SAN BEDA UNIVERSITY

COLLEGE OF LAW
MENDIOLA, MANILA

CASE DIGESTS

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

SUBMITTED BY:
ALBA, ERIC JOSEPH MARFIL, OSCAR PEPIN
BASTO, MATTHEW JOSEPH MIRANDA, MIKHAIL ISAAC
ESBER, ANNA BIANCA REANDINO, STEVEN
FABIAN, MARY ABIGAIL SEBOLLENA, BIANCA
FERRIOL, NISSIEL SOLAS, LOREN CHRISTINE
GARCIA, DANIEL ALEXEI VILLANUEVA, JOHN FIEL

GROUP 1

SECTION 1-K

SUBMITTED TO
ATTY. JOSE ANGELO DAVID

JANUARY 29, 2018

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

01. PEOPLE VS MARTI

G.R. NO. 81561, JANUARY 18 1991

FACTS
On August 14, 1987, the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the
booth of the "Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" in the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita,
Manila, carrying with them four (4) gift wrapped packages. Anita Reyes attended to them. The
appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich,
Switzerland. Appellant filled up the contract necessary for the transaction, writing therein his
name, passport number, the date of shipment and the name and address of the consignee, namely,
"WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland".

Appellant refused the inspection of the boxes and guaranteed that it contained books,
cigars and gloves. Before delivery, the Mr Job Reyes, the proprietor of Manila Packaging and
Exporters inspected the boxes because of the usual operating procedure of inspection, then he was
able to smelled a peculiar odor and discovered that dried marijuana leaves under the cigars inside
the package. He then wrote a letter to the NBI and report the said marijuana. The NBI then
submitted samples of the dried leaves to the laboratories for examination. Later on when they
opened the wholly the box, they discovered cake like and bricks of dired marijuana leaves.
Appellant now contends that his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures
was violated.

ISSUE
Whether or not the accused rights to unreasonable searches and seizures were violated?

HELD
No. As a rule, the Bill if Rights guarantees protection of constitutional liberties from
arbitrary constitutional restratints pertains to the act of the State itself and not to private
individuals. Furthermore, The constitutional proscription under Article III, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only
against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could
only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable
exercise of power is imposed. In the present case, the evidence sought to be excluded was
primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without
the intervention and participation of state authorities. Under the circumstances, the appellant
cannot validly claim that his constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure was
violated. The protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts
committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion
by the government.

The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the Government
without the latter transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the
Court sees no cogent reason why the same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution
of the offense charged. Hence, appellants constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizures was not violated and the evidence was deemed admissible to the court.
 02. STONEHILL VS. DIOKNO
G.R. NO. L-19550, JUNE 19, 1967

FACTS
Upon application of the officers of the government (respondent prosecutors), several
judges (respondent judges) issued a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners & or the
corporations of which they were officers, directed to any peace officer, to search the persons
named and/ or the premises of their offices, warehouses, and/ or residences, and to seize several
personal properties as the "subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled or the fruits of the
offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense" as violation of
Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws (TCC), NIRC and the RPC." Alleging that the
aforementioned search warrants are null & void, as having contravened the Constitution and the
Rules of Court for, among others, it did not describe the documents, books and things to be seized
particularly. The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants
in question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the
offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of
petitioners herein.

ISSUE
Whether petitioners' right against unreasonable searches and seizures were violated?

HELD
No. As a rule under Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, there are requirements
for a valid warrant. These are (a) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge in the manner set forth therein; and (b) that the warrant shall particularly
describe the things to be seized. In case at bar the petitioners have no cause of action against the
contested warrants on the first major group. This is because corporations have their respective
personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of their officers, directors and
stockholders. The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been
impaired, the objection to an unlawful search and seizure purely being personal cannot be availed
by third parties.

For the second group, none of these requirements has been complied with. Indeed, the
same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical persons therein named
had committed a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and Revised Penal Code."No specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The
averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was
impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of a probable
cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom
it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given
provision of our criminal laws

General search warrants are outlawed because they place the sanctity of the domicile and
the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion
of peace officers. Hence, the second group of warrants issued were general and that the items to
be seized were not particularly described, thus sich warrants are in valid and violatove of section
of Article III of the Bill of Rights.
 03. SOLIVEN VS. MAKASIAR
GR NO. 82585, NOVEMBER 14, 1988

FACTS:
Petitioners and Maximo V. Soliven were charge with Libel by the late President Corazon
Aquino. President Aquino herself filed the complaint- affidavit against the petitioners. Petitioners
contend that she cannot file a complaint affidavit against them because these would manifest that
she would be waiving her immunity from suit. That she would place herself under the jurisdiction
of the courts and be consenting to be sued back. In the second case Upon court proceedings, the
Respondent Judge Ramon Makasiar issued a warrant for Luis Beltran's arrest without personally
examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause. Petitioner
contends that the Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and
his witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrests. The
basis for his contention was the fact that the word "personally" was added after the word
"determined" and the phrase "other responsible officers as may be authorized by law" was
omitted.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Petitioner's rights against unreasonable searches and seizures was
violated.

HELD
No as a rule under Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution states that The Right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The
addition of the word "personally” after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of
authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be
authorized by law", has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now
requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses determination of
probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation. What
the Constitution requires is that exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to
satisfy himself the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required personally to examine the
complaint and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1)
personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the
existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the
basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the
existence of probable cause.

In the present case, Petitioner Beltran contention is erroneous and amounts to the wrong
interpretation of the constitutional provision. Hence, the word personally under section 2 of
Article III foes not connote to examine personally the complaint and find the probable cause,
what is mandated is that the judge must satisfy himself the existence of a probable cause,
regardless whether he do it personally or not.
 04. SILVA VS. PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC, NEGROS ORIENTAL
G.R. NO. 81756, OCTOBER 21, 1991

FACTS
M/Sgt. Ranulfo Villamor Jr. the chied of PC Narcom Detachment in Dumaguete City
filed an application for search warrant with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Dumaguete City
against petitioners Nicomeds and Marlon Silva. The said application was accompanied by a
deposition of witness executed by Pfc. Alcoran and Pat. Quindo. Judge Nickarter Ontal then
presiding Judge of the RTC issued a Search Warrant No. 1 directing the police officers to search
for the room of Marlon in the house of Nicomedes for violation of RA 6425 or Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972. The Search Warrant states that there is a probable cause to believe that the
petitioners are in control and possession of marijuana, dried leaves and cigarettes.

The serving officers also seized money which is owned by Antonieta Silva amounting to
P1,231.40. The latter then filed a motion for return of the said amount stating that the said warrant
does not include the seizure of the money, and that there is a violation of Rule 126, Section 11 of
the Rules of Court. However, Judge Ontal issued an order stating that the said amount was for the
appropriate charges in connection with the warrant.

Petitioner then filed a motion to quash Search Warrant No. 1 and alleged that: (1) it was
issued on the sole basis of a mimeographed which was filled in blanks; and (2) it violates Section
3, Rule 126 of the ROC for the Judge’s failure to personally examine the complainant and the
witnesses. Respondent on the other hand denied for lack of merit and said requisites for a valid
search warrant is complied with. A motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied, hence a
special civil action for certiorari was filed.

ISSUE
Whether or not Search Warrant No. 1 is valid

HELD
No, Search Warrant No. 1 is invalid. Article III Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution states
that “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.”

In the present case, there is a clear violation of Section 2 Article III of the 1987
Constitution in connection with Sections 3 and 4 Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, since it is one of
the requisites for the issuance of search warrant is that the Judge must determine whether there is
a probable cause by examining the complainant and the witnesses through question and answers.
The term “probable cause” has been defined "as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched". That it must
not come from hearsay but through their personal knowledge. However, in the case, the questions
asked were merely placing yes or no in the blanks provided and most of the questions were very
leading as it did not appear as a searching questions and answers.
 05. MORANO VS. VIVO
G.R. NO. L-22196, JUNE 30, 1967

FACTS
Chan Sau Wah, a Chinese citizen arrived to the Philippines to visit her cousin Samuel
Malaps, she left her two children from first marriage, she and one of her son Fu Yan Fun was
permitted entry to the Philippines under a temporary visitor’s visa for two months and posted a
cash bond for P4,000.00. she then married Esteban Morano a Filipino Citizen and had a son.
Chan and Fu obtained several extensions and the last expired on September 10, 1962. The
Commissioner o Immigration (CIR) then order the two to leave the country on or before the said
date and if they failed to leave, he will issue a search warrant of arrest and will confiscate the
bond. Instead of leaving the country, they petitioned to the Court of First Instance to compel the
CIR to cancel petitioner’s Alien Certificates Registration; prohibition to stop the CIR from
issuing warrants of arrest pending the resolution of the case.

ISSUE
Whether or not the issuance of warrant of arrest is valid

HELD
Yes, the issuance of warrant of arrest is valid. Section 1(3) Article III of the Constitution
provides that "(3) The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized."

However, in the present case they said proceeding is a deportation proceeding therefore it
is held by the Supreme Court that it is not violative of the bill of rights since the issue of probable
cause determined by a judge does not extend to deportation proceedings. Chan Sau Wah was only
a holder of a temporary visitor’s visa, she is tagged as an alien from another country and a non-
immigrant. If she wants to continue to stay in the Philippines she must secure a proper visa from
the appropriate country. In the case, the warrant of arrest issued by the CIR is purely
administrative since its purpose is to carry out a finding of violation of law and if there is any
violation for the conditions for the admission in a local state, they have the authority to issue a
warrant of arrest for deportation or order of contempt.
 06. HARVEY VS. SANTIAGO
G.R. NO. 82544, JUNE 28, 1988

FACTS
Petitioners Andrew Harvey and John Sherman were both American nationals living in
Laguna, while Adriaan Elshout a Dutch Citizen also living in laguna. They were among the 22
suspected alien pedophiles who were apprehended and under surveillance by the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation (CID). A roll of photo negatives and photos of suspected child
prostitutes were seized in their house and also posters advertising child prostitutes. A deportation
proceeding was then issued against the petitioners for being undesirable aliens and later on a
warrant of arrest were issued for violation Sections 37, 45, and 46 of the Immigration Act as well
as Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code.

Petitioners then filed an urgent motion for release under bond alleging that their health
was affected by the detention, but was examined and declared healthy. They also filed a petition
for bail however the certification by the CID physician said that such petitioners were healthy.
The respondent then ordered the petitioners to be transferred in the detention cell in Fort
Bonifacio to avoid congestion but was deferred pending trial due to difficulty of transportation.

Petitioner then assails the validity of the detention and alleged that: (1) the commissioner
has no authority under PIA of 1940 or Section 69 of RAC to arrest and detain petitioners pending
the existence of probable cause in the administrative investigation; it violated Section 2 Article III
of the 1987 Constitution; and the allegation that they were pedophiles are not valid grounds
unless they are caught in the act.

ISSUE
Whether or not the deportation proceedings and warrants issued against the petitioners
are valid

HELD
Yes, the deportation proceedings and warrants issued against the petitioners were valid.
Article III Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution states that “The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.”

Section 5 Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure also provides that an arrest
with warrant may be done by a peace officer or a private person (1) when such person has
committed, actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense in his presence; and (2)
when and offense has in fact been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it.

One of the constitutional requirements of a valid search warrant is that it must be based
on a probable cause. In the present case, the arrest of the petitioners was valid since it was based
on a probable cause after the close surveillance for a period of three months wherein their
activities were monitored by the CID. Since there is a probable cause, the seizure of photo
negatives, photographs and posters without warrant were justified and is admissible as evidence.
 07. ALVAREZ VS. CFI
G.R. NO. 45358, JANUARY 29, 1937

FACTS
The chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board, of the Department of Justice,
presented to Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David then presiding over the Court of First Instance of
Tayabas, an affidavit alleging that according to reliable information, the petitioner kept in his
house books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his
activities as a money-lender charging usurious rates of interest in violation of the law. The
attorney for the petitioner filed a petition alleging that the search warrant issue was illegal and
that it had not yet been returned to date together with the proceedings taken in connection
therewith, and praying that said warrant be cancelled

ISSUE
Whether or not the search warrant is illegal

HELD
The search and seizure made are illegal for the following reasons: (a) Because the
warrant was based solely upon the affidavit of the petitioner who had no personal knowledge of
the facts of probable cause, and (b) because the warrant was issued for the sole purpose of seizing
evidence which would later be used in the criminal proceedings that might be instituted against
the petitioner, for violation of the Anti-Usury Law

Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent in this case was insufficient because his knowledge
of the facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require the affidavit
of one or more witnesses for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause to
warrant the issuance of the search warrant
 08. MATA VS. BAYONA
G.R. NO. 50720, MARCH 26, 1984

FACTS
Petitioner claims that during the hearing of the case, he discovered that nowhere from the
records of the said case could be found the search warrant and other pertinent papers connected to
the issuance of the same. Section 4 of Rule 126 judge must before issuing the warrant personally
examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their
depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to
him. Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient.

Respondent Judge impresses this Court the urgency to stop the illegal gambling. She
claims that in order to abate the proliferation of this illegal "masiao" lottery, she thought it more
prudent not to conduct the taking of deposition which is done usually and publicly in the court
room.

ISSUE
Whether or not there is compliance as to the requisites of the constitution and rules of court as to
the validity of the search warrant?

HELD
The term “depositions" is sometimes used in a broad sense to describe any written
statement verified by oath but in its more technical and appropriate sense the meaning of the word
is limited to written testimony of a witness given in the course of a judicial proceeding. The
examination or investigation which must be under oath may not be in public. It may even be held
in the secrecy of his chambers. Far more important is that the examination or investigation is not
merely routinely but one that is thorough and elicit the required information. To repeat, it must be
under oath and must be in writing
 09. PEOPLE VS. DEL ROSARIO
G.R. NO. 109633, JULY 20, 1994

FACTS
Normando del Rosario was charged with Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunitions
in Criminal Case No. 236-91 and Illegal Sale of Regulated Drugs in Criminal Case No. 237-91. It
was agreed upon that PO1 Venerando Luna will buy shabu from appellant and after his return
from appellant's house, the raiding team will implement the search warrant. The prosecution has
failed to prove the guilt of accused-appellant. Foremost among the inadequacies of the
prosecution is its failure to call to the witness stand PO1 Venerando Luna, the alleged poseur-
buyer. The omission to present the poseur-buyer casts serious doubts that an illegal sale of a
dangerous drug actually took place.The statements of prosecution witnesses as to the alleged sale
of shabu are hearsay, without weight, as all of them were not present during the alleged sale

ISSUE
Whether or not there is an appropriate seizure

HELD
Accused-appellant cannot be convicted of possession of the shabu contained in a canister
and allegedly seized at his house, for the charge against him was for selling shabu with the
information alleging that the "accused, without legal authority did . . . sell to a poseur buyer an
aluminum foil containing Methamphetamine Hydrochloride . . ." Sale is totally different from
possession. Neither can accused-appellant be convicted of illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition, The raiding party was authorized to seize only shabu and paraphernalia for the use
thereof and no other. Section 3, Rule 126 - the search warrant must particularly describe the
things to be seized. Thus, the search warrant was no authority for the police officers to seize the
firearm which was not mentioned. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
REVERSED and accused-appellant is hereby ACQUITTED in Criminal Case No. 236-91 and
Criminal Case No. 237-91.
 10. UMIL VS. RAMOS
G.R. NO. 81567, JULY, 9, 1990

FACTS
On 1 February 1988, the Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital Command
(RIOU-CAPCOM) received information about a member of the NPA Sparrow Unit (liquidation
squad) being treated for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes Hospital in Quezon City. The
information was from the attending doctor and hospital management, and therefore came from
reliable sources. The one being treated is Rolando Dural, who was listed in the hospital records as
Ronnie Javelon, a member of the NPA, responsible for the killing of two (2) CAPCOM soldiers.
Due to the positive identification of the witnesses, Rolando Dural was then referred to the
Caloocan City Fiscal who conducted an inquest and thereafter filed with the RTC of Caloocan
City information charging Dural alias Ronnie Javelon with the crime of “Double Murder with
Assault Upon Agents of Persons in Authority.” Later, Bernardo Itucal was included as defendant.
As to Dural, it clearly appears that he was not arrested while in the act of shooting the two (2)
CAPCOM soldiers nor was he arrested just after the commission of the said offense for his arrest
came a day after the said shooting incident. Seemingly, his arrest without warrant is unjustified.
However, Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA, an outlawed subversive
organization.

ISSUE
Whether or not the warrantless arrest of the petitioners is valid

HELD
Yes. The warrantless arrest of the petitioners is valid. In the present case, arrest and
search warrant is no longer required for the crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or
proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in
connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State. Subversion being a continuing
offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was
committing an offense when arrested.
 11. PEOPLE VS.SUCRO
G.R. NO. 932239, MARCH 18, 1991

FACTS
In the evening of March 21, 1989, in the Municipality of Kalibo, Pat. Roy Fulgencio, a
member of the INP, was instructed by P/Lt. Vicente Seraspi, Jr. (Station Commander of the INP)
to monitor the activities of appellant Edison Sucro, because of information gathered by Seraspi
that Sucro was selling marijuana. At about 5pm on said date, Fulgencio, saw appellant enter the
chapel, taking something which turned out later to be marijuana from the compartment of a cart
found inside the chapel, and then return to the street where he handed the same to a buyer, Aldie
Borromeo. After a while, appellant went back to the chapel and again came out with marijuana
which he gave to a group of persons. Pat. Fulgencio called up Seraspi to report that a third buyer
later Identified as Ronnie Macabante, was transacting with appellant.

On that point and time, the team of P/Lt. Seraspi proceeded to the area and while the
police officers were at the Youth Hostel at Maagma St., Fulgencio told Seraspi to untercept
Macabante and the appellant. Upon seeing the police, Macabante threw asomething to the ground
which turned out to be a tea bag of marijuana. When confronted, Macabante admitted that he
bought the same from Sucro in front of the chapel. The police team was able to overtake and
arrest appellant and recovered 19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from the cart inside the chapel
and another teabag from Macabante.

The accused-appellant contends that his arrest was illegal, being a violation of his rights
granted under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. He stresses that there was sufficient
time for the police officers to apply for a search and arrest warrants considering that Fulgencio
informed his Station Commander of the activities of the accused two days before March 21, 1989,
the date of his arrest.

ISSUE
Whether or not the arrest without warrant of the accused is lawful and consequently

HELD
Yes. Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the
instances where arrest without warrant is considered lawful. The rule states: Arrest without
warrant, when lawful. — A peace officer or private person may, without warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;

Fulgencio, when tasked by Seraspi, was a distance of two meters when he saw Sucro
conduct his nefarious activity infront of the chapel. He saw the accussed talk to different people,
go inside the chapel, and return to them and exchange some things. These, Sucro did three times
during the time that he was being monitored. Fulgencio would then relay the on-going transaction
to P/Lt. Seraspi.Also, the fact that Macabante, when intercepted by the police, was caught
throwing a marijuana stick and when confronted, admitted that he bought the same from accused-
appellant clearly indicates that Sucro had just sold the marijuana stick to Macabante, and
therefore, had just committed an illegal act of which the police officers had personal knowledge,
being members of the team which monitored Sucro's nefarious activity.
 12. PEOPLE VS. RODRIGUEZA
G.R. NO. 95902, FEBRUARY 4, 1992

FACTS
In the afternoon of July 1, 1987, CIC Ciriaco Taduran was in their headquarters at the Office of
the Narcotics Regional Unit at Camp Bagong Ibalon, Legaspi City, when a confidential informer arrived
and told them that there was an ongoing illegal traffic of prohibited drugs in Tagas, Daraga, Albay. Then
Major Zeidem formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation, which team was given P200.00 in different
denominations, which were marked and used to buy marijuana. Sgt. Molinawe gave the money to
Taduran who acted as the poseur buyer. He was told to look for a certain Don, the alleged seller of
prohibited drugs. Taduran went to Tagas alone and, while along the road, he met Samuel Segovia. He
asked Segovia where be could find Don and where he could buy marijuana. Segovia left for a while and
when be returned, he was accompanied by a man who was later on introduced to him as Don, herein
appellant. After agreeing on the proce, Don left and when he came back, Don gave Taduran a certain
object wrapped in a plastic which was later identified as marijuana, and received his payment for such.
Taduran then returned to the headquarters and made a report about such purchase. Subsequently, Major
Zeidem ordered a team to conduct an operation to apprehend the suspects. In the evening of the same
date, appellant, Lonceras and Segovia was arrested. Consequently, the officers were not, however, armed
with a warrant of arrest when they apprehended the three accused. Thereafter, agents of the Narcotics
Command (NARCOM) conducted a raid in the house of Jovencio Rodrigueza, father of appellant. During
the raid, they were able to confiscate dried marijuana leaves and a plastic syringe, among others. The
search, however, was not authorized by any search warrant. The RTC found Rodrigueza guilty of
violating the Dangerous Drug Act.

ISSUE
Whether or not the warrantless arrest was in accordance to his constitutional right

HELD
No. The arrest and seizure were illegal in nature. In the case at bar, the procedure adopted by the
NARCOM agents failed to meet some qualification. The raid conducted in the house of Jovencio
Rodriguez was not authorized by any search warrant. As provided in the present Constitution, a search, to
be valid, must generally be authorized by a search warrant duly issued by the proper government
authority. Here, appellant's right against unreasonable search and seizure was clearly violated. The
NARCOM agents could not have justified their act by invoking the urgency and necessity of the situation
because the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveal that the place had already been put under
surveillance for quite some time. Had it been their intention to conduct the raid, then they should, because
they easily could, have first secured a search warrant during that time.
 13. GO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 101837, FEBRUARY 11, 1992

FACTS
Petitioner, Rolito Go entered a one-way street and started travelling in the opposite direction. At
the corner of the street petitioner’s and Eldon Maguan’s car bumped each other. Petitioner alighted from
his car, walked over and shot Maguan inside his car then left the scene. The police arrived shortly
thereafter at the scene of the shooting and there retrieved an empty shell and one round of live
ammunition. After a series of investigation, the police have obtained the identity of the suspect from
witnesses and verification from the Land Transportation Office the registration of the car of the suspect.

The police launched a manhunt for the petitioner after establishing his identity. Six days after,
petitioner presented himself before the Police Station to verify the news reports that he was being hunted
the police. The police forthwith detained him. An eyewitness at the police station at that time, positively
identified petitioner as the gunman. Prosecutor informed petitioner, in the presence of his two counsels,
that he could avail himself his right to preliminary investigation but that he must first sign a waiver of the
provision of Article 125 of the RPC. Petitioner refused such waiver.

Petitioner, after information for murder was filed before the RTC, filed for omnibus motion for
immediate release and proper preliminary investigation, alleging it has been an unlawful warrantless
arrest, furthermore praying for release in recognizance or on bail.

ISSUE
Whether or not a lawful warrantless arrest has been accomplished by the police.

HELD
No. The Court held that the warrantless arrest or detention of petitioner in the instant case does
not fall under the occasions enumerated on Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure. Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The "arresting"
officers obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had
allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the "arrest" effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably
regarded as effected "when [the shooting had] in fact just been committed" within the meaning of Section
5(b). Moreover, none of the "arresting" officers had any "personal knowledge" of facts indicating that
petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The information upon which the police acted had been
derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting — one stated that petitioner was
the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned out to
be registered in petitioner's wife's name. That information did not, however, constitute "personal
knowledge."
 14. POSADAS V COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 89139, AUGUST 2, 1990

FACTS
Two members of the Integrated National Police of the Davao Metrodiscom, Pat. Ungab and Pat
Umpar, conducted surveillance. During which they spotted the petitioner, Zamora carrying a “buri” bag
and they noticed him acting suspiciously. When they approached the petitioner and identified themselves
as members of INP the former attempted to get away but was stopped by the two. They checked the bag
the petitioner’s been carrying, finding a revolver, rounds of live ammunitions and smoke grenade. They
brought the petitioner to the police station for further investigation finding out that petitioner has no
license to own such firearms and ammunitions. He was prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions in the RTC.

ISSUE
Whether or not there is a lawful arrest or search or seizure and the items confiscated from the
possession of the petitioner are admissible in evidence against him.

HELD
Yes. Even though the search does not fall under Section 12, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court which
states that a person lawfully arrested may be searched without a search warrant since his arrest was also
not justified under Section 5 of Rule 113, the Court reiterated that there are many instances where a
warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest, foremost of which is
the “stop and search” without a search warrant. In the instant case, the search effected is reasonable on the
basis of a probable cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted
to flee with the “buri” bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag
and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same. Furthermore, as it is stated in
People v CFI of Rizal that what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure becomes purely
a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the
purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the
search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched and the character of the articles procured.
 15. PEOPLE VS. MENGOTE
G.R. NO. 87059, JUNE 22,1992

FACTS
The Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer that there were three
suspicious-looking persons A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place.
As later narrated at the trial by Patrolmen Mercado and Juan, they there saw two men "looking from side
to side," one of whom was holding his abdomen. They approached these persons and identified
themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried to run away but were unable to escape because the
other lawmen had surrounded them. The suspects were then searched. One of them, who turned out to be
the accused-appellant, Mengote was found with revolver with six live bullets in the chamber. His
companion, later identified as Morellos, had a fan knife in his front right pants pocket. The weapons were
taken from them. Mengote and Morellos were then turned over to police headquarters for investigation by
the Intelligence Division.

ISSUE
Whether or not the weapons confiscated are inadmissible as evidence to court because of its
illegal seizure since no warrant therefor has been obtained.

HELD
Yes. It is the absolute prohibition of Article III, Section 3(2), of the Constitution. The Court ruled
that the arrest and search was not lawful under Section 5 of Rule 113 of Rules of Court. Since, Par. (c) of
Section 5 is obviously inapplicable as Mengote was not an escapee from a penal institution when he was
arrested. We therefore confine ourselves to determining the lawfulness of his arrest under either Par. (a)
or Par. (b) of this section. Par. (a) requires that the person be arrested (1) after he has committed or while
he is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (2) in the presence of the
arresting officer.

These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in
question, the accused-appellant was merely "looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen,"
according to the arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that had just been
committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempted by Mengote in their presence. The
case before us is different because there was nothing to support the arresting officers' suspicion other than
Mengote's darting eyes and his hand on his abdomen. By no stretch of the imagination could it have been
inferred from these acts that an offense had just been committed, or was actually being committed, or was
at least being attempted in their presence.

Par. (b) is no less applicable because its no less stringent requirements have also not been
satisfied. The prosecution has not shown that at the time of Mengote's arrest an offense had in fact just
been committed and that the arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that Mengote
had committed it. All they had was hearsay information from the telephone caller, and about a crime that
had yet to be committed.
 16. MALACAT VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 123595, DECEMBER 12, 1997

FACTS
Police officer Rodolfu Yu, in response to bomb threats reported seven days earlier, was on foot patrol
with three other police officers (all of them in uniform) along Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near the
Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking men, with each
group, comprised of three to four men, posted on opposite sides of the corner of Quezon Boulevard near the
Mercury Drug Store. These men were acting suspiciously with their eyes moving very fast. Yu and his
companions positioned themselves at strategic points and observed both groups for about thirty minutes. The
police officers then approached one group of men, who then fled in different directions. As the policemen gave
chase, Yu caught up with and apprehended petitioner. Upon searching petitioner, Yu found a fragmentation
grenade tucked inside petitioners front waistline. Yu’s companion, police officer Rogelio Malibiran,
apprehended Abdul Casan from whom a .38 caliber revolver was recovered. Petitioner and Casan were then
brought to Police Station No. 3 where Yu placed an X mark at the bottom of the grenade and thereafter gave it
to his commander. The trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of petitioner was akin to a stop
and frisk, where a warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest and
whose object is either to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more
information. Probable cause was not required as it was not certain that a crime had been committed, however,
the situation called for an investigation, hence to require probable cause would have been premature. The RTC
emphasized that Yu and his companions were confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to
obtain a warrant, threatens the destruction of evidence and the officers had to act in haste, as petitioner and his
companions were acting suspiciously, considering the time, place and reported cases of bombing. The trial
court then ruled that the seizure of the grenade from petitioner was incidental to a lawful arrest, and since
petitioner later voluntarily admitted such fact to the police investigator for the purpose of bombing the
Mercury Drug Store, concluded that sufficient evidence existed to establish petitioners guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. CA affirmed lower court’s decision.

ISSUE
Whether or not the search and seizure conducted by the police was valid.

HELD
NO. The warrant-less arrest is illegal. According to the SC, the prosecution failed to establish
petitioners guilt with moral certainty. The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures are that a
warrant is needed in order to validly effect the same. The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable
arrests, searches and seizures refer to those effected without a validly issued warrant, subject to certain
exceptions. As regards valid warrant-less arrests, these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court,
which reads, in part: Sec. 5: Arrest, without warrant; when lawful — A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped. A warrant-less arrest under the
circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that
under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest. Turning to valid warrant-less searches, they are
limited to the following: (1) customs searches; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain
view; (4) consent searches;(5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest; and (6) a "stop and frisk.’ In a search
incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality
of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, In this instance, the law requires that there first be
a lawful arrest before a search can be made the process cannot be reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid arrest,
the arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a
weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found which was used in the commission
of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the
arrestee with the means of escaping or committing violence.
 17. PEOPLE VS. AMINNUDIN
G.R. NO. L-74869, JULY 6, 1988

FACTS
Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon
9 at about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him simply
accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their
headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and later
taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. When they were verified as marijuana leaves, an information
for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. Later, the information was amended to
include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that same evening and likewise
investigated. Both were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to
dismiss the charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers absolving her
after a 'thorough investigation." The motion was granted, and trial proceeded only against the accused-
appellant, who was eventually convicted.

According to the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier received a tip from one of their
informers that the accused-appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying
marijuana. He was Identified by name. Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the evening of June 25,
1984, and approached him as he descended from the gangplank after the informer had pointed to him.
They detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. It was found to contain three kilos of what
were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner, who testified that she conducted
microscopic, chemical and chromatographic tests on them. On the basis of this finding, the corresponding
charge was then filed against Aminnudin.

ISSUE
Whether or not Aminnudin’s arrest and search were lawful

HELD
NO. It is clear that the PC had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant
to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known.
The vehicle was identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had
received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance
of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was
ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had determined on
his own authority that a “search warrant was not necessary.” The Supreme Court Held that warrantless
arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the rules of court not justified unless the accused was caught in flagrante
or a crime was about to be committed or had just been committed. The evidence of probable cause should
be determined by a judge and not law enforcement agents.
 18. PEOPLE VS. MALMSTEDT
G.R. NO. 91107, JUNE 19, 1991

FACTS

Captain Alen Vasco, the commanding officer of the first regional command (NARCOM)
stationed at camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint for the purpose of checking
all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint was prompted by
persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited
drugs. And an information also was received about a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his
possession prohibited drugs.

In the afternoon the bus where accused was riding stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan boarded
the bus and announced that they were members of the NARCOM and that they would conduct an
inspection. During the inspection CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused waist. Suspecting the bulge on
accused waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accussed’s passport and other identification papers. When
accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging o his
waist. And it turned out to be a pouched bag and when accused opened the same bag the officer noticed
four suspicious looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape. It contained hashish, a derivative of
marijuana.

Thereafter, the accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from
the bus accused stopped to get two travelling bags. The officer inspects the bag. It was only after the
officers had opened the bags that the accused finally presented his passport. The two bags contained a
stuffed toy each, upon inspection the stuff toy contained also hashish.

ISSUE
Whether or not there is a violation of the constitutional right against unreasonable search and
seizure

HELD
NO. The Supreme Court held that under Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides:
“Arrest without warrant; when lawful – a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person: a) When, in the presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense; b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and c) When the person to
be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporary confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another”
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs. A crime was actually being
committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto, thus the search made upon his personal
effects falls squarely under paragraph 1 of the foregoing provision of law, which allows a warrant-less
search incident to a lawful arrest.

Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable,
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the object sought in
connection with the offense are in the placed sought to be searched. When NARCOM received the
information that a Caucasian travelling from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him a prohibited
drug, there was no time to obtain a search warrant.
 19. ESPAÑO VS COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 120431, April 1, 1998

FACTS
Pat. Wilfredo Aquino, Simplicio Rivera, and Erlindo Lumboy of the Western Police District
(WPD), Narcotics Division went to Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila to confirm reports of drug
pushing in the area. They saw petitioner selling "something" to another person. After the alleged buyer
left, they approached petitioner, identified themselves as policemen, and frisked him. The search yielded
two plastic cellophane tea bags of marijuana. When asked if he had more marijuana, he replied that there
was more in his house. The policemen went to his residence where they found ten more cellophane tea
bags of marijuana.The policemen went to his residence where they found ten more cellophane tea bags of
marijuana. Petitioner was brought to the police headquarters where he was charged of possession of
prohibited drugs. Petitioner was charged with possession of prohibited drugs. The court found the accused
him guilty of the crime of violation of Section 8, Article II, in relation to Section 2 of Republic Act No.
6425 as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 179.

ISSUE
Whether the search of Espano’s home after his arrest does not violate his right against
unreasonable search and seizure.

HELD
Espano’s arrest falls squarely under Rule 113 Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court. He was caught
in flagranti as a result of a buy-bust operation conducted by police officers on the basis of information
received regarding the illegal trade of drugs within the area of Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila.
Rule 113 Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court provides that a peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.

The police officer saw petitioner handing over something to an alleged buyer. After the buyer
left, they searched him and discovered two cellophanes of marijuana. His arrest was, therefore, lawful and
the two cellophane bags of marijuana seized were admissible in evidence, being the fruits of the crime.
The 1987 Constitution guarantees freedom against unreasonable searches and seizures under Article III,
Section 2 which provides that the right of the people tobe secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable causeto be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
 20. PAPA VS MAGO
G.R. NO. L-27360, FEBRUARY 28, 1968

FACTS
Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police Department, acting
upon reliable information that a certain shipment of personal effects, allegedly misdeclared and
undervalued, would be released the following day from the customs zone of the port of Manila and loaded
on two trucks. Upon orders of petitioner Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and a duly deputized
agent of the Bureau of Customs, Petitioner Alagao conducted surveillance at gate No. 1 of the customs
zone and elements of the counter-intelligence unit went after the trucks and intercepted them at the
Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila. Upon investigation, a person claimed ownership of the goods and
showed to the policemen a "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected in Informal Entry No. 147-5501",
issued by the Bureau of Customs in the name of a certain Bienvenido Naguit. Mago, the owner of the
goods that were seized, when the truck transporting the goods was intercepted by the BOC, questioned the
validity of the search conducted by them since it was made without any search warrant and whether the
BOC has jurisdiction over the forfeited goods.

ISSUE
Whether or not the seizure of the imported goods is validly done by herein petitioners

HELD
The goods in question are imported articles entered at the Port of Cebu. Should they be found to
have been released irregularly from Customs custody in Cebu City, they are subject to seizure and
forfeiture, the proceedings for which comes within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs pursuant to
Republic Act 1937

It is the settled rule, therefore, that the Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over
imported goods, for the purposes of enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment the goods are
actually in its possession or control, even if no warrant of seizure or detention had previously been issued
by the Collector of Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings

Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to affect the seizure without any
search warrant issued by a competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant
in the instant case. The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff
and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not
being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk,
package, or envelope or any person on board, or to stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or
person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the
Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases.
 21. PEOPLE VS. MUSA
G.R. NO. 96177, JANUARY 27, 1993

FACTS
On December 14, 1989, the accused-respondent was criminally charged for violating the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, for selling two wrappers of dried marijuana leaves to NARCOM agent,
Sgt. Amado Ani. However, upon arraignment on January 11, 1990, the respondent pleaded not guilty to
the charges. During the trial, the prosecution presented three witnesses namely: Sgt. Amado Ani as poseur
buyer; T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga as NARCOM team leader of the buy-bust operation; and Athena Elisa P.
Anderson, a PNP forensic chemist. Sgt. Ani, was assigned as a poseur buyer by Belarga, to proceed in
the house of the respondent. Ani gave marked money amounting to P 20.00 to Mari Musa in exchange for
the dried marijuana leaves. Ani with the buy-bust team later returned to the house. Belarga frisked Musa,
and asked where the marked money was but the latter replied that it was given to his wife. Consequently,
Musa was placed under arrest. However the acquired newspaper-wrapped marijuana bought by Ani was
examined by Anderson and reported that the specimen were positively indicated as marijuana. The
defense however contends that Musa’s wife was putting their child to sleep, and NARCOM Agents
dressed as civilians, and announced that they were NARCOM did not ask permission to enter the house.
The latter searched the house for marijuana while dismissing the inquiry of Musa if there is a search
warrant. Musa said that four bullets were placed between the fingers of his right hands and was boxed by
the agents. Moreover, respondent also denies that there was a transaction of marijuana. Now, the
respondent seeks to reverse the decision of the RTC of Zamboanga Branch XII finding him guilty on of
selling marijuana in violation of Article II, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425 also known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Furthermore, He contends that his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable
doubt since he does not know Sgt. Ani, and assails the seizure and admission as evidence of plastic bag
containing marijuana from his kitchen.

ISSUE
Whether there was a violation of Musa’s right against unreasonable searches and seizures
pursuant to Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution when the NARCOM acquired another evidence of
plastic bag containing marijuana from his kitchen

HELD
Yes. While a valid search warrant is generally necessary before a search and seizure may be
effected, exceptions to this rule are recognized. Thus, in Alvero v. Dizon,36 the Court stated that. "[t]he
most important exception to the necessity for a search warrant is the right of search and seizure as an
incident to a lawful arrest.” Rule 126, Section 12 of the Rules of Court expressly authorizes a warrantless
search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest. There is no doubt that the warrantless search incidental to a
lawful arrest authorizes the arresting officer to make a search upon the person of the person arrested. In
the case at bar, the NARCOM agents searched the person of the appellant after arresting him in his house
but found nothing. They then searched the entire house and, in the kitchen, found and seized a plastic bag
hanging in a corner. The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest, may
extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate
control. Objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view
are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. However, the Court, therefore, hold that under
the circumstances of the case, the "plain view" doctrine does not apply and the marijuana contained in the
plastic bag was seized illegally and cannot be presented in evidence pursuant to Article III, Section 3(2)
of the Constitution. The exclusion of this particular evidence does not, however, diminish, in any way, the
damaging effect of the other pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution to prove that the appellant
sold marijuana. WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the judgment of the Regional Trial Court
AFFIRMED.
 22. VALMONTE VS. DE VILLA
G.R. NO. 83988, SEPTEMBER 29, 1989

FACTS
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated
pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of
conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of
establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere
conducive to the social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region.1 As part of
its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila.

Petitioner files a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
order, seeking the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila or elsewhere, as
unconstitutional and the dismantling and banning of the same or, in the alternative, to direct the
respondents to formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints, for the protection of the
people. Moreover, petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of
Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and
whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are
being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a
search warrant and/or court order.

Furthermore, petitioners further contend that the said checkpoints give the respondents a blanket
authority to make searches and/or seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the
Constitution; and, instances have occurred where a citizen, while not killed, had been harassed.

ISSUE
Whether or not the setting up of NCRDC checkpoints contravenes the searches and seizures
clause of the Constitution

HELD
The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable
only by those whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to be infringed. What constitutes a
reasonable or unreasonable search and seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question,
determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved. Petitioner Valmonte's general
allegation to the effect that he had been stopped and searched without a search warrant by the military
manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating the details of the incidents which amount to a
violation of his right against unlawful search and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to determine
whether there was a violation of Valmonte's right against unlawful search and seizure. Not all searches
and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to
be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.

Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is
parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not
constitute unreasonable search. The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably
in other areas) may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of
establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public.
Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the
interest of public security.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

 23. MICROSOFT CORPORATION VS SAMIR
GR NO. 205800, SEPTEMBER 10, 2014

FACTS
Petitioner Microsoft Corporation and Adobe Systems Incorporated are copyright owners
respectively of “Microsoft” software, and all corresponding users’ manuals and Microsoft DOS
trademarks in the Philippines; and Adobe Systems copyright relating to all versions and editions of Adobe
software. New Fields (Asia Pacific) Inc., was using counterfeit versions of their software, thus they
engaged Orion Support Inc. to assist in the verification of the information. Michael Moradoz and Norma
Serrano, trained to detect counterfeit software were assigned to confirm the information. PNP-CIDG PSI
Ernesto Padilla and the two witnesses were able to ascertain that the company New Fields Inc. was indeed
using counterfeit software, by using two computers of New Fields by using two computers of New Fields
and getting information about the installed software on the computer, which revealed that they were using
common product identification or serial numbers, an indication that the software is counterfeit; also they
noted that the company used only one installer of the software which were installed on several computers,
numbering about 90 computers. Two search warrants were issued by Judge Amor Reyes and seized 83
computers containing unauthorized copies of Microsoft and/or Adobe software. New Fields then filed for
Motion to Quash, petitioners object for the motion averring that it did not comply with the 3-day notice
rule on motions. The RTC nevertheless granted the Motion to Quash, and quash both warrants, hence they
elevated to the CA which the CA also denied. The petitioners appealed via Rule 45 to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE
Whether or not Judge Amor Reyes committed grave abuse of discretion in granting motion to
quash search warrants.

HELD
The Supreme Court rule that strict compliance with the three-day notice rule may be relaxed in
this case. However we sustain petitioners’ contention that there was probable cause for issuance of a
warrant, and the RTC and CA should have upheld the validity of both warrants.

In this case, we find reason to overturn the rulings of the RTC and CA. since there was grave
abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts. Looking at the records it is clear that Padilla and his
companions were able to personally verify the tip of their informant. Padilla has been trained to
distinguish illegally reproduced Adobe and Microsoft software. Thus in his affidavit he said that “At least
two (2) computer units are using a common Product Identification Number of Microsoft and Adobe
software. This is one indication that the software being used is unlicensed or was illegally reproduced or
copied.” The evidence on record clearly shows that the applicant and witnesses were able to verify the
information obtained from their confidential source. Petition was granted, and the orders of RTC and CA
were reversed and set aside.
 24. COMERCIANTE VS PEOPLE
GR NO. 205926, JULY 22, 2015

FACTS
On July 30, 2003, Agent Radan and PO3 Calag were on a motorcycle patrolling the area on their
way to visit their friend. Cruising at a speed of 30 km/hr. along Mandaluyong. They spotted two men in
front of a jeepney, these men are identified as Comerciante and Dasilla, men were standing and showing
improper and unpleasant movements, one of them handing plastic sachets to other. They confiscated two
small plastic sachets containing shabu. Dasilla filed a demurrer to evidence subsequently granted by the
RTC, which resulted to Dasilla’s acquittal, while Comerciante failed to file his own demurrer, and the
RTC considered this as him waiving his right to do so and ordered him to present his evidence.
Comerciante averred that PO3 Calag was looking for a certain “Barok” a drug pusher. That after being
arrested, they were asked for money in exchange of release. When they failed to make the demand they
were brought to the police station. The RTC ruled that Comerciante was guilty of violating Section 11,
Article II of RA 9165. Comerciante appealed to the CA but the CA affirmed his conviction. Thus he filed
this Rule 45 petition with the Supereme Court.

ISSUE
Whether or not the warrantless arrest was validly exercised

HELD
No. The evidence against Comerciante is inadmissible as it was procured through an unlawful
search. There was no lawful arrest, because it is highly implausible that PO3 Calag, even assuming that he
has perfect vision, would be able to identify from 10 meters, while moving at a speed of 30 km/hr. on the
motorcycle, miniscule amounts of shabu inside two (2) very small plastic sachets as held by
Comerciante. There is no overt act that could properly attributed to Comerciante as to rouse suspicion in
the mind of PO3 Calag that the former had just committed, was currently committing, or was about to
commit a crime. The acts of standing around with a companion handling over something cannot be
considered as a criminal act. Hence, there being no lawful arrest, the evidence procured is inadmissible,
being a fruit of the poisonous tree. Wherefore, the petition is granted. The decision of RTC and CA are
reversed and set aside.
 25. CELEDONIO V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 209137 JULY 1, 2015

FACTS
On the evening of April 21, 2007, a certain Adriano Marquez (Marquez)witnessed the robbery
perpetrated in the house of Carmencita De Guzman (De Guzman)while she was away to attend to the
wake of her deceased husband. He identified Celedonio as the culprit. Upon learning of the incident, De
Guzman reported it to the police and requested that Celedonio be investigated for possibly having
committed the crime, based on the account of Marquez. Later, a follow-up operation was conducted by
PO1 Rommel Roque (PO1 Roque) and SPO2 Adrian Sugui (SPO2 Sugui), accompanied by Marquez.
They proceeded to Raja Humabon St., Navotas, to survey the area for the possible identification and
apprehension of the suspect. On their way, Marquez pointed to a man on a motorcycle and said, "Sir, siya
po si Eduardo Celedonio." The police immediately flagged down Celedonio. PO1 Roque asked him if he
was Eduardo Celedonio, but he did not reply and just bowed his head. SPO2 Sugui informed Celedonio of
a complaint for robbery against him. Celedonio still remained silent and just bowed his head. SPO2 Sugui
asked him, "Where [were] the stolen items?" Celedonio then alighted from his motorcycle and opened its
compartment where PO1 Roque saw some of the stolen items, as per report of the incident, such as the
portable DVD player and a wristwatch, among others. PO1 Roque asked Celedonio if the same were
stolen, to which the latter answered, "Iyan po."7 Thus, Celedonio was arrested and was informed of his
constitutional rights. More items were seized from Celedonio at the police station.

ISSUE
Whether or not the search conducted was illegal rendering the articles recovered inadmissible.

HELD
No illegal search was made upon Celedonio. When the police officers asked where the stolen
items were, they merely made a general inquiry, and not a search, as part of their follow-up operation.
Records did not show that the police officers even had the slightest hint that the stolen items were in
Celedonio’s motorcycle compartment. Neither was there any showing that the police officers frisked
Celedonio or rummaged over his motorcycle. There was no showing either of any force or intimidation on
the part of the police officers when they made the inquiry. Celedonio himself voluntarily opened his
motorcycle compartment. Worse, when he was asked if the items were the stolen ones, he actually
confirmed it. The police officers, therefore, were left without any recourse but to take him into custody
for further investigation. At that instance, the police officers had probable cause that he could be the
culprit of the robbery. He did not have any explanation as to how he got hold of the items. Moreover,
taking into consideration that the stolen items were in a moving vehicle, the police had to immediately act
on it.
 26. SYDECO VS. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 202692, NOVEMBER 12, 2014

FACT
In 2006, separate informations, one for Violation of Section 56 (f) of Republic Act No. 4136 and
another, for Violation of Article 151 of the Revised Penal Code were filed against petitioner Edmund
Sydeco. According to the prosecution, on the night of the incident, police officers were manning a
checkpoint when they spotted a swerving red Ford Ranger pick up driven by Sydeco. The team members
flagged the vehicle down and asked Sydeco to alight from the vehicle so he could take a rest at the police
station situated nearby, before he resumes driving. Sydeco, who the policemen claimed was smelling of
liquor, denied being drunk and insisted he could manage to drive. Thereafter, Sydeco was arrested and
brought to the Ospital ng Maynila where he was examined and found to be positive of alcoholic breath
per the Medical Certificate issued by that hospital. Sydeco, on the other hand, averred that he, the cook
and waitress in his restaurant were on the way home when they were signaled to stop by police officers
who asked him to open the vehicle’s door and alight for a body and vehicle search. When Sydeco instead
opened the vehicle window and insisted on a plain view search, one of the policeman told him he was
drunk, pointing to three empty beer bottles in the trunk of the vehicle. The officers then pulled Sydeco out
of the vehicle and brought him to the Ospital ng Maynila where they succeeded in securing a medical
certificate depicting Sydeco as positive of alcoholic breath, although no alcohol breath examination was
conducted. Sydeco was detained and released only in the afternoon of the following day when he was
allowed to undergo actual medical examination where the resulting medical certificate indicated that he
has sustained physical injuries but negative for alcohol breath.

ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in upholding the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties by
the police officers

HELD
Yes. Surely petitioner’s act of exercising one’s right against unreasonable searches to be
conducted in the middle of the night cannot, in context, be equated to disobedience let alone resisting a
lawful order in contemplation of Art. 151 of the RPC. As has often been said, albeit expressed differently
and under dissimilar circumstances, the vitality of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees, but in the
courage of the people to assert and use them whenever they are ignored or worse infringed. Moreover
there is to stress or nothing in RA 4136 that authorized the checkpoint- manning policemen to order
petitioner and his companions to get out of the vehicle for a vehicle and body search "and it bears to
emphasize that there was no reasonable suspicion of the occurrence of a crime that would allow what
jurisprudence refers to as a “stop and frisk action. As SPO4 Bodino no less testified the only reason why
they asked petitioner to get out of the vehicle was not because he has committed a crime but because of
their intention to invite him to Station 9 so he could rest before he resumes driving but instead of a tactful
invitation, the apprehending officers in an act indicative of overstepping of their duties, dragged the
petitioner out of the vehicle and in the process of subduing him pointed a gun and punched him on the
face.
 27. PEOPLE VS. MERCADO
G.R. NO. 207988, 11 MARCH 2015

FACTS
The accused-appellant was charged of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of R.A. 9165, in
two (2) Informations, both dated 31 July 2007. Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not
guilty to said charges. The version of the Prosecution states that accused-appellant was arrested during a
buy-bust operation organized by the Philippine National Police (PNP), wherein the one (1) sachet he
offered to sell as well as the two (2) remaining plastic sachets were confiscated. Qualitative examination
conducted on all three heat-sealed transparent plastic sheets yielded positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. The version of the Defense, however, contended that while accused-appellant
was walking home, a jeepney with police officers onboard suddenly stopped in front of him and and was
forced to ride in the said jeepney where eight (8) other persons were onboard wearing handcuffs. In
exchange for his liberty, otherwise, a case would be filed against him. Unable to pay, accused-appellant
faced the present charges.

ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC and the. CA erred in finding that the evidence of the prosecution was
sufficient to convict the accused of the alleged sale and possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu.

HELD
We sustain the judgment of. Upon perusal of the records of the case, we see no reason to reverse
or modify the findings of the RTC on the credibility of the testimony of prosecution’s witnesses, more so
in the present case, in which its findings were affirmed by the CA. Undoubtedly, the prosecution had
indeed established that there was a buy-bust operation showing that accused-appellant sold and delivered
the shabu for value to PO3 Galvez, the poseur-buyer.

Alongside these rulings are our pronouncements that failure to strictly comply with the prescribed
procedures in the inventory of seized drugs does not render an arrest of the accused illegal or the times
seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is essential is “the preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused.” We are not always looking for the strict step-by-step adherence to the
procedural requirements; what is important is to ensure the preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would determine the guilt or innocence of the accused;
further, that non-compliance with Section 21 of said law will not render the drugs inadmissible in
evidence. Evidence is still admissible under Section 3 of Rule 128 when it is relevant to the issue and is
not excluded by the law or these rules; and that there should be a law or rule which forbids its reception.

We do not find any provision or statement in said law or in any rule that will bring about the non-
admissibility of the confiscated and/or seized drugs due to non-complain with Section 21 of R.A. 9165.
The issue therefore is not of admissibility but of weight — evidentiary merit or probative value — to be
given the evidence. Said witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had
been no change in the condition of the time and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have
possession of the same. From the testimonies of the police officers, the prosecution established that they
had custody of the drug seized from the accused from the moment he was arrested, during the time he was
transported to the police station, and up to the time the drug was submitted for examination; the chain of
custody rule.
 28. DEL CASTILLO VS. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 185128, 30 JANUARY 2012

FACTS
Pursuant to a confidential information that petitioner was engaged in selling shabu, police officers
headed by SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon, after conducting surveillance and test-buy operation at the house
of petitioner, secured a search warrant from the RTC and around 3 o’clock in the afternoon of 13
September 1997, the same police operatives went to the location to serve the search warrant to petitioner.
Upon arrival, somebody shouted “raid,” which prompted them to immediately disembark from the jeep
they were riding and went directly to petitioner’s house and cordoned it. When they went upstairs, they
met petitioner’s wife and informed her that they will implement the search warrant. But before they could
do so, SPO3 Masnayon claimed that he saw petitioner run towards a nipa hut in front of his house. He
was chased but to no avail. They closely guarded the place where the subject ran for cover and requested
help from the barangay tanods.

In the presence of the barangay tanod and the elder sister of petitioner, Nelson Gonzalado
searched the house including the nipa hut, wherein four (4) plastic packs containing a crystaline
substance, which would later on yield positive to shabu, was confiscated in the nipa hut. Petitioner asserts
that the nipa hut located about 20 meters away from his house is no longer with the “permissible area”
that may be searched by the police officers due to the distance and that the search warrant did not include
the same nipa hut as one of the places to be searched. The OSG argues that the constitutional guaranty
against unreasonable searches and seizures is applicable only against government authorities and not to
private individuals such as the barangay tanod who found the said items.

ISSUE
Whether or not the four (4) packs of shabu seized inside the shop of petitioner are admissible in
evidence against him.

HELD
It must be remembered that the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched
and persons to be seized in order for it to be valid. A designation or description that points out the place to
be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies
the constitutional requirement of definiteness.

In the present case, said search warrant specifically designates or describes the resident of the
petitioner as the place to be searched. Incidentally, the items were seized by a barangay tanod in a nipa
hut, 20 meters away from the residence of petitioner. The confiscated items, having been found in a place
other than the one described in the search warrant, can be considered as fruits of an invalid warrantless
search, the presentation of which as an evidence is a violation of petitioner’s constitutional guaranty
against unreasonable searches and seizure.

Having been established that the assistance of the barangay tanods was sought by the police
authorities who effected the search warrant, the same barangay tanods therefore acted as agents of
persons in authority. By virtue of Art. 152 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 388 of the Local
Government Code, the police officers, as well as the barangay tanods were acting as agents of a person in
authority during the conduct of the search. Thus, the search conducted was unreasonable and the
confiscated items are inadmissible in evidence.
 29. MANALILI V. CA
GR. NO. 113447, OCTOBER 9, 1997

FACTS
At about 2:10 PM on April 11, 1988, Police Anti-Narcotics Unit of Kalookan City conducted
surveillance along A. Mabini Street, in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery. This was done after
receiving information that drug addicts were roaming around said area.

Upon reaching the cemetery, the policemen chanced upon a male person, the petitioner, in front
of the cemetery who appeared high on drugs. The petitioner had reddish eyes and was walking in a
swaying manner.

Alain Manalili y Dizon, the petitioner was trying to avoid the policemen, but the officers were
able to introduce themselves and asked him what he was holding in his hands. Petitioner resisted.
Patrolman Espiritu asked him if he could see what the petitioner had in his hands. The petitioner showed
his wallet and allowed the officer to examine it. Pat. Espiritu found suspected crushed marijuana residue
inside. He kept the wallet and its marijuana contents and took petitioner to headquarters to be further
investigated. The suspected marijuana was sent to the NBI Forensic Chemistry Section for analysis.

ISSUE
Whether or not the search and seizure of the suspected marijuana is unreasonable, and hence
inadmissible as evidence.

HELD
No, the search and seizure is reasonable. The general rule is a search and seizure must be
validated by a previously secured judicial warrant; otherwise, such a search and seizure is
unconstitutional and subject to challenge. Any evidence obtained in violation of this constitutionally
guaranteed right is legally inadmissible in any proceeding.

The exceptions to the rule are: (1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving
vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4) customs search, and (5) waiver by the accused of their right against
unreasonable search and seizure. In these cases, the search and seizure may be made only with probable
cause. Probable cause being at best defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or the existence of such facts and circumstances
which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed
and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and
destruction by is in the place to be searched.

Additionally, stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another exception to the general rule
against a search without a warrant.

In the present case, petitioner effectively waived the inadmissibility of the evidence illegally
obtained when he failed to raise the issue or object thereto during the trial. A valid waiver of a right, more
particularly of the constitutional right against unreasonable search, requires the concurrence of the
following requirements: (1) the right to be waived existed; (2) the person waiving it had knowledge,
actual or constructive, thereof; and (3) he or she had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
 30. TERRY V. OHIO
392 U.S. (1968)

FACTS
The officer noticed the Petitioner talking with another individual on a street corner while
repeatedly walking up and down the same street. The men would periodically peer into a store window
and then talk some more. The men also spoke to a third man whom they eventually followed up the street.
The officer believed that the Petitioner and the other men were “casing” a store for a potential robbery.
The officer decided to approach the men for questioning, and given the nature of the behavior the officer
decided to perform a quick search of the men before questioning. A quick frisking of the Petitioner
produced a concealed weapon and the Petitioner was charged with carrying a concealed weapon.

ISSUE
Whether a search for weapons without probable cause for arrest is an unreasonable search under
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution (“Constitution”)?

HELD
No, it is reasonable. The Supreme Court of the United States (“Supreme Court”) held that a
search for weapons in the absence of probable cause to arrest, however, must, like any other search, be
strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation. Thus it must be limited to that which
is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer or others nearby, and
may realistically be characterized as something less than a full search, even though it remains a serious
intrusion.

An arrest is a wholly different kind of intrusion upon individual freedom from a limited search for
weapons, and the interests each is designed to serve are likewise quite different. An arrest is the initial
stage of a criminal prosecution. It is intended to vindicate society's interest in having its laws obeyed, and
it is inevitably accompanied by future interference with the individual’s freedom of movement, whether
or not trial or conviction ultimately follows. The protective search for weapons, on the other hand,
constitutes a brief, though far from inconsiderable, intrusion upon the sanctity of the person. It does not
follow that because an officer may lawfully arrest a person only when he is apprised of facts sufficient to
warrant a belief that the person has committed or is committing a crime, the officer is equally unjustified,
absent that kind of evidence, in making any intrusions short of an arrest.

Where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light
of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be
armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as
a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter
serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others’ safety, he is entitled for the protection of
himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in
an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search
under the [contest of the constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure], and any weapons
seized may properly be introduced in evidence against the person from whom they were taken.