ELECTION AND CANVASS

ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B. Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar, seeking a
declaration that certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from
constitutional infirmity. Claiming that he has actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of this case in seeing
to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed the instant petition as a taxpayer
and as a lawyer.

ARGUMENTS:

Petitioner raises three principal questions for contention:

(1) That Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters who are immigrants or permanent residents in
other countries, by their mere act of executing an affidavit expressing their intention to return to the Philippines, violates
the residency requirement in Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution;

(2) That Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for national offices
and party list representatives, including the President and the Vice-President, violates the constitutional mandate under
Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution that the winning candidates for President and Vice-President shall be proclaimed as
winners only by Congress; and

(3) That Section 25 of the same law, allowing Congress (through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created in
the same section) to exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR) that the COMELEC shall promulgate, violates the independence of the COMELEC under Art. IX-A, Sec. 1 of the
Constitution.ioner cites the ruling of the Court in Caasi vs. Court of Appeals to support his claim. In that case, the Court
held that a green card holder immigrant to the United States is deemed to have abandoned his domicile and residence in
the Philippines.

Petitioner further argues that Section 1, Article V of the Constitution does not allow provisional registration or a promise
by a voter to perform a condition to be qualified to vote in a political exercise; that the legislature should not be allowed
to circumvent the requirement of the Constitution on the right of suffrage by providing a condition thereon which in effect
amends or alters the aforesaid residence requirement to qualify a Filipino abroad to vote. He claims that the right of
suffrage should not be granted to anyone who, on the date of the election, does not possess the qualifications provided
for by Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Is RA 9189 [Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003], valid & constitutional?

RULING: Section 18.5 and Section 25 are unconstitutional

HELD:

1) NO. Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 is not violative of Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.

2) YES. Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189, with respect only to the votes of the President and Vice-President, and not to the
votes of the Senators and party-list representatives, is violative of Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution.
3) YES. Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189, with respect only to the second sentence in its second paragraph allowing Congress
to exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the IRR that the COMELEC shall promulgate, is violative of
Art. IX-A, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.

2) Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 provides that the overseas absentee voter may vote for president, vice-president, senators,
and party-list representatives.

Section 18.5 of the same Act provides:

Sec. 18. On-Site Counting and Canvassing.—

18.5 The canvass of votes shall not cause the delay of the proclamation of a winning candidate if the outcome of the
election will not be affected by the results thereof. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Commission is empowered to order
the proclamation of winning candidates despite the fact that the scheduled election has not taken place in a particular
country or countries, if the holding of elections therein has been rendered impossible by events, factors and circumstances
peculiar to such country or countries, in which events, factors and circumstances are beyond the control or influence of the
Commission.

Petitioner claims that the provision of Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 empowering the COMELEC to order the proclamation
of winning candidates for President and Vice-President is unconstitutional and violative of the following provisions of
Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution:

Sec. 4.

The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each province or
city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass,
the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all the certificates in the
presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination of
the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.

The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an equal
and highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both
Houses of the Congress, voting separately.

The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.

-Indeed, the phrase, proclamation of winning candidates, in Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is far too sweeping that it
necessarily includes the proclamation of the winning candidates for the presidency and the vice-presidency, granting merit
to petitioner’s contention that said Section appears to be repugnant to Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution only insofar
as said Section totally disregarded the authority given to Congress by the Constitution to proclaim the winning candidates
for the positions of President and Vice-President.

Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to it or, as aptly stated by
petitioner, to encroach “on the power of Congress to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President and the power
to proclaim the winners for the said positions.”

3) Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189 created the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee (JCOC), as follows:

Sec. 25. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.—a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee is hereby created,
composed of the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Constitutional Amendments, Revision of Codes and Laws, and
seven (7) other Senators designated by the Senate President, and the Chairman of the House Committee on Suffrage and
Electoral Reforms, and seven (7) other Members of the House of Representatives designated by the Speaker of the House
of Representatives: Provided, that of the seven (7) members to be designated by each House of Congress, four (4) should
come from the majority and the remaining three (3) from the minority.

The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee shall have the power to monitor and evaluate the implementation of this
Act. It shall review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Commission.

All the parties, petitioner and respondents alike, are unanimous in claiming that Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189 is
unconstitutional. Thus, there is no actual issue forged on this question raised by petitioner. However, the Court finds it
expedient to expound on the role of Congress through the JCOC vis-à-vis the independence of the COMELEC as a
constitutional body, as aptly provided for under Art. IX-A, Sec. 1, which reads “Section 1. The Constitutional Commissions,
which shall be independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on
Audit.”

The ambit of legislative power under Article VI of the Constitution is circumscribed by other constitutional provisions, one
of which is the aforementioned provision on the independence of constitutional commissions. The Court has held that
“whatever may be the nature of the functions of the Commission on Elections, the fact is that the framers of the
Constitution wanted it to be independent from the other departments of the Government.”

The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to play a distinct and important part in our scheme of
government. In the discharge of its functions, it should not be hampered with restrictions that would be fully warranted
in the case of a less responsible organization. The Commission may err, so may this court also. It should be allowed
considerable latitude in devising means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which
it was created — free, orderly and honest elections. We may not agree fully with its choice of means, but unless these are
clearly illegal or constitute gross abuse of discretion, this court should not interfere. Politics is a practical matter, and
political questions must be dealt with realistically – not from the standpoint of pure theory. The Commission on Elections,
because of its fact-finding facilities, its contacts with political strategists, and its knowledge derived from actual experience
in dealing with political controversies, is in a peculiarly advantageous position to decide complex political questions.

The Court has no general powers of supervision over COMELEC which is an independent body “except those specifically
granted by the Constitution,” that is, to review its decisions, orders and rulings. In the same vein, it is not correct to hold
that because of its recognized extensive legislative power to enact election laws, Congress may intrude into the
independence of the COMELEC by exercising supervisory powers over its rule-making authority. In line with this, this Court
holds that Section 25 of R.A. 9189 is unconstitutional and must therefore be stricken off from the said law.

The petition was partly GRANTED. The following portions of R.A. No. 9189 are declared VOID for being
UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

17. a) The phrase in the first sentence of the first paragraph of Section 17.1, to wit: “subject to the approval of the
Joint Congressional Oversight Committee;”
18. b) The portion of the last paragraph of Section 17.1, to wit: “only upon review and approval of the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee;”
19. c) The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19, to wit: “The Implementing Rules and Regulations shall
be submitted to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue of this Act for prior approval;” and
20. d) The second sentence in the second paragraph of Section 25, to wit: “It shall review, revise, amend and approve
the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Commission” of the same law; for being repugnant
to Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution mandating the independence of constitutional commission, such as
COMELEC.

Pursuant to Section 30 of R.A. No. 9189, the rest of the provisions of said law continues to be in full force and
effect
B. RUY ELIAS LOPEZ V. SENATE
The petitioner seeks for a Petition for prohibition and mandamus seeking to nullify Section 13, Rule VIII of the Rules of the
Joint Public Session of Congress, creating a Joint Committee, which shall preliminarily canvass the votes of the candidates
for President and Vice-President during the May 10, 2004 elections.

Facts
(From the Puno and Davide Opinions):
May 10, 2004: The Philippines held a national election.
May 28, 2004: The Senate and the House in a joint session approved the Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress on
Canvassing the Votes Cast for Presidential and Vice-Presidential Candidates in the May 10, 2004 Elections.
June 2, 2004: Cong. Lopez filed this petition as well as an application for TRO.
June 4, 2004: The Court in a resolution denied the TRO application.

Issue:
W/N the creation of a Joint Committee on Canvassing constitutes grave abuse of discretion for being violative of Article
VII, Section 4 of the Constitution.

Held/Rationale (Resolution)
No. Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution expressly empowers Congress "to promulgate its rules for the canvassing of
the certificates."
The Court had previously ruled that it had no power to review the internal proceedings of Congress, unless there is a clear
violation of the Constitution
. The creation of the Joint Committee does not constitute grave abuse and cannot be said to have deprived petitioner and
the other members of Congress of their congressional prerogatives, because under the very Rules under attack, the
decisions and final report of the said Committee shall be subject to the approval of the joint session of both Houses of
Congress, voting separately
.
Better Explanation
(Puno Opinion):
The Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress on Canvassing the Votes Cast For Presidential and Vice-Presidential
Candidates in the May 10, 2004 Elections do not violate Article VII, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution.
The Constitution grants Congress the power to promulgate its own rules for the canvassing of election certificates. The
Rules enjoy the presumption of legality and the petitioner has miserably failed to overcome this presumption.

The purpose of the Joint Committee is spelled out in no uncertain terms in Rule VIII, Section 13, viz: "The Joint Committee
shall, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass,
preliminarily canvass
the votes of candidates for the offices of the President and Vice-President."
The preliminary work is performed by the Joint Committee by satisfying itself
—
(1) that each certificate of canvass was duly executed, signed and thumb marked by the Chairman and Members of the
provincial, city or district Board of Canvassers concerned; (2) that it contains the names of all the candidates for President
and Vice-President and their corresponding votes in words and figures; (3) that there exists no discrepancy in other
authentic copies of the certificate of canvass or discrepancy in the votes of any candidate in words and figures in the same
certificate
The Joint Committee will then submit
two kinds of reports to a joint public session of the Congress:
(1) the interim report which the Committee, in its discretion, may submit whenever there is a need for guidance or
direction from Congress.
(2) the final report containing the objections raised on certain certificates of canvass and the rulings of the Committee.
The rules then provided that “after the debates, the Joint Committee report and the accompanying
resolution have to be approved by majority of all the members of both Houses voting separately in the joint public session.
The President-elect and the Vice-President-elect shall then be
proclaimed through the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.”

The rulings of the Joint Committee reflected in its Report are merely recommendatory in nature. Its Report is yet to be
submitted to the joint public session of Congress for approval, each House voting separately. The constitutional canvassing
duty of Congress is therefore preserved and remains undiminished

Doctrine:
Congress may validly delegate the preliminary determination of the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of
canvass to a Joint Congressional Committee constituted under the Rules adopted by the Joint Session of Congress.

FACTS
The case is a petition for prohibition and mandamus seeking to nullify Section 13, Rule VIII of the Rules of the Joint
Public Session of Congress. It created a Joint Committee that would preliminary canvass the votes of the candidates for
president and vice-president in the May 2004 election.

ISSUE
WON the creation by Congress of the Joint Committee to canvass the votes for president and vice president in the 2004
elections is unconstitutional. (NO)

HELD “Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution expressly empowers Congress “to promulgate its rules for the
canvassing of the certificates.” In the exercise of this power, Congress may validly delegate the initial determination of
the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass to a Joint Congressional Committee, composed of
members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate
The creation of the Joint Committee does not constitute grave abuse and cannot be said to have deprived
petitioner and the other members of Congress of their congressional prerogatives, because under the very Rules under
attack, the decisions and final report of the said Committee shall be subject to the approval of the joint session of both
Houses of Congress, voting separately.”

C. PIMENTEL v. JOINT COMMITTEE OF CONGRESS

G.R. No. 163783, June 22, 2004
EN BANC

FACTS
Nature of Action: Petition for Prohibition
Petitioner:
1. Sen. Pimentel, Jr. seeks a judgment declaring null and void the continued existence of the Joint Committee of Congress
to determine the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass and preliminarily canvass the votes cast for
Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates in the May 10, 2004 elections following the ajournment of Congress sine die
on June 11, 2004.
2. He prays for the issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Joint Committee to cease and desist from conducting any
further proceedings pursuant to the Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress on Canvassing.
3. With the adjournment sine die on June 11, 2004 by the Twelfth Congress, all its pending matters and proceedings
terminate upon its expiration (citing Section 15, Art. VI of the Constitution).
Respondent:
1. The precedents set by the 1992 and 1998 Presidential Elections do not support the move to stop the ongoing canvassing
by the Joint Committee.

ISSUE Whether or not the continued existence of the Joint Committee of Congress to canvass the votes for President and
Vice-President upon its ajournment sine die is null and void.

HELD Supreme Court: The instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

1. The Petition has no basis under the Constitution.
2. The term of the present Twelfth Congress did not terminate and expire upon the ajournment sine die of the regular
session of both Houses on June 11, 2004. Section 15, Art. VI of the Constitution does not pertain to the term of Congress,
but to its regular annual legislative sessions.
3. The legislative functions of the Twelfth Congress may have come to a close upon the final ajournment of its regular
sessions on June 11, 2004, but this does not affect its non-legislative functions, such as being the National Board of
Canvassers.
4. The joint public session cannot ajourn sine die until it has accomplished its constitutionally mandated task.

D. FERNANDO POE VS ARROYO

FACTS: On June 24, 2004, Mrs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (GMA) was proclaimed as the duly elected President of the
Philippines and movie-actor Fernando Poe, Jr was the second-placer. Mr. FPJ filed an election protest before this Electoral
Tribunal and Mrs. GMA filed her Answer with Counter Protest.

Mr. FPJ died on December 14, 2004. Mr. FPJ’s counsel submitted to the Tribunal a ‘Manifestation with
Urgent Petition/Motion to Intervene as a Substitute for Deceased Protestant FPJ’ BY THE WIDOW, Mrs. Jesusa Sonora Poe
a.k.a. Susan Roces.

As movant/intervenor, Mrs. Poe claims that there is an urgent need for her to continue and substitute for
her late husband to ascertain the true and genuine will of the electorate in the interest of the Filipino people.

Mrs. GMA contends that under the Rule 14 of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, only the registered
candidates who obtained the 2nd and 3rd highest votes for the presidency may contest the election of the president. Mrs.
GMA also stresses that this Tribunal has no jurisdiction over actions of surviving spouses to ascertain the vote of the
electorate as the Tribunal has jurisdiction only over election protests and quo warranto cases.

Mrs. GMA, further asserts that the widow of a deceased candidate is not the proper party to replace the
deceased protestant since a public office is personal and not a property that passes on to the heirs. She points out that
the widow has no legal right to substitute for her husband in an election protest. Since no such right survives the husband,
considering that the right to file an election protest is personal and non-transmissible.

ISSUE: Whether or not a widow is allowed to substitute/intervene during the pending protest case.

RULING: The Presidential Electoral Tribunal is guided by its Rules, as well as the Rules of Court in a suppletory
manner. Considering the transcendental importance of the electoral contest involving the Presidency, a rush to judgment
is simply out of the question. Yet decide the matter we must, without further delay, to prevent popular unrest and avoid
further destabilization of government at the highest level.
Rule 14 of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal Rules provides:

Rule 14. Election Protest.–Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of the Philippines who
received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice-President, as
the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days
after the proclamation of the winner.

Stated above, the Rule effectively excludes the widow of a losing candidate.

PET Rules, however, does not have any rule on substitution nor intervention but it does allow for the
analogous and suppletory application of the Rules of Court, decisions of the Supreme Court, and the decisions of the
electoral tribunals. Hence Rule 19, section 1 of Rules of Court “ A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation
or in the success of either of the parties or an interest against both”

Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rules of Court allows substitution by a legal representative. This rule to an
election contest, the Court ruled that a public office is personal to the public officer and not a property transmissible to
the heirs upon death. Thus, the Court consistently rejected substitution by the widow or the heirs in election contests
where the protestant dies during the pending protest case.

However, this rule is not purely personal and exclusive. Hence, we have allowed substitution and
intervention but only by a real party in interest. A real party in interest is the party who would be benefited or injured by
the judgment and the party who is entitled to the avails of the suit. In the case, Mrs. Poe herself denies any claim to the
office of the President and will not directly benefit from the outcome. Thus, given the circumstances of the case, the
protestant’s widow is not a real party in interest to this election protest.

Mrs. Poe a.k.a. Susan Roces to intervene and substitute for the deceased protestant is DENIED for lack of merit.

E. ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL v. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

To foreclose all arguments of petitioner, we reiterate that the establishment of the PET simply constitutionalized
what was statutory before the 1987 Constitution. The experiential context of the PET in our country cannot be denied.

FACTS: Petitioner Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal, through a Motion for Reconsideration reiterates his arguments that Section
4, Article VII of the Constitution does not provide for the creation of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) and that the
PET violates Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution. In order to strengthen his position, petitioner cites the concurring
opinion of Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro in “Barok” C. Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 that the
Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a public office which cannot be created by the president, the power to do so being
lodged exclusively with Congress. Thus, petitioner submits that if the President, as head of the Executive Department,
cannot create the PTC, the Supreme Court, likewise, cannot create the PET in the absence of an act of legislature.

ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is Constitutional.

HELD: Motion for Reconsideration DENIED.

Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by the same Constitution is plenary. And under the doctrine of
necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution
to decide presidential and vice-presidential elections contests includes the means necessary to carry it into effect.

The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution which provides that the
power "shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law." Consistent with our
presidential system of government, the function of "dealing with the settlement of disputes, controversies or conflicts
involving rights, duties or prerogatives that are legally demandable and enforceable" is apportioned to courts of justice.
With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, judicial power was expanded to include "the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government." The power was expanded, but it remained absolute.

Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal is going to town under the misplaced assumption that the text of the provision itself
was the only basis for this Court to sustain the PET’s constitutionality.

The Court reiterates that the PET is authorized by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution
and as supported by the discussions of the Members of the Constitutional Commission, which drafted the present
Constitution.

The explicit reference by the framers of our Constitution to constitutionalizing what was merely statutory before
is not diluted by the absence of a phrase, line or word, mandating the Supreme Court to create a Presidential Electoral
Tribunal.

Suffice it to state that the Constitution, verbose as it already is, cannot contain the specific wording required by
petitioner in order for him to accept the constitutionality of the PET.

“The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterizes the resolution of electoral contests as
essentially an exercise of judicial power.

At the barangay and municipal levels, original and exclusive jurisdiction over election contests is vested in the
municipal or metropolitan trial courts and the regional trial courts, respectively.

At the higher levels - city, provincial, and regional, as well as congressional and senatorial - exclusive and original
jurisdiction is lodged in the COMELEC and in the House of Representatives and Senate Electoral Tribunals, which are not,
strictly and literally speaking, courts of law. Although not courts of law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve
election contests which involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial power, because of the explicit constitutional
empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House
Electoral Tribunals) of the Constitution. Besides, when the COMELEC, the HRET, and the SET decide election contests, their
decisions are still subject to judicial review - via a petition for certiorari filed by the proper party - if there is a showing that
the decision was rendered with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election
contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power. In the landmark case of Angara v. Electoral Commission, Justice
Jose P. Laurel enucleated that "it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which
to direct the course of government along constitutional channels." In fact, Angara pointed out that "[t]he Constitution is
a definition of the powers of government." And yet, at that time, the 1935 Constitution did not contain the expanded
definition of judicial power found in Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2 of the present Constitution.

With the explicit provision, the present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court, in conjunction with
latter's exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts, the task of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election
contests, with full authority in the exercise thereof. The power wielded by PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial power
allocated to courts of law, expressly provided in the Constitution. On the whole, the Constitution draws a thin, but,
nevertheless, distinct line between the PET and the Supreme Court.

If the logic of petitioner is to be followed, all Members of the Court, sitting in the Senate and House Electoral
Tribunals would violate the constitutional proscription found in Section 12, Article VIII. Surely, the petitioner will be among
the first to acknowledge that this is not so. The Constitution which, in Section 17, Article VI, explicitly provides that three
Supreme Court Justices shall sit in the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals, respectively, effectively exempts the Justices-
Members thereof from the prohibition in Section 12, Article VIII. In the same vein, it is the Constitution itself, in Section 4,
Article VII, which exempts the Members of the Court, constituting the PET, from the same prohibition.

We have previously declared that the PET is not simply an agency to which Members of the Court were designated.
Once again, the PET, as intended by the framers of the Constitution, is to be an institution independent, but not separate,
from the judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court. McCulloch v. State of Maryland proclaimed that "[a] power without
the means to use it, is a nullity." The vehicle for the exercise of this power, as intended by the Constitution and specifically
mentioned by the Constitutional Commissioners during the discussions on the grant of power to this Court, is the PET.
Thus, a microscopic view, like the petitioner's, should not constrict an absolute and constitutional grant of judicial power”

Finally, petitioner’s application of the Court’s decision in Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission to the present
case is an unmitigated quantum leap.

The decision therein held that the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) “finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of
the Constitution.” A plain reading of the constitutional provisions, i.e., last paragraph of Section 4 and Section 17, both of
Article VII on the Executive Branch, reveals that the two are differently worded and deal with separate powers of the
Executive and the Judicial Branches of government. And as previously adverted to, the basis for the constitution of the
PET was, in fact, mentioned in the deliberations of the Members of the Constitutional Commission during the drafting of
the present Constitution.