Fiel v Banawa

Topic: Presumption of Marriage

Doctrine:

Philippine law does not recognize common-law marriages. A man and woman not legally married who co-habit for
many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed
to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered legally “married” in common law
jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.

Facts:

Dominga Fiel, who lived in a common law relationship with Natalio Banawa for twenty five years, filed a complaint
on March 3, 1971 for the annulment of a partition of the properties allegedly owned in common by her and the latter.
Natalio Banawa was a widower, before living with Dominga. Natalio Banawa died on June 29, 1970, after living
with Dominga since 1945. On Oct. 22, 1970, one of the nephews of Natalio brought Atty. Catane to Dominga for the
execution of a document of partition of the properties. Dominga received 1/3 while 2/3 were given to the brothers
and nephews of Natalio. Upon realization that she received less than what she was supposed to, she filed this
complaint. The lower court rendered a decision in favor of Dominga (awarding her half). Appeal was taken by the
defendants.

Issue:

WON the parties’ relationship should entitle Dominga to receive half of the properties

Ruling:

YES. Though Article 144 was not fully satisfied, on legal and equitable considerations, she should receive half.

Philippine law does not recognize common-law marriages. A man and woman not legally married who co-habit for
many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed
to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered legally “married” in common law
jurisdictions but not in the Philippines. In the Philippines, the property of such “common-law relationships” are
governed by Art. 144 of the Civil Code: “When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are
not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through
their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.” For Art. 144 to
apply, two requisites must be satisfied: 1) The couple must not be incapacitated to contract marriage; and 2) That the
properties must have been acquired through the work or industry of both or either of them. As to the second
requisite, the records show that Natalio set up a sari-sari store with Dominga, after disposing of his properties from
his “previous marriage” and became a widower. As to the first requisite, Dominga admits that she was legally
married to Eusebio Potestas and that Eusebio Potestas was still alive when she testified in the trial court.

However, despite such failure to satisfy a requisite, the Court finds that “On the combined strength of legal and
equitable considerations, we rule that the co-ownership rules provided by Article 144 of the Civil Code are
applicable. Dominga should receive ½ of the fruits and earnings of her joint efforts with Natalio. The properties in
part came from her own sweat, brains and efforts. As to the donations made by Natalio to Dominga during his
lifetime, the same should be declared void. Art. 739 of the Civil Code expressly provides that donations made
between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation are void. Adultery or concubinage
need not be proved in a criminal action, mere preponderance of evidence is required. Furthermore, as stated in the
ruling of Buenaventura v Bautista, the donations are contrary to public policy as well since legally married spouses
cannot donate to each other so should those not married.

Article 220. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or
facts leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the
community of property during marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the validity of defense for
any member of the family in case of unlawful aggression.

Republic v Cantor

Topic: Presumptive Death

Docrtine:

Notably, Article 41 of the Family Code, compared to the old provision of the Civil Code which it superseded,
imposes a stricter standard. It requires a "well-founded belief " that the absentee is already dead before a petition for
declaration of presumptive death can be granted.

FACTS:

The respondent and Jerry were married on September 20, 1997. They lived together as husband and wife in their
conjugal dwelling in Agan Homes, Koronadal City, South Cotabato. Sometime in January 1998, the couple had a
violent quarrel brought about by: (1) the respondent’s inability to reach "sexual climax" whenever she and Jerry
would have intimate moments; and (2) Jerry’s expression of animosity toward the respondent’s father.

After their quarrel, Jerry left their conjugal dwelling and this was the last time that the respondent ever saw him.
Since then, she had not seen, communicated nor heard anything from Jerry or about his whereabouts.

On May 21, 2002, or more than four (4) years from the time of Jerry’s disappearance, the respondent filed before the
RTC a petition4for her husband’s declaration of presumptive death, docketed as SP Proc. Case No. 313-25. She
claimed that she had a well-founded belief that Jerry was already dead. She alleged that she had inquired from her
mother-in-law, her brothers-in-law, her sisters-in-law, as well as her neighbors and friends, but to no avail. In the
hopes of finding Jerry, she also allegedly made it a point to check the patients’ directory whenever she went to a
hospital. All these earnest efforts, the respondent claimed, proved futile, prompting her to file the petition in court.

ISSUE:

W/N the petition for the declaration of presumptive death should be granted

RULING:

NO. Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that the prior spouse had
been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse was
already dead. Under Article 41 of the Family Code, there are four (4) essential requisites for the declaration of
presumptive death:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance
occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee

Notably, Article 41 of the Family Code, compared to the old provision of the Civil Code which it superseded,
imposes a stricter standard. It requires a "well-founded belief " that the absentee is already dead before a petition for
declaration of presumptive death can be granted.

In the case at bar, the respondent’s "well-founded belief" was anchored on her alleged "earnest efforts" to locate
Jerry, which consisted of the following:

(1) She made inquiries about Jerry’s whereabouts from her in-laws, neighbors and friends; and
(2) Whenever she went to a hospital, she saw to it that she looked through the patients’ directory, hoping to find
Jerry.

These efforts, however, fell short of the "stringent standard" and degree of diligence required by jurisprudence for
the following reasons:

First, the respondent did not actively look for her missing husband. It can be inferred from the records that her
hospital visits and her consequent checking of the patients’ directory therein were unintentional. She did not
purposely undertake a diligent search for her husband as her hospital visits were not planned nor primarily directed
to look for him. This Court thus considers these attempts insufficient to engender a belief that her husband is dead.

Second, she did not report Jerry’s absence to the police nor did she seek the aid of the authorities to look for him.
While a finding of well-founded belief varies with the nature of the situation in which the present spouse is placed,
under present conditions, we find it proper and prudent for a present spouse, whose spouse had been missing, to seek
the aid of the authorities or, at the very least, report his/her absence to the police.

Third, she did not present as witnesses Jerry’s relatives or their neighbors and friends, who can corroborate her
efforts to locate Jerry. Worse, these persons, from whom she allegedly made inquiries, were not even named. As
held in Nolasco, the present spouse’s bare assertion that he inquired from his friends about his absent spouse’s
whereabouts is insufficient as the names of the friends from whom he made inquiries were not identified in the
testimony nor presented as witnesses.

Lastly, there was no other corroborative evidence to support the respondent’s claim that she conducted a diligent
search. Neither was there supporting evidence proving that she had a well-founded belief other than her bare claims
that she inquired from her friends and in-laws about her husband’s whereabouts. In sum, the Court is of the view
that the respondent merely engaged in a "passive search" where she relied on uncorroborated inquiries from her in-
laws, neighbors and friends. She failed to conduct a diligent search because her alleged efforts are insufficient to
form a well-founded belief that her husband was already dead.

Lontoc-Cruz v Cruz

Topic: Psychological Incapacity

Doctrine:

Notably, “mere showing of ‘irreconcilable differences’ and ‘conflicting personalities’ [as in the present case,] in no
wise constitutes psychological incapacity.” “Nor does failure of the parties to meet their responsibilities and duties
as married persons” amount to psychological incapacity.

FACTS:

Marivi met Nilo and they became sweethearts in 1986. The couple married in a civil ceremony followed by a
church wedding. The marriage produced two sons. Sometime in 2005, Marivi filed with the RTC a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. In support of her claim that she and Nilo were
suffering from psychological incapacity, Marivi presented Dr. Villegas, a psychiatrist, and Dr. Encarnacion, a
clinical psychologist. According to Dr. Villegas, both parties could not tolerate each others’ weaknesses and that the
incapacities of the parties are grave because they preferred to satisfy their own needs rather than to give in to th
other’s needs. Dr. Encarnacion supported Dr. Villegas’ diagnosis. The RTC denied the Petition. From the RTC’s
verdict, petitioner appealed to the CA. The CA united with the RTC in rejecting the alleged existence of
psychological incapacity.

ISSUE:
Whether the psychological conditions of the parties fall under Article 36 of the Family Code to warrant the
declaration of nullity of marriage.

RULING:

We sustain the findings of both the RTC and the CA.

Article 36 of the Family Code states:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.
We have laid down guidelines in interpreting and applying this provision. In Republic v. De Gracia, we reiterated
the doctrine in Santos v. Court of Appeals, “that psychological incapacity must be characterized by:
(a) gravity (i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in a marriage);
(b) juridical antecedence (i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage); and
(c) incurability (i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the
party involved).”

Also, in Republic v. Court of Appeals, we reiterated the well-settled guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration
of nullity of marriage, as embodied in Republic v. Court of Appeals, viz.:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological – not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may
be physical.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at ‘the time of the celebration’ of the marriage.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, ‘mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts’ cannot be
accepted as root causes.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards
the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state.

Notably, “mere showing of ‘irreconcilable differences’ and ‘conflicting personalities’ [as in the present case,] in no
wise constitutes psychological incapacity.” “Nor does failure of the parties to meet their responsibilities and duties
as married persons” amount to psychological incapacity. We further elucidated in Yambao v. Republic that the
psychological condition should render the subject totally unaware or incognitive of the basic marital obligations:
Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations and not
merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will. This incapacity consists of
the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) this inability to commit oneself
must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of
mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological
abnormality. It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it
is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness.
Upon the view we take of this case, thus, this Court believes that the protagonists in this case are in reality simply
unwilling to work out a solution for each other’s personality differences, and have thus become overwhelmed by
feelings of disappointment or disillusionment toward one another. Sadly, a marriage, even if unsatisfactory, is not a
null and void marriage.

(Mirasol) Castillo v Republic

Topic: Psychological Incapacity

Doctrine:

Irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do
not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a
person’s refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

FACTS:

Mirasol and Felipe started as friends then, eventually, became sweethearts. During their courtship, Mirasol
discovered that Felipe sustained his affair with his former girlfriend. The couple’s relationship turned tumultuous
after the revelation. With the intervention of their parents, they reconciled. They got married and were blessed with
two childåren.

However, after thirteen years of marriage, Felipe resumed philandering.

Tired of her husband’s infidelity, she left the conjugal dwelling and stopped any communication with him. Felipe’s
irresponsible acts like cohabiting with another woman, not communicating with her, and not supporting their
children for a period of not less than ten years without any reason, constitute a severe psychological disorder.

Mirasol filed a Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage which was granted by the trial court.

On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the totality of evidence presented warrants, as the RTC determined, the declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Mirasol and Felipe on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code.

RULING:

Irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do
not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a
person’s refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

In order for sexual infidelity to constitute as psychological incapacity, the respondent’s unfaithfulness must be
established as a manifestation of a disordered personality, completely preventing the respondent from discharging
the essential obligations of the marital state; there must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor that
effectively incapacitated him from complying with the obligation to be faithful to his spouse.

It is indispensable that the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest
psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
As discussed, the findings on Felipe’s personality profile did not emanate from a personal interview with the subject
himself. Apart from the psychologist’s opinion and petitioner’s allegations, no other reliable evidence was cited to
prove that Felipe’s sexual infidelity was a manifestation of his alleged personality disorder, which is grave, deeply
rooted, and incurable.

The Court is not persuaded that the natal or supervening disabling factor which effectively incapacitated him from
complying with his obligation to be faithful to his wife was medically or clinically established.

Basic is the rule that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof, i.e., mere allegations
are not evidence.

The petition for review was denied.

Morigo v People

Topic: Requisites of a valid marriage

Doctrine:

The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no
judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid
marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity
before he contracts a subsequent marriage.

Facts:

Lucio (Morigo) and Lucia (Barrete) were board mates at Tagbilaran City, Bohol for four years. They re-established
contact in 1984 and became sweethearts. In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition Lucio
to join her in Canada. They both agreed to get married and were thus married on August 30, 1990. Lucia returned to
Canada but left behind Lucio. She filed a petition for divorce against Lucio in Ontario, Canada which was granted
and took effect on February 17, 1992. Lucio then married Maria Jececha (Lumbago) at Tagbilaran. On September
21, 1993, Lucio filed a civil case for judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage to Lucia, docketed as Civil
Case No. 6020, alleging that no marriage ceremony took place.

On October 19, 1993, Lucio was charged with bigamy before the RTC of Bohol. Initially, his motion for suspension
of arraignment on the ground of existence of a prejudicial question (Civil Case No. 6020) was granted, but it was
later reversed, and trial proceeded against him. After trial, the court convicted him as charged, ruling that want of a
marriage ceremony is not a defense in bigamy and the parties in the marriage should not be allowed to assume that
their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of nullity of said marriage.
Lucio also cannot rely on the divorce decree, as the same is without force and effect when both parties are not
domiciled in the country which granted it and was merely resorted to for the purpose of obtaining a divorce.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. During the pendency of his appeal, Civil Case No. 6020 was decided
in his favour. In that case, the RTC ruled that there was no valid marriage ceremony that took place since the parties
merely signed the marriage contract without the presence of the solemnising officer. The trial court held that the
marriage was therefore void, in accordance with Articles 3 and 15 of the Family Code. His motion for
reconsideration denied by the CA, he elevated his case to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not Lucio is liable for Bigamy, in view of the finding in Civil Case No. 6020 (judicial declaration of
nullity of marriage) that his first marriage was void for having been no valid marriage ceremony.

Ruling:
No, he is not liable. The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and
Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two,
without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in
accordance with Articles 35 and 46 of the Family Code. As the dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700,
correctly puts it, “This simply means that there was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity
retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the
declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was,
under the eyes of the law, never married.”

The records show that no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the
decision had long become final and executory. The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must
have been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete.
Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab
initio, the two were never married “from the beginning.” The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect.
Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he
contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential
element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is
no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.The present case is
analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan. In the latter case, the judicial declaration of nullity of
the first marriage was likewise obtained after the second marriage was already celebrated. We held therein that: A
judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted.
One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This
principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statutes as “void.”

It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized not just once, but twice: first
before a judge where a marriage certificate was duly issued and then again six months later before a priest in
religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared to have transpired, although later declared void ab
initio.

In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer.
Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a
marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act
alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held
liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.

The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in favor of an accused and
weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the
circumstances of the present case, we held that petitioner has not committed bigamy.

Further, we also find that we need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of
criminal intent, which is now moot and academic.

Aquino v Delizo

Topic: Fraud

Doctrine:

The concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her
husband constitutes fraud and is a ground for annulment of marriage.

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari to review a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal which dismissed petitioner's complaint for annulment of his marriage with respondent Conchita
Delizo. The dismissed complaint was based on the ground of fraud against Conchita Delizo that at the date of her
marriage with the former on December 1954, concealed the fact that she was pregnant by another man and sometime
in April 1955 or about 4 months after their marriage, gave birth to a child. During the trial, Provincial Fiscal Jose
Goco represent the state in the proceedings to prevent collusion. Only Aquino testified and the only documentary
evidence presented was the marriage contract between the parties. Delizo did not appear nor presented any evidence.
CFI-Rizal dismissed petitioner’s complaint for annulment of marriage, which was affirmed by CA thus a petition for
certiorari to review the decisions.

Issue:

Whether or not concealment of pregnancy as alleged by Aquino does not constitute such fraud as would annul a
marriage.

Ruling:

Concealment constitutes fraud. (relate with Art. 46(2) of FC)

The concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her
husband constitutes fraud and is a ground for annulment of marriage. Delizo was allegedly to be only more than
four months pregnant at the time of her marriage. At this stage, it is hard to say that her pregnancy was readily
apparent especially since she was “naturally plump”. It is only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the enlargement
of the woman’s abdomen reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the roundness of the abdomen more general
and apparent. The court remanded the case for new trial and decision complained is set aside.

Jones v Hortiguela

Topic: presumptive death for purposes of remarriage

Doctrine:

For the celebration of civil marriage, the law only requires that the former spouse has
been absent for 7 consecutive years at the time of the 2nd marriage, that the spouse
present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is
generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believe at the time of the
celebration of the marriage.

Facts:

- Marciana Escaño married Arthur W. Jones in the suburban catholic church of San
Nicolas, Province of Cebu on December 1914. Angelita Jones (P) was her daughter from
this union.
- On January 10, 1918, Jones secured a passport to go abroad and thereafter nothing
was ever heard of him.
- In October 1919, proceedings were institute in CFI-Maasin, Leyte, at the instance of
Escaño, to have her husband judicially declared an absentee. On the 25th of said
month, the court issued declared Jones an absentee pursuant to the provisions of article
186 of the Civil Code, with the proviso that said judicial declaration of absence would not
take effect until six months after its publication in the official newspapers. Said order
directed the publication thereof in the Official Gazette and in the newspaper "El Ideal".
- On April 23, 1921, the court issued another order for the taking effect of the declaration
of absence since publication was fulfilled.
- On May 6, 1927, Felix Hortiguela (R) and Escaño were married before the justice of the
peace of Malitbog, Leyte, and they signed the certificate of marriage.
- As Marciana Escaño had died intestate, her widower R was appointed judicial
administrator of her entire estate, and in an order issued on May 9, 1932, P and R, her
widower by her 2nd marriage, were declared her only heirs. R adjudicated a part of the
estate to himself in payment of his share of the conjugal properties and his usufructuary
right, and the remaining part to P. P was a minor at this time.
- On May 3, 1934, the heiress P, then married to Ernesto Lardizabal, alleged that she was
the only heir of her mother, the deceased Escaño, since there was never was a valid
marriage between her mother and R or that had such marriage been celebrated.
- P filed that her mother’s marriage to R be rendered void and to annul R’s partition of
properties be annulled since she is supposed to be the only universal heir.

Issue:
Whether or not Felix Hortiguela's alleged marriage to Marciana Escaño was celebrated thus
rendering him as an heir to the latter’s estate.

Ruling:

Yes. Jones, the 1st husband, is lawfully considered to be presumed dead.

- His should be counted from January 10, 1918, the date on which the last news
concerning Arthur W. Jones was received, and from said date to May 6, 1927, more than
9 years elapsed. Said marriage with R is, therefore, valid and lawful.
- Escaño believed Jones to be dead when she contracted her 2nd marriage. P herself was
of the same belief, since she lived with her mother after the latter had married R, treated
Hortiguela as her true stepfather, and lived and traveled with him together with her
mother. She certainly would not have behaved so if she had not believed her father to be
dead.

Dispositive:

For all the foregoing consideration this court reverses the appealed order of March 14, 1935, in
so far as it set aside the order of January 10, 1933, relative to the administrator's fees and the
order of June 26, 1933, approving the final account and the project of portion, and in so far as
said order of March 14, 1935, required the presentation of a new project of partition; denied the
appointment of Angelita Jones husband as administrator; affirms the order of May 9, 1932,
relative to declaration of heirs; and holds it unwarranted to make a finding as to whether or not
the properties of this intestate estate are paraphernal properties of the deceased Marciana
Escaño reserving to the parties the right to discuss which are paraphernal and which are
conjugal properties. So ordered.

Van Dorn v Romillo

Topic: Divorce decreed abroad

Doctrine:

Owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered
by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality.

FACTS:

Petitioner Alicia Reyes Van is citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard Upton is a citizen of the
United States, were married on 1972 at Hongkong. On 1982, they got divorced in Nevada, United States; and the
petitioner remarried to Theodore Van Dorn.

On July 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner, asking that the petitioner be ordered to render an
accounting of her business in Ermita, Manila, and be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner
moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgement in the divorce
proceeding before Nevada Court where respondent acknowledged that they had no community property. The lower
court denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines, that the
Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. Respondent avers that Divorce Decree abroad cannot prevail over the
prohibitive laws of the Philippines.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not the divorce obtained the spouse valid to each of them.
(2) Whether or not Richard Upton may assert his right on conjugal properties.

HELD:

As to Richard Upton the divorce is binding on him as an American Citizen. As he is bound by the Decision of his
own country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is
estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
Only Philippine Nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorce the same being considered contrary to
our concept of public policy and morality. Alicia Reyes under our National law is still considered married to private
respondent. However, petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights
to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

Lapuz v Eufemio

Topic: When petition for Legal Separation may be filed

Doctrine:

An action for legal separation is purely personal. Being personal in character, the death of
one party to the action causes the death of the action itself.
The right to the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, the loss of right by the offending spouse
to any share of the profits earned by the partnership or community, or his disqualification to inherit by
intestacy from the innocent spouse as well as the revocation of testamentary provisions in favor of the
offending spouse made by the innocent one, are all rights and disabilities that are vested exclusively
in the persons of the spouses and by their nature, such claims and disabilities are not assignable or
transmissible.

FACTS:

• CARMEN O. LAPUZ SY filed a petition for legal separation against EUFEMIO. She alleged that they
were married civilly on 9/21/1934 and had lived together as husband and wife continuously until 1943
when her husband abandoned her. They had no child.

• She prayed for the issuance of a decree, which would order defendant Eufemio to be deprived of
his share of the conjugal partnership profits.

• EUFEMIO alleged affirmative and special defenses and counter-claimed for the declaration of
nullity ab initio of his marriage with Carmen because of his prior and subsisting marriage,
celebrated according to Chinese law and customs, with one Go Hiok, alias Ngo Hiok.

• During trial, petitioner Carmen died in a vehicular accident on May 1969.

• Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation on 2 grounds that the: (1) petition for legal
separation was filed beyond the 1-year period provided for in Article 102 of the Civil Code; and (b)
death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation.
• Counsel for deceased petitioner moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario
Lapuz. Counsel for Eufemio opposed the motion.

• The court dismissed the case and stated that the motion to dismiss and the motion for substitution
had to be resolved on the question of whether or not the plaintiff's cause of action has survived, which
the court resolved in the negative.

• Petitioner filed a petitioner for review of the order of dismissal, but the order of dismissal was
affirmed.

ISSUES:

Does the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal separation, abate the
action?

RULING:

YES. An action for legal separation involves nothing more than the bed-and-board separation of the
spouses is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes in Article 100 allows only
the innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal separation and in Article 108, by providing that
the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of
legal separation already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one
party to the action causes the death of the action itself.

• Changes in property relations between spouses shows that they are solely the effect of the decree of
legal separation. Hence, they cannot survive the death of the plaintiff if it occurs prior to the
decree.

• An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are
involved, is that these rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree
itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a
decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation.

• Regarding Eufemio’s petition for a declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage to Carmen Lapuz, it is
apparent that such action became moot and academic upon the death of the latter, and there could
be no further interest in continuing the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the
questioned union.

Matubis v Praxedes

Topic: Consent as a defense in legal separation

Doctrine:

The law (Art. 100 Civil Code), specifically provides that legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent
spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage.

FACTS:

In 1943, Socorro Matubis and Zoilo Praxedes were legally married. In 1948, they entered into a contract wherein
they agreed that they shall live separately and that they should not prosecute each other for adultery or concubinage
or any other crime or suit arising from their separation. In January 1955, Zoilo began cohabiting with Asuncion, who
later gave birth to their child. In April 1956, Socorro filed a complaint for legal Separation on the ground of
abandonment and concubinage against Zoilo. The lower court dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription
and condonation/consent.

ISSUE:

1.) Did the action prescribe?

2.) Did Socorro consent to the commission of concubinage by her husband?

RULING:

1.) Yes. Under Art. 102 of the Code Code, an action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one year from
and after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from after the date
when cause occurred (now 5 years under Art. 57, FC). The complaint was filed outside the periods provided for by
the above Article. By the very admission of plaintiff, she came to know the ground (concubinage) for the legal
separation in January, 1955. She instituted the complaint only on April 24, 1956.

2.) Yes. The very wording of the agreement gives no room for interpretation other than that given by the trial judge.
Condonation and consent on the part of plaintiff are necessarily the import of paragraph 6(b) of the agreement. The
condonation and consent here are not only implied but expressed. The law specifically provides that legal separation
may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or
concubinage. Having condoned and/or consented in writing, the plaintiff is now undeserving of the court's
sympathy.