“La Insular” Cigar and Cigarette Factory, Inc., vs. B.E.
Jao Oge Alfredo de Dios & Emily De Dios vs. Bristol Laboratories & P.P. Lagdameo
Facts:
After setting forth the ownership of this trademark and the continuous use of the same
for nearly forty years by the plaintiff and its predecessors in interest, alleges that in the
year 1915 the defendant, B. E. Jao Oge, proprietor of the cigarette factory "La Ciudad,"
in the city of Manila, began to use two different labels on packages of cigarettes
offered for sale by him which are in fringing imitations of the plaintiff's mark.
In the petitory clause the plaintiff prays that the defendant be perpetually
enjoined from the further use of the alleged obnoxious labels in the sale of cigarettes;
that he be required to render a true and complete account of his profits upon all
cigarettes bearing such labels sold or otherwise disposed of by him; that judgment be
entered in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant for treble the amount
.thereof, which the plaintiff avers will" amount to P20,000; and finally that the plaintiff be
granted any other appropriate remedy.
To this complaint the defendant interposed a general demurrer on the ground
that the facts stated did not constitute a cause of action. This demurrer was sustained
by the trial judge, to which action the plaintiff excepted; and he having elected not to
amend further, judgment was entered dismissing the complaint. From this judgment the
plaintiff appealed.
The cause was then returned for further proceedings to the lower court, and in
due time the defendant answered. When the cause finally came on for hearing upon
the pleadings and proof, the trial judge found that the labels used by the defendant
(Exhibits B and C) did not resemble the label used by the plaintiff (Exhibit A) closely
enough to constitute an infringement of the plaintiff's trade-mark right. He therefore
absolved the defendant from the complaint, and the plaintiff again appealed.
Held:
Upon these facts we are of the opinion that the delay in the institution of this
proceeding from the year 1912, when the unlawful user was begun, till 1920, when the
civil action was commenced, is not fatal to the right, it not appearing with certainty
when the plaintiff first acquired knowledge of the defendant's acts. It is undoubtedly
true that inexcusable delay in the institution of the proceedings for the infringement of a
trademark or patent will destroy the right of action, upon the authority of many cases
decided in courts of the United States; but an examination of these cases shows that the
action is held to be barred by laches only when the period of delay is lengthy, as for
thirteen years or longer. (Woodmanse & Hewitt Mfg. Co. vs. Williams, 68 Fed., 489.) The
period that had elapsed in the case of La Insular vs. Yu So, supra, was twelve years. In
the present case we find the period of unlawful user prior to the institution of this action
to have been but eight years; and we are of the opinion that this is not sufficient to
destroy the plaintiff's right.
Facts:
Spouses De Dios filed a complaint against Bristol Lab, and P.P. Lagdameo, the
latter in his capacity as Acting General Manager of the former for recovery of
damages.
The defendants-appellees filed a motion to dismiss said complaint upon the
ground that it states no cause of action against them. The lower court sustained
defendants-appellees’ motion, and dismissed the complaint. Sps. De Dios appealed.
They say that are holding the defendants — appellees liable for damages they
sustained by reason of the latter’s fabrication of a false ground for dismissal; use of
libelous statements in the letter of and circulation of libelous matter to other parties,
thereby placing Alfredo Vergel de Dios in disrepute in the eyes of his wife, family,
relatives, friends and community, thus making it difficult, if not impossible, for him to
obtain a new employment as a detailman for which he has all the needed
qualifications, training and experience. Plaintiffs-appellants further state that the
allegations of the complaint call for the application by the courts of the corresponding
relief, principally on the strength of the provisions of Article 19, 20, 21, 33, 2176 and 2202
of the Civil Code.The allegations referred to are those contained in paragraphs 5 to 9,
inclusive, of the complaint.
Issue: whether or not those allegations in the complaint referred to sufficiently state a
cause or causes of action,
Held:
For the purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of
the facts alleged in the complaint. The admission, however, is limited only to all material
and relevant facts which are well pleaded in the complaint. Thus, it has been ruled that
a demurrer admits only such matters of fact as are sufficiently pleaded; that the
demurrer does not admit the truth of mere epithets charging fraud; nor allegations of
legal conclusions; nor an erroneous statement of law. The admission of the truth of
material and relevant facts well pleaded does not extend to render a demurrer an
admission of inferences or conclusions drawn therefrom, even if alleged in the pleading;
nor mere inferences or conclusions from facts not stated; nor conclusions of law; nor
matters of evidence; nor surplusage and irrelevant matter.
The allegations that the defendants-appellees were “actuated by ulterior
motives, contrary to law and morals, with abuse of their advantageous position as
employers, in gross and evident bad faith and without giving plaintiff Alfredo Vergel de
Dios his due, willfully, maliciously, unlawfully, and in a summary and arbitrary manner”,
are conclusions of law, inferences from facts not alleged and expressions of opinion
unsupported by factual premises. For nowhere in the complaint can be found any
particular factual allegations as to the ulterior motives of the defendants-appellees; as
to how they abused their position as employer; as to how or why there was bad faith;
and as to how plaintiff Alfredo Vergel de Dios was deprived of his due. Likewise, the
allegation characterizing the letter of dismissal as a “libelous letter” is a conclusion of
law without factual basis. And the allegations that the “charges and statements
mentioned in said letter are not true”, and that defendants “knowingly made the
same”, are legal conclusions or mere expressions of opinion, there being no factual
premises showing why the charges and statements in the letter are not true; nor is there
stated any particular fact or circumstance upon which the defendants-appellees’
knowledge of the falsity thereof can be predicated.
Ismael Mathay et. al vs. The Consolidated Bank and Trust Company et al
Facts:
A class suit was filed, contained six cause of action
ASIA BANKING CORPORATION vs. WALTER OLSEN & CO. INC. ET AL
Facts:
The defendant Walter E. Olsen & Co., Inc., obtained a loan of P200,000 from
the plaintiff for the purpose of purchasing a piece of land in Tondo. On account of this
loan the other defendants and Mr. A. D. Gibbs—all stockholders of the defendant
corporation— executed jointly and severally a promissory note for the amount of
P200,000 in favor of the plaintiff. After the land had been purchased, the defendant
corporation, Walter E. Olsen & Co., Inc., executed in favor of its codefendants and of
Mr. A. D. Gibbs a promissory note for the amount of P200,000 and a mortgage upon the
land to secure the payment of the P200,000, or any such part thereof as any of them
might be compelled to pay the plaintiff upon the promissory note subscribed by them.
The defendant corporation Walter E. Olsen & Co., Inc., through its president
and treasurer, Mr. Walter E. Olsen, one of the defendants, mortgaged the same land to
the plaintiff to secure the payment of the loan of P200,000. Due to the fact that this
land, as already stated, was mortgaged by the defendant corporation, Walter E. Olsen
& Co., Inc., to its codefendants and to Mr. A. D. Gibbs, the mortgage in favor of the
plaintiff could not be recorded in the registry inasmuch as it was necessary to cancel
first the other mortgage. The loan of P200,000 in favor of the plaintiff has not been paid
until this date.
Issue
Held:
As president and treasurer of the defendant corporation, Walter E. Olsen &
Co., Inc., he mortgaged this land unto the plaintiff. This mortgage cannot be recorded,
and thus acquire full efficacy, without first cancelling the mortgage upon the same land
executed in favor of the appellant and of his co-defendants. Appellant cannot now
refuse to do that which is necessary for the efficacy of the mortgage he made in favor
of the plaintiff in behalf of Walter E. Olsen & Co., Inc. On the other hand, the mortgage
in favor of the def endants, in view of the judgment rendered, is now useless. It was
made solely for the purpose of securing the reimbursement of any amount that they
may have had to pay to the plaintiff on account of the loan of P200,000 which they
guaranteed. Since they have been absolved from all liability on account of this loan,
that mortgage has no longer any purpose. In the answer of the defendants there was
no denial under oath of the authenticity of these documents. Under section 103 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, the authenticity and due execution of these documents must,
in that case, be deemed admitted. The effect of this is to relieve the plaintiff from the
duty of expressly presenting such documents as evidence. The court, for the proper
decision of the case, may and should consider, without the introduction of evidence,
the facts admitted by the parties.
City of Cebu vs. CA
Facts:
Merlita Cardeno is the owner of a parcel of land. The petitioner, City of Cebu,
filed a complaint for eminent domain against private respondent seeking to expropriate
the said parcel of land.
Private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the said complaint on the ground
of lack of cause of action. She asseverated that the allegations contained in paragraph
VII of the complaint, do not show compliance with one of the conditions precedent to
the exercise of the power of eminent domain by a local government unit as enunciated
in Section 19 of R.A. 7160.
Petitioner sought to establish compliance with the abovecited requirement by
alleging in its “Comment and Opposition” to private respondent’s Motion to Dismiss, the
following facts:
“7. To further pursue its desire to acquire the property concerned, the plaintiff made on
October 28, 1991, another offer to Mrs. Cardeno, through her lawyer, Atty. Omar
Redula, for the purchase of her property in the amount of Four Hundred Seventy Eight
Thousand (P478,000.00) Pesos. x x x;
“8. The said offer was again refused, thus the resort by the plaintiff to expropriation
The RTC nevertheless dismissed the complaint. “The Court is of the opinion
that the City of Cebu has not complied with the condition precedent, hence, the
complaint does not state a cause of action.” Aggrieved, petitioner filed a special civil
action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals which, however, affirmed the above
ruling of the RTC.
Issue:
Held:
In other words, a complaint should not be dismissed for insufficiency unless it
appears clearly from the face of the complaint that the plaintiff is not entitled to any
relief under any state of facts which could be proved within the facts alleged therein.
The error of both the RTC and respondent Court of Appeals in holding that the
complaint failed to state a cause of action stems from their inflexible application of the
rule that: when the motion to dismiss is based on the ground that the complaint states
no cause of action, no evidence may be allowed and the issue should only be
determined in the light of the allegations of the complaint. However, this rule is not
without exceptions.
Furthermore, a closer scrutiny reveals that even on the face of the complaint
alone, there is extant a cause of action. Petitioner avers in paragraph I thereof that,
“x x x. Under R.A. 7160, Sec. 9 thereof, the City of Cebu is legally vested with the power
of eminent domain and pursuant thereto is filing this petition/complaint as authorized by
Ordinance No. 1418 passed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod on February 17, 1992, a
photocopy of which is herein attached as Annex “A,” and made an
integral part of this complaint. x x x.” [Italics supplied.]
 All documents attached to a complaint, the due execution and genuineness
of which are not denied under oath by the defendant, must be considered as part of
the complaint without need of introducing evidence thereon. Additionally, the general
rule is that a motion to dismiss hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged in the
complaint. Thus, Ordinance No. 1418, with all its provisions, is not only incorporated into
the complaint for eminent domain filed by petitioner, but is also deemed admitted by
private respondent.
There is no longer any room for doubt that as alleged in the complaint, and as
admitted by private respondent, the petitioner had in fact complied with the condition
precedent of “a valid and definite offer” set forth in Sec. 19 of R.A. 7160.
ORBIT TRANSPORTATION COMPANY vs. WORKMEN COMPENSATION COMMISSION
Facts:
Messrs. Sergio D. Vendero and Renerio R. Bartonico as counsel for petitioner
filed the petition at bar for review of respondent Workmen’s Compensation
Commission’s decision and resolution directing petitioner to pay respondent-claimant
(as grandchild-dependent of the deceased driver-employee) the principal sum of
P4,360.00 as compensation and burial expenses. In their “summary statement of the
matters involved,” counsel claimed that the “questions of law involved”. It was an error
not to consider the payment of P5,000.00 in Philippine currency as full and complete
payment of the compensation for the death of Ramon Crespo. It was an error to
disregard the express and obvious statement of such payment.” The petitioner
voluntarily paid the amount of P5,000.00 in cash. The Court found that material facts
bearing on the petition’s lack of merit had been suppressed.
Issue: Whether or not the payment of 5000( Settlement and Release Claim) in cash is in
full and complete compensation for the death of Ramon Crespo in accordance with
the Workmen’s Compensaion Law?
Held:
Fausto Rosales vs Vicente Reyes and Juan Ordoveza
Facts:
On 1902, Rivera sold a parcel of land to Reyes and Ordoveza for 800 pesos
under pacto de recto, on the condition, however, that the repurchase could not be
made until after three years from the date of the contract of sale.
On 1903, Rivera sold his right to repurchase to Rosales for 1,075 pesos. Rosales,
who is the plaintiff in this case, alleges he tendered 800 pesos to Reyes and Ordoveza
with the request that the land be surrendered to him in accordance with the contract
entered into between them and Rivera but that they refused to accept the money and
comply with his request. The first objection to the complaint is that it is inconsistent
because plaintiff asks that the contract in question be annulled on the ground that
Rivera was a minor when he entered into it in 1902, and then asks that the defendants
be required to deliver the land to him upon payment to them of 800 pesos, as per its
terms. There is no basis for this objection for the reason that the inconsistency alleged
appears in the prayer for relief.
Issue:
Held:
"The demand in the complaint is no part of the statement of the cause of
action, and does not give it character. The facts alleged do this, and the plaintiff is
entitled to as much relief as they warrant."
The contract of 1902 cannot be annuled, however, for the reason that Rivera
ratified it by entering into the contract with Rosales in 1903, wherein he stated he was 23
years of age,, thus making applicable the provisions of article 1311 (Civil Code), which
provides: "It shall be understood that there is an implied confirmation when, being
aware of the cause of the nullity and such cause having ceased to exist, the person
who may have a right to invoke should execute an act which necessarily implies his wish
to renounce such a right."

Counsel’s profferred excuse for their suppression of the material facts that the
receipt signed by the deceased employee’s heirs was in payment of the deceased’s
insurance (not compensation) and that respondent was entitled to the compensation
award as the claim was uncontroverted, to wit, that a copy of respondent commission’s
decision was attached to the petition, manifestly violates the requirement of Rule 43,
section 2 that
“the petition shall contain a concise statement of the issues involved and the
grounds relied on for the petition . . “and that “the questions raised must be distinctly set
forth in the petition.”

Rule 8, section 1 lays down the fundamental rule on pleadings that “Every
pleading shall contain in a methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and direct
statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or
defense, as the case may be, omitting the statement of mere evidentiary facts." It is
plainly evident by the same token that material facts established in the annexes
attached to the complaint or petition which disprove or are contrary to the very
allegations of the pleader should not be suppressed in the pleader’s statement of his
case and of the issues involved but must be specifically averred so that the Court may
have before it a full and complete picture of the questions raised in the light of all the
material facts fuly found to have been established at the trial or hearing.
Leviton Industries et al vs Hon. Serafin Salvador and Leviton Manufacturing Co Inc
Facts:
Private respondent Leviton Manufacturing Co.,a Inc., a foreign corporation,
filed a complaint for unfair competition against petitioners Leviton Industries, before the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, presided by Judge Salvador. The complaint alleges that
defendants not only used the trademark Leviton but likewise copied the design used by
plaintiff in distinguishing its trademark which would cause confusion in the minds of the
consumers and likely to deceive them as to the source of origin, thereby enabling
defendants to pass off their products as those of plaintiff’s.
Invoking the provisions of Section 21-A of Republic Act No. 166, plaintiff prayed
for damages. It also sought the issuance of a writ of injunction to prohibit defendants
from using the trade name Leviton Industries, Co. and the trademark Leviton.
Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action,
drawing attention to the plaintiff’s failure to allege therein its capacity to sue under
Section 21-A of Republic Act No. 166, as amended. Respondent judge denied the
motion. Defendants filed their answer, reiterating the ground supporting their motion to
dismiss. Thereafter, defendants served upon plaintiff a request admission under Rule 26
of the Rules of Court.
Complying with the said request, plaintiff admitted: That it does not
manufacture ballasts; that it has not registered its trademark in the Philippine Patent
Office, but has filed with the same office an application of its trade mark on April 16,
1971; and that it has no license to do business in the Philippines.
On the basis of these admissions, defendants filed an Urgent Supplemental
Motion to Dismiss. This was followed by the plaintiff’s opposition, and the defendant’s
rejoinder, after which respondent judge issued the questioned order denying the
motion. The motion for reconsideration having likewise been denied, defendants
instituted the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition, charging respondent judge
with grave abuse of discretion in denying their motion to dismiss.
Issue:
Held:
All that is alleged in private respondent’s complaint is that it is a foreign
corporation. Such bare averment not only fails to comply with the requirements
imposed by the aforesaid Section 21-A but violates as well the directive of Section 4,
Rule 8 of the Rules of Court that “facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or be
sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity or the
legal existence of an organized association of persons that is made a party, must be
averred.” In the case at bar, private respondent has chosen to anchor its action under
the Trademark Law of the Philippines, a law which, as pointed out, explicitly sets down
the conditions precedent for the successful prosecution thereof. It is therefore
incumbent upon private respondent to comply with these requirements or aver its
exemption therefrom, if such be the case. It may be that private respondent has the
right to sue before Philippine courts, but our rules on pleadings require that the
necessary qualifying circumstances which clothe it with such right be affirmatively
pleaded.
Respondent Leviton Manufacturing Co., Inc. alleged in paragraph 2 of its
complaint for unfair competition that its action “is being filed under the provisions of
section 21-A of Republic Act” No. 166, as amended. Respondent is bound by that
allegation in its complaint. It cannot sue under Section 21-A because it has not
complied with the requirements thereof that (1) its trademark “Leviton” has been
registered with the Patent Office and (2) that it should show that the State of New York
grants to Philippine corporations the privilege to bring an action for unfair competition in
that state. Respondent Leviton has to comply with those requirements before it can be
allowed to maintain an action for unfair competition (Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co. vs. Cebu
Stevedoring Co., Inc. 124 Phil. 463).
SIGNETICS CORPORATION vs CA and FREUHAUF ELECTRONICS PHILS. INC.,
Facts:
Signetics Corporation is a foreign corporation. Through Signetics Filipinas
Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary, Signetics entered into a lease contract over a
piece of land with Freuhauf. The latter filed a complaint against Signetics for damages,
accounting or return of certain machinery, equipment and accessories, as well as the
transfer of title and surrender of possession of the buildings, installations and
improvements on the leased land, before the Regional Trial Court.
On the basis of the allegation that Signetics is a “subsidiary of US PHILIPS
CORPORATION, and may be served summons at Philips Electrical Lamps, Inc., Las Piñas,
Metro Manila and/or c/o Technology Electronics Assembly & Management (TEAM)
Pacific Corporation, Electronics Avenue, FTI Complex, Taguig, Metro Manila,” service of
summons was made on Signetics through TEAM Pacific Corporation.
By special appearance, Signetics filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction over its person. But motion to dismiss was denied. MR
subsequently filed was also denied. Signetics elevated the issue to CA via petition for
certiorari and prohibition, with application for preliminary injunction. CA dismiss the case
affirming the orders of the lower court. MR was also denied. The instant petition for
review on certiorari was filed in the SC.
Issue:
Whether or not “a foreign corporation can be sued in the Philippines and
validly summoned by a Philippine court without prior ‘proof that it was doing business
here at the time of the suit.”
Held:
“The pertinent rule to be considered is section 14, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, which
refers to service upon private foreign corporations. This section provides: ‘SEC. 14.
Service upon private foreign corporations.—If the defendant is a foreign corporation, or
a non-resident joint stock company or association, doing business in the Philippines,
service may be made on its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that
purpose, or, if there be no such agent, on the government official designated by law to
that effect, or on any of its officers or agents within the Philippines.’
The above section provides for three modes of effecting services upon a
private corporation, namely: (1) by serving upon the agent designated in accordance
with law to accept service by summons; (2) if there be no special agent, by serving on
the government official designated by law to that effect; and (3) by serving on any
officer or agent within the Philippines. But, it should be noted, in order that services may
be effected in the manner above stated, said section also requires that the foreign
corporation be one which is doing business in the Philippines. This is a sine qua non
requirement. This fact must first be established in order that summons can be made and
jurisdiction acquired.
PUMA SPORTSCHUHFABRIKEN RUDOLF DASSLER, K G., petitioner, vs. THE INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT and MIL-ORO MANUFACTURING CORPORATION
Facts:
Petitioner Puma, a foreign corporation, filed a complaint for infringement of
patent or trademark with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
against the private respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Prior to the
filing of the said civil suit, three cases were pending before the Philippine Patent Office.
The private respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the
petitioners' complaint states no cause of action, petitioner has no legal personality to
sue, and litis pendentia.
maintain an action in the Philippines to restrain the residents and inhabitants thereof
from organizing a corporation therein bearing the same name as the foreign
corporation, when it appears that they have personal knowledge of the existence of
such a foreign corporation, and it is apparent that the purpose of the proposed
domestic corporation is to deal and trade in the same goods as those of the foreign
corporation." hold that the petitioner had the legal capacity to file the action below.
Anent the issue of lis pendens as a ground for a motion to dismiss, the petitioner
submits that the relief prayed for in its civil action is different from the relief sought in the
Inter Partes cases. More important, however, is the fact that for lis pendens to be a valid
ground for the dismissal of a case, the other case pending between the same parties
and having the same cause must be a court action. As regards the propriety of the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, the records show that herein private
respondent was given the opportunity to present its counter-evidence against the
issuance thereof but it intentionally refused to do so to be consistent with its theory that
the civil case should be dismissed in the first place.

The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and at the same time granted the
petitioner's application for a writ of injunction. The private respondents appealed to the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the trial court and ordered
the respondent judge to dismiss the civil case filed by the petitioner.

According to the petitioner, its complaint specifically alleged that it is not

doing business in the Philippines and is suing under the said Republic Act; that Section
21-A thereof provides that "the country of which the said corporation or juristic person is
a citizen, or in which it is domiciled, by treaty, convention or law, grants a similar
privilege to corporate or juristic persons of the Philippines" but does not mandatorily
require that such reciprocity between the Federal Republic of Germany and the
Philippines be pleaded; that such reciprocity arrangement is embodied in and supplied
by the Union Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (Paris Convention) to
which both the Philippines and Federal Republic of Germany are signatories and that
since the Paris Convention is a treaty which, pursuant to our Constitution, forms part of
the law of the land, our courts are bound to take judicial notice of such treaty, and,
consequently, this fact need not be averred in the complaint.

Issues:
1. Whether or not it had no legal capacity to sue
2. Whether or not the doctrine of lis pendens is applicable as a ground for dismissing the
case
3. Whether or not the writ of injunction was improperly issued

Held:

In the leading case of La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. v. Fernandez, (129 SCRA 373),
we ruled:
"But even assuming the truth of the private respondent's allegation that the
petitioner failed to allege material facts in its petition relative to capacity to sue, the
petitioner may still maintain the present suit against respondent Hemandas. As early as
1927, this Court was, and it still is, of the view that a foreign corporation not doing
business in the Philippines needs no license to sue before Philippine courts for
infringement of trademark and unfair competition. Thus, in Western Equipment and
Supply Co. v. Reyes (51 Phil. 115), this Court held that a foreign corporation which has
never done any business in the Philippines and which is unlicensed and unregistered to
do business here, but is widely and favorably known in the Philippines through the use
therein of its products bearing its corporate and tradename, has a legal right to
 WANG LABORATORIES, INC vs. THE HONORABLE RAFAEL MENDOZA, THE
HORORABLE BERNARDO ABESAMIS
Facts:
Petitioner is a foreign corporation, with a principal address in USA, engaged in
the business of manufacturing and selling computers worldwide. In the Philippines,
petitioner sells its products to EXXBYTE TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION, hereinafter
referred to as EXXBYTE, its exclusive distributor.
Respondent ACCRALAW entered into a contract with EXXBYTE for acquisition
and installation of a Wang 2200 US Integrated Information System at the former's office.
A letter of credit for US$86,142.55 was thereafter opened by ACCRALAW in favor of
petitioner herein to pay for the Wang 2200 US System. ACCRALAW and EXXBYTE entered
into another contract for the development of a data processing software program
needed to computerize the ACCRALAW office. Such contract was not implemented.
ACCRALAW filed a complaint for breach of contract with damages, replevin and
attachment against herein petitioner in RTC Makati.
jurisdiction, by praying: (1) for authority to take testimony by way of deposition upon oral
examination; (2) for extension of time to file opposition to plaintiffs' motion to effect
Extraterritorial Service of Summons; (3) to hold in abeyance any and all proceedings
relative to plaintiffs' foregoing motion and (4) to consider as a mere scrap of paper
plaintiff's motion to strike out Deposition. In addition, the records show that petitioner
also prayed for: (1) authority to reset date of taking of deposition; (2) admission of the
formal stenographic notes and (3) suspension of time to file responsive pleadings, not to
mention its various participation in the proceedings in the court other than for the
purpose of objecting to lack of jurisdiction. If the appearance is for any other purpose,
the defendant is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Such
an appearance gives the court jurisdiction over the person. Clarifying further, the Court
has likewise ruled that even though the defendant objects to the jurisdiction of the
Court, if at the same time he alleges any non-jurisdictional ground for dismissing the
action, the Court acquires jurisdiction over him.

Petitioner filed a MTD on the ground that there was improper service of
summons, hence, the court below had not obtained jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner. Petitioner filed a Motion for Deposition by Oral Examination for the purpose of
presenting testimonial evidence in support of its motion to dismiss. The respondent court
thereafter ordered the taking of the deposition by way of oral examination. Petitioner
filed its reply to the opposition to motion to dismiss. ACCRALAW filed an Ex-Abundante
Cautela Motion for leave to Effect Extraterritorial Service of Summons on petitioner.
Respondent Judge Mendoza, among others, granted the Ex-Abundante Cautela
Motion to Effect Extraterritorial Service of Summons, denied the petitioner's motion to
dismiss on the ground that it had voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the
court, and thus declined to consider the legal and factual issues raised in the Motion to
Dismiss.

Issue: Whether or not respondent Court has acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner, a foreign corporation.

Held:

Summons intended for the petitioner was served on EXXBYTE, Makati, Metro
Manila as its duly authorized and exclusive representative and distributor in the
Philippines Petitioner opposed such service and filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction on its person, being a foreign corporation not engaged in business
in the Philippines. Evidence presented by private respondent however, shows that
contrary to petitioner's allegations, the various public advertisements of WANG and
EXXBYTE clearly show that Wang has appointed EXXBYTE, which is domiciled in the
Philippines, as its authorized exclusive representative in this country. In fact, WANG
represents that its office in the Philippines is EXXBYTE, while the letterhead of EXXBYTE and
its invoices show that it is WANG's representative. Moreover, in its Reply to Opposition to
Motion to Dismiss, WANG itself admitted that it deals exclusively with EXXBYTE in the sale
of its products in the Philippines.

Furthermore, even though petitioner objects to the jurisdiction of the Court

over its person, the fact that it alleged nonjurisdictional grounds in its pleadings indicates
that it has waived lack of jurisdiction of the court. As noted by the trial court, defendant
Wang in its Motion to Dismiss sought affirmative reliefs requiring the exercise of
GREGORIO ARANETA vs. LYRIC FILM EXCHANGE
Facts:
The building rented by the defendant is owned by the plaintiff. The building
was used as a cine theatre.
Defendant informed the plaintiff that the building need repairs because the
piece of metal covering the walls fell down and the wall was rotten. The theatre was in
too dangerous a condition for use.
When defendant was notified that the premises were repaired, it formally
notified plaintiff that it regarded the contract as cancelled, and this suit was
immediately instituted for the unexpired portion of the contract of lease.
After trial the Court of First Instance of Manila held that defendant had no right
to cancel the contract of lease and gave judgment for seven months' rental as
provided for in the contract of lease.
Issue:
Held:
Plaintiff was suing on the written contract of lease, not on the letters recited in
the complaint. These might have some evidential value, but evidence, even in writing,
does not necessarily have a proper place in the pleadings. Nor does section 103 of the
Code of Civil Procedure apply to such letters.
No authorities are cited by the appellant to the effect that it is incumbent
upon the owner to constantly inspect the premises and that if he fails to do so or
through error of judgment fails to make repairs before the damage is material, the
lessee has a cause of action. This is contrary to universal practice, as the lessee is in
possession and if repairs are necessary, which it is the duty of the owner to make, the
lessee should call upon the owner to make the necessary repairs. If the owner then fails
to perform his duty, action would lie. In this case when the lessee in possession notified
the owner of the bad condition of the building, the owner promptly made the
necessary repairs. There is therefore no basis for the counterclaim.
ANACLETO ONDAP vs. BONIFACIO ABUGAA, CRISTINA JANOLINO, AND NICOLAS
LABARES
Facts:
Defendants-appellants assailed the validity of an order of the Court of First
Instance of Bukidnon, finding the judgment of the inferior court to have been issued
properly and in accordance with Rules, the appeal filed by the defendants is dismissed,
and the records of this case are hereby returned to the Justice of the Peace Court of
Kibawe for further disposition.
It is the contention of defendants-appellants that the lower court ought to
have tried the case on the merits instead of merely affirming the decision of the Justice
of the Peace Court of Kibawe, Bukidnon, which ordered defendants in an ejectment
case to vacate the premises and to pay plaintiff the sum of P711.00, with costs. It was a
judgment on the pleadings, as defendants, who did not even bother to file a written
answer, merely denied at the trial paragraphs 2 to 8 of the complaint filed with the
Justicely the material allegations, a failure which in law amounted to an admission
Issue:
Held:
It was a judgment on the pleadings, as defendants, who did not even bother
to file a written answer, merely denied at the trial paragraphs 2 to 8 of the complaint
filed with the Justice of the Peace Court. Clearly then, they failed to deny specifically
the material allegations, a failure which in law amounted to an admission. Nothing is
better settled than that under the admitted facts, a judgment on the pleadings was
appropriate. So it was held in El Hogar Filipino v. Santos, quoted extensively in the
opinion of Justice Ozaeta in Baetamo v. Hon. Amado P. Amador. Thus: “Upon the first
question, respondents contend that their answers were not a general denial because,
as counsel emphasized in his oral argument, he was careful not to use the word
“generally’ but used the word “specifically’ in denying “each and every allegation
contained in each and every paragraph of the complaint.’ That in naive if not puerile
argument. A general denial does not become specific by merely calling it so, any more
than stone can become bread by applying the latter nomenclature to it.”
ADOLFO BENAVIDES vs. EDUARDO ALABASTRO
Facts:
Defendant Alabstro was ordered by the MTC to pay Ajax Intenational
Corporation the sum of 274.85, with interest at the rate of 12% per annum plus 20% of the
total amount due as attorney’s fees, and the costs of action.
Ajax assigned its rights to Benavides. Benavides demanded from Alabastre the
payment of the judgment rendered against him, and having failed to meet the
demand, Benavides commenced the present action.
Defendant answered the complaint denying its important allegations and
setting up certain affirmative defenses.
After plaintiff had asked for judgment on the pleadings, which the court
granted over defendant’s opposition, the court a quo rendered decision ordering
defendant to pay plaintiff.
Defendant, in his answer, states that, with regard to paragraph 1 of the
complaint, “he has no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth
of the rest of the allegations therein and therefore specifically denies the same,” and as
to the rest of the complaint, he further stated that “he has no knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraphs 2, 3,
4, 5 and 6 of the complaint and therefore specifically denies the same.” And as
affirmative defense, defendant stated that plaintiff’s claim has already been
extinguished and as such it cannot be the subject of a valid assignment because it has
not been revived before such assignment.
Issue: Whether or not court a quo erred in rendering decision merely on a motion for
judgment on the pleadings
Held:
Section 10, Rule 8, of our Rules of Court provides that “where the defendant is
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material
averment made in the complaint, he shall so state, and this shall have the effect of a
denial.”

It thus appears that judgment on the pleadings can only be rendered when
the pleading of the party against whom the motion is directed, be he the plaintiff or
defendant, does not tender any issue, or admits all the material allegations of the
pleading of the movant, otherwise judgment on the pleadings cannot be rendered.
Here, defendant’s answer tenders an issue, for it does not only deny the material
allegations of the complaint, but it sets up certain special and affirmative defenses. The
nature of such answer calls for presentation of evidence and, therefore, it is error to
render decision thereon without it.
MARIA ENCANACION CASTILLO, ELISEA GALVAN AND PATRONICIO GALVAN vs. JOSEFA
GALVAN et al
Facts:
The plaintiffs therein alleged that Paulino Galvan, during his lifetime, was the
registered owner of an undivided one-half (1/2) interest over two parcels of land. The
other undivided half is owned by his two daughters by a first marriage, herein
defendants Josefa Galvan and Natividad Galvan. On these lots, which are contiguous,
is built the family home. Paulino Galvan died and the plaintiffs, out of “delicadeza”
waited for the defendants to initiate the move for the settlement of his estate. The
plaintiffs became apprehensive, so that they began to go over the papers concerning
the properties of the decedent. They were surprised to find a deed of sale, signed by
the late Paulino Galvan and the plaintiff, Maria Encarnacion Castillo, whereby they had
purportedly sold for P500.00 the one-half undivided portion of Paulino Galvan over said
lots in favor of defendants. Wherefore, they prayed that the deed of sale be declared
null and void; that the plaintiffs be declared the owners of four-sixths (4/6) of the
undivided half share pertaining to Paulino Gaivan; that the defendants be ordered to
pay the amount of P1,500.00, as attorney’s fees; and to pay the costs of suit.
The defendants filed their answer with counterclaim wherein they interposed negative
and affirmative defenses. As their affirmative defense, the defendants claim that “they
are the absolute and exclusive owners of whole parcels of land described in the
complaint for having acquired the portions belonging to their late father Paulino Galvan
through legal and valid conveyance and this fact is known to the plaintiffs long before
the filing of the complaint.” But before the case was tried, the defendants filed an
amended answer with the corresponding motion to admit it, which amended answer
contained an allegation that “the action of plaintiffs is barred by the statute of
limitations.” Over plaintiffs’ objections, the trial court permitted the defendants to
amend their answer by adding the defense of statute of limitations.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that
the action is barred by the statute of limitations for the reason that the present action for
the annulment of the instrument; of sale is based upon fraud which should he brought
within four (4) years from the time of the discovery of the same in accordance with
Article 1391 of the Civil Code; The trial court sustained the defendants’ contention, and,
consequently, dismissed the complaint. MR was denied.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting the amended answer which
incorporated a defense of prescription not heretofore pleaded in the original answer
2. whether or not the trial court improperly dismissed the complaint on the ground of
prescription.
Held:
The plaintiffs have apparently ignored the rule that a party may amend his
pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served,
or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action
has not been placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within ten
(10) days after it is served. After the case is set for hearing, substantial amendments may
be made only upon leave of court. But such leave may be refused if it appears to the
court that the motion was made with intent to delay the action or that the cause of
action or defense is substantially altered. Here, leave to file an amended answer was
sought after the case had been set for trial but before the trial thereof, so that it is well
within the ambit of the rule aforementioned.
The allegations of the complaint show, however, that the plaintiffs’ action is to
declare void and inexistent the deed of sale executed by Paulino Galvan and
Encarnacion Castillo on August 3, 1955 in favor of Josefa and Natividad Galvan, upon
the grounds that (a) there is fraud in securing the signatures of the vendors in said deed
of sale; and (b) there was no consideration given at the time of the transaction. In other
words, the plaintiffs are seeking a judicial declaration that the deed of sale in question is
void ab initio, which action is imprescriptible. The trial court erred, therefore, in dismissing
the complaint for the reasons stated.
DELEBROS HOTEL CORPORATION vs. IAC, HILTON INTERNATIONAL COMPANY et al
Facts:
Delbros Hotel
Issue:
Held:
LEDESMA OVERSEAS SHIPPING CORPORATION vs. HON. CELSO AVELINO
Facts:
A compromise entered into between petitioner and private respondent is in
the form of a letter signed by Jaime L. Ledesma as Executive Vice-President of petitioner
addressed to private respondent. It was duly signed on behalf of private respondent by
its official, Romulo Robles by name. As admitted by it in its answer, such “agreement
between the [parties]” was furnished respondent Judge.
Moreover, such letter contained the following explicit affirmation that it was
intended as the answer: “In connection with the above case, please find enclosed
copy of the agreement between the plaintiff and ourselves. By copy of this letter, we
would advise that this is our Answer to the summons as stated above.
Nonetheless, private respondent did rely on the fact that “petitioner did not file
any responsive pleading and neither however did it pay the balance within the
stipulated period as stated.
After several incidents before respondent Judge, private respondent, filed a
motion for declaration of default. It was granted by respondent Judge in an order. It
was then allowed to present its evidence ex-parte, resulting in a decision, increasing its
liability to the much bigger amount, as noted at the outset. As likewise previously
mentioned, the motion under oath to set aside the decision by default and for new trial
proved futile. Hence this certiorari petition.
Issue:

Held:

Neither respondent Judge, therefore, much less private respondent, could very
well assert that no answer was filed by petitioner. The Rules of Court cannot be any
clearer. Only where there is failure by defendant to answer within the time specified
may a court, upon motion of the plaintiff and proof of such failure, “declare the
defendant in default.” It is to be admitted that counsel for petitioner, perhaps due to
inexperience, failed to file its answer in the proper form. Nonetheless, respondent Judge
ought to have been more cautious and prudent and ought to have refrained from
taking the step he did. Even private respondent, in the answer to this petition, admitted
as much, as evidenced by the portion quoted above. This palpable fact adds
reinforcement to the plea of petitioner that such order, improvidently and erroneously
granted, ought to have been set aside and petitioner as defendant in the suit before
respondent Judge allowed to present its evidence.