PHILOSOPHY & GEOGRAPHY, VOL. 5, NO.

1, 2002

SPECIAL SECTION

Against war as a response to terrorism

NIGEL DOWER
Department of Philosophy, University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen, Scotland, UK

1. Introduction
War is not the answer in the present crisis.1 If we accept a truly global ethic which takes
into account human well being and justice in the broadest way and combine this with
the new realities of our global situation, we will make a robust response to the current
crisis which emphasizes international law, dialogue and the way of peace and non-
violence, but not war. In short we need what will be for many quite new ways of thinking.
In thinking about how to respond to the events of September 11th, we need Ž rst
to recognize the enormity of what happened and show our immense sympathy for the
American people in their time of collective trauma. It has been said by some that many
terrible things have happened in the past—like the genocide of Rwanda or the bloodbath
of Srebrenica—and that these have not evoked the crisis we are in. Is it that Americans
think American lives matter more than those of others? This is hardly fair. It is the
combination of so many deaths of totally unsuspecting innocents, the deliberate symbolic
strike at the heart of a powerful country’s military and economic standing and the suicidal
intentions of the actors which is without precedent. What is more, these acts must impress
themselves on almost any thinking person as repeatable anywhere in the world.
Whilst many of us may have severe reservations about vengeance and retaliation (as
opposed to bringing the collaborators to justice through due processes of international
law), anyone must recognize the utmost importance of trying to stop future terrorist
attacks of this kind. The desire to take resolute action against international terrorism is
entirely natural and right. The real possibility of other possibly worse atrocities has to
be reckoned with.
However, the wish to rid the world altogether of international terrorism is unrealistic.
It is certainly unrealistic in the short term, since the networks and cells already exist and
are highly dispersed. It is probably unrealistic in the long run too, since that which causes
people to turn to terrorism will probably never be completely eliminated, so long as
humans have different value systems and believe that ends can justify violent means. We
must accept that the deŽ nition of terrorism is highly contested (over the terrorism/
freedom Ž ghter distinction, over questions of scale and methods, and over the extent to
which forms of state action can count as terrorism). Nevertheless, even if we focus on
paradigmatic cases of direct destruction of large numbers of innocents intended to
ISSN 1090-3771 print/ISSN 1472-7242 online/02/010029-06 Ó 2002 Taylor & Francis Ltd
DOI: 10.1080/10903770120116813
30 N. DOWER

induce terror in populations, it still remains the case that all we can do is reduce its
likelihood.
How can we do this? Schematically, we should consider four possibilities:
(a) Destroy terrorists. A dead terrorist will not hijack planes or strap explosions to his
body.
(b) Find, apprehend and bring to trial terrorists. This will not stop those who intend to
become terrorists, but it reduces the likelihood of terrorism by stopping those who
are involved and would do more in the future.
(c) Prevent terrorists from carrying out such acts by increased security and by cutting
off their means (e.g. bank account freezing). This by itself does not get rid of
terrorists or their motivations, but it disables them in various ways.
(d) Reduce the number of terrorists by tackling the causes that give rise to terrorism.
This is a longer term response mainly concerned with reducing the number of
would-be terrorists but it might persuade some now committed to it to turn away
from it.
It is clear that (b), (c) and (d) are all vitally necessary to reducing terrorism,
whereas (a) is wrong, counterproductive and dangerous. Why?

2. Why Resorting to War is Inappropriate

First, such a war is likely to undermine the very objectives those prosecuting the war
intend to achieve, namely the elimination of international terrorism and the creation of
a more peaceful world. It will only ferment further terrorism since it will be perceived
by the extremists as the occasion for further war in response and also create many more
bin Ladens.2 It will also continue the cycle of violence, and quite apart from increasing
the likelihood of future terrorism, may well sow the seeds of future con icts that will
suck nations—maybe in coalition at the moment—into large-scale war. Indeed, the
suggestion currently made (at the time of writing) that the USA may wish to attack other
countries harboring terrorists (which at least shows logical consistency if one thinks the
way to deal with terrorism is to destroy the governments that support it) only conŽ rms
the possibility of this dangerous scenario. Furthermore, there is great danger that it will
polarize East-West relations and divide multicultural societies. It has been stressed—and
rightly so—that this is not a war between Christians and Muslims (many of the latter
died in the World Trade Center) or between the secular Western worldview and more
traditional theological worldviews. There is no “clash of civilizations”, as Huntington
suggested,3 and all of us who care about the future of our world need to afŽ rm the
principles of mutual respect between religions and societies.4 But if this war gets out of
hand, Huntington’s thesis could come to be reality. Indeed we are already seeing the
upsurge of anti-Western feeling in many Islamic countries in response to the current
bombing. One thing this indicates is that the creation of a coalition of governments—
governments which themselves are often not democratically elected—does not mean,
and could have been predicted not to mean, the support of the populations of those
countries. A military attack on a very poor Muslim country with millions starving against
a government (however extreme) that has not itself declared war was never likely to
command acceptance by others of the “Western” perception of what was being done.5
The non-existence of a clash depends on the lack of hostility on each side: this can be
achieved (except for the extremists) but not by what is being done now.
Second, it will almost certainly involve the destruction of human life on a large
 AGAINST WAR AS A RESPONSE TO TERRORISM 31

scale. Apart from the paciŽ st rejection of any war as a way of solving problems, the
question must be put to those who do accept that there could be a just war: is this one?
A positive answer has to be given to at least two questions: Is there a just cause? If so,
are the costs proportionate? If the answer is “no” to either of these questions, then
action is not justiŽ ed. A just cause could mean here one of four things: action needed
to stop a terrorist threat; self-defense against a government harboring aggressors;
revenge or retribution as reasons of justice for retaliation. The Ž rst is counterproductive,
as I have argued, the other three inappropriate in the current context. I do not argue the
latter case, because my main point is that even if any of these answers provided a just
cause, the second condition cannot be met since in this case the likely level of deaths of
innocents and other people would not satisfy any principle of proportionality and will
only add to the evil of the deaths of innocents in the World Trade Center attacks—and
this would be the case even if one does not include the humanitarian disaster through
starvation which is clearly being made worse by the continuing military engagement.
Although many will of course justify the action by a different estimate of consequences,
I believe we must recognize that in terms of justice, there is a wider justice to do with
the rights of ordinary people not to be killed, maimed, or have the basis of their
livelihoods further undermined by the general destruction of the infrastructure (power
supplies, radio stations, airports etc.) which is often deliberately targeted.
Third, the likely effect of the massive expenditure devoted to the war effort by the
USA, but also by the UK and other countries to a lesser extent, is a net reduction of
resources made available for famine relief and humanitarian assistance elsewhere, and
for social services within such countries. Here I am not referring to Afghanistan where
indeed commitments to large-scale humanitarian intervention during or after the
con ict may be forthcoming, but the general effects on such programs globally. Of
course, that effect is likely not inevitable. If there were a massive transformation in our
commitment to reducing global inequality, as I argue below we should accept, then the
opposite might occur. But as things stand that is not likely. Indeed what the rapidity of
committing large sums to military offensives reinforced is just how unimportant in the
scale of priorities the prevention of the deaths of millions really is—and the perception
of that priority elsewhere is part of our global problem.
Fourth, in similar vein, the very resort to war symbolizes in a way a rejection of an
alternative route to responding to the crisis, that of international law. Of course the
coalition talks of bringing bin Laden and others to justice, and no doubt if in subsequent
operations he or others are captured rather than destroyed, some form of due legal
process would occur. But the present strategy makes that outcome less likely than a
more patient approach would, it conceptually shifts what is happening into a con ict
between states and quasi-states as opposed to a policing action against international
criminals, and it also marginalizes the role of international law to that of an adjunct to
the military solution. A real commitment to the due process of international law would
see that as the primary objective. That we have failed to take that route is itself one of
the moral failures of the current operation.

3. Other Responses
What about the other responses? Can they be effective? Ought they to be pursued?
First, it is vital to apprehend those involved in this terrible event and try them for
crimes against humanity. Although there is of course some risk that even this may foster
terrorism, it is the least we can do in response to the outrage. At the end of the day
32 N. DOWER

terrorism has to be answered with the rule of law and reason, not with other forms of
violence. Provided that the court of law is truly international or so chosen as to
genuinely represent the international perspective (and not the interest of particular
parties), its authority will help to create the climate in which the impulse to terrorism
will lose its perceived legitimacy. What is needed is the equivalent of a police action not
military style operations. International policing which must be under the auspices of the
UN (and not particular powerful countries) is quite different from military action
(though limited force may have to be used as with domestic policing). Police operations
against criminals often take a long time. The patient accumulation of evidence drawn
from many countries is more to the point than the targeting of the Ž gurehead and a few
of the network in one. We need to hasten the day when the permanent International
Criminal Court can be established. It is ironic that the USA has so far opposed its
establishment.
Second, preventative action is vitally important for a long time to come. But we
need to note that there are dangers of general erosion of civil liberties as well as uneven
discriminatory forms of it—freezing bank accounts could lead for instance to innocent
people with middle eastern names having their bank accounts frozen—so a Ž ne balance
needs to be struck. It is also important to realize that preventative action does nothing
to tackle the root causes of terrorism.
Third then is tackling the causes. This is the most important thing to do in the long
run, but also in some areas the most difŽ cult. There may be many different causes and
tackling the causes may not be something we are willing to do (because of other values
we have). Amongst the causes which seem to be the most likely candidates are the
following Ž ve, two of which are speciŽ c regional problems, three broad geopolitical
problems.

(a) The Middle East continues to be a major source of tension, and there is little doubt
that frustration in Palestine and in much of the Middle East stems from a sense that
Palestine is not being treated properly by Israel. Israel also feels threatened and
under attack, so there is urgent need to Ž nd a just peace both for the countries
immediately involved and for the sake of reducing one potent cause of terrorist
feelings.
(b) Dominant Western presence (especially of a military kind) in countries in the
Middle East appears to be a source of resentment in the minds of a small minority
who might turn to terrorist responses. It appears for instance that bin Laden is keen
to get the USA presence out of Saudi Arabia, and if he is behind these attacks, these
attacks may have the withdrawal of the USA in mind. (It is difŽ cult to tell since
there are no stated political goals.) If this is one source of terrorism, it is a difŽ cult
one to know what to do about, since the presence of Western personnel and
interests in most countries of the world seems at one level as reasonable as is the
presence of people and interests from other parts of the world in Western coun-
tries—it is all part of living in our global village. In any case most people in such
countries are happy enough with such presence. Perhaps the response here is not the
withdrawal of such a presence as such, but an attempt to change the perception of
others of that presence by being more accommodating to the cultural traditions of
such countries.
(c) As many people have pointed out, North-South inequalities are probably an
underlying factor insofar as extreme poverty leads to desperation and a sense of
profound injustice. Not that the terrorists themselves need be desperately poor but
 AGAINST WAR AS A RESPONSE TO TERRORISM 33

they get much of their legitimation from a sense of striking back on behalf of the
dispossessed against rich countries, corporate power and so on. Of course there are
great inequalities within countries (rich and poor) as well, but being poor in a poor
country is a particularly disempowering condition to be in. (If bin Laden is involved
in this, it is unclear whether this would be his motive—see (b) above.) We have
plenty of other good reasons to tackle global poverty and inequality, but this factor
adds another powerful argument. Let us be frank: responding to this challenge
requires real changes in priorities. It may even mean that we have to consider
collectively a lower standard of living (which in turn should mean less inequality in
the name of social justice within rich countries as well).
(d) Western hegemony—economic, political, and cultural—may well be an underlying
factor. I say Western hegemony rather than USA hegemony though I think some of
the resentment probably does focus on the USA. I am not saying that most people
in other parts of the world such as the Middle East perceive this pervasive in uence
at a global level as an unacceptable hegemony. There is no clash of civilizations or
anything else so far as most people are concerned (though attitudes may change if
war continues as I noted above). But for some minorities this dominance irks deeply
and calls for violent responses in forms of “value”/ideological war. This dominance
may be the fact of political dominance, or economic control of the world economy,
or the fact that there is a projection of a certain way of life (based on individualism,
economic libertarianism, materialism, and secular values).
Should we then give up our dominant role, apologize for it or regret that these
values have become so pervasive in the world? Put starkly like this, this seems
neither realistic nor necessary. And yet there is a sense in which this is what is
needed albeit in measured form. We in the West could be and should be less
arrogant about our dominant role in the world or about our values. We still live in
the legacy of the incredible hubris—not intended I am sure—re ected in the
suggestion that after 1989 we had reached the “end of history”.6 There is much
wrong with the post-1989 dominant paradigm anyway. We need some shifts in our
values anyway, if we are to tackle world poverty and environmental problems
properly. A willingness to learn from and listen to other countries and traditions is
essential, and might just defuse much of the resentment that festers in the minds of
extremist minorities.
(e) The fact that the world as a whole is so militarized is also arguably a background
factor. There are so many groups, large and small, with greatly varying political and
religious agendas, that resort to violence, that it is not surprising that some groups
emerge pursuing international terrorist agendas; so long as each group “justiŽ es” its
violence, a culture of “justiŽ cation” prevails. Even if we accept, as many will argue,
that the violence used by states is different from non-state violence and therefore
legitimate (for internal and external security), there is little doubt that the level of
militarization of states cannot help but fuel violence in other groups. Underlying all
this is the brute fact of the proliferation of arms, large and small, in which the
lucrative arms trade is a crucial factor. If we want a less terrorism-laden world, we
had better tackle the arms trade and our own levels of militarization.

4. Conclusion
In many ways the above background causes point to an underlying global reality which
has not been sufŽ ciently taken into account by the leaders of nation-states, namely the
34 N. DOWER

complex phenomenon of globalization. Global communications and interdependence

have rendered a state-centered approach inadequate: global inequalities and the lack of
priority given to tackling them, lack of respect for different cultures, failure to consider
the views of peoples not their governments, failure to recognize just how different a
struggle this is against terrorism with different strategies needed, failure to see that our
future security depends on the primacy of international law and the greater role of the
UN (not sufŽ ciently in the forefront so far)—all these failures are evidenced in the
current priorities of our leaders. It is time for a deep rethink.
Whatever we do, some sources of terrorism will remain. Given the prospects of
future acts of massive destruction, eternal vigilance is necessary as are sustained
attempts to cut off support to terrorism, alongside longer term measures to create a
more harmonious world. But a robust response—which requires a high level of critical
self-examination—should not include war as an option. War kills innocents, is deeply
counterproductive and leads us away from a more reason- and law-based world. Rather
we need a world in which we can increasingly accept after Gandhi that the means are
the ends in the making.7 He meant of course that the means ought to be consistent with
the ends pursued, not that they always are. Real progress in the world can, I think, be
measured by the extent to which we come to accept and act on Gandhi’s dictum.

Notes
1. This is a written text based on a talk given to an anti-war meeting in Aberdeen on Thursday 27 September
2001, and revised and extended on 13 October during the bombing offensive against Afghanistan. In his
talk the author introduced himself as a member of United Nations Association, as a Quaker and a
philosopher interested in the ethics of international relations. (For the latter see Nigel Dower, World
Ethics—the New Agenda (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998).)
2. See e.g., William McIlvanney, “The tele-evangelist America can’t switch off,” Scotland on Sunday, 14
October, 2001, 15.
3. Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Making of World Order (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1996).
4. See e.g. Hans Küng, Global Responsibility—the Search for a New World Ethic (London: SCM Press, 1992).
5. Jonathan Freedland, “The war Bin Laden has already won,” The Guardian, 10 October, 2001, 21.
6. See Francis Fukayama, The End of History and the Last Man (London: Penguin Books, 1992).
7. Quoted in Quaker poster: the ideas are expressed in M. Gandhi, Collected Works, vol. 24, 396 (reference
made by Bart Gruzalski, Gandhi (Belmont CA: Wadsworth, 2001)).