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Libyan Civil War

Article  in  SSRN Electronic Journal · January 2013

DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2377561

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Running head: LIBYAN CIVIL WAR 1

Libyan Civil War

‫الحرب االهلية الليبية‬

Hassan Elkatawneh

‫حسان القطاونة‬

Doctor of Philosophy Public Policy and Administration - Terrorism Mediation & Peace

Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Arab Organization for mediation and conflict
resolution

November 21, 2013

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2377561

 LIBYAN CIVIL WAR 2

Abstract

In this paper, we will discuss one of the recent armed conflicts in the North African state of

Libya. Which we are going to write briefly describe the relevant facts of the conflict. Then we

are going to discuss what types of power are being used by the parties, and check if that power

has used been effective for one of the conflict parties, and see if the power impact the conflict or

not. In the second half of this assignment, we will examine if there are any cultural issues were

linked to the conflict, also we will see if there are any cultural differences or similarities between

the involved parties.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2377561

 LIBYAN CIVIL WAR 3

Libyan Civil War

After popular movements overturned the rulers of Tunisia and Egypt, its immediate

neighbors to the west and east, Libya experienced a full-scale revolt beginning on 17 February

2011. By 20 February, the unrest had spread to Tripoli. In the early hours of 21 February 2011,

Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, oldest son of Muammar Gaddafi, spoke on Libyan television of his fears

that the country would fragment and be replaced by "15 Islamic fundamentalist emirates" if the

uprising engulfed the entire state. He admitted that "mistakes had been made" in quelling recent

protests and announced plans for a constitutional convention, but warned that the country's

economic wealth and recent prosperity was at risk and threatened "rivers of blood" if the protests

continued (Paula, 2011).

On 27 February 2011, the National Transitional Council was established under the

stewardship of Mustafa Abdul Jalil, Gaddafi's former justice minister, to administer the areas of

Libya under rebel control. This marked the first serious effort to organize the broad-based

opposition to the Gaddafi regime. While the council was based in Benghazi, it claimed Tripoli as

its capital. Hafiz Ghoga, a human rights lawyer, later assumed the role of spokesman for the

council. On 10 March 2011, France became the first state to officially recognize the council as

the legitimate representative of the Libyan people (Paula, 2011).

By early March 2011, much of Libya had tipped out of Gaddafi's control, coming under

the control of a coalition of opposition forces, including soldiers who decided to support the

rebels. Eastern Libya, centered on the port city of Benghazi, was said to be firmly in the hands of

the opposition, while Tripoli and its environs remained in dispute. Pro-Gaddafi forces were able

to respond militarily to rebel pushes in Western Libya and launched a counterattack along the
 LIBYAN CIVIL WAR 4

coast toward Benghazi, the de facto center of the uprising. The town of Zawiya, 48 kilometers

(30 mi) from Tripoli, was bombarded by planes and tanks and seized by pro-Gaddafi troops,

exercising a level of brutality not yet seen in the conflict (Paula, 2011).

In several public appearances, Muammar Gaddafi threatened to destroy the protest

movement, and Al Jazeera and other agencies reported his government was arming pro-Gaddafi

militiamen to kill protesters and defectors against the regime in Tripoli. Organs of the United

Nations, including United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and the United Nations

Human Rights Council, condemned the crackdown as violating international law, with the latter

body expelling Libya outright in an unprecedented action urged by Libya's own delegation to the

UN. The United States imposed economic sanctions against Libya, followed shortly by

Australia, Canada and the United Nations Security Council, which also voted to refer Gaddafi

and other government officials to the International Criminal Court for investigation (Paula,

2011).

On 17 March 2011 the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1973 with a

10–0 vote and five abstentions. The resolution sanctioned the establishment of a no-fly zone and

the use of "all means necessary" to protect civilians within Libya. Shortly afterwards, Libyan

Foreign Minister Moussa Koussa stated that "Libya has decided an immediate ceasefire and an

immediate halt to all military operations". On 19 March, the first Allied act to secure the no-fly

zone began when French military jets entered Libyan airspace on a reconnaissance mission

heralding attacks on enemy targets. Allied military action to enforce the ceasefire commenced

the same day when a French aircraft opened fire and destroyed a vehicle on the ground. French

jets also destroyed five tanks belonging to the Gaddafi regime (Paula, 2011).
 LIBYAN CIVIL WAR 5

The United States and United Kingdom launched attacks on over 20 "integrated air

defense systems" using more than 110 Tomahawk cruise missiles during operations Odyssey

Dawn and Ellamy. On 27 June 2011, the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant

for Gaddafi, alleging that Gaddafi had been personally involved in planning and implementing "a

policy of widespread and systematic attacks against civilians and demonstrators and dissidents".

By 22 August 2011, rebel fighters had entered Tripoli and occupied Green Square, which they

renamed Martyrs' Square in honor of those who died. Meanwhile, Gaddafi asserted that he was

still in Libya and would not concede power to the rebels (Paula, 2011).

On 16 September 2011, the U.N. General Assembly approved a request from the National

Transitional Council to accredit envoys of the country’s interim controlling body as Tripoli’s

sole representatives at the UN, effectively recognizing the National Transitional Council as the

legitimate holder of that country’s UN seat. The National Transitional Council has been plagued

by internal divisions during its tenure as Libya's interim governing authority. It postponed the

formation of a caretaker, or interim government on several occasions during the period prior to

the death of Muammar Gaddafi in his hometown of Sirte on 20 October 2011. Mustafa Abdul

Jalil heads the National Transitional Council and is generally considered to be the principal

leadership figure. Mahmoud Jibril served as the NTC's de facto head of government from 5

March 2011 through the end of the war, but he announced he would resign after Libya was

declared to have been "liberated" from Gaddafi's rule (Paula, 2011).

The "liberation" of Libya was celebrated on 23 October 2011, and Jibril announced that

consultations were under way to form an interim government within one month, followed by

elections for a constitutional assembly within eight months and parliamentary and presidential
 LIBYAN CIVIL WAR 6

elections to be held within a year after that. He stepped down as expected the same day and was

succeeded by Ali Tarhouni (Paula, 2011).

Two types of power had been used during the crisis, the Utilitarian power and the coercive

power.

UTILITARIAN POWER

Many states and supranational bodies condemned Gaddafi's government over its attacks

on civilian targets within the country. Virtually, all Western countries cut off diplomatic relations

with Gaddafi's government over an aerial bombing campaign in February and March. United

Nations Security Council Resolution 1970 was adopted on 26 February, freezing the assets of

Gaddafi and ten members of his inner circle and restricting their travel. The resolution also

referred the actions of the government to the International Criminal Court for investigation, and

an arrest warrant for Gaddafi was issued on 27 June. This was followed by an arrest warrant

issued by Interpol on 8 September (Mayer, 2000).

The development of events on the ground indicate that the Utilitarian power approach were not

enough to stop Gaddafi from killing the demonstrators. Based on the findings of the International

Federation for Human Rights, concluded that Gaddafi was implementing a scorched earth

strategy, Where Qaddafi's troops used of the Libyan Air Force to strike civilians. Which is that

led the United Nations Security Council to use the second power approach.

Coercive power

The government's use of the Libyan Air Force to strike civilians, led to the adoption of

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 to create a Libyan no-fly zone on 17 March.
 LIBYAN CIVIL WAR 7

Though several countries involved in the resolution's enforcement have also carried out regular

strike missions to degrade the offensive capacity of the Libyan Army and destroy the

government's command and control capabilities, effectively acting in de facto empower of anti-

Gaddafi forces on the ground. US government had asked Saudi Arabia if it could supply

weapons to the rebels in Benghazi. The Saudis have been told that the opponents of Gaddafi

need anti-tank rockets, mortars and surface-to-air missiles. Also the Egypt's special operations

force Unit 777 and Tunisian volunteers were in Libya fighting for the rebels. 100 countries have

recognized the anti-Gaddafi National Transitional Council as Libya's legitimate representative,

with many of those countries explicitly describing it as the legal interim government of the

country due to the perceived loss of legitimacy on the part of Gaddafi's government (Mayer,

2000).

On 20 October 2011, Muammar Gaddafi was killed while attempting to flee the Battle of

Sirte at the end of the war. NATO forces involved in the military intervention in Libya were

among the participants in the battle, and warplanes and at least one unmanned aerial vehicle

operated by coalition partners struck Gaddafi's convoy, leaving him seriously injured and forcing

him to abandon his retreat from the city. Opposition fighters located Gaddafi and took him into

custody later that day, but he died from a gunshot wound to the head before reaching the hospital

in Misrata (Paula, 2011).

Using the coercive power approach was good enough to stop the bloodbath. The use of

coercive power was not a choice, but it was a necessary, in part to counteract the coercive tactics

of Gaddafi and his army. Many countries responded to Gaddafi's death by pronouncing it to

mark the end of "tyranny" in Libya, with some world leaders even describing it as the end of the

war (Rachel, 2011).

 LIBYAN CIVIL WAR 8

Libya is culturally similar to its neighboring Maghrebian states. Libyans consider

themselves very much a part of a wider Arab community. The Libyan state tends to strengthen

this feeling by considering Arabic as the only official language, and forbidding the teaching and

even the use of the Berber language. Libyan Arabs have a heritage in the traditions of the

nomadic Bedouin and associate themselves with a particular Bedouin tribe. By far the

predominant religion in Libya is Islam with 97% of the population associating with the faith. The

vast majority of Libyan Muslims adhere to Sunni Islam, which provides both a spiritual guide for

individuals and a keystone for government policy, but a minority (between 5 and 10%) adhere to

Ibadism (a branch of Kharijism), above all in the Jebel Nafusa and the town of Zuwara, west of

Tripoli (Rachel, 2011).

Many analysts have focused on the protests as being a uniquely Arab phenomenon, and

indeed, protests and uprisings have been strongest and most wide-reaching in majority-Arabic-

speaking cities, giving rise to the popular moniker of Arab Spring. In addition, this series of

revolutions has been marked by the absence of Arab Nationalist banners and rhetoric among the

masses in favor of principles of human rights, freedom, democracy and cultural diversity, even in

absolute majority-Arab cities (Rachel, 2011).

The Berbers of Libya participated massively in the protests and fighting’s under Berber

identity banners, some Berbers in Libya often see the revolutions of North Africa, west of Egypt,

as a reincarnated Berber Spring and some call it the "Berber-Arab Spring. During the civil war in

Libya, one major theater of combat has been the western Nafusa Mountains, where the

indigenous Berbers have taken up arms against the regime while supporting an interim

government based in the majority-Arab eastern half of the country (Rachel, 2011).
 LIBYAN CIVIL WAR 9

References

Mayer, B. (2000). The dynamics of conflict resolution: A practitioner’s guide. San Francisco:

Jossey-Bass.

Paula, I. (2011). International coalition for the responsibility to protect. Institute for Global

Policy. New York. Reverted from

http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-libya?format=pdf

Rachel, G. (2011).Beyond Libya: A world ready to respond to mass violence. The Stanley

Foundation. Iowa . Reverted from

http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/resources.cfm?id=462

Rachel, G. (2011). More than War. The complex relationship between mass atrocities and

armed conflict. The Stanley Foundation, Iowa. Reverted from

http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/resources.cfm?id=675&article=1

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