B

Problem set 2

1. Expectation
Say that one changes one’s mind just if there are an earlier and a later
time and some proposition p such that, at the earlier time, one believes p,
while at the later time, one disbelieves p.
Evidently, if one learns ‘intersectively’, then given the definition of belief
from (df-4.25), one never changes one’s mind.

(a) Explain why this is.

two points
Now, in real life, we change our minds from time to time. So when our belief-
model predicts that we cannot, that is a certain inadequacy to the model.
Let us consider a way to complicate up the model to fix the inadequacy.
One strategy preserves the intersective story about the relation between
one’s accumulating evidence and one’s evolving information state, but
changes the relation between the information state and what one believes,
by adding a complication.
The complication involves what we will call a surprise function: for
a universe of possibilities U, this is a mapping from the members of U
onto some initial segment of natural numbers (namely, there is some set
{0, 1, . . . , n} such that for every number in that set, some member of U maps
to it—duplications are OK). The higher the number assigned to a possibility
x, the more surprising one would find it, at the outset, were x to turn out
eventually to be the answer.
These are stable ‘diachronically’ (over time), but not ‘intersubjectively’
(between people): so Holmes has a certain fixed surprise function over the
entire investigation, and Watson has a certain fixed surprise function over
the entire investigation—but Holmes’s and Watson’s may or may not be
the same.
An information-state s and surprise function σ determine an expectation
state containing all the least surprising members of s, according to σ: or,
 148 puzzles and paradoxes

more precisely, a set X ( s, σ) ⊆ s, such that for x ∈ s, x ∈ X ( s, σ) just if for

every x0 ∈ s, σ( x) ≤ σ( x0 ).

• Example: Watson has surprise function σW assigning 0 to the Butler

and to the Heir, 1 to the Footman and to the Heiress, and 2 to the Cook
and to the Dutchess; while Holmes has surprise function σH assigning
0 to the Butler and to the Cook, 1 to the Footman and to the Heiress,
and 2 to the Heir and to the Dutchess.
This represents Watson finding it unsurprising were either the Butler
or Heir to have done it, somewhat surprising were the Footman or the
Heiress to have done it, and quite surprising for the Cook or Dutchess
to have done it; for Holmes, it is similar, but with the Heir and Cook
reversed.
At the outset, when each of them has info-state >, Watson’s expectation
state is the proposition X (>, σW ) = {Butler, Heir}; while Holmes’s is
X (>, σH ) = {Butler, Cook}.)

And we can then redefine the notion of belief:

df-A2 One believes p := one’s expectation state X is such that X ⊆ p;

(similarly for disbelief and uncertainty).

(c) Assuming the above surprise functions, describe the expectation state
for each of Watson and Holmes, upon getting the following evidence (to
be clear: the evidence from (i) does not carry over into (ii), and so on; at
each of (i), (ii), and (iii) they start over from scratch):
i. up
ii. young
iii. woman, then old
two points (total)
(d) Explain why the redefinition of belief fixes the above change of mind
problem.
two points
(e) Design surprise functions for Holmes and Watson, and a single course
of evidence shared by both of them, such that they wind up agreeing
that the murderer is the Heiress—despite starting out disagreeing over
young, and each of them changing their mind about that proposition at
least once.
three points

There is a way for a surprise function to be which ‘cancels out’ the redefi-
nition of belief—such that, for any surprise function σ with this character,
and any information state s and proposition p, s ⊆ p just if X ( s, σ) ⊆ p.
 problem set 2 149

(f) What is it? —Justify your answer: namely, show that any σ with this
special feature does ‘cancel out’ the redefinition, and any σ ‘canceling
out’ the redefinition has the special feature.
three points

2. Context and meaning

Holmes, pointing at an individual behind a curtain, makes the following
speech, using our language £:
thatage ≡ old;
thatclass ≡ thatgender;
them ≡ man;
them ≡ ¬thatage

• Who does Holmes think did it? And who is Holmes pointing at? —Justify
your answer.

six points

3. Sorites
Plausibly, tastes the same (in level of sweetness, for example) is a ‘transitive’
relation (check the index for the definition): whenever a and b taste the
same, and b and c taste the same, then a and c taste the same.
Plausibly also, there could be a line of cups of coffee, for which each cup
tastes the same as the cup to its right, but for which the cups at the left and
right ends do not taste the same.
But these plausible thoughts cannot be both true.

• Show this.

six points

4. Defectiveness
Suppose we want for some reason to enrich £ with some defective vocab-
ulary. (We might need to be able to do this, if we want to get into PR
bamboozling for a living!) Let’s get some practice.
For each of the following ways to be defective, adapt the technique in
section 7.3.3 to design intro and elim rules for a sentence which is
defective in that way:

(a) Having a meaning just if the universe excludes the Butler and the Heir
(b) Presupposing old ≡ woman
(c) Making all six suspects inconceivable

six points (total)