy upheld as constitutional a state law requirement
that races be segregated on public transportation. In Brown, the U.S. Supreme Court, unanimously held that
"separate . . . is inherently unequal." Thus, by freeing itself from the shackles of stare decisis, the U.S.
Supreme Court freed the colored Americans from the chains of inequality. In the Philippine setting, this Court
has likewise refused to be straitjacketed by the stare decisis rule in order to promote public welfare. In La
Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, we reversed our original ruling that certain provisions of the
Mining Law are unconstitutional. Similarly, in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, we overturned our first ruling and
held, on motion for reconsideration, that a private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during
the evaluation stage of the extradition process.

An examination of decisions on stare decisis in major countries will show that courts are agreed on the factors
that should be considered before overturning prior rulings. These are workability, reliance, intervening
developments in the law and changes in fact. In addition, courts put in the balance the following determinants:
closeness of the voting, age of the prior decision and its merits.

The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow the stare decisis rule in constitutional litigations is
Planned Parenthood v. Casey. It established a 4-pronged test. The court should (1) determine whether the rule
has proved to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability; (2) consider whether the rule is subject to a
kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the
cost of repudiation; (3) determine whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have the old
rule no more than a remnant of an abandoned doctrine; and, (4) find out whether facts have so changed or
come to be seen differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification.53

To be forthright, respondent's argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos and Molina should
not be applied retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare decisis is no longer new. The same
argument was also raised but was struck down in Pesca v. Pesca,54 and again in Antonio v. Reyes.55 In these
cases, we explained that the interpretation or construction of a law by courts constitutes a part of the law as of
the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court is overruled, and a different view is
adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the
old doctrine and have acted in good faith, in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non
respicit."

II. On liberalizing the required proof for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36.

Now, petitioner wants to know if we have abandoned the Molina doctrine.

We have not.

In Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te,56 we declared that, in hindsight, it may have been
inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of
psychological incapacity. We said that instead of serving as a guideline, Molina unintentionally became a
straightjacket, forcing all cases involving psychological incapacity to fit into and be bound by it, which is not
only contrary to the intention of the law but unrealistic as well because, with respect to psychological
incapacity, no case can be considered as on "all fours" with another.57

By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and understandable to give
weight to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological temperament of parties in
order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the psychological
incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly advisable, are not conditions sine qua non in granting
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage.58 At best, courts must treat such opinions as decisive but not
indispensable evidence in determining the merits of a given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination of
the person concerned need not be resorted to.59 The trial court, as in any other given case presented before it,
must always base its decision not solely on the expert opinions furnished by the parties but also on the totality
of evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings.

It was for this reason that we found it necessary to emphasize in Ngo Te that each case involving the
application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision
on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.

Far from abandoning Molina, we simply suggested the relaxation of the stringent requirements set forth
therein, cognizant of the explanation given by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules on the rationale of
the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC), viz.:

To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause of the psychological incapacity and to
attach thereto the verified written report of an accredited psychologist or psychiatrist have proved to be too
expensive for the parties. They adversely affect access to justice o poor litigants. It is also a fact that there are
provinces where these experts are not available. Thus, the Committee deemed it necessary to relax this
stringent requirement enunciated in the Molina Case. The need for the examination of a party or parties by a
psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and the presentation of psychiatric experts shall now be determined by the
court during the pre-trial conference.60

But where, as in this case, the parties had the full opportunity to present professional and expert opinions of
psychiatrists tracing the root cause, gravity and incurability of a party's alleged psychological incapacity, then
such expert opinion should be presented and, accordingly, be weighed by the court in deciding whether to
grant a petition for nullity of marriage.

III. On petitioner's psychological incapacity.

Coming now to the main issue, we find the totality of evidence adduced by respondent insufficient to prove that
petitioner is psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and more particularly,
that he suffered from such psychological incapacity as of the date of the marriage eighteen (18) years ago.
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's and the appellate court's rulings declaring the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio.

The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage.61 The psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage
should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities
of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume.62 ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

In this case, respondent failed to prove that petitioner's "defects" were present at the time of the celebration of
their marriage. She merely cited that prior to their marriage, she already knew that petitioner would
occasionally drink and gamble with his friends; but such statement, by itself, is insufficient to prove any pre-
existing psychological defect on the part of her husband. Neither did the evidence adduced prove such
"defects" to be incurable.

The evaluation of the two psychiatrists should have been the decisive evidence in determining whether to
declare the marriage between the parties null and void. Sadly, however, we are not convinced that the opinions
provided by these experts strengthened respondent's allegation of psychological incapacity. The two experts
provided diametrically contradicting psychological evaluations: Dr. Oñate testified that petitioner's behavior is a
positive indication of a personality disorder,63 while Dr. Obra maintained that there is nothing wrong with
petitioner's personality. Moreover, there appears to be greater weight in Dr. Obra's opinion because, aside
from analyzing the transcript of Benjamin's deposition similar to what Dr. Oñate did, Dr. Obra also took into
consideration the psychological evaluation report furnished by another psychiatrist in South Africa who
personally examined Benjamin, as well as his (Dr. Obra's) personal interview with Benjamin's
brothers.64 Logically, therefore, the balance tilts in favor of Dr. Obra's findings.

Lest it be misunderstood, we are not condoning petitioner's drinking and gambling problems, or his violent
outbursts against his wife. There is no valid excuse to justify such a behavior. Petitioner must remember that
he owes love, respect, and fidelity to his spouse as much as the latter owes the same to him. Unfortunately,
this court finds respondent's testimony, as well as the totality of evidence presented by the respondent, to be
too inadequate to declare him psychologically unfit pursuant to Article 36.

It should be remembered that the presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage. Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio.65 In this case, the presumption has not been amply rebutted and must, perforce,
prevail.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The November 17,
2003 Amended Decision and the December 13, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
59903 are accordingly REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.
Pesca vs. Pesca, G.R. No. 136921, April 17, 2001

LORNA GUILLEN PESCA, petitioner

vs.
ZOSIMO A PESCA, respondent.

VITUG, J.:

Submitted for review is the decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 27 May 1998, in C.A. G.R. CV.
No. 52374, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Caloocan City, Branch 130, which has
declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent to be null and void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of respondent.

Petitioner Lorna G. Pesca and respondent Zosimo A. Pesca first met sometime in 1975 while on board an
inter-island vessel bound for Bacolod City. After a whirlwind courtship, they got married on 03 March 1975.
Initially, the young couple did not live together as petitioner was still a student in college and respondent, a
seaman, had to leave the country on board an ocean-going vessel barely a month after the marriage. Six
months later, the young couple established their residence in Quezon City until they were able to build their
own house in Caloocan City where they finally resided. It was blissful marriage for the couple during the two
months of the year that they could stay together - when respondent was on vacation. The union begot four
children, 19-year old Ruhem, 17-year old Rez, 11-year old Ryan, and 9-year old Richie.

It started in 1988, petitioner said, when she noticed that respondent surprisingly showed signs of
"psychological incapacity" to perform his marital covenant. His "true color" of being an emotionally immature
and irresponsible husband became apparent. He was cruel and violent. He was a habitual drinker, staying with
friends daily from 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon until 1:00 o'clock in the morning. When cautioned to stop or, to
at least, minimize his drinking, respondent would beat, slap and kick her. At one time, he chased petitioner with
a loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence of the children. The children themselves were not
spared from physical violence.

Finally, on 19 November 1992, petitioner and her children left the conjugal abode to live in the house of her
sister in Quezon City as they could no longer bear his violent ways. Two months later, petitioner decided to
forgive respondent, and she returned home to give him a chance to change. But, to her dismay, things did not
so turn out as expected. Indeed, matters became worse.

On the morning of 22 March 1994, about eight o'clock, respondent assaulted petitioner for about half an hour
in the presence of the children. She was battered black and blue. She submitted herself to medical
examination at the Quezon City General Hospital, which diagnosed her injuries as contusions and abrasions.
Petitioner filed a complaint with the barangay authorities, and a case was filed against respondent for slight
physical injuries. He was convicted by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City and sentenced to eleven
days of imprisonment.

This time, petitioner and her children left the conjugal home for good and stayed with her sister. Eventually,
they decided to rent an apartment. Petitioner sued respondent before the Regional Trial Court for the
declaration of nullity of their marriage invoking psychological incapacity. Petitioner likewise sought the custody
of her minor children and prayed for support pendente lite .

Summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served on respondent on 25 April 1994 by personal
service by the sheriff. As respondent failed to file an answer or to enter his appearance within the reglementary
period, the trial court ordered the city prosecutor to look into a possible collusion between the parties.
Prosecutor Rosa C. Reyes, on 03 August 1994, submitted her report to the effect that she found no evidence
to establish that there was collusion between the parties. 1âwphi1.nêt

On 11 January 1995, respondent belatedly filed, without leave of court, an answer, and the same, although
filed late, was admitted by the court. In his answer, respondent admitted the fact of his marriage with petitioner
and the birth of their children. He also confirmed the veracity of Annex "A" of the complaint which listed the
conjugal property. Respondent vehemently denied, however, the allegation that he was psychologically
incapacitated.

On 15 November 1995, following hearings conducted by it, the trial court rendered its decision declaring the
marriage between petitioner and respondent to be null and void ab initio on the basis of psychological
incapacity on the part of respondent and ordered the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.

Respondent appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals, contending that the trial court erred,
particularly, in holding that there was legal basis to declare the marriage null and void and in denying his
motion to reopen the case.

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and declared the marriage between petitioner and
respondent valid and subsisting. The appellate court said:

"Definitely the appellee has not established the following: That the appellant showed signs of mental
incapacity as would cause him to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenant, as so provided for in
Article 68 of the Family Code; that the incapacity is grave, has preceded the marriage and is incurable;
that his incapacity to meet his marital responsibility is because of a psychological, not physical illness;
that the root cause of the incapacity has been identified medically or clinically, and has been proven by
an expert; and that the incapacity is permanent and incurable in nature.

"The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies in the plaintiff and any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity."1

Petitioner, in her plea to this Court, would have the decision of the Court of Appeals reversed on the thesis that
the doctrine enunciated in Santos vs. Court of Appeals,2 promulgated on 14 January 1995, as well as the
guidelines set out in Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina,3 promulgated on 13 February 1997, should
have no retroactive application and, on the assumption that the Molina ruling could be applied retroactively, the
guidelines therein outlined should be taken to be merely advisory and not mandatory in nature. In any case,
petitioner argues, the application of the Santos and Molina dicta should warrant only a remand of the case to
the trial court for further proceedings and not its dismissal.

Be that as it may, respondent submits, the appellate court did not err in its assailed decision for there is
absolutely no evidence that has been shown to prove psychological incapacity on his part as the term has
been so defined in Santos.

Indeed, there is no merit in the petition.

The term "psychological incapacity," as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code, has been explained by the Court, in Santos and reiterated in Molina. The Court, in Santos,
concluded:

"It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the
deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase 'psychological
incapacity' under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of
psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence,
immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Balumad's 'Void and Voidable Marriages in the
Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law,' quoting form the Diagnostic Statistical Manuel of Mental
Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's 'Handbook II for Marriage Nullity
Cases'). Article 36 of the Family. Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand
in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, 'psychological incapacity'
should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
 the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations
to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated."

The- "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the
settled legal maxim - "legis interpretado legis vim obtinet" - that the interpretation placed upon the written law
by a competent court has the force of law.3 The interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes
the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and construed would thus
constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds
itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied
prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance
therewith5 under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non respicit."

The phrase "psychological incapacity ," borrowed from Canon law, is an entirely novel provision in our statute
books, and, until the relatively recent enactment of the Family Code, the concept has escaped jurisprudential
attention. It is in Santos when, for the first time, the Court has given life to the term. Molina, that followed, has
additionally provided procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in trying cases for annulment of
marriages grounded on psychological incapacity. Molina has strengthened, not overturned, Santos.

At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make
out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the
contract, so as to warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility,
invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological incapacity.

The Court reiterates its reminder that marriage is an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the
family6 that the State cherishes and protects. While the Court commisserates with petitioner in her unhappy
marital relationship with respondent, totally terminating that relationship, however, may not necessarily be the
fitting denouement to it. In these cases, the law has not quite given up, neither should we.

WHEREFORE, the herein petition is DENIED. No costs.

SO ORDERED
ART. 9-10

Karen Salvacion vs. Central Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 94723, August 21, 1997

KAREN E. SALVACION, minor, thru Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., father and Natural Guardian, and
Spouses FEDERICO N. SALVACION, JR., and EVELINA E. SALVACION, petitioners,
vs.
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, CHINA BANKING CORPORATION and GREG BARTELLI y
NORTHCOTT, respondents.

In our predisposition to discover the "original intent" of a statute, courts become the unfeeling pillars of
the status quo. Ligle do we realize that statutes or even constitutions are bundles of compromises thrown our
way by their framers. Unless we exercise vigilance, the statute may already be out of tune and irrelevant to our
day.

The petition is for declaratory relief. It prays for the following reliefs:

a.) Immediately upon the filing of this petition, an Order be issued restraining the respondents
from applying and enforcing Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960;

b.) After hearing, judgment be rendered:

1.) Declaring the respective rights and duties of petitioners and respondents;

2.) Adjudging Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 as contrary to the provisions of the
Constitution, hence void; because its provision that "Foreign currency deposits shall be exempt
from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body,
government agency or any administrative body whatsoever

i.) has taken away the right of petitioners to have the bank deposit of defendant
Greg Bartelli y Northcott garnished to satisfy the judgment rendered in
petitioners' favor in violation of substantive due process guaranteed by the
Constitution;

ii.) has given foreign currency depositors an undue favor or a class privilege in
violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution;

iii.) has provided a safe haven for criminals like the herein respondent Greg
Bartelli y Northcott since criminals could escape civil liability for their wrongful
acts by merely converting their money to a foreign currency and depositing it in a
foreign currency deposit account with an authorized bank.

The antecedent facts:

On February 4, 1989, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, coaxed and lured petitioner Karen
Salvacion, then 12 years old to go with him to his apartment. Therein, Greg Bartelli detained Karen Salvacion
for four days, or up to February 7, 1989 and was able to rape the child once on February 4, and three times
each day on February 5, 6, and 7, 1989. On February 7, 1989, after policemen and people living nearby,
rescued Karen, Greg Bartelli was arrested and detained at the Makati Municipal Jail. The policemen recovered
from Bartelli the following items: 1.) Dollar Check No. 368, Control No. 021000678-1166111303, US 3,903.20;
2.) COCOBANK Bank Book No. 104-108758-8 (Peso Acct.); 3.) Dollar Account — China Banking Corp.,
US$/A#54105028-2; 4.) ID-122-30-8877; 5.) Philippine Money (P234.00) cash; 6.) Door Keys 6 pieces; 7.)
Stuffed Doll (Teddy Bear) used in seducing the complainant.
On February 16, 1989, Makati Investigating Fiscal Edwin G. Condaya filed against Greg Bartelli, Criminal Case
No. 801 for Serious Illegal Detention and Criminal Cases Nos. 802, 803, 804, and 805 for four (4) counts of
Rape. On the same day, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati Civil Case No. 89-3214 for
damages with preliminary attachment against Greg Bartelli. On February 24, 1989, the day there was a
scheduled hearing for Bartelli's petition for bail the latter escaped from jail.

On February 28, 1989, the court granted the fiscal's Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of Warrant of
Arrest and Hold Departure Order. Pending the arrest of the accused Greg Bartelli y Northcott, the criminal
cases were archived in an Order dated February 28, 1989.

Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 89-3214, the Judge issued an Order dated February 22, 1989 granting the
application of herein petitioners, for the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment. After petitioners gave
Bond No. JCL (4) 1981 by FGU Insurance Corporation in the amount of P100,000.00, a Writ of Preliminary
Attachment was issued by the trial court on February 28, 1989.

On March 1, 1989, the Deputy Sheriff of Makati served a Notice of Garnishment on China Banking
Corporation. In a letter dated March 13, 1989 to the Deputy Sheriff of Makati, China Banking Corporation
invoked Republic Act No. 1405 as its answer to the notice of garnishment served on it. On March 15, 1989,
Deputy Sheriff of Makati Armando de Guzman sent his reply to China Banking Corporation saying that the
garnishment did not violate the secrecy of bank deposits since the disclosure is merely incidental to a
garnishment properly and legally made by virtue of a court order which has placed the subject deposits
in custodia legis. In answer to this letter of the Deputy Sheriff of Makati, China Banking Corporation, in a letter
dated March 20, 1989, invoked Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 to the effect that the dollar
deposits or defendant Greg Bartelli are exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of
any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body, whatsoever.

This prompted the counsel for petitioners to make an inquiry with the Central Bank in a letter dated April 25,
1989 on whether Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 has any exception or whether said section has been
repealed or amended since said section has rendered nugatory the substantive right of the plaintiff to have the
claim sought to be enforced by the civil action secured by way of the writ of preliminary attachment as granted
to the plaintiff under Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court. The Central Bank responded as follows:

May 26, 1989

Ms. Erlinda S. Carolino

12 Pres. Osmena Avenue
South Admiral Village
Paranaque, Metro Manila

Dear Ms. Carolino:

This is in reply to your letter dated April 25, 1989 regarding your inquiry on Section 113, CB
Circular No. 960 (1983).

The cited provision is absolute in application. It does not admit of any exception, nor has the
same been repealed nor amended.

The purpose of the law is to encourage dollar accounts within the country's banking system
which would help in the development of the economy. There is no intention to render futile the
basic rights of a person as was suggested in your subject letter. The law may be harsh as some
perceive it, but it is still the law. Compliance is, therefore, enjoined.

Very truly yours,

 (SGD) AGAPITO S. FAJARDO
Director1

Meanwhile, on April 10, 1989, the trial court granted petitioners' motion for leave to serve summons by
publication in the Civil Case No. 89-3214 entitled "Karen Salvacion, et al. vs. Greg Bartelli y Northcott."
Summons with the complaint was a published in the Manila Times once a week for three consecutive weeks.
Greg Bartelli failed to file his answer to the complaint and was declared in default on August 7, 1989. After
hearing the case ex-parte, the court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners on March 29, 1990, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against defendant,

ordering the latter:

1. To pay plaintiff Karen E. Salvacion the amount of P500,000.00 as moral damages;

2. To pay her parents, plaintiffs spouses Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., and Evelina E. Salvacion
the amount of P150,000.00 each or a total of P300,000.00 for both of them;

3. To pay plaintiffs exemplary damages of P100,000.00; and

4. To pay attorney's fees in an amount equivalent to 25% of the total amount of damages herein
awarded;

5. To pay litigation expenses of P10,000.00; plus

6. Costs of the suit.

SO ORDERED.

The heinous acts of respondent Greg Bartelli which gave rise to the award were related in graphic detail by the
trial court in its decision as follows:

The defendant in this case was originally detained in the municipal jail of Makati but was able to
escape therefrom on February 24, 1989 as per report of the Jail Warden of Makati to the
Presiding Judge, Honorable Manuel M. Cosico of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch
136, where he was charged with four counts of Rape and Serious Illegal Detention (Crim. Cases
Nos. 802 to 805). Accordingly, upon motion of plaintiffs, through counsel, summons was served
upon defendant by publication in the Manila Times, a newspaper of general circulation as
attested by the Advertising Manager of the Metro Media Times, Inc., the publisher of the said
newspaper. Defendant, however, failed to file his answer to the complaint despite the lapse of
the period of sixty (60) days from the last publication; hence, upon motion of the plaintiffs,
through counsel, defendant was declared in default and plaintiffs were authorized to present
their evidence ex parte.

In support of the complaint, plaintiffs presented as witnesses the minor Karen E. Salvacion, her
father, Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., a certain Joseph Aguilar and a certain Liberato Madulio, who
gave the following testimony:

Karen took her first year high school in St. Mary's Academy in Pasay City but has recently
transferred to Arellano University for her second year.

In the afternoon of February 4, 1989, Karen was at the Plaza Fair Makati Cinema Square, with
her friend Edna Tangile whiling away her free time. At about 3:30 p.m. while she was finishing
her snack on a concrete bench in front of Plaza Fair, an American approached her. She was
then alone because Edna Tangile had already left, and she was about to go home. (TSN, Aug.
15, 1989, pp. 2 to 5)

The American asked her name and introduced himself as Greg Bartelli. He sat beside her when
he talked to her. He said he was a Math teacher and told her that he has a sister who is a nurse
in New York. His sister allegedly has a daughter who is about Karen's age and who was with
him in his house along Kalayaan Avenue. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 4-5)

The American asked Karen what was her favorite subject and she told him it's Pilipino. He then
invited her to go with him to his house where she could teach Pilipino to his niece. He even
gave her a stuffed toy to persuade her to teach his niece. (Id., pp. 5-6)

They walked from Plaza Fair along Pasong Tamo, turning right to reach the defendant's house
along Kalayaan Avenue. (Id., p. 6)

When they reached the apartment house, Karen noticed that defendant's alleged niece was not
outside the house but defendant told her maybe his niece was inside. When Karen did not see
the alleged niece inside the house, defendant told her maybe his niece was upstairs, and invited
Karen to go upstairs. (Id., p. 7)

Upon entering the bedroom defendant suddenly locked the door. Karen became nervous
because his niece was not there. Defendant got a piece of cotton cord and tied Karen's hands
with it, and then he undressed her. Karen cried for help but defendant strangled her. He took a
packing tape and he covered her mouth with it and he circled it around her head. (Id., p. 7)

Then, defendant suddenly pushed Karen towards the bed which was just near the door. He tied
her feet and hands spread apart to the bed posts. He knelt in front of her and inserted his finger
in her sex organ. She felt severe pain. She tried to shout but no sound could come out because
there were tapes on her mouth. When defendant withdrew his finger it was full of blood and
Karen felt more pain after the withdrawal of the finger. (Id., p. 8)

He then got a Johnson's Baby Oil and he applied it to his sex organ as well as to her sex organ.
After that he forced his sex organ into her but he was not able to do so. While he was doing it,
Karen found it difficult to breathe and she perspired a lot while feeling severe pain. She merely
presumed that he was able to insert his sex organ a little, because she could not see. Karen
could not recall how long the defendant was in that position. (Id. pp. 8-9)

After that, he stood up and went to the bathroom to wash. He also told Karen to take a shower
and he untied her hands. Karen could only hear the sound of the water while the defendant, she
presumed, was in the bathroom washing his sex organ. When she took a shower more blood
came out from her. In the meantime, defendant changed the mattress because it was full of
blood. After the shower, Karen was allowed by defendant to sleep. She fell asleep because she
got tired crying. The incident happened at about 4:00 p.m. Karen had no way of determining the
exact time because defendant removed her watch. Defendant did not care to give her food
before she went to sleep. Karen woke up at about 8:00 o'clock the following morning. (Id., pp. 9-
10)

The following day, February 5, 1989, a Sunday, after a breakfast of biscuit and coke at about
8:30 to 9:00 a.m. defendant raped Karen while she was still bleeding. For lunch, they also took
biscuit and coke. She was raped for the second time at about 12:00 to 2:00 p.m. In the evening,
they had rice for dinner which defendant had stored downstairs; it was he who cooked the rice
that is why it looks like "lugaw". For the third time, Karen was raped again during the night.
During those three times defendant succeeded in inserting his sex organ but she could not say
whether the organ was inserted wholly.
Karen did not see any firearm or any bladed weapon. The defendant did not tie her hands and
feet nor put a tape on her mouth anymore but she did not cry for help for fear that she might be
killed; besides, all the windows and doors were closed. And even if she shouted for help,
nobody would hear her. She was so afraid that if somebody would hear her and would be able
to call the police, it was still possible that as she was still inside the house, defendant might kill
her. Besides, the defendant did not leave that Sunday, ruling out her chance to call for help. At
nighttime he slept with her again. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 12-14)

On February 6, 1989, Monday, Karen was raped three times, once in the morning for thirty
minutes after a breakfast of biscuits; again in the afternoon; and again in the evening. At first,
Karen did not know that there was a window because everything was covered by a carpet, until
defendant opened the window for around fifteen minutes or less to let some air in, and she
found that the window was covered by styrofoam and plywood. After that, he again closed the
window with a hammer and he put the styrofoam, plywood, and carpet back. (Id., pp. 14-15)

That Monday evening, Karen had a chance to call for help, although defendant left but kept the
door closed. She went to the bathroom and saw a small window covered by styrofoam and she
also spotted a small hole. She stepped on the bowl and she cried for help through the hole. She
cried: "Maawa no po kayo so akin. Tulungan n'yo akong makalabas dito. Kinidnap ako!"
Somebody heard her. It was a woman, probably a neighbor, but she got angry and said she was
"istorbo". Karen pleaded for help and the woman told her to sleep and she will call the police.
She finally fell asleep but no policeman came. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 15-16)

She woke up at 6:00 o'clock the following morning, and she saw defendant in bed, this time
sleeping. She waited for him to wake up. When he woke up, he again got some food but he
always kept the door locked. As usual, she was merely fed with biscuit and coke. On that day,
February 7, 1989, she was again raped three times. The first at about 6:30 to 7:00 a.m., the
second at about 8:30 — 9:00, and the third was after lunch at 12:00 noon. After he had raped
her for the second time he left but only for a short while. Upon his return, he caught her shouting
for help but he did not understand what she was shouting about. After she was raped the third
time, he left the house. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 16-17) She again went to the bathroom and
shouted for help. After shouting for about five minutes, she heard many voices. The voices were
asking for her name and she gave her name as Karen Salvacion. After a while, she heard a
voice of a woman saying they will just call the police. They were also telling her to change her
clothes. She went from the bathroom to the room but she did not change her clothes being
afraid that should the neighbors call for the police and the defendant see her in different clothes,
he might kill her. At that time she was wearing a T-shirt of the American because the latter
washed her dress. (Id., p. 16)

Afterwards, defendant arrived and he opened the door. He asked her if she had asked for help
because there were many policemen outside and she denied it. He told her to change her
clothes, and she did change to the one she was wearing on Saturday. He instructed her to tell
the police that she left home and willingly; then he went downstairs but he locked the door. She
could hear people conversing but she could not understand what they were saying. (Id., p. 19)

When she heard the voices of many people who were conversing downstairs, she knocked
repeatedly at the door as hard as she could. She heard somebody going upstairs and when the
door was opened, she saw a policeman. The policeman asked her name and the reason why
she was there. She told him she was kidnapped. Downstairs, he saw about five policemen in
uniform and the defendant was talking to them. "Nakikipag-areglo po sa mga pulis," Karen
added. "The policeman told him to just explain at the precinct. (Id., p. 20)

They went out of the house and she saw some of her neighbors in front of the house. They rode
the car of a certain person she called Kuya Boy together with defendant, the policeman, and two
of her neighbors whom she called Kuya Bong Lacson and one Ate Nita. They were brought to
Sub-Station I and there she was investigated by a policeman. At about 2:00 a.m., her father
 arrived, followed by her mother together with some of their neighbors. Then they were brought
to the second floor of the police headquarters. (Id., p. 21)

At the headquarters, she was asked several questions by the investigator. The written
statement she gave to the police was marked as Exhibit A. Then they proceeded to the National
Bureau of Investigation together with the investigator and her parents. At the NBI, a doctor, a
medico-legal officer, examined her private parts. It was already 3:00 in the early morning of the
following day when they reached the NBI. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, p. 22) The findings of the
medico-legal officer has been marked as Exhibit B.

She was studying at the St. Mary's Academy in Pasay City at the time of the incident but she
subsequently transferred to Apolinario Mabini, Arellano University, situated along Taft Avenue,
because she was ashamed to be the subject of conversation in the school. She first applied for
transfer to Jose Abad Santos, Arellano University along Taft Avenue near the Light Rail Transit
Station but she was denied admission after she told the school the true reason for her transfer.
The reason for their denial was that they might be implicated in the case. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989,
p. 46)

xxx xxx xxx

After the incident, Karen has changed a lot. She does not play with her brother and sister
anymore, and she is always in a state of shock; she has been absent-minded and is ashamed
even to go out of the house. (TSN, Sept. 12, 1989, p. 10) She appears to be restless or sad,
(Id., p. 11) The father prays for P500,000.00 moral damages for Karen for this shocking
experience which probably, she would always recall until she reaches old age, and he is not
sure if she could ever recover from this experience. (TSN, Sept. 24, 1989, pp. 10-11)

Pursuant to an Order granting leave to publish notice of decision, said notice was published in the Manila
Bulletin once a week for three consecutive weeks. After the lapse of fifteen (15) days from the date of the last
publication of the notice of judgment and the decision of the trial court had become final, petitioners tried to
execute on Bartelli's dollar deposit with China Banking Corporation. Likewise, the bank invoked Section 113 of
Central Bank Circular No. 960.

Thus, petitioners decided to seek relief from this Court.

The issues raised and the arguments articulated by the parties boil down to two:

May this Court entertain the instant petition despite the fact that original jurisdiction in petitions for declaratory
relief rests with the lower court? Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of R.A.
6426, as amended by P.D. 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act be made applicable to
a foreign transient?

Petitioners aver as heretofore stated that Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 providing that "Foreign
currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court,
legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever." should be adjudged as
unconstitutional on the grounds that: 1.) it has taken away the right of petitioners to have the bank deposit of
defendant Greg Bartelli y Northcott garnished to satisfy the judgment rendered in petitioners' favor in violation
of substantive due process guaranteed by the Constitution; 2.) it has given foreign currency depositors an
undue favor or a class privilege in violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution; 3.) it has provided
a safe haven for criminals like the herein respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott since criminals could escape civil
liability for their wrongful acts by merely converting their money to a foreign currency and depositing it in a
foreign currency deposit account with an authorized bank; and 4.) The Monetary Board, in issuing Section 113
of Central Bank Circular No. 960 has exceeded its delegated quasi-legislative power when it took away: a.) the
plaintiffs substantive right to have the claim sought to be enforced by the civil action secured by way of the writ
of preliminary attachment as granted by Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court; b.) the plaintiffs substantive
right to have the judgment credit satisfied by way of the writ of execution out of the bank deposit of the
judgment debtor as granted to the judgment creditor by Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, which is beyond
its power to do so.

On the other hand, respondent Central Bank, in its Comment alleges that the Monetary Board in issuing
Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 did not exceed its power or authority because the subject Section is copied
verbatim from a portion of R.A. No. 6426 as amended by P.D. 1246. Hence, it was not the Monetary Board that
grants exemption from attachment or garnishment to foreign currency deposits, but the law (R.A. 6426 as
amended) itself; that it does not violate the substantive due process guaranteed by the Constitution because
a.) it was based on a law; b.) the law seems to be reasonable; c.) it is enforced according to regular methods of
procedure; and d.) it applies to all members of a class.

Expanding, the Central Bank said; that one reason for exempting the foreign currency deposits from
attachment, garnishment or any other order or process of any court, is to assure the development and speedy
growth of the Foreign Currency Deposit System and the Offshore Banking System in the Philippines; that
another reason is to encourage the inflow of foreign currency deposits into the banking institutions thereby
placing such institutions more in a position to properly channel the same to loans and investments in the
Philippines, thus directly contributing to the economic development of the country; that the subject section is
being enforced according to the regular methods of procedure; and that it applies to all foreign currency
deposits made by any person and therefore does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

Respondent Central Bank further avers that the questioned provision is needed to promote the public interest
and the general welfare; that the State cannot just stand idly by while a considerable segment of the society
suffers from economic distress; that the State had to take some measures to encourage economic
development; and that in so doing persons and property may be subjected to some kinds of restraints or
burdens to secure the general welfare or public interest. Respondent Central Bank also alleges that Rule 39
and Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court provide that some properties are exempted from
execution/attachment especially provided by law and R.A. No. 6426 as amended is such a law, in that it
specifically provides, among others, that foreign currency deposits shall be exempted from attachment,
garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body whatsoever.

For its part, respondent China Banking Corporation, aside from giving reasons similar to that of respondent
Central Bank, also stated that respondent China Bank is not unmindful of the inhuman sufferings experienced
by the minor Karen E. Salvacion from the beastly hands of Greg Bartelli; that it is only too willing to release the
dollar deposit of Bartelli which may perhaps partly mitigate the sufferings petitioner has undergone; but it is
restrained from doing so in view of R.A. No. 6426 and Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960; and that
despite the harsh effect of these laws on petitioners, CBC has no other alternative but to follow the same.

This Court finds the petition to be partly meritorious.

Petitioner deserves to receive the damages awarded to her by the court. But this petition for declaratory relief
can only be entertained and treated as a petition for mandamus to require respondents to honor and comply
with the writ of execution in Civil Case No. 89-3214.

This Court has no original and exclusive jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief. 2 However, exceptions
to this rule have been recognized. Thus, where the petition has far-reaching implications and raises questions
that should be resolved, it may be treated as one for mandamus.3

Here is a child, a 12-year old girl, who in her belief that all Americans are good and in her gesture of kindness
by teaching his alleged niece the Filipino language as requested by the American, trustingly went with said
stranger to his apartment, and there she was raped by said American tourist Greg Bartelli. Not once, but ten
times. She was detained therein for four (4) days. This American tourist was able to escape from the jail and
avoid punishment. On the other hand, the child, having received a favorable judgment in the Civil Case for
damages in the amount of more than P1,000,000.00, which amount could alleviate the humiliation, anxiety,
and besmirched reputation she had suffered and may continue to suffer for a long, long time; and knowing that
this person who had wronged her has the money, could not, however get the award of damages because of
this unreasonable law. This questioned law, therefore makes futile the favorable judgment and award of
damages that she and her parents fully deserve. As stated by the trial court in its decision,

Indeed, after hearing the testimony of Karen, the Court believes that it was undoubtedly a
shocking and traumatic experience she had undergone which could haunt her mind for a long,
long time, the mere recall of which could make her feel so humiliated, as in fact she had been
actually humiliated once when she was refused admission at the Abad Santos High School,
Arellano University, where she sought to transfer from another school, simply because the
school authorities of the said High School learned about what happened to her and allegedly
feared that they might be implicated in the case.

xxx xxx xxx

The reason for imposing exemplary or corrective damages is due to the wanton and bestial
manner defendant had committed the acts of rape during a period of serious illegal detention of
his hapless victim, the minor Karen Salvacion whose only fault was in her being so naive and
credulous to believe easily that defendant, an American national, could not have such a bestial
desire on her nor capable of committing such a heinous crime. Being only 12 years old when
that unfortunate incident happened, she has never heard of an old Filipino adage that in every
forest there is a
snake, . . . .4

If Karen's sad fate had happened to anybody's own kin, it would be difficult for him to fathom how the incentive
for foreign currency deposit could be more important than his child's rights to said award of damages; in this
case, the victim's claim for damages from this alien who had the gall to wrong a child of tender years of a
country where he is a mere visitor. This further illustrates the flaw in the questioned provisions.

It is worth mentioning that R.A. No. 6426 was enacted in 1983 or at a time when the country's economy was in
a shambles; when foreign investments were minimal and presumably, this was the reason why said statute
was enacted. But the realities of the present times show that the country has recovered economically; and
even if not, the questioned law still denies those entitled to due process of law for being unreasonable and
oppressive. The intention of the questioned law may be good when enacted. The law failed to anticipate the
iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality such as the case before us.

It has thus been said that —

But I also know,5 that laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human
mind. As that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new
truths are disclosed and manners and opinions change with the change of circumstances,
institutions must advance also, and keep pace with the times. . . We might as well require a man
to wear still the coat which fitted him when a boy, as civilized society to remain ever under the
regimen of their barbarous ancestors.

In his Comment, the Solicitor General correctly opined, thus:

The present petition has far-reaching implications on the right of a national to obtain redress for
a wrong committed by an alien who takes refuge under a law and regulation promulgated for a
purpose which does not contemplate the application thereof envisaged by the alien. More
specifically, the petition raises the question whether the protection against attachment,
garnishment or other court process accorded to foreign currency deposits by PD No. 1246 and
CB Circular No. 960 applies when the deposit does not come from a lender or investor but from
a mere transient or tourist who is not expected to maintain the deposit in the bank for long.
The resolution of this question is important for the protection of nationals who are victimized in
the forum by foreigners who are merely passing through.

xxx xxx xxx

. . . Respondents China Banking Corporation and Central Bank of the Philippines refused to
honor the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 89-3214 on the strength of the following
provision of Central Bank Circular No. 960:

Sec. 113. Exemption from attachment. — Foreign currency deposits shall be

exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any
court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body
whatsoever.

Central Bank Circular No. 960 was issued pursuant to Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6426:

Sec. 7. Rules and Regulations. The Monetary Board of the Central Bank shall
promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
provisions of this Act which shall take effect after the publication of such rules
and regulations in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of national circulation
for at least once a week for three consecutive weeks. In case the Central Bank
promulgates new rules and regulations decreasing the rights of depositors, the
rules and regulations at the time the deposit was made shall govern.

The aforecited Section 113 was copied from Section 8 of Republic Act NO. 6426, as amended
by P.D. 1246, thus:

Sec. 8. Secrecy of Foreign Currency Deposits. — All foreign currency deposits

authorized under this Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1035, as well
as foreign currency deposits authorized under Presidential Decree No. 1034, are
hereby declared as and considered of an absolutely confidential nature and,
except upon the written permission of the depositor, in no instance shall such
foreign currency deposits be examined, inquired or looked into by any person,
government official, bureau or office whether judicial or administrative or
legislative or any other entity whether public or private: Provided, however, that
said foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or
any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or
any administrative body whatsoever.

The purpose of PD 1246 in according protection against attachment, garnishment and other
court process to foreign currency deposits is stated in its whereases, viz.:

WHEREAS, under Republic Act No. 6426, as amended by Presidential Decree

No. 1035, certain Philippine banking institutions and branches of foreign banks
are authorized to accept deposits in foreign currency;

WHEREAS, under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1034 authorizing the
establishment of an offshore banking system in the Philippines, offshore banking
units are also authorized to receive foreign currency deposits in certain cases;

WHEREAS, in order to assure the development and speedy growth of the

Foreign Currency Deposit System and the Offshore Banking System in the
Philippines, certain incentives were provided for under the two Systems such as
confidentiality of deposits subject to certain exceptions and tax exemptions on
 the interest income of depositors who are nonresidents and are not engaged in
trade or business in the Philippines;

WHEREAS, making absolute the protective cloak of confidentiality over such

foreign currency deposits, exempting such deposits from tax, and guaranteeing
the vested rights of depositors would better encourage the inflow of foreign
currency deposits into the banking institutions authorized to accept such deposits
in the Philippines thereby placing such institutions more in a position to properly
channel the same to loans and investments in the Philippines, thus directly
contributing to the economic development of the country;

Thus, one of the principal purposes of the protection accorded to foreign currency deposits is "to
assure the development and speedy growth of the Foreign Currency Deposit system and the
Offshore Banking in the Philippines" (3rd Whereas).

The Offshore Banking System was established by PD No. 1034. In turn, the purposes of PD No.
1034 are as follows:

WHEREAS, conditions conducive to the establishment of an offshore banking

system, such as political stability, a growing economy and adequate
communication facilities, among others, exist in the Philippines;

WHEREAS, it is in the interest of developing countries to have as wide access as

possible to the sources of capital funds for economic development;

WHEREAS, an offshore banking system based in the Philippines will be

advantageous and beneficial to the country by increasing our links with foreign
lenders, facilitating the flow of desired investments into the Philippines, creating
employment opportunities and expertise in international finance, and contributing
to the national development effort.

WHEREAS, the geographical location, physical and human resources, and other
positive factors provide the Philippines with the clear potential to develop as
another financial center in Asia;

On the other hand, the Foreign Currency Deposit system was created by PD. No. 1035. Its
purposes are as follows:

WHEREAS, the establishment of an offshore banking system in the Philippines

has been authorized under a separate decree;

WHEREAS, a number of local commercial banks, as depository bank under the

Foreign Currency Deposit Act (RA No. 6426), have the resources and
managerial competence to more actively engage in foreign exchange
transactions and participate in the grant of foreign currency loans to resident
corporations and firms;

WHEREAS, it is timely to expand the foreign currency lending authority of the

said depository banks under RA 6426 and apply to their transactions the same
taxes as would be applicable to transaction of the proposed offshore banking
units;

It is evident from the above [Whereas clauses] that the Offshore Banking System and the
Foreign Currency Deposit System were designed to draw deposits from
foreign lenders and investors (Vide second Whereas of PD No. 1034; third Whereas of PD No.
 1035). It is these deposits that are induced by the two laws and given protection and incentives
by them.

Obviously, the foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist is not the kind of deposit
encouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given incentives and protection by said laws
because such depositor stays only for a few days in the country and, therefore, will maintain his
deposit in the bank only for a short time.

Respondent Greg Bartelli, as stated, is just a tourist or a transient. He deposited his dollars with
respondent China Banking Corporation only for safekeeping during his temporary stay in the
Philippines.

For the reasons stated above, the Solicitor General thus submits that the dollar deposit of
respondent Greg Bartelli is not entitled to the protection of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular
No. 960 and PD No. 1246 against attachment, garnishment or other court processes.6

In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if we rule that the questioned
Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order
or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is
applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like
accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides that "in case of
doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and
justice to prevail. "Ninguno non deue enriquecerse tortizeramente con dano de otro." Simply stated, when the
statute is silent or ambiguous, this is one of those fundamental solutions that would respond to the vehement
urge of conscience. (Padilla vs. Padilla, 74 Phil. 377).

It would be unthinkable, that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank No. 960 would be used as a device
by accused Greg Bartelli for wrongdoing, and in so doing, acquitting the guilty at the expense of the innocent.

Call it what it may — but is there no conflict of legal policy here? Dollar against Peso? Upholding the final and
executory judgment of the lower court against the Central Bank Circular protecting the foreign depositor?
Shielding or protecting the dollar deposit of a transient alien depositor against injustice to a national and victim
of a crime? This situation calls for fairness against legal tyranny.

We definitely cannot have both ways and rest in the belief that we have served the ends of justice.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the provisions of Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246, insofar as it
amends Section 8 of R.A. No. 6426 are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its peculiar
circumstances. Respondents are hereby REQUIRED to COMPLY with the writ of execution issued in Civil
Case No. 89-3214, "Karen Salvacion, et al. vs. Greg Bartelli y Northcott, by Branch CXLIV, RTC Makati and to
RELEASE to petitioners the dollar deposit of respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott in such amount as would
satisfy the judgment.

SO ORDERED.
ART. 13
National Marketing Corp. vs. Tecson, 29 SCRA 70, G.R. No. L-29131, August 27, 1969

NATIONAL MARKETING CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
MIGUEL D. TECSON, ET AL., defendants,
MIGUEL D. TECSON, defendant-appellee,
THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER, petitioner.

Government Corporate Counsel Leopoldo M. Abellera and Trial Atty. Antonio M. Brillantes for plaintiff-
appellant.
Antonio T. Lacdan for defendant-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

This appeal has been certified to us by the Court of Appeals only one question of law being involved therein.

On November 14, 1955, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment, in Civil Case No. 20520
thereof, entitled "Price Stabilization Corporation vs. Miguel D. Tecson and Alto Surety and Insurance Co., Inc.,"
the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

For the foregoing consideration, the Court decides this case:

(a) Ordering the defendants Miguel D. Tecson and Alto Surety Insurance Co., Inc. to pay jointly and
severally plaintiff PRATRA the sum of P7,200.00 plus 7% interest from May 25, 1960 until the amount
is fully paid, plus P500.00 for attorney's fees, and plus costs;

(b) ordering defendant Miguel D. Tecson to indemnify his co-defendant Alto Surety & Insurance Co.,
Inc. on the cross-claim for all the amounts it would be made to pay in this decision, in case defendant
Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. pay the amount adjudged to plaintiff in this decision. From the date of
such payment defendant Miguel D. Tecson would pay the Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc., interest at
12% per annum until Miguel D. Tecson has fully reimbursed plaintiff of the said amount.

Copy of this decision was, on November 21, 1955, served upon the defendants in said case. On December 21,
1965, the National Marketing Corporation, as successor to all the properties, assets, rights, and choses in
action of the Price Stabilization Corporation, as plaintiff in that case and judgment creditor therein, filed, with
the same court, a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 63701 thereof, against the same defendants, for the
revival of the judgment rendered in said Case No. 20520. Defendant Miguel D. Tecson moved to dismiss said
complaint, upon the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof and prescription of action.
Acting upon the motion and plaintiff's opposition thereto, said Court issued, on February 14, 1966, an order
reading:

Defendant Miguel Tecson seeks the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and
prescription. As for lack of jurisdiction, as the amount involved is less than P10,000 as actually these
proceedings are a revival of a decision issued by this same court, the matter of jurisdiction must be
admitted. But as for prescription. Plaintiffs admit the decision of this Court became final on December
21, 1955. This case was filed exactly on December 21, 1965 — but more than ten years have passed a
year is a period of 365 days (Art. 13, CCP). Plaintiff forgot that 1960, 1964 were both leap years so that
when this present case was filed it was filed two days too late.

The complaint insofar as Miguel Tecson is concerned is, therefore, dismissed as having
prescribed.1äwphï1.ñët
The National Marketing Corporation appealed from such order to the Court of Appeals, which, on March 20,
1969t certified the case to this Court, upon the ground that the only question therein raised is one of law,
namely, whether or not the present action for the revival of a judgment is barred by the statute of limitations.

Pursuant to Art. 1144(3) of our Civil Code, an action upon a judgment "must be brought within ten years from
the time the right of action accrues," which, in the language of Art. 1152 of the same Code, "commences from
the time the judgment sought to be revived has become final." This, in turn, took place on December 21, 1955,
or thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment — which was received by the defendants herein on November
21, 1955 — no appeal having been taken therefrom. 1 The issue is thus confined to the date on which ten (10)
years from December 21, 1955 expired.

Plaintiff-appellant alleges that it was December 21, 1965, but appellee Tecson maintains otherwise, because
"when the laws speak of years ... it shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each" —
according to Art. 13 of our Civil Code — and, 1960 and 1964 being leap years, the month of February in both
had 29 days, so that ten (10) years of 365 days each, or an aggregate of 3,650 days, from December 21,
1955, expired on December 19, 1965. The lower court accepted this view in its appealed order of dismissal.

Plaintiff-appellant insists that the same "is erroneous, because a year means a calendar year (Statutory
Construction, Interpretation of Laws, by Crawford, p. 383) and since what is being computed here is the
number of years, a calendar year should be used as the basis of computation. There is no question that when
it is not a leap year, December 21 to December 21 of the following year is one year. If the extra day in a leap
year is not a day of the year, because it is the 366th day, then to what year does it belong? Certainly, it must
belong to the year where it falls and, therefore, that the 366 days constitute one year." 2

The very conclusion thus reached by appellant shows that its theory contravenes the explicit provision of Art.
13 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, limiting the connotation of each "year" — as the term is used in our laws
— to 365 days. Indeed, prior to the approval of the Civil Code of Spain, the Supreme Court thereof had held,
on March 30, 1887, that, when the law spoke of months, it meant a "natural" month or "solar" month, in the
absence of express provision to the contrary. Such provision was incorporated into the Civil Code of Spain,
subsequently promulgated. Hence, the same Supreme Court declared 3 that, pursuant to Art. 7 of said Code,
"whenever months ... are referred to in the law, it shall be understood that the months are of 30 days," not the
"natural," or "solar" or "calendar" months, unless they are "designated by name," in which case "they shall be
computed by the actual number of days they have. This concept was later, modified in the Philippines, by
Section 13 of the Revised Administrative Code, Pursuant to which, "month shall be understood to refer to a
calendar month." 4 In the language of this Court, in People vs. Del Rosario, 5 with the approval of the Civil Code
of the Philippines (Republic Act 386) ... we have reverted to the provisions of the Spanish Civil Code in
accordance with which a month is to be considered as the regular 30-day month ... and not the solar or civil
month," with the particularity that, whereas the Spanish Code merely mentioned "months, days or nights," ours
has added thereto the term "years" and explicitly ordains that "it shall be understood that years are of three
hundred sixty-five days."

Although some members of the Court are inclined to think that this legislation is not realistic, for failure to
conform with ordinary experience or practice, the theory of plaintiff-appellant herein cannot be upheld without
ignoring, if not nullifying, Art. 13 of our Civil Code, and reviving Section 13 of the Revised Administrative Code,
thereby engaging in judicial legislation, and, in effect, repealing an act of Congress. If public interest demands
a reversion to the policy embodied in the Revised Administrative Code, this may be done through legislative
process, not by judicial decree.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from should be as it is hereby affirmed, without costs. It is so ordered.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Primetown Property Group, G.R. No. 162155, August 28, 2007

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and ARTURO V. PARCERO in his official capacity as

Revenue District Officer of Revenue District No. 049 (Makati), Petitioners,
vs.
PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP, INC., Respondent.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari1 seeks to set aside the August 1, 2003 decision2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 64782 and its February 9, 2004 resolution denying reconsideration.3

On March 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap, vice chair of respondent Primetown Property Group, Inc., applied for the
refund or credit of income tax respondent paid in 1997. In Yap's letter to petitioner revenue district officer
Arturo V. Parcero of Revenue District No. 049 (Makati) of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), 4 he explained
that the increase in the cost of labor and materials and difficulty in obtaining financing for projects and
collecting receivables caused the real estate industry to slowdown.5 As a consequence, while business was
good during the first quarter of 1997, respondent suffered losses amounting to ₱71,879,228 that year. 6

According to Yap, because respondent suffered losses, it was not liable for income taxes.7 Nevertheless,
respondent paid its quarterly corporate income tax and remitted creditable withholding tax from real estate
sales to the BIR in the total amount of ₱26,318,398.32.8 Therefore, respondent was entitled to tax refund or tax
credit.9

On May 13, 1999, revenue officer Elizabeth Y. Santos required respondent to submit additional documents to
support its claim.10 Respondent complied but its claim was not acted upon. Thus, on April 14, 2000, it filed a
petition for review11 in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).

On December 15, 2000, the CTA dismissed the petition as it was filed beyond the two-year prescriptive period
for filing a judicial claim for tax refund or tax credit.12 It invoked Section 229 of the National Internal Revenue
Code (NIRC):

Sec. 229. Recovery of Taxes Erroneously or Illegally Collected. -- No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in
any court for the recovery of any national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to have been erroneously or
illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, or of any
sum alleged to have been excessively or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit
has been duly filed with the Commissioner; but such suit or proceeding may be maintained, whether or not
such tax, penalty, or sum has been paid under protest or duress.

In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the expiration of two (2) years from the date
of payment of the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after
payment: Provided, however, That the Commissioner may, even without a claim therefor, refund or credit any
tax, where on the face of the return upon which payment was made, such payment appears clearly to have
been erroneously paid. (emphasis supplied)

The CTA found that respondent filed its final adjusted return on April 14, 1998. Thus, its right to claim a refund
or credit commenced on that date.13

The tax court applied Article 13 of the Civil Code which states:

Art. 13. When the law speaks of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood that years are of three
hundred sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours, and nights from sunset to
sunrise.
If the months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number of days which they
respectively have.

In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last included. (emphasis supplied)

Thus, according to the CTA, the two-year prescriptive period under Section 229 of the NIRC for the filing of
judicial claims was equivalent to 730 days. Because the year 2000 was a leap year, respondent's petition,
which was filed 731 days14 after respondent filed its final adjusted return, was filed beyond the reglementary
period.15

Respondent moved for reconsideration but it was denied.16 Hence, it filed an appeal in the CA.17

On August 1, 2003, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the CTA.18 It ruled that Article 13 of the Civil
Code did not distinguish between a regular year and a leap year. According to the CA:

The rule that a year has 365 days applies, notwithstanding the fact that a particular year is a leap year.19

In other words, even if the year 2000 was a leap year, the periods covered by April 15, 1998 to April 14, 1999
and April 15, 1999 to April 14, 2000 should still be counted as 365 days each or a total of 730 days. A statute
which is clear and explicit shall be neither interpreted nor construed.20

Petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied.21 Thus, this appeal.

Petitioners contend that tax refunds, being in the nature of an exemption, should be strictly construed against
claimants.22 Section 229 of the NIRC should be strictly applied against respondent inasmuch as it has been
consistently held that the prescriptive period (for the filing of tax refunds and tax credits) begins to run on the
day claimants file their final adjusted returns.23 Hence, the claim should have been filed on or before April 13,
2000 or within 730 days, reckoned from the time respondent filed its final adjusted return.

The conclusion of the CA that respondent filed its petition for review in the CTA within the two-year prescriptive
period provided in Section 229 of the NIRC is correct. Its basis, however, is not.

The rule is that the two-year prescriptive period is reckoned from the filing of the final adjusted return.24 But
how should the two-year prescriptive period be computed?

As already quoted, Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that when the law speaks of a year, it is understood to
be equivalent to 365 days. In National Marketing Corporation v. Tecson,25 we ruled that a year is equivalent to
365 days regardless of whether it is a regular year or a leap year.26

However, in 1987, EO27 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 was enacted. Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I
thereof provides:

Sec. 31. Legal Periods. — "Year" shall be understood to be twelve calendar months; "month" of thirty
days, unless it refers to a specific calendar month in which case it shall be computed according to the number
of days the specific month contains; "day", to a day of twenty-four hours and; "night" from sunrise to sunset.
(emphasis supplied)

A calendar month is "a month designated in the calendar without regard to the number of days it may
contain."28 It is the "period of time running from the beginning of a certain numbered day up to, but not
including, the corresponding numbered day of the next month, and if there is not a sufficient number of days in
the next month, then up to and including the last day of that month."29 To illustrate, one calendar month from
December 31, 2007 will be from January 1, 2008 to January 31, 2008; one calendar month from January 31,
2008 will be from February 1, 2008 until February 29, 2008.30
A law may be repealed expressly (by a categorical declaration that the law is revoked and abrogated by
another) or impliedly (when the provisions of a more recent law cannot be reasonably reconciled with the
previous one).31 Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions) of the Administrative Code of 1987 states:

Sec. 27. Repealing clause. — All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulation, or portions thereof, inconsistent
with this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

A repealing clause like Sec. 27 above is not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or
designate the laws to be abolished.32 Thus, the provision above only impliedly repealed all laws inconsistent
with the Administrative Code of 1987.1avvphi1

Implied repeals, however, are not favored. An implied repeal must have been clearly and unmistakably
intended by the legislature. The test is whether the subsequent law encompasses entirely the subject matter of
the former law and they cannot be logically or reasonably reconciled.33

Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 deal
with the same subject matter — the computation of legal periods. Under the Civil Code, a year is equivalent to
365 days whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, however, a year
is composed of 12 calendar months. Needless to state, under the Administrative Code of 1987, the number of
days is irrelevant.

There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of computing legal periods under the Civil Code
and the Administrative Code of 1987. For this reason, we hold that Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent law, governs the computation of legal periods. Lex
posteriori derogat priori.

Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 to this case, the two-year
prescriptive period (reckoned from the time respondent filed its final adjusted return34 on April 14, 1998)
consisted of 24 calendar months, computed as follows:

Year 1st calendar April 15, 1998 to May 14, 1998

1 month
2nd calendar May 15, 1998 to June 14, 1998
month
3rd calendar June 15, 1998 to July 14, 1998
month
4th calendar July 15, 1998 to August 14, 1998
month
5th calendar August 15, 1998 to September 14,
month 1998
6th calendar September 15, to October 14, 1998
month 1998
7th calendar October 15, 1998 to November 14,
month 1998
8th calendar November 15, to December 14,
month 1998 1998
9th calendar December 15, to January 14, 1999
month 1998
10th calendar January 15, 1999 to February 14, 1999
month
 11th calendar February 15, 1999 to March 14, 1999
month
12th calendar March 15, 1999 to April 14, 1999
month
Year 13th calendar April 15, 1999 to May 14, 1999
2 month
14th calendar May 15, 1999 to June 14, 1999
month
15th calendar June 15, 1999 to July 14, 1999
month
16th calendar July 15, 1999 to August 14, 1999
month
17th calendar August 15, 1999 to September 14,
month 1999
18th calendar September 15, to October 14, 1999
month 1999
19th calendar October 15, 1999 to November 14,
month 1999
20th calendar November 15, to December 14,
month 1999 1999
21st calendar December 15, to January 14, 2000
month 1999
22nd calendar January 15, 2000 to February 14, 2000
month
23rd calendar February 15, 2000 to March 14, 2000
month
24th calendar March 15, 2000 to April 14, 2000
month

We therefore hold that respondent's petition (filed on April 14, 2000) was filed on the last day of the 24th
calendar month from the day respondent filed its final adjusted return. Hence, it was filed within the
reglementary period.

Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED. The case is REMANDED to the Court of Tax Appeals which is
ordered to expeditiously proceed to hear C.T.A. Case No. 6113 entitled Primetown Property Group, Inc. v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue and Arturo V. Parcero.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
ART. 15-17
Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 PHIL 867

Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this case.

The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the
deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it.

The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:

(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his participation in the inheritance; (3) the denial of
the motion for reconsideration of the order approving the partition; (4) the approval of the purchase made by
the Pietro Lana of the deceased's business and the deed of transfer of said business; and (5) the declaration
that the Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause, and the failure not to postpone the approval of the scheme
of partition and the delivery of the deceased's business to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions
requested in reference to the Turkish laws.

The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the provisions of
Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason
they are void as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code which, among other things, provides the
following:

Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to
the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by
the national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the
property or the country in which it may be situated.

But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary dispositions are not in accordance with the
Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter,
and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines.
(Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil., 472.)

It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He, himself, acknowledges it when he
desires to be given an opportunity to present evidence on this point; so much so that he assigns as an error of
the court in not having deferred the approval of the scheme of partition until the receipt of certain testimony
requested regarding the Turkish laws on the matter.

The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not constitute an error. It is
discretionary with the trial court, and, taking into consideration that the oppositor was granted ample
opportunity to introduce competent evidence, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the court in this
particular. There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo
was violated in the testamentary dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our laws in force, must be
complied with and executed. lawphil.net

Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not erroneous.
In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the exclusion of the herein appellant as a legatee,
inasmuch as he is one of the persons designated as such in will, it must be taken into consideration that such
exclusion is based on the last part of the second clause of the will, which says:

Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship having been
conferred upon me by conquest and not by free choice, nor by nationality and, on the other hand,
having resided for a considerable length of time in the Philippine Islands where I succeeded in
acquiring all of the property that I now possess, it is my wish that the distribution of my property and
everything in connection with this, my will, be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in
force in the Philippine islands, requesting all of my relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and
cancel beforehand whatever disposition found in this will favorable to the person or persons who fail to
comply with this request.

The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted legatees must
respect the testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his nationality, but in
accordance with the laws of the Philippines.

If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to comply with it, as the herein
oppositor who, by his attitude in these proceedings has not respected the will of the testator, as expressed, is
prevented from receiving his legacy.

The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of the civil Code
provides the following:

Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not imposed
and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator
otherwise provide.

And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when, according to
article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary
dispositions.

Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, and the institution
of legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the herein oppositor.

It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law which shall govern it, and to the
condition imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law.

All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests are perfectly valid and effective it
not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the testator's national law.

Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of this estate be made
in such a manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and the scheme of
partition submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all other respects, without any pronouncement
as to costs.

So ordered.
Matter of Testate Estate of the Deceased Edward E. Christensen 2 of 2 Garcia, G.R. No. L-16749, January 31,
1963

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding,
in Special Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated September 14, 1949, approving among things the final
accounts of the executor, directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600
paid by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to the
residue of the property to be enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case of death without issue, one-half of said
residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance with the provisions of the will of the
testator Edward E. Christensen. The will was executed in Manila on March 5, 1951 and contains the following
provisions:

3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard Daney),
who was born in the Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and who is now residing at No. 665 Rodger
Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no descendants except my above named
daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.

xxx xxx x x xchanrobles virtual law library

7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo Garcia, about
eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized Christensen, is not in any way
related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted by me, and who, from all information I have now resides
in Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00),
Philippine Currency the same to be deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen Christensen with the Davao
Branch of the Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine
Currency per month until the principal thereof as well as any interest which may have accrued thereon, is
exhausted..

xxx xxx x x xchanrobles virtual law library

12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter, the said MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young Village,
Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest, remainder, and residue of my property and estate,
real, personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever situated, of which I may be
possessed at my death and which may have come to me from any source whatsoever, during her lifetime: ....

It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his final account and project of
partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and proposed that the residue of the
estate be transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library

Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen Garcia, insofar as it
deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been declared by Us in G.R.
Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward E. Christensen. The legal grounds of
opposition are (a) that the distribution should be governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said
order of distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged
natural children, one-half of the estate in full ownership. In amplification of the above grounds it was alleged
that the law that should govern the estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the internal law of
California alone, but the entire law thereof because several foreign elements are involved, that the forum is the
Philippines and even if the case were decided in California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which
requires that the domicile of the decedent should apply, should be applicable. It was also alleged that Maria
Helen Christensen having been declared an acknowledged natural child of the decedent, she is deemed for all
purposes legitimate from the time of her birth.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of
California at the time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will are to
be governed by the law of California, in accordance with which a testator has the right to dispose of his
property in the way he desires, because the right of absolute dominion over his property is sacred and
inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49
Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record on Appeal). Oppositor Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed
various motions for reconsideration, but these were denied. Hence, this
appeal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The most important assignments of error are as follows:

Ichanrobles virtual law library

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT
THAT HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN AND,
CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN THE INHERITANCE.

IIchanrobles virtual law library

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE
EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE
APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW.

IIIchanrobles virtual law library

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW,
PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE TESTAMENTARY
DISPOSITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN
SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.

IVchanrobles virtual law library

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE OF DISTRIBUTION
SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE PHILIPPINE LAWS.

Vchanrobles virtual law library

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN
CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP.

There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of
California at the time of his death. But there is also no question that at the time of his death he was domiciled
in the Philippines, as witness the following facts admitted by the executor himself in appellee's brief:

In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of record show that the deceased Edward E.
Christensen was born on November 29, 1875 in New York City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival in the Philippines,
as an appointed school teacher, was on July 1, 1901, on board the U.S. Army Transport "Sheridan" with Port
of Embarkation as the City of San Francisco, in the State of California, U.S.A. He stayed in the Philippines until
1904.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States and stayed there for the following nine years
until 1913, during which time he resided in, and was teaching school in Sacramento,
California.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the year 1913. However, in 1928, he again
departed the Philippines for the United States and came back here the following year, 1929. Some nine years
later, in 1938, he again returned to his own country, and came back to the Philippines the following year, 1939.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this
Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by
this stipulation of facts.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the Japanese Military Forces in the Philippines
during World War II. Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left for the United States but returned to the Philippines
in December, 1945. Appellees Collective Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as Exhibits "AA", "BB" and
"CC-Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l", "MM-2-Daney" and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)chanrobles virtual law library

In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to California shortly after the making of his last will
and testament (now in question herein) which he executed at his lawyers' offices in Manila on March 5, 1951.
He died at the St. Luke's Hospital in the City of Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp. 2-3)

In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the Philippines, we are persuaded by the fact
that he was born in New York, migrated to California and resided there for nine years, and since he came to
the Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very rarely and only for short visits (perhaps to relatives), and
considering that he appears never to have owned or acquired a home or properties in that state, which would
indicate that he would ultimately abandon the Philippines and make home in the State of California.

Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from mere temporary presence to the most
permanent abode. Generally, however, it is used to denote something more than mere physical presence.
(Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)

As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he acquired in California when he resided in
Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the latter was a
territory of the United States (not a state) until 1946 and the deceased appears to have considered himself as
a citizen of California by the fact that when he executed his will in 1951 he declared that he was a citizen of
that State; so that he appears never to have intended to abandon his California citizenship by acquiring
another. This conclusion is in accordance with the following principle expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of
Laws.

The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to mean the same thing, a place of permanent
abode. But domicile, as has been shown, has acquired a technical meaning. Thus one may be domiciled in a
place where he has never been. And he may reside in a place where he has no domicile. The man with two
homes, between which he divides his time, certainly resides in each one, while living in it. But if he went on
business which would require his presence for several weeks or months, he might properly be said to have
sufficient connection with the place to be called a resident. It is clear, however, that, if he treated his settlement
as continuing only for the particular business in hand, not giving up his former "home," he could not be a
domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choice requires the exercise of intention as well as physical
presence. "Residence simply requires bodily presence of an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires
bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile." Residence, however, is a term
used with many shades of meaning, from the merest temporary presence to the most permanent abode, and it
is not safe to insist that any one use et the only proper one. (Goodrich, p. 29)

The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, which is as follows:

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country where said property may be found.

The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning of the term "national
law" is used therein.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States, each
state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in force only within the state.
The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or
apply to any general American law. So it can refer to no other than the private law of the State of
California.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal property? The decision
of the court below, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under the California Probate Code, a
testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he desires, citing the case of Estate of
McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil
Code of California, which is as follows:

If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the
person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.

The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not denied. We have checked it in the
California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the other hand, relies on the case cited in the decision and
testified to by a witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is argued on executor's behalf that as
the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State of California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in
the abovecited case, should govern the determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of
Christensen's will, such law being in force in the State of California of which Christensen was a citizen.
Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and
following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary provision in question should
be referred back to the law of the decedent's domicile, which is the
Philippines.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:

The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of Laws rule of the forum refers a jural matter to a
foreign law for decision, is the reference to the purely internal rules of law of the foreign system; i.e., to the
totality of the foreign law minus its Conflict of Laws rules?"chanrobles virtual law library

On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose to accept the renvoi, that is, applied the
Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which referred the matter back to Michigan law. But once having determined the
the Conflict of Laws principle is the rule looked to, it is difficult to see why the reference back should not have
been to Michigan Conflict of Laws. This would have resulted in the "endless chain of references" which has so
often been criticized be legal writers. The opponents of the renvoi would have looked merely to the internal law
of Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi or the reference back. Yet there seems no compelling logical reason why
the original reference should be the internal law rather than to the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true that such a
solution avoids going on a merry-go-round, but those who have accepted the renvoi theory avoid
this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at the second reference and at that point applying internal law. Perhaps
the opponents of the renvoi are a bit more consistent for they look always to internal law as the rule of
reference.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to the renvoi plead that greater uniformity will
result from adoption of their respective views. And still more strange is the fact that the only way to achieve
uniformity in this choice-of-law problem is if in the dispute the two states whose laws form the legal basis of the
litigation disagree as to whether the renvoi should be accepted. If both reject, or both accept the doctrine, the
result of the litigation will vary with the choice of the forum. In the case stated above, had the Michigan court
rejected the renvoi, judgment would have been against the woman; if the suit had been brought in the Illinois
courts, and they too rejected the renvoi, judgment would be for the woman. The same result would happen,
though the courts would switch with respect to which would hold liability, if both courts accepted
the renvoi.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: where the title to land is in question, and where
the validity of a decree of divorce is challenged. In these cases the Conflict of Laws rule of the situs of the land,
or the domicile of the parties in the divorce case, is applied by the forum, but any further reference goes only to
the internal law. Thus, a person's title to land, recognized by the situs, will be recognized by every court; and
every divorce, valid by the domicile of the parties, will be valid everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7,
pp. 13-14.)chanrobles virtual law library

X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France, leaving movable property in Massachusetts,
England, and France. The question arises as to how this property is to be distributed among X's next of
kin.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There the rule of the conflict of laws as to
intestate succession to movables calls for an application of the law of the deceased's last domicile. Since by
hypothesis X's last domicile was France, the natural thing for the Massachusetts court to do would be to turn to
French statute of distributions, or whatever corresponds thereto in French law, and decree a distribution
accordingly. An examination of French law, however, would show that if a French court were called upon to
determine how this property should be distributed, it would refer the distribution to the national law of the
deceased, thus applying the Massachusetts statute of distributions. So on the surface of things the
Massachusetts court has open to it alternative course of action: (a) either to apply the French law is to intestate
succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a French court and apply the Massachusetts statute of distributions, on
the assumption that this is what a French court would do. If it accepts the so-called renvoi doctrine, it will follow
the latter course, thus applying its own law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers to a
foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter back again to the law of the forum. This
is renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term for this judicial process is 'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law
Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)chanrobles virtual law library

After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be resorted to as governing a particular case, the
further question may arise: Are the rules as to the conflict of laws contained in such foreign law also to be
resorted to? This is a question which, while it has been considered by the courts in but a few instances, has
been the subject of frequent discussion by textwriters and essayists; and the doctrine involved has been
descriptively designated by them as the "Renvoyer" to send back, or the "Ruchversweisung", or the
"Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative answer to the question postulated and the operation of the adoption
of the foreign law in toto would in many cases result in returning the main controversy to be decided according
to the law of the forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.)chanrobles virtual law library

Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been advanced. The theory of the doctrine of renvoi is
that the court of the forum, in determining the question before it, must take into account the whole law of the
other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of laws, and then apply the law to the actual question which
the rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the law of the forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has
generally been repudiated by the American authorities. (2 Am. Jur. 296)

The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for its application in a country
explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-531. The
pertinent parts of the article are quoted herein below:
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict of laws are to be understood as
incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or country, but its rules of the conflict of
laws as well. According to this theory 'the law of a country' means the whole of its law.

xxx xxx x x xchanrobles virtual law library

Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of International Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900, in the
form of the following theses:chanrobles virtual law library

(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the application of foreign
laws.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court shall respect:

(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind its nationals abroad as regards their
personal statute, and desires that said personal statute shall be determined by the law of the domicile, or even
by the law of the place where the act in question occurred.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library

(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be certain that one of them is necessarily
competent, which agree in attributing the determination of a question to the same system of law.

xxx xxx x x xchanrobles virtual law library

If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the personal estate of an Englishman who has
died domiciled in Belgium in accordance with the law of his domicile, he must first inquire whether the law of
Belgium would distribute personal property upon death in accordance with the law of domicile, and if he finds
that the Belgian law would make the distribution in accordance with the law of nationality - that is the English
law - he must accept this reference back to his own law.

We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in In re
Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on succession and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be
enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should
apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in
California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the
determination of matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the general principle of American law
that the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.

When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states, and leaves a will directing the manner of
distribution of the property, the law of the state where he was domiciled at the time of his death will be looked
to in deciding legal questions about the will, almost as completely as the law of situs is consulted in questions
about the devise of land. It is logical that, since the domiciliary rules control devolution of the personal estate in
case of intestate succession, the same rules should determine the validity of an attempted testamentary
dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is not that the domiciliary has effect beyond the borders of the
domiciliary state. The rules of the domicile are recognized as controlling by the Conflict of Laws rules at the
situs property, and the reason for the recognition as in the case of intestate succession, is the general
convenience of the doctrine. The New York court has said on the point: 'The general principle that a dispostiton
of a personal property, valid at the domicile of the owner, is valid anywhere, is one of the universal application.
It had its origin in that international comity which was one of the first fruits of civilization, and it this age, when
business intercourse and the process of accumulating property take but little notice of boundary lines, the
practical wisdom and justice of the rule is more apparent than ever. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp.
442-443.)

Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the national law is the
internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its
citizens, one for residents therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands that
We should enforce the California internal law prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and enforce the
conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we must enforce the law of California as in comity we
are bound to go, as so declared in Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California in
accordance with the express mandate thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal law for residents
therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library

It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in the place where the
property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that the national
law of the deceased should govern. This contention can not be sustained. As explained in the various
authorities cited above the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in
the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of
the testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the
case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at
bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave
the issue incapable of determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth
between the two states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his
domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the
decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California
provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines,
makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing
them.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105; Miciano vs.
Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs. Government, 59 Phil.
293.) cited by appellees to support the decision can not possibly apply in the case at bar, for two important
reasons, i.e., the subject in each case does not appear to be a citizen of a state in the United States but with
domicile in the Philippines, and it does not appear in each case that there exists in the state of which the
subject is a citizen, a law similar to or identical with Art. 946 of the California Civil
Code.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is the Philippines,
the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be
governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the
internal law of California..chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to the lower court with
instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides. Judgment reversed, with
costs against appellees.
Testate Estate of Amos Bellis, et al. vs. Edward A. Bellis, 20 SCRA 358

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.

PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.

Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.

Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila
dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed by the executor in Civil Case No. 37089 therein.1äwphï1.ñët

The facts of the case are as follows:

Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By his first wife, Mary
E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased
him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who
survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he
had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.

On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes,
obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the
following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three
illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the
foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and
second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis,
Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.1äw phï1.ñët

Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was
admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.

The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein including the amount of
$240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis,
Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their
respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released from time to time according as the lower court
approved and allowed the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on
account of their respective legacies.

On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its "Executor's Final
Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the
legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of
Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of
P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the executor — pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will
and Testament — divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven
legitimate children by his first and second marriages.

On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project of
partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory
heirs of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which is evidenced by the registry
receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.1

After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964,
issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final account, report and administration and
project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this
case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.

Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June 11, 1964, oppositors-
appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply — Texas law or Philippine law.

In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court
in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is
a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was
both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict
of law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a
reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule
adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties are
situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence,
however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours.3 Appellants'
position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their
arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of
Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.

Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or
testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional
rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that —

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by
the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.

Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that —

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public
order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated,
or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct. Precisely,
Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article" when they
incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial
change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose
to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate
succession. As further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which
decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.

It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of legitimes,
Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen
to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must
prevail over general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern his Texas estate and the
other his Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate.
Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law,
for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his
properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for
his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code
states said national law should govern.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the
laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the
will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes
cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against appellants. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.